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Howell 131202 www.BillHowell.ca_ Icebreaker Unchained : We should have lost World War II Page 1 of 47 Video Script for Icebreaker Unchained : We should have lost World War II www.BillHowell.ca, 01Jan2013 first listing of key references and their links, 19May2013 first draft of main part, Summary I MUST POSE PROVOCATIVE QUESTIONS! Targets : • 30 minute introduction to the theme, well set up for further episodes. Status as of ?date?: • endpage www.BillHowell.ca_ Icebreaker Unchained : We should have lost World War II Page 2 of 47 **************************************************************************** Waiver/ Disclaimer The contents of this document do NOT reflect the policies, priorities, directions, or opinions of any of the author's past current, or future employers, work colleagues family, friends, or acquaintances, nor even of the author himself. The contents (including but not restricted to concepts, results, recommendations) have NOT been approved nor sanctioned at any level by any person or organization. The reader is warned that there is no warranty or guarantee as to the accuracy of the information herein, nor can the [analysis, conclusions, and recommendations] be assumed to be correct. The application of any concepts or results herein could quite possibly result in losses and/or damages to the readers, their associates, organizations, or countries, or the entire human species. The author accepts no responsibility for damages or loss arising from the application of any of the concepts herein, neither for the reader nor third parties. ******************************************* Copyright © 2013 Bill Howell of Calgary, Alberta, Canada Exceptions: • All papers cited are the property of the publisher or author as specified in the books and papers. • All information from conversations with other individuals are potentially the property of that individual, or of third parties. Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify ONLY the non-third-party content of this document under either: The GNU Free Documentation License (http://www.gnu.org/licenses/); with no Invariant Sections, Front-Cover Texts, or Back-Cover Texts. Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported License. It is expected that users of the content will: • Acknowledge William Neil Howell and/or the specific author of content or images on this page as indicated, as the source of the image. • Provide a link or reference back to this specific page. • Allow any modifications made to the content to also be reused under the terms of one or both of the licenses noted above. **************************************************************************** www.BillHowell.ca_ Icebreaker Unchained : We should have lost World War II Page 3 of 47 Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................................................................6 Introduction__Core_theme_of_Hitler_as_a_Stalin_protege.....................................................................6 ....................................................................................................................................................................7 PART I........................................................................................................................................................7 ....................................................................................................................................................................7 Opening Context : Soon after the Battle of Britain....................................................................................7 A_year_of_stunning_victories..............................................................................................................7 Three_hurdles_against_the_Nazis.........................................................................................................7 Battle_of_Britain...................................................................................................................................7 Battle_of_Atlantic.................................................................................................................................8 Battle_of_Oil.........................................................................................................................................8 Operation_Sea_Lion..............................................................................................................................8 Failure_of_Western_intellectuals..........................................................................................................9 Back_to_the_future...............................................................................................................................9 ....................................................................................................................................................................9 Communists_itching_for_a_war................................................................................................................9 Drowning_in_wealth_with_jealousy_and_rebellion.............................................................................9 Destroy_and_rebuild_both_man_and_society....................................................................................10 Exporting_trouble................................................................................................................................11 Bolsheviks_in_Berlin..........................................................................................................................11 ..................................................................................................................................................................13 Nazi_phoenix_from_ashes_and_rubble - Hitler's emergence as a socialist leader..................................13 Discontent_and_anger.........................................................................................................................13 From_artist_to_socialist_revolutionary...............................................................................................13 Yet_another_tough_socialist_party.....................................................................................................14 Yet_another_loud_socialist_party.......................................................................................................15 Beer_Hall_Putsch................................................................................................................................16 Mein_Kampf.......................................................................................................................................16 ..................................................................................................................................................................17 The Communists' Invisible Hand in Hitler's rise to power......................................................................17 Hitler_on_the_radar_screen................................................................................................................17 The_right_stuff_for_the_Communists................................................................................................17 ICEBREAKER....................................................................................................................................18 Moscow_needs_the_brown_shirts......................................................................................................19 Whiff_of_conspiracy...........................................................................................................................20 ..................................................................................................................................................................21 ..................................................................................................................................................................21 PART II.....................................................................................................................................................21 ..................................................................................................................................................................21 Grand Cooperation - Beating Versailles and bringing the Communists into the industrial age..............21 Democratic_Nazi_victory...................................................................................................................21 Barriers_to_German_progress_on_the_inside_and_out.....................................................................21 Fast_track_to_Russian_Industrialisation.............................................................................................22 Communism_of_guns_not_people......................................................................................................22 www.BillHowell.ca_ Icebreaker Unchained : We should have lost World War II Page 4 of 47 Matched_weaknesses_can_be_a_collective_strength.........................................................................22 You_cant_see_what_you_dont_want_to_see !!!!nyet - the buildups were overt and broadcast - not hidden!!!!.............................................................................................................................................23 The_dark_side_of_organisation..........................................................................................................23
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