CAUSATION and SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION in LOCKE Patrick J
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Carolina Digital Repository CAUSATION AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION IN LOCKE Patrick J. Connolly A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy. Chapel Hill 2013 Approved by: Alan Nelson Robert Merrihew Adams Marilyn McCord Adams Andrew Janiak Tad M. Schmaltz ©2013 Patrick J. Connolly ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT PATRICK J. CONNOLLY: Causation and Scientific Explanation in Locke (Under the direction of Alan Nelson) This dissertation examines the topics of causation and scientific explanation in the philosophy of John Locke. The first half of the dissertation focuses on causation. Previous interpreters have assumed that Locke was offering a metaphysical theory of causation. I show that this was not Locke’s project. He was instead offering a psychological account of causation; he was attempting to account for our cognition of causal processes and the sorts of causal attributions and judgments we make. On my view, Locke thinks we understand causation as a relation between two powers. So I begin by examining Locke’s views on our ideas of power and relations. I show that Locke distinguishes between several different types of idea of power in the Essay. I then argue that by deploying these distinctions Locke can avoid the problems posed by his commentators. With respect to relations, I argue that Locke is interested in the psychology of relations; he seeks to explain relations as a mental comparison of ideas. I also argue, contra several recent interpreters, that Locke does not offer a metaphysical theory about external-world relations. Once we are furnished with an account of the ideas of power and relations, Locke’s psychological account of causation becomes surprisingly clear. In the latter half of the dissertation I turn to questions about causation in the physical world and to scientific explanation. I examine the topics of mechanism, superaddition, laws iii of nature, and the status of hypotheses in Locke’s thought. My general goal is to show that Locke’s views on natural processes and scientific explanation are governed by a certain form of epistemic humility. I argue that because of this epistemically humble approach Locke did not make any substantive claims about the nature of causation in the physical world. On my view, Locke was agnostic about how the process of superaddition was meant to work, did not believe laws of nature were causally efficacious, and only endorsed scientific hypotheses which respected the strict limits to human knowledge. iv To Mom and Dad, in deepest gratitude, for everything v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thanks go first and foremost to the members of my dissertation committee. Tad Schmaltz encouraged me to pursue early modern philosophy from a very early stage in my career. Andrew Janiak offered extensive feedback on earlier drafts and valuable insight into Locke’s scientific context. Marilyn Adams was always a model of both rigorous analytic thought and serious devotion to the history of philosophy. Bob Adams continually encouraged me to think both more broadly and more deeply than I would have otherwise. I am grateful to all of them. But the biggest thanks go to the chair of my committee, Alan Nelson. From the moment I arrived at UNC he proved to be an outstanding advisor; I hope this dissertation is worthy of his efforts. He will continue to serve as one of my role models long after I have left Chapel Hill. I have been very fortunate to be a member of the Philosophy Department at UNC. The community here is a model of collegiality and philosophical industry. I’d like to thank the other UNC graduate students working on early modern philosophy during my time here. I learned so much from Seth Bordner, Emily Kelahan, Matt Priselac, Cathay Liu, and Dan Layman. I also owe a huge debt of gratitude to Luke Elson; as a friend and fellow philosopher he has proved to be exemplary. Earlier drafts of several chapters were presented to audiences at UNC and other universities. I would like to thank the commentators and audiences for their generous and useful feedback. vi A number of funding sources made possible the completion of my graduate studies. The Philosophy Department at UNC provided the bulk of the financial support and also kindly assisted with conference travel costs. The Mellon Foundation provided funding to complete a paleography course at the Folger Shakespeare Library. UNC’s program in Medieval and Early Modern Studies awarded me a grant to conduct research in the Locke archives at Oxford. Finally, the UNC Graduate School awarded me a generous summer research fellowship which was very helpful at a late stage of the dissertation. A number of other institutions also provided support or resources for the work on this dissertation; I’m grateful to the libraries at UNC, Duke University, and Portland State University as well as to the Folger Shakespeare Library, the Bodleian Library, and the Leeds Library. Very special thanks go to Elanor Taylor. She has all the right philosophical values and has been a continuing source of both support and inspiration. And finally, I’d like to thank my parents, Jim and Coleen Connolly. Their love and support has been a constant in my life, and for that I am grateful beyond words. This dissertation is dedicated to them. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 1 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 2. ONE WAY OF INTERPRETING THE ESSAY ........................................................................... 3 2.1 Locke’s Goal: Describing the Human Understanding ............................................... 4 2.2 Locke’s Method: The Way of Ideas .......................................................................... 10 3. DOES LOCKE EVEN HAVE A THEORY OF CAUSATION? .................................................... 16 4. LOCKE’S ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION ................................................................................. 18 5. CAUSATION IN THE NATURAL WORLD? ........................................................................... 19 6. AN OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION ................................................................................ 22 2. LOCKE’S IDEAS OF POWER ...................................................................................... 25 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 25 2. WHY THE IDEA OF POWER MATTERS ............................................................................... 25 3. SIMPLE IDEAS AND COMPLEX IDEAS ................................................................................ 27 4. TWO CATEGORIES OF IDEAS OF POWER ........................................................................... 29 5. PUTTING THE DISTINCTION TO WORK .............................................................................. 33 5.1 The Simplicity Problem ............................................................................................ 34 5.2 Solving the Simplicity Problem................................................................................. 38 5.3 The Circularity Problem ........................................................................................... 39 5.4 Solving the Circularity Problem ............................................................................... 41 5.5 The Origin Problem .................................................................................................. 43 viii 5.6 Solving the Origin Problem ...................................................................................... 46 6. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES ............................................................................................ 51 6.1 Relative Simplicity .................................................................................................... 51 6.2 Taxonomic Neglect ................................................................................................... 53 7. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 59 3. A NEW APPROACH TO LOCKEAN RELATIONS .................................................. 60 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 60 2. RELATION-IDEAS AS MENTAL COMPARISONS.................................................................. 61 3. AN INITIAL OBJECTION .................................................................................................... 67 4. A METAPHYSICS OF RELATIONS? .................................................................................... 70 5. TWO OBJECTIONS ............................................................................................................ 81 5.1 Conceptualism .......................................................................................................... 82 5.2 Textual Objections .................................................................................................... 85 6. TWO CONSEQUENCES .....................................................................................................