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Can Sharp Power Explain Chinese Interactions with Western Universities?

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Can Sharp Power Explain Chinese Interactions with Western Universities? Can Sharp Power Explain Chinese Interactions with Western Universities? Jack Patfield - 26 June 2020 Masters Programme in Political Science Programme: Authoritarian Leadership? The Rise of China in International Relations Supervisor: Dr Julia Bader Second reader: Dr Julian Gruin Candidate Number: 12718637 Department: Graduate School of Social Science Word Count: 22,000 Acknowledgments Without the help of the following group of people, this paper would be immeasurably poorer. First, Dr Julia Bader for her patience and inspiration, and for supervising a course that has proven at times interesting, frustrating, challenging and enjoyable. To my classmates, for their good humour and the valuable information they provided over Zoom, Canvas and WhatsApp. To Ms Kim Ribbink, for her administrative nous. The University of Amsterdam, for providing an Australian (with an Irish passport) the opportunity to study abroad, and for being so reasonable when he decided to flee home in the midst of a pandemic. And finally, to my family and friends, for keeping me sane. This thesis is entirely my own work, and any mistakes contained herein are my own. 2 Table of Contents Title Page 1 Acknowledgments 2 Table of Contents 3 List of Acronyms and Colloquialisms 4 Chapter One: Introduction 5 Chapter Two: Literature Review and Conceptual Considerations 8 Section 2.1: What is Sharp Power, and How Can We Recognise it? 8 Section 2.2: Clarifying Sharp Power 16 Chapter Three: Methodological Approach 21 Chapter Four: Empirical Analysis 26 Section 4.1: Students 26 4.1.1: Chinese Student and Scholars Associations 29 4.1.2: Patriotic Students 31 Section 4.2: Academics 33 4.2.1: Knowledge Sharing 34 4.2.2: Censorship 38 Section 4.3: Cyber-Attacks 43 Section 4.4: Confucius Institutes 46 4.4.1: Accusations of Espionage 47 4.4.2: Promoting Censorship 48 4.4.3: Discriminatory Practices 49 4.4.4: Moulding Student Behaviour 50 Section 4.5: Assessing Sharp Power 52 Chapter Five: Redefining Sharp Power 56 Bibliography 60 3 List of Acronyms and Colloquialisms ABC Australian Broadcasting Corporation ANU Australian National University ARC Australian Research Council CCP Chinese Communist Party CETC China Electronics Technology Group Corporation CI Confucius Institute CSSA Chinese Student and Scholars Associations Hanban Office of Chinese Language Council International NCSU North Carolina State University NED National Endowment for Democracy NUDT National University of Defense Technology PLA People’s Liberation Army PRC People’s Republic of China US/ USA United States of America USYD The University of Sydney UTS University of Technology Sydney VUB Vrije Universiteit Brussel 4 Abstract: Since Walker & Ludwig first coined the term ‘sharp power’ in 2017 there has been a flurry of academic scholarship examining the term. This work has focused on defining the concept, and identifying where it can be applied in international relations. Walker & Ludwig argue the concept can help clarify the nature of malign authoritarian influence over democratic states (Walker & Ludwig 2017: 7). Noting scholarship has not been able to settle on an agreed definition, this paper uses their original definition and examines the case of Chinese interference in western university education to test the concept. It also advances a typological tool to identify sharp power. Because scholars have not been able to precisely define sharp power, this article finds the concept unequal to the task of clarifying authoritarian influence in international relations. The conclusion seeks to improve the concept, and invites discussion to further develop the utility of sharp power. Chapter One: Introduction In 2017 the term sharp power was first coined by Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig. Their report for the Washington D.C. based think tank, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) described sharp power as the malicious and intrusive influence that one nation can wield over another. It is distinguished from soft power by the methods of its application, secretive, and malign, and from hard power by its lack of open coercion backed by military force (Walker & Ludwig 2017: 6). The parameters that define this term are broad. Where does the line between soft power end, and sharp power begin? Where does this then morph into hard power? To a large degree answering this question depends on terminology. Providing a precise and useful definition of the concept is one of the key aims of this paper. This is important for a number of reasons. In its present form the concept is vague, and does not necessarily provide clarity to a researcher looking into the interactions that take place between authoritarian states and democratic states and their institutions. It is only once we have arrived at a more precise definition for sharp power that we can address the central concern of this paper: whether sharp power can explain the interactions that take place between the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and western universities. This topic matters. Since its economy reopened to the world in the 1970s, China has grown richer, and with that wealth, more influential. As an autocratic power, its style of governance, and its interactions with western institutions are necessarily different from democratic western nations. With its newfound global influence, the PRC has engaged with western industries and 5 institutions to not always positive endings. Universities are vital repositories of learning and knowledge; their work powers a country’s innovation. Influential policy advocates frequently work within universities. Perhaps most importantly - in their goal of educating students, universities shape the future. Their work influences the politicians, policymakers, business leaders, academics and activists of tomorrow. To influence such an institution is to hold sway over what a country might become. So has China employed sharp power in its interactions with western universities? This is a difficult question to answer; the terms of engagement must be defined. This means unpacking sharp power, a nebulous and as yet ill-defined term. To answer the thesis question, this paper is divided into several chapters. These chapters step the reader through the topic, allowing for a logical progression from definition; to methodology; to analysis; and finally to conclusion. Chapter Two contains a literature review that surveys the work undertaken by other scholars and identifies ‘gaps’ in the literature. It is in these ‘gaps’ that this paper seeks to place itself. In effect, this review sets the stage for this paper. It demonstrates a scholarly confusion surrounding sharp power. Clarification of this confusion may well be the key contribution of this paper. The review finds that there is no one commonly held and consistent definition of sharp power. Examples of authoritarian malfeasance and disruption of democratic targets are cited as ‘sharp power’, though no concrete definition is agreed upon. It is left to the reader to assume examples of authoritarian interference constitute sharp power, as and when they are cited. Defining sharp power is therefore, one of the key tasks of this essay. By parsing the literature, searching through existing definitions of the concept, and discussions of the concept before it was named by Walker & Ludwig, Chapter Two arrives at a reasonable definition of sharp power. Adopting this definition throughout the rest of the paper allows us to address one final important aspect of this Chapter. This is developing a typological tool, whereby we can recognise examples of sharp power as they are presented to us. The typological tool, and the methods by which it identifies sharp power are justified in Section 2.2: Clarifying Sharp Power. Following this theoretical chapter is a methodological exploration of how the analytical ballast of this paper, Chapter Four: Empirical Analysis, is organised. Chapter Three is a preliminary chapter, laying out: the subjects to be studied; the organisation of the empirical analysis; the 6 data employed; the biases that affect this data; the shortcomings and weaknesses involved with this approach and; the timeframe and geographical location within which this paper is situated. Chapter Four examines several well-known examples of Chinese interactions with western universities. These examples are divided by type, into unique categories. This provides a suitable array with which to perform our analysis. Each category provides a fresh angle with which we can critique the concept of sharp power. While no qualitative study can be exhaustive, this approach provides sufficient evidence to develop a compelling argument on the nature of Chinese influence on western universities, and of sharp power itself. The categories are inspired by an Australian government report, and attempt to holistically account for the most important areas of interaction between the PRC and western universities. The categories contained therein are, in order: students; academics; cyber-attacks; and Confucius Institutes (CI). The aim of this paper is to answer whether or not sharp power can account for the interactions between the People’s Republic and western universities. If sharp power is inadequate to explain Chinese interference, then we must ask how the concept can be altered. What might need to change in order to explain the malignant Chinese interactions we shall examine? The paper concludes with a discussion of how the idea of sharp power can be improved. It identifies where a refined definition of the concept could
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