THE SAYING AND THE DOING: A SURVEY OF SECURITY AND THEFT PREVENTION MEASURES IN U.S. ARCHIVES
by
ABIGAIL LEAB B.A., Columbia University, 1993
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARCHIVAL STUDIES
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
School of Library, Archival and Information Studies
We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
April 1998
© Abigail Leab, 1998 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.
-r^fmrcrrt of t- The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date h?C.\ <\/ l^g DE-6 (2/88) 11 Abstract Although the principles and model practices of archival security are well known in the United States having been codified by the Society of American Archivists in the 1970s, little is known about archives' actual policies and their implementation. This study attempts to determine whether there is a dichotomy between principles and practice in the area of archival security. Analysis of the genesis of the SAA Archival Security Program and of its components (including the Register of Lost or Stolen Materials, the newsletter, the consultancy service, the model legislation), especially Timothy Walch's standard setting 1977 manual, as well as other historical events such as the Oberlin Conference on Theft not only illuminate the ideal principles with which to compare practices, but also reveal the reactive nature of the field. Examination of related literature from 1977 to the present demonstrates both trends concerning the topic and the need to make it part of everyday archival functions rather than debating whether it is part of disaster planning or preservation. It also establishes the contributions to the topic of archival security made by such activists as Philip P. Mason, Timothy Walch, Gregor Trinkaus-Randall and Richard Strassberg. The results of a questionnaire focusing on handling of materials and patrons demonstrates the gulf between the real and the ideal in various types of archives and examines how lack of staffing, budget and knowledge contribute to this gap. Finally, methods and practices are suggested for improvement of security awareness and methods. The willingness of the SAA to take a leadership role and to update of the components of the original Archival Security Program using new technology (such as the Internet) to create a centralized source of Ill information for archivists struggling with balancing access and security is key. The work already started by the newly re-established SAA Security Roundtable needs to be built upon by the SAA's devoting financial and organizational support in order to make archival security a proactive and effective field. If that were to happen, the principles and the practice, the saying and the doing, could then become synonymous. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii List of Figures vi Acknowledgements vii CHAPTER I: Introduction 1 CHAPTER II:History& Analysis of Components 7 of Society of American Archivists's 1970s Archival Security Program CHAPTER III: Review of Literature 28 related toArchival Security from 1977-1998 Walch — The Foundation 28 Other Works of the late 1970s 35 Urgings to Action, A Prelude to Walch — 37 Pioneers of the late 1960s and early 1970s The 1980s: Transition 41 from Archival to "Library-and-Archival" Through Increased Library Interest and the Oberlin Conference Library, Archival, and Museum Compendiums of the 1980s 44 Security Literature in the 1980s: Library Literature 50 of Use to Archives and Archivists 1980s Archival Views of Security and its Proper Place 54 in Archival Functions The 1990s: Poised for a Renaissance — 61 Guidelines, Case Studies, and a Renewed Call to Action Reviewing the Literature: Issues to Explore 76 V CHAPTER IV : The Questionnaire: Design, 81 Implementation and Analysis of the Responses CHAPTER V: Conclusions and Recommendations 104 New Beginnings 107 Building a New Security Initiative 109 Permanent Security Committee 109 Establishing Links 110 Marking Ill Model Legislation 114 Archival Security Officers 115 Education and Advocacy 117 Professional Outreach 121 SAA Security Home Page 121 Funding 126 The Individual Archivist 127 Bibliography 129 Appendix I: The Questionnaire with Tabulated Responses 140 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Type of Institution 86 Figure 2: Archives and Theft Policies 88 Figure 3: Thefts by Type of Institution 89 Figure 4: Prosecutions of Thieves by Institutions 97 Figure 5: Recovery of Stolen Material by Institution 98 Vll ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Though in many cases the phrase "without the help of these individuals, this project would not be possible" is a cliche, in this case it's the absolute truth. Thanks are due first and foremost to the members of the Society of American Archivists's Manuscript Repository Section who kindly took the time to answer the questionnaire. Without them, this project really could not have gone ahead. Heartfelt thanks must also go to Edmund Berkeley, Jr., Philip P. Mason, Richard Strassberg, Timothy Walch, and Everett C. Wilkie, Jr., for the contribution of their wisdom and knowledge about security matters and history; to Troy Sturdivant and the powers-that-be at the SAA and J. Frank Cook (SAA Archivist) of the University of Wisconsin-Madison for their kindness and generosity; to Terry Eastwood guidance and even more patience; to Mary Sue Stephenson for her great assistance with SYSTAT® and her research methods class, without which the questionnaire could not have been created; and especially to my parents for their love, support and constructive criticism. 1 CHAPTER I Introduction Archival security is often regarded with the same lack of joy as paying taxes, an unpleasant duty to be thought about and discussed as little as possible. The lack of a large body of practical literature solely concerning the topic of archival security is ample evidence of this attitude. Archivists are guardians and gatekeepers, protecting and providing access to archival documents. To be able to provide access, an archivist must make sure that the documents remain safely in custody. Collections need to be protected to preserve their integrity. Security, therefore, should be an essential archival function and something very much on the minds of each archivist. As Richard Strassberg, Chair of the Society of American Archivists' (SAA) Security Roundtable, once said: "Security is like motherhood and apple pie— you can't be against it. You may not want to think about it but you can't be against it."1 What measures are archivists taking to secure their collections and prevent theft? Much is known about what should be done but comparatively little seems to be known about what actually is being done to protect collections and combat theft. The widespread knowledge about what security measures should be taken is chiefly the result of the SAA's dynamic pioneering in the 1970s. The SAA was able to create awareness of both the need for security and the methods by which it could be best achieved. The culmination of this initiative was its Archival Security Program, comprised of model legislation (or library laws 'Richard Strassberg, conversation with author, Ithaca, NY., 15 September 1997. 2 with teeth); a central reporting mechanism for theft in the form of the Register of Lost and Stolen Archival Materials; a consultancy service advising institutions without adequate security measures on how to improve or initially implement security; a newsletter giving the latest details on security technology, thefts and their aftermaths; and the crown jewel of the program, Timothy Walch's definitive 1977 manual Archives and Manuscripts: Security} Walch's brilliant yet basic manual spells out necessary policies, procedures and actions to be taken in order to prevent theft. Although the principles and model practices of archival security are (or should be) well known in the United States, having been codified by Walch for the SAA and recodified for the 1990s by Gregor Trinkaus-Randall in Protecting Your Collections: A Manual of Security, very little is known about the extent to which the policies and practices outlined in the literature have been implemented in archives. This work attempts to examine some current practices and measure them against the ideals set forth by the SAA. Does the real have any relation to the ideal? Or, are Walch's seminal guidelines as far removed from the achievable as Edmund Berkeley Jr.'s clever statement of his idea for the foolproof security system: Possibly the only perfect system for a manuscripts reading room would insist that a researcher strip to the skin, wear into the room a sheet furnished by the institution, use paper and pencil similarly provided to take his notes, use one piece of manuscript at a time, each one of which would be checked out and in individually, surrender all notes for inspection upon leaving the room, and submit to a body search when returning the sheet in the dressing room. 2 Timothy Walch, Archives and Manuscripts: Security (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 1977). 3 Any system less than this will involve a certain amount of risk for archivists and curators... ".3 This study begins by providing a backdrop and a sense of history by detailing both the origins and demise of the SAA security initiatives. Close analysis of each of the important components of the Archival Security Program will show just why this program was so innovative, important, and useful. The first chapter also delves into other historically important events that have influenced the area of archival security such as the Oberlin Conference on Theft and the impact of the celebrated thefts of James Shinn and Stephen Blumberg. Additional illumination will be shed upon the subject in the second chapter through a detailed literature review that not only demonstrates the importance of Timothy Walch's work but also reveals what trends have been most prominent as well as what issues have been ignored. Not only is this analysis a good way to gauge awareness and innovation in security matters in the field, but it also serves as the bridge from the 1970s to the present. The third chapter of this work presents new information on current practices. In an attempt to begin discovering the actual state of security in the modern archival community, a data-gathering questionnaire was designed with the main objective of finding out the extent to which Timothy Walch's manual and the literature that it has inspired has had an impact upon security practices in the areas of materials protection and patron use in American archives. By inducing the archivists of the study population to discuss their security policies, and the implementation of the stages contained in those policies, this questionnaire has been 3Edmund Berkeley, Jr., "Archival Security A Personal And Circumstantial View", Georgia Archive 4, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 13. 4 a means of discovering the extent of and reasons for any discrepancies between the ideal and the real anti-theft procedures and practices followed by archivists. Furthermore, many of the questions are based on suggestions put forth by Walch and his successors, and thus have provided a means of determining how familiar archivists are with the literature and its tenets. The questionnaire also has been used as an noninvasive way to gather information on actual thefts and their aftermaths. Additionally, this questionnaire has allowed the investigation of other factors which might affect the levels of security awareness and measures. Whether measures vary greatly in different types of archives or whether the existence of a written policy affects the incidence of theft in archives are the sorts of issues that are considered. Some of the questions attempt to discover what security knowledge gaps practicing archivists would like to have filled, and what matters are most troubling to them. Admittedly, the questionnaire could not cover all potential areas of interest related to archival security. There was no possible way to inquire about every detail of procedure without creating data- gathering instrument of overwhelming length. Thus, the focus was narrowed to two of the four main areas of archival security: materials protection and patron use. Building security (locks, other hardware, windows, etc.) is these days often not the province of the archivist, and so was not included. And the fourth area, internal security (theft by staff and related procedures) is a very important area but it is also the one which nobody likes to talk about at all. Including it here might have meant that the response rate would plummet to near-zero. Thus the questionnaire covers the important issues of materials 5 protection and patron use in some detail and broaches the subject of actual theft in a way that is not threatening. The population that has been chosen for this study is a section of the SAA. It seemed appropriate to choose such a group because it would reveal how many archivists actually implement the guidelines set forth by their association. It also seemed appropriate to limit the study population to the home country of that association. Having carefully reviewed possible SAA sections for study, Section 8, Manuscript Repositories, was chosen as the target group because of its diversity and because the commercial value represented in many manuscript repositories makes them attractive to thieves. The section cuts across the archival population and provides a random but wide-visioned look at SAA member archivists and their institutions. Another aspect of this questionnaire results that makes its results compelling is that they suggest the shape of the future. Not only has the survey allowed the comparison of ideal and real practice but it also makes clear what new initiatives are necessary to aid in implementing and updating the Society of American Archivists's Archival Security Program's model components in the 1990s. That is the focus of the final section of this work. Methods, practices and measures that could be implemented to improve both security and awareness of it are suggested. Certain truths are already clear. Finding a way to restimulate the interest of the archival community in this topic is crucial. So too is the modernizing and relinking of elements of the written work on security, model legislation, a consulting service, and a mechanism for reporting thefts created by archivists in the 1970s. 6 This study begins to fill a gap in the current literature— much has been written about what should be done, but little is known about what is being done, whether implementation of standard practice was effective, and how it could be made more so. That these areas are tackled in this work may indeed make it useful to other students of the subject and archivists in the field who have responsibility for security. If interest can be stirred up in the topic of archival security, particularly if the SAA could be convinced to renew its leadership role, it is possible that a major positive attitude shift towards security could come to pass. Perhaps, then, any gap between theory and practice could be closed. As Timothy Walch, author of Archives and Manuscripts: Security notes: "Advances in archival security will come only if the SAA or the AC A make it a priority. Sad to say, security will not become a priority until a number of institutions have suffered losses and others become concerned. We should be proactive on security — in fact, we are reactive."4 For now, the relation of the state of archival security in practice to that of archival security in theory may well be summed up by a quote from the French philosopher, Michel de Montaigne: "Saying is one thing, doing is another." One hopes that the time will come when action will become congruent with words and we will be able to say, with Montaigne, that "When doing and saying go together it is indeed a beautiful harmony; and I will not deny that words, when followed by deeds, are of greater authority and efficacy."5 4 Timothy Walch, "Theft," personal e-mail to author, 16 January 1998. 5 Michel de Montaigne, "Of Anger," in The Essays of Montaigne , trans, by E. J. Trechmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1946), 621. 7 CHAPTER H History and Analysis of Components of Society of American Archivists 1970s Archival Security Program "On June 15,1975, the SAA began a comprehensive security program"1 announced SAA Executive director Ann Morgan Campbell in the pages of The American Archivist. The key components of this archival security initiative were: the Register of Lost or Stolen Materials; a newsletter devoted to security; model legislation; and both a consultative service and the 1977 manual Archives & Manuscripts: Security, authored by the program's associate director, Timothy Walch. These components, then, included a centralized means of reporting thefts, a means of publicizing thefts, a means of dealing with thefts, and two means of promoting the prevention of thefts. The education of the archival community concerning security, prevention of further thefts, and publicizing those that had already happened were the goals of this program. However, as previously mentioned, the focus of this thesis is squarely upon whether or not what archivists actually do in terms of security coincides with what they are they should be doing. As Walch's manual is still the principal text on how archivists should handle archival security, it is necessary to look briefly at the context from which it sprang: the SAA's 1975 security initiative. 1Ann Morgan Campbell, "The Archival Security Program of the SAA," The American Archivist 38 (October 1975): 499. 8 Financially, the National Endowment for the Humanities was largely responsible for the existence of this program. It supplied a "$99,690 grant"2 for the period from 15 June 1975 to 15 September 1977 that funded most of the program. The grant proposal accepted by the NEH was an ambitious one with a large scope. It had six objectives: 1) an investigation of the scope of the problem; 2) a positive educational program to encourage reporting of thefts and assistance in the apprehension of criminals; 3) the establishment of a centralized registry of stolen or missing materials and the publication of a security newsletter; 4) the development of a consultant program; 5) the preparation of a security manual; and 6) the coordination of this program with other professional organizations.3 In the next few years, the program achieved all of these goals, though degrees of success and depth did vary, from roaring success to quiet and modest achievement. Curiously, the program ended in 1982. Though the fading of the effects of the notorious thefts which led to the initiative as well as memories of thefts becoming hazy in the minds of archivists could be used as a justification for the lapsing of the program, such a contention would be little more than an excuse. The SAA had devoted considerable time and money to put all the resources of the security initiative into place. Even if the attention of the SAA was drawn to other initiatives or issues, it seems odd that no care was given to at least the bare-bones maintenance of such an important, effective, and pioneering program. It remains unclear just 2Society of American Archivists, National Endowment for the Humanities Research Grant Application Summary Sheet, No Date [c. 1974-5], Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI. 3 Society of American Archivists, Archival Security Program Final Report. (Grant Period) (Amount of Grant), 21 January 1980, Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin—Madison, Madison, WI., 1. 9 why, after such hard, pioneering work, the SAA allowed the program to end. However, that is the end of the story, and it is always better to start at the beginning. The origins of the SAA Archival Security Program predate the grant proposal to the National Endowment for the Humanities by a decade. Just as the crimes of biblioklept extraordinaire James Shinn would convince the library world of the seriousness of the theft problem faced by their profession and would lead in 1982 to the groundwork for the Oberlin Conference on Theft, it was the earlier exploits of a master thief that led to the creation of the SAA Archival Security Program. The SAA initiatives in large measure were caused by Robert Bradford Murphy, his crime wave and the impact that spree had upon an archivist named Philip P. Mason. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Robert Bradford Murphy (also known as Samuel George Matz among other aliases) and his wife, Elizabeth Irene Murphy, proved to be frighteningly productive and effective thieves. Primarily he stole the books or manuscripts and she sold them to unsuspecting archives, dealers and small libraries. Not only was the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) actively seeking them- they were also wanted by the U. S. Post Office Department on numerous counts of mail fraud. They were accused of using "the mails to defraud persons in transactions involving collector items such as rare documents, coins, stamps, guns, etc."4 By the time of their arrest in Detroit on February 2, 1964, the Murphys had managed to obtain books and manuscripts from a dazzling array of institutions. As Philip P. Mason remembers: 4Donald W. Jackanicz, "Theft at the National Archives: The Murphy Case, 1962-1975," Library & Archival Security 10, no. 2 (1990): 26. 10 among the books and historical manuscripts recovered after their arrest were items identified as the property of institutions in Baltimore, Maryland; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Columbus, Ohio; Tampa, Florida; South Bend, Indiana; Louisville, Kentucky; New Orleans, Louisiana and other cities.5 It is no wonder that the Murphy case was considered by Donald W. Jackanicz and many others as "an archival cause celebre ... an example of archival thievery on a grand scale."6 The Murphys had even managed to victimize a well-staffed institution with a good budget and a sizable staff-- they had successfully "ripped off' the National Archives. In August 1962, Murphy began his assault on the National Archives by registering as a researcher. No proof of identity was required. His tactics were clever. By behaving rudely and eccentrically, he made himself so loathsome that "the staff avoided him"7, which left him free to pilfer. He also cunningly avoided using microfilmed versions of valuable documents by claiming that "poor eyesight made his use of microfilm impossible."8 He also insisted on seeing items in the central research room in the evenings, choosing a space that was harder to monitor at a time of day when there was minimal staff on hand. His disagreeably aggressive behavior meant that his wishes were met with at each turn. For a period of two or three weeks, Murphy thoroughly, easily and successfully stole at will from this treasure trove. As Jackanicz notes: theft was executed by a combination of surreptitious removal of records charged out to Robert Murphy, and in greater quantities of records ordered by others. Removed documents, investigators theorized, were concealed in...Murphy's briefcase or Elizabeth Murphy's purse.9 5Philip P. Mason "Archival Security: New Solutions to an Old Problem", The American Archivist (October 1975): 485. 6Jackanicz, "National Archives", 23. 7Mason, "New Solutions", 482. 8Jackanicz, "National Archives", 24. 9Jackanicz, "National Archives", 27. 11 It was early October 1962, nearly a month later, before the National Archives staff realized that something was very wrong. Documents were missing, including letters by "James Monroe ... Presidents John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, Millard Fillmore, John Tyler, James Buchanan, Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, U. S. Grant... and others. Other... well-known Americans ... were ... Stephen Decatur, Sam Colt"10 and many others. The National Archives contacted the FBI, and began its own investigation immediately. Like many other archives that had been victimized in the past, the National Archives kept silent about its losses, fearing harm to its reputation and, more importantly, fearing that Murphy might destroy the documents if news of the theft came out. It was over a year before the story was leaked to the press. In the meantime, the Murphys were on the road with their many children, stealing here and there before their capture in Detroit by the FBI. The agents were shocked by what the Murphys had in their possession: six suitcases ... containing historical documents, rare books, paintings, pamphlets, publications foreign currencies and coins ... [and] five days later, ten containers weighing 600 lbs., shipped from Detroit by the Murphys, were confiscated... these contained another cache of rare books and manuscripts."11 The Murphys were tried in the United States District Court in Detroit before Judge Thomas P. Thornton in June 1964; he sentenced them each to ten years in federal prison. Despite years of legal wrangling, both Murphys served their time, Elizabeth serving her full sentence, though Robert Murphy "was manditorily released upon accrued good time credited towards his sentence"12 in 1970. The National Archives eventually retrieved its property, a 10Mason, "New Solutions", 483. nJackanicz, "National Archives", 28. 12Jackanicz, "National Archives", 34. 12 considerable time after "Robert H. Bahmer... Deputy Archivist of the United States ... testified that 210 documents submitted as evidence had definitely been identified as records belonging to the National Archives."13 The Murphy case was highly significant as a warning that thought and effort had to be given to devising more effective methods (or, in some cases, any methods at all) of archival security. If a large-scale and resource- rich institution such as the National Archives was vulnerable, then any and all archives were potential targets. Something had to be done. These were the sorts of thoughts that were swirling around in the brain of Philip P. Mason, labor archivist at Wayne State University and later Secretary of the SAA. Mason became involved with the Murphy case just after the confiscation of the Murphys's ill-gotten gains. Mason volunteered his services to the FBI field office in Detroit for six months (as did some other archivists and librarians), to attempt to identify the stolen materials and their origins. According to Mason, it was this involvement that awakened his interest in security and made him realize the extent of the problem of archival theft: "The Murphy case made me aware of the National significance of the issue of theft. Through this case, and when I accessed the FBI records on other cases, I realized how enormous and widespread the problem was."14 Along with Edmund Berkeley, Jr., John C. Broderick, John M. Kinney and Clyde C. Walton, Mason became a member of an influential Advisory Committee for the SAA Archival Security Program. It took considerable time and effort and lobbying to convince others of the need to do something about the problem of archival security, a topic then 13Jackanicz, "National Archives", 30. 14Philip P. Mason, telephone conversation with author, 16 October 1997. 13 spoken about in hushed tones if at all. To publicly address a need for security would mean admitting that archives were vulnerable to theft. With much perseverance Mason finally, and in conjunction with the SAA Council, "wrote the proposal"15 in 1974 for the grant which Executive Director Ann Morgan Campbell applied for from the National Endowment for the Humanities. Quite a few important people at the SAA were involved in this grant proposal. The grant application bears the signature of the SAA's then president James B. Rhoads (who had written a bold and prophetic article on archival theft in 1966) and Executive Director Ann Morgan Campbell is named as principal investigator on the form. Timothy Walch is another investigator named. So much of the actual work and planning fell to this man, hired fresh from a Ph.D. in history and work in the University Archives at Northwestern University.16 However, Mason is also listed on the form as having had much contact with the NEH about the project. His interest and perseverance helped lead the way on this project. Therefore, it was out of something horrendous (the Murphy case) that something wonderful came, sort of in the way that hideous, awful and smelly fertilizer can cause huge, beautiful flowers to bloom. However, to extend the garden metaphor, not every section of the garden blossomed at the same time. The first component of the program to be completed was the Register of Lost or Stolen Archival Materials in the spring of 1976. The purpose of the bimonthly Register was to "publicize archival items missing from ... collections."17 The emphasis of the 15Mason, telephone conversation. 16Timothy Walch, "Theft", personal e-mail to author, 15 January 1998. 17Timothy Walch, Archives and Manuscripts: Security (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 1977), 21. 14 Register was to be upon one-of-a-kind materials (such as manuscripts) rather than printed materials or mass-produced materials such as photos or books. Edmund Berkeley, Jr., of the University of Virginia, who wrote quite a few early and important articles on archival security, explained that the "most interesting and immediately useful to professionals, dealers and collectors alike is the register ... which will be operated from the Society's headquarters in Chicago."18 The Register was not only a way of breaking the silence that surrounded many thefts, but also a method of preventing one of Elizabeth Irene Murphy's favorite activities, the sale of stolen archival material. Dealers and archives would be able to check to determine whether an article offered to them was coming from a legitimate source or was pilfered goods. As the SAA proposal itself noted: "according to informed public sources, the existence of such a Registry will discourage theft in some cases and will reduce the involvement of dealers in the resale of stolen property."19 The Register was simple to use. To include material in the Register, a person needed only to send in a form (provided by the SAA) describing the missing material. Any dealer or archives wishing to inquire whether a document offered them was stolen needed only to call or write the SAA office. If an archivist had registered a document as stolen, the institution and the archivist could remain anonymous so as not to bring on negative publicity. If a dealer later inquired about a document received or offered to him or her for sale that an archivist had registered as having been stolen, the archivist would be given the name and 18Edmund Berkeley Jr., "Archivists and Thieves," Manuscripts 28, no. 3 (Summer 1976): 207. 19Society of American Archivists, Archival Security Program-Society of American Archivists, No Date [c.1975], Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, 5. 15 address of the dealer making the inquiry. Thus the archivist could contact the dealer privately, giving them both a measure of anonymity and allowing them to work the return of the document on their own. Due to the funding by the NEH, these services were both provided free of charge. This last statement illustrates just why this program was so dynamic and innovative: suddenly there was a free and easily accessible source of nationwide information about lost and stolen material. To augment the Register, a bimonthly archival security newsletter was created. It was a two-page supplement to the SAA Newsletter which detailed thefts and prosecutions and other matters related to the Register. The security newsletter was planned as a publication devoted entirely to matters of archival security, including theft reports, descriptions of materials stolen, and details about trials of apprehended thieves. It was hoped that the newsletter would generate further awareness by giving attention and publicity to the problem of theft, serving both as a preventative and recovery mechanism simultaneously: For example ... a Newsletter ... might include an announcement that several archives in the Mid-west have reported that all of their Orestes Bronson letters are missing or stolen. Thus, other archives which have Bronson letters would be advised to check their holdings and be on the lookout for researchers requesting collections containing such material."20 Until its demise in 1982, the Register was a successful program. One justification for the cessation of the Register was the creation of the not-for-profit computer database Bookline Alert Missing Books and Manuscripts (BAMBAM). Abashed at being informed by a librarian at the University of California that their publication was being used as a shopping guide by rare-book and manuscript thieves, the editors of American Book Prices Current 20Society of American Archivists, Archival Security Program-Society of American Archivists NEH proposal, No Date[c. 1974-5], Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI., 7. 16 sought some corrective through the creation of BAMBAM in 1981. This online database was truly a revolutionary step in technological developments to fight theft and loss. It provided a central and convenient place to quickly report thefts: Subscribers, be they librarians, booksellers, or collectors, can notify the world of a theft, almost instantly by telephoning BAMBAM or by typing in a description of the lost item on their own computer terminals. Should a suspicious item be offered for sale, booksellers or collectors can find out if it has been stolen by the same means.21 Unfortunately, the existence of the database caused the Executive Director of the SAA, Ann Morgan Campbell, to shut down the Register. As she then explained, "SAA feels that the archival profession is best served by one national system for reporting stolen and missing items. BAMBAM's use of computers, which allows up-to-the-minute accuracy, seems to be the best approach."22 It is true, however, that turning over the Register's records to BAMBAM allowed the SAA to close down an expensive and time-consuming program. The loss of the Register was actually quite a blow. Unlike European countries, the USA had no central reporting system other than the one established by the SAA. For 13 years this work was carried on by BAMBAM. One of the more interesting aspects of the history of BAMBAM was that it was meant to be a stopgap measure and a way to shame government bodies into setting up some sort of national mechanism. Unfortunately, despite the continued existence of BAMBAM as a free consultative service, the database shut down in 1994 due to a seeming lack of interest and unwillingness of any government agency to get involved and take over.23 No governmental body ever assumed responsibility, though the FBI 21Katharine Kyes Leab, "Cases on File: The Disappearing Books," Alfred Hitchcock's Mystery Magazine 27, no. 10 (September 1982): 57. 22Ann Morgan Campbell, SAA circular letter, 2 November 1981, BAMBAM Archives, Washington, CT. 23.BAMBAM, "Historical Notes, 1981-95," BAMBAM Archives, Washington, CT. 17 made some weak, preliminary attempts. The result leaves a gaping void where two forms of national registration of theft, the SAA Register and BAMBAM, used to be. Another component of the SAA initiative was model legislation. At the time of the initiative in 1975, there was a huge and powerful change in library legislation taking place known as the Virginia Library Act. It was that piece of innovative legislation that would soon serve as the basis for the model legislation drawn up by the legal counsel of the SAA Archival Security Program, Alex Ladenson. It seems important to justify why the emphasis here seems to be on library legislation. In most states the legislation that is the closest related to archival theft and security, is in fact library by name, legislators not truly having thought out the distinction. This situation is more charitably explained by Ladenson: "This is understandable, not only because there exists a close relationship between archives and libraries, but also because in many jurisdictions, the state library serves as the state archival agency." 24 The Virginia Library Act sprang from a series of thefts in Virginia, including one from The University of Virginia where Edmund Berkeley, Jr., was serving as Curator of Manuscripts and University Archivist. Berkeley became interested in archival security after a large and important theft took place at Virginia. At his suggestion, the legal adviser to the University of Virginia was persuaded to look over the legal code of the State of Virginia to see what laws might apply to libraries. The result was the revelation that there were "no applicable laws in the Commonwealth ... [which] offered to librarians and archivists the protection granted to merchants detaining someone detected of shoplifting. The university 24Alex Ladenson, "The Law Relating to Library and Archival Security" Draft, No Date, Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WL, 1. 18 attorney immediately drafted legislation to cover this situation." The draft evolved into a bill and became a state law in 1975. Looking at the law, two major improvements leap out. The first is a broadening and modernizing of the definition of library materials so that more modern forms of library material like audiovisual materials and electronic data were covered. However, the most powerful and innovative aspect of this law is the legal protection that it gives to archivists and librarians to take action in a case of suspected theft with confidence. The Virginia Library Act contains provisions related to shoplifting statutes that makes detention of suspected thieves much easier. Any concealment of library property while on its premises would be considered "prima facie evidence of intent to commit larceny thereof."26 Additionally, the Act makes provisions to protect library or archival employees should they detain a suspected thief: It "declares that an employee of an archives or library shall not be subject to civil prosecution for the detention or false arrest of a patron under special circumstances."27 In other words, an archivist would be able to detain a suspect for questioning without worry of a lawsuit, so long as he or she had probable cause. These were new and helpful concepts that gave a lot of strength and aid to archival staffs- in Virginia, at least, they could act without fear. The model legislation, as it appeared in Timothy Walch's 1977 manual Archives and Manuscripts: Security, is closely related to and based partially upon the Virginia Library Act, along with "the shoplifting statutes that have been enacted in one form or another by 25Berkeley, "Archival Security", 16. 26Edmund Berkeley Jr., "Code of Virginia Revised to Benefit Librarians and Archivists", Virginia Librarian 31 (May 1975): 19. 27Walch, Archives, 19. 19 forty-four states." The assumption behind the creation of this legislation was that librarians and archivists would make their state governments and representatives aware of this legislation and would lobby for its adoption. This effort did enjoy some success: during the grant period, legislation addressing the crime of library and archives theft has been passed in Ohio, Mississippi, California and Iowa (?). The Society of American Archivists and ... Alex Ladenson played a large role in passage of these bills, through letter-writing campaigns and the drafting of a model law.29 When Alex Ladenson was hired as counsel for the SAA in December of 1975, this creation of model legislation was unforeseen. It was expected merely that his "main responsibilities would be advising the staff on legal questions pertaining to program forms and publications, researching the state and federal laws pertaining to the theft of manuscripts, and, perhaps, recommending improved state codes."30 However, his research did lead him to make recommendations for a model law. The SAA model law, like the Virginia Library Act, seeks to "provide libraries and their employees and agents with additional legal protection to insure greater security for their collections."31 It also contains a section on the presumption of guilt due to concealment of library property. Once again, this is accomplished by giving librarians and archivists the Alex Ladenson to Miss Toby Fishbein, 9 May 1977, Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI. 29Society of American Archivists, Society of American Archivist Archival Security Program Final Report (Grant Period) (Amount of Grant), 21 January 1980, Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI., 3. 30Ann Morgan Campbell to Dr. Alex Ladenson, 2 December 1975, Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin—Madison, Madison, WI. 3'Alex Ladenson, "A Model Law Relating to Library Theft" Draft, 10 November 1976, Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin-Madison, WI., 1. 20 power to presume that concealment of library or archival property can be taken as being equivalent to having the intent to steal that property. The model law also provides a section exempting library (or archival) employees from either civil or criminal liability (such as lawsuits for unlawful detention or assault or slander) if they act due to probable cause and if they "conduct an investigation in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable length of time to determine whether such person has unlawfully concealed or removed a book or other library materials."32 As for what constituted "library materials", the definition is as vast and inclusive as that of the Virginia Library Act. Every possible article or portion of an article that that could conceivably be found in a collection held by a library, archives, or cultural institution such as a museum or a historical society at that time is covered, including: any book, plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting, drawing, map, newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, broadside, manuscript, document, letter, public record, microform, sound recording, audiovisual materials in any format, magnetic or other tapes, electronic data processing records, artifacts, or other documentary, written or printed materials regardless of physical form or characteristics, belonging to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of the following: (1) any public library; (2) any library of an educational, historical or eleemosynary institution, organization or society; (3) any museum; ... [and]... any repository of public records.33 Aside from the noticeable and undesirable lack of the word "archives", this is an inclusive definition, leaving very little room for maneuver on the part of any would-be thief. It is a tremendous improvement over earlier library laws, which merely made the mutilation or failure to return of materials misdemeanors. 32Walch, Archives, 26. 33 Alex Ladeson, "Model Law", 10 November 1976, Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin—Madison, Madison, WL, 3. 21 The other aspects of this model law, unique to it, are two areas of flexibility that make it adaptable to any state's requirements. The first is a section on penalties, which is left blank in order that each state may assign penalties in accordance to its existing policy. The second is a section noting that, should this model law be adapted by any state, it would be additional or supplemental to any other previously existing laws covering library crime in that state. By the fall of 1976, complementing the Register and the model legislation, SAA added a third part of its security program. It established a security consultant service to aid any archives that might need expert advice relating to security. The program began with a pilot security survey at the University of California at Los Angeles which resulted in a manual for the consultants that was set up, operated and produced by the tireless and dedicated Timothy Walch. Among the areas for which the SAA would provide experts were "security systems, internal archival procedures ... and ... apprehension of suspected thieves".34 Any interested institution could apply to the SAA Archival Security Program. In turn, the SAA would suggest consultants and help set up their consultant's visit to the institution in question. This was not a free service, but a generous and effective one in which the members of the Archival Security Committee (along with others appointed by that committee) served as consultants. Unfortunately, this service, along with the rest of the program, ceased to exist in 1982. The most enduring component of the SAA security initiatives is Timothy Walch's 1977 SAA publication, Archives and Manuscripts: Security. Ironically, while the archival 34Society of American Archivists, Archival Security Program-Society of American Archivists, No Date [c. 1975], Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI., 9. 22 community had begun its active Archival Security Program a full six years before the library community's first major initiative, the Oberlin Conference on Theft, but by the time that conference actually met, only one element of the SAA program still existed: the manual. The rest of the SAA program had been shut down, supposedly for reasons financial. As Albin Wagner has noted, the program ended "due to the expense of the program and federal cuts in funding for NEH and similar programs."35 Twice, one-year extensions of NEH grant number RC-22930-75-510 were given and the grant period was stretched out again until June 15, 1980.36 Then, as the funds dwindled and archivists became more convinced that their archives would not be plundered, the program faded away. As Timothy Walch himself noted "when the funds ran out... the program began to diminish.... In addition, I think many archivists find it hard to believe that their collections would ever be looted and therefore don't consider security to be a great concern."37 Despite the lack of funds and seeming lack of interest, the archival community has been fortunate in that the initiative left a lasting product that can and does still aid them. Thankfully, Walch's vision and hard work have provided the archival community with the manual, which still exists to offer guidance. However, the remarkableness of the manual's very existence must be made clear. The publication of the SAA-sanctioned Archives and Manuscripts: Security showed that the archival community was finally ready to treat security as a serious and important subject, as 35Albin Wagner, "Archival Security and Insecurity," Colorado Libraries (September 1985): 12. 36David J. Wallace (Grants Officer, National Endowment for the Humanities) to Ann Morgan Campbell, 6 February 1980, Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin—Madison, Madison, WI. "Timothy Walch, "Theft", personal e-mail to author, 15 January 1998. 23 well as to admit openly that archival theft was a indeed a serious problem. As Donald Jackanicz noted: "By the ... appearance of the Walch volume, security has been given equal billing with such traditional archival fields as appraisal, arrangement, and description."38 Finally, the recognition of the problem of theft and the need to act and prevent was being recognized for the archival community. The Murphy crimes and their aftermath illustrate one important but unfortunate fact about security measures in both the archival and library fields. Most of the major innovations and amendments in the field of archival and library security seem to be reactions to the devastating sprees of master thieves. Both archival and library security are reactive fields, when they should be a preventive and proactive ones. Despite the fact that the wide concern over library security blossomed over half a decade later than the SAA's security initiative, the reasons for its conception were the same— the devastating work of a master thief, in this instance James Shinn. When James Shinn was arrested in December 1981, he "pleaded guilty to his crimes ... received two consecutive 10-year prison terms ... [and] was regarded as the greatest of American book thieves until Blumberg came along and usurped the title," according to writer Christopher Reed.39 Shinn's reign of terror was successful and extreme, revealing the vulnerability of libraries everywhere until he was apprehended, tried, and convicted, in large part due to the efforts of William Moffatt, the librarian at Oberlin College, future site of the anti-theft conference. Jackanicz, "Theft at the National Archives", 44. 39Christopher Reed, "Biblioklepts, Part IV," Harvard Magazine Web Edition, The Oberlin Conference on Theft was concrete evidence of an increased awareness of the need for security. The library community's new attitude is reflected in the evolution of the Association of College and Research Libraries Rare Books and Manuscripts Section Security Committee from an ad hoc to a permanent standing committee in July of 1982. Previously, as Terry Belanger, a library security pioneer, has pointed out, the committee had been "concerned with the appropriateness and technique of indelibly marking printed books and manuscripts in rare book and other special collections environments."40 Once its status had shifted from ad hoc to permanent, this section soon became involved in developing an "invitational conference on security ... [where] representatives from the library and bookselling community, from insurance companies, the legal profession, the FBI, and other concerned groups would be invited ... the conference will attempt to develop guidelines for theft prevention."41 The conference was actually the brainchild of Ellen S. Dunlap and William Moffett. Dunlap, current Director of the American Antiquarian Society, was then Curator of manuscripts at the Humanities Research Center of the University of Texas and a member of the SAA/ALA joint committee. It was in fact Moffett, then Oberlin's librarian and later director of the Huntington Library until his death in 1995, who had been responsible for the discovery and first capture of the master thief James Shinn. However, the organizer who actually pulled together this massive undertaking was Marie Korey, then Head of the Rare Book Department at the Free Library of Philadelphia. Their vision and her hard work as 40Terry Belanger, "RBMS & Oberlin," personal e-mail to author, 18 January 1998). 41RBMS, ARCL RBMS Meeting Report Form, 10 July 1982, BAMBAM Archives, Washington CT. 25 Conference Moderator made possible the Oberlin Conference on Theft on September 19 and 20,1983. It is important to note that this conference is the melding point where security issues became "library and archival" security, almost as if it were one word. The American Library Association, the Society for American Archivists and the Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America joined to sponsor this conference on library and archival theft, which garnered much- needed publicity on the problem of theft. However, it is the proposal to the H. W. Wilson foundation (which accepted the proposal and funded the conference) that best spells out the desire for collaboration and concern over the issue that brought these and other organizations together for the conference: The conference intended to bring representatives of the three associations together with the law enforcement officials, librarians, archivists, museum administrators, and dealers who have had experience with thefts, in order to examine ... critically the steps taken so far, to make specific recommendations for further action by the ALA, SAA, ABAA, and other organizations concerned with the security of valuable books and manuscripts.42 The Oberlin Conference was a chance for all those concerned about theft to exchange information and ideas. As the conference program reveals, many of the major problems were tackled: access, establishment of ownership of material, legal considerations relating to the apprehension and prosecution of thieves, potential protocols for libraries, archives and Ad Hoc Committee of the Members of the Rare Books and Manuscripts Section of the Association of College & Research Libraries (ALA), of members of the Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America, of the Society of American Archivists, and of the SAA/ALA Joint Committee. Draft of Proposal to the H. W. Wilson Foundation for an Invitational Conference on Theft, December 1982, BAMBAM Archives, Washington, CT. 26 dealers in the event of theft, discussion of model legislation and even the possibility of the establishment of a National Security Office and a Registry of Marks.43 Truly the Conference became what it had publicized itself as: an opportunity for archivists, librarians and others to "consult with one another about the depth of the problem and attempt to develop strategies both to curb the increases ... of thefts and to deal with them more effectively when they occur."44 This was the moment when librarians joined in with archivists to write about security and began to outstrip their archival counterparts in terms of production and interest in the area of theft. Just as Murphy and then Shinn caused major innovations in the field of security for the archival and library communities, so too do did a talented and effective thief named Stephen Blumberg. When he was caught in 1990, "18,900 books stolen from 327 libraries and museums in 45 states, 2 Canadian provinces, and the District of Columbia... the value of the collection was ... $5.3 million... [and] 20 linear feet of manuscript material"45 were found at his house in Ottumwa, Iowa. The discovery of the crimes of Stephen Blumberg lead neither to a program devoted to archival security nor to a conference on theft. There was no direct attempt at preventive action that sprang from the discovery of his crimes. Instead, there was a strong adjustment in attitude concerning theft away from concealment and towards acknowledgment of losses, as well as another increased awareness of theft that made a difference in the willingness of 430berlin Conference on Theft Program, 1982, BAMBAM Archives, Washington, CT. 440berlin Conference on Theft, News Release, 31 September 1983, BAMBAM Archives, Washington, CT. 45Christopher Reed, "Biblioklepts", Harvard Magazine (March/April 1997): 43. 27 libraries to speak up and speak out. The Blumberg thefts also served as a late wake-up call for law enforcement agencies that book theft was indeed to be considered a serious crime. Returning the 1970s and the SAA's Archival Security Program from the future of joint and solo library initiatives and their instigating thieves, and having already noted and described the other products and history of the SAA's Archival Security Program, it seems that the most prudent course of action would be to examine the contents of the most influential and lasting aspect of that program: Timothy Walch's 1977 manual Archives and Manuscripts: Security. Perhaps the most effective and useful manner in which to examine this work is in the context of its forerunners and also in the context of the considerable amount of literature that it in turn inspired. 28 CHAPTER m Review of Literature related to Archival Security from 1977 to 1998 Walch — The Foundation Much of the literature related to archival security tells archivists what they should be doing in terms of security, but most of these writings refrain from discussing what is being done in terms of security. It is Timothy Walch's 1977 manual, Archives and Manuscripts: Security, that is both the culmination of the SAA security initiative and the beginning of the literature of "ought." In Walch's case, suggestions and "shoulds" were new and positive steps forward. Any discussion of archival literature on the topic of security must necessarily begin with Walch. Many of the recommendations he put forth, as well as many of the problems he cited, set the trends in thinking and writing about archival security for the following two decades. Walch broke new ground by stating that "archives and libraries can implement a number of practical security procedures that cost little or nothing and offer a definite improvement."1 This emphasis on practicality and affordability made archival security seem less foreboding. As Frederick J. Stielow aptly put it, Walch righted "misperceptions over... supposed high costs and great complexity."2 Walch brought archival security into the realm 1 Timothy Walch, Archives and Manuscripts: Security (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 1977), 1. 2 Frederick J. Stielow, "Archival Security," in Managing Archives and Archival Institutions, ed. James Gregory Bradsher (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 207. 29 of plausibility, by taking an economical and practical approach to a variety of crucial aspects of archival security. Along with discussions of security equipment (such as locks and alarms), disaster prevention, and legal issues, Walch focused on such central aspects of archival security as planning, implementation and its impact on staff, patrons, and the collection itself. Here again, he advanced new ideas that would so permeate the literature as to become cliches. His emphasis on planning is a good example. He presented a checklist of considerations relating to staff, patrons, the collection, and the building that has been reprinted, rephrased, and reused in many later security manuals. It is worth examining Walch's recommendations for each of these areas in detail, remembering that although many of the measures he suggested now seem obvious and rooted in common sense, they had never before been discussed in print. Walch presents archival security as a collaborative effort, suggesting that a mixture of collaboration and suspicion be used for handling the patrons and, to a lesser degree, the staff: "If the archivist takes the time to explain this dilemma to the staff and patrons, long-term problems... can be kept to a minimum. The coordinated efforts of archivists, staff and patrons will stymie the thief."3 Security, then, is a group effort for the care of the collection, rather than something restrictive that makes additional work. To this end, staff input should be encouraged, as should outreach to the local law-enforcement agency. The collaborative approach turns into a balancing act when patron access is considered, with access and security doing the balancing. As Walch puts it, archivists wish to "promote the use of collections by patrons with legitimate search needs, but prevent... 3 Walch, Archives, 8. 30 theft...."4 The nexus of materials and patrons is the most critical point in any discussion of archival security. As the archival security pioneer, Philip P. Mason, has stated: "This is often a difficult dilemma to resolve. I believe strongly that an archivist's primary responsibility is to preserve the collections in his/her custody for future generations of researchers even if this involved limiting access to the collections."5 A fine neo-Walchian suggestion has been put forth recently by the SAA's currently most active member in the field of security, Richard Strassberg. He suggests a procedure for co-opting patrons, by explaining to them that if part of the collection goes missing, archivists must be certain that they and all previous patrons can be eliminated from suspicion. Thus the patrons' cooperation in security procedures is a means of protecting the patron from later suspicion.6 Collaboration is impossible without coordination, so that staff can act effectively in security matters. Walch urges that one staff member be appointed "a security officer... responsible... for quarterly assessments of the security system in operation and for exploring new ideas in archival security."7 The appointment of a security officer also emphasizes the importance of the role security procedures should play in archives. Walch also emphasizes staff training in the art of observation, procedures for prevention, and procedures should a theft occur. For instance, staff members should be taught to watch patrons in the reading room at all times, particularly their hands, for "professional thieves frequently attempt to block the vision of the desk attendant."8 4 Walch, Archives, 3. 5 Philip P. Mason, telephone conversation with author, 16 October 1997. 5 Richard Strassberg, conversation with author, Ithaca, NY, 15 September 1997. 7 Walch, Archives, 3. 8 Walch, Archives, 6. 31 The minimization of temptation is an additional consideration for both staff members and patrons. Walch begins by focusing on employee access, recommending limited access to stack and storage areas and to keys and combinations of vaults.9 He stresses the limiting of access to master keys as well. Restrictions are also recommended for patrons: no coats or bags are to be allowed in the reading room; rather, they should be stored in a locker supplied by the institution, a practice that also reduces the likelihood of patrons' belongings disappearing. If the opportunities to steal are reduced, there is correspondingly less likelihood of theft. Richard Strassberg has expanded on this Walchian precept in discussing the result of one institution's survey of employees. While some employees are intrinsically honest and will not steal under any circumstances and others will steal under any and all circumstances, many employees are situationally honest. They will only steal when presented with an overwhelming opportunity. What Walch and Strassberg are both suggesting is that if security measures are evident enough, they will help keep staff members (and patrons) honest.10 As another precaution, Walch suggests not only checking the backgrounds of potential and current employees for criminal records but also for interests in collecting. Allowing someone who collects material similar to that of the institution access to the vaults is like allowing an alcoholic to tend bar. The idea of employee theft is hinted at, but not discussed in detail. As Philip Mason has said, when it comes to employee theft, there is still 9 Staff members do not always agree. In July 1992 "three unions representing Library of Congress staff filed an unfair labor practice charge against the library for implementing new security measures restricting staff access to the stacks." Incidents of Book Theft, ed. by Heather Lloyd for the RBMS Security Committee Meeting, January 1996. See: Gilreath, who ironically had been a contributor to the Rare Books and Special Collections part of LC's online guide and the editor of a collection of essays about the forging of the Oath of a Freeman}2 Walch also advises on precautions to be taken concerning patrons. Background checks are deemed necessary, verifying identity and the lack of a criminal record: "patrons should be asked to complete a researcher registration card, listing their names, addresses, companies or institutions, and research topics. The information should be carefully checked against some suitable form of identification."13 Only then should a patron be allowed access, and that access should never include stack or restricted areas. Documentation is another important preventive measure in terms of patrons. Once a researcher has registered, he or she should be asked to read and understand a statement of the rules and regulations of the institution before using any material. This disallows ignorance as a defense for improper behavior. The paper trail should continue by having the patron sign all call slips so that there is a reliable record of what material each researcher has used. nMason, telephone conversation. 12Information about Driver and Willingham from "Notes on Convictions", BAMBAM Archives, Washington, CT., and on Willingham & Gilreath from Incidents of Book Theft. Gilreath's collection is The Judgment of Experts (Worcester, MA: American Antiquarian Society, 1991). 13Walch, Archives, 6. 33 The call slips should also be preserved for a period of time for referral. Should a theft occur, it would be useful to know who had shown an interest in the material previously. When it comes to distribution of materials to patrons, "less is more" seems to be the most security-conscious attitude to take. One archival unit at a time, be it box or volume, should be provided to the patron - and should be checked by a staff member both before and after use by the patron to be certain that everything is in order and that nothing is empty. Archival security must also be applied to the collection itself. Walch divides the procedures necessary to protect a collection into three components: deterrence of theft; identification of missing items; and (to a lesser extent) the insurance of commercially valuable materials.14 Deterrence begins with the consideration and identification of which materials need protection. No repository has the ability to protect every item equally; some selection must be made. Walch recommends that archivists regard their collections "from the viewpoint of a thief. Only selected items will have a market value sufficient to interest the professional thief."15 Should this leap of imagination daunt the archivist, then items of high market value can be identified by a qualified dealer. Walch suggest that such items be removed from the collection and placed in a secure area such as a vault. Facsimiles, photocopies or microfilms can be substituted, thus offering patrons access to the material without compromising its security. Marking can be both a method of identification and a method of deterrence. After lengthy consideration of the effects of marking on the aesthetics of documents as well as types of marking, Walch recommends stamping documents with an inert, permanent ink (then available from the Office of Preservation of the Library of Congress). He adds that 14Walch, Archives, 8. 15Walch, Archives, 3. 34 each institution could use its National Union Catalog symbol as an easily identifiable mark. Identification is supremely important in effecting the recovery of stolen documents, and marking provides clear evidence of ownership. Additionally, Walch advises the use of finding aids, accession records and call slips as sources of information about valuable items, both to help determine what has been taken after a theft and to help prove ownership of these items in case of recovery. The photocopy record and footnotes in articles citing the collections also can aid in this task. An insurance policy is another way to prove ownership; yet when Walch was writing, it was not something that every institution would find attractive. Walch suggests that insurance is best for those institutions with a limited number of rarities or valuable items. Before noting that the SAA has lists of independent appraisers available, Walch suggests that "as a general rule, if an item is to be stamped, it should be insured."16 As previously noted, the three main products of the SAA's security initiative in the 1970s were Walch's procedural manual, the SAA's Register of Lost or Stolen Materials, and model legislation to provide more protection for archives and libraries. Walch urges the use of the Register and the promotion of model legislation in attempts to change state codes. Attention is also given by Walch to the types of legislation then existing, including the Virginia act of 1975. Two distinct types of laws relating to archival and library security existed then: "One type of law makes it a misdemeanor to mutilate or destroy archival or library materials. The second type... makes it a misdemeanor to fail to return library archival materials that have been retained after the expiration of the loan period."17 The latter 16Walch, Archives, 10. Both insurance rates and commercial values are vastly different from those of the early 1970s; the decision to insure is no longer an easy matter to carry out. 17Walch, Archives, 19. 35 comment illustrates that much of the legislation tied to archives is really just modified library laws. Walch encourages the modification of existing laws and the creation of new ones. Timothy Walch's manual was the definitive security text that sprang from the SAA initiatives in the 1970s. There were other articles and journals written after Walch, but few had either the breadth or the detail of his work. From Walch's time onward, the university or governmental archive seemed to be the models on which writings were based; there was and is very little literature about the one-person archive. Moreover, most later writings were concerned almost solely with what archivists should be doing, often with little reference to budget and staffing constraints Other Works of the late 1970s Cheryl Price's article, "Document Examination in American Archives," deals with training for archivists in authentication techniques. Price stresses that "archivists... have a legal and ethical duty to maintain the authenticity of their records"18 and that the introduction of forgeries in to the archives' custody calls the authenticity of the archives into question. Authenticity is a key characteristic of archives. As Terry Eastwood has explained in an important article: "Archives are authentic only when they are created with the need to act through them in mind and when they are preserved and maintained as faithful witness of fact and act by the creator and its legitimate successors... documents must be created, maintained, and kept in custody according to regular procedures that can be attested."19 Thus Price's 18Cheryl A. Price, "Document Examination in American Archives," Special Libraries, 68, no. 9 (Sept 1977): 300. 19Terry Eastwood, "What is Archival Theory and Why is it Important?" Archivaria 37 (Spring 1994): 127. 36 concerns are indeed valid. It is her conclusion that archivists should be trained in "the authentication of documents... [and] most serious investigation of authentication techniques"20 in order to be able to prevent forgeries from being slipped in while authentic documents are slipped out of the collection. Her "should" concerns the fact that archivists ought to get more training to prevent security breaches in the collection. Further suggestions come from two chapters of a 1978 reference work for manuscript collectors entitled A utographs and Manuscripts: A Collector's Manual. One of these chapters concerns legal issues relating to collecting; the other, ethical concerns tied to this interest. Leslie J. Schreyer discusses how a collector (such as an archival institution) can avoid the purchase of stolen manuscripts and perhaps recover property lost: "the greatest protection... is to purchase from a reputable and reliable seller."21 John F. Reed, in his chapter on ethics, echoes Schreyer concerning dealer honesty and the underhandedness of forgeries. He also delves into the area of theft itself. Reed repeats what Walch had said about the necessity for marking. He believes that archives should mark documents because "proof of theft... is the burden of the archives... [they] should... indelibly mark... their manuscripts for easy recognition of legal ownership."22 He challenges the idea that marking is damaging to the value of documents, noting that "since no future sale of the material is contemplated at the time of acquisition... marking... is quite ethical."23 Reed also gives voice to a sentiment that will ring resoundingly throughout the "should" literature for the next two 20Price, "Document Examination," 303. 21Leslie J. Schreyer, "Legal Ramifications of Manuscript Collecting," in Autographs and Manuscripts: A Collector's Manual, ed. Edmund Berkeley, Jr. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), 174. 22JohnF. Reed, "Ethics," in Autographs and Manuscripts: A Collector's Manual, ed. Edmund Berkeley, Jr. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), 193. 23Reed, "Ethics," 193. 37 decades: When theft occurs, it must be publicized so that other dealers or archives do not unwittingly buy or sell stolen material. It should be noted here that Philip P. Mason had earlier and more forcefully made mention of the public acknowledgment problem, though from a slightly different angle. In 1975, he gave voice to frustration with archives' need "to avoid adverse publicity, [and thus] refuse either to prosecute thieves or attempt to recover stolen documents."24 Urgings to Action, A Prelude to Walch — Pioneers of the late 1960s and early 1970s That Edmund Berkeley, Jr., served as editor of the manual containing the Schreyer and Reed articles is significant. There is a pocket of influential literature from the 1960s and earlier in the 1970s that very much influenced Walch, and Berkeley is the author of two such articles. A brief look backwards to understand what influenced the writers of the late 1970s shows that these articles served as an introduction to the problems of archival security, and while they made suggestions for preventing and detecting theft, more importantly they also revealed to an unsuspecting world that archives were having theft problems and what those problems entailed. Before examining Berkeley's articles, one must begin with James B. Rhoads's "Alienation and Thievery: Archival Problems," written in 1966. This article was one of the sparks that helped ignite the blazing initiative of the mid-1970s. It was Rhoads who first urged the SAA to action: "Are there not also steps that we can take collectively as a profession and as a Society? I think there are. I think that by our collective vigilance we can 24Philip P. Mason, "Archival Security: New Solutions to an Old Problem," The American Archivist 38 (October 1975): 490. 38 discourage documentary theft and make it increasingly difficult, risky, and unprofitable."25 One of his immediate suggestions was the drawing up of a code of ethics for the conduct of business between archivists and dealers, a code to be drawn up by an SAA committee. Rhoads clearly saw the SAA as providing the infrastructure for a major security initiative. Edmund Berkeley, Jr's involvement "in archival security was most ironical, since my chief'background and training' in the subject has been to be the head of an archival agency which suffered a major theft."26 While serving as Curator of Manuscripts and University Archivist at the University of Virginia, Berkeley became interested in archival security in the aftermath of a major theft of manuscripts and rare books, including the loss of one of the very few copies extant of the first edition of Edgar Allen Poe's Tamerlane and Other Poems, 1827, a book that is almost as rare as a black tulip. As Berkeley notes, when a theft occurs at your institution, the subject of archival security then "captures your almost total attention for months and is never out of consciousness thereafter.27 Wishing to spare other archivists his experience of theft, Berkeley authored three important articles in the 1970s. "Code of Virginia Revised to Benefit Librarians and Archivists" tells how a draft law written by the University of Virginia's attorney evolved into a bill and then a state law in 1975, making the theft of very broadly defined "library property" a crime.28 A second Berkeley article, "Archival Security: A Personal and Circumstantial View," carefully details the discovery of the robbery at the University of Virginia, the actions taken in the aftermath of the discovery 25James B. Rhoads, "Alienation and Thievery: Archival Problems," The American Archivist 29, (April 1966): 207. 26Edmund Berkeley, Jr., "Archival Security: A Personal and Circumstantial View," Georgia Archive 4, no. 1 (Spring 1976): 1. 27Berkeley, "Archival Security," 1. 28Berkeley, "Code of Virginia Revised to Benefit Librarians and Archivists," Virginia Librarian 31 (May 1975): 19. 39 of the theft, and the changes made in security procedures, policies and measures to protect Virginia from a recurrence. What is most fascinating about this article is that all of the measures discussed by Berkeley (e.g., patron registration, checking of bags & coats, staff security training) later were incorporated into Walch's manual. This article is the direct and influential ancestor of the SAA manual. The third Berkeley piece, "Archivists and Thieves," which appeared in Manuscripts in 1976, provides a summary of the increasingly common and expensive problem of theft facing the archival community and then goes on to praise and describe the measures taken by the SAA to counter the problem. This article is an excellent introduction to the components of the SAA's Archival Security program as it existed in 1976. Berkeley thus played both the roles of innovator and of cheering observer in the SAA's security initiative. A leading pioneer and guiding force behind that security initiative, Philip P. Mason, in 1975 wrote a seminal essay entitled "Archival Security: New Solutions to an Old Problem" for the American Archivist. Mason begins by showing that the problem of archival security to be older and much larger than it had been perceived to be, using the Murphy case and other thefts as examples. The article also contains many of the seeds of solution that blossomed in Walch's manual. The cooperative-suspicious approach, credential verification, limitation of access, questions of stamping or microfilming for identification, and apprehension planning — all these are to be found in Mason's article. In fact, the very existence of Walch's manual springs from Mason's essay. When proposing features of an SAA security program (which became a reality that year thanks in large part to Mason's foresight, hard work, and perseverance), the final suggestion he makes 40 is for "the preparation and publication of either a manual or a series of monographs relating to security.29 The same issue of American Archivist contains an article entitled "Archival Security and Insecurity," by John M. Kinney. In discussing actual thefts that took place in Texas, Kinney delves into various potential motivations behind theft. After looking at profit, expansion of personal collections, kleptomania, and retaliation as motivation, Kinney notes that "the possibilities are endless of who might steal and why. Everyone might be suspect. You need not be paranoid to be an archivist, but it helps."30 After touching on such matters as microfilming, patron registration, charge slips, observation, and materials control, Kinney sums up: "A properly administered archives is involved in a working compromise between the maximum availability of records and the maximum protection for those records — at the minimum inconvenience to the researcher.... The challenge to the archivist is to make the compromise work."31 As the decade progressed, the emphasis in literature moved from actual occurrences of theft and examinations of the state of archival security to shoulds, oughts, and suggestion, there were occasional articles on what was actually happening. An example is the case study on New York University's Institute of Fine Arts and its security measures in the journal Library and Archival Security (which changed its name from Library Security Newsletter in the wake of the SAA's security initiative).32 Such case studies were exceptions more than the 29Mason, "New Solutions," 491. 30John M. Kinney, "Archival Security and Insecurity," The American Archivist 38 (October 1975): 495. 31Kinney, "Archival Security," 497. 32Evelyn Samuel, "Protection of Library and Archival Materials: A Case Study-New York University's Institute of Fine Arts," Library & Archival Security 2, nos. 1/2(1978): 1-6. 41 rule, and the article would have been improved by a discussion of whether or not the measures taken were effective. The 1980s: Transition from Archival to "Library-and-Archival" Through Increased Library Interest and the Oberlin Conference As the 1970s rolled into the 1980s, the literature relating to archival security metamorphosed into a component of "Library and Archival Security," with articles on libraries and special collections becoming much more common and frequent than those concerning archival security proper. In October 1981 the first online publication of records in BAMBAM took place. Its founders worked out a way to adapt the structure which had been worked out for their American Book Prices Current online database to records of missing and stolen books and added a "notes" program so that anyone dialing in could leave a note instantly but could not alter the data base. Realizing that they "could not simply set up as cultural vigilantes," they turned for support to Terry Belanger, then Assistant Dean of the School of Library Service at Columbia and chairman of the Ad Hoc Security Committee of the Rare Books and Manuscripts Section (RBMS) of the Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL).33 As a result of meetings with Belanger and in January 1981 with Belanger and John Jenkins, president of the Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America (ABAA), it was decided that a workshop on BAMBAM would be held at the RBMS preconference in San Francisco in June and that the ABAA would agree to buy a copy of the first BAMBAM volume for each of its members. The Antiquarian Booksellers Association 33Bookline Alert: Missing Books and Manuscripts. BAMBAM 1: To September 1981 (New York: American Book Prices Current, Bancroft-Parkman Inc, 1982), iv. See also: Katharine Kyes Leab, "Electronic Theft-Reporting Systems: The State-of-the-Art," International Federation of Library Associations 9 (1983): 324-30. 42 of Great Britain, the FBI and the SAA added their records to the mix. BAMBAM went online in October 1981 and appeared first in book form at the beginning of 1982. Also in 1982, Terry Belanger wrote the introduction to John H. Jenkins's Rare Books and Manuscript Thefts, published by the Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America. In it he noted that the security pointers in the book are meant to combat a problem that "encompasses the entire book world: librarians, archivists, booksellers, book collectors, and ~ ultimately — users of books."34 The same holds true for documents and manuscripts. Jenkins himself is particularly interesting on the types of thieves and their motivations: kleptomaniacs, collectors, those who steal in anger/revenge, the casual thief and those stealing to make money. And he is emphatic about the reluctance of "librarians, dealers, and collectors... to release information regarding... thefts.... Failure to report theft aids and abets the thief... Everyone in the book world has — both morally and legally — the obligation to prevent thefts and make thefts known when they occur."35 He is similarly strong on thoroughness in reporting a theft and on strict, vigorous prosecution as a protective and prohibitive measure as well as a punishment: "By vigorous prosecution of all... thieves an effective deterrent is established. If potential thieves know they will be prosecuted with vigor, they will think twice about stealing."36 Finally, Jenkins incorporates the RBMS Ad Hoc Security Committee's Guidelines for Marking Rare Books and Manuscripts into an appendix, presented here as more a deterrent than an identifier. It is ironic that John Jenkins, during his time as President of the Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America, 34Terry Belanger, foreword to Rare Books and Manuscript Thefts (New York: Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America, 1982), by John H. Jenkins, 1. 35 Jenkins, Rare Books, 6. 36Jenkins, Rare Books, 9. 43 accomplished so much in terms of theft deterrence, for he later died in mysterious circumstances and was written about as both a thief and a forger.37 The library community's interest in security increased greatly in the early 1980s, as witnessed by publication of the Shinn List on OCLC38 and the evolution of the ACRL/RBMS Security committee from Ad Hoc (1980-82) to permanent standing committee in July of 1982. This committee involved itself in developing the Oberlin Conference on Theft, held at Oberlin College on September 19-20,1983. This interdisciplinary conference, sponsored by ALA, SAA, and the ABAA, was: intended to bring representatives of the three associations together with law enforcement officials, librarians, archivists, museum administrators, and dealers who have had experience with thefts, in order to examine critically the steps taken so far, to make suggestions for further refinement of the procedures now in effect, and to make specific recommendations for further action by the ALA, SAA, ABAA, and other organizations concerned with the security of valuable books and manuscripts.39 As the conference program reveals, many major problems were tackled at Oberlin: access; establishment of ownership of material; legal considerations relating to the apprehension and prosecution of thieves; potential protocols for libraries, archives and dealers in the event of theft; the possibility of the establishment of a National Security Office and Registry of Marks, and a discussion of model legislation.40 This was the moment when libraries joined 37An excellent account of the underside of Jenkins's career is W. Thomas Taylor, Texfake. An Account of the Theft and Forgery of Early Texas Printed Documents. (Austin: W. Thomas Taylor, 1991). 38William Moffett, "The Shinn List," OCLC, January 1982, BAMBAM Archives, Washington CT. 39ACRL/RBMS Meeting Report Form, 10 July 1982, BAMBAM Archives, Washington CT.; Ad Hoc Committee of the Members of the Rare Books and Manuscripts Section of the Association of College & Research Libraries (ALA), of members of the Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America, of the Society of American Archivists, and of the SAA/ALA Joint Committee. Draft of Proposal to the H. W. Wilson Foundation For An Invitational Conference on Theft, Dec 1982, BAMBAM Archives, Washington, CT. 40Oberlin Conference on Theft Program, 1982, BAMBAM Archives, Washington, CT.; 44 in with archives to write about security and began to outstrip their archival counterparts in terms of production and interest in the are of theft. Sadly, though many of the speeches at the conference appeared elsewhere as articles, the proceedings of the Oberlin Conference, though scheduled to be published, never appeared. Library, Archival and Museum Compendiums of the 1980s Both the scope and amount of literature relating to theft that appeared in the 1980s show that security was receiving much more serious consideration. As author Slade Richard Gandert said: "Security matters are gradually being given the attention they deserve. If these are slighted in some quarters, it is nevertheless true that there is a growing understanding of their importance."41 His Protecting Your Collection was in the collaborative spirit of the Oberlin Conference rather than being library literature that also could be applied to archives. Gandert's book, which began life as Vol 4, Nos 1-2 of Library & Archival Security finds its strength in pulling together the issues raised in disparate writings related to theft into a single work. Each chapter is a simple snapshot of the surface of a problem and some quick asides concerning potential solutions, along with some wonderful anecdotes about thefts. One newly raised issue is that of what motivates thieves. Gandert emphasizes the trusted researcher, who takes "great pains... to build up a relationship with the staff in these institutions. Security officers agree that it is the person who is known to the staff and who is Oberlin Conference on Theft. News Release, 31 Sept 1983, BAMBAM Archives, Washington, CT. 41 Slade Richard Gandert, Protecting Your Collection. A Handbook, Survey & Guide for the Security of Rare Books, Manuscripts, Archives, & Works ofArt (New York: The Haworth Press, 1982), 5. 45 respected by them that is many times the greatest security risk."42 Thefts can be carried out by people with great reputations and even better credentials, a fact that archivists often seem to forget. As Philip Mason notes, "some archives have established firm security guidelines and follow them by the letter. Others have established such guidelines but fail to enforce them especially when special, VTP researchers are involved."43 Security only works when its rules are applied evenhandedly to all patrons ~ with no exceptions. Another point given new emphasis by Gandert is that of detection. Backlogs in acquisitions appraisal or even the overwhelming size of a collection can mask a theft. As Gandert puts it, "the fact that security considerations have not been given their due in the past makes the task of doing it now all that difficult."44 Undetected losses from the past mean that the trail has grown cold and the chances of catching the thieves has grown significantly as time has passed. Gandert also was innovative in discussing what qualities and characteristics are to be sought in guards. That the large-institution model is in place here is clear: Gandert does not debate the fact of having guards; he assumes that there are guards. And he believes that the guards should guard closely: collections "should be closely guarded.... The perception that restrictions of usage or strict rules are upsetting to the scholarly community may be accurate. Yet such restrictions are unavoidable in a careless — and, some say, larcenous ~ age."45 In Gandert's work, the suspicion voiced by Walch is present, but the component of collaboration is lacking. 'Gandert, Protecting, 16. 'Mason, telephone conversation. 'Gandert, Protecting, 66. 'Gandert, Protecting, 124. 46 Lawrence J. Fennelly's huge compendium, Museum, Library Archival Security, is the work of a former professional security person at Harvard who has written on many aspects of security, from archives to parking lots. Though this compendium seems to be biased towards museums and other large and well-funded cultural institutions, its 30 chapters contain a richness of insights, suggestions, and advice. The book is divided into five general areas: A primer into basic security issues and considerations; basic security standards and how to assess the level of your institution; security equipment such as alarm systems and closed-circuit television; the training and characteristics of guards; and [art] theft investigation. The sections on alarm systems and on the design and use of closed-circuit television devices are out-of-date in their particulars, but extremely useful to a basic understanding of how such devices work. The sections on guards, whether to have them, and how they should be trained are good reading for anyone with a large enough budget to allow for guards. These sections also highlight the necessity for training staff in matters relating to security, reiterating and extending the Walchian ideal of collaboration. As Fennelly himself states in "Guidelines for Guard Training,": "An effective security training program should also include... secretaries, janitors, curatorial staff, and administrative personnel, thereby making security everyone's responsibility."46 What these chapters boil down to is the need for people to know how and when to act in relation to achieving proper levels of security. The result of no action or improper action can be theft, and three chapters in Fennelly's compendium tackle that subject, though mainly in terms of art theft. The most valuable lessons that archivists can learn from these sections concern the need to describe and record 46Lawrence J. Fennelly, "Guidelines for Guard Training," in Museum, Library and Archival Security, ed. Lawrence J. Fennelly (Boston: Butterworths, 1983), 679. 47 a document in an evidentiary sense, its physical condition and a bit about its content so that it could be identified if stolen. Lest this point seem overly obvious, here is a recent description from an INTERPOL International Stolen Art Notice: STOLEN ITEM: Incunabulum DATE OF THEFT: 15 May 1995 COUNTRY: Chile (from a museum in Chilian) Incunabulum dating from the end of the 14th century, religious text in Latin. The book has approximately 500 pages, is printed on paper in black, using wooden type, and is bound in white-ochre kidskin. This is the only existing copy in South America. Dimensions: 30 x 20 x 6 cm. Value: inestimable.47 This is a hopelessly deficient description; thus the chance of this inclinable being identified and returned is almost nil. Law-enforcers and archivists have different priorities in terms of description, and only by establishing mutually educative relationships will each group be able to be effective in working with the other. Renata Rutledge's piece in Fennelly's compilation emphasizes this need to "maintain a close-working relationship with... police and fire departments."48 To have quick and effective cooperation from police after a theft, a well-established relationship is essential — not just for prompt theft response, but also for effective theft response.49 Rutledge also emphasizes the relationship between the person in 47INTERPOL Secretariat General on behalf of INTERPOL Santiago, Dossier: 20613/95, BAMBAM Archives, Washington, CT. 48Renata Rutledge, "The Many Facets of a Museum Security Director's Job," in Museum, Library and Archival Security, ed. Lawrence J. Fennelly (Boston: Butterworths, 1983), 22. 49Edmund Berkeley, Jr., had made clear what happens when this is not the case: "If it is true that... archivists are rarely acquainted with police and their procedures, the reverse is equally so. We had to educate the police in our methods and approaches before they could conduct a thorough investigation...." Berkeley, "Archival Security," 9. 48 charge of security and the latest information about the latest technology ~ both in terms of devices that deter theft and devices that thieves might use to aid their stealing. The fear of bad publicity for an archives has allowed many thieves to remain unpunished for their crimes and much material to remain missing or unclaimed. Many archives (and libraries) will even deny that a theft has taken place, for fear of damaging their reputation, attracting other thieves, and losing potential donations or grants. Stephen J. Allen's "Crisis Public Relations Communication" is useful even to those at small institutions with no public-relations staff, for it suggests the creation of a crisis communications plan to use in communicating with the press in the event of a theft. "What is done is done. What must be told will be told... the objective plan is to maintain... credibility and integrity as the protector of its contents, and to ensure continued public and private support."50 The author walks the reader through the creation of the plan and the management of the press. Allen, however, misses some points about timing and about dealers. News releases must be made in such a way and at such a time that the thief does not destroy material; at the same time, dealers who might unwittingly buy the stolen item(s) must be informed.51 Fennelly and Louis A. Tyska offer the most practical chapters in this compendium, one on physical security standards, and one on how to properly conduct a security survey. The first of these is somewhat out-of-date but nevertheless useful in considering the wide range of matters that must be considered and why, an example being how deliveries should be handled and what materials one needs for fencing, gates, lighting, and locks if deliveries are being made.52 In making the transition from materials guidelines standards to the 50Stephen J. Allen, "Crisis Public Relations Communication," in Museum, Library and Archival Security, ed. Lawrence J. Fennelly (Boston: Butterworths, 1983), 136. 5'See Berkeley, "Archival Security," 17. 52Lawrence J. Fennelly and Louis A. Tyska, "Physical Security Standards," in Museum, 49 conducting a security survey, Tyska and Fennelly take the reader step by step through "a critical onsite examination and analysis... to ascertain the present security status; to identify deficiencies or excesses; to determine the protection needed; and to make recommendations to improve the security...."53 Although equipment has changed greatly since this chapter was written, it remains useful as a survey tool. Timothy Walch's piece for the Fennelly book, "Common Sense for Museum Libraries" is a partial restatement of the themes in Archives and Manuscripts: Security, with some updates. He encourages a mix of wariness and collaborating, noting the case of a pastor from a small town in Texas having been charged with the theft of about $75,000 worth of rare books and manuscripts. Walch notes that "no patron's honesty can be taken for granted. The good reverend is not the only member of the clergy who has been convicted of manuscript and rare-book thievery."54 Walch also notes that the coordinated efforts of staff and patrons "will stymie the thief."55 Here, Walch expands his work on legal protection, noting that there may be some loss even with the best of security systems in place.. Finally, one must not leave this compendium without mentioning the excellent and exhaustive work by John E. Hunter, who not only wrote the excellent introduction to the work as a whole, but also produced a 73-page bibliography, arranged by subject, which remains a necessary stopping place for anybody wishing to become acquainted with the security field. Library and Archival Security, ed. Lawrence, J. Fennelly (Boston: Butterworths, 1983), 495-510. "Lawrence J. Fennelly and Louis A. Tyska, "The Security Survey," in Museum, Library and Archival Security, ed. Lawrence J. Fennelly (Boston: Butterworths, 1983), 511-12. 54Timothy Walch, "Common Sense for Museum Libraries," in Museum, Library and Archival Security, ed. Lawrence J. Fennelly (Boston: Butterworths, 1983), 95. "Walch, "Common Sense," 102. 50 Security Literature in the 1980s: Library Literature of Use to Archives and Archivists In the 1980s there was an abundance of library literature related to security for special collections and closed stacks that could easily be applied to archives. This in no way means that security is more important for libraries, but as Richard Strassberg has noted, that security may be more of a problem for libraries. Books are easier to sell or fence without revealing that they are stolen — there are multiple copies of them. Manuscripts and documents are more difficult to pass along unless there is a buyer already lined up.56 With that idea in mind, it is easy to understand the flourishing of library-related security literature, with 1984 being a year of particularly heavy publication. In that year alone the ALA produced Security for Libraries, edited by Marvine Brand; a special issue of Library Trends focused on the theme "Protecting the Library"; and Alan Jay Lincoln, an author prominently involved with the issue of Library Trends, produced a book entitled Crime in the Library. Lincoln's book concerns crime as it affects public libraries and is a fine source of statistics concerning library crime in the mid-1980s. Much of this work recapitulates earlier writings, but Lincoln adds a number of useful insights, including an examination of effective low-cost measures of prevention. Although he agrees with Jenkins about prosecution as a policy for deterrence, he also indicates that advice from the police or a prosecutor should be sought in determining whether or not a crime is serious enough to prosecute.57 The usual "how to" section on designing a security program is fairly comprehensive and worth a look for its long and careful listing of potential risks to consider. 56Strassberg, conversation with author. "Alan Jay Lincoln, Crime in the Library (New York: R. R. Bowker, 1984), 127. 51 Lincoln also was closely involved with the 1984 Library Trends issue on library theft. This compilation of thematically related articles features theoretical musings by criminologist John T. Kirkpatrick on the biological, psychological and sociological causes of crime and criminal behavior, and a very good, even if now outdated, article by Alice Harrison Bahr on electronic security systems. Two sections of this issue warrant close attention. Richard Boss's "Collection Security" critiques responses to the huge increase in thefts and publicity in the decade between 1972 and 1982, stating that institutions "commonly respond to losses in a reactive, rather than a proactive manner. A common reaction... is to purchase an electronic detection system.... theft detection systems can instill a false sense of security.... It is generally recognized that any security system can be compromised."58 His other particularly strong point is that "the human element must be assigned not only as it operates during the routine functioning of the safeguard, but also how it will operate when the person is distracted or negligent."59 Boss was the first to consider that vigilance may flag after several hours on the job. Human frailty and capability for error are important considerations in the implementation of any security system. Legal issues are skillfully dealt with in Peter J. Parker's "Statutory Protection of Library Materials," which gives an overview of "statutory and legal remedies available to library administrators for the protection of their institutions, their employees and their collections."60 Parker's stated belief is that legal remedies should be a last resort because statutes that are specific to libraries may be more trouble than they are worth, counterproductive in fact. In 58Richard Boss, "Collection Security," in "Protecting the Library", ed. Alan Jay Lincoln, Library Trends 33 (1984): 40. 59Boss, "Collection Security," 47. 60Peter J. Parker, "Statutory Protection of Library Materials," in "Protecting the Library," ed. Alan Jay Lincoln, Library Trends 33 (1984): 77. 52 terms of the police, "statutes that create special circumstances - outside the normal, routine experiences of police officers, prosecutors and judges — may be extremely difficult to enforce."61 For many police officials a theft of materials from an archive or library is just another property theft and not necessarily a case to be given high priority. In his analysis of types of library laws, Parker notes two main types of laws. Type A are statutes "generally enacted before 1970, which provide some protection against willful detaining or defacing of library property," while type B statutes are "newer... [and] directed primarily against library theft."62 The Virginia Library Act, for instance, is a Type B law. The strength of the Type B's is in assuming that concealment is "evidence of intent to steal and [that] the employee who discovers the concealment is exempt from civil action arising from false arrest or slander suits."53 Parker notes that a consultation with a lawyer and the staff about state laws can aid greatly in the design of an effective security program. In general, however, what is striking about the boom in library literature in the 1980s is the amount of repetition to be found in it. This is especially apparent in the compilations of essays about library security, of which Security for Libraries, edited for the ALA by Marvine Brand, is an example. Within these similarities there are, however, differences which should be noted. Thus Thomas Shaughnessy places new emphasis on inventory control, which he believes "must be applied from the moment of receipt...."64 Wilbur B. Crimmin's procedural section is strong on rare materials, while Janelle A. Paris analyzes the types of security at different types of institutions in order to contrast in-house security versus 61Parker, "Statutory Protection," 78. 62Parker, "Statutory Protection," 82. 63Parker, "Statutory Protection," 87 ^Thomas W. Shaughnessy, "Security: Past, Present, and Future," in Security for Libraries: People, Buildings Collections, ed. Marvine Brand (Chicago: American Library Association, 1984), 17. 53 that supplied by police or a guard service. The legal chapter in this work, by Barbara Bintliff and Al Coco is an excellent primer in the different types of law and how they might affect an institution. Correctly noting the need of a good and thorough administrator to "become acquainted with the legal counsel provided for the library or institution.... to discuss any questions relating to your library's security," Bintliff and Coco provide a series of useful questions to ask that lawyer and tackle specific situations in which liabilities might arise, including searches.65 The final library-related work on security is directed specifically at university libraries. Crime Prevention, Security and Emergency Procedures for University Libraries is full of examples of procedures and policies from actual security manuals, and this is its primary strength. It also contains a series of articles related to security and press materials related to the Oberlin Conference. A glance through this book would acquaint any reader with a passing knowledge of the basics. Security from a museum point-of-view also found a fair amount of representation in the 1980s, a good example being Robert Burke and Sam Adeloye's A Manual of Basic Museum Security for the International Council of Museums. Emphasis is placed upon creating a long-term plan that is tested and evaluated on a regular basis to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency, and sample policies are included to guide the reader in creating policy and procedure. The authors emphasize inventory control and back up their assertions about its importance with strong and well considered suggestions as to what information should be "Barbara Bintliff and Al Coco, "Legal Aspects of Library Security," in Security for Libraries: People, Buildings, Collections, ed. Marvine Brand (Chicago: American Library Association, 1984), 91-105. 54 included. Inventory control is an issue that seems to get an increasing amount of attention throughout the 1980s. While updating its anecdotes of theft and emphasizing the increasing rate of theft, Mary Wyly's 1987 article, "Special Collections Security: Problems, Trends, and Consciousness," provides a quick overview of the types of thieves, available security programs, need for marking, and actions taken by such professional organizations as SAA and RBMS relating to theft. After taking a look at how security measures have changed over the past few decades, Wyly suggests that reevaluation of the current handling of security might be beneficial for all. Emphasis is placed on awareness and its maintenance, for "lack of awareness, looking away from problems, simple thoughtlessness, and loss of consciousness are the greatest hazards to... security."66 Wyly also emphasizes the evenhanded and uniform application of restrictions and rules to all researchers, noting that restricted access seems to invite exceptions and pleas for special privileges; if responsibility and authority are not clearly delegated to staff immediately responsible for access control and if privileges are granted by library directors or university administrators distant from the situation, control is lost. By the same token, if standards for access are not closely monitored, procedures may slip.67 1980s Archival Views of Security and its Proper Place in Archival Functions The abundance of 1980s security literature also contained articles representing the purely archival point of view. Some, like Albin Wagner's "Archival Security and Insecurity" are 66Mary Wyly, "Special Collections Security: Problems, Trends, and Consciousness," Library Trends (Summer 1987): 255. 67Wyly, "Special Collections," 251 55 gentle surface overviews of the problem. Wagner's summation of the chief problem concerning archival security deserve repetition: Until recently, archivists... gave little attention to security because of oversight, the complexity of the problem, or the reputed costs of security measures. Indeed, some... seem to manifest an almost religious belief that the sacred status of the archive alone is somehow sufficient to protect archival materials and ensure their preservation for posterity.68 Wagner's article is a tidy package that touches on all the key issues relating to theft from the refusal of many archives to acknowledge that a theft has occurred to a recommendation of Walch's manual as "the best single source for establishing a security program."69 Wagner gives attention to the growing sophistication of thieves and their methods. Many thieves have been "caught with briefcases equipped with electronic security and surveillance devices, magnets, false compartments, special inks and dyes, counterfeit labels and other tools for altering the evidence of ownership of books and manuscripts."70 As thieves get cannier and more high-tech, archivists must keep abreast of these changes. Wagner would be interested by Richard Strassberg's recent demonstration of how documents can be hidden and spirited away in modular laptop computers. The legal issues that face archivists in all their activities, from acquisition to copyright and access, form the content of Gary M. and Trudy Huskamp Peterson's manual, Archives & Manuscripts: Law. This work is particularly noteworthy in the context of security for its discussion of reference service and the law. The Petersons look carefully at reference service, an activity full of potential legal and security problems. As in Walch, the use of registration forms to obtain information about researchers as well as to inform the 68Albin Wagner, "Archival Security and Insecurity," Colorado Libraries (September 1985): 10. 69Wagner, "Insecurity," 11. 70Wagner, "Insecurity," 11. 56 researcher of the rules of the reading room is considered to be crucial. This form is a means to determine the background and research interests of the patron in question. Identification is very important, even if it proves to be false: "Even false information may on occasion help investigators establish a pattern. Some institutions require references, either in the form of a letter of introduction or a list of names provided by the researcher; these are purely an exercise unless the archives has a policy of checking the references."71 The Petersons also assert the need for meticulous record-keeping and the maintaining of these records: "If questions later arise about loss or defacement of materials believed delivered to a researcher, the archives will need to be able to establish clearly what the researcher received to use and what the researcher returned to the archivist providing the service."72 The practice of retaining reference receipts is a very sensible one, allowing a thorough review of past users should items turn up missing. Moreover, the authors suggest that no material be granted to researchers without their first signing call slips, a practice that is gradually taking hold. The ability to observe is a skill needed by most archivists. The Petersons make some excellent suggestions about the observing of patterns of behavior. In addition to registration records and reference receipts, the authors suggest making lists "of known manuscript thieves and of persons who have previously been excluded from the institution for cause (destruction of property, threatening to harm persons, and so on)."73 The authors also suggest an additional precaution of having users sign a register whenever they enter or leave the reading room as a way of determining and understanding patterns of behavior. Such a precaution might seem excessive but it is in fact wise. Such thieves as James Shinn made 71Gary M. Peterson and Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Archives & Manuscripts: Law (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 1985), 74. 72Petersons, Law, 76. "Petersons, Law, 74. 57 multiple research visits to gain the trust of staff before acting. Noting the visits and areas of interest of patrons could be helpful in catching and recovering materials from thieves with this sort of modus operandi. The Petersons also make some useful suggestions concerning the apprehension of a suspected thief, even taking into account the many archives where a single staffer is on duty. Their suggested method is to move the suspect away from the research room to avoid creating a major disturbance.... In general, the approach should be quiet but firm, and the archivist should remember to interrupt the action, keep talking, prevent the researcher from leaving until the issue is resolved, and make sure that there is a credible witness to the discussion (to avoid a case of my-word-against-your-word).... If the room has only one staff member in it at a time, it should be equipped with a buzzer that can be used to signal for help.74 Sally Buchanan's manual on disaster planning, D. L. Thomas's RAMP study and the handbook put together by the Toronto Area Archivists Group (TAAG) represent another kind of literature from the 1980s that can aid in the security of archives. These works really concern conservation and disaster prevention, though theft prevention is briefly addressed in each. This is a fairly traditional method of dealing with security. As Frederick J. Stielow has explained: Archival security is "preservative". It is charged with deterring unwarranted access to and the mutilation or theft of archival materials and, because of the impossibility of immediately differentiating between human and natural causes, its purview must also overlap with disaster preparedness.75 Whether one sees security as a function of processing, conservation, or disaster planning, Sally A. Buchanan's Disaster Planning: Preparedness and Recovery for Libraries 'Petersons, Law, 11-1%. 'Stielow, "Archival Security," 208. 58 and Archives is useful especially in her emphasis on the development of a written plan to "eliminate panic, assure proper decisions... and provide step-by-step instructions which are clear and easy to follow."76 Buchanan here takes a step beyond Walch by accenting the need to codify training and reporting procedures in text form, dividing the process into fact-gathering, collection assessment, and setting priorities before the actual production of the written plan. Buchanan also stresses the need to make "management... willing to commit the financial resources required to make it effective."77 Would that she had given the reader a step-by-step plan for this as well, for budget is crucial to the success of a security program. As Edmund Berkeley, Jr., had suggested earlier: Invite your superiors into your areas at every opportunity. Have coffee with them lunch with them, and lobby them unmercifully. Send them copies of articles on manuscripts, rare books, and the special problems of both. But be sure they develop an appreciation of the concerns... [of] security of archives and manuscripts.78 Buchanan puts a new twist on the idea of the designated security officer by proposing formation of a committee to assist in the planning to be certain that all areas from staff, through collections, to finances are correctly understood. Knowledge and training are strongly emphasized by Buchanan: "Staff who are well-trained are... the best protective measures available, because they can be trained to handle emergencies correctly and competently, reducing the risk considerably."79 Those interested in archival security should pay particular attention to such staff training tools as the emergency information sheet and the telephone list. The sheet "should be one page and easy to use, posted at every telephone, 76Sally A. Buchanan, Disaster Planning: Preparedness and Recovery for Libraries and Archives (Paris: UNESCO, 1987), 7. 77Buchanan, Disaster Planning, 8. 78Berkeley, "Archival Security," 13. 79Buchanan, Disaster Planning, 38. 59 [and] listing the immediate and correct steps to take for collection emergencies. This saves critical time and gives untrained staff brief and concise instructions on how to respond and what to do in case of an emergency."80 The telephone list gives the numbers of key people to contact in those emergency situations, a list headed by the names of local law enforcement officials. If both lists are updated regularly, they could prove invaluable in case of a theft: a staff member suddenly confronted with a suspected theft would know precisely what to do and how to do it. There are many similarities to be found in TAAG's 1985 publication, An Ounce of Prevention: A Handbook of Contingency Planning for Archives, Libraries and Records Centers, and D. L. Thomas's 1987 Study on Control of Security and Storage of Holdings: A RAMP Study with Guidelines. The new slant TAAG offers is the increased stress upon the need to update security plans: "The plan must be periodically updated, preferably each year, to reflect changes in personnel, suppliers, technology and laws... The plan should not be a fixed entity case in stone; it must change with the changing times and circumstances."81 There should be room for adaptability so that the plan can both survive and provide effective protection. D. L. Thomas's study includes the usual topics plus considerable discussion of building design. He also writes of the fear and paranoia related to bad publicity from theft and of a seeming general lack of interest in the topic which has lead to a reduced amount of literature, and that only to be found in rather obscure journals. As Thomas explains the situation: 80Buchanan, Disaster Planning, 19. 81Toronto Area Archivists Group, An Ounce of Prevention (Toronto: Toronto Area Archivists Group Education Foundation, 1985), 3. 60 The problem of providing adequate security has not been widely discussed in archival literature. Evidence from the USA indicates that there is a problem of thefts from archives, but that many institutions are afraid of admitting to losses because of the risk of damaging their reputations or scaring off potential depositors.82 New ideas, as well as restatements of old problems and solutions, are to be found in Frederick J. Stielow's "Archival Security," in Managing Archives and Archival Institutions. Particularly innovative is Stielow's centering on the way an archives enfolds security into its operations. Rather than making security a separate set of duties, Stielow suggests incorporating security into existing functions. This makes it easier for staff to accept and act than if security were to entail separate and additional duties lumped on top of all the work that already needs doing: "Indeed, the heart of a successful security program and a prime daily concern its integration with other ongoing activities."83 In other words, take everyday activities and play up the elements in them relating to security. Take, for example, appraisal. Under this system, "appraisal emerges as central to the security effort."84 It is during appraisal that items are brought under inventory control by recording information which makes it clear the documents belong to the archives, and it is during appraisal that particularly valuable documents can be identified, separated and placed in the vault. In the area of legal issues, Steilow also adds to the traditional recommendations. Stielow's is one of the more extensive discussions on the risk of confronting a suspect: most archivists in the United States are still not free to detain a supposed thief without the dangers of a false arrest suit.... Even in protected areas, archivists should always be tactful, call for assistance, and avoid holding the suspect up to public ridicule. Another rule of thumb... is to be certain to minimize any risk 82D. L. Thomas, Study on Control of Security and Storage of Holdings: A RAMP Study with Guidelines (Paris: UNESCO, 1987), 19. 83Stielow, "Archival Security," 212. '"Stielow, "Archival Security," 213. 61 of physical danger to themselves and others.85 Mention must also be made of Alice Harrison Bahr's piece entitled "The Thief in Our Midst". This piece brings into high relief the theme that those who are most trusted are those to be the most feared by archives ~ many of the thefts are inside jobs committed by staff. Case studies are provided, along with prudent advice. The 1990s: Poised for a Renaissance — Guidelines, Case Studies and a Renewed Call to Action Articles relating to security for archives continue to appear in the 1990s. However, some of the most useful publications are library-related. In particular, the Association of College and Research Libraries Rare Books and Manuscripts Section (hereafter known as RBMS) Security Committee issues and continually revises a series of guidelines.86 Once again, the library world is shown to be more involved with theft prevention than is the 85Stielow, "Archival Security," 216. 86These are ACRL/RBMS Security Committee, "Guidelines Regarding Thefts in Libraries," Mason's interpretation was that "Librarians are much more involved with theft than archives... and have much better control over individual holdings than do archives," while ACRL/RBMS Security Committee head Everett C. Wilkie, Jr., explained that "RBMS seemed more attuned to that [security] concern than was SAA.... And despite the fact that there is an SAA/ALA joint committee, both camps still eye each other warily...."87 As the literature of each camp has so much to offer the other, it is important that cross-camp exchange and collaboration be fostered, and that SAA adopt the RBMS model of interrelated and interdependent guidelines for security and other matters. The RBMS guidelines will be familiar to Walchians, but new emphases and technologies have been added. In the "Guidelines Regarding Thefts in Libraries" heavy emphasis is placed upon the routine operation of cataloging, suggesting that it is a key to security. The guidelines suggest that if "providing complete cataloging records at the point of receipt is not possible, maintaining a brief record of ownership is recommended," and urges that all institutions "eliminate cataloguing backlogs" to bring their holdings under control.88 Gaining control of inventory through random inspections is yet another suggestion made for both catalogued and uncatalogued materials, echoing Frederick Stielow's idea that security should be part of everyday archival functions and not added duties. The "Guidelines for Marking" are being revised to cover both visible markings and, additionally, such hidden identifiers as microembossers, micro-photography, and micro-taggants, recommending that both be used but that "if only one type of mark is to be used, it should be of the readily visible type," 87Mason, telephone conversation; Everett C. Wilkie, Jr., [No Subject], personal e-mail to author, 27 September 1997. 88ACRL/RBMS Security Committee, "Guidelines Regarding Thefts," Gopher. 63 noting the recognition that "Marking is planned disfigurement." The marking guidelines also cycle back to the "Guidelines Regarding Thefts" in noting that "the role of cataloguing in identifying materials should not be overlooked. Accurate and detailed physical descriptions that note anomalies, defects, and other unusual physical characteristics are essential adjuncts to ownership markings."89 Other actions advised by the "Guidelines Regarding Thefts" that extend the Walchian model are those recommending that the librarian "work with the... institutional administration to insure support for prosecution of thieves... [and] work with appropriate institutional, local, and state groups to lobby for strengthening of state laws regarding library thefts and for diligent prosecution of such crimes."90 This work also takes a novel approach in providing a checklist of what to do after a suspected theft has occurred, including notification, collection of evidence, evaluation of evidence and laws, inventory and communication with appropriate outside sources, and handling publicity. An even richer source of information for dealing with the aftermath of a theft is Susan Allen's 1990 article, "Theft in Libraries or Archives." Allen, who coordinates the listserv for Library Security Officers and who is a former head of the ACRL/RBMS Security Committee, believes that there should be three stages to any recovery plan: notification, inventory and chronicling. Allen notes the change in attitude towards notification: Historically libraries and archives have tried to "hush up" thefts.... It is safe to say that this argument no longer holds credibility, nor is it seen as ethical.... The question is no longer a question of whether to notify. Rather it has shifted to a question of who should do the notifying and who should be notified.91 89 ACRL/RBMS Security Committee, "Guidelines for the Security of Rare Book, Manuscript, and Other Special Collections" (draft of 1997-98 revisions as presented to the Committee Session at New Orleans, LA, January 1998). 90ACRL/RBMS Security Committee, "Guidelines Regarding Thefts", Gopher. 91 Susan Allen, "Theft in Libraries or Archives," College & Research Libraries News 51 64 In addition to the usual staff and law-enforcement agencies to be contacted by the Library Security Officer, Allen suggests informing rare book and manuscript dealers and local institutions with similar collections. As she puts it, "one must not forget that other institutions should be notified, especially those in the area with similar collections, for they are likely to be 'hit' as well."92 This procedure may alert some institutions to the fact that they already have been "hit" but have not realized it. Many thefts take time to notice, especially if the holdings are large and numerous. As in the RBMS Guidelines, emphasis is placed by Allen on inventory. Inventory control has been an increasingly common security theme in the 1980s and 1990s. Allen argues that it is important to quickly compile a list of detailed descriptions of the missing material and its estimated value, the latter either being done by the staff or by using an independent insurer's appraisal. If one is "lacking detailed item-specific information, one must... piece together as much as possible from donor files.... In the event that a recovery is made, all of this information will prove invaluable to proving ownership."93 The ability to prove ownership is precisely why inventory control is so crucial. As Edmund Berkeley noted in the mid-1970s: "The weakest link of all may be the quantity of material handled by archivists which frequently prevents them from identifying a specific document as having come from records in their charge. Presenting proof of ownership to the satisfaction of a court is very difficult."94 (November 1990): 940. 92Allen, "Theft in Libraries," 941. 93Allen, "Theft in Libraries," 942. 94Berkeley, "Archivists and Thieves," 206. 65 The spirit of Allen's article is typical of the 1990s. There is a new and positive slant on archival security in this decade, an emphasis on doing rather than planning and reacting. This spirit is also evident in two articles that appeared in the book-trade journal AB Bookman's Weekly, Jacob L. Chernofsky's brief editorial, "Recognizing the Crime of Booktheft," noting that theft is being regarded with increasing seriousness by both the law and librarians, and Ron Lieberman's 1991 article entitled "Security Concerns for Archival Collections." Lieberman, then both head of the ABAA's Security Committee and a member of the ACRL/RBMS Security Committee, also reflects the stronger emphasis on inventory control and a new sense of urgency: "Archivists and librarians must begin today to forcefully assert their ownership of these materials."95 Articles concerning security began to appear in more mainstream journals in the 1990s for the first time in two decades. Vincent A. Totka, Jr.'s article, "Preventing Patron Theft in the Archives: Legal Perspectives and Problems," appeared in The American Archivist in 1993. Totka surveyed 11 member institutions of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin's Area Research Center Network to determine the level of security awareness and theft prevention measures. This group was chosen because it consisted of similar collections with common procedures which were governed by the same laws. What Totka found was that, within this small sample, the archivists surveyed were largely unaware of the laws that could have an impact on their organization... [and] the available tools, such as security policies and procedures, were not being fully employed.... Most security measures are being ignored in the name of providing better access to patrons.96 95Ron Lieberman, "Draft of Security Concerns for Archival Collections," personal e-mail to author, 24 November, 1997. 96Vincent A. Totka, Jr., "Preventing Patron Theft in the Archives: Legal Perspectives and Problems," The American Archivist 56 (Fall 1993): 670. 66 Totka also maintains that although preservation is a great and deep concern of archivists, security is a puzzlingly low priority. He finds these disproportionate levels of concern strange, for a patron with a desire to steal can do just as much damage as a leaky pipe. According to Totka, "many archival repositories in the United States have a disaster plan to cope with flood or fire, but few have a formalized plan to deal with theft."97 Totka argues emphatically that a written security plan is essential and offers many Walchian suggestions as to the content of such a plan. One interesting individual case study of a thief that appeared in The American Archivist in 1990 was Theresa Galvin's "The Boston Case of Charles Merrill Mount: The Archivist's Arch Enemy." Mount was known and trusted as a researcher at both the Library of Congress and the National Archives. Considering him to be above suspicion cost both institutions dearly, as Mount managed to steal manuscripts and documents worth about $100,000. Here, finally, was a clearly written case illustration of the need for automatic and uniform application of rules and regulations to all researchers at all institutions. Another protective measure that can be taken for a collection is insurance, though in these expensive times, many institutions are "self-insured." In 1994 the SAA joined with the Inland Marine Underwriters Association to create Libraries & Archives: An Overview of Risk and Loss Prevention. This collaboration came about because insurance for archives is specialized and falls within the jurisdiction of inland marine class insurance. These policies apparently have the flexibility to be adapted to the needs of individual institutions. The purpose of this publication was to "help insurance, library and archives professionals Totka, "Preventing Patron Theft," 665. 67 understand the risk management process and raise awareness of the importance of loss prevention and control."98 This publication includes a primer on the basics of insurance, including a glossary of insurance terms. It promotes the idea of using insurance for risk management, which means that an institution tries to manage all possible risks by covering them in the insurance policy, except for standard exclusions such as insects or daily use wearing a document down. Much stress is placed on the valuation of the collection. For archives, many items are irreplaceable, and this will affect the amount of insurance to be purchased, as will the mission statement of the institution: This mission will influence the amount of insurance purchased in relation to the value of the collection. For example, the mission of a research institution will likely be preservation of its rare manuscripts, recognizing the fact that the collection can never be replaced or duplicated. The insurance value established might then reflect what it would cost to restore or preserve items damaged... not the value to replace them.99 Although it barely mentions Walch and completely ignores the literature concerning security prior to 1987, Tonya Shockowitz's 1995 article, "Security Issues for Archives, Rare Books and Special Collections: A Bibliographic Essay," is useful. Shockowitz not only gives the reader an overview of the security-related literature from the late 1980s and early 1990s but also reveals some of the major trends in security writings by grouping the works according to theme. She divides the writings into three categories: "issues and trends, a subcategory of which deals with access versus security and personal privacy; particular security methods that are new or deemed by the work's author to be most effective; and 98Inland Marine Underwriters Association, Libraries and Archives: An Overview of Risk and Loss Prevention (New York: Inland Marine Underwriters Association and Society of American Archivists, 1994), 1. "Inland Marine Underwriters Association, Loss Prevention, 7 68 exhaustive guidelines."100 This article is an excellent starting place for research. Moreover, Shockowitz's conclusion supports the idea that awareness and willingness to act was increasing in this time period in the area of archival security: "Although it is difficult to guarantee, the prevailing attitude is that establishing and following policies and procedures can do much to deter thefts."101 In another article from the year 1995, Linda Overman touches on security as a component of preservation, recalling the writings of Buchanan, Thomas, and TAAG. Overman's article, "Managing the Archival Environment: Environmental and Security Issues," makes many of the usual suggestions about restricting access, maintaining records related to circulation and researchers, and creating a written security policy.102 The most informative and thorough compendium of the 1990s was produced by Gregor Trinkaus-Randall for the Society of American Archivists. His 1995 manual, Protecting Your Collections: A Manual of Archival Security, took Walch's work and built upon it, modernizing and updating by incorporating ideas from the writings produced since Walch's initial publication and from Trinkaus-Randall's own experience. Echoing Frederick J. Stielow, Trinkaus-Randall emphatically states the need to consider security a key component of archival work: "This means thinking of archival security as an integral part of an archival program rather than as a form of exterior protection."103 100Tonya Schokowitz, "Security Issues for Archives, Rare Books and Special Collections: A Bibliographic Essay," Current Studies in Librarianship, 19, nos. 1/2 (Spring/Fall 1995): 4. 101Shockowitz, "Security Issues," 10. 102Linda Overman, "Managing the Archival Environment: Environmental and Security Issues," Mississippi Libraries 59, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 38. 103Gregor Trinkaus-Randall, Protecting Your Collections: A Manual of Archival Security (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 1995): 2. 69 Trinkaus-Randall divides his manual into eight sections, each addressing important elements of a security program. Like Walch, Trinkaus-Randall begins by suggesting a security assessment, dividing it up into evaluation of the building's exterior, interior, and then the policies, procedures, and operations of the archives. Thus, "the archivist develops a knowledge of potential problem areas and establishes in his or her mind a priority of security issues that must be addressed."104 The author does stress that his suggestions must be adapted for each institution because each one is unique in its holdings and locations. He also emphasizes cost as a factor, noting that "few repositories can afford to implement all the suggestions put forth in this volume. However, each component must be examined thoroughly and decisions made on its appropriateness and feasibility to that institution and its holdings."105 After proposing restricting access to the stacks as the most effective and easiest first step in any security program, Trinkaus-Randall looks at measures necessary to provide security for the collections. Though there is again emphasis on theft prevention and deterrence, a loud note of realistic practicality is introduced by the author when he states that Preventing theft is a special kind of protection and the archivist must be highly selective in implementing this security. It is impossible to protect properly every item in a repository, even small ones. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the most valuable materials... and provide specifically for their security.106 Familiar suggestions include prevention of access to unprocessed collections, accompanying custodial staff, accurate and timely inventories, separation and extra securing of valuable materials, insurance, and marking based on the ACRL/RBMS guidelines. 104Trinkaus-Randall, Protecting, 8. 105Trinkaus-Randall, Protecting, 5. 106Trinkaus-Randall, Protecting, 9. 70 Security for the stacks is dealt with separately. Closed stacks mean that "archivists are able to keep the use of their materials under control in the reading room.... Patrons must neither be allowed into closed stacks nor permitted to retrieve their own materials."107 The measures involved include key-control policies, careful doling out of materials, even more careful protection of unprocessed materials, and maintenance of circulation records. With reference to staff, he recommends the combination of wariness and collaboration that Walch favored. Security in the reading room is also given a separate section because "the collections of a repository are most vulnerable to theft in the reading room."108 Trinkaus-Randall goes into considerable detail about the procedure for registration, both by providing examples of registration and regulation forms and by suggesting that the archivist discuss the patron's area of research ~ as an aid in doing the work and to note should items in that area later be found missing. In a Buchanan-like vein, another section dwells upon conservation and its relation to security. Environmental control, technology to aid it and creating written disaster plans are considered. Once again, this is security as a component of preservation. Equipment and technology are also the subjects of a section on physical security which demonstrates and provides illustrations of the various types of locks, alarms, and surveillance equipment available in the mid-1990s. In terms of the staff, Trinkaus-Randall makes it clear that even though a designated security officer is responsible for developing a program, the management must back it and the staff must act in concert for it to be implemented effectively. He suggests both training 107Trinkaus-Randall, Protecting, 17. 108Trinkaus-Randall, Protecting, 21. 71 the staff and coaching them on how to explain procedures to the patrons and how to apply them uniformly. He also suggests giving them a legal background and proper methods in handling the papers for conservation's sake. Conservation is why only staff should photocopy the papers (he does not mention that patron photocopying provides a prime opportunity to switch the photocopy and the original). Unlike Walch, Trinkaus-Randall gives attention to methods of patron education. In addition to the usual posting of rules and explanations by staff, he suggests making them the focus of a public-relations campaign and having exhibits or posters that highlight "damage that has been done to books, documents and photographs."109 An entire section is devoted to what to do when a suspected theft occurs. After laying out a few different ways in which a theft might be discovered (e.g., notification by dealers or just noticing), Trinkaus-Randall gets to the heart of the matter, which is recovery: "the recovery of stolen or damaged materials will depend on quick action, bolstered by a written security plan and previous contacts with book and manuscript dealers, auctioneers, the police... and prosecutors."110 His suggestions for action are in concurrence with Susan Allen's suggestions in that he discusses notification, inventorying and then chronicling as the three main stages, as well as her emphasis on not hushing up the theft and her recommendations as to which organizations should be told of the theft. Trinkaus-Randall provides many excellent models in his appendices. He has included Walch's security checklist, Burke and Adeloye's suggested background check form, and the Smithsonian Office of Protection Services collection management guidelines, internal theft prevention guide and protection rule guides. He also has included the text of 109Trinkaus-Randall, Protecting, 41. 110Trinkaus-Randall, Protecting, 63. 72 the Massachusetts laws on library and archive crime, a brief emergency action plan from a museum manual, and a bibliography that is both deep and extensive. Particularly innovative are the author's suggestions as to patterns that can alert an archivist to possible insider thefts. These patterns include "materials... consistently not found in their usual location... the same person consistently reports items missing... there appears to be a deliberate attempt to confuse records... a staff member develops personal collecting interests quite similar to the repository."111 The year 1997 also saw publication of articles on library and manuscript theft in Harvard Magazine and in Art & Antiques. Christopher Reed's "Biblioklepts" in Harvard Magazine documents the rise in thefts from university libraries and their reactions to the problem. Reed provides a selection of thefts from university collections, most culled from a chronological log of thefts which has been kept by the ACRL/RBMS Security Committee since 1987. As Associate Harvard College Librarian Lawrence Dowler states in the article, "the seriousness of library theft reached a point where people agree we've got to start publicizing it and be a lot more aggressive about it."112 Reed surmises that the discovery of the crimes of Stephen Blumberg have led to this attitude adjustment. He implies that when it was discovered how many institutions had material pilfered by Blumberg and how vulnerable they all were, there was a lessening of reticence to speak out. This discovery also served as a wake-up call for law enforcement agencies. In fact, the final message of this piece is a •••Trinkaus-Randall, Protecting, 64. 112Dowler, quoted in Christopher Reed, "Biblioklepts," Harvard Magazine (March/April 1997): 48. It should be noted that in July, 1997, Jose Torres-Carbonnel was sentenced to imprisonment followed by deportation and was ordered to pay restitution to Harvard of $601,987, for stealing an estimated 1,500 books, prints, and maps. 73 ringing endorsement of vigilance because, as Blumberg himself said, "I never saw it so much as a matter of poor security.... To me it was a matter of opportunity."113 "The Paper Chase," a profile of Princeton University art history professor and "manuscript sleuth" James Marrow, also points to increased awareness and an improvement in the handling of the problem of theft. Author Benjamin Ivry sees a dim future for manuscript thievery, "thanks to better public awareness, increased reporting of stolen goods, and more knowledgeable buyers.... Many manuscript collections... now routinely microfilm their manuscripts, which means stolen leaves can be identified more easily."114 Ivry's article offers one unique (though slightly ungainly) suggestion for protecting a manuscript collection: an effective security measure now in effect at the British Library, London: Each manuscript is precisely weighed before and after it is consulted by a researcher, so a thief would have to replace whatever was removed with a page of exactly the same weight, which would be unlikely in the extreme."115 The existence of the Ivry and Reed articles are illustrations of a more popular awareness of theft from libraries and archives, and a new determination to crack down on it. Richard Strassberg, a longtime activist in the archival security field and the man responsible for the rebirth of the SAA's Security Roundtable, also seems to agree that awareness has increased, but holds that even greater vigilance is necessary. In his comprehensive 1997 essay, "The Final Barrier: Security Consideration in Restricted Access U3Reed, "Biblioklepts," 55. Blumberg has been at it again, though not with books and manuscripts this time. He was arrested in Des Moines on December 11,1997, on the charge of 3rd degree burglary for stealing brass knobs and other items from a vacant apartment building (Eileen Brady, "Blumberg Arrested," Exlibris listserv, 14 December 1997, archived at Reading Rooms," Strassberg notes that restricted access is a good start, but it isn't enough. He then takes certain standard and essential security suggestions and both extends and modernizes them. Technological changes and their impact on security play an important role in Strassberg's piece. For example, while expressing support of researcher registration and verifying of identification, he gives heavy consideration to the type presented: As a result of the great proliferation of scanners, color photocopiers, printers, and laminators and the ease of photographic manipulation using PC technology, a professional thief can simply and inexpensively forge letterheads and a variety of faculty, student and other work-related identification.116 Strassberg counters by requiring two forms of identification, suggesting that one of these be a government-issued photo id such as a driver's license or passport, which can be verified by a staff member while the researcher is in the reading room. Additionally, there should be a written policy explaining what to do in the case of suspected false identification. Technological advances can help to improve surveillance. Strassberg describes advances in closed-circuit television which create the capability for zooming in on suspicious-seeming patrons and recording their behavior on an attached VCR. Another technology-related change that might seem small but is inexpensive and could be crucial is the use of colored paper in Xerox machines in the reading room should self-service photocopying be allowed. This will "enable staff to easily distinguish between originals and photocopies. The used of colored copier paper... is especially important if photocopying on white archival bond is used by a repository as a conservation technique...."117 Shocking-pink ll6Richard Strassberg, "The Final Barrier: Security Considerations in Restricted Access Reading Rooms," in Reference Services for Archives and Manuscripts, ed. Laura B. Cohen (New York: The Haworth Press, 1997), 97. 117Strassberg, "Final Barrier," 101. 75 paper is much easier to spot as an obvious copy. More small but clever measures like this are needed in the war against archival theft. Strassberg maintains that an alert staff, thinking and observing, is more effective than any fancy surveillance system. Patterns of behavior should be studied; the same standards should be applied to all patrons; and staff surveillance should be active. Strassberg suggests strolling the room and masking the intent to undertake surveillance by asking some readers if they need more materials. He insists that not all thieves have their greedy eyes on whole manuscripts. Ephemera and components of documents can be just as stealable, among them "envelopes (covers) with or without postage stamps on them... picture postcards (used or unused), postal cards (used or unused), stamps (postage or revenue type), coins, currency... greeting cards... and ephemera."118 In his section of theft response, Strassberg cautions that reports to professional organizations and colleagues should not be made until the police grant permission to do so. He also provides lists of listserv addresses and web sites to be added to one's traditional theft reporting places. However, Strassberg does warn that "caution should be exercised in mentioning the names of individuals suspected of theft unless they have been arrested to avoid libel suits. Premature public announcement, moreover, may warn thieves that you are on to them."119 Instead he suggests calling colleagues in the region who manage similar collections of material and describing the last known user of the materials. At this point in time, the topic of archival security seems poised for a renaissance. Through much hard work and dedication, Richard Strassberg has just established a Security Roundtable for the SAA and has created a listserv devoted to archival security. The articles 118Strassberg, "Final Barrier," 96. 119Strassberg, "Final Barrier," 103. 76 written in this decade indicate an increasing awareness and willingness to act. More attention and serious consideration has been given to the issue as articles about it have moved from important but more obscure journals to the mainstream organ of the Society of American Archivists, The American Archivist. There is a body of literature that certainly provides sufficient guidance in what the archivist ought to do. The next step is to discover, not what archivists have written or read about what they ought to do, but what in fact they do and don't do about archival security. Reviewing the Literature: Issues to Explore While reading the literature, it became clear that certain issues were more prominent than others. They kept rearing their heads again and again like determined dandelions in an otherwise tidy and weed-free lawn. As the next chapter presents a detailed discussion of the creation of the survey, these issues will be touched on but lightly here. The existence of a written policy denotes not only planning but also a serious enough consideration of security to warrant codification of rules and procedures. Walch and many writers after him suggested a policy and a scrutinizing security officer (or in Sally A. Buchanan's case a committee) as the fundamental starting point for a good security program. Discovering how many archivists have actually taken this first step would go a long way towards measuring the gap between theory and practice. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, an emphasis on inventory control, ideally from the moment of acquisition, informed the security writings of such authors as Thomas W. Shaughnessy, Frederick J. Stielow, Susan Allen, and the RBMS Security Committee in its 77 Guidelines. Determining to what degree archivists actually have their inventories under control and how they manage them seems very important. To protect a collection, one must know what is in the collection. Control could be accomplished at the moment of acquisition, as suggested by Stielow, Shaugnessy, Gandert, and Allen, or by reinventorying, as noted by the "RBMS Guidelines Regarding Thefts in Libraries." Careful description and knowledge of holdings is vital in the literature — but is such the case with practicing archivists? Does the concept of "inventory control" lead to sufficiently detailed finding aids or accession records for law-enforcers to use easily in recovering stolen materials. Does that concept also lead to a review of materials recently used by patrons to be certain that nothing is missing? The topic of inventory control harkens back to older issues related to archival materials such as marking. Whether or not to mark items and how to go about it has been frequently discussed in the literature from John F. Reed in the 1970s to Everett C. Wilkie, Jr., in 1998. Suggested policies on marking also have increasingly emphasized hidden marks to aid in recovery after a theft, as well as obvious marks as a deterrent to theft. Because of its longevity and importance as a topic in the literature of archival security, it is necessary to determine whether or not archivists today mark their collections. Similarly, the literature notes that as technology improves, a multiplicity of ways become available to duplicate the more valuable items in archives. Walch and Trinkaus-Randall recommend the replacement of valuable originals with copies, which are less tempting to would-be thieves. Do archivists follow their advice? Attention to documents has come to mean not only those in the archives, but also those records that the literature suggests be created for each patron. From Mason and Walch 78 in the 1970s to the Petersons in the 1980s and Trinkaus-Randall in the 1990s, the literature stresses that patrons should be made to sign call slips and that staff members should make note of each patron request that is filled. The literature also emphasizes that these records should be maintained indefinitely, so that suspects can be eliminated or incriminated in case of a theft. What patron records do archivists maintain? The behavior of patrons in regard to archival materials, the latitude that they are allowed and the rules, and the procedures they are asked to follow also fine emphasis within the literature of archival security. Do archivists research patrons' backgrounds, insist upon presentation of personal identification, or require a witnessed reading and signing of rules before patrons can begin research? The literature also points up other suggestions and technological developments related to patron treatment. Many writers, including Walch, the Petersons, and, recently, Richard Strassberg, have declared the need for vigilant observation of patrons. Can archivists actually manage this, and, if so, how do they go about it? What, if any, technology (such as closed-circuit television) is used? And are there patrons whom one does not observe? Throughout the decades, writers such as John M. Kinney, Slade Richard Gandert, and Vincent A. Totka, Jr., have warned archivists to be suspicious and to apply all rules evenhandedly to all researchers. Have these goals been achieved in real archives? With reference to patron theft, the literature places much emphasis on the need for training so that the correct actions would be taken should a suspected theft occur or an actual theft be discovered. Determining whether archivists would know what to do and whom to contact in the midst or aftermath of a theft helps reveal how close the literature's imperatives are to actual practice. So too is ascertaining whether or not archives actually prosecute 79 thieves, a punitive and preventive measure strongly suggested by such writers as Alan Jay Lincoln and John Jenkins. Discovering to whom thefts are reported will also serve as a roundabout way to gauge the closeness of archivists' relations with their administrators — do they report thefts to them? Are the lines of communication open? Has the advice of Sally A. Buchanan, Renata Rutledge, and Edmund Berkeley, Jr., been followed? Have strong ties been made with the people who control the budget? The availability of information is also an issue to be tackled. Do archivists agree with Benjamin Ivry and Christopher Reed's shared viewpoint that in the 1990s theft is not only admitted to but publicized? Has the code of silence ended? Or is that merely wishful thinking? Are thefts actually discussed within the archival community? Finally, after so much of the literature has told archivists what they should do, the archivists will have a chance in the survey to say what they think should be done. They should have a say about their various security needs, desires and concerns, No article has yet served that particular purpose for archivists, especially for a sizable group of them. This group of issues is merely the tip of a huge iceberg. Much investigation into actual practice needs to be done, but no single survey instrument can cover all of them - it would be too onerous and time-consuming for most archivists to bother to complete it. The literature reviewed above has illustrated which issues and trends have endured through the decades. The purpose of the survey detailed in the next chapter is to reveal the extent to which this advice has been followed or implemented, and, if not, what measures are taken in its place. It is time to move from theory into practice and to begin to discover what archivists actually do in terms of security relating to the prevention and detection of thefts, 80 the recovery from their aftermath, and the punishment of their perpetrators. It is time to turn to the survey for some answers. 81 CHAPTER IV The Questionnaire: Design, Implementation and Analysis of the Results The literature and history of archival and library security give a fine and clear sense of what ought to be done in the best of all possible worlds. The question remains: what in fact is being done to combat theft after two decades of writing and talking about it? The people in the field who either were or are most concerned with security matters ranged in belief from cautiously optimistic to disgusted and despairing. Accordingly, it seemed wise to construct a questionnaire in the hopes of gaining some insight into actual practices. This effort obviously would be both preliminary and heuristic, rather than being constructed in an attempt to prove a series of assumptions. In designing this questionnaire it was decided to concentrate on practices concerning materials and patrons, the nexus where the collections and researchers meet and theft can most easily occur. The questionnaire could not survey all aspects of security without overburdening the recipients and causing them to discard rather than answer it. Thus it was decided to downplay such aspects of security as hardware, legal, and staff matters and to concentrate on the archives and the patrons. The questionnaire was deliberately constructed along Walchian lines, and three questions concerning Walch and other SAA literature were 82 included. It also was decided to ask, without being invasive, about actual thefts in the past 20 years, for data is sadly lacking. Before discussing the specifics of the questionnaire and its results, a few words must be said about the methodological bases upon which the questionnaire, its code book, and its textual definitions were constructed. In addition to such standard works as Babbie, Dillman, Berdie et al, Sudman and Bradburn, and Lockhart,1 useful information for the design of the questionnaire came from such diverse sources as a series of Florida Cooperative Extension Service circulars, a note on response scales by National Computer Systems (which resulted in a combination of 4- and 5-point scales being used for certain ordinal-level variables within the questionnaire), and an online workbook on the subject of questionnaires by Alison Galloway.2 As completed, the questionnaire3 contained 13 questions, most of them multi-part; each respondent could check or write in up to 102 items. The sections of the questionnaire 1 Earl R. Babbie, Survey Research Methods (Belmont CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1973); Don A. Dillman, Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978); Douglas R. Berdie, John F. Anderson, and Marsha A. Niebuhr, Questionnaires: Design and Use, 2d Ed (Metuchen NJ: The Scarecrow Press, 1986); Seymour Sudman and Norman M. Bradburn, Asking Questions: A Practical Guide to Questionnaire Design (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1982). 2 W. R. Summerhill and C. L. Taylor, "Writing Questions for Mail Questionnaires," Circular PE-16 (Gainesville: University of Florida, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, October 1992); Summerhill and Taylor, "Formatting a Mail Questionnaire," Circular PE-17 (Gainesville: University of Florida, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, October 1992); Summerhill and Taylor, "Writing Options for Mail Questionnaires," Circular PE-18 (Gainesville: University of Florida, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, October 1992); National Computer Systems Corporation (NCS), Research Notes NCS, "Response Scales: How Many Points and What Labels?" The various sections of Question 4 were designed to discover how many of the institutions had followed the basic Walchian tenets of having a written policy and a security officer, and whether the policy was an ongoing effort. The multi-part Question 5 was meant to discover what anti-theft procedures are being used with reference to collection materials themselves. Then Questions 6 through 8.3 begin with questions about anti-theft procedures concerning patrons and move on to the interaction between patrons and materials. Questions 8.4 through 8.8 examine the exit check and its ramifications in law and training. Theft reporting is the subject of Question 9; and Question 10 touches upon possible variations in reporting procedures should staff be involved in a theft. Actual thefts, recovery, and prosecution are the subjects of the eight parts of Question 11. Question 12 attempts to elicit each respondent's opinions about his/her collection's standing with reference to anti-theft procedures (parts a.-e.) and about awareness of and the availability of information concerning anti-theft matters (parts f.-p). The final question aims to bring forth the respondent's opinion about need in the security area. Because of time constraints, the pilot or test group for the completed questionnaire was very small and did not represent a random sample. Rather, the test group consisted of four archivists, two of whom were deeply entrenched in security matters, and two of whom were not. All of them took between 20 and 25 minutes to complete the questionnaire; instructions and questions were deemed to be clear. The two archivists who were expert in security matters each made suggestions for additional questions, some of which were implemented, thereby improving the final questionnaire. 84 As a sample population, the membership of the SAA's Section 8, Manuscript Repositories, seemed the obvious choice for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the very fact of its being a section of the SAA, which had originated the anti-theft initiatives two decades ago. Because documents and manuscripts are the natural targets of literary-historical thieves, and because repositories of documents and manuscripts are to be found in a wide variety of institutions, both public and private, this particular section seemed the best choice, even though some of its members work under the rubric of "special collections" in libraries rather than archives as such.4 Some winnowing was done before mailing took place. Omitted were those Section 8 members who had no institutional affiliation, strictly governmental bodies like the National Archives (these on the grounds that such bodies are subject to generalized government regulations), and duplicate members from the same archives or institution. At the end of this process, 234 questionnaires were mailed out, of which 99 were returned.5 Of these, 94 were used to tabulate results; 2 were returned uncompleted by respondents to whom they no longer applied because they had just changed professions; and 3 arrived well after the deadline for returns and the tabulation of results — too late to include but still useful for their comments. In all, then, 40% of the possible respondents returned valid, usable questionnaires. This rate of return meant that generalizations from data are valid 19 times out of 20, plus or minus 7.5%. 4 The SAA Executive Office was wonderfully helpful and supportive, providing absolutely up-to-date mailing labels and accurate information. 5 No returned questionnaires were damaged in the course of mailing, quite possibly because of the use of self-sealing envelopes made of Tyvek® for returning them. 85 The results of the 94 usable questionnaires were entered into SYSTAT®6 data files on a question-by-question basis. The data then was "cleaned" by printing the files out and looking at them, creating and checking frequency tables for all variables in all files, creating some contingency tables (crosstabulation) to check numbers of results, and comparing a random sample of responses in the files to the original questionnaires.7 The data then were analyzed descriptively, in the main using frequency tables, graphing, and crosstabulation, utilizing SYSTAT®. The remainder of this chapter presents the results of these activities. Of the 90 archives or collections defining themselves (see Figure 1), 46 were part of institutions concerned with higher education; 26 of these named subject specialties, ranging from Africana and Architecture through Labor and Local History to University Archives and Women's History. Historical societies accounted for 17 responses. There were 4 returned questionnaires from private archives. Corporate archives contributed 3 responses. Religious archives provided 8 responses. No law archives responded. Museum archives sent back 4 questionnaires, and archives or collections in public libraries returned 11. It should be noted that 3 respondents did not provide information on institutional type. 6 As a SYSTAT® novice, the author made extensive use of the following in working with the data in the returned questionnaires: Kenneth N. Berk, Introductory Statistics with SYSTAT®, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998; Leland Wilkinson, Grant Blank, and Christian Gruber, Desktop Data Analysis with SYSTAT®, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996. 7 A good exposition of the cleaning process, with suggestions for identifying problems, is National Computer Systems Corporation (NCS), Research Notes NCS, "Cleaning Your Data," l=educational institution 5=religious archives 2=historical society 6=museum archives 3=private archives 8=public library 4=corporate archives Figure 1 87 The respondents noted that 48% of them belonged to a professional staff numbering 2-4, 35% to a staff larger than 4, and 16% held the fort alone. This was an experienced group: 26.6% of them had more than 21 years of experience in archives; 30.9% between 16-21 years. Thus, a full 57% of them were practicing archivists when the SAA anti-theft initiatives were fairly new. None of the respondents has less that one year's experience; and only 21.3% of them had less than 7 years' experience. Given the large number of respondents who are affiliated with institutions of higher education and the large number of highly experienced archivists who took the time to answer the questionnaire, it is surprising to note that only 33, or 35.1%, of all the archives or collections reporting, have written security policies. It is even more surprising that only 19 (41.3%) of the 46 representatives of institutions of higher education have written policies, while 27 (58.7%) do not. In conversation before the questionnaire was constructed, a number of archivists at such institutions ~ all of which did have written security polities — expressed the belief that of course all university archives have written policies. As the graph below (Figure 2) indicates, no policy holds the majority in every category of institution reporting except for museum archives: 88 Archives and Theft Policies Written Policy? • 2, NO • 1, YES 01 23456789 TYPARC l=educational institution 5=religious archives 2=historical society 6=museum archives 3=private archives 8=public library 4=corporate archives Figure 2 In addition to noting the absolute faith of those at religious archives in their patrons, it is it is interesting to compare this chart with that for the incidence of theft by type of institution: 89 Thefts by Type of Institution Thefts? a 2, NO • 1, YES • ., MISSING l=educational institution 5=religious archives 2=historical society 6=museum archives 3=private archives 8=public library 4=corporate archives Figure 3 As Figure 3 shows, of 46 institutions of higher education, 19 had policies and 26 experienced thefts; 11 of these had both policies and thefts. Were there differences between the thefts from this class of institutions with policies and those without? First let us take a look at what was stolen in these thefts. Institutions with policies mainly suffered thefts of printed materials. In one instance important manuscripts and books were taken; in another maps were razored from books; in a third a calling card laid into a bound volume was taken. In all but two instances, the thefts 90 were discovered quickly, often within a day, and once before the perpetrator had left the reading room. In one instance only was the alert made by outsiders, in this instance reported to the collection by a dealer. There seemed to be no conspicuous difference at all in the rate of recovery or prosecution between institutions with and without policies. More commercially valuable material seemed to be stolen from institutions of this class which did not have policies. Valuable manuscript leaves or holograph letters were stolen in 5 of the 15 instances. Maps were stolen in two instances. Some of the thefts were minor: one institution even reported the theft of liner notes to a CD, noting "typical student behavior. Easily replaced materials." One institution noted the theft of erotica materials by construction workers, a theft billed to and paid for by the construction company. The striking difference between archives and collections at institutions of higher education with policies and without them in the event of theft is in the area of discovery. In 7 of 15 instances, the institutions without policies were informed of the thefts by others: the FBI, other institutions, or dealers. This contrasts sharply with the 1 in 11 in the institutions with written policies; the other 10 were discovered within the institution itself. Interestingly enough, this is the only significant difference; comparisons of practices related to the handling of materials and patrons yielded no statistically significant differences, although it was noted that slightly more marking is being done by institutions that have policies. Perhaps such unquantifiable factors as attitude and awareness make the discovery rate higher in institutions that have policies. The materials and patrons sections lead the researcher to conclude that some Walchian principles have become common practice. In terms of materials, about two-thirds of the respondents were confident that their accession records (27% Always, 42.6% 91 Sometimes8) and finding aids (14.9% - A, 63.8% - S) are sufficiently detailed and that they have identified most of the items of potential commercial value (19.1% - A, 45.7% - S). For items of unusual commercial or research value, scanning is not a technology that is favored in archives - - only 7 respondents scan with some regularity, with 9 more doing so on rare occasions; the photocopy remains the favorite duplicating method (8.5% - A, 73.4% - S), though many archives and collections microfilm materials (4.3% - A, 46.8% - S). The replacement of items of unusual commercial value with some sort of image facsimile is always done 9.6% of the time and sometimes done 59.6% of the time, and sequestration is almost as popular. Packaging ( 33% - S), calendaring (1.1% - A, 29.8% - S), and marking (4.3% - A, 29.8% - S) are only practiced by about a third of the respondents, while noting distinctive physical characteristics in accession records or finding aids is done less often (4.3%-A, 21.3%-S). There is much more agreement and uniformity in the handling of patrons with reference to security matters than there is about materials. In most instances, the "always" had by far the greatest number of responses. When the patron arrives, he or she may well be required to submit ID (52.1% - A, 12.8% - S), which one hopes will be genuine, as addresses and affiliations probably will not have been verified beforehand (17.0% - A, 9.6% - S). The interview and orientation to the archives or collection is an aid to access as well as security, and thus is always undertaken by 59.6% of the archives or collections surveyed, and sometimes undertaken by another 29.8% of them. Copying materials for patrons (61.7% - A, 25.5% - S) and observing each patron at all times (59.6% - A, 28.7% - S) are similarly popular activities, though having patrons leave belongings in a secure place outside the 8 Hereafter, within parentheses, Always may be expressed as A, and Sometimes as S. 92 archives (68.1% - A, 11.7% - S), making records of each patron request (71.3% - A, 11.7% - S), and retaining patron-use records indefinitely (69.1% - A, 5.3% - s) come close. The importance of having call slips signed (59.6% - A, 6.4% - S) is not quite so well understood. As with scanning, the introduction of such tools as closed-circuit television is slow in coming (11.7% - A, 3.2% - S). The figures for patrons using only copies of commercially valuable material (7.4% - A, 44.7% - S) makes one wonder what is happening to some of those photocopies and microfilms, for the figures for photocopying and replacement of materials are higher than the answer to the equivalent question in the patron section. The reviewing by folder or box for completeness of materials before (12.8% - A, 29.8% - S) and after (25.4% - A, 35.1% - S) use seems a somewhat happier prospect than does reviewing heavily used materials against finding aids (31.9% say "Yes"). It is easier to concentrate on patrons than materials — there are fewer of them. Access is a prime tenet of the archivist's faith. The paradox is that access becomes more difficult if one has to concentrate on protecting the material from the patron rather than on processing the material to a greater extent (e.g., marking, measuring, describing defects), thus enabling fewer strictures on the patron. Much of the problem may lie in the size of the budget. The answers to the question "How often is your archives/collection physically reviewed against its finding aids or re-inventoried?" throw this problem into relief. Of the 89 respondents who wrote in their answers, 34 said "never", and another 11 were in the "hardly ever" or "rarely" category. Typical comments were: "Are you serious? This has never been done in our 22 year history. Can't imagine us ever having the staff or the time to do so. Who does?" or "We barely have time to inventory the first time, much less to re-inventory" or "Review?? You must be kidding." No time, no staff, too much other work: such was the 93 three-part refrain. Several other archives indicated that only when there was an obvious problem was there any review. A total of 3 archives engage in the review process continuously; other typical answers were: every 5 years or when collections relocated; when space becomes a problem; when inventory-level descriptions are added to the computer. When asked to respond directly to the statement "The security budget needs to be increased," 14 of those returning questionnaires did not respond or expressed no opinion. Agreement with this statement was expressed by 28 of the 46 institutions of higher education (15 of them strongly), while 14 disagreed (2 strongly). The 17 historical societies had 9 in agreement (3 strongly) and 4 in some disagreement (but none strongly). Only 1 private archives agreed (not strongly), while 2 were in some disagreement. The lone corporate respondent disagreed with the statement. Of the 8 religious archives or collections, 3 agreed (3 strongly) and 4 disagreed, (2 strongly). Three of the museums agreed (none strongly); none disagreed. The 11 public libraries were affirmative in the extreme, with 8 of them agreeing (2 strongly) and only 2 disagreeing. Although these numbers must be approached with care, they do point to a felt need for budget increases, especially when the numbers are combined with the comments. The situation was summarized succinctly by one respondent: "The biggest risk of theft stems from the under-processed status of many of our important collections, and the lack of financial support for additional staff to improve arrangement and description of these collections, and thus our knowledge of their contents." Moreover, if marking, calendaring, and/or the noting of physical peculiarities is not part of the original processing (and in two-thirds of the archives responding they were not) and if no re-inventorying can be done, the potential problems in an evidentiary sense of proving that a stolen item really does 94 belong to an archives, or even knowing that it has been stolen, become large indeed. This being the situation, it is difficult to understand why only 22% of the respondents disagreed with the statement "The highest-ranking officials of this institution support the implementation of anti-theft procedures," for real support has a strong budgetary component. Concentrating on the patron component of security also has its pitfalls. In speaking about the convicted thief Daniel Speigelman, who stole US$1.4 million in rare manuscripts, documents, maps and books from Columbia University, the director of Columbia's manuscript and special collections, Jean Ashton9, pointed out that Speigelman was found to have 12 valid-seeming but forged Columbia identification cards. Professional thieves are both imaginative and sophisticated. As Everett C. Wilkie, Jr., in his capacity as chair of the ACRL/RBMS Security Committee, has pointed out, "the hand is unfortunately quicker than the eye, and sometimes the best of watching does no good." He recounts two such instances, noting that in the second instance: After the staff became suspicious of him, the manuscripts he requested were checked before they were delivered to him. Reading room staff were alert, of course. Yet, when the mss were turned back in, it was discovered that he had managed to steal some right from under our noses.10 9 Note that Ashton assumed the Columbia job after these thefts had taken place and that her heroic efforts have resulted in the recovery of 90% of the material stolen and in possible new precedents concerning the seriousness of crimes involving documents whose cultural value is more important than their commercial value (Ashton to ACRL/RBMS Security Committee meeting, January 20,1998). The case citation is United States of America v. Daniel Speigelman, 97 Crim 309 (LAK). 10Everett C. Wilkie, Jr., "Re: Theft Alert," Exlibris listserv, 11 December 1993, archived at Wilkie wryly comments that it might be a good idea to give "thieves an all-expense paid trip to one of our annual meetings and let them show us all how they do it. It would be cheaper and less frustrating than dealing with the aftermath of their activities."11 If a thief does steal from the reading room, he or she has a good chance of getting away from half of the surveyed institutions of higher education, historical societies, and public libraries, for there will be no checking by an exit attendant; 3 of the small respondent group from private archives have exit attendants; but only 1 of the 8 religious institutions reporting has an exit check. Again here the data becomes too sparse to be significant, but it does seem that not much training is taking place in terms of the proper actions that they may safely and legally take. Reporting a theft is most typically done to one's supervisor (75%). A security department or law-enforcement agency typically is informed by the archivist directly about half the time. Dealers are underutilized by the respondent group: they are contacted by 13 institutions of higher education, 7 public libraries, 3 historical societies, 2 religious archives, and 1 each of private libraries and museums. Only 15 respondents report to insurance companies (3 institutions of higher education, 4 historical societies, 5 public libraries, 2 religious archives, and 1 museum archives), which most probably is a reflection of the trend toward "self-insurance" by institutions or the very large deductibles for those which have outside insurance. Almost 40% of all institutions would publicize a theft within the organization or would call or write other archivists at other institutions, which, if the writings in the field are to be believed, is certainly an improvement over the past. Internet postings would be made by 18 of the respondents, but only 6 would publicize a theft in the media. "Wilkie, "Re: Theft Alert," 11 December 1993. 96 When one considers the frequency with which thefts become known to archives solely because a law-enforcement agency, a dealer, or another archivist calls and informs the plundered archives that they should check their holdings, it becomes apparent that archivists should inform representatives of all of those groups whenever they experience a theft. The two questions about "insider" theft were obviously uncomfortable for the respondents. Most of the comments were terse: "situational"; "human resources would be brought in". The majority of the comments were to the effect that greater discretion would be used. In 2 instances, the employee's tasks might be changed. Of the 43 cases of known theft by outsiders that were reported by the respondents, 26 have already been treated with reference to institutions of higher education. The remaining thefts were: rare map; important documents; leaf recording a historically significant baseball game; rare book; valuable picture postcard; biographical file; items from many collections, many with signatures of well-known people; an old ballot box that had been on display; materials relating to the "Old West"; pamphlets; autographed books stolen by a staff member; photographic material, and more documents with signatures of well-known people. Other than those undertaken by archives in institutions of higher education, prosecutions were made by 2 historical societies and 2 public libraries only. Over the full range of institutions (see Figure 4 below), the reasons for no prosecution in other cases ranged from lack of evidence to "no backup from administration to proceed further" to "aberrant behavior at a difficult time," and "material was returned so local District Attorney declined to prosecute." The most troubling cases were those in which the identity of the perpetrator was known but no action was taken, either because a chain of evidence could not be constructed or because somebody did not think that prosecution was worthwhile. 97 Whether the reason be the District Attorney's budget, the administrator's fear of publicity, or modern society's tendency to explain away criminal behavior as illness, every failure to prosecute a theft from an archives makes the next theft more difficult to prosecute successfully. Prosecutions of Thieves by Institutions 25 "i r i—i—r 20 h 15k o O 101- Thief Prosecuted? • 2, NO IrL • IkJ • LYES 01 23456789 TYPARC l=educational institution 2=historical society 3=private archives 4=corporate archives 5=religious archives 6=museum archives 8=public library Figure 4 On a slightly happier note, as Figure 5 shows, in half the cases reported by archives other than those at institutions of higher education, material was recovered. 98 Recovery of Stolen Material by Institution 301—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i 20 h o O 10 Recovered? G3 2, NO • 1, YES mi • ., MISSING 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TYPARC l=educational institution 2=historical society 3=private archives 4=corporate archives 5=religious archives 6=museum archives 8=public library Figure 5 The final series items in the questionnaire called for conjectural responses - an opinion or sense of a situation in each case. When asked whether their collections were well protected against theft, strong agreement or agreement was expressed by 23 (of 45) respondents at educational institutions, 10 (of 17) at historical societies, 1 (of 4) at private 99 archives, 1 (of 1) at corporate archives, 4 (of 8) religious archives, 2 (of 4) museum archives, and 4 (of 11) archives at public libraries. The same 4 archives at public libraries thought they had sufficient staff, but the numbers fell slightly in all other categories. While some 50% of the combined categories believed that their archives were well-protected, 44% found the staffing level to be sufficient. As might be expected, only 3 of the 15 archives with a 1-person staff thought that level sufficient, though 9 deemed their archives to be well-protected. When it comes to training, 37 archives or collections, 42.6%, said that training at anti-theft procedures is adequate. Reviews of procedures, however, happen in 29 archives or collections, or 30.8%. The respondents were cautious when it came to questions that moved beyond the walls of their archives and asked them to evaluate "most archivists/manuscript curators in the USA." Opinion was almost equally divided on over-all familiarity with Walch and other SAA security publications, but 24.5% of the sample said they had no opinion. Fully one-third of the respondents had no opinion about whether their peers implemented the policies and procedures recommended by these publications; and 45.5% were at least somewhat dubious about such implementation. There was mild agreement that their peers have input in determining anti-theft policies at their institutions. Only a quarter of the group deems it easy to find information about the anti-theft problems of their peers, although 44.7% of those surveyed discuss anti-theft procedures with staff at other institutions. Only 21% easily find information about state laws affecting theft in archives/collections, and almost all of these work in universities, historical societies, or public libraries. A listserv seems a good idea to 59 (64.9%) of those polled. This group, however, has not been spending its time surfing the web for theft matters: 42 (44.7%) of them have no opinion 100 about fragmentation, though nobody at all disagreed with the proposition that Internet "information on specifically archival/collection theft matters is fragmented." There was a bit more range of opinion on the timeliness of such information on the Internet: here 60 (63.8%) had no opinion, 2 (2.1%) strongly agreed, 22 (23.4%) agreed, 4 (4.3%) disagreed, 1 (1.1%) strongly disagreed, and the remaining 5 did not answer. Why this lack of opinion? On such matters as the listserv and the Internet, the explanation may be akin to that for scanning and the use of closed-circuit television: technology seems to move into manuscript repositories at a stately pace, perhaps slightly hobbled by lack of budget. The rest of these answers, however (and this impression is heightened by the responses to the final question about each respondent's most pressing anti-theft concern), point to a knowledge gap in terms of security matters. It is not that archivists don't care about what other archivists think and do about security. This group certainly was diligent and thoughtful in completing the questionnaires. But there obviously is no strong archival security community with a shared body of information and strong leadership, which the SAA did and once again could provide. Where opinions showed very clearly indeed was in the responses to the last item in the questionnaire. Couched in terms of what article about security the respondent would like to read, the question attempted to elicit statements about archivists' greatest felt needs with reference to security. Finding the philosophical balance-point was the chief concern of three respondents: "how to both preserve and secure rare and unique items while making them publicly accessible," especially with "the necessity to streamline processing procedures for voluminous twentieth-century collections" and with "researchers on tighter and tighter 101 budgets whose primary goal is to get through as much material as possible in as short a time as possible." Six respondents (4 of whom had experienced thefts) wanted help in the battle to persuade "administrators to take library and archival security seriously" and the expression of that seriousness in budgetary support. At least one of these respondents was despairing: "Nothing beats live security guards constantly observing, and nothing you write is going to get us one." A further 6 respondents hoped for basic procedural articles and had questions that the existing literature, such as Trinkaus-Randall, would answer; another hoped for "a series of case studies based upon experiences with theft in archives and the resulting measures that were implemented." Staff matters were the focus of another group of 7 respondents, all but 2 of whom had experienced thefts. Two members of this group wanted to see more written about insider theft, but the others were concerned with staff training and motivation. Sometimes this was expressed gently: "ideas for training the staff to be more aware of anti-theft procedures (reminding without nagging)." Other times it was expressed more firmly: "How to motivate staff to place importance on reading room security. We have procedures to follow but no one seems to feel they have to follow them." And one archivist commented: "We don't need an article, we need a motivational speaker ~ to change generations of staff mindset." Help in keeping abreast of technological advances was the expressed concern of 6 respondents. These range from several who are curious about the value of closed-circuit television monitoring, 2 looking for ways of marking materials that do not damage the 102 materials, 1 wondering about the effectiveness of alarms, and another wondering "whether electronic security improves detection of theft." Another 7 respondents were chiefly concerned with the reading room and patron security. One archivist, in the process of lobbying for a reading room, could use an article on the benefits of dedicated researcher space as a theft deterrent. Another archivist wants advice on handling an overcrowded reading room, while a third wants to know how to redesign the reading room to facilitate clear observation by staff without the new arrangement being too obvious and distracting to patrons. Public-library patrons, according to 2 respondents, do not understand the difference between the library proper and its special archives or collections, and thus they resent the additional security measures imposed in the special areas. How is the archivist to build acceptance of these security needs? Insufficient knowledge of legal and safety procedures is a concern of 2 other respondents. One hopes for "techniques for examining researchers' belongings without actually searching them. Legally can we touch their papers? Can we physically detain them? How can we check on trusted, known users to be sure they aren't taking things?" On one level, knowledge of these procedures is a matter of staff training; on another, it points to a need for state laws in their most up-to-date form to be readily accessible to archivists. A few of the comments fell outside of the readily definable categories, but are worth noting. This writer's favorite is the one that said "we made your survey an item in a recent department meeting"; another noteworthy comment stated that "I would like to see someone combat the pervasive notion that you enhance security by keeping your institution's holdings a secret. I suspect that the opposite is true." 103 The largest group of comments came from the archival category that is farthest from the institutional model assumed by most writings: the archive staffed by one person. Others with small staffs asked for "practical coverage of what can be done with limited staff, large collections, and a tradition of service over user impediments." But those in the one-person archive point out that "issues for larger institutions might not apply to us." Of the 15 respondents from one-person archives or collections, 12 wrote about this problem:. "It would be helpful to see sample security policies and procedures for the one-person shop as well as large institutions. The idea of having a security force to turn to is hard to imagine"; " In a one-person operation, how do you 'keep an eye' on the patron while you retrieve boxes?" A report or roundtable specifically devoted to security in the one-person archive is an urgent need of this part of the archival community. In reading all of the comments made in response to the final item on the questionnaire, it is apparent that those in charge of manuscript repositories, be they archives or special collections, have an enormous sense of frustration when it comes to dealing with security matters. They want to do their "real jobs" — managing the collections and providing access to researchers — but the collections are burgeoning madly, the institution's money is being spent elsewhere, and the researchers (and perhaps even the staff) may be untrustworthy. Because security often has not been integrated into other processing or patron functions, it is viewed by some archivists as being one task too many. For the sake of both the archivists and their collections, steps must be taken to make archival security an easier task. As the next section will show, easier access to information, new training initiatives, and guidance in security matters - all under the aegis of the SAA ~ are needed and are quite possible to implement. 104 CHAPTER V: Conclusions and Recommendations As the literature review has shown, the archival community is reawakening to the need for security. Unfortunately, the results of the questionnaire analysis have also revealed that the actual measures to protect and prevent theft have only a piecemeal existence. As Timothy Walch recently remarked: "in truth, most archivists do the minimum (check bags, close stacks) and then give little thought to theft until a loss is discovered."1 Only 33 of the 94 respondents to the questionnaire have comprehensive, written security policies. Some of the differences between these 33 and the remainder of the sample population do confirm both the basic importance of the written security policy as the spine on which any security program must be built, and the sad fact that often such a policy either does not get written or does not become a well-thought-out document until the harsh reality of a theft shatters the daily routine of an archives. Of the 33 respondents with written policies, 6 were one-person archives, 13 had staffs of 2-4, and 14 had staffs of 5 or more. As the total population sample contained 15 one-person archives, 46 with staffs of 2-4, and 33 with 5 or more staff, size is not the determining factor in policy creation. Those policy-having archives which had experienced thefts were 5 (of 6) one-person archives, 7 (of 13) with staffs of 2-4, and 5 (of 14) with staffs of 5 or more, that is, 17 archives in all.. Policy changes were made as a result of a theft by 3 of the 5 one-person archives, 5 of the 7 with staffs of 2-4, and 4 of the 5 with staffs of 5 or more. All 5 of the one-person libraries which had experienced a theft expressed a need for increases in their security budgets, as did 5 of the 7 with staffs of 2-4, though only timothy Walch, "Theft," personal e-mail to author, 16 January 1998. 105 2 of the 5 with staffs of 5 or more. It does seem that Walch's contention that theft is the chief goad to the development of a security program is pointed to, if not confirmed, by the survey data. If awareness increases because of notable thefts, so too does it increase when an institution experiences a theft, at least where policy is concerned. Implementation of the policy almost always leads to increased budget needs. Over-all, the picture presented by the survey results is one of confusion, ignorance, and uncertainty at the institutional level about security. The heavy emphasis on patrons rather than materials is vitiated by the failure of 73.4% of all institutions in the survey to verify the identities of patrons before they arrive. This is the era of the "fake ID."; it is ubiquitous among college students, let alone thieves. Such miscreants as Shinn and Speigelman have used a variety of identities, complete with a full complement of identity documents. Should a patron be suspected of stealing, only 20 of the 94 members of the sample population are certain of the relevant laws in the states where they work. (Only one of these 20 knowledgeable people works in a one-person archive; most of the rest work at institutions of higher education or historical societies.) To repeat one respondent's comment, "Legally can we touch their papers? Can we physically detain them?" And while this unsureness produces hesitation, a thief can waltz out the door, unchecked at the exit at half of the archives surveyed. The situation in terms of materials is enough to make a policeman tear his hair out. At two-thirds of the surveyed institutions, the items bear no form of physical identification, though they may have been copied by some means. Replacing items with photocopies and sequestering the originals does not always serve to deter thieves. Consider the case of Helard Gonzales O'Higgins, a janitor at the Lincoln Center branch of the New York Public Library, 106 the branch where the Performing Arts collections are housed.2 O'Higgins was charged on 6 February 1998 with the theft of letters and manuscripts by Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Richard Wagner from a "locked safe cabinet," where they had been sequestered. Here sequestration turned out to be an organizer and a time-saver for the thief. What happened next shows why the institutions represented by the 45 respondents in the survey which do not re-inventory are easy prey, and why more than 27 of the respondents should understand why it is also important to report thefts to dealers. O'Higgins sold the items to a bookstore, which took a copy of his driver's license (and verified it) and made him sign a receipt saying that the documents were his "sole property." The bookstore, having received no theft report and having no staff experts on musical manuscripts, placed the documents on consignment with a manuscript dealer, and it was he who recognized them and notified the library's security department (it is not clear whether Performing Arts had any idea that the items were missing), which called the FBI. But for the manuscript dealer's honesty and expertise, and the bookstore's identification and receipting procedures, these items would not have been recovered easily, if at all.3 One could make any number of suggestions, based on the literature and the survey, but they will not be of much help to beleaguered archivists so long as one important element is lacking in the fight against theft: leadership on the professional level by the SAA. Librarians have better security and a better sense of security because they have been led, guided, and aided by their professional organizations. They have approved guidelines that 2 Al Guart, "Janitor Facing the Music Over Stolen Mozart," New York Post, 6 February 1998: 5. 3 One unexpected result of the odyssey undertaken by these documents was that the manuscript dealer discovered that a signed Mozart musical manuscript was, in fact, a forgery. 107 they can take to the budget-makers in their institutions, while an archivists, lacking such materials, may seem to be little more than a vaguely paranoid worrywarts when requesting funds for security purposes. Archivists working within a library system may find it difficult to explain why their policies and procedures should vary somewhat from those established for the printed book. Moreover, to be effective on an institutional level, archivists need guidance from experts. The literature is not enough for many. Institutions, especially the smaller ones that do not fit the university or government model that underlies much of the literature, need instruction and training in order to tailor standard security guidelines to their institutional needs and budgets. The SAA should make resources and training available to fill its members' security needs. New Beginnings Not that it is all doom and gloom. There are a few developments providing reasons for optimism and hope. Richard Strassberg has managed to nurture a Society of American Archivists Security Roundtable, which met for the first time on August 29, 1997. Two familiar names in the field of archival security have been elected to lead this group. Richard Strassberg has been named its Chair. The existence of this group is the culmination of a great deal of effort and struggle to follow a vision on his part. Strassberg began campaigning at the SAA conference in St. Louis 3 years ago. At the following year's convention in San Diego, he needed the signatures of fifty members of the society to form a roundtable. He "got one hundred names. No one ... personally asked refused to sign."4 In fact, Peter Hirtle agreed to be the roundtable's liaison to the SAA Council. That in itself is a sign of greater 4Richard Strassberg, conversation with author, Ithaca, NY., 15 September 1997. 108 awareness and a strong sense that new measures need to be taken. Additionally, Gregor Trinkaus-Randall, author of the most recent manual the SAA has to offer on security, Protecting Your Collections, was named Vice-Chair/Chair-Elect. The formation and initial meeting of this Roundtable are positive signs of continued and renewed interest in security. Many, many proposals for activities and duties were discussed at this initial meeting, and some very positive developments are poised to grow out of the discussion. Much depends on the support the SAA is willing to give the group, particularly in terms of money. For example, the notes from the Roundtable meeting make clear that the group hopes to make use of a newsletter, much in the way that the 1970s Archival Security Program did, but realizes that may be an impossibility: " It was noted that the SAA is restricting the monies it makes available for printed newsletters; we should investigate the Archival Outlook newsletter as a forum for announcements, etc."5 Additionally, the SAA Security Roundtable members hope to make use of emergent technology to spread awareness and aid in the prevention of theft. A listserv is being established solely to exchange policy, procedure and technology information amongst archivists. However, it is not open to any and all for fear that thieves might indeed use the site as a way to learn about what measures are being taken and how to get around them. As Richard Strassberg noted, the listerv is "limited to members so that everyone and their mother will not have access."6 The model for this listerv is Susan Allen's Library Security Officer Listserv for RBMS. In order to sign up for that particular listserv, which is devoted to the issues involved in library security, a librarian needs a letter of recommendation from 5Judy Robbins, SAA Security Roundtable Notes, 4 September 1997, Richard Strassberg Personal Security Archives, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. 6Strassberg, conversation with author. 109 their supervisor at their institution certifying that they are indeed the institution's duly elected or appointed security officer. Then, and only then, can they join and participate. Building a New Security Initiative The existence of the Security Roundtable provides a foundation upon which the SAA could easily build another security initiative. The SAA needs only to reinvent with more advanced technology what its members and employees invented in the 1970s. Last time around, the SAA found itself in a reactive role: "theft of manuscript materials from archives and libraries has increased dramatically. In response to the problem, the Society of American Archivists has established a comprehensive security program ... "7 This time around, in the spirit of the 1990's and its burgeoning awareness about archival theft and the need for security, the SAA could be proactive and take a lead in combating the problem instead of reacting to one. Not much can happen without the endorsement, support and interest of the organization. As Timothy Walch has noted : "Advances in archival security will come only if the SAA or the ACA make it a priority ....We should be proactive on security"8. Permanent Security Committee The first step that the SAA could take to show a commitment to stamping out archival theft and improving archival security would be to raising the status of the roundtable to that of a committee and giving it equal status with other permanent standing committees. 7Society of American Archivists — Archival Security Program, No Date, Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin—Madison, Madison, WI. NB: The Italics in the Quotation are the Author's addition. 8Timothy Walch, "Theft," personal e-mail to author, 16 January 1998. 110 That would be a clear signal that security is an important and weighty subject for the organization. This elevation in status could also give the group more influence and possibly more funds with which to carry on their meritorious work. Establishing Links One of this Committee's first actions could (and should) be to establish links with such dealer and library groups as the Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America (ABAA) and the Association of College and Research Libraries Rare Books and Manuscripts Section Security Committee (RBMS). The library community has made many advances in the area of security which the SAA could adapt or from which they could borrow. In this case imitation would not only be the sincerest form of flattery, but also a very effective way of going about things. Those at the Security Roundtable meeting have already discussed the possibility of joining with the American Library Association (ALA) to adapt "the RBMS Statement on theft to include archival & manuscript materials, and/or adopt a closely similar statement of its own."9 The latter option is preferable. Since the nature of archives and the composition of their collections is fundamentally different than that of libraries, archivists should have their own guidelines. Such a policy, officially sanctioned by the mother professional organization, would be something archivists can use to show keepers of the budget at their institutions. Thus the policy would do double duty as a lobbying document. bobbins, Roundtable Notes, 4 September 1997, Richard Strassberg Personal Security Archives, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. Ill Marking Another set of guidelines that the proposed Security Committee could adapt, though certainly after some debate, concerns marking. Due to new technological advances, the strategy of marking is being rethought. On January 20,1998, at the ARCL/RBMS Security Committee meeting in New Orleans, Everett C. Wilkie, Jr., presented a new draft of Guidelines for Marking Books, Manuscripts and Other Special Collections Materials that shows a change in attitude in marking. Rather than just marking material outright in an attempt to deter thefts, it is now suggested that institutions use "readily visible marks ... intended to deter potential thieves; hidden marks ... intended to assist in the recovery of stolen material."10 This signifies a major shift in attitude about marking. Hidden marks were something previously disparaged and discouraged. The newfound approval for supplemental hidden marks is because of technological advances such as the product Microstamp, an embosser able to make marks so small that they barely take up space on the back of a penny. This type of technology is called a microembosser and is very useful because it can "provide an extremely cheap and difficult to detect type of nearly invisible mark."11 This type of marking technology is very valuable because it provides solid and hard to detect ownership identification which unlike visible stamps cannot be falsely canceled out or cut away easily. Another type of advanced technology that can be used to create secret marks that is more expensive but also non-invasive is a form of micro-photography. An example of this 10Everett C. Wilkie Jr., "Guidelines for Marking Manuscripts and Other Special Collections Materials" (revised working guidelines presented at the annual meeting of the Association of College and Research Libraries, Rare Books and Manuscripts Section Security Committee, New Orleans, LA., January 1998). nWilkie, "Guidelines". 112 sort of marking is the product ISIS (Intrinsic Signature Identification System) by Verification Technologies, Inc. The microphotographs are like fingerprints: For each object we capture a unique series of microphotographs and a log of how they are collected. This data is the Intrinsic Signature that, like a fingerprint, uniquely identifies any object. We combine this data with textual and additional certification and authenticity information describing an object to form a Registration. This registration is then entered into ... [a] secure, Intranet based, registration database ... For record keeping purposes, a registration certificate is issued to the object's owner as a receipt for the process.12 With this sort of technology, it would be easy to be able to prove ownership in the case of a theft. These microphotographs are very advanced and can zoom up to about 500X. The equipment involved is considerable, so this is obviously not something that every archives could obtain easily: "The equipment consists of a Pentium computer with a lot of ram for images, a high-power microscope with color CCD camera, and a sophisticated software that captures and compresses the sequence of images. Search software provides for later access."13 However, in this day and age of technology turnover, objects that initially cost the moon and stars can quickly become more affordable. For example, biometric security (such as retina and fingerprint scanners) which are very useful in the area of computer security, have recently become affordable. As Lawrence Aragon notes in a recent issue of PC Week: "A year ago fingerprint scanners cost more than $1,000. But in six to nine months, Key Tronic Corp. will ship a keyboard with an embedded fingerprint scanner for less than $100"14 Such technology could not only replace the need for the forgetful among us to remember 12Verification Technologies, Inc. ISIS Main Page, There are two very important considerations that are tied into secret marking. First and foremost, with marks that small, a very accurate and very careful record must be kept of what the marks are and where they are. If the marks cannot be located, then ownership cannot be verified and they are pointless. Furthermore, it is important to use these marks in conjunction with obvious marking, both as a deterrent and for the sake of dealers and other archives that might be offered stolen material. It will be argued by some that marking hurts the aesthetics or integrity of a work. Wilkie admits that this is true and in fact "marking is planned disfigurement" but that this must be "balanced against the need to secure materials from theft and to assist in their identification and recovery."15 Surely it is more important to protect the work. Even though the marks may be excised or fraudulently canceled, at least 15Wilkie, "Guidelines". 114 their existence makes more work for the thief and may in the end therefore help deter some thefts. Archivists may still want to chew over some of the problems of marking such as positioning and even what the marks themselves should be. Once again, as the contents of archival collections and the nature of archives tend to differ from those of libraries, different solutions from those recommended by RBMS might be reached. The results from the questionnaire indicate that while 5 respondents in fact always mark, the numbers of those who sometimes mark is dead even with those who never mark, in each case 38. Having the SAA fully consider the matter of marking, take a stance, and set a standard on this issue provides archivists with a clear professional imperative for marking. Model Legislation Another use for the liaison between the SAA's Security Committee and RBMS and ABAA is that the library and archival communities could once again together make an impact upon the law, much as they helped pass model legislation based on Alex Ladenson's work in four states in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As suggested at the SAA Security Roundtable meeting, an advocacy role is one that would fit the security group well. In conjunction with library groups and dealers, SAA could be a potent force through sponsoring efforts to amend local legislation to reflect the true severity of rare/cultural materials theft and destruction ... We can also make it a point to respond to pending legislation, and to notable case of theft... through resolutions, press releases and letters of support and/or denunciation.16 Robbins, Roundtable notes, 4 September 1997, Richard Strassberg Personal Security Archives, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. 115 In terms of law, there is quite a bit of work to be done. The SAA needs to push to even further improve upon Ladenson's legislation. It was noted in the 1970s legislation that a person could be detained by a library or archives if the staff had probable cause to detain them. However, probable cause is not a clear-cut or easily defined principle. As Ladenson wrote at the time of the first initiative, the concept of probable cause was a problem: The phrase "probable cause" constitutes a dangerous legal pitfall... Freedom from false arrest, freedom from unlawful search and the right of privacy are all involved here. What we need to do is strike a delicate balance. But balancing property rights with personal rights is not a simple task.17 Rather than deal with the vagaries of probable cause and shoplifting statutes, perhaps it is time for a dramatic push for library and archival specific legislation. This would be the first bit of advocacy work to be performed by the SAA Security Council in conjunction with its library and dealer counterparts. Such an effort would require finding an Alex Ladenson equivalent for the 1990s and once again hiring a part-time legal consultant. However, if the results were as successful as they were two decades ago, this advocacy work would be well worth the cost. It should be undertaken. Archival Security Officers Before communication can be effectively organized outside the association and security measures on the legal and publicity fronts can be advocated, communication must be well established on the topic of security within the organization. There needs to be an initiative to encourage each member institution to appoint or elect a designated archival security officer (or "ARCSO"). Then the director of each institution with an appointed 17Alex Ladenson, "The Law Relating to Library and Archival Security" Draft, No Date, Society of American Archivists Archives, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WL, 6-7. 116 ARCSO would write a letter of confirmation to the person designated to be running the Listserv. As letterhead is increasingly easy to forge and paranoia runs increasingly high, the listserv's operator could then call the institution to verify that the ARCSO named in the letter is what and who they say they are. Upon confirmation, the ARCSO would be issued a password and an address to enable access to the listserv. However, the one way that this work's perception of the listserv for the proposed Security Committee differs from the current members of the SAA Roundtable's has to do with one area of content. Richard Strassberg has emphasized that discussion about or descriptions of suspected thieves is not to appear for fear that creating or maintaining those descriptions could lead to lawsuits involving libel or slander.18 While correct about the overly litigious nature of American society at this point in time, this view overlooks how this listserv could be used to alert ARCSOs that a particular thief or suspect is in the region or neighborhood. It would be used in conjunction with regional telephone trees. A message could go out on the listserv along the lines of "call in region 2" or "trouble in region 2" which could alert members to expect a call soon. The telephone trees in Region 2 (be it the Midwest or south or whatever) would then be activated. Each person in the tree would have two people to call and so on and so on. The person who had a description of a suspected thief or a sighting of a known thief in the area would call the head of the regional tree and word could be passed on without anything incriminating being placed in writing. As already noted by the Security Roundtable members, telephone trees are also good "for such activities as letters-to-legislators campaigns, and response to emergencies at the local, regional and national level."19 18Strassberg, conversation with author. 19Robbins, Security Roundtable notes, 4 September 1997, Richard Strassberg Personal 117 Education and Advocacy Education is another activity at which the Security Committee would excel— not only education of the archival community on the importance of archival security but also how to properly implement security, through workshops and manuals aimed at particular types of archives. For example, one need that becomes blindingly obvious from reading the survey responses is that many small and (in particular) one-person archives feel that there is no literature that directly applies to their situation. Many respondents desire "practical coverage of what can be done with limited staff, large collections, and a tradition of service over user impediments."20 As one interest the Roundtable has already expressed is in filling an educational role, they could do so easily by creating a workshop or a manual directly addressing such needs. They would immediately find a large and interested audience, thus filling that role most effectively. The Security Committee could also follow the example of the ARCL/RBMS and put on a workshop like "Reading Room Security and Beyond", scheduled for the June 1998 ALA meetings. This workshop will combine information about surveillance systems and techniques with a segment that concerns a noted vintage map thief, Gilbert Joseph Bland, Jr., and will feature presentations from two of the archives he fleeced, The Johns Hopkins University and the University of Delaware. As the workshop description explains, these sessions are meant to educate participants about what actually happens when an institution is faced with an apprehended thief... One session will be devoted to the experiences of an institution that did not prosecute; the other... of one that did prosecute and to the methods the FBI used to identify stolen materials for return to the Security Archives, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. 20Security Questionnaire Results 118 rightful owners.21 As many institutions do not have a written policy or training in how to apprehend a suspected or known thief, this sort of workshop could be both useful and also, unfortunately, pertinent. The tale of this particular cartographic coveter is full of valuable lessons for any archivists. This story is in itself an education, even though libraries were his primary target. This clever thief specialized in the removal of maps from antique atlases and was tremendously good at what he did, utilizing an X-acto knife, a mild and trust-inducing manner, and several aliases including that of James Perry. As writer Miles Harvey put it in a recent article about Bland: Ultimately 18 institutions, including libraries at the University of Delaware, the University of Florida, and Washington University would report that they had been visited by a James Perry. It was an invisible crime spree, hidden among the seldom-opened pages of centuries-old books."22 The road that led to Bland's turning himself in on 2 January 1996 to local Florida police began at the Johns Hopkins University-run George Peabody Library in Maryland on 7 December 1995. A fellow researcher noticed that Bland was tearing a page out of a book, and reported him to security. A chase through Baltimore ensued after he bolted the building. When he was caught, it was discovered that Bland had a notebook containing pages from a rare 18th- century book belonging to the library. 21American Library Association, "Reading Room Security And Beyond Workshop Description" (workshop description distributed at the annual meeting of the Association of College and Research Libraries, Rare Books and Manuscript Section Security Committee, New Orleans, LA., January 1998). 22Miles Harvey, "Mr. Bland's Evil Plot to Control the World," Outside Magazine, June 1977 Donald Pfouts, the library's director of security, interrogated Bland, discovering that he was Bland and not James Perry as his false ED card claimed. What happened next showed kindness on Pfouts's part but also would turn out to be a controversial decision, the library released him after he promised to pay $700 to restore the book. Bland was in such a hurry that he forgot to take his notebook with him .... Pfouts made a startling discovery ... He realized it was essentially a hit list containing the names and prices of rare maps as well as the names of several other major libraries at which they could be found."23 Pfouts flew to the telephone to contact and warn those institutions. Shortly thereafter, the FBI became involved. Soon, hounded and chased, Bland surrendered himself in Florida. However, he did so without immediately revealing where his stash of maps was hidden, so that he would have bargaining power with the authorities. The results of Bland's prosecution were unsettling, but important for archivists to note. Because the crime seemed relatively harmless to those not in the library community, just a slight mutilation of some old books, the sentences were appallingly light for someone who had plundered part of our cultural heritage and profited from it: In exchange for a reduced sentence and limited immunity from further prosecution, Bland promised, among other things, to cooperate with federal authorities and to advise libraries on ways to beef up their security and prevent future thefts... Bland would be forced to pay $70,000 in restitution in the federal case... plus an as-yet-undetermined amount in the Delaware case. All told, he would serve only 17 months in various prisons ranging from Virginia to North Carolina to Delaware.24 Thieves must be prosecuted. That is the primary lesson here. As the punishments the receive for even the most dire crimes seem to be distressingly light, it is important to strenuously prosecute so that they do not get off without even a slap on the wrist. The more Harvey, "Mr Bland's Evil Plot to Control the World". Harvey, "Mr Bland's Evil Plot to Control the World". 120 crimes that are prosecuted, the more of a chance that the crimes of archival and library theft will be taken seriously. As James B. Rhoads stated emphatically and correctly way in 1966, "it is our task to make plain to him [the thief] that there is at least one line of specialization that does not provide attractive career opportunities.... To this end... we should be willing to prosecute document thieves vigorously."25 More prosecution can serve as an effective theft deterrent. The Security Committee in its advocacy role also can work with other associations such as RBMS and ABAA to lobby for stronger penalties for such crimes. Bland's case also points up the need for unflagging alertness among archival and library staffs. Bland was a respected professional, well-known as a reputable map dealer. His case reminds us that even respected professionals can obtain a fake ID and perform heinous acts. Archivists must learn to be pleasant and helpful while following the warning of television's The X-Files: Trust No One. Vendors of archival and storage products also required a kind of educating by the proposed Security Committee. At the ALA midwinter conference in January 1998 only three vendors26 exhibited or had in their catalogues any products relating to archival or library security, though several vendors (particularly 3M) showed interest when the subject of security was broached ~ they had no idea that there was a call for such products. If they were to be made aware of security needs and wants, they might comply by feeding that demand. Therefore, a liaison from the proposed SAA Security Committee to archival and storage product vendors would be more than appropriate. 25James B. Rhoads, "Alienation and Thievery: Archival Problems," The American Archivist 29, no. 2 (April 1966): 208. 26These were: Kingsley (carts & book returns), Vernon Library Supplies, and Gressco (security media cases). 121 Professional Outreach Having established communication within the organization, the SAA security committee could then reach out as previously discussed and establish strong relations with the active and sophisticated RBMS Security Committee and the ABAA, which would be happy to cooperate with archivists when thefts of commercially valuable material occur. Ties to the Association of Canadian Archivists (ACA) would also be invaluable. Another important relationship to both establish and publicize would be one with the American Society for Industrial Security. ASIS is an excellent source for information about available security hardware (from alarms and locks to CCTV technology and even hidden cameras that look like lamps), security planning and procedural questions. SAA Security Home Page However, the most useful and exciting suggestion to be made is one not yet considered by the Security Roundtable. It is also one which would respond to the information gaps and disjunctiveness that many respondents to the questionnaire agree exist. A way to fulfill most of the 1970s recommendations, combining a register of stolen materials, a security consultant service, archival security manuals, an archival security newsletter and model legislation information in one spot — a web site linked up to the SAA's main page. This would allow for the first time a central source of information at which a frazzled archivist could find information or links to information related to any and all aspects of archival security. The site would offer information and options, but leave the ARCSO listserv for debate, interaction and organizing lobbying efforts. 122 The "how-to" and "why-you-should" aspects of the archival security manuals could be presented here along with the newly adapted or adopted guidelines based on the RBMS r guidelines on how to react after a theft as well as on how to mark to help deter a theft could be found in HTML markup at this site. Additionally, both Walch and Trinkaus-Randall's manuals could be digitized in their entirety and placed here, with allowances made for full-text searching in order to find the section most relevant to an archivist seeking help on a particular topic, be it detaining a suspected thief or what kind of researcher identification to require. Other relevant texts, as decided upon by the Security Committee, could be added as needed or required. In this fashion, the vital information in those manuals could be easily accessed and thus more easily reach a wider audience of archivists. There are those who will argue that this is a poor idea as it will tell thieves what security measures are taken. That is ridiculous. The really skilled thieves already know more about security than most archivists. The SAA needs to help educate archivists to give them a fighting chance against such criminals. Furthermore, many of the thieves are quite inspired and innovative. For example, the mid-1990s thefts of medieval and other documents and of rare books from Columbia University's special collections by Daniel Speigelman involved his nighttime utilizing of an unused dumbwaiter in the library below to go up an airshaft to the side of the vault. Speigelman unscrewed the vault sides and plundered at will and undetected, making over forty vault visits and replacing the sides each time so that no evidence remained.27 Thieves may find a way regardless of what you do, but the point is to put more obstacles in their way. • Right now many institutions do not do much 27 Jean Ashton, "Columbia University Theft" (report presented at the annual meeting of the Association of College and Research Libraries, Rare Books and Manuscripts Section Security Committee, New Orleans, LA, January 1998). 123 and aren't sure what steps to take. Almost all of the needed information can all be found in Walch and Trinkaus-Randall, and if archivists could have easy access to their texts, they would be able to combat theft more effectively. To fulfill the consultancy role of the SAA, the web site could feature links to other security information sites such as ASIS and perhaps also to certain vendors for hardware and procedure information. Additionally, the SAA could start up its consultancy program again, hand-picking certain experts in the area of archival security who could again journey to interested institutions for a minimal fee and expenses. The web site could keep a register of expert consultants by their area of expertise. An interested institution could contact them directly via e-mail from the web site. Or the link could be to a designated officer from the Security Committee who would then contact a consultant and help set up the visit to the inquiring institution. One kind of expert who should be placed near the top of the list is someone who understands what type of insurance policies are available that best benefit libraries and archives. Insurance is one of the trickiest matters with which any archivist must deal. Not every risk can be eliminated as that would be too expensive for most institutions. The best an archives may be able to do is to insure its rarest items and do their best to protect the institution. Each institution need to evaluate its own needs, its own budget and its own collection to determine what sort of policy it should take. Legal experts should also be near the top of this list, especially for reference in undertaking prosecution. These experts should be supplemented with an easy way for any curious archivist to find out exactly what his or her state laws are in terms of detaining thieves and protection of library materials. This may soon be a reality. Currently, Everett C. 124 Wilkie, Jr., is working with a lawyer on an up-to-date compendium of state laws to be mounted on the web, and perhaps this could be linked up to the archives site so that archivists from all states could quickly hook up and find out what their state laws entail and thus what actions they can actually take. As a majority of the survey respondents indicated that it is not easy to find information on state laws applicable to archives, this measure would obviously be much appreciated. A list of addresses, fax numbers, phone numbers and e-mails by which archivists could contact the appropriate people at the FBI, Interpol and state level law enforcement officials would also be useful in case of major thefts. Establishing a relationship with local authorities is something that every archives should do on its own and therefore, local law agencies would not be listed on the web site. Information about thefts and conferences and events of security interest such as the RBMS Security Committee meeting at the American Library Association in June could also be posted on this web site. In that way, the web site could take over the functions of the 1970s Archival Security Newsletter. Like the newsletter it could include "notices of accounts of recent thefts and prosecutions and articles on various security systems and related matters ... a vehicle to educate and inform archivists and librarians among others of the problems of theft and the need for a preventative program."28 If the cry is once again heard that this would be alerting thieves to vulnerable institutions and ways to get around things, then it could easily be made a section of the site accessible only by designated user name and password. This device is currently employed by the SAA for those who subscribe to the SAA Employment Bulletin and pay for the right to browse employment ads. However, 28Society of American Archivists-Archival Security Program, No Date, SAA Archives, University of Wisconsin—Madison, Madison, WI. 125 it might be more effective to allow access to anyone surfing the net and put emphasis on prosecutions and new security developments in the hope that this might deter would-be thieves. Furthermore, the site would just post events and dates with the more detailed information being disseminated on the ARCSO listserv. Additionally, the web site should follow RBMS's lead and maintain a list of reports of recent thefts. Unlike RBMS, however, this list should be updated with some regularity. The SAA Security web site could follow the example of the Museum Security Network web site and allow interested institutions to sign up via Netmind's "URL-Minder" receive notification of when the web site has been changed so that they will know to look at the updated theft list. This too could be made a secure site if need be. As another facet of this newsletter function, the site could also post a few suggestions on how to educate institutional public-relations officers and administrators about the importance of archival security and how to move them out of the "code of silence - it didn't happen if we don't talk about it" mode of thinking. Winning support is of major importance and is not always easy to do. There is still need of a central site for registering lost or stolen materials. Currently, the ABAA has an excellent site for reporting rare book theft, The ABAA Stolen Book Registry. This site requires a user to register, providing personal information as well as information about the institution with which the person is affiliated. Having registered, the person can then file a loss report and is encouraged to file a recovery report when and if the item is stolen so that the ABAA may update its listings. Exlibris also allows easy reporting of theft and disseminates the information quickly. Additionally, Securma, the Museum Security Network and Interloc have sites where thefts can be reported. There are too many 126 options, most of which focus upon books and none of which fit quite right for archives. Together, these organizations could join and create a meta-site for reporting theft of fine art, rare book or manuscript materials. The SAA page could link to that site for easy reporting of thefts. There could at last be a central theft registry for cultural materials. This sort of joining together could create much publicity, thus raising funds and awareness while creating a new resource, all of which would aid in preventing theft. Funding The question of funding is, of course, an issue. None of these measures is wildly expensive, but there must be a way to pay for people to build and update the web site, hire a part-time legal consultant, digitize the texts, buy micromarking equipment in bulk if there is enough interest, and help create the cultural theft registry for a start. Should outside funding prove necessary, the first and obvious choice is to apply for an NEH grant on the twentieth anniversary of the publication of Walch's Archives and Manuscripts: Security. There is much groundwork in place this time, and much less grant money is needed. Other potential and appropriate non-profit funding resources include the Delmas, Carnegie, and Mellon foundations. Furthermore, dues could also always be slightly raised in the unlikely event that no funding was forthcoming. It is important for the SAA to take a leadership role and act to prevent archival theft. James B. Rhoads made the call to action way back in April of 1966, but his words are at least as pertinent today as they were then: Are there not also steps that we can take collectively as a profession and as a Society ? ... I do think that by collective action we can persuade clever thieves to turn their talents to such pursuits as embezzlement, 127 pickpocketry, extortion, and here in Texas, cattle rustling. The Individual Archivist Just as the SAA needs to fill a leadership role, individual archivists need to do their part. There has been a tightening by some in the area of security since before the last security initiative. Otherwise scholars would not have complaints like the following from the Distinguished Research Professor of History at the University of Alabama, Forrest McDonald: the archival collections are not open anymore ... because of people stealing manuscripts and all this kind of stuff. When I first worked at the National Archives, they just turned me loose in the stacks. Now you've got to go in and you've got to tell them what... you want... and they will bring the stuff to you, and that's that. You can't work that way; you can't get things done."30 This is by now an all-too-common complaint by researchers. And balancing access against security is a tricky feat and one for archivists still to master. However, it can be done. Together, archivists need to act within their institutions and within the framework of the SAA to be sure that proper security measures are implemented and that archival theft is all but stamped out. But before acting, archivists must learn to think about security in new ways. As security pioneer Timothy Walch recently stated : We need to evaluate archival institutions in terms of threats, assets, and liabilities. We face a variety of threats; we protect a range of assets; we contain a range of liabilities. Some threats we can eliminate, some we can contain, and some we must live with.31 2yJames B. Rhoads, "Alienation and Thievery: Archival Problems", The American Archivist 29, no. 2 (April 1966): 207-208. 30Forrest McDonald, "Forrest McDonald," In Booknotes , edited by Brian Lamb, 11-13 (New York: New York Times Books, 1997), 12. 3timothy Walch, "Theft," personal e-mail to the author, 16 January 1998. 128 If every archivist can learn to think to think about archival security in terms of threats, assets, and liabilities, then perhaps the suggested anti-theft measures really will come to pass and the saying- writings about archival security-- will at last be in harmony with the doing - archival security practices. 129 BIBLIOGRAPHY Published Printed Materials Allen, Susan M. "Theft in Libraries or Archives: What to Do During the Aftermath of a Theft." College & Research Libraries News 50 (1990): 939-943. Aragon, Lawrence. "Show Me Some ID." PC Week (12 January 1998): 77-80. Association of College and Research Libraries, Rare Books and Manuscript Section Security Committee. 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Jenkins, John. Rare Books and Manuscript Thefts: A Security System for Librarians, Booksellers, and Collectors, with a foreword by Terry Belanger. New York: Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America, 1982. Kinney, John M. "Archival Security and Insecurity." The American Archivist 38 (1975): 495-500. Ladenson, Alex. "Library Security and the Law." College and Research Libraries 38 (March 1977): 109-118. Leab, Katharine Kyes. "The Disappearing Books." Alfred Hitchcock's Mystery Magazine 27, no. 10 (September 1972): 54-58. . "Electronic Theft-Reporting Systems; The-State-of-the-Art." International Federation of Library Associations Journal 9 (1983): 324-330. Leninger, Sheryl, ed. Internal Theft: Investigation & Control: An Anthology. Los Angeles: Security World Pub. Co., 1977. Library & Archival Security. New York: The Haworth Press, 1978- Library Security Newsletter. New York: The Haworth Press, 1975-1978. Lincoln, Alan Jay. "Protecting the Library." 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"Alienation and Thievery: Archival Problems." The American Archivist 28 (1965): 367-79. Rosenbaum, Richard W. "Can We Predict Employee Theft?" Security World 12 (October 1975): 26-27,104,106-108. Rude, Renee, and Robert Hauptman. "Theft, Dissimulation and Tresspass: Some Observations on Security." Library & Archival Security 12, no. 1 (1993): 17-22. 134 Sable, Martin H. The Protection of the Library and Archive: An International Bibliography. New York: The Haworth Press, 1984. Samuel, Evelyn. "Protection of Library and Archival Materials: A Case Study — New York University's Institute of Fine Arts." Library & Archival Security 2, nos. 3/4 (1978): 1-6. "Society of American Archivists Security Program: Advice for Repositories." Library Journal 102 (15 April 1977): 858. Shockowitz, Tonya. "Security Issues for Archives, Rare Books and Special Collections: A Bibliographic Essay." Current Studies in Librarianship 19, nos. 1/2 (Spring/Fall 1995): 4-12. Stielow, Frederick J. "Archival Security." In Managing Archives and Archival Institutions, edited by James Gregory Bradsher, 207-17. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. Strassberg, Richard. "The Final Barrier: Security Consideration in Restricted Access Reading Rooms." In Reference Services for Archives and Manuscripts, edited by Laura B. Cohen, 95-105. New York: The Haworth Press, 1997. Sudman, Seymour, and Norman M. Bradburn. Asking Questions: A Practical Guide to Questionnaire Design. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1982. Summerhill, W. R., and C. L. Taylor. "Writing Questions for Mail Questionnaires." Circular PE-16. Gainesville: University of Florida, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, October 1992. . "Formatting a Mail Questionnaire," Circular PE-17. Gainesville: University of Florida, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, October 1992. . "Writing Options for Mail Questionnaires," Circular PE-18. Gainesville: University Florida, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, October 1992. Totka, Vincent A., Jr. "Preventing Patron Theft in the Archives: Legal Perspectives and Problems." American Archivist 56 (1993): 664-672. Thomas, D. L. Study on Control of Security and Storage of Holdings—A RAMP Study with Guidelines. Paris: UNESCO, 1987. Tiloston, R. G. Museum Security. London: Museum Association Information Sheet, 1981. 135 Trinkaus-Randall, Gregor. Protecting Your Collection: A Manual of Archival Security. Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 1995. . "Preserving Special Collections Through Internal Security." College & Research Libraries 50 (1989): 448-454. Wagner, Albin. "Archival Security and Insecurity." Colorado Libraries (September 1985): 10-13. Walch, Timothy. Archives & Manuscripts: Security. Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 1977. Wilkinson, Leland, Grant Blank, and Christian Gruber, Desktop Data Analysis with SYSTAT®. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996. Wyly, Mary. "Special Collections Security: Problems, Trends, and Consciousness." Library Trends 36 (Summer 1987): 241-256. 136 Unpublished Materials Manuscript Collections, Material from Meetings and Unpublished Documents American Library Association. "Reading Room Security and Beyond Workshop Description." Workshop Description distributed at the annual meeting of the Association of College and Research Libraries, Rare Books and Manuscripts Section Security Committee, New Orleans, LA., January 1998. Ashton, Jean. "Columbia University Theft." Report presented at the annual meeting of the Association of College and Research Libraries, Rare Books and Manuscripts Section Security Committee, New Orleans, LA., January 1998. Association of College and Research Libraries, Rare Books and Manuscripts Section Security Committee. Papers and Letters. BAMBAM Archives, Washington, CT. Association of College and Research Libraries, Rare Books and Manuscripts Section Security Committee. "Incidents of Book Theft." 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"Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America (ABAA) Stolen Book Registry." Ferguson, Steve. "Rare Books and Manuscripts Section Homepage." Fox, Katherine. "University of Houston Libraries Special Collections and Archives Departmental Polices and Procedures." Galloway, Alison, "Questionnaire Design & Analysis: A Workbook." Harvey, Miles. "Mr. Bland's Evil Plot to Control the World." Outside Magazine, June 1997. "Interloc Home Page." National Computer Systems Corporation, Research Notes NCS, "Response Scales: How Many Points and What Labels?" . "Cleaning Your Data, Reed, Christopher. "Biblioklepts, Part IV." Harvard Magazine on the web "Securma the Museum Security Network Safety Planning and Safety Regulations." Society of American Archivists. "Society of American Archivists". "Trace Magazine Home Page ~ For Stolen Art and Antiques". Verification Technologies, Inc. ISIS Main Page. < http://www.netventure.com/ vti/isis/index.htm>. 16 April 1997. No 140 MATERIALS AND PATRONS: A Questionnaire about Anti-Theft Practices in Manuscript Archives and Collections Please answer each question as indicated. If you feel you cannot answer a question, please make a note of that by the question and go on to the next one. 1. Please check the term that best describes the department or institution in which you work (Please check only one): 46 college/university library (including a departmental or specialty archive within a college or university library; indicate subject specialty): 17 historical society 4 private archives 1 corporate archives 8 religious archives 4 museum archives ( 3 provided no answer) 0 law archives 11 public library 2. Please indicate the number of professional staff in your archives/collection. 15 1 46 2-4 33 5+ 3. Please indicate the total number of years of experience you have as an archivist/manuscript curator. 0 <1 20 1-7 20 8-15 29 16-21 25 >21 4.1 Does your archives/collection or its institution have a written security policy that includes anti-theft measures? 33 Yes 61 No (If No, please skip now to question 5) 4.2 Who created the security policy? (Please check all that apply) (Note that 33 respondents for this) 23 archives or collection has its own policy 9 another department head or director (e.g., university librarian, church official, etc) 1 legal department 4 security department 4.3 Does the archives or collection have a separate policy that varies from the general policy of the institution? (Please check) 20 Yes 13 No If yes, please comment on how it is different from the general policy (if you prefer, you may simply send copies of both): 2 - circulate 2- limit access 7 - more spec 1 - unmark ed materials 1 - high security 1 - writ rule No 141 4.4 The influence on your security policy by items from the professional literature such as Timothy Walch, Archives and Manuscripts: Security has been: (Please check) 3 very important 9 important 13 somewhat important 9 unimportant 4.5 Is someone in your archives or collection designated to act as security officer or person actively responsible for security? (Please check) 17 Yes 19 No (If no, then please skip to 4.7) 4.6 Title of the person responsible for security (please fill in) . Admin Ms - 1 archivist - 4 director - 2 head arch - 1 head ref -1 lib asst -1 librarian - 2 Ms archiv - I pub serv - 1 ref arch -2 spec coll librarian - 1 4.7 Since 1977 have there been any changes to your security policy as the result of theft in your archives/collection or as a result of publicity about thefts at other archives? (Please check) 28 Yes 9 No If yes, please indicate the changes made: 2 - checkroom 7 - closer supervision 1 - forms 1- locker 5 - new facilities 1 - paper pro' 2 - photocopying 1 - training 2 - policy 3 - restr acc 1 - security consultant 1 - written rule Please respond to the following statements about materials in your archives or collection by making a circle around the appropriate capital letter at the right of the statement. These letters stand for: A =Always; S = Sometimes R = Rarely N=Never. a. Accession records are sufficiently detailed to identify unprocessed materials. A S R N A-26 S-40 R-24 N-3 (Missing-I) b. Finding aids are sufficiently detailed to identify missing materials A S R N A-14 S-60 R-16 N-3 (Missing-I) c. Items of possible commercial value have been identified. A S R N A-18 S-43 R-22 N-U d. Rare postage stamps or other incidental items of possible commercial value have been identified. A s R N A-9 S-31 R-3 N-27 (Missing-1) e. Items of unusual commercial or research value have been e.l scanned A S R N S-7 R-9 N-57 (Missing - 21) e.2 photocopied A s R N A-8 S-54 R-18 N-7 (Missing- 7) e.3 microfilmed A s R N A-4 S-44 R-19 N-U (Missing-16) No 142 e.4 removed and replaced with photocopy, microfilm, or scanned image A S R N A-9 S-56 R- 16 N-10 (Missing-3) e.5 sequestered or restricted for use A S R N A-7 S-51 R-17 N-5 (Missing-14) e.6 "packaged" in some way to make them harder to steal A s R N S-31 R-21 N-29 (Missing-13) e.7 calendared A s R N A-l S-28 R-18 N-29 (Missing-18) e.8 physical distinctions such as watermarks, repairs, foxmarks, etc have been noted in accession records or finding aids A s R N A-4 S-20 R-21 N-37 (Missing-12) f. Some materials have been marked or stamped for identification during processing A S R N A-5 S-38 R-12 N-38 (Missing-1) 6. Is your archives/collection used by people who are not employed by your institution? (Please check) 92 Yes 1 No (If No, please skip to question 8) (Missing -1) 7. Please respond to the following statements about patrons who use your archives or collection. Again, please make a circle around the appropriate capital letter at the right. A = Always S = Sometimes R = Rarely N = Never a. Patrons' addresses and affiliations are verified before they arrive. A S R N A-16 S-9 R-23 N-44 (Missing-2) b. Patrons are required to submit ID on arrival A S R N A-56 S-28 R-6 N-2 (Missing-2) c. Patrons are interviewed and oriented to the archives/collection before using it A s R N A-56 S-28 R-6 N-2 (Missing-2) d. Patrons read and sign a copy of the rules and procedures governing the archives/collection A s R N A-61 S-8 R-4 N-19 (Missing-2) e. Patrons must leave coats, briefcases, etc, in a secure designated place before entering archive A s R N A-64 S-ll R-4 N-13 (Missing-2) f. Records are made of each patron request that is filled A s R N A-67 S-ll R-8 N-6 (Missing-2) g. Patrons sign each call slip or equivalent request record A s R N A-56 S-6 R-7 N-22 (Missing-3) h. Patron-use records are maintained indefinitely A s R N A-65 S-5 R-2 N-16 (Missing-6) i. Unprocessed material may not be used by patrons A s R N A-19 S-39 R-21 N-ll (Missing-4) j. Staff members, not patrons, photocopy material for patrons A s R N A-58 S-24 R-7 N-3 (Missing-2) k. A staff member observes each patron at all times A s R N A-56 S-27 R-7 N-l (Missing-3) 1. A closed-circuit television system observes all patrons A s R N A-11 S-3 N-78 (Missing-2) m. A VCR is used in conjunction with the closed-circuit television to record suspicious behavior A s R N A-7 S-2 N-82 (Missing-4) n. Patrons use only copies of commercially valuable material A s R N A-7 S-42 R-23 N-19 (Missing-3) o. Before patrons use material, staff review it for completeness by folder or box A s R N A-12 S-28 R-19 N-33 (Missing-2) p. When patrons return material, staff review it for completeness by folder or box A s R N A-23 S-33 R-23 N-13 (Missing-2) No 143 8.1. How often is your archive/ collection physically reviewed against its finding aids or re-inventoried? (Please describe) 89 completed 8.2 Are heavily used materials reviewed more often? (Please check) 30_Yes 52_No (Missing-12) 8.3 If yes, what determines when a review is made? (Please comment) 28 completed. 8.4 Who can leave the archive/collection 's area or building without being checked by an exit attendant? (Please check one) 7_no-one /6_staff only 79_staff and other employees of institution VI Ps 7_patrons 48 everyone (skip to question 9) (Missing - 3) 8.5 If an exit check is done, who does it? (Please check all that apply) 35_staff member 10 hired guard 5 student intern or volunteer 8.6 If an exit check is done, what is examined? (Please check all that apply) 4 carried clothing 2J_papers 2/_books 70_computer 23 carrying cases 8.7 Should a stolen item be discovered during the exit check, what would be the institutional response? (Please check all that apply) 18 ask person to return to reading room 24 examine papers for other possibly stolen items 30 try to detain person 23 call predetermined police agency after person leaves 8.8 Have all the persons doing the exit check received training in the proper actions that they may safely and legally take? (Please check one) 16 Yes 17 No 8 Don't know 9. If a theft were discovered, to whom would it be reported? (Please check all that apply) 54 Security Dept 72 Supervisor 51 Police 15 Insurance Co. 27_Dealers 18 post on internet (where?) 36 publicize within organization 6 publicize in newspapers or on television 32 call or write other archivists at other institutions No 144 10.1 If you were to suspect that a staff member or employee had stolen material, would procedures be different from those for users? (Please check one) 27_Yes 25_No 41_Oon,t know 10.2 If so, how? (Please describe) 24 completed 11.1 Has your archives/collection experienced a known theft since 1977? (Please check) 43 Yes 48 No (If no, then skip to question 12) 11.2 What was stolen? (Please describe) 43 completed 11.3 How soon after the theft was it discovered? (Please describe) 39 completed 11.4 To whom was the theft reported? (Please describe) 38 completed 11.5 Was any of the material recovered? (Please check) 27 Yes 14 No 11.6 Was the identity of the perpetrator known or discovered? (Please check) 28 Yes 15 No 11.7 If so, was the perpetrator prosecuted? (Please check) 18 Yes 12 No 11.8 If not, why? (Please comment) 10 completed No 145 12. Please indicate your general reaction to the following statements: (SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; D=Disagree; SD = Strongly Disagree; N = No Opinion) a. This archives/collection is well protected against theft. SA A D SD N SA - 8 A-39 D-40 SD-6 (Missing -1) b. This archives/collection does not need to have any anti-theft procedures. SA A D SD N SA-l A-7 D-28 SD-54 N-l (Missing-3) c. The security budget needs to be increased. SA A D SD N SA-22 A-32 D-25 SD - 4 N-ll (Missing-1) d. This archives/collection has sufficient staff to implement anti-theft procedures. SA A D SD N SA-7 A-35 D-28 SD-22 N-2 e. Staff members have received/receive adequate training in anti-theft procedures SA A D SD N SA-3 A-37 D-37 SD- 15 N-2 f. We review our anti-theft procedures at regular intervals. SA A D SD N SA-5 A-24 D-40 SD- 19 N-5 (Missing-1) g. The highest-ranking officials of this institution support the implementation of anti-theft procedures SA A D SD N SA-15 A-41 D-14 SD-7 N-16 (Missing-1) h. Most archivists/manuscript curators in the USA are thoroughly familiar with such SAA publications as Timothy Walch's book, Archives and Manuscripts: Security SA A D SD N SA-4 A-29 D-32 SD-5 N-23 (Missing-1) I. Most archivists/manuscript curators in the USA implement the policies and procedures recommended by these SAA publications SA A D SD N SA-2 A-21 D-34 SD-5 NO-31 (Missing-1) j. Most archivists/manuscript curators in the USA have little or no input in determining the anti-theft policies set by their institutions. SA A D SD N SA-2 A- 14 D-44 SD - 9 N - 24 (Missing-1) k. It is easy to find information about the anti-theft problems of archivists/manuscript curators at other institutions SA A D SD N SA-3 A-21 D-43 SD-7 N- 19 (Missing-1) 1. We discuss anti-theft procedures with staff at other institutions SA A D SD N SA-2 A-40 D-29 SD-11 N-ll (Missing-1) m. It is easy to find information about state laws affecting theft in archives/collections SA A D SD N SA-3 A-17 D-39 SD-8 N-25 (Missing-2) n. A listserv dedicated to discussion of security problems faced by and procedures used by archivists/manuscript curators would be helpful SA A D SD N SA-14 A-47 D-17 SD-1 N-14 (Missing-1) o. Internet information on specifically archival/collection theft matters is fragmented SA A D SD N SA-3 A-47 N-42 (Missing-2) p. Internet information on specifically archival/collection theft matters is often out-of-date SA A D SD N SA-2 A-22 D-4 SD-1 N-60 (Missing-5) 13. If an article were to be written that would answer your archives/collection's most pressing anti-theft concern, what would its focus be? 60 completed No 146 Thank you very much for taking the time and thought to complete this questionnaire. Please return this questionnaire to: Abigail Leab P. O. Box 1216 Washington CT 06793 (I am using my address in the USA rather than at the University of British Columbia because I will be in the USA when I tabulate the results of this questionnaire) If you have comments or questions, please e-mail me at [email protected]