Marines with Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, convoy light-armored vehicles across beach as Navy landing craft, air cushion with Assault Craft Unit 4, departs beach of Sierra del Retin, Spain, during Spanish Amphibious Bilateral Exercise 2014, February 24, 2014 (U.S. Marine Corps/Austin Hazard)
The Tao of Doctrine Contesting an Art of Operations
By G. Stephen Lauer
Pity the theory that conflicts with reason!
—Carl von Clausewitz
ccording to Army Doctrine space, and purpose.”1 With this defini- In contrast to ADP 3-0, however, Army Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified tion, the U.S. Army broke with both its Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, A Land Operations, “Operational prior doctrinal paradigm of an opera- Unified Land Operations, emphasizes art is the pursuit of strategic objec- tional level of war and the joint model the joint definition, acknowledging an tives, in whole or in part, through the in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint operational level: “Operational art is arrangement of tactical actions in time, Operations, of the three levels of war.2 applicable at all levels of war, not just to the operational level of war.”3 Thus, a contested delineation of operational art entered the cognitive space of schools Dr. G. Stephen Lauer is an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He is a retired U.S. Marine Corps Infantry Officer and served as the first Chief of Florida Domestic and commands throughout the Army. (Homeland) Security from 2001 to 2004. This article is not specifically about
118 Joint Doctrine / The Tao of Doctrine JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 whether there should or should not be limitations imposed by budgets, policy emergence. Seen in this light, doctrine, an operational level of war; rather, it is and politics, and strategic limitations. as the Tao itself, becomes understood as concerned with the concept of “doc- The external discourse involves explora- a living form, agile enough to flow and trine” and its relationship to history tion of its relationship with allies, but adjust to the demands of the complex, and theory in the context of an opera- more importantly with a presumed or adaptive system model that we teach is tional art. constructed antagonist. In essence, the character of modern warfare. Absent While definitions of operational art doctrine is the result of this discourse this understanding, and training to imple- appear in self-described doctrinal manu- applied to an institution’s perception of ment such, doctrine becomes a rigid als, do they describe, in fact, a doctrine of its own historical continuity in action, and stilted endeavor. It binds and blinds operational art? Can one prescribe art in pending its next engagement. Doctrinal the force to the requirement to flexibly doctrine? These questions lie at the heart manuals then anticipate the near future adapt its use—to be more correct than of the contest engendered by the dual and assume its usefulness in the future incorrect in the new environment, to measures changing the Army doctrinal environment. Since we cannot predict adapt immediately to the new context, definition of operational art and dropping the future, we anticipate at least a level and then to embrace and disseminate an the operational level of war, both within of utility that will suffice in planning as emergent consensus that allows for the a joint philosophical and doctrinal com- we assess a potential commitment. agility and responsiveness necessary to position that retains that level. The term Because of this future uncertainty, save American lives in battle. The need doctrine may be the most overused in doctrine presents the practitioner with for this agility becomes an embedded and the military lexicon.4 It can describe any the problem of anticipating and adapt- emergent purpose of institutions such as written manual of guidance for any size ing to the new environment in the most the School of Advanced Military Studies. force in either a training or combat envi- expeditious manner. This includes the This is the education of the art, the ronment. This article offers an approach possibility that what is “next,” requiring imagination, of the student. to make clear where the term doctrine can adaptation, may be so radically different Throughout On War, Carl von most effectively be located in relation to from the anticipation as to constitute a Clausewitz described these qualities as an art of operations within the framework crisis, requiring an essential rethinking necessary for a commander at any level, of the policy aim, allowing greater preci- of expected conditions.6 The options in but especially for those most senior offi- sion in its expression and clarifying its adaptation lie on a spectrum from the cers commanding a theater of operations, relationship to the larger concept of mili- need for minor procedural modifications for example.7 The use of the terms art tary ends, ways, and means—the context to a response to a fundamental surprise and judgment was intimately tied to the of strategy, operations, and tactics. and the recognition of the need for a nature of war and its conduct.8 Judgment new doctrinal paradigm. This demand was the end result of both an individual’s Anticipation, Adaptation, underscores the view that doctrine is pri- talent and his personal experience of Emergence marily authoritative as a means to provide war, or vicarious experience in the study The words anticipation, adaptation, a common historical understanding for of history in the development of an in- and emergence evoke a flow of move- the forces, the means, going into action formed intuition and the willingness to ment in experience, as in the concept of anew. Doctrine cannot extend beyond follow one’s path despite the distractions Tao, useful to describe both the purpose the anticipation of a near future because and uncertainty inherent in the clash of and evolution of doctrine.5 History the context of the approaching conflict or wills, driving our present understanding and theory bind the term doctrine in commitment environment, especially the of complexity in war.9 His understand- time as a statement of the institutional future opponent’s will, requires a nearly ing resonated with the philosophy of understanding of the current nature immediate adaptation of the doctrine to Immanuel Kant. It was the realm of the and form of warfare in the context of the new contextual circumstances. irrationality of genius: an internal and external discourse. The This adaptive response to the internal discourse starts from analysis of environment requires recognition, a Hence the concept of genius corresponds to the most recent employment of forces learning response, of the imperative what Kant sees as the crucial thing about and capabilities of the Army. Second, for emergence and change within the aesthetic taste, namely that it facilitates the dialogue anticipates a resonance new environment, at whatever level the play of one’s mental powers, increases with all other individual Services, as this is recognized. The old discourse the vitality that comes from the harmony well as with the conceptual joint force, crystallizes in time and space with the between imagination and understanding, including exploration of its results and engagement of an opposing will—the and invites one to linger before the beauti- effects by schools, in publications, and new external discourse—seeking to adapt ful. Genius is ultimately a manifestation within official and unofficial papers itself to the new situation. An emerging of this vivifying spirit for, as opposed to the and correspondence. Finally, this doctrine, concurrent with its dissemina- pedant’s rigid adherence to rules, genius interchange includes American societal tion through the force, enters again the exhibits a free sweep of invention and thus expectations and constraints, especially process of anticipation, adaptation, and originality that creates new models.10
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Lauer 119 instruction that follows from general theo- retical or technical knowledge. . . . Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically undog- matic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them. The dialectic of experience has its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowl- edge but in the openness to experience that is made possible by experience itself.12
The manifestation of the com- mander’s art lies, in doctrine, in the joint concept of a commander-centric philosophy of command and the U.S. Army mission command concept with its split between the art of command and the science of control.13 There are few concrete differences between the two concepts of command. The Army defines mission command as “the exercise of au- thority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”14 JP 3-0 describes mission command as “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and inde- pendently to accomplish the mission.”15 Nothing in these words denies the essence of the development of the art and judgment of the commander. Both include the admonition that control, rd st Marine mortarman assigned to 3 Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion “Wolfpack,” 1 Marine through synchronization, is immanent Division, during tactical training briefing during Integrated Training Exercise 2-16 at Marine Corps Air 16 Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, January 23, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Efren Lopez) in this dialogue. As both the art of command (commander-centric) and Thus, the development of judgment involves not merely applying the universal the science of control, synchronization, depended upon the openness of the indi- principle according to which it is judged, exist together, the opportunity exists for vidual to adapt: but co-determining, supplementing, and one to dominate the execution of any correcting that principle.11 operational structure. At what level of Judgment is necessary in order to make a command is a subordinate empowered to correct evaluation of the concrete instance. In the context of this presentation, break synchronization if he or she sees an . . . Every judgment about something in- the “principle” is the nature of doctrine: opportunity? tended in its concrete individuality (e.g., As operations become more complex the judgment required in a situation that Agility and flexibility of mind, then, at the granular, local level within a theater calls for action) is—strictly speaking—a became a product of one’s experience, one’s of operations, and especially in light of judgment about a special case. That means art: Experience stands in an ineluctable the tight control of rules of engagement nothing less than that judging the case opposition to knowledge and to the kind of inherent in our post–World War II wars
120 Joint Doctrine / The Tao of Doctrine JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 of limited aim, how much freedom can Figure. Overarching Theory of War: Human, Social, Political, a commander be allowed to make these Economic, and Technological Phenomenon nonsynchronous decisions? This is es- pecially so when a single judgment by a junior officer or enlisted leader may lead Theory of Warfare to significant political and policy risk, Encompasses what is possible to even if that decision was within the small apply in the current context unit leader’s understanding of the com- mander’s intent. Clausewitz noted that the more limited the political aim, the Realm of Ends: Why less effort demanded to achieve that aim, The Purpose—from and the less involved the population, the Policy to Emergent application of violence as the fundamental Strategy nature of the phenomenon of war appears Domain Realm of Ways: Philosophies more politically effected and derived, and How The Operational of War less military in its execution. Political and Philosophy—The Art policy risk17 dominates the concerns of the military instrument— Realm of Means: Application The Doctrines of How and with But the weaker the motives and the ten- the Forces what means for what Purpose sions, the less will the tendency of the military element, the tendency to violence, coincide with the directives of policy; the Educating the imagination as the more, therefore, must war be diverted from means to adapt the organization to the new/next warfighting environment—to its natural tendency, the greater is the know what to change—at any realm. distance between the political object and the aim of an ideal war, and the more does war seem to become political.18
Thus, in limited war, mission com- The commander, in effect, becomes I propose to paraphrase Clausewitz’s mand as a doctrine becomes ever more instrumental in preventing the recogni- use of the term realms and apply it to difficult to execute. Rules of engagement tion of changes in the new environment a description of the ends, ways, and in the 21st century reflect more directly and adaptation therein, relying on strict means in a discussion of doctrine, phi- the concerns of politics and policy, not execution of known doctrine and syn- losophy, and theory.21 With the model the use of violence to attain a political chronization to avoid errors in judgment. shown in the figure, we can more aim, limiting operational and tactical The clarification of the terms doctrine, accurately place the role and function flexibility.19 This is especially the case philosophy, and theory, then, may provide of doctrine in the realm of the means when the consequences of junior leader a way for senior commanders to arrive at as against the philosophy that guides decisions, or unfortunate or unexpected solutions permitting both the adaptation the art of operations in the realm of the soldier actions, resonate in negative policy necessary to save lives and the control ways. Each in turn relates to the realm impacts for the theater commander and necessary to achieve the policy aim. of the ends, wherein lies the policy aim. the policymaker. The location of operational art lies in Whereas the Tao of doctrine implies Placing Doctrine in Context the discourse between policy and the an inherent ability to adapt doctrine to If all things written in a green (or blue tactical means. It is from this discourse conditions in the new context, this same or black) manual are doctrine, how do that an emergent strategy appears. The doctrine, in its application in wars of lim- we distinguish and bring to clarity the purpose of this emergent strategy, then, ited aim, appears to have just the opposite concepts that underlie the new defini- is to achieve the aim of policy in the effect. If the commander of the joint tion of operational art and the end of application of the ways that ties the tac- force cannot survive junior leader devia- the operational level of warfare? As tical to the strategic in consonance with tions from synchronization, including the Clausewitz noted, a purpose of theory that policy. rules of engagement, adapting when and is to “clarify concepts that have become, Furthermore, we can see the rela- where he believes essential to the conduct as it were, confused and entangled.”20 tionship of “domains” whose Service of the mission and the protection of the To distinguish those things that are philosophies of warfare guide the doc- lives of soldiers, doctrinal adaptation doctrine from those that may more trines of the forces, as well as the true through judgment becomes problematic. succinctly be defined as philosophy, role of the joint philosophy of warfare
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Lauer 121 that attempts to bind the whole in terms especially when those tenets become President Franklin D. Roosevelt, such as of unified action, which again cannot substitutes for understanding the nature Army Chief of Staff General George C. be so prescriptive as to constitute a doc- of such expression by a commander. The Marshall, to determine the means neces- trine. The domains not associated with precepts that may be used to illustrate sary to carry the war onto the European a Service include the means associated the characteristics of art may only define continent, as well as the ways necessary with space and cyberspace and may include the nature of the canvas and the tools to achieve the strategy that emerged information as a human domain element. necessary for its creation. These are never to defeat the German war machine in Limiting the term doctrine to the realm sufficient to identify and restrict the na- northwest Europe.26 Admiral Chester of the means makes clear the distinction ture of the imagination employed by the Nimitz had the same responsibility in the that the word art implies a location in the commander in his manifestation of the Pacific theater of operations and a similar realm of ways and ends—the art of opera- art of command. relationship to policy with President tions lies in the ways the actions of the Roosevelt and Admiral Ernest King as means relate to the realm of ends—the An Operational Artist the Chief of Naval Operations.27 General why or purpose, through a military strat- Who is this operational artist? Current Douglas MacArthur met personally with egy, to which the means aim. Operational doctrine as written in ADP 3-0 states President Harry S. Truman in ongoing art, then, lies in the realm of ways, not that anyone can be doing this in any discourse to determine the aims and the the doctrinal frame for the manner and formation at any level of command.24 means necessary to the emergent strategy methods of the employment of the The figure, however, implies something determined to achieve those aims in the means—the inherent complex interaction entirely different—the operational Korean theater of operations.28 General at the tactical level that constitutes the artist is the person tasked with both the William Westmoreland met alike with flow of fires and movement, the art of authority and responsibility to decide President Lyndon Johnson and his chief battle maneuver in direct contact with an and order the ways in which the means civilian policy advisors such as Secretary enemy’s will during the engagement. will be employed, within the defined of Defense Robert McNamara also to In contrast, an operational art may policy aim. How do we identify this determine the policy aims and the means best find definition as a philosophy person in terms of modern warfare necessary for these aims through ways within a theory of war, a philosophical and experience? Who is the person deemed essential to accomplish the emer- understanding of a theory of warfare that given the authority to negotiate for the gent strategy in Vietnam.29 highlights the imagination of the com- means with which to achieve the policy At its most basic level, theory fails to mander in the determination of the ways aim? In the Afghanistan context, that explain and differentiate that which is in which to employ the means to achieve person would have been the joint task unclear if everyone (and everything done policy. If, as Clausewitz noted, art is an force commander (of the International at every level) is potentially an operational expression of talent and experience, then Security Assistance Force), the person artist. The mission, placement, and rules the ways cannot be limited by doctrine.22 who met with the Secretary of Defense of engagement provided to the tactical This fits an understanding in our times to obtain and clarify the war policy and means can only come from the person that Clausewitz’s definition of strategy as to coordinate that understanding with tasked with the determination of the ways the use of the engagement to achieve the and for the means available to him.25 In in which the means act to achieve policy. ends of policy fulfills a theoretical place- this location, defined by authority and It is in the theater of operations, where ment of operational art in that locus, the responsibility within a delimited theater the joint force commander is in discourse realm of the ways.23 of operations, lies the role that must with policy in the determination of the Using this model, a definition of allow and expect the adaptation of the means required to achieve policy aims, operational art emerges as a philosophy doctrine of the means to facilitate the that strategy emerges and operational art for the employment of the means to emergence of doctrine specific to the resides. achieve a strategic aim derived from, new environment. Thus, the location of and in concert with, a policy/political the art of operations in the realm of the Philosophy, Not Doctrine aim that provides its purpose and logic. ways drives the placement of an opera- To paraphrase Michael Howard, it is Operational art is an expression of the tional artist as the person charged with not simply a matter of not getting the imagination of the commander. It is ef- this role. doctrine too wrong at first contact in a fected as an understanding of the ways Examples of this placement abound new environment; it is the recognition in which to orchestrate the actions of in the history of theater of war com- that the doctrine of the means, by its the means—the forces that must act—to mands both during World War II and nature, will and must change once in achieve the policy aim in a warfare char- after. As the Supreme Allied Commander contact with a new environment.30 The acterized by uncertainty created by the of the European theater of operations, force must be capable of such anticipa- clash of wills with thinking, complex, General Dwight D. Eisenhower routinely tion and, through this understand- adaptive opponents. This art cannot interacted with policymakers. These ing, to immediately adapt, and then be defined by doctrinal lists of tenets, included military representatives of to embrace the emergence of a new
122 Joint Doctrine / The Tao of Doctrine JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Marines with 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion suspend from special-purpose insertion and extraction rope after being extracted from jungle during patrol at Jungle Warfare Training Center on Camp Gonsalves, Okinawa, Japan (U.S. Marine Corps/Mark W. Stroud) doctrine. This further underscores the military forces.” See Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, DC: The Joint Staff, 2010). Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint 5 These terms first arose in a conversation importance of the art inherent in the Staff, August 2011), I-13. Marine Corps and in the “hayloft” at the School of Advanced development and adaptation of the ways joint doctrine offer a similar construct of the Military Studies (SAMS) between the author, that are solely the responsibility of the operational level of war. Marine Corps doctrine Rick Herrera, and Kurt Taylor, a member of artist whose task lies in what we call the notes, “The operational level of war provides the SAMS Lyceum, from a question concerning operational art—a philosophy—not a the linkage between tactics and strategy. It the purpose and evolution of doctrine. Clari- is the discipline of conceiving, focusing, and fication of the relationships therein belongs to JFQ doctrine. exploiting a variety of tactical actions to realize discussions with Jeff Kubiak, Bob Tomlinson, a strategic aim. With that thought as our point and Chris Marsh, then also of the “hayloft.” of departure, this publication discusses the Mark Calhoun also provided a thoughtful Notes intermediate, operational level of war and the review of an early draft of this article. Here, military campaign which is the vehicle for orga- Tao means “The world . . . is the efficient cause 1 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) nizing tactical actions to achieve strategic objec- of itself. It is resolutely dynamic, autogenera- 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, tives.” See Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication tive, self-organizing, and in a real sense, alive. DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, (MCDP) 1-2, Campaigning (Washington, DC: . . . a “pathway” that can, in varying degrees, October 2011), available at
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Lauer 123 Senior Airman inspects parachutes on a C-130 Hercules aircraft during Red Flag–Alaska 14-3 at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, August 5, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Chad C. Strohmeyer) according to the precept of wu wei, or nonac- 15 JP 3-0, II-2. 27 Ibid., 288–289 (map), 305, 312, 367. tion. What is meant by this is not that people 16 ADP 3-0, 9, 13; JP 3-0, II-3. The Pacific Ocean Areas included the South- do nothing, but that action should be effortless 17 Alan C. Lamborn, “Theory and Politics west Pacific Area under Douglas MacArthur, and in harmony with the natural forces at work in World Politics,” International Studies Quar- within United States Strategic Direction, by in the universe. It is therefore ‘effortless doing,’ terly 41, no. 2 (June 1997), 191–197. structure under Admiral William Leahy “as or ‘acting without acting’ (wei wu wei).” See 18 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. titular head of the Joint Chiefs.” Christopher Marsh, Religion and the State in by O.J. Matthias Jolles (New York: Random 28 Max Hastings, The Korean War (New Russia and China: Suppression, Survival, and House, 1943), 17. York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 121–123. Revival (New York: Continuum, 2011), 152. 19 Emile Simpson, War from the Ground 29 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost 6 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the Viet- Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of (Sydney, Australia: Scribe Publications, 2013), nam War (Berkeley: University of California Chicago Press, 1996), 84; John Lewis Gaddis, 54–56, 74. Press, 1999), 234, 324; and H.R. McMaster, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map 20 Clausewitz, 132. Dereliction of Duty (New York: Harper Collins, the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 21 Ibid., 149. 1997), 244–245. 2002), 30–31. 22 Ibid., 146–147. 30 “I am tempted to declare that whatever 7 Clausewitz, 111, 146. 23 Ibid., 128. doctrine the Armed Forces are working on, 8 Ibid., 147–149. 24 “Operational art is not associated with a they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to 9 Ibid., 102. specific echelon or formation, nor is it exclusive declare that it does not matter that they have 10 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and to theater and joint force commanders. Instead, got it wrong. What does matter is their capac- Method, trans. and rev. Joel Weinsheimer and it applies to any formation that must effectively ity to get it right quickly when the moment Donald G. Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. (London: arrange multiple, tactical actions in time, space, arrives. It is the task of military science in an Continuum Publishing Group, 1989), 46. See and purpose to achieve a strategic objective, in age of peace to prevent the doctrine being too also Kant’s Critique of Judgment, 1790, Part I, whole or in part.” See ADP 3-0, 9. badly wrong.” See Michael Howard, “Military §46-49. 25 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Science in the Age of Peace,” RUSI Journal 11 Gadamer, 34–35. Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014), 119, no. 4 (March 1974), 4. 12 Ibid., 350. 344–358, 367–386. 13 ADP 3-0, 13. 26 Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory (New 14 Ibid., 6. York: Random House, 2013), 235–236.
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