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ORIGINAL IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO MEGHAN GALLAGHER Case No. 2010-1788 On Appeal from the Lucas County Plaintiff - Appellant, Court of Appeals, Sixth Appellate District, Case No. L-10-1051 V. LUCAS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS Defendant - Appellee, and OHIO REPUBLICAN PARTY STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE Defendant - Appellee, and NOV 1,72010 PAUL HOAG and JEFFREY SIMPSON CLERK OF COURT Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee. SUPREME COURT OF OHI® MEMORANDUM OF OHIO REPUBLICAN PARTY STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OPPOSING JURISDICTION Anne Marie Sferra (0030855) Anthony J. DeGidio (0069064) Christopher N. Slagle (0077641) 712 Farrer Street BRICKER & ECKLER LLP Maumee, Ohio 43537 100 South Third Street Telephone: (419) 509-1878 Columbus, Ohio 43215-4291 Facsimile: (419) 740-2556 Telephone: (614) 227-2300 Facsimile: (614) 227-2390 Scott A. Ciolek (0082779) [email protected] CIOLEK, LTD. [email protected] 520 Madison Avenue, Suite 820 Toledo, Ohio 43604 Attorneysfor Defendant-Appellee Telephone: (419) 740-5935 Ohio Republican Party State Central Comm ee Facsimile: (866) 890-0419 Co-Counsel for Appellant Meghan Gallagher 4114471v1 JULIA R. BATES LUCAS COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY Steven J. Papadimos (0005317) John A. Borell (00 1646 1) Andrew K. Ranazzi (0040617) Lucas County Courthouse, Suite 250 Toledo, Ohio 43624 Telephone: (419) 213-2001 Fax: (419) 213-2011 Counsel for Appellee Lucas County Board of Elections R. Kent Murphree (0065730) Gary O. Sommer (0006257) HEBAN SOMMER & MURPHREE 200 Dixie Highway Rossford, Ohio 43460 Telephone: (419) 662-3100 Facsimile: (419) 662-6533 Counselfor Appellees Jeffrey Simpson and Paul Hoag 2 4114477v1 MEMORANDUM OPPOSING JURISDICTION A. This Case Does Not Involve a Question of Public or Great General Interest or a Substantial Constitutional Question' Plaintiff-Appellant Meghan Gallagher ("Gallagher") initiated this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief in January 2010, based on a 2009 squabble within the Lucas County Republican Party ("LCRP"). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court resolved this intraparty spat by denying the injunctive relief sought and ordering the party to resolve its own dispute pursuant to R.C. 3517.05. The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Gallagher now asks this Court to accept this appeal as a discretionary appeal. Simply put, this case does not warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary review. Not only is this appeal devoid of any question of public or great general interest, the issues raised in this action are moot. More specifically, this action is moot because the two-year term of office at issue - from shortly after the primary election in May 2008 until shortly after the primary election in May 20102 - has expired. (County party central committee members, such as Gallagher, are elected for a two-year term at the primary election held in even-numbered years. See R.C. 3517.03.) The premise of Gallagher's action is that she and others with whom she is aligned in the LCRP were elected in the May 2008 primary and then became the officers of the LCRP Central and 1 Although Appellant's Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction includes a section entitled "Explanation of Why this Case is a Case of Public or Great General Interest and Involves a Substantial Constitutional Question," such Memorandum does not assert that any constitutional question, let alone a substantial one, is part of this appeal. The Ohio Republican Party State Central Committee asserts there is no substantial constitutional question before the Court. 2 R.C. 3517.05 provides, "A county central committee shall serve until the sixth day after the date of the declaration of the results by the board of elections of the primary election in that county." This Memorandum uses the phrase "shortly after the primary election" to refer to this statutory time frame. al1aa71v1 Executive Committees for a two-year term (beginning shortly after the May 2008 primary election). Gallagher initiated this action seeking a declaration to that effect and sought an injunction restraining the Lucas County Board of Elections and the Ohio Republican Party State Central Committee ("State Central Committee") from taking any action that would change the composition of these committees or their officers during the two-year term. See Complaint, ¶ 133 (seeking, in part, an injunction restraining the State Central Committee from becoming "involved with the resolution of intraparty disputes as to the legitimacy of committees .. '). Significantly, no legal action was ever taken by anyone to oust Gallagher from her Chair position throughout the 2008-2010 term (or at any time). Gallagher's commencement of the instant action was in the nature of a preemptive strike - she sought a court declaration that (1) she validly held her Chair position, (2) others with whom she was aligned validly held their officer positions, and (3) none of them could be removed from such positions by a rival faction of the LCRP, the Lucas County Board of Elections, or the State Central Committee for the duration of the 2008-2010 term. Since that term has ended, this action is moot. Obviously, the Court should not expend its scarce resources to address an issue that is moot. See State ex rel. White v. Kilbane Koch, 96 Ohio St.3d 395, 2002-Ohio-4848. This is particularly true where, as here, the plaintiff had an opportunity to present evidence at trial and to appeal the adverse decision. Even if this action were not moot, it does not involve a question of public or great general interest. Rather, it involves a single county's intraparty squabble and the dispute resolution mechanism set forth in. R.C. 3517.05 to be used when more than one organized group claims to 4 4114471v1 be the rightful county central or executive committee. This statute certainly does not have broad application to Ohioans or Ohio litigants generally. In fact, even though this statute has been a part of Ohio law for decades, it has been the subject of only a few published decisions (including the decision that is the subject of this appeal). In those instances where it has been cited in a published decision, courts - including this Court in 2010 - have made clear that if more than one organized group claims to be the rightful county central or executive committee, this issue shall be submitted to the state central committee for resolution. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lucas County Republican Party Executive Committee v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 1513, 2010-Ohio-930, at ¶118-21; Federspiel v. Ohio Republican Party State Central Committee (1994), 867 F. Supp. 617, 619, affirmed (1996), 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 15422. Thus, in the few instances where courts have been called on to address intraparty disputes regarding rightful county central or executive committees, they have consistently turned to the party, initially, to resolve its own dispute. The trial court followed this precedent and the court of appeals affirmed. Gallagher has not cited a single case (and none has been found) which strayed from this approach. Thus, there is no conflict among Ohio's lower courts or federal courts regarding this matter. Given the nature of political part ies, this approach makes utmost sense. Political parties are essentially voluntary associations of persons who act together principally for party and community purposes. Generally, courts are reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of political parties and, therefore, allow them to attempt to resolve their own disputes, whether pursuant to statute or otherwise. See State ex rel. Cain v. Kay (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 15, 18-19; see also Federspiel, 867 F.Supp. 617, 622. ("Even without this statute [R.C. 3517.05], the 4114471v1 Republican Party would have the right to choose between two competing factions as to which one will represent its Party.") Lastly, it is well established that this Court will not indulge in advisory opinions. State ex rel. White v. Kilbane Koch, 96 Ohio St.3d 395, 2002-Ohio-4848, at ¶18. Yet, that is precisely what Gallagher is asking this Court to do. First, she is asking the Court to render an opinion declaring that action which was not taken against her (or anyone else) - namely removal from office - could not have been taken. Second, she is asking this Court to address issues which she admits the lower courts did not address. See Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction, pp. 4, 6. Because this Court does not render advisory opinions, it should decline to accept this discretionary appeal. B. Brief Argument in Support of the State Central Committee's Position Regarding Appellant's Propositions of Law In the interest of brevity, this Memorandum Opposing Jurisdiction does not restate Gallagher's numerous and lengthy propositions of law. The State Central Committee's position as to each of these propositions of law is that this action is moot because the relief Gallagher sought below can no longer be granted. The 2008-2010 term has expired and, thus, no court can now protect Gallagher's Chair position or any other officers' positions for that term; nor can a court enjoin any action related to that term. Additionally, as stated by the court of appeals, the applicable standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. "A trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless its decision involves more than an error of judgment or law and can be characterized as unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." Gallagher v. Lucas County Board of Elections, 6°i Dist. No. L-10-1051, 2010-Ohio-4164, at ¶15 (citing Blakemore v. Blakemore 6 4114471v1 (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219). Gallagher's Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction does not address whether the trial court abused its discretion (nor does it urge a different standard of review).