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Defence conversion: Dead duck or still a relevant object of study?

Marc von Boemcken \ BICC

\ WORKING PAPER 7 \ 2017 DEFENCE CONVERSION: DEAD DUCK OR STILL A RELEVANT OBJECT OF STUDY? \ MARC VON BOEMCKEN

SUMMARY

The Working Paper charts the evolution of Conversion Studies from the to the post-Cold War period and discusses some of the reasons for the de- mise of the discipline in the new millennium. Based on a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of Conversion Studies in the past, it makes some suggestions on how conversion could inform a systematic field of academic inquiry in the 21st century. The propositions put forward to this end lean to- ward a comparatively conservative approach that pays close attention to the historical legacy of conversion as a concept. In sum, Conversion Studies should be a multi-disciplinary, critical and policy-relevant field of research that advocates social change based on analyses of political of vio- lence, particularly in the affluent, industrialized and comparatively peaceful societies of the Global North. At the same time, it ought to abandon its past re- liance on a simple civil–military dichotomy and, instead, engage with the more complex issues raised by a focus on organized violence. This includes a continual questioning and readjustment of one’s own normative coordinates.

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CONTENTS

Summary 2

Main findings 5

Introduction 6

Conversion: The basic idea 8

Economic conversion as a technical challenge 10

The politicization of Conversion Studies 13 Causes of militarization: The military–industrial complex 14 Effects of militarization: The depleted 15 Liberal vs. radical Conversion Studies 17

Conversion Studies after the Cold War and the establishment of BICC 20

Conversion Studies today? Six propositions 26 Conversion Studies pro-actively advocates processes of transformation bent upon reducing the potentials of organized violence for wider social benefits 26 Conversion Studies particularly emphasizes the economic conditions of organized violence 27 Conversion Studies goes beyond an exclusive concern with protracted violent conflicts and mainly focuses on organized violence in ‘peaceful’ regions 29 Conversion Studies bridges academic cultures 30 Conversion Studies is both critical and policy relevant 31 Conversion Studies is always also Post-Conversion Studies 32

Conclusion 34

Bibliography 35

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Main findings

Conversion Studies pro-actively Conversion Studies bridges academic advocates processes of transformation cultures bent upon reducing the potentials of organized violence for wider social Conversion Studies connects the ‘soft’, overtly normative and emancipatory agenda of ‘peace studies’ benefits with the ‘hard’, positivist and quantitative approach It makes no sense to speak of conversion without a of ‘peace science’. It thus appears as an opportunity reference to some sort of desired or actual process of for both cultures in Peace and Conflict Research to social transformation. A Conversion Studies of the 21st communicate with each other, to find common century would have to be an explicitly normative grounds and appreciate differences. science that identifies and proposes reductions in the potentials for organized violence against the prevailing Conversion Studies is both critical and political Zeitgeist. Importantly, this entails clearly spell- policy relevant ing out the expected benefits of any such reduction. Conversion Studies brings criticality and policy Conversion Studies particularly relevance together—as two principles of research emphasizes the economic conditions of that depend upon each other in order to make a real organized violence change. Conversion Studies ought to be policy relevant precisely because it conducts (self-)critical research, Conversion Studies needs to be more than a large not despite of it. container for accommodating any normative approach to reductions in organization of violence. The aim is Conversion Studies is always also not to convert hearts and minds and militaristic or Post-Conversion Studies aggressive attitudes. Instead, Conversion Studies ought to be squarely concerned with material resources, A Conversion Studies of the 21st century should the political economy of organized violence: with go beyond the reliance of a clear-cut civil-military capital allocation, manpower, and the dichotomy. The objective is not to fully overcome or defence industry. eradicate organized violence. Indeed, not every reduc- tion of organized violence is necessarily desirable. In Conversion Studies goes beyond an this sense, the normative agenda of conversion needs exclusive concern with protracted to be continually contested violent conflicts and mainly focuses on organized violence in ‘peaceful’ regions The primary objects of Conversion Studies are material manifestations of organized violence in the comparatively affluent and highly industrialized societies of North America, and East Asia—not (or, at least, not only) the violent conflicts of the Global South. Increasing investments into organized violence in ‘peaceful’ regions present problems of themselves— and quite regardless of whether they lead to violent conflict or not.

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Introduction

Toward the end of the 1990s Michael Brzoska, at Iron Curtain. BICC’s definition of conversion as ‘the the time Director of Research at the Bonn Interna- operational process of demilitarization and the prac- tional Center for Conversion (BICC), observed in the tical of disarmament’ (Laurance et al., ‘Journal for Peace Research’ that “[c]oncepts, like fash- 1995, p. 5) sums up the more general take on the issue ions, come and go” (1999a, p. 131). If this is the case, during this time quite well. Contrary to popular belief, then another eighteen years down the line, the con- however, Conversion Studies was not a child of the cept of conversion appears to be something of an aca- 1990s. Already well beforehand, it described a buzzing, demic mullet. Between 1972 and 2013, the library cata- diverse and ‘fashionable’ field of academic inquiry logue of BICC lists a total of 1,415 publications that and critique, firmly established within the overall deal with defence conversion as their main subject. discipline of Peace and Conflict Research. In 1979, for What seems fairly impressive at first sight gives way example, Ulrich Albrecht published an extensive to a somewhat sobering insight on the second. 88 overview of studies on defence conversion, which percent of this body of texts was published in the boasted several hundred entries. If anything, the con- course of the 1990s. For the more recent period from ceptual approach to studying conversion became de- 2000 onwards, the catalogue contains a mere 129 en- cidedly narrowed in the course of the 1990s—and this tries. Of these, again more than 80 percent cover the narrowing might go some way in explaining why the years 2000 and 2001 alone. Between 2006 and 2013, no study of conversion went out of style around the turn more than three recorded studies took defence con- of the millennium. version as their principal object of inquiry. The diag- If there are some relevant insights to be gained nosis could hardly be clearer: Conversion has long from Conversion Studies, then we must go back to outlived its heydey, both as an academic concept and the times predating the end of the Cold War. We need as an economic or political process. Had the end of to ask ourselves: What were the motivations, inter- the Cold War prompted many states to significantly ests, questions, standpoints, attitudes and objectives reduce their armed forces, certainly since the 9/11 at- of Conversion Studies before there was an actual po- tacks and the still ongoing global ‘war on terror’, the litical demand for conversion? As it turns out, we find overall trend has shifted, once again, to massive rear- a contested arena of various inclinations, comprising mament in many parts of the world. States, generally a more economic and a more political branch, a more speaking, are no longer interested in conversion. Why liberal and a more radical school, more narrow and should academics be? very technical alongside broader, more encompassing This Paper asks whether we, as a scholarly com- approaches. There were those merely concerned with munity that roughly identifies itself with Peace and converting the assembly lines in a factory from the Conflict Research, should let the concept of conver- production of military to civilian goods. At the same sion rest in peace—or whether there might be some- time, a significant number of conversion scholars, of- thing, some aspects to it, worth reviving. To give away ten associated with the social activism and peace the answer right at the beginning: It doubts that a movements of the early 1980s, went beyond such lim- full-fledged renaissance of ‘old-school’ Conversion ited aims and developed larger visions of how we Studies is an altogether realistic or even desirable ob- might move from a world of war to a world of peace. jective. It does, however, argue that a couple of valua- In retrospect, it is certainly easy to dismiss their writ- ble lessons can be learnt by taking a closer look at its ings on the grounds of the often naive and idealistic evolution following World War II, its further develop- assumptions that guided their analyses and do not ment and fanning out between the 1960s and 1980s, withstand closer scrutiny today. Nevertheless, we its ‘Golden Age’ in the 1990s and eventual demise in should acknowledge that these scholars made an ef- the new millennium. fort to think against the grain of the arguably no less The by far most publications on the subject ap- naive axioms of mainstream Security and Strategic peared in the 1990s as a reaction to political decisions Studies of the day. In doing so, they tried to formulate to downsize military capacities on both sides of the concrete normative visions of the future, never

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content with simply describing the world as it is, but empirical as well as normative and conceptual always motivated by a desire to change it. What is grounds, in turn fundamentally challenging the core more, most agreed that this task required a deeper idea of conversion itself. Maybe a newly revived aca- understanding of the political economy of organized demic engagement with the issue at hand should un- violence in society, the causes and effects of invest- derstand itself as ‘Post-Conversion Studies’. That is to ments into the military and security sector, and par- say: While explicitly situating itself within the tradi- ticularly the vested economic interests of the armed tion of Conversion Studies, and thereby not least re- forces and defence industries. Notwithstanding some taining its critical, normative and emancipatory spir- notable exceptions, it appears that this overall ap- it, it would simultaneously always question the very proach does not figure very prominently in cur- parameters that render conversion a coherent and rent-day Peace and Conflict Research. A review of old- somewhat intelligible concept. time Conversion Studies might be an occasion to The Paper is organized into three main parts. The discuss the validity of this neglect in the 21st century. first begins with an inquiry into the meaning of the This Paper does not propose a new research agen- term conversion, before tracing the history of Conver- da. Its purpose is comparatively modest, although sion Studies from the end of World War II to the still quite ambitious and challenging. Given the vir- 1980s. It considers different definitions of and ap- tual absence of conversion as a relevant subject of proaches to conversion within this field and alludes Peace and Conflict Research today, it aspires to tell a to some of the main arguments and debates put for- brief history of Conversion Studies. This history, it ar- ward by conversion scholars, particularly as they re- gues, may partly inspire us to be more courageous late to the causes and effects of militarization. Impor- when reflecting upon and disclosing our normative tantly, this first part suggests a basic distinction predispositions, to think about and clearly state what between two broad perspectives in Conversion Stud- kind of world we are working toward in the research ies: The one conceives conversion as a largely techni- we do. It could also alert us to some empirical phe- cal undertaking reacting to an external political de- nomena that we have neglected, although they re- mand; the other places a stronger emphasis on an main relevant. Related to this, it might make us re- understanding of conversion as a pro-active political consider the widespread implicit assumption process. according to which a quantitative (and often heavily The second part of the Paper analyzes how this economic) emphasis on ‘facts and figures’ necessarily distinction played out in the relocation of Conversion precludes more normative and emancipatory re- Studies as an academic field of inquiry after the end search designs. To revisit the rise and downfall of of the Cold War. Doing so, it identifies factors explain- Conversion Studies equally draws attention to a dan- ing the gradual demise of the discipline as a relevant gerous pitfall: A discipline that all too easily aban- scholarly subject within Peace and Conflict Research. dons pro-active criticality for the sake of following The third and final part explores the extent to the footsteps of political demand may find itself as all which it may be worthwhile to resuscitate aspects of but water under the bridge once this demand has Conversion Studies in the new millennium. Can an subsided. argument be made that conversion is still a relevant There are, then, some good reasons to revisit the analytical concept? Or is it better left dead and bur- past. Yet, the concept of conversion is not without its ied? The Paper concludes with six propositions that problems. Its main shortcoming concerns the overtly ought to be taken into account when answering simplistic dichotomy between the military and the these questions. civilian—or between war and peace—on which it commonly relied. In the complex world of today (but arguably also in the just as complex worlds of former times) things rarely come as clear-cut as that. The distinction can be rightfully called into question on

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Conversion: The basic idea

The etymological roots of the term conversion go and less well-known application of the term: military back to the Latin noun conversio, which translates as or defence conversion. The basic idea is not new, to be ‘a turning round, revolving, revolution’, sometimes sure—and also a popular theme of Christian scripture. also ‘subversion, alteration, change’ or a ‘change of As the well-known passage in the view or opinion’. A common modern dictionary de- sums it up, “and they shall beat their swords into fines conversion as ‘the process of changing or causing ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks” something to change from one form to another’. This, (:4). At the most general level, defence conver- of course, is a rather broad understanding that invites sion may be defined as the transformation of some- a range of applications across various contexts. On thing military into something civilian. Similar to the one hand, conversion has acquired numerous faith-conversion, which relies on an initial distinction ‘technical’ connotations, for example in finance (the between the believers and the non-believers, it thus changing of one currency into another) or medicine requires the separation between two social spheres: (‘conversion disorder’) (see Heinemann-Grüder, 2006, the civilian and the non-civilian or military. At the pp. 16–17). On the other hand, many people associate same time, conversion intimately connects these two the term with a religious meaning. According to opposing poles with each other, for it denotes the Catholic dogma, conversion refers to the process very process whereby the one morphs into the other. whereby a ‘misguided’ individual abandons his or her Hence, and just as faith-conversion does not burn the ‘old’ belief and embraces the ‘true faith’ of the church heretic at the stake, defence conversion suggests an (see Breitschwerdt, 1988/9, p. 10; Albrecht, 1979, pp. 17–18). internal transformation of the converted object, from This move may be voluntary; it may be enforced from military to civilian. the outside. In either case, the specifically religious Two observations follow from this. On the one appropriation of conversion points to an actively ini- hand, conversion always involves a reduction, a tiated process that differs from any more mechanical shrinking of the military realm, whatever this may or neutral transformation in three significant ways. mean in a concrete case. For example, if a defence First of all, it does not presuppose the disappearance— company diversifies its production portfolio and or full-scale destruction—of the converted object. To enters civilian markets, while nonetheless continuing convert is not to replace one thing with another, alto- to produce and sell military goods on the same scale gether different thing; it is to effect a substantive as before, this would not count as conversion (see change within the internal composition of one and Dumas, 1995, pp. 18–19; Brzoska, 2000, pp. 134–35). As the same entity (or individual). Second, conversion Southwood explained, it would need a “once-for-all seeks to align its object with the general and accepted re-employment of a firm’s defense resources to civil- norms of society; by way of contrast, the act of de- ian use” (1997, p. 100). On the other hand, defence con- nouncing those norms and becoming an outcast version ought not to be confused with arms control or could be characterized by its antonym ‘perversion’. disarmament. Restrictions in the procurement, Third, whoever becomes converted experiences a pos- stockpiling and transfer of military resources may itive enhancement of his or her quality—not simply help to prevent an arms race from spiralling out of in the eyes of the community but also in terms of an control; yet, they do not necessarily transform the independent and absolute truth. Conversion always status quo between military and civilian resources denotes something desirable and good: The end of within a given society (see Roberts, 1991, p. 77). And delusion and return to the comforting lap of the one whereas an actual reduction in armament might and only, eternal order of things. create a certain potential for conversion—and is, The explicitly normative aspects first encoun- arguably, a precondition for any such process to come tered in the religious understanding of faith-conver- about in the first place—the former may well proceed sion resonate with another, comparatively younger despite the latter (see BICC, 1996, p. 17). Brzoska noted

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that disarmament and demobilization could conceiv- Nevertheless, the main distinction I would like to ably even contribute to enhancing—rather than propose here concerns not so much the conversion diminishing—defence capabilities, for instance by process in and by itself, but rather the academic study streamlining the military sector and thereby making and engagement with conversion as a problem, that it more efficient and effective (1999b, pp. 15–16). is the problematization of conversion. How does Conver- Conversion, then, is not solely concerned with sion Studies position itself vis-à-vis the political and putting a lid on or downsizing the military forces social agents and structures that it addresses? Does it and/or defence industry. Instead, it directs its main problematize the presence or, on the contrary, the attention to the civilian benefits that any such measures absence of conversion? It seems that publications on need to entail. For example, it would not be sufficient the issue can be situated along a continuum between to simply close down a weapons-producing factory two extreme positions: an economic and technical and dismiss the workforce. The central question is and a more pro-active, political approach. how the freed labour could be put to an alternative, socially productive use. Swords are not beaten into scrap; they are beaten into ploughshares. This broad conceptualization of defence conver- sion leaves a number of important questions un- answered. How does conversion come about? What is its scope? Can every decrease in military resources be translated into tangible civilian goods? Or should conversion rather focus on particular resources? And what is a ‘socially productive’ civilian good anyway? However, as Bjorn Møller pointed out, such questions are “probably more useful for specifying particular versions of conversion than for distinguishing con- version from something completely different” (1996, p. 10). They shed some light on Brzoska’s observation that “conversion is a contested concept” (1999b, p. 15). The academic study of defence conversion is any- thing but a homogeneous field of inquiry. Reviewing the relevant literature, it quickly becomes clear that there is—or, rather was—no such thing as ‘the one and only’ way to write and think about conversion. Conversion Studies encompassed a wide variety of scholarly dispositions, approaches and objectives. Most commonly, different understandings were dis- tinguished regarding the scale of conversion (local/ national/ global) and/or the types of resources to be converted (see e.g., Laurance et al., 1995; Brzoska, 1999a; 1999b). And, of course, it makes a difference whether an effort at conversion is only concerned with, say, a single factory or military base, or whether it directs its attention to the military expenditure of a country or even the whole world.

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Economic conversion as a technical challenge

Many writings on conversion reacted to an exter- a number of military bases in the early 1960s, often nal political demand, some decision to convert some with severe economic ramifications for surrounding parts of the military or defence infrastructure. In communities. Similarly, cuts in the US space pro- such cases, conversion poses—above all else—a tech- gramme in the early 1970s seriously affected some nical problem or challenge to scholars. What kind of parts of the defence industry (see Albrecht, 1979, p. 9). knowledge and techniques would such a process Looking through the vast literature on defence require? How can it be organized effectively and effi- conversion, published over a period of almost five ciently? As it happens, these were the principal ques- decades, it quickly becomes clear that most writings tions on the mind of the American economists who adopted a very technical and economic focus. Theo- popularly coined the idea of defence conversion as retically, of course, the conversion of a military object World War II was drawing to a close (see Boulding, could also include the transformation of militaristic 1983, p. 163). They were a very practical response to the attitudes, mindsets or perceptions. Yet, the civilian straightforward problem that the US economy was benefits of such processes would, arguably, be a lot facing at the time, namely an undesired surplus in harder to pin down than concrete material redistri- military production and labour due to decreasing butions. As Seymour Melman insisted, the concept of (political) demand for weapons and soldiers. A shock defence conversion “pertains to the actual physical therapy of simply dismantling substantial portions of resources used for military purposes” (1992, p. 139). For the defence industry and dismissing countless workers this reason, it was, in fact, commonly characterized alongside armed forces’ personnel was ruled out as ‘economic conversion’. because this may have generated widespread unem- In the narrowest understanding, economic con- ployment and social unrest. The export of military version applied only to the defence industry: to factories, goods and services to foreign markets was equally out assembly lines and, not least, human labour (see of the question since the possible demand elsewhere Gummet, 1997). Brzoska observed that this was very could not have been met without undermining one’s much “the focus of the debate in the 1970s and early own foreign policy goals. Given these considerations, 1980s” (1999a, p. 133). Sometimes also termed “industrial the notion of defence conversion appeared as an conversion” (Brzoska, 2000, p. 134) or “direct conversion” attractive third strategy to US government officials. (Hartley, 1997, p. 93; Struys, 1999, p. 34), its concern was, It promised to reduce military capacities while at the quite simply, with shifts “from the production of mil- same time not only averting unemployment but cre- itary to civilian goods” (Brzoska 1999a, p. 133). Individual ating a number of social and economic benefits (see studies differed in terms of the scale they analyzed, Albrecht, 1979, p. 9). As it turned out, the diligently which could range from global over national indus- planned and executed conversion of large parts of the trial transformations to very specific reorientations US defence sector in the late 1940s was very much a within only parts of a single production plant (see success story that would be frequently invoked by later Brzoska, 2000, p. 134). Gummet and also Southwood proponents of military downsizing (see Melman, 1974, distinguished between three major focal points in p. 2.; Bischak & Raffel, 1992, pp. 2–3; Bischak & Yudken, the literature. The first “attempts to change what is 1993, pp. 174–75; Klein, 1993, pp. 18–19; Intriligator, 1996, produced in an individual plant” (Gummet, 1997, pp. 8–10). pp. 35–36), sometimes also characterized as the “factory- Publications concerned with the technical man- based approach” (Southwood, 1997, p. 101) or “firm-level agement of conversion processes continued to appear conversion” (Brzoska, 2000, p. 134). The second with some frequency over the following decades. The “attempts to alter the overall product range of a firm”, need for such expertise persisted, albeit on a much which may include several production facilities, pos- smaller scale than beforehand. For example, US sibly located in various places (Gummet, 1997, pp. 35–36). Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara closed down Southwood referred to this as the “company-based

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Table 1 Typology of economic conversion

DIRECT / INDUSTRIAL CONVERSION INDIRECT CONVERSION

INTERNAL CONVERSION EXTERNAL CONVERSION \ CONVERSION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL (‘REINTEGRATION’) \ FACTORY-BASED / FIRM \ COMMUNITY-BASED \ CONVERSION OF MILITARY BASES LEVEL (‘BASE CONVERSION’) \ COMPANY-BASED \ CONVERSION OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURE approach” (1997, p. 100). The third “attempts to gener- Economic conversion may address various types ate new foci of economic growth in a region” (Gummet, of material resources. Still, the focus on economic 1997, pp. 35–36). Such a “community-based approach” aspects lent itself to a rather narrow and limited (Southwood. 1997, p. 102) need not limit itself to academic perspective. Lisa Peattie wrote in 1988 that changes within one or more factories. It might even economic conversion was “most frequently thought close down military production sites completely, as of as a set of essentially technically projects” (p. 11). In long as the workforce is relocated to a different facility this understanding, it is easy to imagine conversion to produce civilian goods. Whereas the former two as the reaction to a situational change that is brought types have been categorized as cases of internal con- about independently and thought of as somehow version (i.e. taking place within a single plant or com- problematic. A defence corporation might be con- pany), the latter is also referred to as external conver- fronted with a sudden decrease in demand for the sion, i.e. the transition of labour from one factory or weapons it produces. A community might be faced company to another (see Dumas, 1996, pp. 140–41). with the closure of a military base in its vicinity, thus Although the defence industry was certainly an losing an important source of income for its local important focus of Conversion Studies, various scholars economy. In either case, conversion would be one adopted a broader perspective (see Brzoska, 1999a; among other options the affected actors could choose Hartley, 1997, p. 3). Besides the ‘direct’ conversion of to pursue. The defence corporation may try to switch industrial facilities and labour, conversion could also to the manufacture of civilian goods; alternatively, it pertain more generally to military personnel, infra- may seek to enter new markets and sell its weapons structure or capital. In this case, it was sometimes abroad or even shut down production lines completely. distinguished from the former as indirect conversion The local community may attract investors to convert (see Table 1). Again, however, the resource in question the formerly military buildings to, say, a holiday resort, would need to be transformed to benefit or enhance thereby generating new economic opportunities for non-military social goods: The successful reintegra- itself—or some of its inhabitants may simply migrate tion of soldiers into civilian life and workplaces, the to different places with brighter prospects for making reconstruction of military bases, for instance for social a living. housing schemes, or the redirection of a government’s In all likelihood, actors will only opt for conversion defence expenditures into, say, health or education if it appears as a viable strategy that promises a great- budgets. As illustrated by the various definitions of er return than any of the alternative possibilities. defence conversion in Box 1, in the 1990s, this broad Sometimes, divergent interests within the groups or understanding—referred to by BICC as the “‘resource institutions in question could lead to conflicts over re-use perspective”’ (Brzoska, 2000)—was, while whether or not to implement a conversion process. maintaining the economic focus, very much the con- To stick with the example of the aforementioned sensus among scholars. defence corporation: Whereas the workers might

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Box 1 General definitions of economic defence conversion

[E]conomic defence conversion seeks to redirect military resources in such a manner that they are put to non-military, productive or ‘civilian’ use. It can refer to the reallocation of capital, public funds formerly invested into the defence sector, to the redesign of the means of production or the reorientation of human labour (Dumas, 1977).

Economic conversion refers to the process of moving labor, capital and other resources from the military to the civilian economy (Bischak & Raffel, 1992, p. 1).

Conversion is plain and simple—a shift from military to civilian activity using released personnel and facilities that were formerly devoted to defence production (Klein, 1993, p. 17).

Conversion reaches into the economy and redirects human and capital resources from military to civilian-oriented activity (Dumas, 1995, p. 6).

The problem of defense conversion is that of shifting defense production into non-defense civilian production. Of particular importance in the process of conversion is that of shifting labor and capital from military production to civilian production. Labor, in the form of armed forces personnel and defense plant workers, must be redirected to produce civilian goods. Capital, including both military bases and plant and equip- ment producing military goods and services, must be transformed so as to be able to produce civilian goods (Intriligator, 1996, p. 3).

The conversion challenge is to achieve a re-allocation of resources from the military to the civilian sectors of the economy (Hartley, 1997, p. 83).

[I]n its broadest sense, conversion is the allocation of military capacities to civilian use (Struys, 1999, p. 34).

consider conversion an ideal means for retaining their jobs, the executive management may expect higher profit margins if parts of the workforce are simply dismissed. The important point to keep in mind is that for this kind of conversion to come about, its objectives need to be grounded in the eco- nomic self-interests of the affected constituents who initiate it. As such, and although potentially broad in scope, the scale of conversion usually remains small, concerned with a set of microeconomic challenges (and possible conflicts) encountered in a specific pro- duction facility or local community (see Møller, 1996, p. 9). This type of conversion is arguably apolitical, meaning that it serves no higher purpose than to secure the socio-economic status quo of a particular group. “Economic conversion” is often only about preventing “a loss of employment or firm closures” (Struys, 1999, p. 34). In some cases, it may even be “no more than a mopping up operation” and “part of the process of making the defence industry more effi- cient” (Southwood, 1997, p. 100).

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The politicization of Conversion Studies

The more technical and economy-oriented If one conceives of conversion as a more political perspective only describes part of conversion-related project, it becomes less a technical reaction to some studies and research activities. In the course of the shift in external circumstances, premised on main- 1970s and, especially the 1980s, it is possible to discern taining some social and economic status quo (employ- an increasing politicization of Conversion Studies, ment, turnover). Quite the contrary, conversion would accompanied by a broadening of issues beyond a seek to pro-actively transform existing social and mere concern with economic problems. In a 1988 economic conditions. Whereas this political take on special issue on defence conversion in the ‘Bulletin the issue may still be concerned with a very limited for Peace Proposals’, Michael Renner argued that con- scale or object, i.e. a single factory or local community, version “ought to be more than just a mechanism to more commonly it assumed a broader perspective adjust for fluctuations and piecemeal reductions in and addressed the problems of an entire country or military spending” (p. 138). As Peattie seconded, it even the whole world. In comparison to industrial should really be considered “a political movement that and base conversion, the question of, for example, addresses the economic basis of what in international reallocating public expenditures on the military relations is known as ‘the arms race’ and in domestic moved up on the agenda of Conversion Studies. politics can be thought of as ‘militarism’ ” (p. 11). The questions and tasks differed from those writ- Renner’s and Peattie’s proposal was not wholly ings that were merely reacting to some very specific new. A comparatively smaller, nevertheless still sig- requirements of the government. For a start, scholars nificant and influential strand of Conversion Studies needed to empirically demonstrate that investments had been doing just that for quite some time. Unlike in the defence sector were, by and large, a social and the approaches discussed above, it was concerned economic burden, not a benefit. At least throughout with the absence of a large-scale conversion project the 1970s, conversion scholars thus often remained behind the backdrop of what US President Dwight D. clearly within the discipline of economic science, Eisenhower, in his famous 1961 farewell address, had usually applying macroeconomic analytical frame- warningly characterized as an emerging “military– works (see Albrecht, 1979, p. 10). This included econo- industrial complex”. Notwithstanding occasional metric models to quantify the opportunity costs of problems in individual communities and industry investments into the defence sector (e.g. Stone, 1973), sectors, US military spending as a whole had signifi- substitution and trade-off analyses to calculate cantly increased over the Cold War period, sustaining potential impacts of reduced military spending on an ever-expanding defence–industrial base, the social other public budgets (e.g. Russett, 1970; Caputo, 1975), value of which was increasingly contested, especially parametric cost comparisons of military and civilian during the economic recession of the mid-1970s. A enterprises (e.g. Clayton, 1972; Sivard, 1977), or more popular critique of ‘development’ policy blamed high sophisticated methods for comparing the wider socio- levels of armament in the donor countries—as well as economic effects of projected changes in defence the Third World itself—for the failure of the develop- expenditures to similar changes in, say, health ment-project to deliver on its promises (see Boulding, expenditure (e.g. , 1977). The main pur- 1983, pp. 166–69). What is more, in the 1980s, the neo- pose behind these studies was to highlight the antici- liberal and conservative policies of pated benefits that would result from a reallocation of and Margret Thatcher severely circumscribed spending military resources (mostly in the form of capital) to on social welfare while maintaining (or even increasing) civilian uses. Rather than being concerned with the defence and military expenditure (see Breitschwerdt, particularistic economic self-interest of workers in a 1988/89, p. 11). The politicization of Conversion Studies specific defence plant, scholars wanted to demon- also neatly tied in with the concerns of new social strate the value of large-scale conversion for society movements advocating ecological sustainability and as a whole. a world free of nuclear weapons (see Boulding, 1983, pp. 172–73).

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Besides its continual leaning towards economic Renner wrote that the arms race between the super- science, the politicization of Conversion Studies powers had reached “a self-sustained momentum with also attracted political scientists (see Albrecht, 1979, little real causal relationship to national security” (p. pp. 53–54). The focus of their questions was less on the 129). Already a decade earlier, a comprehensive study anticipated effects as rather on the social conditions had failed to detect any correlation between varia- of conversion: Under what circumstances can we tions in inter-state conflict intensities and changes expect to realistically implement a conversion pro- in military expenditure (see Senger, 1975). Some ar- cess? What is required for it to be successful? What gued that increasing militarization, accompanied by sustains resistance to conversion? How can such the evocation of an Evil Empire instilling a perma- resistance be overcome? Or, to put it differently: Why nent state of fear in people, was occasioned by domes- do we have such a thing as the ‘military’ sector? tic concerns over social fragmentation and civil un- What arguments actually explain and justify arma- rest, a “means for inducing compliance and maintain ment and military build-up? And how is it possible to the existing order” and “of keeping the citizenry in effectively counter these arguments? line” (Peattie, 1988, p. 12). Others emphasized econom- Since it combines both an economic and a political ic motives. Mary Kaldor related rises in British and outlook, the pioneering work of Seymour Melman, up US military spending during the 20th century to ef- to his death in 2004 professor of Industrial Engineering forts of governments to support declining industry and Operations Research at Columbia University and branches in the wake of technological changes (1978, one of the most well-known founding fathers of Con- p. 324). Similarly, Dana Dunn stressed the importance version Studies, deserves particular scrutiny here. His of ensuring employment: overall objective was to unmask and delegitimize the [W]e need weapons contracts to provide jobs for de- “ideologists of military power” that advocated the fense workers. In order to produce the weapons, we “necessity of war economy” (Melman, 1974, p. 122). This must fund a massive defense budget or radically in- required a critical engagement with a number of pop- crease arms sales around the world. In order to justi- ular claims about both the causes and effects of mili- fy such allocation of resources, we need a threatening tarization. The following section will look at both de- enemy. Defense workers also require this socially con- bates, which were highly influential within the structed enemy in order to rationalize their work political wing of Conversion Studies, in some more (1995, p. 40). detail. Such arguments were closely related to a more general theory according to which military build-up Causes of militarization: The military– was driven by the vested economic interests of certain industrial complex coalition groups that were organized in what became known as the ‘military–industrial complex’ (MIC) Up until the 1960s, peace researchers and the (see Heinemann-Grüder, 2006, pp. 17–18; also Bischak, classical Realists in International Relations (IR) theory 1993, p. 133). Gaining popularity in the 1960s and 1970s, largely agreed in that inter-state rivalry was the prin- the MIC was a somewhat vague concept accommo- cipal factor explaining rises in defence expenditure dating a wide spectrum of political inclinations and and military build-up, the main disagreement being various theoretical and empirical assumptions (see whether this resulted in more security or more inse- Albrecht, 1978). The perhaps most comprehensive—and curity for the parties involved (see Glaser, 2000). consistent—account of the US American MIC was Investments in the defence sector, conventional wis- provided by Melman. Having outlined its central dom held, were excited by geostrategic considerations, elements in his 1970 book Pentagon Capitalism, he ideological differences, threat perceptions and the clearly spelled out its organizational characteristics quest for security. However, in the course of the 1960s, four years later in The Permanent War Economy and particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, various (1974). scholars began to question this viewpoint. In 1988,

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Importantly, Melman argued that the political administrators, militaries, defence-industrial manag- economy of the US defence sector significantly dif- ers and workers would drive these groups to resist fered from the usual dynamics of civilian markets any disarmament initiative and presented, in fact, (1974, p. 54). Whereas, by all outward appearances, it the greatest obstacle to any such effort (see Melman, mimicked some normal features of private capitalism, 1974, pp. 59–61). The arms race could not simply be end- it ought to be regarded as “a full-fledged centrally ed by venturing out into the realm of international managed industrial system” (p. 20) whose “top politics. The greater challenge was of an economic directorate is located in government” (p. 59). In this and domestic nature, namely to render the disman- advanced MIC, which Melman labelled the “war tling of the defence economy” (p. 260) of “militarized state capitalism” sector beneficial to the very people that profited from (p. 299)—and later scholars would alternatively dub it—and thereby winning their support. Conversion, the “war machine” (Renner, 1988, p. 132) or the then, appeared as a lot more than simply the promise “welfare–warfare state” (Peattie, 1988, p. 12)—decision- of an ‘added economic value’ to a process of disarma- making power was not dispersed between structurally ment, itself brought about by other means. Quite the differentiated positions of producers and consumers. contrary: Economic conversion became the principal Instead, both sides were collapsed within a single, political strategy necessary to realize disarmament in more or less homogeneous body that joined “peak the first place (see Breitschwerdt, 1988/89, p. 11). Nota- political and economic” leverage (Melman, 1974, p. 60). bly, this did not necessarily imply a break or conflict Just as Eisenhower had feared, the MIC represented with the more limited and technical approaches to “a concentration of power hitherto unknown in Amer- conversion outlined earlier. Indeed, much of the ican experience” (pp. 20–21). conversion literature in political science highlighted The crucial assumption was that the symbiotic the potential of the concept to build bridges between relationships between government bureaucrats, the different interest groups and form political coalitions, military and its defence–industrial base had become for example between trade unions and the peace so intimate, uncoupled from both civilian economy movement (see Peattie, 1988, p. 15). and effective democratic control, that decisions over defence spending, military research and development Effects of militarization: The depleted and the acquisition of new weapons were less guided economy by some public interest (be it manifest in real or im- agined security concerns and cost-efficiency) as by A central thesis of Conversion Studies was that the personal interests of those that partook in the militarization could be primarily explained by vested war economy and derived some (usually material) economic interests within the MIC rather than polit- benefits and privileges from it (see Melman, 1974, p. ical concerns over (in)security. Conversion was thus 54). For Melman, the “post World War II American the key to disarmament (instead of, for instance, war economy was developed and sustained by politi- establishing a system of collective security, which cal decisions” that “were rooted in an economic in- was also discussed at the time). Nevertheless, and terest base of part of the economy” (p. 287) and affect- even if correct, this claim did not expound why con- ed only “a minority of American society” (p. 280; see version and disarmament ought to be pursued in the also Huffschmid, 1977, p. 23). first place. In fact, if thereal driver behind militariza- This theory on the causes of militarization had tion were merely economic self-interest—rather than significant consequences for formulating a politics of the preparation for war—increases in conversion. For a start, it was clear that any impulse armament may not have been as bad as critical IR to change or transform the present order would not scholars made them out to be when they pointed to originate from within the military–industrial complex the dangers of arms races and the “security dilemma” itself. The vested interests conjoining public (e.g. Herz 1950). What is more, a popular argument

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held that investments into the defence sector even production managing” (Melman, 1974, p. 21). Any com- yielded positive economic externalities for society as pany that becomes part of a MIC works “under the a whole. This view had been particularly popular dur- assumption that indefinitely large capital funds are ing the 1940s and 1950s, where excessive military available for the military” (p. 65). This clearly differs spending was commonly considered an effective from the expectations of agents in private capitalism; means of averting economic recession. As Dumas here, need to compete against other com- summed up the general argument, panies over prices, keep costs to a minimum and the defence sector creates jobs and provides an addi- learn to cope with “uncertainties stemming from un- tional source of demand to stimulate economic activ- predictable market behavior”, always threatened by ity [...]. It drives the discovery of new possible under-consumption (p. 60). In the state- con- with important application to civilian purposes, trolled war economy such nuisances do not exist. The technology that ultimately results in rising produc- money flows from a single source that tends to give tivity and better products. And by the threat it poses the military and its needs “first place” in capital allo- to other nations, a high level of military expenditure cation (pp. 60–61). The “terms of competition are not guarantees access to both needed raw materials and price and efficiency, but grantcraft and lobbying” (Pe- profitable product markets (1988, p. 1). attie, 1998, p. 12). Military corporations are “subsi- Not all of these claims could be easily dismissed. dy-maximiz- ing firms” (Melman, 1974, p. 55). Instead Dumas himself acknowledged that some of them of minimizing costs and maximizing profits, as in tra- contained a grain of truth. Renner, just as Dumas an ditional market economies, they seek to maximize advocate of conversion, similarly conceded that various costs and maximize the subsidies they receive from “criteria crucial to the development of the industrial the state (see p. 21; also Renner, 1988, p. 133; Dumas system as we know it today—uniformity, repeatability, 1995, pp. 13–14). predictability, mathematical quantifiability, and com- Poor performance and a tendency to overprice mand and control features—find their origin at least might be worrisome features of the defence industry; in part in the requirements of the military system” by themselves they do not necessarily imply direct (1988, p. 131). The “war machine”, he went on, acceler- negative repercussions for the civilian economy, ated “the speed of standardization and mass produc- however. To make this argument, a second character- tion from the sixteenth century on” and has therefore istic needs to be taken into account, namely “the been “central to industrial development since the basic non-productive” (Melman, 1974, p. 19) or even dawn of the Industrial Revolution” (pp. 131–32; see “parasitic nature of military economy” (p. 62; also also Mumford, 1977, pp. 504–06). Klein, 1993, pp. 15–16; Dumas, 1995, p. 8). This insight If conversion were to be demanded and pursued, itself is anything but new. No one less than Adam scholars needed to seriously engage with economic Smith had contended in his Wealth of Nations, pub- justifications for investing in the military. Dumas lished in 1776, that the “sovereign” with eventually concluded that they were gravely out- all the officers both of justice and war who serve under weighed by a variety of additional factors “rather dra- him, the whole army and navy, are unproductive matically revers[ing] the ultimate conclusion” (1988, labourers. They are servants of the public, and are p. 4). Melman’s study of the American MIC suggests maintained by a part of the annual produce of the three interrelated arguments for the negative social industry of other people. Their service […] produces and economic effects of armament and militarization. nothing for which an equal quantity of service can First, defence production usually does not measure afterwards be procured (Smith, 2001, p. 221). up to its equivalent in the civilian economy. Since In the same vein, Melman argued that the war military–industry firms operate “in an insulated economy does “not yield ordinary economic use-value”, monopoly market”, they are prone to “poor productivity that is, “usefulness for the level of living (consumer performance, to poor product design and poor goods and services)” or “usefulness for further

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production (as in machinery tools being used to In no other country has there been a military econo- make other articles” (1974, p. 19; also Dumas, 1988, p. 3). my that is comparable to the American one in size All resources that are spent on the military could and longevity. Having endured for thirty years, it has have potentially been invested in productive civilian occupied the occupational lifetime of millions of activities. The defence sector always entails opportu- workers, technicians, managers and soldiers. Never nity costs for the larger economy that sustains it. It before in American experience has the military estab- diminishes “productive capacities by withdrawing lishment utilised so many industrial and other facili- resources from civilian economy”. As Melman had it, ties, […] constructed specifically for military require- it “is, in fact, an anti-economy” (1974, p. 285). Or, in the ments (pp. 226–27). words of Dumas, military spending “is an economic Melman found that the defence sector had become burden, not an economic boon” (Dumas, 1988, p. 4). “a major source of corrosion of the productive compe- While this assessment is shared by economists tence of the American economy as a whole” (p. 260). It from all persuasions (see Albrecht 1979, p. 76), it does is thus that the need for conversion was considered not necessarily render all defence expenses undesira- all the more urgent and imperative. ble. For Adam Smith, the doubtlessly parasitic quality of the military was justified, since it served the “use- Liberal vs. radical Conversion Studies ful” and “necessary” (Smith, 2001, p. 221) purpose of “defending the society from the violence and injustice Melman’s arguments on the causes and effects of of other independent societies” (p. 386). However, if militarization and armament influenced many of the one follows the parallel argument concerning the more political writings in the field of Conversion causes of militarization and accepts that military Studies. Sometimes referred to as the “liberal school” build-up and security policy have become largely un- (Albrecht 1979, p. 12), they placed the main emphasis coupled from one another, then the Smithian caveat on fostering economic growth. Disarmament was no longer holds. The war machine drains resources considered to be in the best economic interest of soci- from the civilian economy while delivering no public ety—and conversion a means to install an “economic good in return (see Melman, 1974, p. 63). system unburdened by the debilitating effects of ex- This may not be too damaging, provided the de- cessive military spending” and therefore “able to fence industry constitutes only a small fraction of the make greater strides in improving the material con- overall productive capacities of society. Unfortunately, ditions of life” (Dumas, 1988, p. 7). The propositions of for Melman and other conversion scholars, the third Melman, in particular, were commonly read as an characteristic of the US American military–industrial attempt toward “making the American economy system was its “propensity to expand” (Melman, 1974, more competitive internationally” (Peattie, 1998, p. 17; pp. 64–65). Again, Adam Smith had somewhat also Abrecht 1979, p. 58). His perspective certainly dif- pre-empted this observation by pointing out that the fered from those more technical approaches that military “grows gradually more and more expensive regarded conversion as nothing but the reaction of a as the society advances in civilization” (2001, p. 386). defence plant or community to changes in the status And indeed, forever bent on the maximization of sub- quo. In opposition to the dominant Cold War ideolo- sidies, by the late 1960s the US American war econo- gies of the time, calling for ever more military invest- my had eventually “become the dominant one as ments, Melman and other liberal scholars against the private capitalist economy in the United assumed a pro-active, political stance that advocated States” (Melman, 1974, p. 73). It dwarfed civilian econ- the transformation of military overcapacities. How- omy in terms of “control over capital”, “control over ever, to their mind, the central economic, political research and development” and “control over means and cultural coordinates of society ought to be left of production” (p. 70). more or less intact. At no point, for instance, did Melman propose to completely abolish the military. As Dumas

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put it, “[w]ithin the bounds of affordability, levels of Given the dependency of the economic system on support for the military should be based on what is military investments, any large-scale effort at defence needed to achieve the mission of securing the nation conversion would need to be accompanied by a more against real and significant external military threats” general conversion of capitalist modes of production, (1995, p. 5). Moreover, if Melman at one point dreamt exchange and accumulation (see Albrecht 1979, p. 58; of “the formation of a new, post-capitalist society” Breitschwerdt 1988/89, p. 13). To be sure: This claim (1974, p. 299), he was only thinking of the micro-level remained a minority position in Conversion Studies. of capitalist relations, manifest in the hierarchical Marxist writers themselves disagreed on the validity decision-making structure of the factory. As is evi- of the ‘under-consumption’ theory. Some demon- dent from his criticism of the US American MIC, strated that economic crises had occurred despite Melman displayed a clear preference for competitive, military expenditure reaching peak levels (see Roth- free markets as opposed to a state-directed economy. schild, 1956). Others pointed out that it simply no Not all advocates of conversion shared such sen- longer mattered in the nuclear age. As Renner observed: timents for keeping the military and/or maintaining Even if war was ‘beneficial’ in the past to capitalist a capitalist macro-system. At least two divergent industry in the sense of serving as a ‘valve’ for over- viewpoints, which Albrecht subsumed under the production and over-accumulation, the tremendous heading of the “radical school” in Conversion Studies, and accelerating lethality of today’s weaponry has can be discerned here (see: Albrecht 1979, p. 12). The made major war antithetical to capitalism” (1988, p. 132). first, ironically, shared some common grounds with Moreover, the sheer magnitude of resources being those that pointed to the ostensibly beneficial effects poured into the MIC had long since surpassed any of military spending on society as a whole. As some reasonable amount of non-productive spending Marxist scholars argued, non-productive investments required for—possibly—averting economic crises helped to sustain productive capitalist relations. To (which, by the way, could also be achieved through their mind, the capitalist system relied on high levels other wasteful expenditure). Even economists behind of defence expenditure to remedy the structural the Iron Curtain agreed that large-scale conversion problem of simultaneous overproduction and under- could be achieved in the West without having to consumption (see: Sweezy, 1974, pp. 20–21). The follow- fundamentally transform its economic system (see ing argument by Jörg Huffschmid illustrates this Albrecht, 1979, p. 65). To argue otherwise, Melman noted, point well: would only heighten broader social resistance to Die eigentliche ökonomische Funktion von Rüstungs- conversion and thereby play into the hands of those ausgaben ist es, der Tendenz zu Überakkumulation insisting on continuously high levels of military von Kapital und Überdproduktion von Waren da- spending (see Melman 1974, pp. 289–90). durch entgegenzuwirken, dass ein Teil des gesell- In any case, for most radical proponents of con- schaftlichen Gesamtkapitals aus dem normalen version, the main line of division was not so much Verwertungsprozess herausgezogen und künstlich the question of maintaining or overcoming capital- verwertet wird, wodurch gleichzeitig die ‚normale’ ism. Instead, they took issue with the rather narrow Verwertung des anderen Teils des gesellschaftlichen focus of liberals on economic concerns and sought to Gesamtkapitals gewährleistet werden soll. Ein- reconcile the purpose of conversion with a compara- schränkung von Rüstungsausgaben […] baut ein den tively broader—and often distinctly pacifist—agenda, Krisentendenzen des Kapitalismus entgegenwirkendes as it was popular among many social movements of Moment ab und verschärft daher diese Krisentendenzen the time. Conversion, for them, ought to be directed (1977, p. 35).1 toward ‘peace’ rather than only economic growth.

1 \ It is the original economic purpose of defence expenditures to counter this is intended to guarantee the ‘normal’ recovery of the other share the tendency of over-accumulation of capital and overproduction of of the society’s overall capital. The limitation of defence expenditures goods by taking out a part of the society’s overall capital from the nor- […] decreases the momentum countering the crisis tendencies of capi- mal recovery process and by recovering it artificially. At the same time, talism and thus exacerbates these crisis tendencies (own translation).

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With this in mind, Brzoska distinguished what he it may even strive towards the “establishment of a called “qualitative” and “military–political” conver- just and lasting peaceful order” (p. 100). If it is under- sion from “quantitative” and “economic” conversion stood to serve such a broad objective, Brzoska noted (1999b, p. 29). Of course, both objectives are not neces- that conversion loses “its economic focus” and, instead, sarily mutually exclusive (see Dumas, 1988, p. 7). needs to take account of “all kinds of economic, Nevertheless, the former tends to considerably psychological, cultural and political changes” (1999a, expand the agenda of Conversion Studies. Dieter p. 133). Economic conversion would be combined with Senghaas held that conversion efforts, even if nar- what he called “societal” conversion, that is, efforts to rowly conceived in economic terms only, needed to convert and reduce “the influence of the military” be “synchronized” with a range of additional, more and “militaristic thinking on societies and minds, for encompassing political aims. In the final assessment, the purpose of ‘civilianization’ ” (1999b, p. 29). In line conversion ought to be guided by a desire for human with such a pacifist agenda, a radical variant in Con- “emancipation” (1974, p. 72). version Studies promoted full-scale disarmament Writings in Conversion Studies during the Cold toward a “post-military order” (Boulding, 1983) as a War differed in whether they located this ambitious “comprehensive alternative to the war system” (Renner, goal primarily on either a micro- or more macroscopic 1998, p. 134). Any such undertaking, the proponents scale. Numerous scholars, including Melman, envi- realized, required a fundamental transformation of sioned converted industry plants characterized by how human collectives were presently organized. humane working conditions, workers’ participation Conversion Studies, Peattie wrote, ought to critically in operative decisions, considerations of “engage central institutional and intellectual arrange- ecological concerns and, most importantly, the pro- ments of our society” (1988, p. 12). duction of “socially useful” objects (see Breitschwerdt, Similarly, Senghaas contended that a conversion 1988/89, p. 12; Birckenbach, 1991, p. 5, Renner, 1992, effort concerned with “destructive hardware” (i.e. p. 36; Bischak & Yudken 1993, pp. 167–68). A much- weapons) alone would be short-sighted (1974, p. 71). discussed model was the so-called Lucas Plan, devel- Any transition from a war economy to a peace economy oped in 1976 by workers at the defence company needed to be “characterized by more than the Lucas Aerospace in Great Britain (see Elliot, 1977; (momentary) absence of war and war-related produc- Smith, 2014). Although never put into action and rarely tion” (Renner, 1988, p, 129). Senghaas called, more copied elsewhere, many hoped that democratically, broadly, for a transformation of the entire “political, bottom-up initiated conversion projects in small- military and socio-economic context” that enabled scale working environments could lay the foundation any kind of armament in the first place (1974, p. 71). for a “new kind of social, cultural and political coex- Reminiscent of Johan Galtung’s concepts of “struc- istence” (Wulf et al., 1987, p. 281). tural violence” and “positive peace” (see Galtung, Novel modes of coexistence could be equally 1969), Renner argued that the prime objective of con- imagined on an international or global scale. As an version was “the absence of fundamental social, eco- example for “qualitative” conversion, Brzoska alluded nomic, political, and ecological conflicts”, a world free to a shift from offensive to defensive military doctrines, of “conflicts between nations, along ethnic, gender, in turn requiring a certain restructuring and, in all and class lines, and between humans and their natu- likelihood, downsizing of forces (1999b, p. 29). Conver- ral environment” (1988, p. 129). To achieve this noble sion would be less a matter of promoting economic goal, we ought to proactively work toward the transi- growth and/or improving the quality of working con- tion to a “non-destructive, non-alienating, democrati- ditions; it would be a “strategy for international cally-structured, and environmentally benign economy” peacebuilding” (see Southwood 1997, p. 103). Ultimately, (p. 138).

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Conversion Studies after the Cold War and the establishment of BICC

As the Cold War came to an end and the member “”—today, this biblical theme states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is no mere dream but a justified hope for many people. (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact began to significantly With the end of the Cold War, we may assume [...] reduce military spending and cut the size of their that it will be possible in future to use more sensibly armed forces, the grand visions of both liberal and the finance that has been wasted on weapons and many radical conversion scholars seemed close at armies in the past... to fight starvation, sickness and hand. While some commentators remained sceptical need, to safeguard the natural basic of life. Conversion— and pointed out that conversion had so far been “un- originally a concept by experts for experts—might blemished by success” (Adelman & Augustine, 1992, well become a keyword of the decade (p. XXIII). p. 26), euphoria initially prevailed. All of a sudden, Echoing many of the more radical voices in Conversion Studies faced a widespread and very con- Conversion Studies, he went on to suggest that the crete political demand for practical advice on trans- “unwritten agenda” of conversion was forming military and defence resources. “Disarma- “nothing less than the global implementation of the ment”, Adam Roberts wrote in 1991, “is no longer a human right to an existence in peace and liberty, the distant vision, safely confined to a utopian future, but human right to a life free of hunger and the human a reality” (p. 71). An annotated bibliography of conver- right to a clean and non-poisoned environment” sion-related studies, compiled by Brzoska in 2000, (p. XXVII). shows a sharp rise in the number of publications over The spirit of the days and the high hopes associ- the first years of the 1990s. In 1991, Jonathan Feldman, ated with expected disarmament also found their Program Director at the newly established National way into academic definitions of conversion, for Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarma- instance as the “realignment of national priorities to ment in the , proposed a “comprehensive reflect the lowered defence needs of a new era in conversion and disarmament program” (p. 234) that international relations and to address important would involve “several fundamental changes in the domestic needs” (Bischak & Yudken, 1993, p. 167). structure of political and economic decision-making However, although the time may have been ripe for and institutions”’ (pp. 229–30). One year later, the conversion, it was less so for the scholarly field of United Nations Commission on Science and Technology Conversion Studies. This held, in particular, for the for Development, the German State of North Rhine- more political—as opposed to technical—approaches Westphalia and the Institute of Environmental Pro- to the subject. For at the same time that a utopia was tection Policy (INFU) of the University of Dortmund preparing itself to become reality, many of the theories, organized a large ‘International Conference on which had been hotly debated only a couple of years Conversion’. One of the speakers at the event, Kofi earlier, had become irrelevant. The question as to Annan, at the time Assistant Secretary-General of the whether conversion necessitated an overcoming of United Nations, claimed that the “world is looking the capitalist system lost much of its appeal as many forward [...] towards the establishment of a new system, were celebrating the triumph of free markets, even perhaps of a new order, in which peace, co-operation pondering the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992). and the rule of law will prevail” (Brunn et al.,1992, More significantly, the end of superpower confronta- p. XXVIII). Conversion, the conference participants tion could not be explained by the once popular agreed, would pave the road to this goal. The North assumption that the vested economic interests of the Rhine-Westphalian Minister of Higher Education MIC had been the principal drivers of the arms race and Research, Anke Brunn, demanded that while (see Heinemann-Grüder, 2006, pp. 18–19; Birckenbach, “[o]nly a few months ago, conversion [...] seemed to be 1991, p. 6). Conversion could no longer claim to repre- a mere academic concept, a utopia”, it “must now sent the most viable strategy for initiating a process become a reality, worldwide” (p. XX). Johannes Rau, of disarmament. then Prime Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, sec- onded her plea:

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The coincident political demand for conversion had called for a fundamental ‘societal conversion’, the and (partial) academic bankruptcy of Conversion far-reaching transformation of people’s hearts and Studies provides the contextual backdrop surrounding minds. By restricting itself to material and physical the establishment of the Bonn International Center objects, BICC certainly remained squarely in the for Conversion (BICC) in 1994—a direct consequence well-established tradition of most conversion scholars. of the Dortmund conference two years earlier. Receiving As for Brzoska, it ascribed to a “narrow concept”, its core funding from the State of North Rhine-West- which was “closely related to the quantitative side of phalia and initially headed by Herbert Wulf, who had disarmament” (1999b, p. 17). At the same time, BICC been much involved in conversion-related debates in emphasized that conversion could refer to all the 1970s and 1980s, its mandate remained rather “resources that become available for civilian use open, namely to use “applied science and research through reduced armaments, demobilization and to deal with questions and problems arising from demilitarization” (BICC, 1996, p. 18). This “resource- conversion”. Conversion itself, the document continued, reuse” perspective (Brzoska 1999; 1999b, p. 17) was “aims to reduce and/or prevent the preparation, threat applied to altogether six possible types of convertible or use of military or war-like violence in all its forms military resources: 1) the reallocation of public through the process of a comprehensive transfor- defence budgets; 2) the reorientation of military mation”. Interestingly, this formulation suggested a research and development; 3) the restructuring of the decisively broad understanding of its subject that did defence industry; 4) the demobilization of soldiers; not preclude a pro-active and political approach to 5) military base closure and redevelopment; 6) the the problem. The reference to a ‘comprehensive scrapping of surplus weapons (see Laurance et al., 1995). transformation’ even seemed to situate BICC on the In each of these areas, BICC viewed conversion as more radical end of the conversion-continuum. This “a process of managing the resources freed from the was not the direction that the institute would pursue, military sector for the greatest long-run benefit to however. Instead, it was the additional remark that society” (1996, p. 22). The faint resonance with previous BICC ought to “optimize” conversion “in the practical debates concerning ‘social utility’ did imply a certain implementation of disarmament” that contained a normative orientation, to be sure. Yet, the practical first clue as to where the institute would be heading turn of BICC also signalled a departure from those (BICC Mandate/ Gesellschaftsvertrag, 1994, Section 2a). earlier approaches that had perceived conversion as a BICC published a detailed account of its “concept pro-active political movement. As the Conversion of conversion” in the first volume of the Conversion Survey acknowledged, the concept has “been trans- Survey in 1996. Notably, it refrained from articulating formed from a largely utopian project into a combi- conversion within a larger theory that could have nation of practical problems and potential opportuni- replaced—or adjusted—the outdated axioms con- ties” (p. 16). BICC did not want to advocate “the full cerning the MIC. The disengagement from causal transfer of resources to civilian use”, for “thus far, explanations for armament-dynamics allowed BICC complete conversion has rarely occurred”. Instead, to address conversion issues as they presented them- conversion could always only be a “partial” process selves across a wide spectrum of military resources. (p. 20). A possible synchronization of conversion The MIC-perspective had prompted many earlier efforts with other fields—after all, a central concern writings to focus on the defence industry (see Heine- of many writings in the 1980s—was neither required mann-Grüder, 2006, p. 20). Untroubled by any such nor was it thought to be particularly helpful: predispositions, BICC regarded post-Cold War disar- For practical reasons, the analysis of the dynamic mament as “a multi-faceted process that releases var- aspects of conversion cannot be extended too far. The ious types of resources” (BICC, 1996, p. 22). This is not further one moves from the original resource transfers, to say that it followed in the footsteps of those that the less insight can be gained from viewing such

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processes as specific conversion problems. Conversion anticipated and hoped for. Three years before the becomes indistinguishable from other issues, relin- founding of BICC, Hanne-Margret Birckenbach pub- quishing its link to the original military resource use lished an almost prophetic paper arguing that post- (p. 20). Cold War disarmament was largely a sham and most In other words: Precisely because BICC lacked an talk about conversion purely symbolic. Conversion overall theoretical framework that could have Studies, she feared, was very much in danger of contextualized conversion vis-à-vis wider social becoming “complicit” with a political discourse that phenomena, it needed to limit itself to addressing loudly paraded peace, yet in reality sought to “re- clearly identifiable problems as they presented them- legitimize” and “conserve” the military system (1991, selves to policymakers. This focus on practicality also p. 5). In doing so, it was about to strip itself of “difficult” meant that conversion denoted more than transfor- theoretical baggage, not least due to its reliance on mations in only the defence industy. As the BICC- state funding: publication had it: “We do not advocate a specific Wie alle anderen können auch die Konversionsfor- approach to conversion but rather are guided by the scherInnen verstehbare Gründe dafür anführen, das search for the optimal use of resources freed by disar- Erkenntnisinteresse nicht allzu deutlich zu for- mament” (p. 16). mulieren. Sie liefen z.B. Gefahr, potentielle Geldgeber Arguably, then, the concept of conversion pro- zu irritieren. Insofern gleichen sich Friedensforscher- posed by BICC in 1996 leant heavily toward the side Innen und die militär- und rüstungsabhängig Bes- of what was described earlier as the more technical and chäftigten. Mittäterschaft verbindet […]. Erst wenn reactive or ‘problem-solving’ approach. In an article die KonversionsforscherInnen für sich selbst einen for the Journal of Peace Research, which was pub- Ausweg finden und in der Lage sind, die Erkenntnis- lished one year earlier, Julian Cooper had put it even interessen zu benennen und trotzdem more explicitly. To his mind, in the post-Cold War Forschungsmittel zu erhalten, werden sie in ihren ei- world, the “problematic of conversion requires its genen Praxisbezügen glaubwürdig (p. 11) .2 own conversion” (1995, p. 132). That is to say: “A con- In the 1990s, Conversion Studies would simply cept of conversion heavily freighted with ideological ‘manage’ the smooth reduction of surplus weapons, overtones is no longer appropriate” (p. 132). Conversion soldiers and capital—avoiding the pertinent questions, Studies ought to, instead, embrace the “new spirit of much discussed by pro-active and political conversion realism and pragmatism” and support the concrete scholars in the 1970s and 1980s, as to who defines this “task of undertaking military downsizing with a min- surplus and why (see Heinemann-Grüder, 2006, p. 19). imum social cost” (p. 132). Already in 1992, Linda What is the military for? How much military is needed? Forcey noticed that despite the skyrocketing number On which assumptions does any such claim rest? of publications concerned with practical conversion And how can these assumptions be deconstructed? problems, a “major debate or discourse within the The opportunity to seriously re-engage these questions peace research community over ways in which a at the end of the Cold War—which would have also ‘peace dividend’ should (1) be forthcoming and (2) be necessitated critically revisiting some of the apparently distributed [...] does not appear to be happening” flawed and one-dimensional theories of Conversion (p. 215). This was also due to a certain degree of disap- Studies—was clearly missed. pointment among scholars. Although many states 2 \ Like all others, conversion scholars can give reasonable grounds for were indeed dismantling parts of their defence sector, the fact that they do not specify their research interest too much. They the extent of disarmament was nowhere near the would, for instance, risk to irritate potential donors. This is where pea- ce researchers and those employed in the arms industry are alike. dimensions of what either the old ideologists in Complicity unites […]. Only when conversion scholars have found a Conversion Studies or, for that matter, the keynote way out for themselves and are able to name their research interests speakers at the Dortmund conference had and still receive grants for their work will they become credible in their own practical relevance. (p. 11) (own translation).

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By the mid-1990s, the euphoria—so palpable at “post-conversion situation” and suspected “that in the Dortmund conference—had largely waned. time the very word may fall into disuse” (1995, p. 131). Delivering a paper to the Proceedings of the NATO And, indeed: “Perhaps the time has come to abandon Advanced Study Institute on Defence Conversion the term altogether” (p. 132). Global levels of military Strategies in 1995, Philip Gummet remarked that “[i]t expenditure began to consistently rise again by 1997. is unclear where all this activity will lead” (1997, p. 40). Conversion’s short-lived day in the sun was over Some pointed out that we could not expect conver- almost as quickly as its sudden dawn in 1991 and 1992. sion to produce any immediate positive outcomes: BICC, however, remained. Taking stock of post- “[D]isarmament resembles an investment process Cold War conversion, researchers at the Center involving short to medium term costs to achieve showed a somewhat mixed track record toward the long-run economic benefits in the form of greater end of the decade (see Heinemann-Grüder, 2006, p. 21). output of civil goods and services” (Hartley, 1997, p. 92). Brzoska acknowledged that industrial conversion had Others conceded that “there are very substantial un- not provided the degree of economic stimulus certainties about the effects of military expenditure expected by Melman (2000, p. 140). Discussions of on the economy”, mainly due to “the lack of a good “socially useful goods” and increased worker partici- theory of economic growth and how military expend- pation in decision-making had hardly played a role iture influences the determinants of the growth rate” (see p. 140). By the end of the decade, many workers (Smith, 1996, p. 357). Dumas, next to Melman a key who had previously been employed in defence corpo- figure from ‘old school’ Conversion Studies, still rations were still looking for a job (see Brzoska, 1999a, suspected a “classic case of a set of vested interests” p. 137). However, Brzoska took issue with assessments behind the apparent failure of conversion to deliver according to which conversion had been a complete tangible goods (1995, p. 5). In 1996, he felt that a tipping failure. As he noted point had been reached and warned that there was a expectations were simplistic and overoptimistic and “danger of side-tracking the process of international could only be frustrated. They took little or no account demilitarization” (1996, p. 148). As he went on, conver- of the wider political and economic environment sion scholars “must stop making excuses for our re- shaping the shift of resources from the military to luctance to move into the future” (p. 149), for—and the civilian sector, underestimated the cost and speed still clinging to the hopeful spirit of the early decade: of adjustment and assumed shifts in political decision- These are times of truly historic significance. We are making parallel to large-scale disarmament which poised on the brink of a new era in international rela- would have to occur (1999a, p. 131). tions. What we do now will set the pattern for the At a closer look, the “balance sheet” was “not next century, perhaps for the next millennium. Hu- negative, nor even zero”. Indeed, “a good measure of man beings have long dreamed of a more peaceful, transformation of resources has been achieved” (p. less militarized world. Now we stand at the thresh- 137). The success rates differed from region to region, old of that dream. Instead of anguishing over all the with economically weak countries, especially in east- reasons why the dream might fail, it is up to us that ern Europe, facing the most difficulties. The “peace it does not (p. 149). dividend”, meanwhile, did not go into increased social Now, twenty years later, it is safe to say that or development expenditures, as many had hoped, Dumas’ dream remained just that—a dream. Only but into deficit reduction and the balancing of budgets one year after the founding of BICC, Cooper noted (see Dedek, 1997; Krause, 2000, p. 18). how the term conversion had lost its hold on political But with decreasing political demand for conver- discourse. At the same time that Dumas was almost sion, what was to become of Conversion Studies in desperately trying to reinvigorate the vision of the the 21st century? Or, even more poignantly: What Dortmund conference, he soberly diagnosed a about the future of BICC? Keith Krause discussed this

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question in an article for a BICC brief in 2000. Reflecting of dealing with disarmament after the Cold War upon the past decade, he effectively suggested a warranted greater attention” (p. 21). Now, however, return to a more pro-active and re-politicized take on was the time to develop a more daring and political conversion. In the final analysis, the experiences of agenda, lest conversion—and Conversion Studies— the 1990s had “call[ed] into question the basic idea of should become fully irrelevant. Krause suggested a conversion” (p. 19). Not only had a degree of world- concept of what he called “preventive conversion” for wide disarmament been completed, but the actual this purpose; that is: importance of conversion to that very process was The pro-active development and timely implementa- more than doubtful. In most cases, the defence indus- tion of conversion policies to prevent the escalation try had restructured itself without relying on too of protracted conflict relationships [...] into violence, much input from “conversion advocates” (p. 20). To to diminish or avoid the accumulation of excessive the extent that conversion had been talked about at and destabilizing quantities of arms or the waste of all, it was largely considered “a ‘clean-up’ process that economic and human resources, and to reduce the follows the transformation of political-security rela- militarization of social, economic and political rela- tions as essentially a technical and managerial task” tions (within societies and between states) (p. 22). (p. 19). It was “turned—intentionally or not—into a The thematic emphasis of “preventive conver- [...] tool for dealing with the consequences of sion” would remain on the “efficient reallocation of changed security relationships” (p. 21). Conversion resources from military purposes to other ends” would only be a relevant topic of political and schol- (p. 24). Importantly, however, Conversion Studies arly discussion if there were an external demand for could directly intervene and partake in—highly polit- it. All the while, the older field of Conversion Studies ical—debates surrounding the prevention of violent seemed, at least at first sight, to have little immediate conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction. When appeal to any future-oriented research agenda. If it Krause published his text, these were certainly the was “inextricably linked to the Cold War problem of up-and-coming themes high on the agenda of inter- the military–industrial complex or to unjustifiably national policymakers. The time was ripe to re-fashion high levels of defence spending”, then it “cannot easily conversion as a “crucial element” of those broader be transferred or adapted to new contexts” (p. 20). peace- and security-building activities in many places Given these challenges, Krause encouraged BICC in the world (and particularly the Global South) to consider the “logic of the core concept of conversion” (see p. 24). (2000, p. 21). For him, this implied, on the one hand, a At least from 2000 onwards, BICC reoriented itself “concern with the economic dimension of military very much in line with Krause’s proposal. With its expenditures and related activities” (p. 21). On the new director Peter Croll, who was appointed in 2002 other hand, it meant to install “a focus on the poten- and had previously worked in development coopera- tial of conversion activities to transform the role and tion, the working focus shifted from a concern with weight of institutions of organized violence in social, the post-Cold War conversion of defence industries, political and economic life” (pp. 21–22). This latter military personnel, R&D, bases or capital in western observation was crucial. It served as a reminder that and eastern Europe to applied research and policy conversion was not simply a technical reaction to advice on, among other things, demobilization on the ready-made political decisions; instead, it “can play Balkans, small arms control in Sub-Saharan Africa, a role in the transformation of political-security ‘security sector reform’ in Afghanistan and the reinte- relations themselves” (p. 19). As to most of BICC’s gration of former combatants following violent con- work during the 1990s, Krause noted that “the trans- flicts in Liberia, Sudan or the Democratic Republic of formative potential has been almost entirely left the Congo. While BICC was certainly successful in aside, perhaps simply because the practical problems securing third-party funding from various sources

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(mostly public) and published numerous studies dealing with issues of crisis prevention, ‘early warn- ing, early action’ and post-conflict reconstruction, the idea of ‘preventive conversion’ got lost along the way, that is, it rarely served as an explicit reference point in any of BICC’s publications in the first decade of the new millennium. Somewhat more nuanced and encompassing theoretical reflections informing popular concepts such as peacebuilding or conflict transformation effectively overshadowed it (see Heinemann-Grüder, 2006, p. 24). Conceivably, also, the complexities underlying many of the so-called new wars did not allow for any easy and straightforward solutions and answers to which an updated concept of conversion could have normatively attached itself (as in the past, where the vested interests in the mili- tary–industrial complex became posited as the root of all evil). As one critical commentator pointed out, BICC’s research was not as agenda-setting or trans- formative as Krause had hoped for with his reconcep- tualization of conversion (see Bayer, 2012). Just like its work in the 1990s, the reliance on funding from pub- lic donors continued to put BICC into a position in which it largely responded to already made policy de- cisions—rather than pro-actively contributing to the development of alternative policies.

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Conversion Studies today? Six propositions

In the new millennium, academic or, for that Conversion Studies pro-actively matter, any writings on conversion have been scarce, advocates transformation processes to say the least. Neither is there a major political bent upon reducing the potentials of demand (as in the 1940s or 1990s), nor does the organized violence for wider social concept appear to adequately address what is widely benefits. perceived as the main problematics of security and defence policy in the 21st century (as it did in the The beginning of this Paper demonstrated that 1960s, 1970s and 1980s). The final part of thisPaper the term conversion immediately evokes a process of makes six propositions that might guide a more social—or spiritual—change from one state of existence concrete understanding of what Conversion Studies to another. What Krause referred to as the transform- could mean in the 21st century. The argument is not ative potential of the concept applies equally to its necessarily a call to revive a dead duck and restore original usage in Catholic dogma (‘faith conversion’) the study of conversion to its former ‘glory’. It merely as it does to 20th-century Conversion Studies with its holds that if one wanted to do such a thing, then one focus on reusing formerly military resources for civilian would be well advised to take the propositions sug- means. Any reference to conversion and Conversion gested here into consideration. They are inspired in Studies in the 21st century ought to stay clearly part by an acknowledgement of what Conversion attached to this tradition. It makes no sense to speak Studies did in the past, particularly by the debates of of conversion without a reference to some change. the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, the study of conversion today The essence of studying conversion is to either advo- cannot simply copy and paste the past into the present. cate or analyze a desired or actual process of social It has to adapt old theories to fit new realities, all the transformation. Not all conversion scholars actively while critically reflecting upon outdated axioms and called for change, to be sure. Particularly post-Cold thereby noticeably advancing the field along norma- War Conversion Studies—but also the first writings tive, conceptual and empirical-analytical trajectories. on converting military overcapacities following As a final caveat, this exercise should not be mis- World War II merely reacted to changes already taking taken as a proposal for a new, different or more specific place (and quite irrespective of whether they had been research agenda for BICC. Parts of the Paper have demanded by academics or social movements). At considered the evolution of BICC since its founding times, these conversion efforts were very successful in 1994. This attention was justified since BICC played (as in the late 1940s), at others a rather more mixed an important part in the conversion debates of the picture emerged (as in the 1990s). Yet, and regardless 1990s and remains today the only academic institute of the outcome, once the transition had been com- that carries the term conversion in its name (at least pleted, the need for conversion-related expertise that I know of). The purpose of this Paper is not to quickly diminished. Hence, if Conversion Studies make recommendations on how the Center should wants to be anything more than an occasional response continue to develop in the future. Of course, parts of to political demands for technical solutions, it ought BICC’s future work might take aspects of Conversion to pro-actively advocate change itself—as did those Studies on board (and, in fact, BICC already does that either liberal or radical scholars during the Cold War. in many regards). Importantly, however, Conversion As it happens, in the year 2017, the world resem- Studies would appear as a larger sub-discipline within bles the Cold War period to the extent that nearly all Peace and Conflict Research that runs through various of the major military powers are either implement- institutes and crisscrosses scholarly communities of ing or anticipating significant increases to their de- different methodological and normative inclinations. fence budgets. Conversion Studies in the 21st century would have to be an explicitly normative science that

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critically analyses the status quo and, on this basis, deems all organized violence an evil to be eradicated. identifies and proposes relevant social transforma- Quite the contrary: Instead of simply assuming that tions against the prevailing political Zeitgeist, espe- disarmament is always somehow good, a conversion cially concerning the on-going build-up of military perspective requires us to spell out the expected capacities in many places of the world. (civilian) benefits it would entail at a particular time Generally speaking, it ought to work toward and place—which also includes weighing these bene- reducing the potentials for organized violence. fits against possible harms. Needless to say that these Organized violence, in this understanding, refers to benefits and harms are again open to interpretation any collective social structure established for the and debate. Still, any piece of writing in Conversion express purpose of exercising direct, physical vio- Studies would thereby distinguish itself by following lence against human bodies. Militaries and adjacent a certain grammar, namely how changes in one area defence industries—the core objects of traditional (reductions of organized violence) affect either posi- Conversion Studies—are the first such structures that tive or negative changes in another. come to mind. However, while the term organized violence certainly captures them, it also expands the Conversion Studies particularly possible focus to include police and paramilitary forces, emphasizes the economic conditions private military and security companies or non-state of organized violence armed groups such as militias, rebels or even ‘terrorist’ networks. The primary scale of Conversion Studies The question of how to organize violence, and would no longer be national and/or local; rather, it what the either positive or negative outcomes of such would need to take into account how various scales an organization would be (or are), underlines many become connected through transnational and publications in Peace and Conflict Research. And trans-local networks, as they have, for instance, been even if such writings develop concrete recommenda- theorized in the concept of “global security assemblages” tions for social change, there is no apparent need to (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011). re-label them as part of Conversion Studies. Designa- Just as in the past, there would be no need to tions such as peacebuilding or conflict transformation agree on how much potentials for organized violence could be used with equally good reason—and they are. ought to be reduced. Whereas there is a likely consen- Moreover, the deeper issues this question raises argu- sus regarding those ‘terrorist’ groups, things will ably constitute the defining core of IR (the interna- probably get a lot more complicated when it comes to tional organization of violence) and traditional political regular armed forces and, even more so, the police. theory (the domestic organization of violence) more The point here is not to prescribe a benchmark that generally. Consider, for instance, the highly popular everyone in Conversion Studies needs to abide by but concept of ‘securitization’. It shows how certain to emphasize this question as an explicit topic of speech acts represent social problems as existential contention. A certain degree of organized violence threats and thereby justify exceptional—and usually may well be deemed necessary if we want the police violent—military actions (see Buzan et. al., 1998). to fight crime and, by extension, militaries to stop Would a reverse process of ‘de-securitization’ already genocides and mass murder. It follows that the reduc- count as an instance of conversion? And what about tion of organized violence, depriving certain groups those no less frequent proposals from numerous or institutions of their abilities to exercise violence studies on ‘security governance’ and ‘security sector effectively, is not per se a desirable outcome. Although reform’, making recommendations for improving the some conversion scholars might push and argue for a regulation of military and police forces in accordance pacifist agenda, Conversion Studies is not—and never with widely shared principles of democratic account- has been—a pacifist science in the sense that it ability (‘good governance’)?

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If it wants to delineate a fairly concrete and spe- and Conflict Research, described the micro-level eco- cific field of inquiry within the broader context of nomic incentive structures guiding the behaviour of Peace and Conflict Research, Conversion Studies non-state armed groups in civil wars (see e.g. Kalyvas, needs to be more than a large container for accom- 2006; Schlichte, 2009; Chojnacki & Branović, 2007). modating any normative approach to changes in the One of the realizations underlying many of these organization of violence. Looking back at the history approaches is that variations of organized violence of the discipline, and especially to the influential connect different strategies of capital accumulation work of Melman, it is clear that the primary focus of to contingent forms of political order (see Boemcken, the more pro-active and politico-normative scholars 2013a). Or, to put it in simpler terms, the political was on economic causes and effects of militarization economy of organized violence matters, be it for (itself understood as mainly an economic process of understanding the behaviour of individual actors, resource allocation). As argued, this goes some way in the mobilization of groups, or the composition of explaining why Conversion Studies gradually went entire social collectives. Second-generation research out of style. For example, the much-debated question at BICC has even resuscitated the old discussions concerning the relationship between military surrounding ‘vested economic interests’ in regular expenditure and capitalism—and whether defence military forces (see e.g. Brömmelhörster & Paes, 2003; conversion ought to go hand-in-hand with overcom- Grawert & Abul-Magd, 2016). In doing so, it has pro- ing the capitalist macro-structure—no longer seemed duced original findings and policy recommendations relevant once the only surviving economic system without falling into the trap of relying on overtly was taken for granted. And even the liberal positions deterministic causal explanations. put forward by Melman were somewhat overrun by In sum, a Conversion Studies of the 21st century the sudden end of the Cold War, which ‘vested inter- would be well advised to remain faithful to its roots ests’ in the American MIC obviously failed to prevent and install its analytical focus on the political economy (as Melman had thought they would). Today, whoever of organized violence. To delimit Conversion Studies talks of such a thing as a military–industrial-complex in this way not only has the advantage of further would immediately be suspected of leaning to con- specifying its distinctive contribution vis-à-vis other— spiracy theories (and in most cases probably rightly so). and just as relevant—approaches to the subject. As With the benefit of hindsight, the central problem suggested earlier, Conversion Studies also pushes of Conversion Studies in the 1970s and 1980s consisted normative objectives of social transformation, high- in a certain tendency to search for linear causalities lighting benefits resulting from reductions in the (‘causes’, ‘effects’), in turn prompting an often very potentials of organized violence. Hence, the broader one-dimensional overemphasis on certain economic the scope of analyses, the broader and more encom- factors at the expense of appreciating the complexities passing the conversion process it advocates. By framing warranted by a broader analytical perspective. Conversion Studies as, first and foremost, a narrow- Crucially, however, this does not already disqualify concern with the material resources and political investigations into the political economy of organized economy of organized violence, it is less likely to violence. There is, indeed, a well-established body of become a project pursuing a comprehensive and literature in historical sociology that does precisely far-reaching agenda of ‘social engineering’, of con- this. Already quite some time ago, scholars such as verting peoples’ hearts and minds—a valid criticism Charles Tilly (1992) or Michael Mann (1988) produced that applies to the more radical approaches of the impressive, macroscopic accounts on how, not least, 1980s as much as it does to many current efforts in economic conditions informed modern state-building. peacebuilding and conflict transformation (see e.g. Recent studies, more directly associated with Peace Duffield & Waddell, 2006; Pupavac, 2005).

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Conversion Studies goes beyond an attention in the future, it should not only remain exclusive concern with protracted concerned with normative social change and political violent conflicts and mainly focuses on economy, but also with manifestations of organized organized violence in ‘peaceful’ regions violence as they appear in comparatively affluent, highly industrialized and usually ‘peaceful’ societies. The vast majority of academic writings on the As conversion scholars of the past have forcefully political economy of organized violence concerns i argued over and over again, these present problems of tself squarely with protracted civil wars in the Global themselves—and quite regardless of whether they South. This is much in line with an overall shift in lead to violent conflict or not. Organized violence Peace and Conflict Research over the past two decades, already shows itself in any social structure that which seems to have discovered those ‘new wars’ as collects and invests resources for the purpose of its primary field of inquiry. At the same time, political acquiring the necessary capabilities to effectively discourses in Europe and North America have increas- exercise physical force. In purely quantitative terms, ingly presented these conflicts in so-called fragile or it is thus most immediately apparent in the Global failed states as ‘safe havens for terrorists’, hubs of North and parts of East Asia. US defence expenditure transnational criminal networks, disruptions of global still constitutes, for example, almost half of all global trade routes, catalysts of migration flows and thus investments into the military. By way of contrast, the threats to their own security. Research on such issues resources devoted to establishing and maintaining thus follows a certain political demand for developing structures of organized violence in those conflict- recommendations on how these conflicts may be ridden and ‘fragile’ states of the South are compara- ended or, at least, contained. Krause’s original sugges- tively minimal, even when considered in relation to tion for a concept of ‘preventive conversion’ was also the overall economic performance of these societies intended to adapt Conversion Studies in such a way (see Boemcken, 2008). that it could tap into this prevailing trend. A quick scan of publications from Peace and While certainly a worthy and relevant area of Conflict Research in the new millennium, including study, especially for Peace and Conflict Research, an studies on the political economy of violence, reveals a argument can be made that contemporary Conver- clear bias in favour of analyzing violent conflicts. sion Studies should avoid the obvious temptation of There appears, then, to be a certain niche that all-too-readily joining into the chorus of what, in Conversion Studies could occupy—and rightfully so, effect, has become ‘Conflict Research’ and remode- given the history of the discipline. The rationale ling conversion as, for instance, a synonym of would decidedly differ from the early 1990s, of course, ‘post-conflict reconstruction’. For a start, Krause’s where the world was caught up in a widespread pro- proposal for installing the term conversion as a popular cess of disarmament. In a way, present-day Conversion pillar of research and action on violent conflicts did Studies would much more closely resemble the 1970s simply not work out. The legacy of Conversion Studies and 1980s. Indeed, global military spending has as a discipline concerned with somewhat different reached a level comparable to that of the Cold War. topics appears to have been too strong. The term The myth according to which defence and security could not easily be moved from addressing one theme, spending has a beneficial impact on the wider economy, namely the possible reuse of Cold War military spread by lobbyists from the arms industry and taken resources held by the major powers on both sides of up in official documents of states, is once again gaining the Iron Curtain, to another one (the civil wars of the popularity (see Brzoska, 2013). For the time being, the South). This lesson needs to be taken seriously. Con- European defence industry still has significant over- version Studies was never primarily about violent capacities (Mehrens & Wilke, 2009, p. 40). Yet, instead conflicts. If it is to gain any wider and renewed of instigating a renewed discussion of industrial

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conversion, these have so far only resulted in increased annual Global Militarization Index (GMI) already arms exports to states outside of NATO and the builds on former approaches in Conversion Studies European Union (see Moltmann & Boemcken, 2012). by comparing levels of military expenditure in various Finally, and despite all the theoretical shortcomings, countries to social spending on health or education. many of Melman’s observations regarding the ineffi- One pertinent issue concerns the modelling of sce- ciency of the defence industry remain as accurate narios outlining the expected wider consequences today as they were in the 1970s—just think of the when either increasing or decreasing defence expen- many procurement scandals that regularly make the ditures to any significant degree. Keith Hartley noted headlines. Conversion Studies can pose many of the in 1997 that the “regional and local economic impacts same critical questions it did in the past—and the of disarmament”, particularly on labour markets, are answers might not be that different in many cases an “under-researched field” (1997, p. 96). This observa- (see Mehrens & Wilke, 2009). tion remains valid twenty years down the line. Whereas many economists continue to address a Conversion Studies bridges academic range of rather “esoteric problems” with little bearing cultures on the actuality of collective social life, the “profession [allocates] relatively few of its [scholars] to study the Conversion studies also has the potential to com- theoretical, empirical and policy questions raised by” bine largely distinct academic disciplines and cultures. armament and disarmament (Hartley 1997, p. 979). On the one hand, it is an openly normative discipline: What effects, for instance, would the dismantling of It is all about change and ‘making the world a better the overcapacities in the European defence industry place’. In this sense, Conversion Studies clearly belongs have on employment levels? How do the qualifications to what has sometimes been labelled the soft and of workers in the defence industry prepare them for emancipatory agenda of peace studies, commonly finding jobs in civilian sectors? These are very perti- associated with notions of ‘structural violence’, nent and highly policy-relevant questions, which exploitation and class struggle, gender inequalities would make significant contributions to ongoing and racism. On the other hand, however, its more debates (see Boemcken, 2013b). specific concern with military resources, such as Conversion Studies should not be left to econo- defence spending, situates the discipline very close to mists alone, however. Social scientists ought to com- the so-called hard and positivist approach of ‘peace plement their findings and ask how violence ought science’, focusing on issues of arms control and arma- to be organized in any given society and how much ment. Linda Rennie Forcey observed that the history resources would be necessary to this end (an issue of Peace and Conflict Research—or rather: peace somewhat neglected by earlier writings on conversion, studies/ peace science—is very much a story of oppo- see Cooper, 1995). This question, in turn, could greatly sition between these two distinct strands (1992, p. 217). benefit from situated micro-level analyses of the As she went on, Conversion Studies calls “both for the actual networks that structure the political economy scientific, technological, quantitative skills of peace of organized violence in very concrete settings— science, and for the normative, activist, future-oriented examples include Hugh Gusterson’s study of the skills of peace studies” (p. 225). It is thus an “excellent “securityscapes” of workers in the American defence meeting point at which the two cultures may come industry (2004) or Didier Bigo’s “field analysis” of to appreciate their interconnectedness and appreciate security professionals in Europe (2007; also Bigo & their differences” (p. 216). Jeandesboz, 2010). Although this and similar work In the 21st century, the study of conversion could partly resonates with past interests in ‘military– incorporate and combine both hard macroeconomic industrial-complexes’, it jumps to no hasty conclusions and softer micro-sociological approaches. BICC’s and is based on thorough empirical field research.

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Conversion Studies could build upon such findings by intricate complexities driving social phenomena. A combining them with results from other disciplines critical Conversion Studies would therefore—also— for the purpose of formulating concrete ideas for so- have to be self-critical, that is reflect upon some of cial change, not—or not only—in areas of violent con- the shortcomings of the (critical) theories developed flict but in those regions where by far the most re- during the Cold War, which constitute a further reason sources go into organized violence. underlying the irrelevance of the discipline today. Whoever attributes, for instance, current dynamics Conversion Studies is both critical and in armament and militarization singlehandedly to policy relevant ‘vested interests’ in ‘military–industrial-complexes’ will hardly be taken seriously. The same goes for Criticality implies a perspective that is not con- those demanding a world without weapons and the tent with simply accepting a given state of affairs, in complete abolishment of all armed forces. Research this case the particular organization of violence at can only expect to have an impact if it can self- any given place or scale. This was certainly true for critically demonstrate its explanatory power to make the more political conversion scholars of the Cold a difference. And it is, in fact, quite understandable War period, who wanted to unmask the ostensibly that the conversion scholars of the 1990s quickly false assumptions put forward by the warmongering relieved themselves of difficult theoretical and nor- ideologists of the arms race. Melman, for instance, mative baggage, distinguishing a ‘utopian’ past from explicitly positioned himself in the intellectual tradi- a present ‘reality’ in which practical responses to an tion of critical realism (see Melman 1974, pp. 146–57), already ongoing development promised to bring perhaps most famously represented by Noam Chomsky about more concrete changes than Conversion Studies (who, himself, heavily relied on Melman’s work in his had ever actually initiated beforehand. analysis of war economies, see e.g. Chomsky, 2004). Of This is not to say that criticality precludes policy course, a critical academic perspective can come in relevance. To argue that Cold War Conversion Studies many guises and mean different things (an ‘uncritical’ was critical but not policy relevant, whereas post- academic work is, arguably, not academic at all). Cold War Conversion Studies was policy relevant but Nevertheless, to understand Conversion Studies as a not critical would be an assessment bordering on critical discipline is to set it apart from those clearly caricature. Think of the—very practical—deliberations technical studies, which essentially regarded conver- of conversion scholars in the 1980s to conjoin the sion as what Southwood called a ‘mopping up’ exercise, interests of workers in defence plants with those of executing rather than reflecting upon political deci- popular social movements to build broad coalitions sions and suggesting alternatives. As the earlier argu- whose voices would be heard by those holding polit- ment had it, the predominantly reactive stance of ical power. Or consider the critical assessments of Conversion Studies in the 1990s partially accounts for researchers at BICC in the late 1990s on the success the demise of the discipline as worldwide military and failure of various conversion efforts. The point expenditures increased again towards the end of here, however, is that both old and new Conversion the decade. By way of contrast, a critical approach to Studies rarely, if ever, brought criticality and policy organized violence does not so much wait for things relevance together—as two principles of research that to happen but rather goes out and engages with communicate with each other on an equal footing. things as they are. That is to say, Conversion Studies ought to be policy To be critical also means not to settle for overtly relevant precisely because it conducts (self-)critical simplistic and one-dimensional causal explanations, research, not in spite of it. thereby neglecting the multiplicity of factors and

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Conversion Studies is always also paradoxical and impossible. Civility is always already post-Conversion Studies perverted. The more we insist on a civil space of peace and harmony, the sharper and more pronounced the Can, then, an argument be made for a renaissance contours will spring into view that distinguish it of Conversion Studies? As demonstrated on the previ- from a dangerous and militarized borderlands (see ous pages, it has a lot to commend it. Nevertheless, e.g. Caygill, 1993). conversion could only be reasonably some critical comments are also in order. In particular, thought of as a transformation that actually collapses an argument can be made that Conversion Studies this distinction between the military and civil or, by today ought to understand itself as ‘post-Conversion extension, war and peace. Only, the question is Studies’. Post-conversion is not meant here in the whether such a process would be, indeed, desirable? sense suggested in 1995 by Cooper, that is, as referring As it were, there is reason to believe that precisely to a period ‘after’ conversion in which the concept such a conversion is currently taking place (if, in fact, has become more or less obsolete. Rather, post-con- the clear distinction between the two sides ever real- version draws attention to the need to question and ly existed, see Neocleous, 2010). For example, policy self-critically reflect upon the basic parameters that discourses are beginning to call the strict demarca- render conversion an intelligible process. The begin- tion between military and non-military security ning of this Paper showed that all previous definitions practices into question. Concepts such as ‘homeland of defence conversion relied on drawing a clear dis- security’ evoke a broad spectrum of risks that ought tinction between the military and the civilian sphere. to be engaged in concerted efforts by both military This dichotomy, moreover, presented one side as bad and civilian agents (see Hayes 2009, pp. 72–73). Bigo and the other as good. In effect, previous writings in observed an increasing “de-differentiation” of the Conversion Studies conceptually and normatively “inside” and “outside” (2008), and Derek Gregory opposed the civil to the military; both were regarded argued that contemporary wars can often no longer as distinct and unrelated conditions that endured in, be spatially confined, and thus clearly distinguished by and for themselves. For this reason, the idea of from zones of peace (2011). conversion ultimately harbours an almost eschato- For Conversion Studies, this blurring of boundaries logical fantasy of ‘overcoming’, which goes back to is anything but a merely abstract and theoretical the theological origin of the concept. At the end of problem; it shows itself very concretely in what has days, the military will give way to the civil. And even always been the principal concern of the discipline: if conversion scholars conceded that this goal might The defence industry. Already in the past, many con- be practically unattainable for the time being, it con- version scholars noted that modern weapons systems tinued to linger in any thought and argument that are increasingly made of dual-use components, presented the civilian sphere as the somehow better, which can be used in a military and a civilian context more true and worthwhile, state of social existence. (see Altmann, 2000; also Roberts, 1991). Even more Yet, is it possible to imagine a civil condition poignantly, many defence manufacturers no longer without its military anti-thesis? Does not any identi- concentrate on the production of military weapons fication of civility depend upon a simultaneous move alone but seek to enter the growing civilian markets of designating that which is uncivil? If this is the for security (see Marti Sempere, 2011; case, then Conversion Studies needs to acknowledge Mawdsley, 2013). As early as 1999, Wally Struys charac- that the civil and the military do not exist in isolation terized the industry therefore as a “civilian–military from one another. On the contrary, they constitute a complex” (1999, p. 40). Besides weapons, it develops, dialectical symbiosis. It follows that any conceptual- produces and sells, for example, sophisticated border ization of conversion relying on a clear- cut dichotomy control and surveillance technologies, often to civilian between the two poles would be deeply flawed, if not customers. Yet, if such ‘civilian’ products can cause

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potentially just as much harm as military ones—and are often indistinguishable from them—then an un- derstanding of conversion that relies on a civil–mili- tary dichotomy can no longer serve as a useful guide for formulating normative objectives. Not least for this reason, the final part of this Paper proposed to conceptualize conversion in relation to organized violence. Unlike all former approaches and definitions, this avoids drawing a distinction between a military and civilian sphere. Organized violence should not be regarded as one side of a dichotomy that opposes it to something altogether different (‘peace’). There is nothing exter- nal to it, organized violence is everywhere, neither essentially good nor bad. Conversion Studies thus ought to recognize that—while its potentials can certainly be reduced—organized violence itself cannot be overcome, but always only re-organized over and over again: It is in this sense post-Conver- sion Studies (or perhaps also ‘Perversion Studies’ ). A normative orientation toward social change ought to continually motivate conversion scholars, to be sure. Only, this orientation cannot be sought along a straight- forward and ready-made linear or even teleological trajectory. Instead, the precise normative agenda of conversion needs to be continually contested.

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Conclusion

The Paper set out to chart the evolution of Con- version Studies from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period. It then discussed some of the reasons explaining the demise of the discipline in the new millennium. Based on a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of Conversion Studies in the past, the final part made some suggestions on how conversion could inform a systematic field of academic inquiry in the 21st century. The propositions put forward to this end lean toward a comparatively conservative approach that pays close attention to the historical legacy of conversion as a concept. In sum, Conversion Studies should be a multi-disciplinary, critical and policy-relevant field of research that advocates social change based on analyses of political economies of violence, particularly in the affluent, industrialized and comparatively peaceful societies of the Global North. At the same time, it ought to abandon its past reliance on a simple civil–military dichotomy and, instead, engage with the more complex issues raised by a focus on organized violence. This includes a continual questioning and readjustment of one’s normative coordinates. In the contemporary world, an increasing amount of resources is directed into the organization of violence. It goes without question that this trend needs to be accompanied by critical scholarship. Given the potential of Conversion Studies to conjoin otherwise distinct scientific approaches and traditions, a possible revival of the discipline might be worth discussing. Yet, and although the Paper concluded by identifying some relevant topics, which deserve closer attention in Peace and Conflict Research, there is no compelling reason to assemble, say, all critical analyses of the European defence industry under the heading of Conversion Studies—even if they come up with concrete recommendations for resource re-use and social change. Quite possibly, the patient is beyond all help. Nevertheless, this does not make the need for more and systematic research on these and similar issues less relevant. Regardless of whether a future field for studying the political economies of organized violence in a pro-active, critical and policy-relevant manner explicitly evokes the term conversion or not, it can arguably learn a lot from the looking back into the past of Conversion Studies.

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36 \ \ WORKING PAPER 7 \ 2017 DEFENCE CONVERSION: DEAD DUCK OR STILL A RELEVANT OBJECT OF STUDY? \ MARC VON BOEMCKEN

\ WORKING PAPER 7 \ 2017 37 \ bicc \ Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn Bonn International Center for Conversion GmbH Pfarrer-Byns-Straße 1, 53121 Bonn, Germany +49 (0)228 911 96-0, Fax -22, [email protected] www.bicc.de www.facebook.com/bicc.de

Director for Research Professor Dr Conrad Schetter

Director for Administration Michael Dedek

AUTHOR Dr Marc von Boemcken is Senior Researcher at BICC

COPYEDITING Heike Webb

PUBLICATION DATE 21 July 2017

EDITORIAL DESIGN Diesseits – Kommunikationsdesign, Düsseldorf

Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under: cf. creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/