Control Processes, Priority Management, and Affective Dynamics 590616Research-Article2015

EMR0010.1177/1754073915590616Emotion ReviewCarver Control Processes, Priority Management, and Affective Dynamics 590616research-article2015

Emotion Review Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 2015) 301–307 © The Author(s) 2015 ISSN 1754-0739 DOI: 10.1177/1754073915590616 Control Processes, Priority Management, and er.sagepub.com Affective Dynamics

Charles S. Carver Department of Psychology, University of Miami, USA

Abstract

Affective dynamics are discussed from the perspective of a view of origin and functions of affective valence based in control processes. This view posits that affect reflects the error signal of a feedback loop managing rate of progress at goal attainment or threat avoidance. Negative feelings signal doing poorly, demanding more effort. Positive feelings signal doing better than necessary, allowing coasting, which yields goal attainment without unnecessary resource expenditure. Given multiple simultaneous goals, these functions assist in moment-to-moment priority management, facilitating attainment of all.

Keywords affect, control processes, feedback, priority

To address affective dynamics requires a viewpoint on the origins of affect. This article summarizes a viewpoint in which two Desired or intended condition layers of feedback loops manage two aspects of behavior, jointly Comparison situating behavior in time as well as space. One of the layers is posited to be responsible for affect, the evaluative core of emotions. Such an arrangement would facilitate both attainment of single goals and the handling of a life space in which multiple Sensed condition Change in behavior goals compete for attention. These variations in goal pursuit (input function) (output function) would also yield a constantly changing profile of affects.

Effect on environment Feedback, Action, and Affect My starting point is the idea that behavior involves feedback Other influences loops (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973). In a discrepancy-reducing loop (Figure 1), existing conditions are Figure 1. Feedback loop. compared to a desired or intended condition (a goal). Detection of a difference (an “error”) yields adjustment of output, aimed at moving the current condition closer to the comparison value you move away from it. Discrepancy enlargement typically is (Powers, 1973). Put differently, action homes in on the goal. constrained by discrepancy-reducing processes. Thus, one can This is one way to construe approach behavior. often avoid a threat by approaching a safe zone, sometimes liter- There also exist loops that enlarge deviations from the com- ally (moving behind a barrier), sometimes figuratively (introduc- parison point rather than decrease them. One class of phenomena ing safe topics into a conversation to prevent a distressing one that seems to display this pattern is responses to threats or dan- from arising). gers. If you perceive a threat (an alligator nearby; an impending The idea that such feedback loops provide directionality social interaction that you fear will cause public embarrassment), (approach or avoidance of a comparison value) is a start, but it

Corresponding author: Charles S. Carver, Department of Psychology, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124-0751, USA. Email: [email protected]

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Desired or intended rate A to intended end Comparison a

Desired or intended end B Comparison b

Sensed state Change in behavior

Sensed rate Change in rate Effect on environment

Other influences

Figure 2. Two layers of feedback loops. Loop B monitors directionality—in this case, movement toward the desired end (Loop B is equivalent to Figure 1). Loop A monitors rate of progress toward the desired end. For efforts to avoid threats rather than approach incentives, “undesired” replaces “desired or intended” in Loop B.

Approach: and Scheier (1990, 1998, 2013) proposed that error signals in Doing well this loop are manifested subjectively as affect—positive or Elation, joy negative valence. A rate below the criterion yields negative affect. A rate high enough to exceed the criterion yields positive affect. If the rate is not distinguishable from the criterion, affect is neutral. Avoidance: Relief, Anxiety, Avoidance: In essence, the argument is that feelings with a positive Doing well calm fear Doing poorly valence mean you are doing better at something than you need to, and feelings with a negative valence mean you are doing worse than you need to (Carver & Scheier, 1998, Chapters 8 and 9). Evidence supporting the role of the velocity function in Anger, depression affect comes from several sources (reviewed by Carver & : Approach Scheier, 2013). Doing poorly In this view, an attempt to approach a goal may be accompa- Figure 3. Carver and Scheier’s (1998) view of two orthogonal dimensions nied by affect of either valence. That is, affect can be positive, of self-regulatory function (approach and avoidance) and examples of the neutral, or negative, depending on how well or poorly the action affects that can emerge from them. is going. As you do unexpectedly well at your effort to revise an article, you feel happier. As you struggle and fall behind in the revision efforts, you feel distress. Both feelings, however, per- does not yet involve affect. To address affect, Carver and Scheier tain to your approach effort. (1990, 1998, 2013) suggested that affect arises from a feedback loop that occurs simultaneously with, and in parallel to, the one guiding directionality (Figure 2). This second loop essentially Two Kinds of Behavior, Two Dimensions of checks on how well the first one is doing. Thus, the input for the Affect second loop is a representation of the rate of discrepancy reduction in the action system over time. Now consider avoidance. The view just outlined is not that pos- In this view, the input (sensed rate) by itself does not define itive feelings result from approach, but that positive feelings affect, because a given rate of progress can yield different affect result when an action system is making rapid progress doing in different circumstances. Rather, the input is compared to an what it is organized to do. There is no obvious reason why this acceptable or desired or intended rate (cf. Frijda, 1986, 1988), to principle should not also apply to systems that avoid. If it is check for conformity to it (Comparison A in Figure 2).1 Carver making sufficiently rapid progress at what it is organized to do,

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Affect Blissful Happy Frustrated Dejected quality: Eager Angry Sad Delighted Despondent

Extent of engagement or effort

Above Criterion Below

Figure 4. Hypothesized approach-related affects as a function of doing well versus doing poorly compared to a criterion velocity. The vertical dimension depicts the degree of behavioral engagement posited to be associated with affects at different degrees of departure from neutral. Based on Carver (2004). there should be positive affect. If it is doing poorly, there should from the criterion yields continued effort to maintain that rate be negative affect. (if slightly above it) or regain that rate (if slightly below it). Thus, the idea that two valences are possible for a given These two circumstances are associated with mild affect (pos- motivated behavior seems applicable to both approach and itive or negative, respectively) but not much variation in avoidance. Nonetheless, doing well at approach is not quite the engagement. same as doing well at avoiding threat. There may be differences Greater deviation below the criterion leads to increased between the two positives, and between the two negatives engagement, aimed at regaining the criterion rate, unless (as (Figure 3). Evidence indicates that approach efforts relate to noted before) things are going so badly that effort seems fruit- such positive affects as eagerness, excitement, and elation when less. The latter perception induces a shift from effort to disen- things are going well, but to such negative affects as frustration, gagement (a shift that may be gradual or abrupt, depending on anger, and sadness when they are not (Carver, 2004; Carver & circumstances; Carver & Scheier, 1998, 2013). Thus moderate Harmon-Jones, 2009; Higgins, 1996; Pettersson & Turkheimer, negative deviation yields increased engagement, but more 2013). Avoidance efforts relate to such positive affects as relief extreme negative deviation yields disengagement. and contentment when they are going well (Carver, 2009), and Greater deviation above the criterion also theoretically pro- such negative affects as fear, anxiety, and guilt when they are motes a reduction in engagement, for a different reason. This not. Of course, because approach and avoidance efforts can be deviation means outperforming the criterion. Recall, though, engaged simultaneously (e.g., avoiding a threat by approaching that affect is construed in this model as the error signal in a a safe zone), affective experiences can also be blended. feedback loop. Positive affect is subjectively pleasant (it does, This view resembles one proposed for different reasons by after all, mean doing better than necessary). But if this really is Rolls (1999, 2005). He identified emotions in terms of occur- a feedback loop, this high rate is not the intended condition. rence of reinforcers and punishers, and omission or termination There should be a tendency to return to the criterion rate. The of reinforcers and punishers: The occurrence of a punisher simplest way to do that is to ease up, “coast” a little (Carver, yields fear and the omission of a reinforcer yields frustration 2003; Izard, 1977). Effort slacks a little and the positive feeling and anger; the occurrence of a reinforcer yields elation and the begins to fade. omission of a punisher yields relief. Does positive affect (or making greater than expected pro- This view is dimensional in assuming a linearly varying gress) promote coasting? Louro, Pieters, and Zeelenberg (2007) property of system functioning (very well to very poorly). found that when people were relatively close to a goal, positive However, the affects that fall on that dimension of system func- feelings from surging ahead prompted decreased effort toward tioning do not themselves form a linear dimension (Figure 4). that goal and a shift of effort to an alternate goal. Another expe- Depression (when things are going very poorly) is not simply rience sampling study (Fulford, Johnson, Llabre, & Carver, more intense frustration (when things are going less poorly). 2010) similarly found that greater than expected progress The affects are nonlinear consequences of linear variation in toward a goal in one time block led to reduction in effort toward system functioning. Both anger and depression are potential that goal in the next block. consequences of approach going poorly. Which emerges This view predicts coasting in response to positive affect or depends on whether the goal seems lost or not (see also Rolls, greater than expected progress because of the nature of feed- 1999, 2005). back control, but there are also other reasons to propose such a Also noteworthy in Figure 4 are the shifts in behavioral tendency. One is that it is maladaptive to expend energy need- engagement that are postulated toward both extremes of the lessly (Brehm & Self, 1989; Gendolla & Richter, 2010; Nesse, rate dimension. Begin at the criterion rate. Deviating slightly 2000). Coasting prevents that.

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Another reason is that people have multiple concerns at any Priority Management as a Core Issue in Self- given time (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Carver, 2003; Carver & Regulation Scheier, 1998; Frijda, 1994). Given multiple concerns, people don’t optimize, but “satisfice” (Simon, 1953)—do a good- The idea that coasting helps people to deal with multiple con- enough job on each to deal with it satisfactorily. This permits cerns implicates positive affect in a very broad function: priority the person to handle many concerns adequately, rather than just management across time (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Shallice, one (see also Fitzsimons, Friesen, Orehek, & Kruglanski, 2009; 1978; Shin & Rosenbaum, 2002). This function, often over- Kumashiro, Rusbult, & Finkel, 2008). looked, deserves closer examination. Humans usually pursue A tendency to coast with respect to one goal would epito- many goals simultaneously, but only one has top priority at a mize satisficing regarding that goal. That is, reducing effort given moment. People attain their many goals by shifting among would prevent attaining the best possible outcome for that goal. them, changing over time which goal has the top priority. How A tendency to coast would also promote satisficing for a are those changes managed? broader array of goals. That is, if progress in one domain Many years ago Simon (1967) noted that although goals with exceeds need, a tendency to coast in that domain (satisficing) less than top priority are largely out of awareness, ongoing would make it easier to devote energy to another domain. This events still can be relevant to them. Sometimes events that occur would help ensure goal attainment in the other domain and, while pursuing the top-priority goal create problems for a lower ultimately, across multiple domains (for detail see Carver & priority goal. Indeed, the mere passing of time can create a prob- Scheier, 2013). lem for it, because passing of time can interfere with its attainment. If the lower priority goal is also important, an emerging problem for its attainment must be taken into account. If a threat Affect and Action Are Intertwined to that goal arises, a mechanism is needed for changing priori- This two-layered viewpoint implies a natural link between ties, so that the second goal replaces the first as focal. affect and action. If the input function of the affect loop is a sensed rate of progress in action, the output function must Affect and Reprioritization involve an attempt to change the rate of that action. Thus, the affect loop acts through the associated action loop. Simon (1967) proposed that emotions are calls for reprioritiza- Some changes in rate output are straightforward. If you are tion. He suggested that emotion with respect to a goal outside lagging behind and feel distress, you push harder to go faster awareness eventually induces people to interrupt what they are (Brehm & Self, 1989; Wright, 1996). Sometimes they are less doing and give the neglected goal a higher priority than it had. straightforward. Rates sometimes are determined by choices The stronger the emotion, the stronger the assertion that the among programs of action. For example, increasing your rate of unattended goal should have a higher priority. Simon did not progress on a work project may mean choosing to spend a week- address negative affect regarding a currently focal goal, but the end working on it rather than camping. Thus, adjustment in rate same principle seems to apply. In that case, negative affect is often translated into terms such as concentration, or allocation seems to be a call for an even greater investment of effort in that of time and effort. focal goal than is now being made. The idea of two feedback systems functioning in concert Simon’s analysis applies easily to negative feelings, in which with one another together—one controlling position, one con- a nonfocal goal demands a higher priority and intrudes on trolling velocity—permits the device in which they are embed- awareness. However, another way in which priority ordering ded to respond with both quickness and stability (Clark, 1996). can shift is that the currently focal goal can relinquish its place. This dual control thus confers adaptive advantage. Carver (2003) raised that possibility, suggesting that positive The interweaving of affect and action also has another feelings represent a cue to reduce the priority of the goal to side, which is critical to affective dynamics. The actions that which the feeling pertains. This seems consistent with the sense follow from the affects (or from the processes underlying the of Simon’s analysis, but suggests that the prioritizing function affects) also lead in most cases to reduction of the affects. of affect pertains to both valences. Positive affect regarding Thus, in a very basic sense, the affect system (in concert with avoidance (relief or tranquility) indicates that a threat has dissi- the action system) is self-regulating (cf. Campos, Frankel, & pated and can now assume a lower priority. Positive affect Camras, 2004). Though people also make voluntary efforts to regarding approach (happiness, joy) indicates that an incentive regulate emotions (Gross, 2007), the system does most of that is being attained, and that you could temporarily withdraw on its own. Indeed, if the affect system is highly responsive in effort from this goal, because you are doing so well. output, affect generally will never be intense, because devia- What follows if a currently focal goal falls in priority? This tions are countered before they become large (cf. Baumeister, situation is less directive than that of a nonfocal goal demanding Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007). There are, of course, indi- higher priority. What happens here depends partly on what else vidual differences in the rate at which affect returns to base- is waiting in line and whether the context has changed during line, which have been termed variations in affective inertia effort at the focal goal. Opportunities for incentives sometimes (e.g., Kuppens, Oravecz, & Tuerlinckx, 2010; Kuppens et al., appear unexpectedly, and people put aside their plans to take 2012). advantage of them (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979). It seems

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reasonable that people experiencing positive affect should be A number of theorists place affects on dimensions (e.g., most prone to shift goals at this point if something else needs Russell & Carroll, 1999, argued for bipolarity crossed by fixing or doing (regarding a next-in-line goal) or if an unantici- arousal; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999, and others, pated opportunity for foraging has appeared (cf. Kahn & Isen, argued for unipolar positive and negative activation). As noted 1993). earlier, the view described here also has a sort of dimensionality, On the other hand, sometimes neither of these conditions but one quite different from the others (see Carver & Scheier, exists. In such cases, no shift in goal would occur. That is, even 2013, for broader discussion). In particular, it assumes two with the downgrade in priority, the focal goal still has a higher bipolar dimensions, one linked to each core motivational ten- priority than the alternatives. Thus, positive feeling does not dency (approach and avoidance). require that there be a change in direction. It simply sets the Why does this difference matter? It matters because it has stage for such a change to be more likely. implications concerning what mechanism might underlie affect. For example, theories postulating two unipolar dimensions (e.g., Watson et al., 1999) appear to equate greater activation or Priority Management and Depressed Affect engagement of a motivational system to more affect of the One more important aspect of priority management is that valence they postulate as tied to that system. If the approach goals sometimes are unattainable. As Figure 4 indicates, suf- system actually relates to feelings of both valences, however (as ficient doubt about goal attainment is associated with sadness indeed it appears to), such a mechanism is not tenable. A con- and reduction of effort toward the goal. Does this contradict ceptual mechanism is needed that addresses both positive and Simon’s (1967) position that negative affect is a call for higher negative feelings within approach (and, separately, avoidance). priority? The mechanism described here does so. There is an important difference between two classes of A second issue concerns the “naturalness” of affects. The approach-related negative affects, which forces another elabo- viewpoint described here does not postulate “basic emotions,” ration of Simon’s thinking. Inadequate movement forward (or each evolved to solve an adaptation problem (Izard, 2007). Nor no movement, or movement backward) first yields frustration does it postulate social or psychological construction of emo- and anger. These feelings (or the mechanism that underlies tions from a set of ingredients (Barrett, 2006; Russell, 2003). them) prompt more effort, so as to overcome obstacles and Nonetheless, it does have some implications for the issues of enhance progress. This fits the priority management model of naturalness and distinctness. It postulates one sort of negativity Simon (1967). reflecting imminent punishment and another reflecting diffi- Sometimes, however, continued effort does not produce ade- culty moving toward an incentive. It postulates one sort of posi- quate movement forward. Indeed, sometimes movement for- tivity reflecting imminent reward and another reflecting ward is precluded because the goal is lost. When failure is avoidance of punishment. Thus, this view argues (for example) assured, the feelings are sadness, depression, grief, and hope- that frustration and fear are distinguished by their motivational lessness. Behaviorally, this is paralleled by disengagement from origins, not their construction. active effort toward the goal (Klinger, 1975). This view has very little nuance, but it can easily be joined to Despite reduction of effort, this goal may not immediately other views that provide nuance. Since incentives differ from assume a lower priority. People often ruminate about the source each other, it is likely that the affects associated with their attain- of dysphoria (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; ment or loss will have different overtones, sometimes very differ- Watkins, 2008). The rumination, which keeps that goal in con- ent. The same logic applies to threats. This view can be inserted sciousness, implies that it retains a relatively high priority. in place of “bad outcome” and “good outcome” in appraisal mod- Ceasing of rumination, which generally comes with time, sig- els, thereby adding to them (in part) the reminder that emotions nals that the goal’s priority has fallen and it can now be disre- arise during the flow of experiences, not just at the end. garded. Thus, feelings of depression also have a place in priority What this viewpoint adds to discussions of emotional experi- management, though their story is a complicated one. ence is an idea about the initial source of affect, which seems Certainly rumination is easier to fall into, and is sustained underspecified in many viewpoints. Surely attributions play a longer by some people than others (Koval, Pe, Meers, & role in subjective experience, but the valence they operate on Kuppens, 2013). This might be viewed as indicating that dys- must have a source. Certainly it is possible for affect to have phoria represents an attractor zone in an affective state space for sources other than perceptions pertaining to incentives and people vulnerable to depression (see Wichers, Wigman, & threats (Russell, 2003, pp. 154–155), but surely most affect does Myin-Germeys, 2015). It might also suggest that inability to derive from those sources. disengage is an important part of that vulnerability. Conclusion Issues This article describes a conception of the origin and functions of Space limitations preclude much theoretical comparison. affects. The overall picture is one in which multiple goal values However, a couple of points should be made about relations are under pursuit at any given time, juggled so that all the between this viewpoint and other prominent ideas. important ones receive attention at one time or another. Positive

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