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376 Müller, Vincent C. (1993), ‘Bibliographie der Schriften von Hilary Putnam [Bibliography Hilary Putnam’s Writings, in Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Hilary Putnam: Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Schriften zu Sprache und Wirklichkeit [From a realist point of view: Writings on language and reality] (rowohlts enzyklopädie; Reinbek: Rowohlt), 278-94. Reprinted – with errors and without obtaining copyright or acknowledging the compilor - in Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism: An Open Question, Oxford: Blackwell 1995, 82–102. - This bibliography has been plagiarized in several places. - Bibliographie der Schriften von Hilary Putnam1 I Bücher 1964 1 Mit Paul Benacerraf (Hg.): Philosophy of Mathematics. Selected Readings, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., und Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 536 S. 2. Aufl. mit einer neuen Auswahl, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 1983. 608 S. [Enthält II-35, 45, 107.] 1971 2 Philosophy of Logic, Harper & Row, New York. 76 S. 1975 1 Nur veröffentlichte oder zur Veröffentlichung angenommene Schriften, keine Wiederabdrucke (auch wenn sie ‹besser zugänglich› wären) — jedoch Angabe der Stellen in den unter I aufgeführten Bänden, wo die Originalpublikationen nicht immer genannt sind. Rezensionen nur insoweit, als sie in den unter I aufgeführten Bänden aufgenommen wurden. Ist die Erstveröffentlichung eine Übersetzung, so wird zusätzlich die erste Publikation im Original aufgeführt. Alle Texte sind im Original Englisch. Angaben ab 1992 teilweise unvollständig. Bibliographie der Schriften von Hilary Putnam 377 3 Mathematics, Matter and Method. Philosophical Papers, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York. 328 S. [Enthält II-9, 12, 22, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 36, 37, 39, 45, 49, 50, 52, 49, 73, 78, 87, 88.] 4 Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York. 457 S. [Enthält II-14, 18, 21, 23, 27, 34, 38, 46–48, 54, 57, 62, 74, 76, 77, 79, 80, 82–86.] 1978 5 Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London/Henley/Boston. 145 S. [Enthält II-81, 89, 92, 93, 95.] 1981 6 Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York. 222 S. [Enthält II-115.] [III-6] 1983 7 Realism and Reason. Philosophical Papers, Volume III, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York. 328 S. [Enthält II-90, 97, 99, 102, 107, 112–114, 122–125, 127, 131, 132, 134, 144.] 8 Mit Carl G. Hempel und Wilhelm K. Essler (Hg.): Methodology, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Essays in Honor of Wolfgang Stegmüller of the Occasion of His 60th Birthday, D. Reidel, Dordrecht. 424 S. Auch als Bd. 19 von Erkenntnis 1983 mit derselben Paginierung. [Enthält II-134.] 1985 9 Mit Wilhelm Karl Essler und Wolfgang Stegmüller (Hg.): Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday, D. Reidel, Dordrecht. 484 S. Auch als Bd. 22 von Erkenntnis 1985 mit derselben Paginierung. [Enthält II-145.] 1987 Bibliographie der Schriften von Hilary Putnam 378 10 The Many Faces of Realism (The Paul Carus Lectures, Washington 1985), Open Court, La Salle, Ill. 98 S. [Enthält II-154, 157.] 1988 11 Representation and Reality, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, Mass./London. 136 S. [III-9.] 1990 12 Realism With a Human Face, hg. v. James Conant, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass./London. 347 S. [Enthält II- 104, 116, 118, 128, 129, 133, 137, 140, 143, 149, 158, 159, 165, 168, 169, 172, 174-177, 179, 180.] 13 The Meaning of the Concept of Probability in Application to Finite Sequences, PhD Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles 1951. Mit ‹Introduction Some Years Later› [II-173]. Garland, New York/London. Typoskript, 128 S. 1992 14 Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures, St. Andrews 1990), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass./London. 234 S. [Enthält Text 10 und II-170, 188.] 15 Mit Ted Cohen und Paul Guyer (Hg.): Pursuits of Reason: Essays Presented to Stanley Cavell, Texas Technical University Press, Lubbock, Tex. 448 S. [Enthält II-171, 190.] 1994 16 Words and Life, hg. v. James Conant, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass./London. [Wird u. a. enthalten II-182, 184, 190, 192, 194, 195, 197, 198.] II Aufsätze, Vorträge und Vorlesungen 1954 Bibliographie der Schriften von Hilary Putnam 379 1 ‹Synonymity and the Analysis of Belief Sentences›, in: Analysis 14, 114–122. 1956 2 ‹A Definition of Degree of Confirmation for Very Rich Languages›, in: Philosophy of Science 23, 58–62. 3 ‹Mathematics and the Existence of Abstract Entities›, in: Philosophical Studies 7, 81–88. 4 ‹Reds, Greens and Logical Analysis›, in: Philosophical Review 65, 206–217. 1957 5 ‹Arithmetic Models for Consistent Formulae of Quantification Theory›, in: Journal of Symbolic Logic 22, 110 f. 6 ‹Decidability and Essential Undecidability›, in: Journal of Symbolic Logic 22, 39–54. 7 ‹Psychological Concepts, Explication and Ordinary Language›, in: The Journal of Philosophy 54, 94–99. 8 ‹Red and Green all Over Again: A Rejoinder to Arthur Pap›, in: Philosophical Review 66, 100–103. 9 ‹Three-Valued Logic›, in: Philosophical Studies 8, 73–80. [I-3, 166– 173.] 1958 10 Mit Martin Davis: ‹Reductions of Hilbert’s Tenth Problem›, in: Journal of Symbolic Logic 23, 183–187. 11 Mit Paul Oppenheim: ‹Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis›, in: Herbert Feigl/Michael Scriven/Grover Maxwell (Hg.): Concepts, Memories and the Mind-Body Problem, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science II, University of Minnesota Press, Mineanapolis, 3–36. [III-1] 1959 Bibliographie der Schriften von Hilary Putnam 380 12 «Memo on ‹Conventionalism›», Publication of the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science, 22.4.1959, University of Minnesota Press, Mineanapolis. [I-3, 206–214.] 1960 13 ‹An Unsolvable Problem in Number Theory›, in: Journal of Symblic Logic 25, 220–232. 14 ‹Minds and Machines›, in: Sidney Hook (Hg.): Dimensions of Mind, State University of New York Press, Albany, N. Y. [III-2. I-4, 362– 385.] 15 Mit Martin Davis: ‹A Computing Procedure for Quantification Theory›, in: Journal of the Association for Computing Machines 7, 201–215. 16 Mit Raymond Smullyan: ‹Exact Separation of Recursively Enumerable Sets Within Theories›, in: Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 11, 574–577. 1961 17 «Comments on the Paper of David Sharp, ‹The Einstein-Podolsky- Rosen Paradox Re-Examined›», in: Philosophy of Science 28, 234– 239. 18 ‹Some Issues in the Theory of Grammar›, in: The American Mathematical Society, Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics 12, 25–42. [I-4, 85–106.] 19 ‹Uniqueness Ordinals in Higher Constructive Number Classes›, in: Yoshua Bar-Hillel (Hg): Essays on the Foundations of Mathematics dedicated to A. A. Fraenkel on his 70th Anniversary, Magnes, Jerusalem, 190–206. 20 Mit Martin Davis und Julia Robertson: ‹The Decision Problem for Exponential Diophantine Equations›, in: Annals of Mathematics 74, 425–436. 1962 Bibliographie der Schriften von Hilary Putnam 381 21 «Dreaming and ‹Depth Grammar›», in: R. J. Butler (Hg.): Analytical Philosophy. First Series, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. [I-4, 304–324.] 22 ‹It Ain’t Necessarily so›, in: The Journal of Philosophy 59, 658–670. [I-3, 237–249.] 23 ‹The Analytic and the Synthetic›, in: Herbert Feigl/Grover Maxwell (Hg.): Scientific Explanation. Space and Time. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science III, University of Minnesota Press, Mineanapolis. [I-4, 33–69.] 24 ‹What Theories are Not›, in: Ernest Nagel/Patrick Suppes/Alfred Tarski (Hg.): Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Cal. [I-3, 215–227.] 1963 25 ‹A Note on Constructible Sets of Integers›, in: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 4, 270–273. 26 ‹An Examination of Grünbaum’s Philosophy of Space and Time›, in: B. Baumrin (Hg.): Philosophy of Science; The Delaware Seminar 2. 1962–1963, Interscience, New York. [I-3, 93–129.] 27 ‹Brains and Behaviour›, in: R. J. Butler (Hg.): Analytical Philosophy. Second Series, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. [I-4, 325–341.] 28 «‹Degree of Confirmation› and Inductive Logic», in: Paul Arthur Schilpp (Hg.): The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, (The Library of Living Philosophers), Open Court, La Salle, Ill. [I-3, 270–292.] 29 ‹Probability and Confirmation›, in: The Voice of America. Forum Philosophy of Science, U. S. Information Agency. [I-3, 293–304.] 30 Mit Martin Davis: ‹Diophantine Sets Over Polynomial Rings›, in: Illinois Journal of Mathematics 7, 251–256. 1964 Bibliographie der Schriften von Hilary Putnam 382 31 ‹Discussion: Comments on Comments on Comments: a Reply to Margenau and Wigner›, in: Philosophy of Science 31/1, 1–6. [I-3, 159–165.] 32 ‹On Families of Sets Represented in Theories›, in: Archiv für mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung 6, 66–70. 33 ‹On Hierarchies and Systems of Notations›, in: Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 15, 44–50. 34 ‹Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?›, in: The Journal of Philosophy 61, 668–691. [I-4, 386–407.] 35 Mit Paul Benacerraf: ‹Introduction›, in: I-1 (1. Aufl.), 1–26. 1965 36 ‹A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics›, in: Robert G. Goldony (Hg.): Beyond the Edge of Certainty: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. [I-3, 130–158.] 37 ‹Craig’s Theorem›, in: The Journal of Philosophy 62, 251–259. [I-3, 228–236.] 38 ‹How not to Talk About Meaning. Comments on J. J. C. Smart›, in: Robert S. Cohen/M. W. Wartowski (Hg.): Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Bd. II (In Honor of Philipp Frank), Humanities Press, New York. [I-4, 117–131.] 39 ‹Philosophy of Physics›, in: Franklin H. Donnell (Hg.): Aspects of Contemporary American Philosophy, Physica Verlag, Würzburg. [I- 3, 79–92.] 40 ‹Trial and Error Predicates and the Solution to a Problem of Mostowski›, in: Journal of Symbolic Logic 30, 49–57. 41 Mit Gustav Hensel: ‹On The Notational Independence of Various Hierarchies of Degrees of Unsolvability›, in: Journal of Symbolic Logic 30, 69–86.
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