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Notes and References Notes and References 1 INTRODUCTION: CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THE USSR AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR l. A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (Harmondsworth, 1964; first published London, 1961). 2. For the debate on Taylor's Origins see W. Roger Louis (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War: A. J. P. Taylor and His Critics (New York, 1972); G. Martel (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: The A. J. P. Taylor Debate after Twenty-Five Years (London, 1986); E. M. Robertson (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1971); and articles in the Journal of Modern History (March, 1997). 3. To my knowledge the only major treatment of Taylor's views on Soviet foreign policy and the outbreak of the Second World War is T. J. Uldricks' 'A. J. P. Taylor and the Russians', in Martel (ed.), Origins Reconsidered. 4. This summary of Taylor's view is based on a reading of remarks scat­ tered throughout the Origins, but see especially chs 9-10. The quote is from p. 319 of the Penguin edition of the book. 5. See G. Roberts, The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's Pact with Hitler (London, 1989), ch. 2. 6. Members of the collective security school of thought include the present author in The Unholy Alliance, T. J. Uldricks, 'Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s' in G. Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991 (London, 1994) and 'A. J. P. Taylor and the Russians'; G. Gorodetsky, 'The Impact of the Ribbentrop Pact on the Course of Soviet Foreign Policy', Cahiers du Monde russe et sovietique Qanuary-March 1990) and 'The Origins of the Cold War: Stalin, Churchill and the Formation of the Grand Alliance', The Russian Review, 47 (1988); M. Jabara Carley, 'End of the "Low, Dishonest Decade": Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939', Europe-Asia Studies, 45, no. 2 (1993) and 'Down a Blind Alley: Anglo­ Franco-Soviet Relations, 1920-1939', Canadian Journal of History (April 1994); 1. Fleischhauer, Der Pact: Hitler, Stalin und die Initiative der deutschen Diplomatie, 1938-1939 ((Frankfurt, 1990); and B. Pietrow, Stalinism us, Sicherheit und Offensive. Das Dritte Reich in der Konzeption der sowjetischen Ausenpolitik 1933 bis 1941 (Melsungen, 1983). An important but semi-detached member of this school is J. Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-1939 (London, 1984), who writes: 'what is so striking from 1933-1939 is less the tenta­ tive soundings in Berlin - the echoes of Rapallo - than the merciless persistence with which the Russians so doggedly clung to the policy of collective security, a policy which so rarely showed any promise of 151 152 NOTES AND REFERENCES success' (p. 230). Exemplars of the old official Soviet line which argue the collective security case include I. K. Koblyakov, USSR: For Peace, Against Aggression 1933-1941 (Moscow, 1976) and V. Sipols, Diplomatic Battles Before World War II (Moscow, 1982). 7. On the Rapallo period in Soviet-German relations see K. Rosenbaum, Community of Fate: Soviet-German Diplomatic Relations 1922-1928 (Syracuse, NY, 1965); H. L. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia 1926-1933 (London, 1966); R. H. Haigh et a!., German-Soviet Relations in the Weimar Era (London, 1985); and the relevant volumes and sections of E. H. Carr's A History of Soviet Russia (London, 1950-78). Some new and interesting archival documents on Soviet-Germany mili­ tary co-operation in the 1920s were published in International Affairs (Moscow), July 1990. A recent, interesting Russian/Soviet article on Rapallo is V. Sokolov and I. Fetisov, 'RapaUo and Prewar Poland', International Affairs (Moscow), March 1993. For a review of Soviet foreign policy as a whole in the 1920s see T.]. Uldricks, 'Russia and Europe: Diplomacy, Revolution and Economic Development in the 1920s', International History Review, no. 1 (1979). 8. Adherents of the 'German' school of thought include O. Pick, 'Who Pulled the Trigger? Soviet Historians and the Origins of World War II', Problems of Communism Ganuary-February 1968);]. Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938 (Ithaca, NY, 1984); N. Tolstoy, Stalin's Secret War (London, 1981); R. Tucker, 'The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy', Slavic Review, XXXVI (1977); and G. L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany, 2 vols (Chicago, 1970; 1980), Germany and the Soviet Union 1939-1941 (Leiden, 1954). The 'German' interpretation has in recent years also found an echo among many Soviet/Russian historians. See e.g. M. I. Semiryaga, Tainy Stalinskoi Diplomatii, 1939-1941 (Moscow, 1992). 9. See the two Uldricks articles cited above in Notes 3 and 6. 10. Doing business with the Nazis was, of course, the universal norm in the 1930s for all types of governments and states. See e.g. G. Dutter, 'Doing Business with the Nazis: French Economic Relations with Germany under the Popular Front' , journal of Modern History Gune 1991). 11. The nature of Soviet collective security policy is explored further in Uldricks, 'Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s' and Roberts, Unholy Alliance, ch. 3. See also Haslam, The Soviet Union, 1933-9 and R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991 (Ithaca, NY, 1992), ch. 3. 12. The most important representatives of the 'internal politics' school are Haslam, The Soviet Union, 1933-9 and, for the most sustained and explicit argument of this view, P. D. Raymond, Conflict and Consensus in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1933-1939, PhD thesis, Pennsylvania State University, 1979. See also Haslam's article in Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy. 13. On Soviet policy towards Japan see]. Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933-1941 (London, 1992). 14. Uldricks, 'Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s', p. 73. NOTES AND REFERENCES 153 15. The emphasis here on the ramshackle character of foreign policy in the 1930s is commensurate with the picture of crisis and chaos in Soviet domestic politics drawn by the so-called 'revisionist' historians. See, inter alia, J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938 (Cambridge, 1985); G. T. Rittersporn, Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications: Social Tensions and Political Conflicts in the USSR, 1933-1953 (London, 1991); J. Arch Getty and R. T. Manning (eds), Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (Cambridge, 1993); and, for a superb summary and commentary on the whole debate, C. Ward, Stalin's Russia (London, 1993). However, com­ pared to internal politics, foreign policy and diplomacy was a relatively sane and controlled domain of decision-making. I also think that the divi­ sions and conflicts over foreign policy were of a different character and order than those typical of domestic politics. 2 FROM CO-OPERATION TO CONFRONTATION: THE END OF RAPALLO AND THE TURN TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 1933-1935 1. J. Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, vol. 3, 1933-1941 (Oxford, 1953), p. 56. 2. Soviet foreign policy archives. Cited by 1. F. Maksimychev, Diplomatiya Mira protiv Diplomatii Voiny: Ocherk Sovetsko-Germanskikh Diplomaticheskikh Otnoshenii v 1933-1939 (Moscow, 1981), p. 28. See also: Documents on German Foreign Policy (hereafter DGFp), series C, vol. 1, docs 6, 10 and 29. 3. E. H. Carr, The Twilight of Com intern, 1930-1935 (London, 1982), p. 95 and Maksimychev, Diplomatiya Mira, p. 25. 4. See Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR (hereafter DVPS), vol. 16, docs 51,54 and 424 and DGFP, series C, vol. 1, docs 41,43 and 73 and vol. 2, doc. 127. 5. DVPS, vol. 16, doc. 54. Cited by J. Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-1939 (London, 1984), p. 7. 6. DGFP, series C, vol. 1, doc. 73. 7. Soviet foreign policy archives. Cited by Maksimychev, Diplomatiya Mira, p. 41. 8. Soviet foreign policy archives. Cited by ibid., pp. 41-2. 9. X. J. Eudin and R. M. Slusser (eds), Soviet Foreign Policy 1928-1934: Documents and Materials, vol. 2 (Pennsylvania, 1967), doc. 97. 10. For Soviet statements on the Hugenberg Memorandum see Degras, Soviet Documents, pp. 21-3. For Soviet protests: DVPS, vol. 16, doc. 189 and DGFP, series C, vol. 1, doc. 331. On Hugenberg's resignation: DGFP, series C, vol. 1, doc. 338. 11. Soviet foreign policy archives. Cited by Maksimychev, Diplomatiya Mira, p. 42. This was the first Soviet diplomatic document in which it was stated that Germany was preparing for war against the USSR, according to A. A. Akhtamzyan, 'Voenno Sotrudnichestvo SSSR i Germanii', Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya, no. 5 (1990),24. 154 NOTES AND REFERENCES 12. Soviet-German military co-operation was ended by Moscow in June 1933, the ostensible reason being that the continuation of such co­ operation was incompatible with Soviet participation in international discussions on disarmament. See DGFP, series C, vol. 1, docs 284, 339, 409,439,460 and 470 and series C, vol. 2, doc. 47. 13. Eudin and Slusser, Soviet Foreign Policy 1928-34, doc. 103. 14. See G. Roberts, The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's Pact with Hitler (London, 1989), pp. 40-3, 59-60. 15. Ibid., pp. 60-2. 16. Istoriya Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny 1939-1945, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1973), p. 283; V. Ya. Sipols, Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo Souza 1933-1935 (Moscow, 1980), p. 150; and DVPS, vol. 16, n. 321, pp. 876-7, for the text of the politburo proposals. Appendix 1 of Roberts, Unholy Alliance con­ tains an English translation. 17. On the USSR and the League see I. Plettenberg, 'The Soviet Union and the League of Nations', in The League of Nations in Retrospect (New York, 1983) and S.
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