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Mikhail Skobelev: The Creation and Persistence of a Legend

Master’s Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The State University

By

Duncan Richardson, BA

Master of Arts in Slavic and East European Studies

The Ohio State University 2019

Thesis Committee

Nicholas Breyfogle, Adviser

Scott Levi

Copyright by Duncan Richardson 2019

Abstract This paper analyzes the creation and manipulation of a modern myth through an examination of the career of Lieutenant-General Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev. From the summer of 1877 until his death in 1882, Mikhail Skobelev’s career and reputation enjoyed a meteoric rise among the Russian people, within the Russian , and all over the world. He became an icon of Russian Imperial might and a hero to the Russian lower classes, as well as a figure of international renown. This reputation was shaped and created in the popular press, particularly mass-circulation papers such as the British Daily News and the Russian

Golos. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 correspondents for these publications, including J. A. MacGahan, , and Vasiliy Nemirovich-Danchenko, presented

Skobelev to their readers with glowing praise and helped to forge an enduring legend surrounding the general. This legend was then used after Skobelev’s death by groups within

Russia, including the Pan-Slavs and reformers, to build support for their ideologies.

Utilizing the original newspapers, archival materials, published memoirs, and secondary sources, this paper analyzes how these authors crafted the legend surrounding the general and how that legend was then instrumentalized

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Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the tremendous assistance given to me throughout this project by several individuals, including my advisor Dr. Nicholas Breyfogle, the helpful and professional at Columbia University’s Butler Library, the staff of Ohio State University’s Thompson

Library, and fellow graduate students who assisted in finding sources, refining ideas, and providing moral support. I would also like to thank the IREX “U.S.- Experts,” program for giving me the funding necessary to conduct the archival research in New York essential to this project.

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Vita

May 2013 ...... Bowling Green High School

May 2017 ...... B.A. History, The Ohio State University

January 2019 ...... IREX U.S. Russia Experts Fellowship Forum

April 2019 ...... 2019 Mid-West Slavic Conference

Fields of Study

Major Field Slavic and Eastern European Studies

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Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii

Acknowledgements ...... iii

Vita ...... iv

Table of Contents ...... v

List of Figures ...... vi

Prologue: A Death in ...... 1

Chapter 1: The Life and Times of the “White General” ...... 2

Chapter 2: Youth and Early Career: Born to be a Soldier ...... 8

Chapter 3: Prelude to War: The Great Eastern Crisis ...... 15

Chapter 4: The Russo-Turkish War and the Making of a Legend ...... 20

Chapter 5: A Political Soldier: The Akhal-Tekke Expedition and the Paris Speeches .....42

Chapter 6: Using a Legend: Military Reform and Pan-Slavism ...... 49

Chapter 7: The Endurance of a Legend: A Tale of Two Monuments ...... 59

Bibliography ...... 66

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List of Figures

Figure 1. Vasilii Vereshchagin, The Battlefield at the Pass ...... 37

Figure 2. Anonymous, Moscow, Mikhail Skobelev Monument Inauguration ...... 61

Figure 3. Anonymous, Skobelev Monument ...... 63

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Prologue: A Death in Moscow

“What is to become of us without you?”

In July 1882, the entered a state of national mourning. Masses were held, speeches were made, and crowds gathered to lament in the streets of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Peasants, soldiers, and aristocrats were united for a moment by shared loss. Lieutenant-General

Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev, a war hero with the status of , , or in the pantheon, was dead. At the age of 38, Skobelev had achieved more in his brief career than many military officers could hope to in a lifetime. His death was greeted with utter disbelief. Officers who knew him reacted to the announcement with a dismissive, “it is impossible for Skobelev to die.”1 Alexander III himself lamented the

General’s death, and crowds thronged to watch the funeral train carrying his remains from Moscow to his family’s estate outside of St. Petersburg. His death was even reported in the international press, obituaries appearing as far afield as Australia. How did this happen? How did a common born soldier rise to a position of such prominence?

1 Vasilii Nemirovich-Danchenko, Personal Reminiscences of General Skobeleff, Trans. by E. A. Brayley Hodgetts (London: W. H. Allen and Co., 1884), 9.

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Chapter 1: The Life and Times of the White General

Lieutenant-General Mikhail Dimitrievich Skobelev, or the “White General,” as he was known in the popular press, was one of the most dynamic and complicated figures of late 19th century Russia. He was a darling of the press, both the gutter and the mainstream, and he was almost as beloved by the general populace of Russia as he was despised by his enemies among the military establishment, the members of the Imperial Court, and the bureaucracy. According the accounts written by his friends he was a brilliant military officer who earned his awards and accolades through a combination of white-knuckle daring and cold tactical calculation. However, he tarnished his reputation with a calculated brutality that shocked even 19th century audiences when reports of massacres reached from Central Asia.

While Skobelev’s life and career were extraordinary in their own right, they were elevated in significance by the times in which he lived and the people who chose to turn a remarkable man into an unbelievable legend. Examining Skobelev’s life and career and the legend surrounding him reveals two broad themes: the close relationship between war-time journalism and mythmaking, and the usage of war heroes for political and propaganda purposes. Skobelev was an extraordinary man, who’s achievements were made into an even more extraordinary legend by a core group of journalists during the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War. These journalists, a mix of Americans,

Englishmen, Russians, and others—all part of a new and rapidly changing profession—filled a

2 role as modern mythmakers. These writers created heroes and tore them down, all in an effort to sell more newspapers and make their own careers.2

Myths and legends are powerful propaganda tools. From the myth of the American

Cowboy being used to sell Marlboro cigarettes, to creating conceptions of national identity, modern myths are created and instrumentalized to achieve a vast array of objectives. Mikhail

Skobelev’s legend was no different. That legend was then utilized by groups within Russia for political and propaganda purposes. Among these, the Pan-Slavists and a group of military reformers stand-out. These groups utilized Skobelev’s legend to advocate for their own political objectives in the waning decades of the 19th century. They took the legend that had been created by war-time correspondents and expanded it to suit their needs.

Pan-Slavism was a new politico-philosophical ideology, introduced to Russia in the mid-

19th century from the Slavic intellectuals of the Hapsburg Empire. It had a close relationship with the Slavophiles, the Russian intellectual movement that emphasized Russia’s distinct identity and opposed the Westernizing influences begun by Peter I’s reforms in the 18th century. Pan-Slavism advocated for unity among the Slavic peoples based on ethno-linguistic and religious ties. In

Russia this ideology came to embrace a form of Russian messianism that called for Russia to unite and lead the various Slavic peoples of Eastern and Central Europe who lived under the rule of the

German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. Pan-Slavism grew rapidly in Russia and greatly influenced Russia’s relationships with the Ottomans, Habsburgs, and the Balkan states, especially .3 Skobelev was closely linked with the ideology during his life and espoused

2 Philip Knightley, The First Casualty: From the to Vietnam: The as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975). 3 Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology. 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1960); David MacKenzie, The and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875-1878 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967).

3 many of its ideals. After his death this made it easy for him to be held up as a paragon of the Pan-

Slav ideal by those who hoped to win support for the cause and influence populations both within and without the Russian Empire.

Similarly, other groups sought to utilize the legend of the “White General” for propaganda purposes. The first was a group of military reformers centered on General Mikhail Ivanovich

Dragomirov. In the aftermath of the and Alexander II’s Great Reforms, the was reorganized and modernized. As the chief instructor of tactics at the Nicholas Military

Academy, Dragomirov was an essential part of this reform process, formulating a new tactical doctrine and instilling it in the army’s officers. This doctrine was focused on the idea that in modern warfare rapid assaults with the bayonet could trump modern firepower, and that if troops were properly led and motivated, they could overcome material disadvantages. This school of tactics latched on to Skobelev as an exemplar to prove the success of their ideas, and that philosophy was maintained into the 20th century with disastrous results in the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War. Furthermore, Skobelev’s legend and memory were utilized by elements within the tsarist government to drum up patriotic support and nationalist feeling in the wake of military and political disaster, such as in 1905. Through the efforts of these groups Pan-Slavists, military reformers, and government propagandists the memory and legend of Skobelev was kept alive and has endured into the 20th century and today.

Part of what made Skobelev so easy to mythologize, was his close relationship with events across the breadth of 19th century Russia. In some ways Skobelev resembles a Tsarist Forrest

Gump, appearing in and out of world-changing events so often that he almost becomes ubiquitous.

However, no other event impacted Skobelev’s life and career like the Great Eastern Crisis and the

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Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. The Great Eastern Crisis, which lasted from 1875 until 1880, was one of many crises that rocked 19th century Europe tied to the and its Eastern

European territories. At its core, the was the ongoing debate among the European

Powers, over what to do with the Ottoman Empire and its vast territories. The various European states vied for influence, economic advantage, and military control of the Ottoman Empire, which they regarded as the “.”4 The Great Eastern Crisis in 1875 began with a revolt in Bosnia and and culminated in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Inspired by press reports of Ottoman atrocities, Pan-Slav agitation, and political calculation, Russia went to war with the Ottoman Empire in 1877. In a war that foreshadowed future wars, with massive barrages, repeating rifles, trench lines, and bloody infantry assaults, Mikhail Skobelev played a prominent role and rose to fame.

During his life and immediately after his death Skobelev was the subject of a massive outpouring of literary work. Biographies flooded the market in Russian, French, and English.

Vasilii Nemirovich-Danchenko, brother of Moscow Art Theater founder Vladimir Nemirovich-

Danchenko, and one of the most prolific Russian writers of all time, even used Skobelev as the basis for his novel, Semʹ͡ia bogatyreĭ, or The Family of Great Warriors. Despite this wealth of contemporary interest, Skobelev has been largely unexamined by Western scholarship. In the majority of writing, he appears tangentially to the main subject, whether it is , Pan-

Slavism, the Russo-Turkish War, or Tsarist expansion into Central Asia. However, in Russian he has remained a subject of analysis throughout the 20th century and has enjoyed a recent resurgence

4 A. L. MacFie The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (New York: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, 1996); M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966).

5 in interest, both academically and popularly.5 The main exception to this lack of interest in

Skobelev as a subject of study in anglophone scholarship is Hans Rogger’s excellent piece of analysis, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” written and published in The Oxford Slavonic Papers in

1976.

Rogger’s paper analyzed the impact of Skobelev on popular culture and life in the late

Tsarist Empire, as well as the cult of personality and hero worship that sprung up around him.

Rogger questioned why a relatively obscure military officer came to occupy such a position of near reverence. He argued that it was Skobelev’s legacy, the feelings he inspired, the way that people thought about him that mattered more than any military contribution he made to the Empire in the or Central Asia. Rogger argues that Skobelev came to embody a proto-nationalistic conception of Russia and the virtues of the Russian nation, that Skobelev in many ways was what the Russian people wished the to be, and that as the popularity of the Romanov dynasty waned, the people’s love for Skobelev increased.6 Overall, for Rogger, Skobelev and the

“Skobelev Phenomenon” represented an attempt by Russian conservatives in the late Tsarist period to create a third option between the monarchy and left-wing revolution, a sort of conservative , that could preserve the autocracy in the face of modernization.

Rogger’s analysis of Skobelev and the “Skobelev Phenomenon,” is valuable in order to understand the man and his legacy. However, while Rogger does analyze why Skobelev’s fame became so widespread and the impact of his legacy, he does not discuss the mechanisms for that

5 Several recent biographies have been published in the Russian Federation, as well as a reprinting of Nemerovich- Danchenko’s Personal Reminiscences. In addition, a new, 4-meter, equestrian statue of the General was unveiled in Moscow on December 9, 2014. 6 Hans Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon: The Hero and His Worship,” The Oxford Slavic Papers, vol. 9, 1976, 46-78.

6 promulgation and what the writers, politicians, and soldiers who propagated the Skobelev cult sought to achieve in depth. Skobelev’s fame and the “Skobelev Phenomenon,” were the product of men and women who sought to use the hero and his legacy to achieve their own ends. His myth was created in newspapers that lauded his exploits and courage, elevating him to the status of an international icon. After his death this myth was taken by writers and politicians who wanted an icon to point at to gain support for their causes and expanded into a legend. His personal virtues were exaggerated, new feats were ascribed to him, from a war-hero he was raised even further into a paragon of military excellence and a symbol of the Russian nation and people. Journalists needed a spectacular story to sell to their readers. The Russian Pan-Slavists needed a hero for their movement to help it to gain popular support. And elements within the Tsarist government could use the legacy of the “White General” to promote patriotism and national sympathy in the aftermath of disastrous wars and humiliating diplomatic defeats. By examining Skobelev’s life and career we can see how and when it intersected with these groups, how he became a perfect candidate for a cult of hero worship, and how the events of his life could be utilized before and after his death for their aims. Furthermore, examining Skobelev provides a window into the forces which shaped Russia, its society, and its foreign policy in the late 19th Century: Pan-Slavism, military modernization and reform, the Great Game, and the Eastern Question.

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Ch. 2: Born to be a Soldier: From Childhood to Central Asia

The seeds of Skobelev’s legend were planted in his childhood and early career, and numerous writers played up the already remarkable story for great effect in crafting the myth about the man. Skobelev was the last scion of a quasi-aristocratic military family and was in many ways, born to be a soldier. The commonly repeated, though unconfirmed, family legend was that his

Great-Grandfather was a serf and a soldier in the of in the 18th century.7 It is known that his grandfather, Ivan Skobelev, entered the Imperial army as a private and earned an officer’s commission from Paul I in the wars against .8 At the time of

Mikhail Skobelev’s birth in 1844, Ivan Skobelev was commandant of the Peter and Paul fortress in St. Petersburg, inside of which Skobelev was born.9 Mikhail Skobelev’s father, Dimitri

Ivanovich, as also a decorated officer, with service in the Polish uprisings, the , and the

Crimean War. He would go on to distinguish himself alongside his son in the 1877-78 Russo-

Turkish War.10

The Skobelev family was firmly entrenched in the hierarchy of the Tsarist military, as well as the nobility. Despite their humble beginnings, which were emphasized by the storytellers who surrounded Mikhail Skobelev, the family was connected by marriage to several prominent aristocratic families and court ministers. Two of Mikhail Skobelev’s three sisters made extremely advantageous marriages, one, to Konstantin Belosselsky-Belozersky, the other, to Prince

7 Ol’ga Novikova Skobeleff and the Slavonic Cause, (London: Longman and Co. 1883), Google Books, 3. 8 Ibid, 3-4. 9 Boris Kostin, Skobelev (Moscow: Moloda͡ia Gvardi͡ia, 2000), 5. 10 Novkiova, Skobeleff, 4.

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Leuchtenberg, Tsar Alexander III’s first cousin.11 Despite the claims made by his supporters that

Skobelev had no friends at court, his own maternal uncle was Count Adelberg, chancellor to

Alexander II.12 He corresponded frequently with the count, addressing him as “dearest uncle,” and keeping him informed on events in the field and on campaign.

Many witnesses testified to the closeness of the Skobelev family, something unusual enough to be remarked upon. Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev produced voluminous correspondence, not only with his uncle but also with his sisters and parents. These letters, predominantly written in French, are full of affectionate phrasing and personal messages. People who knew them frequently noted the closeness of father and son and the importance of Mikhail

Dimitrievich’s relationship with his mother and his intense grief at her death.13 Despite having no children and never marrying, beyond his public persona Skobelev was a devoted family man. He corresponded frequently with his sisters as well as his aunt and uncle Count and Countess

Adelberg.14 Skobelev at first seemed to buck the family trend of by entering the university, however his own profligacy led to his expulsion. After that his father secured him a commission in the Guards and he entered the army. After seeing some minor action in the suppression of the Polish Uprising Skobelev, seeking to distinguish himself, traveled to the

Russian Empire’s newest lands of imperial conquest, Central Asia.15

If Western readers are familiar with Skobelev today, then it is primarily through the context of the Russian conquest of Central Asia and the 19th century Great Game between the Russian

11 Ibid, 4. 12 Rogger, 48. 13 Novikova, Skobeleff, 5. Nemirovich-Danchenko, Personal Reminiscences, 335-336. 14 MDS, Letters from M. D. Skobelev to Count and Countess Adelberg, Box 2. Letters from M. D. Skobelev to N. D. Beloselʹska͡ia-Belozerska͡ia, Box 1. Cataloged Documents, Correspondence. 15 Novikova, Skobeleff, 7-8.

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Empire and Great Britain. Throughout the 19th century the Russian Empire had been expanding southward into Central Asia. First the nomadic populations of the Kipchaq steppe were subdued during the 1850s, then Russia turned its attention to the three independent Khanates, Bukhara,

Khiva, and Khoqand, rapidly conquering all of them by the 1880s. The British perceived this rapid expansion as a threat to their position in India, which was expanding north at the same time the

Russians were moving south, and began what would be called the “Great Game,” between the two

Empires, a semi-secret competition for strategic advantage and influence with the various tribes, khanates, and kingdoms of the region. This competition heightened tensions between the two powers and sparked two separate British invasions of Afghanistan. Most of the scholarship surrounding Skobelev focuses on the parts of his career in Central Asia. For example, Skobelev makes appearances in Peter Hopkirk’s The Great Game, as well as Myers and Brysac’s

Tournament of Shadows, he is also present in Scott Levi’s The Rise and Fall of Khoqand and in other popular works on 19th century Central Asia.16 For Hopkirk, Skobelev is a flamboyant Russian player of the Great Game, whose primary role is in the discussion of the fall of Geok Tepe. Meyer and Brysac provide a more nuanced description of the man and the Great Game in-general, tying competition in Central Asia to other geopolitical issues including the Eastern Question and the

Russo-Turkish War. Meanwhile, the focus of Levi’s work is on the history of Khoqand itself so

Skobelev appears only tangentially at the end of the work, in the discussion of the fall of the khanate. Central Asia was where Skobelev first got a chance for command, a taste of combat and

16 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Asia (New York: Kodansha USA, 1990); Karl Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac. Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia (Washington D.C.: Counterpoint, 1999); Scott Levi, Khoqand: Central Asia in the Global Age, 1709-1876 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017).

10 a hint of notoriety. He also forged his first of many friendships with a prominent war correspondent, J. A. MacGahan.

Skobelev arrived in Central Asia in 1869, after completing an uninspiring course of study at the General Staff College and was attached to the staff of General Konstantin von Kauffman, governor general of Turkestan. Skobelev’s time in Turkestan was unhappy, he frequently fought with other officers and exceeded his orders. Kauffman felt that Skobelev had too much energy to be an effective staff officer but would do well leading troops in combat.17

In 1873, Skobelev was assigned to one of four columns of troops dispatched to conquer the

Khanate of Khiva. The main column was under the command of Kauffman and marched west from

Tashkent to Khiva while the others advanced to envelope the Khanate from multiple directions.

Skobelev was assigned to one of the supporting columns under a Lomakin for the duration of the campaign.18 Although one column had to withdraw due to lack of water, the campaign went smoothly. Kauffman’s army brushed aside all the opposition put in its way by the Khanate and on

June 4, 1873, the Khan sent terms of surrender to Kauffman who now simply had to take possession of Khiva. Despite the surrender, a battle was still fought at Khiva. On June 7th troops from the second Russian column, including Skobelev, reached the outskirts of Khiva, after soldiers on the walls fired at the Russians a bombardment of the city began. These troops were out of contact with Kauffman, so they did not know yet that the khan had surrendered. When they were informed the bombardment ceased. On the 10th, firing resumed from the walls and the bombardment began again. This time the Russian fire breached the walls and Skobelev lead a party

17 Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” 50-51. 18 Januarius MacGahan, Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva (New York: Harper Brothers, 1874), 202.

11 in storming the city. After a fierce fight his force penetrated all the way to the khan’s palace, before discovering that Kauffman had already entered the city from the West Gate peacefully. Skobelev and his men withdrew to avoid embarrassing their superior.19

The attack on Khiva was seen by some as unnecessary glory seeking by ambitious young officers and it earned Skobelev Kauffman’s disapproval. Rumors also abounded that he had indulged an appetite for sadism and cruelty on Khivan prisoners, earning him an unsavory reputation that would later be exacerbated by the Akhal-Tekke expedition.20 However, he was able to redeem himself in Kauffman’s eyes through one of the feats of personal courage that would become his stock-in-trade during the Russo-Turkish War. During the campaign one Russian force had retreated due to lack of water. While the army was camped in Khiva, Skobelev volunteered to lead a reconnaissance to determine whether or not the route had been practical at all for the soldiers.

Disguised in native dress and accompanied only by a small party of Kyrgyz guards, Skobelev conducted a painstakingly thorough survey of the terrain, gathering valuable data, and earned himself the order of St. George (4th Class).21

This event was one of the first seeds of Skobelev’s enduring legend, largely thanks to a friendship Skobelev cultivated with another remarkable young man in Khiva, J. A. MacGahan.

MacGahan was a young American journalist then in the employ of the New York Herald. A farm boy from New Lexington, Ohio, MacGahan had made a name for himself reporting on the Franco-

Prussian War and the subsequent . He had interviewed and had several close brushes with death alongside the Communards, including being arrested by anti-

19 Ibid, 222-229. 20 Rogger, “The Skobeleff Phenomenon,” 51-52. 21 Ibid, 51.

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Communard troops only to be saved by the American ambassador.22 In 1873 he traveled to St.

Petersburg, where he received permission to travel to Turkestan and observe Kauffman’s expedition.23

Together with American diplomat he traveled across Russia to Fort

Perovsky. There the two Americans parted ways, Schuyler continuing to Tashkent, while

MacGahan struck out across the desert to find Kauffman’s column. Kauffman had not wanted to let the American journalist join his expedition and had used bureaucratic delays to keep MacGahan away until after the army had set out.24 He had hoped that MacGahan would be stymied by this.

However, the American stole a march on Kauffman and decided to cross the Kyzyl Kum desert accompanied only by a few Kyrgyz guides and a set of horses. MacGahan’s journey was hair- raising and remarkable, crossing over 400 miles of unmapped desert on horseback. It was such an astonishing feat that it won the admiration of many of Kauffman’s officers and even the grudging respect of the general himself, the soldiers of Kauffman’s army dubbed MacGahan a molode͡ts, “a good young fellow.”25 MacGahan accompanied the army all the way to Khiva and reported his entire journey, both for the Herald and in his own memoir Campaigning on the Oxus. The latter is a thrilling, if dated and rather orientalist, read.

MacGahan met Skobelev “on the banks of the Oxus,” after Skobelev had completed his reconnaissance mission through Transcaspia. MacGahan introduced the world to that exploit, regaling his readers with a description of Skobelev’s daring and skill. This formed the basis of a

22 Dale L. Walker, Januarius MacGahan: The Life and Campaigns of an American War Correspondent (Athens: Ohio University Press, 35-40. 23 Ibid, 59-60. 24 Ibid, 59. 25 Francis V. Greene, Sketches of Army Life in Russia (London: W. H. Allen and Co., 1881), The , 154-155.

13 firm friendship, and Skobelev asked MacGahan to remain in Khiva after Kauffman’s departure, while he was finishing the maps and written report of his mission. MacGahan’s stories made himself an overnight sensation and the tale of his trek across the desert entered local legend.

MacGahan left Central Asia and returned to Russia and later the United States. He married a young

Russian heiress, published his book on Central Asia and completed another daring exploit, accompanying a Polar expedition on board the ship Pandora.26 He and Skobelev would not meet again until 1877, on a train in modern day on their way to a new and far more massive war.

26 Ibid, 155-156.

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Ch. 3: A Prelude to War: The Great Eastern Crisis

The Great Eastern Crisis revealed new forces in European . The power of the press to shape popular opinion undermined the choices of statesmen. Nationalism had reared its head in the Balkans and in Russia to push leaders and peoples towards war. And in some ways the

Great Eastern Crisis and the Russo-Turkish War inaugurated the tradition of humanitarian intervention on behalf of oppressed populations which is still one of the most deeply enshrined beliefs in the Western psyche. Rather than solely a war for territory or economic resources or the myriad of other political goals which influenced the choice to go to war in 1877, the Russo-Turkish

War was sold as a war to save a beleaguered population, to provide aid and succor to the downtrodden.27 This crisis, and the Russo-Turkish War it started provided a launching point for

Skobelev’s legend, and tied him intimately to the groups that would exploit that legend after his death.

In 1875 a revolt in the Ottoman provinces of precipitated one of the largest diplomatic crises of the 19th century. By the time it was finally ended by the Treaty of

Berlin in 1878, the so-called Great Eastern Crisis brought the European Great Powers to the brink of war, redefined the borders of the Balkan Peninsula, began wars that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and catapulted Mikhail Skobelev to international fame and the status of national hero. The Great Eastern Crisis marked a turning point in late 19th century

European history, in some ways the Great Eastern Crisis cemented the destruction of the Concert

27 Tetsuya Sahara, “Two Different Images: Bulgarian and English Sources on the Batak Massacre,” in M. Hakan Yavuz, War & Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and the Treaty of (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010), 479-506.

15 of Europe that had started to collapse with the Crimean War. Some historians have argued that the

Crisis, the Russo-Turkish War it started, and the Berlin Treaty which ended it, marked the beginning of the end of Ottoman Empire; the Berlin Treaty eliminated the majority of Ottoman

European territory, solidified the independence of the Balkan nation-states, and dealt a near fatal blow to what remained of the Ottoman Empire’s prestige in international relations.

Bosnia and Herzegovina had been possession of the Ottoman Empire for centuries by the

1870s. In that decade the resentment of the Christian Slavic populations towards Turkish landlords, administrators, and tax-farmers boiled over into a peasant uprising. The uprising was sparked by the crippling combination of rent and taxes laid on the Christian peasants.28 Repeated reform attempts by the Ottoman central government only increased the problem by raising the hopes of the populace. The resentment was further inflamed by the success of the Greek War for

Independence and the growth of Pan-Slav sentiment among the Balkan Slav populations; South

Slav and Serbian nationalist groups were founded in recently independent Serbia (1830) and in the

Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Moldova and were unified into the principality of

Romania.29 Outside of the Balkans, Pan-Slavism was on the rise in the Russian Empire among intellectuals, military officers, and the diplomatic corps. Furthermore, the appointment of Count

Ignatiev, a noted Pan-Slavist, as ambassador to the Sublime Porte meant that Pan-Slavism now had a powerful voice in shaping Russian policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan Slavs.

Throughout the 1870s, Ignatiev advocated for policies tantamount to the dissolution of the

Ottoman Empire, through a general revolt of the Slav populations, assisted by the Empire’s Arab

28 M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), 179. 29 Ibid, 178.

16 subjects under Egyptian leadership.30 Ignatiev’s presence in only exacerbated the tensions between the Ottoman government and its Slav subjects, as Ignatiev, and his subordinates encouraged rebellion in the provinces and outright warfare on the part of the de facto independent

Balkan states, such as Serbia.

The ongoing resistance inspired uprisings in other Ottoman provinces, particularly

Bulgaria. In 1876 a new revolt broke out among the Christian population in the province which was quickly and violently suppressed.

Western diplomats and journalists in were able to enter the province to record and report the violence of the uprising and the Ottoman response to an eager audience. The reports sent back by journalists were sensational and graphic. They created lurid scenes of violence and atrocity that shocked and inflamed their Western readers, particularly the English populace. J. A.

MacGahan wrote a series of stories for the New York Herald and the London Daily News that were crucial in the sudden change in public opinion. His accounts of the Batak Massacre are especially chilling, though likely exaggerated since he wrote several months after the fact and based his narrative on the accounts of the Bulgarian survivors.

The surge in anti-Ottoman feeling was prevalent throughout Europe but it was especially dominant in the . There, the retired “Great Old Man” of the Liberal Party, former

Prime Minister Gladstone, published his wildly successful The Bulgarian Horrors and the Matter of the East, which achieved almost overnight success and called for the expulsion of the Ottoman

Empire from its European territories.

30 Ibid, 181.

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This sea change in British popular opinion was crucial to the outcome of the Great Eastern

Crisis because it had been the United Kingdom, led by and his Tory government, that had been the most steadfast defenders of the Ottoman Empire’s integrity among the European powers. With public opinion so set against the Empire, Disraeli was forced to step back his support for the Turks, at least temporarily.31

The outbreak and suppression of the revolt in led to an outpouring of support from sympathetic Pan-Slavists. Serbia and both declared war on the Empire in support of the rebels. The expansion of the revolt into a wider war encouraged the first instances of direct intervention by the European powers. In an echo of the foreign volunteers who had flocked to the support of the Greek rebels in the 1830s several thousand Russian citizens traveled to Serbia to join the war effort under the leadership of the “Lion of Tashkent,” General Cherniaev, another famous Pan-Slavist who had been explicitly ordered by Tsar Alexander II to not travel to Serbia.32

These volunteers, despite tremendous enthusiasm, were ineffective, and in fact greatly stained

Serbo-Russian relations through their incompetence and failings.33

However, neither the Tsarist government, nor the other governments of Europe, shared the desire for war common throughout their populations. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1876, as the Ottomans began to press the Serbian forces back and threaten , the powers continued to seek a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. War threatened in October when Russia issued an ultimatum to the Ottomans, promising war if the Turks did not agree to an armistice with

31 Milos Kovic, Disraeli & the Eastern Question trans. Milos Damnjanović (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 144-145. 32 Anderson, The Eastern Question, 186. 33 David MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), 134.

18

Serbia.34 Within days of the armistice the Great Powers convened a conference at Constantinople to establish a compromise settlement agreeable to all parties. At this conference, Ignatiev took the lead, advocating for the creation of an independent Bulgarian state, as well as autonomy for Serbia,

Romania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The British and Austro-Hungarian delegations modified these proposals, limiting the size of independent Bulgaria, but a set of terms was agreed upon by the combined powers. The Ottoman representative Safvet Pasha, rejected the combined proposals, as they would essentially dismantle to the Empire in Europe. Instead, the Ottomans promulgated a new constitution, that promised to protect the rights of all the Porte’s subjects.35

With the Ottoman rejection of the powers’ terms, the stage was set for war. The Russian army began to mobilize, and Prince Carol of Romania accepted the Russian request for access to his territory for their troops. Separate agreements with Austria-Hungary guaranteed their neutrality in the event of a Russo-Turkish war, in exchange for the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.36

Once Austro-Hungarian neutrality had been obtained, the Russian field army began to assemble in modern day Moldova near the city of Kishinev. On April 24, 1877, Alexander II addressed his assembled troops and announced that war had been declared between the two empires. Onlookers said that the Tsar wept, saying that he had hoped not to see war again during his rule, having begun it with the calamity of Crimea.37 But despite the Tsar’s tears and the efforts of diplomats and statesmen from across Europe, war had come.

34. MacFie, The Eastern Question, 39. 35 Ibid, 40. 36 Anderson, The Eastern Question, 193. 37 The War Correspondence of the London ‘Daily News,’ 1877 (London: MacMillan, 1877), 34.

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Ch. 4: The Russo-Turkish War and the Making of a Legend

If the campaign against Khiva had won Skobelev recognition and awards, it was his service in the Russo-Turkish war that made him transformed him into a legend. In Bulgaria he distinguished himself through his courage, command ability, energy, and ability to be where-ever the fighting was fiercest. He won the admiration of war-correspondents, foreign military observers, and his enemies. He became beloved by his men and by the soldiers of the entire Russian army, who held him in a place of near reverence. He became a household name in Russia. Skobelev’s exploits encouraged the American military attaché to the Russian army Lieutenant Francis V.

Greene to say that if he lived another twenty-five years then his name would go down with the great commanders of the 19th century: “Napoleon, Wellington, Grant, and Moltke,” certainly august company.38 During the Russo-Turkish war, Skobelev’s life intersected with the dramatic changes in military technology, the organization of the Russian army, and the profession of the war-correspondent, all of which would have profound impacts on his career and the history of

Russia and the world.

On a grander scale the Russo-Turkish War completely reshaped the borders of the Balkan peninsula, cemented the destruction of the Ottoman Empire’s control in the Balkans, and helped set the stage for the ultimate collapse of the Ottoman state. Furthermore, it heightened tensions between the European Great Powers, strained the relationships among Russia, Austria-Hungary, and , and brought Bosnia-Herzegovina into the control of Austria-Hungary, with all its attendant implications for the events of 1914. In terms of military history, some observers noted

38 Greene, Sketches of Army Life in Russia, 142.

20 the implications of the course of the war, in which well dug-in infantry, armed with modern repeating rifles, dominated the battlefield despite superior enemy numbers.

Throughout the early stages of the Great Eastern crisis Skobelev was in Central Asia. In

1875 he participated in von Kauffman’s first expedition against Khoqand and was promoted to

Major-General. Then in the spring of 1876 he commanded his own campaign against the Khanate which succeeded in destroying it. The city was renamed Fergana and he was made its first military governor-general. During this campaign, he was also awarded the Order of St. George Third Class to add to his previous Order of St. George Fourth Class.39 He was barely 31 years old and his rapid rise and successes had made numerous, jealous enemies. In 1876 rivals in St. Petersburg arranged for him to be charged with corruption, claiming that he had been syphoning funds from his province for personal use. This brought him back to St. Petersburg to defend himself before the

Treasury, which he did successfully.40 Despite his acquittal, he was denied a command position at the start of the war and was simply attached to Grand Duke Nicholas’ staff. However, it did not take long for Skobelev to find his way into a combat command.

Skobelev’s legend was created in the popular press of the day, in Russian newspapers like

Golosʹ and Novoe vrem͡ia, and in British and American papers like The Daily News, The Times of

London, The London Illustrated News, and The New York Herald. The British and American papers especially were booming in circulation and the competition was fierce, with each paper striving to outdo the others. In a desperate bid for the profits of readership and circulation these

39 Novikova, 23-31. 40 Novikova, 31-32.

21 papers dispatched their war-correspondents to the frontlines and delivered their stories of carnage and glory to an eager public.

The profession of the war-correspondent, like the institution of the mass-circulation newspaper itself, was a new, exciting, and innovative feature of the late-19th century. The growth of literacy, particularly in and the United States was driving the market for news to new heights, and warfare was the most exciting news around. The idea of a war-correspondent had been pioneered in the middle of the century, during the Crimean War. William Howard

Russell’s dispatches for The Times of London made him an international icon and took the reading public by storm. In the wake of the Crimean War, the field exploded with both membership and innovation. With every new conflict, new writers sought ever faster methods of communicating their stories and “scooping,” the competition. The Franco-Prussian war introduced a new host of correspondents to the eager public, and telegraph communications, steamships, and railroads allowed readers in London to read news from the battle front within days, if not hours of events.41

Getting a story out before their competitors could make or break both the paper, and the correspondents themselves. During this time the papers placed a premium on vivid imagery, speed of delivery, and magnificent stories. It is not surprising that several of the most prominent correspondents received their jobs due to their skill as fiction writers.42 It was in this foment of techniques and competition that journalists encountered Mikhail Skobelev and turned him into a legend.

41 Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: From the Crimea to Vietnam: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 4-17. 42 Ibid, 42-49.

22

The Russo-Turkish war was, in many ways, one of the most thoroughly covered conflicts in the 19th century in terms of journalism. The late 19th century was the so-called “Golden Age” of war-correspondents. The profession had only recently come into existence and had rapidly begun to flourish. However, governments and military establishments, especially in the English- speaking world, had yet to introduce even rudimentary levels of censorship. Conflicts of this period could be covered in depth by a host of “specials,” as the young men who wrote from warzones all over the world were called.43 As the readership, and the profits, of major newspapers expanded, they were able to dispatch more and more journalists to provide in-depth reporting and occasional analysis from the frontlines. The costs of supporting a war correspondent were substantial, exceeding tens of thousands of dollars or pounds sterling a year, and it is telling that newspapers were able to send multiple men to the Balkans to cover the war. For example, The London Daily

News sent several: Archibald Forbes, whose exploits covering the Franco-Prussian War had redefined the profession, and J. A. MacGahan attached themselves to the Russian army, while others covered the war from the Ottoman perspective. The financial investment these correspondents represented is astounding, their pay could run as high as $10,000 per year, plus expenses, and the costs of sending trans-European, let alone transatlantic, telegrams was high.44

That newspapers’ circulations could support this massive outlay goes to illustrate the insatiable appetite of English-speaking audiences for news.

The laissez-faire attitude towards foreign journalists held by the Russian Army was remarkable in retrospect. Correspondents were given free rein to go where ever they pleased and

43 Ibid, 42-49. 44 Ibid, 42-52.

23 talk to anyone they liked, so long as they wore the identifying armbands the army issued to them and agreed to not publish any information regarding troop-movements, planning, or future operations.45 This unprecedented level of access guaranteed that correspondents could flood their newspapers with up-to-date information. When combined with the telegraph it meant that readers in London or New York could read vivid, accurate, personal accounts of battles only a few days after the fact.

The correspondents who covered the war were predominantly young men from middle- class backgrounds. The requirements of the job were extensive. They needed to be able to write, to ride, occasionally to shoot, and to withstand the myriad of privations and hardships associated with army life in the late 19th century.46 Correspondents suffered heat and cold, rain and snow, side by side with troops in the field. Archibald Forbes spent three days in the wretched trenches of the with Gourko and Leuchtenberg’s troops in August 1877 in order to get a perfect account of the action. J. A. MacGahan went to war despite a partially healed broken ankle, which became more exacerbated until he became almost lame. It is telling that of the dozens of correspondents who began the war with the Russian Army, only MacGahan F.D. Millet, E. M.

Grant and Villiers finished the campaign, and by 1878 MacGahan was so weakened by his injuries and the hard travel that he succumbed to typhoid fever in Constantinople. His funeral was attended by correspondents and officers alike, including his friend Skobelev, and his death was met by honorary masses in St. Petersburg and Moscow.47

45 Greene, Sketches of Army Life in Russia, 163-164. 46 Knightley, 43. 47 Ibid, 51-52.

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Their thrilling exploits and brilliant writing made heroes out of the correspondents just as much as it made the soldiers they wrote about famous. MacGahan, who had already become near legendary for his adventures in Central Asia, became even more famous and beloved for his exploits alongside the Russians. When MacGahan’s body was returned to the United States in

1880, to be laid to rest in his hometown, New Lexington, Ohio, the epitaph “Liberator of Bulgaria” was inscribed on his memorial. To this day a memorial service is held in New Lexington each

June, attended by members of the Bulgarian embassy.48

While he was still attached to the Grand Duke’s staff, Skobelev made his first contact with the journalists who would do so much to spread his name to the English-speaking world. On a train from Kishinev towards the front he encountered his old friend from Turkestan, J. A. MacGahan and his colleague, Archibald Forbes. MacGahan reported the reunion in a dispatch on May 20,

1877. He accompanied his description of Skobelev with an account of the Khokhand campaign which painted him in glowing colors. MacGahan fully expected Skobelev to rise far in the coming war.49 Forbes described the meeting in the memoir he wrote several years after the fact: Tsar and

Sultan. Forbes described Skobelev as “what I imagined an English country gentleman of the best type should look,” he admired Skobelev for his erudition, his manners, and his courage.50 Forbes was notoriously irascible and difficult to impress but Skobelev won his regard and Forbes’ ongoing good opinion would show through in his dispatches throughout the war. In Czar and Sultan Forbes refers to Skobelev as, “the finest soldier in his [Tsar Alexander II’s] land.”51

48 Bill Rockwell, “Liberator of Bulgaria Remembered,” Perry County Tribune, June 7, 2016, https://www.perrytribune.com/community/article_b60d1e7c-f8d4-54ce-935e-490e894c0797.html. 49 The War Correspondence of the London ‘Daily News,’ 1877 (London: Macmillan, 1877), 82-87. 50 Archibald Forbes, Czar and Sultan (London: Scribner’s, 1894), 17. 51Ibid, 34.

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In addition to their necessary professional relationship, Forbes, MacGahan, and Skobelev became fast friends. They became known as the “Triumvirate” among the collection of officers and war correspondents accompanying the Russian army. For the first several months following the declaration of war the Russian army remained north of the river; assembling troops and supplies and preparing to undertake the crossing. During this time Skobelev, MacGahan, and

Forbes became a firm trio. The three would close down the hotel bar, sharing drinks, war stories and songs. Forbes was impressed by Skobelev’s ability to sing in Russian, French, English, and

Kyrgyz.52

Forbes and MacGahan were not the only correspondents that Skobelev formed friendships with, he became close friends with the correspondent for the Russian paper Novoe vrem͡ia: the novelist Vasilii Nemirovich-Danchenko, as well as the Russian master of battlefield painting,

Vasilii Vereshchagin. Vereshchagin served for a time as a member of Skobelev’s staff, and his brother was killed under Skobelev’s command at Plevna.53 Vereshchagin painted an entire series on the war, including several of Plevna before and after the “Grand Assault,” and one epic mural of Skobelev in battle at Schenovo. Vereshchagin’s painting captures Skobelev in all his energy and dynamism, picked out in front of his lines of troops, in his white uniform on his white charger, sword raised. Other correspondents were occasionally drawn into this circle, such as Villiers, the

English correspondent for the London Illustrated News, one of the only correspondents, besides

MacGahan, to cover the entire war from beginning to end.54

52 Ibid, 16-17. 53 The War Correspondence of the ‘Daily News,’ 1877, 481. 54 Greene, Sketches of Army Life in Russia, 167.

26

These close relationships with war-correspondents who would go on to testify to his command abilities, bravery, and heroism in glowing words raise several questions. It is unclear to what extent this represented a deliberate image management on Skobelev’s part, but he was clearly incredibly conscious of the importance of maintaining his own image. He traveled to Bulgaria with several photographic plates, just in case the newspapers needed a photo of him.55 He was always certain to go into battle looking his best. However, the American military attaché Lieutenant F. V.

Greene suggests that much of his attention to personal appearance and conspicuous courage was done to encourage his own troops. This is the same conclusion drawn by the many war correspondents, who argued that his gallantry encouraged both his officers and enlisted men to greater feats, in order to not fail their general’s image. Lieutenant Greene argues that Skobelev’s choices to go into battle were the result of

...cold blooded calculation. It was intended to impress his men, and it did so. They firmly believed he could not be hit, and whenever they saw a white horse, coat, and cap among them they knew that was Skobeloff, and so long as he was there they felt sure that everything was going well.56 In addition to the inspiration given to his troops Skobelev’s habit of leading from the front served another purpose. It allowed him to overcome the cumbersome and outdated communications system available to Russian officers and exercise effective command and control in combat. In many instances, particularly at Lovcha and Third Plevna, success depended on Skobelev’s personal presence with the troops in order to ensure that orders were followed, and battlefield advantages were exploited quickly.57 It was these displays of reckless courage under fire that would elevate Skobelev to legendary status by the end of the war.

55 Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” 73. 56 Greene, Sketches of Army Life in Russia, 140. 57 Bruce Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 69-70.

27

The Russian war plan called for a rapid aggressive assault from Romania, across Bulgaria, to seize the passes through the , which would then turn to seize Adrianople and

Constantinople. Meanwhile, Russian forces in the Caucasus would attack the Ottomans to pin down troops and prevent reinforcements from reaching the Balkan theater. Russian plans and operations were limited by Ottoman naval predominance on the , which denied them waterborne transport or communications. The Ottoman strategy relied on passive defense of both theaters, which they felt would delay the Russians long enough for the other European Great

Powers, particularly Great Britain, to intervene.58

After the declaration of war Russian troops began to move from and Moldova into the Romanian province of Wallachia on the North bank of the Danube. This movement was hindered by several issues, first among them the difference in gauge between Russian and

Romanian railways, which slowed the movement of troops, supplies, and bridging equipment necessary for continued operations. During this period the Russians also undertook operations to eliminate the powerful Ottoman flotilla on the Danube. This force, which included a number of well-armed, steam powered, ironclads, could have inflicted heavy losses on any Russian attempt to bridge the Danube or cross by boat. The Russians conducted a series of daring torpedo-boat raids that sank one ironclad and laid chains of mines across the river, trapping the Ottoman ships in harbor and clearing the river for the army.59

The crossing of the Danube provided several gripping anecdotes of Skobelev’s personal courage, which various writers were eager to report. According to Nemirovich-Danchenko, prior

58 Ibid, 52-54. 59 Ibid, 55.

28 to the crossing, Skobelev made a habit of personally reconnoitering the Turkish positions in full view, in full dress uniform. He says that the General thought this was an excellent pass-time to dare the Turkish defenders to shoot him and his staff. He describes his first meeting with Skobelev and a conversation on the banks of the Danube, “‘The music will soon begin now.’ ‘What music?’

I [Nemirovich-Danchenko] inquired… ‘Well, you see, as soon as I or my father show our noses, that little battery over there opens fire.” After the Ottoman guns opened fire the first shell fell short and the second overshot, “‘If they have good marksmen over there, the next shot will just do it.’

As though they were not aiming at him, as though he were merely a disinterested spectator!”60

Skobelev added to his legend by attempting to swim the Danube on horseback. After the crossing, while the Russian engineers were constructing pontoon bridges over the river Skobelev suggested that it was possible to cross the Cossack Division over by fording the river on horseback and he set out to prove it. Accounts of the anecdote vary, but it is a common enough story to believe that it happened, give or take a few colored details. Novikova and Forbes both agree that

Skobelev succeeded in making it across but disagree on the presence of others in the attempt,

Forbes says that several companions went with Skobelev, and several died, while Novikova repeats a version from the Fortnightly Review, that the crossing was made alone. 61 These exploits provided fodder for the journalists and played crucial part in creating the mystique of invincibility and immortality which surrounded Skobelev.

In June 1877 the Russian Army began operations to cross the Danube River. Diversionary crossings were made at Braila and Galatz while the main assault would be made in between

60 Nemirovich-Danchenko, Personal Reminiscences, 13. 61 Novikova, Skobeleff, 39-40; Forbes, Czar and Sultan, 31-32.

29

Nikopol and Ruschuck at Schistovo.62 This was Skobelev’s first opportunity for combat. He was still unassigned to a command at this point, however, he managed to attach himself to the staff of

Major-General M. I. Dragomirov who had been ordered to undertake the crossing with his 14th

Infantry Division. After the fact, several different accounts of the assault were circulated. Most report that the Russians crossed against moderate resistance and that Skobelev, with more combat experience than his nominal commander, directed much of the action. Nemirovich-Danchenko reports that Skobelev fought with a rifle in his hand as a regular foot soldier and distinguished himself through his usual heroism.63 F. V. Greene suggests that Skobelev’s role fell more into an advisory capacity, though it was still critical to the success of the operation.64 The assault across the river nearly foundered due to a fierce counter attack in the midmorning, which was only successfully repelled by the initiative of junior officers who pushed their troops forward to seize enemy positions without orders.65

After crossing the river and entering Bulgaria proper Skobelev was assigned a command: a brigade of . One veteran of this unit: V. V. Voeĭkov, wrote a memoir, Ot Duna͡ia i do

T͡ Sarʹgrada, (Over the Danube to Tsargrad [Constantinople]) in which he said, “He [Skobelev] loved the brigade very much… And the brigade loved to serve with Mikhail Dmitrievich.”66 With these troops he was engaged in a series of reconnaissance missions on the flanks of the main advance of the army. The lead elements of the army were under the command of Major-General

62 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 56-57. 63 Nemirovich-Danchenko, Personal Reminiscences, 75-76 64 Greene, The Russian Army, 159. 65 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 56-57. 66 V. V. Voeĭkov, Ot Duna͡ia i do T͡ Sarʹgrada: 1877-1878 Zapiski Uchastnika (Moscow: Gosudarstvenna͡ia publichna͡ia istoricheska͡ia biblioteka Rossii, 2008), 28.

30

Gourko, another officer who was elevated to international fame by the summer campaign. Gourko took the vanguard from the Danube across the Balkan Mountains, seizing Shipka Pass and conducting a brilliant deep penetration raid before being forced to withdraw.67

Gourko was forced to fall back on the entrenchments at Shipka because the Russian

“promenade,” to Constantinople had been stymied by the small fortress town of Plevna.68 An

Ottoman army under Osman Pasha had advanced to threaten the Russian right flank and handily defeated a poorly coordinated attack on 19-20 July and had dug in to occupy the town. On the Russian army launched a second assault on the entrenched Ottoman troops; poor coordination and artillery preparation before the attack doomed it to bloody failure. During this second attempt

Skobelev commanded his Cossack Brigade on the left-flank, according to Forbes and Greene it was Skobelev’s actions that prevented the failing assault from turning into a complete rout, Greene went as far as to call it “military genius.”69

After the failure of Second Plevna the Grand Duke Nicholas decided to assemble a crushing force in order to launch a final assault. In the lead up to the so-called “Grand Assault,” it was determined that Osman Pasha’s supply lines needed to be cut off and his army isolated. The first step for this was the reduction of the Ottoman garrison at Lovtcha, which guarded the Plevna- road and Osman Pasha’s primary supply line south-west of the city. Prior to the second Russian assault on Plevna, Skobelev had led a reconnaissance-in-force to determine the strength of the

Turkish position. The mission was successful in ascertaining the Turkish disposition of the Turkish forces and allowed Skobelev to demonstrate his own skills as a leader once again. In the Daily

67 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 59-60. 68 Ibid, 60. 69 War Correspondence of the ‘Daily News,’ 1877, 406; Greene, The Russian Army, 198-200.

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News MacGahan reported on the expedition, emphasizing Skobelev’s personal courage and from the front leadership style:

[Skobelev] was mounted on a white horse, and wore a white coat, offering a splendid target for sharpshooters… he, like myself, began to perceive that the attack was growing far too serious, in spite of his orders, and was now going forward to stop it…. His escort, which had been composed of six Cossacks, was now reduced to three, the others having been more or less seriously wounded….70 This frontal leadership and direct control of his troops would play a role in the actual assault on

Lovtcha. Skobelev was given command of the 16th Infantry Division, under the overall command of Prince Imertinsky. He would command this formation for the rest of the war, and afterwards it would bear his name in future conflicts.

The attack on the Lovtcha entrenchments was a much more limited affair than the massive clashes at Plevna and was far more successful. That success relied upon the direct leadership exhibited by Skobelev. He directed his troops from the front, exercising direct control of his attacking regiments in order to commit his reserves to exploit tactical advantages and seize his objectives. His conduct was praised by Imertinsky in his dispatches and the capture of Lovtcha was one of the Russian’s few unequivocal successes in this phase of the war.71

The attack on Lovtcha was meant to cut off the supplies for Osman Pasha’s army at Plevna to prepare the way for a massive assault on the fortress itself. Prince Carol of Romania had been granted overall command of the attack and Romanian troops would storm the central, “” redoubt. Skobelev and his troops advanced from the south-west along the Plevna-Lovtcha road on the Russian left to assault the Turkish positions on the Green Hills south of the city. The attack was begun by a multi-day artillery bombardment before the general infantry assault. On the far

70 War Correspondence of the ‘Daily News,’ 1877, 369-370. 71 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 69

32 right the attacks failed with heavy losses. In the center, the and Russians successfully stormed the Grivitsa redoubt, despite heavy casualties. They resisted numerous counterattacks but were driven back. On the left-flank, Skobelev’s force, like the Romanians in the center, captured its initial objectives but was unable to hold onto its gains in the face of heavy counter-attacks and crushing numerical superiority.72 The Third Battle of Plevna was a massive affair, leading to almost 30,000 allied casualties for no real gain. The Ottoman army remained entrenched in its positions, still defiantly tying down over 100,000 Russian and Romanian troops.

The fighting around Plevna played a large part in the creation of Skobelev’s legend. For example, MacGahan’s writing emphasized Skobelev’s energetic leadership and daring in contrast with a lack of those qualities throughout the rest of the Russian army, “At only one point of the line is there anything like enterprise, and that is where General Skobeleff is. There it is always lively, and the quiet of the nights is broken by the roar of the musketry.”73 The favorable comparisons to other Russian officers were a frequent aspect of MacGahan and Forbes’ writing, during the Third Battle of Plevna, MacGahan wrote, “Skobeleff is the only general who places himself near enough to feel the pulse of a battle.”74 In the same dispatch MacGahan was certain to describe Skobelev’s personal courage, “… the Turkish redoubt flamed and smoked, and poured forth such a torrent of bullets that the line was again shaken. Skobeleff stood in this shower of balls unhurt.”75 The success of the attack is firmly credited to Skobelev’s personal traits and

72 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets,69-70. 73 The War Correspondence of the ‘Daily News,’ Continuing from the Fall of Kars to the Conclusion of the Peace, 1877-1878 (London: Macmillan, 1878), 4. 74 The War Correspondence of the ‘Daily News,’ 1877, 479. 75 Ibid, 479.

33 leadership, “He picked the whole mass up and carried it forward with a rush and a cheer.”76 Tales of Skobelev’s extraordinary courage abounded in the press and sent Skobelev’s reputation soaring.

His name was featured in papers as far away as Lowell, Massachusetts, Macon, , and St.

Louis, Missouri.77

In Russia itself, Skobelev had become a feature of the lubki, printed broadsheets illustrated with patriotic images of the war and brief captions. Due to the low literacy rate among the majority of the Russian populace, these prints served as a surrogate for newspapers, especially in the peasant communities.78 Stephen Norris has conducted a thorough analysis of the wartime lubki in the 19th century, arguing they played a key role in forming the images of Russian nationhood by both providing images of what the Russian nation encompassed, and images of religious, political, or racial others.79 The lubki during the Russo-Turkish War embraced an image of Holy War and emphasized the religious aspects of the conflict.80 In these images Skobelev was included in a pantheon of other heroes, such as Gourko, however he featured even more prominently. As Norris discusses, Skobelev was commonly discussed in peasant villages where they were eager for news of his exploits. And the lubki themselves were enshrined in peasant homes like religious icons.

The lubki were not only popular with the peasantry, as even the future Nicholas II was eager to see new images of the war each day.81

76 Ibid, 480. 77 Newsvault, “A Brave Russian General,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat (St. Louis, MO), Sep. 1, 1877. “Method in Madness,” Georgia Weekly Telegraph (Macon, GA), Jul. 10, 1877. “A Russian Daredevil,” Lowell Daily Citizen (Lowell, MA), Jul. 6, 1877. 78 Stephen M. Norris, A War of Images (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006), 4-6. 79 Ibid, 4. 80 Ibid, 80-81. 81 Ibid, 91-101.

34

In response to the failure of the Grand Assault, the Russian military brought in General

Todtleben, the hero of , to conduct a traditional of the city and starve Osman Pasha out. To that end, General Gourko led a short, bloody, campaign to close Plevna’s last supply line.

In November, Osman Pasha’s army attempted to cut its way out of the trap but the Russian forces rallied and stopped the breakout. By December 1877 the Turkish army capitulated and Osman

Pasha surrendered his sword to Tsar Alexander II himself. The had been a bloody shambles in many ways. It had cost the allied armies tens of thousands of casualties and almost six months of valuable time, as well as exposing flaws and incompetence within the Russian military.

It had also contributed enormously to the legend of the “White General.” Plevna had cemented

Skobelev’s reputation in the press and he had been one of the only Russian officers to come out of the battle without a failure to his name. Even the terrible losses his forces had sustained during the

Grand Assault were not considered to be his fault. Instead, they were held to be a demonstration of his own will and the determination of his men to fight under his command. The failure of the attack was placed firmly with his superiors. Skobelev had at last been given a major combat command and he would maintain it for the rest of the campaign. With the obstacle of Plevna removed, the Russians were able to resume their “promenade,” to Constantinople. This time, with

Mikhail Skobelev in the vanguard.

Between the Russian army and Constantinople stood the formidable barrier of the

Balkan Mountains and the well defended Shipka Pass, held by Veisil Pasha’s army. The task of clearing the Turkish defenses at the southern end of the pass was assigned to General Radetskii, whose troops had held the pass against fierce attacks back in August, Skobelev was placed under

Radstskii’s command. Radetskii split his force into three columns. He commanded the center,

35 attacking down the Shipka pass itself, while Skobelev and Mirskii would take their forces through smaller, parallel passes to flank the Turkish positions.82

Skobelev led his 16,000 men through the narrow mountain pass, each man carrying barely three days of food. The terrain was too difficult for any artillery, except four light mountain guns, carried by Bactrian camels, to accompany the infantry.83 The rough ground was made worse by heavy snowfall, Skobelev’s men had to make their way through snow almost six feet deep in places. The terrain and the snow delayed their advance by a day, and the main assault began before Skobelev’s force had arrived. The initial attacks were held off by the strong

Turkish positions, and the situation was beginning to look desperate for Mirskii’s troops on the

Russian left, isolated and short on supplies.84

Skobelev’s troops descended the mountains and threw themselves against Turkish left flank at Schenovo. Bruce Menning described what followed as “a perfect battle.”85 Skobelev, with no effective artillery support available, personally led his men in a frontal bayonet attack against the Turkish troops dug into redoubts in the thickets surrounding the small village of Schenovo.

The infantry was protected slightly by the mist, and Skobelev was certain to be present with the regimental bands lined up as if on the parade ground. The assault carried the Turkish positions after a period of intense hand-to-hand fighting. With Skobelev’s troops now in the rear of the main position, the Turkish army began to surrender én masse.86 Skobelev’s 16,000 men captured almost

40,000 Turkish troops and eliminated the second to last Turkish field army between the Balkans

82 Greene, The Russian Army, 349-350. 83 H. M. Hozier, The Russo-Turkish War 6 vols. (London: William MacKanzie, 1878), 799-801. 84 Greene, The Russian Army, 352. 85 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 76-77. 86 Greene, The Russian Army, 353-357.

36 and Constantinople, leaving only Suleiman Pasha’s army to be destroyed by Gourko at Phillipolis a week later.

Figure 1 Vasilii Vereshchagin, Battlefield at the Shipka Pass. Oil on Canvas, 1883, Wikimedia Commons, URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Skobelev#/media/File:1878_Vereshchagin_Schlachtfeld_am_Schipkapass_anagoria.JPG

With the road to Constantinople open, Skobelev’s 16th Division took the lead in a rapid advance on the Turkish capital. They passed through Adrianople on January 22 without firing a shot, as the city was abandoned by its garrison and much of the population. A deputation of the local Greek, Bulgarian, and Jewish populations contacted the Russians, requesting that they occupy the city in order to protect the populace.87 The Russian advance only halted on the 31st,

87 RGA: Telegram from Mikhail D. Skobelev to General Staff, 24/12 January 1878, Microfilm Reel 025, delo 7159, l. 9.

37 barely ten miles from the defenses of Constantinople with the signing of an armistice. The initial armistice ceased hostilities and surrendered the remaining Turkish fortresses in Bulgaria, though it also prevented a Russian occupation of Constantinople itself.88 On February 12, the specter of

British interference finally raised its head. Prime Minister Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield, ordered the British Mediterranean squadron to pass through the and the Sea of

Marmara, ostensibly to “protect the lives and property of [British] subjects in Constantinople.”89

This prompted a similar move by the Russians, who demanded the right to enter the city in order to protect the Christian population from reprisals. On the 24th of February Grand Duke Nicholas, his staff, and the Preobrazhensky Guards Regiment occupied the village of San Stefano, six miles from the city proper.90

On March 5, the war ended with the . This treaty largely matched the terms of the January 31 armistice. It created a large, independently governed Bulgaria, stretching from the Danube to the Aegean, granted independence to Montenegro, full independence to

Romania and Serbia as well as a territorial indemnity, called for governmental reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, granted territory in the Caucasus, including the fortress at Kars to Russia, and required the Ottomans to pay a war indemnity to the Russian government to cover the costs of the fighting.91 In short, the Treaty of San Stefano gave the Russians and the Pan-Slavists everything they had desired out of the conflict, except perhaps control of the Straits, however, the existence of a large, independent Bulgarian state as well as a strengthened Romania and Serbia offered

Russia a very useful set of potential allies in the region.

88 MacFie, The Eastern Question, 41. 89 Greene, The Russian Army, 364. 90 Ibid, 365. 91 MacFie, The Eastern Question, 42.

38

Unfortunately for Russia and the Pan-Slavists, the Treaty of San Stefano was clearly unacceptable to the other European Great Powers. Austria-Hungary and Great Britain were particularly vocal in their disapproval. Neither power was willing to see Russia take such a dominant position in the Balkans at the expense of and threaten their own interests. The

British had made their opposition to the war apparent from the beginning, and as the conflict turned further and further against the Turks Disraeli had even ordered elements of the Indian army moved to Malta, the closest British possession, in case of the outbreak of war.92 The arrival of the British fleet in the Sea of Marmara was only a sign of further interference to come. As for the Austro-

Hungarians, Franz Joseph had sent a personal letter to Alexander II, stating that the creation of an independent Bulgaria would be against the Dual Monarchy’s interests, and that compensation would be required.93

The protests of the Austria-Hungary and Great Britain appealed to the most powerful of the continental states, Bismarck’s Germany, to renegotiate the terms of the peace. In June 1878, the was convened under Bismarck’s good offices. Before the Congress even began it was clear that Russia would have to make concessions faced by the united opposition of

Austria-Hungary and Britain.94 The resulting preserved many of Russia’s gains from the Treaty of San Stefano but sacrificed a great deal for the sake of European peace. The large independent Bulgaria was reduced substantially, to only the territory north of the Balkan

Mountains; Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain Ottoman possessions but their administration was given over to Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain gained the right to occupy as a

92 Ibid, 42-43. 93 Ibid, 42. 94 Ibid, 43.

39 forward base in the Eastern Mediterranean to support the Ottomans against the Russians in the future.95 The long-term results of the Treaty of Berlin were substantial, it introduced the unitary to the Balkans, essentially dismantled the Ottoman Empire in Europe, the remnant of which would be destroyed in the of the early 20th century, and it established Austro-

Hungarian rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina, adding a million and a half hostile Slavs to the empire’s already fractious population.96

In the short-term, however, the treaty had other implications. The Pan-Slav movement and elements within the military saw the peace as a betrayal. Both groups felt that the objectives which had been achieved through so much bloodshed and expenditure had been given up by diplomats and politicians.97 Other Russians thought that the opposition on the part of Great Britain and

Austria-Hungary was an even more dire betrayal, fellow Christians stabbing them in the back to support the Muslim empire in oppressing another Christian population.98 Skobelev agreed with these groups and expressed his own outrage over the peace treaty that gave away so much.99

Ultimately, for Skobelev the war did one thing: made him a hero. The battles at Plevna had brought his name into the limelight both within Russia and on the international stage. This was only heightened by the seizure of the Shipka Pass and the Battle of Schenovo, which was immortalized on canvas by Vereshchagin. The lubki popular prints had in some ways raised him to the status of religious icon.100 The Russian peasant had come to identify Skobelev with the great

95 Ibid, 42-43. 96 Yavuz War and Diplomacy. 97 Anderson, The Eastern Question, 98 Stephen M. Norris, A War of Images (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006), 82. 99 Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” 55-56. 100 Norris, War of Images, 88-89.

40 heroes of Russia’s patriotic past, Suvorov and Kutuzov. When word came that Plevna had fallen it was Skobelev, the White General, who was toasted in Russia’s villages.101 His friendships with foreign and Russian writers and observers had helped to forge a reputation. The writers he was closest with, Nemirovich-Danchenko, MacGahan, Forbes, and Greene, all painted him in glowing terms in their reports, both to the world and in Greene’s case to the American government. For writers like MacGahan and Forbes, their stories on the Russo-Turkish War made them stars. In

MacGahan’s case, his writing was popular reading in Russia as well. Skobelev gave them fodder for their ample talents and they in turn made him a legend. Nemirovich-Danchenko’s writing casts

Skobelev as an all-conquering hero, in the mold of an Alexander the Great or a Napoleon, “And plan after plan came pouring out of his busy brain. There was not an inequality, not the smallest rising-ground that escaped his eagle eye. The impossible became performable, and the unapproachable capable of attainment.”102

Skobelev frequently expressed to friends his conviction that he would not survive the war, and some felt that he was disappointed to have done so. However, surviving the war meant that his fame could be parlayed to bigger and better things. He finished the war as commander of the

Army’s 4th Corps, stationed at Adrianople during the period of occupation. When he returned home it was to a hero’s welcome, in such a display that troubled the court and the ministers, who were concerned by his growing popularity. However, that popularity, as well as Skobelev’s military legacy, could be utilized by elements within the Russian army to advocate for their own ideologies and doctrines.

101 Ibid, 98-99; Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” 72. 102 Nemirovich-Danchenko, Personal Reminiscences, 295.

41

Ch. 5: A Political Soldier: The Akhal-Tekke Expedition and the Paris Speeches

After the end of the Russo-Turkish War Skobelev returned to Russia and the duties of a peacetime army. He had finished the war commander of the army’s 4th Corps, and his primary task during this period was to train his corps and maintain its readiness for combat. He observed the

German army’s maneuvers in 1879, which helped to reconfirm several of his anti-German prejudices, prejudices that had been exacerbated by Germany’s seeming complicity with Great

Britain and Austria-Hungary during the Congress of Berlin.103 But staff work and administration had never been Skobelev’s preferences, and when the opportunity arose to command a new expedition in Central Asia, Skobelev took it.

The Tekke Turkomans inhabited the inland areas of Transcaspia and had been a persistent thorn in the side of the Russian administration of the region for several years. In 1880, Tsar

Alexander II, had decided to complete the subjugation of the Tekke Turkomans using overwhelming military force, and Mikhail Skobelev was to be the instrument of the imperial will.

This command would earn him praise from the highest echelons of Russian literati but would also damn him as a bloodthirsty killer for many both at home and on the international stage.

Skobelev had earned a reputation for rashness, and even a foolhardy lack of judgement, but the Akhal-Tekke campaign allowed him to demonstrate a calm, pragmatic sense of the strategic realities of his objectives. Colonel C. E. Callwell, the 19th century’s acknowledged master of the so-called “Small Wars,” held up the 1880 expedition as a textbook example of how to properly prepare and organize a campaign in a desert environment. Skobelev recognized the superiority of

103 Rogger, “Skobelev Phenomenon,” 56.

42

European arms and technique in combat, which allowed a small force to overwhelm a numerically superior force. He therefore resisted the urge to take an army too large to supply into the desert.

Furthermore, he carefully preplanned the army’s route and pushed outposts and supply depots forward of the line of advance, so that the army could move rapidly from supply point to supply point.104 Despite the need to keep the force small enough to supply, the expedition that set out from

Krasnovodsk in the fall of 1880 was a powerful formation. Over 7,000 infantry and , plus an attendant supply train and the crews for a massive artillery park. Skobelev’s army at Geok-Tepe included almost 60 heavy and light guns, 16 mortars, 5 mitrailleurs,105 and 9 rocket batteries.106

The objective was to hit the Turkomans with overwhelming force, and thereby overawe them into submission.

Starting in October 1880 the expedition moved inexorably into Turkoman territory, brushing aside all resistance. By January 1881 Skobelev’s army had laid siege to Geok-Tepe, though he lacked enough troops to completely envelop the fortified town. Inside were roughly

10,000 Turkmen soldiers, as well as 40,000 civilians, many of whom were the families of the defenders. The Turkmen launched several sorties against the Russian lines, which were driven back, and the siege lines slowly drew closer and the Russian artillery continued to bombard the town. On the morning of January 24, the Russian artillery breached the southern wall, then at 11:20 a.m. a massive mine, almost a ton and a half of gunpowder, was detonated under the eastern wall

104 C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Theory and Practice, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Pres, 1996), 60-66. 105 A French word for machine guns used in all official reports, referring in this case to American made Gatling Guns. Skobelev ordered that these weapons would be utilized in line with the infantry formations, replacing the regimental guns which had been removed from the Russian infantry regiments before the Russo-Turkish War. 106 Mikhail D. Skobelev, The Siege and Assault of Denghil-Tepe, trans. J. J. Leverson (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1881), 66.

43 creating a 140 ft. breach in the wall. Immediately following the breach, a storming column of eight infantry battalions, led by Colonel Alexey Kuropatkin, Skobelev’s former chief-of-staff, and future

Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, set off. Two other columns also assaulted the fortress from different directions.107 The storming columns rapidly seized the fort, prompting a panicked flight by the civilians and the garrison survivors. Skobelev ordered a pursuit of the fleeing populace, who were massacred by the Russian cavalry. In his official report Skobelev listed the dead in the pursuit as “8,000 of both sexes,” and that “6,500 bodies were buried inside [the fortress],” the Russian losses were 70 dead, and roughly 300 wounded.108 With the battle over,

Skobelev distributed an order to the population for all Turkmen to return to Geok-Tepe, to submit to the White Tsar.109 Turkmen resistance had been decisively crushed.

This story reached Western audiences through a familiar medium: a correspondent for the

Daily News, Edmund O’Donovan. O’Donovan had attempted to accompany Skobelev’s expedition but had been denied permission by Skobelev himself.110 This may seem odd given Skobelev’s past fondness for correspondents, however, one explanation could be the conditions of the expedition.

O’Donovan was English, and throughout the expedition Skobelev was concerned about the possibility of British interference in the campaign. In his report he stated that the Turkmen fully expected British military support, either through equipment or troops, and that a British officer was expected at Geok-Tepe by the Turkomans.111 A British officer was in the area, Colonel Charles

Stewart, who had been sent to investigate Skobelev’s actions and determine if they were a threat

107 Ibid, 46-48. 108 Ibid, 54-55. 109 Ibid, 69. 110 Hopkirk, The Great Game, 404. 111 Skobelev, The Siege and Assault of Denghil-Tepe, 3.

44 to British India.112 Skobelev had in the past drawn up plans for an invasion of India, if it were necessary, and clearly did not trust the British in Central Asia.113 However, despite Skobelev’s objections to O’Donovan’s presence, the reporter was able to witness the attack, and write about it in detail.

This report sparked outrage in Europe and Skobelev was recalled, though this may have been at his own request due to boredom now that the fighting was over.114 Despite foreign attitudes,

Skobelev returned to Russia to a hero’s welcome. A crowd of 26,000 gathered to great him at

Moscow, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky exulted about the capture of Geok-Tepe in his Writer’s Diary, seeing Russia’s geopolitical future in an Asia where it could be a conqueror.115 Just weeks after the assassination of Alexander II this spontaneous public display made the bureaucracy nervous, fears were raised about Skobelev’s ambitions, and the possibility that if he had moved against the

Tsarist regime, both the common people and the army might have gone with him.116 Alexander

III’s dislike for Skobelev added fuel to the fire. Skobelev’s precise political leanings are unknown but it is unlikely he felt any great affection for the nihilist revolutionaries or Alexander III reactionary policies.117 He was vocally critical of Russia’s foreign policy and its perceived, pro-

German leanings, as well as openly supportive of anti-Austro-Hungarian risings in Bosnia-and

Herzegovina.

112 Hopkirk, The Great Game, 402. 113 Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” 53. 114 Hopkirk, The Great Game, 408. Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” 57. 115 Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” 58. Campell, “Bloody Belonging,” 1. 116 Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” 58-59. 117 Ibid, 60-61.

45

These sentiments firmly aligned him with the Pan-Slavs, and in January 1882, he traveled to Moscow to meet the leading Pan-Slav writer, .118

Pan-Slavism had become one of the dominant themes in Russian political discourse by the mid-19th century. The philosophy had its roots in the writing of Czech and Slovak nationalists, inspired partly by the . This Western Pan-Slavism simply called for the liberation of the Slavic nationalities from their various imperial rulers: Germans, Hungarians,

Turks, etc. In Russia, however, Pan-Slavism became tied up with ideas of Russian exceptionalism and a conception of Russia as a savior-messiah for the Slavic peoples. Slavs would achieve liberty and unity, but only under the leadership and guidance of Russia. At the first Pan-Slav Congress in

Moscow in 1867, Czech delegates had come away with the impression that Russian Pan-Slavs really advocated a Pan-Russianism rather than Pan-Slavism. For their part Russian Pan-Slavs advocated for universal adoption of the and Orthodox Christianity and refused to discuss the issue of Polish or Ukrainian independence.119

Pan-Slavism had its clearest impact on Russian policy during the Great Eastern Crisis. It had been the Pan-Slav societies that had rallied together to fund the volunteer movement to support

Serbia and Montenegro, and those same groups had pressured Alexander II to go to war as well.

Through Ignatiev at Constantinople, Pan-Slav philosophy had had a direct voice in policy, pushing for aggressive action by the Serbs as well as advocating for unified and expanded Slavic polities in the Balkans.

118 Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” 62. 119 Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology 2nd Edition, (New York: Random House 1960), 176-179.

46

Skobelev identified and spoke in favor of similar attitudes, especially during the winter of

1881-1882. In November of 1881 Austria-Hungary had begun attempts to implement in their newly occupied provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was greatly resented by the

Bosnians and Herzegovinians who resisted Habsburg rule just as they had resisted the Ottomans.120

It was also objected to by the Ottomans, who felt that the Treaty of Berlin had given Austria-

Hungary the right to administer and occupy the provinces but not to levy troops from them, as they were still legally Ottoman territory.121 The Russian government refused to make any comment or object to Austria-Hungary’s actions, because the newly reinstated Three Emperor’s Alliance had linked Russia with Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the government was concerned to maintain peace in the region while it could focus on its domestic problems.122

Skobelev was outraged by this seeming pandering to Germany and Austria-Hungary at the expense of the Balkan Slavs, and made a public speech expressing his feelings in St. Petersburg at a feast celebrating the one-year anniversary of the fall of Geok-Tepe. The speech, recorded by the

Pan-Slavist Ol’ga Novikova, referred to “the great Slavonic race, some of whose families are even now being persecuted and oppressed,” and criticized a political world where, the “illegality,” of

“might makes right,” was recognized.123 The latter referred to Bismarck’s “Blood and Iron” speech and criticized the Hapsburg government for repressing the revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He finished the speech by hailing Russia’s destiny, a theme common to Pan-Slavs at the time, “My

120 Anderson, The Eastern Question, 220. 121 Novikova, Skobeleff and the Slavonic Cause, 255. 122 Anderson, The Eastern Question, 221. 123 Novikova, Skobeleff, 259-261.

47 heart aches. But our faith in the historical mission of Russia is our consolation and our strength.

Long live the Emperor!”124

A speech such as this, made by an active duty officer to other active duty officers was completely unacceptable in Alexander III’s Russia. For a highly popular to call for revolt and rebellion in the territory of an allied monarchy could not be allowed. Skobelev was encouraged to take a trip abroad in order to get him out of the limelight.125 He arrived in Paris in

1882 and was warmly welcomed. However, if the government wanted him to avoid the limelight they had failed. It is unclear precisely what he said in Paris but it is clear that he addressed a deputation of Serbian students on the issue of Austro-Hungarian intentions in the Balkans and suggested that if Austria-Hungary continued its present course and was not dissuaded by Germany, there would be war between Russia and the Hapsburg Empire.126 In the French press, a version of the speech appeared in which he blamed Germany and the German race, as an eternal enemy of all

Slavs, for Russia’s failure to support Serbia as it should.127 These remarks caused a diplomatic uproar throughout Europe. Germany and Austria-Hungary both called for Skobelev to publicly reprimanded. To appease their allies and keep the peace, Alexander III’s government recalled

Skobelev to Russia. Barely five months after his return home, he was dead.

124 Ibid, 261. 125 Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” 63. 126 Novikova, Skobeleff, 269-275. 127 Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” 64.

48

Ch. 6: Using a Legend: Military Reform and Pan-Slavism

Mikhail Skobelev died July 7, 1882 in a Moscow hotel, he was only 38 years old. His exploits in life had made him a beloved figure in Russia and his funeral was attended by crowds of average Muscovites, peasants, soldiers, bureaucrats, and aristocrats. The funeral procession from Moscow to his family estates was the scene of a national outpouring of grief. His comrades and friends mourned him. Even those members of the military elite who had opposed his meteoric rise and had viewed him with jealousy and suspicion now publicly lamented his passing. Poems and songs were composed to mourn the fallen general, calling him “Hero of the Russian nation,” and saying that his death, “could not be imagined.”128

It is a sentiment echoed in Nemirovich-Danchenko’s Personal Reminiscences, which opens with an account of the immediate aftermath of Skobelev’s death and the shock and denial in the crowds outside of his Moscow hotel. Nemirovich-Danchenko includes anecdotes of peasants crying in the streets, demanding that their hero be brought out to them, so that the people could mourn him.129 He tells of veteran officers replying to the news with scoffs, “it is impossible for

Skobelev to die,” and of an old sergeant telling the dead general that “You are happy now, and at rest; but what is to become of us without you?”130

Many authors, politicians, and generals seemed to have shared the feelings expressed by

Nemirovich-Danchenko’s sergeant. Despite his personal dislike for the man, Tsar Alexander III

128 MDS: F. Gaevskago “Venok na grob v Boze po͡tschivshago velikago russkago narodnago gero͡ia Mikhaila Dmitrievicha Skobeleva,” Box 3 Miscellaneous Printed Materials. 129 Nemirovich-Danchenko, Personal Reminiscences, 1-5. 130 Ibid. 9-10.

49 mourned Skobelev’s passing writing in a letter to Skobelev’s sister, “His loss to the Russian Army is one it is hard to replace, and it must be deeply lamented by all true soldiers. It is sad, very sad, to lose men so devoted to their mission.”131 It is hard to calculate precisely what the Russian army truly lost with Skobelev’s early death in terms of command ability and institutional competence for later wars. However, it is not unreasonable to argue that the loss of such a talented officer and leader negatively impacted the Russian military going forward. Skobelev’s protégé Kuropatkin, and the other officers of his generation, led the Russian military in the disastrous 1904-905 Russo-

Japanese War and it is an obvious counter-factual to wonder if their performance and the performance of the Russian military overall in that conflict would have been improved by

Skobelev’s presence. That argument was put forward in the Russian press after the war, particularly in 1912 around the unveiling of the Skobelev monument in Moscow. Several papers ran stories with thinly veiled accusations that Kuropatkin had failed his mentor with his defeat in

Manchuria.132

In some ways, Skobelev’s early death was to his advantage, or at least the advantage of his legend and those who would use it. Skobelev died while still young and vibrant. He had never been defeated in a major battle and his image could be forever preserved as the youthful knight-errant of , his memory never tainted by the stains of defeat or the ignobility of a death in old-age and obscurity. This meant that he remained an unimpeachable symbol for those that wished to utilize him. In the aftermath of his death Skobelev became a figure head and symbol for two groups. The Pan-Slavists hoping to rally support for their

131 Novikova, Skobeleff, 387. 132 MDS: Clippings from several newspapers, Box 3 Miscellaneous Printed Materials.

50 ideology and Russian military reformers using him to support their doctrines and reforms.

Skobelev was an obvious choice for both groups. In his life he had espoused beliefs held by both and his popularity, charisma, and easy recognition made him a powerful propaganda tool.

By identifying Skobelev with Pan-Slavism and by demonstrating his moral perfection, these Pan-Slav writers strove to demonstrate the moral superiority and rightness of their own ideology to their readers. The most obvious usage of Skobelev’s memory for a rhetorical purpose to champion Pan-Slav ideologies is in the writing of Ol’ga Novikova. Her biography of the general,

Skobeleff and the Slavonic Cause sought to closely identify Skobelev with Pan-Slavism and to promote and justify its tenets with the example of Skobelev’s life. Novikova’s intended audience was not Russian though, but English. She lived and worked in London, and her book was published there. She acted at times as a sort of unofficial advocate and propagandist for Russia in the United

Kingdom.133 Her book was intended to “enable Englishmen to realise something of the character of my famous countryman, as well as of the cause to the service of which he dedicated his life, and without which he could never have been entirely our own Skobeleff.”134 The work lays out the details of Skobelev’s military career and his life after Geok-Tepe, alongside an explanation of what

Pan-Slavism is and its many virtues. Throughout, Novikova emphasizes the justice of the

Slavonic/Pan-Slavist cause, its basis in the desire for Slav liberty, and Russia’s noble motives for supporting the Balkan Slavs. “Russia does not want another war,” she says,

All that the Slavs ask could be granted without war and would be granted to-morrow if their rulers were wise. Free local government; a prince elected by the population; a constitution

133 Joseph O. Baylen, “Madame Olga Novikov, Propagandist,” American Slavic and East European Review 10, no. 4 (1951), 256-257. 134 Novikova, Skobeleff, vi.

51

drawn up by their representatives, and the frontiers and the organisation arranged in strict conformity with the nationality and the interests of the mixed populations.135 Novikova turns Skobelev into a paladin of the Pan-Slav ideal, stating that Skobelev detested war and only ever fought for a just cause and in defense of others.136 This is an interesting dichotomy considering the importance of war to the advancement of Skobelev’s career. This contradiction was noted by observers at the time. One correspondent for the Times commenting from St.

Petersburg in 1882 said, “if one thing is certain about Skobeleff, it is that he glories in war, and is ever restless without it.”137 It is hard to credit Novikova’s account except that she did personally know Skobelev, and the British author did not. Furthermore, Nemirovich-Danchenko also testified to Skobelev’s distaste for war.138 Nemirovich-Danchenko was also an advocate of Pan-Slavism and his Personal Reminiscences paints Skobelev in as positive a light as possible. According to

Nemirovich-Danchenko’s account Skobelev was a paragon of chivalry and virtue, a chaste hero beloved by his men.139

Skobelev’s legend was also be a powerful weapon in the debates regarding the future of the Russian military that were common in the late 19th century. The Russian army that Mikhail

Skobelev served in, like the society that it defended, was in a state of flux in the latter half of the

19th century. Industrialization was revolutionizing the way wars were fought, as the implications of breech-loading rifles, steel rifled artillery, and modern communications equipment were beginning to sink in among the military establishments of the world. Defeat at the hands of Great

135 Ibid, 251. 136 Ibid, 228-229. 137 Newsvault, “General Skobeleff and Russian Foreign Policy,” Times; March 8, 1882. 138 Nemirovich-Danchenko, Personal Reminiscences, 65-67. 139 Ibid, 296-297.

52

Britain and during the Crimean War had humiliated the Russian military, and subsequent

European wars had emphasized the importance of new technologies and doctrines. The Franco-

Prussian War in particular had been a wake-up call to the Russian military that reform was necessary if they were to compete with their continental opponents.140

The reform of the army was part and parcel of the Great Reforms of Alexander II. The emancipation of the serfs had as much to do with improving Russia’s ability to field a viable modern army as with the moral and economic evils of the practice.141 Two officers, War Minister

D. A. Miliutin, and General M. I. Dragomirov were the guiding lights of the reform movement.

This reform movement emphasized the traditions and philosophy of Catherine the Great’s commander, Suvorov. The reformers felt that the martial traditions of Suvorov’s army: tactical flexibility, aggressiveness, and pragmatic calculation, had been lost for the sake of uniformity, rigidity, and impressive displays on the parade ground.142

The reformers sought to overcome this stagnation on two fronts. The first was within the army’s institutional organization, the second, was on the tactical and doctrinal level. Miliutin as

War Minister focused on the organizational reforms he felt the army required. These focused on the creation of a modern “cadre and reserve” organization, which would allow for a relatively smaller standing army to be expanded rapidly in the event of war through the rapid mobilization of trained reserves.143 Key to this project was the implementation of universal military service, a policy that was only theoretically possible with the abolition of in 1861 and required a

140 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 6-7. 141 Ibid, 7. 142 Ibid, 7-8. 143 Ibid, 10-13.

53 long and difficult political fight before it was put into effect in 1874.144 The new system required all Russian males over 21 to provide fifteen years of service to the empire, six active and nine in the reserves. The only exemptions were based on “physical standards, domestic considerations, and education.”145 This system had only just begun to have an effect on the army when war broke out in 1877, and the army was almost 30% short of its stated manpower requirements when it crossed the Danube.146

In the area of tactical doctrine and training, Dragomirov took the reformist lead.

Dragomirov served as an adjunct professor of tactics at the Nicholas Military Academy, then later as Chair of Tactics, which allowed him to instill his tactical concepts into a generation of officers.147 Dragomirov’s tactical philosophy dealt with the common conception of battle consisting of two parts: the physical and the moral. He felt that the moral aspect of battle, the ability of soldiers to endure the physical shock of battle and impose their will upon the enemy, was the most important. To this end, he emphasized the importance of cold steel, massed formations, and rapid assault tactics over firepower, dispersed formations, and entrenchment.148 The new regulations for infantry assault tactics published in 1866 emphasized the bayonet attack as the preferred method of infantry attack, at the expense of infantry firepower.

For advocates of the “bayonets before bullets” tactical doctrine, Skobelev was a powerful symbol. The successful action at Lovcha relied on infantry bayonet attacks to seize the Turkish redoubts. Aggressive action and leadership by Skobelev had rescued a dangerous tactical situation

144 Ibid, 21-23. 145 Ibid, 23. 146 Ibid, 26. 147 Ibid, 38. 148 Ibid, 39-41.

54 and the close cooperation of the artillery and the infantry had enabled him to win the day. The success at Lovcha belied the disasters at Plevna and buoyed belief in the efficacy of infantry assaults with cold steel. Even more than Lovcha, the victory at Schenovo encouraged the convictions of Dragomirov and his fellows. Skobelev’s attack had succeeded in crushing an entrenched enemy despite a complete lack of artillery support. F. V. Greene noted, “Finally,

Skobeleff’s energetic attack… was one of the most splendid assaults ever made, and renders more than doubtful the conclusion which has been hastily drawn from this war (from Plevna particularly), that successful assaults of earthworks defended by modern breech-loaders are impossible.”149 Even the Grand Assault on Plevna adds some credence to the argument. Despite the overall failure of the attacks, Skobelev’s units were able to carry through and seize their objectives, despite the enemy’s superior firepower and entrenched positions. That they were unable to subsequently hold their captured positions does not reflect a failure in the offensive doctrine but instead, as presented by the numerous correspondents and Skobelev himself, the failure to properly support and reinforce his troops due to the inefficient General Staff.150 These battles all seemed to reinforce the Dragomirov’s lessons. If they were properly led by an officer of

Skobelev’s caliber, then an infantry assault with the bayonet could carry an entrenched enemy.

This thinking would remain deeply imbedded in Russian tactical doctrine through the Russo-

Japanese War and into the First World War, in which a commitment to infantry assaults would have disastrous consequences for the Russian soldier.151

149 Greene, The Russian Army, 356. 150 War Correspondence of the ‘Daily News,’ 1877, 480-481. 151 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, 85-86.

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On the face of it, this seems to be a vindication of Dragomirov’s system. However, there are several flaws in the argument that Skobelev represented a paragon of Dragomirov’s tactical philosophy. First, Skobelev advocated heavily for effective artillery support and better infantry armament. When it became apparent that the Turks’, British-made, Peabody-Martini rifles were superior to the new Russian breechloaders in both range and rate of fire, Skobelev made certain to order his men to seize any captured rifles they could.152 In fact, during the Schenovo campaign

Skobelev utilized the captured rifles to great effect, in an action described by Greene. During the approach march to Schenovo Skobelev’s column was delayed by a small Turkish force. This detachment had taken a position across a ravine from the line of Skobelev’s column and taken it under fire from the flank. This caused the entire straggling column to halt in place as the Turkish riflemen were out of range for the lead units to engage them. On learning this, Skobelev brought up one of the units armed with the captured rifles to drive the enemy off the opposite ridge. Which they did, enabling the column to advance.153

Furthermore, a reanalysis of the main action at Schenovo also calls into question the conclusions drawn by observers such as Greene. Skobelev’s success was gained through heavy losses and by exploiting the tactical advantages of the weather and terrain, which allowed him to close with the enemy with minimal exposure. Once his troops were exposed to direct fire their losses were tremendous, and it was only through the courage of his regimental commanders, as well as his own leadership that victory was achieved. In addition, Skobelev was aided by the demoralization of the Turkish troops, the lackluster generalship of their commanders, and their

152 Ibid, 85. 153 Greene, The Russian Army, 353-354.

56 surprise that the Russians were able to conduct an offensive operation under the prevailing weather conditions at all.154 Greene’s comments on Schenovo contradict his own analysis presented later in his book, in which he presents the simple, mathematical, tactical advantages conveyed by earthworks and modern breechloaders, demonstrated by Plevna.155 Skobelev himself bucked

Dragomirov’s ban against entrenchment, arguing that the Russian infantry required better entrenching tools and needed to adopt the practice of digging-in every time it halted, given the destructive power of modern rifles.156

However, despite analyses of Skobelev’s battles that contradict Dragomirov’s doctrine, it is clear that Skobelev shared many of his contemporary’s ideas and philosophies. Skobelev frequently demonstrated a commitment to Dragomirov’s ideas of moral combat trumping the physical aspects of battle. Skobelev’s commitment to maintaining his appearance in order to promote the morale of his troops fits well with the moral imperatives of Dragomirov. Furthermore,

Skobelev’s from the front leadership style emphasized the importance his own will and the will of his officers to overcome the material superiority of the enemy. His orders to the forces under his command in Central Asia during the Akhal-Tekke expedition several years after the Russo-Turkish

War also shed light on his military thinking. In his “Instructions for Officers of the Troops in the

Field,” Skobelev outlines his thoughts on tactical doctrine in Central Asia. He clearly distilled the differences enforced by the changed conditions of Central Asian vs. European combat, noting,

“The present European fighting formation is here inapplicable on account of the small numerical strength of our detachments,” and that, “As a fundamental principle, a close formation is all-

154 Hozier, The Russo-Turkish War, 802. 155 Greene, The Russian Army, 421-422. 156 Nemirovich-Danchenko, 97-98.

57 powerful in Central Asia… we shall defeat the enemy… by the bayonet, always terrible in the hands of men united by discipline, and a feeling of duty, and by concentration into one powerful body.”157 Skobelev’s tactics upheld Dragomirov’s maxims regarding the importance of will and morale to fighting men over their training in direct combat skills. For Skobelev, the will of his soldiers to fight, to risk their lives in order to seize an objective, was of the upmost importance.

157 Skobelev, The Siege and Assault of Dengil-Tepe, 60-61.

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Ch. 7 The Endurance of a Legend: A Tale of Two Monuments

How Skobelev’s legend was created during his life and exploited after his death has been discussed, now we move to how the legend was preserved and how it endured into the 20th century.

In addition to the Pan-Slavists and Dragomirov’s reform school, Skobelev’s legend also provided ample material for government propagandists seeking to promote patriotism and national pride.

These nationalist efforts kept Skobelev in the minds of the public and kept his memory and legend alive. Rogger’s conclusion regarding Skobelev is that rather than a revolutionary opposition to the autocracy, he represented a proto-nationalist ideology, and an attempt by conservatives to find a third path between liberal reform and revolution.158 One of the earliest uses of Skobelev’s legacy was the creation of the Mikhail Skobelev Committee. This body provided two functions. The first was to oversee the distribution of pensions and support for the wounded veterans of the Russo-

Turkish War.159 The second was to promote patriotic activities, such as the purchase of war-bonds and donation of money to the government in times of war, up to and including the First World

War. To this end the committee organized concerts and theatrical performances to solicit donations from the wealthy of Russian society.160 It also produced postcards, news reels, and posters to support the war effort.161

Finally, Skobelev’s legacy was used to restore national feeling after the defeat in the Russo-

Japanese War and the diplomatic humiliation of the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and

158 Rogger, “The Skobelev Phenomenon,” 77-78. 159 MDS: File: Komitet imeni M. D. Skobeleva in Box 2, “Manuscripts, Documents, and Subject Files.” 160 “Propaganda at Home,” 1914-1918 International Encyclopedia of the First World War, last updated October 8, 2014, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/propaganda_at_home_russian_empire. 161Ibid.

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Herzegovina in 1908. In 1912 a massive monument to Skobelev was unveiled in Moscow in

Tverskaya Square. The statue depicted Skobelev on his rearing Arabian stallion with sabre drawn, as if riding into battle. The large bronze statue was mounted on a marble base and surrounded by bronze depictions of Russian soldiers equipped as they would have been in the Russo-Turkish

War. The opening of the statue was attended by thousands, a complete honor guard of soldiers from throughout the empire, a delegation from Skobelev’s former province of Fergana, and members of the Imperial family.162 Descriptions of the monument and its unveiling ceremony were carried in many Russian newspapers. These provided an occasion for a recounting of the general’s career, frequently under titles referring to Skobelev as “the hero,” or “legend.” Equally common was his war time nickname, “The White General.”163 The opening of this monument provided an opportunity for a nationalistic spectacle, an attempt to distract the populace from defeat with a reminder of a heroic and victorious past.

162 MDS, Newspaper Clippings from various newspapers, in Box 3, Miscellaneous Printed Materials. 163 Ibid.

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Figure 2 Anonymous, Moscow, Mikhail Skobelev Monument Inauguration, 1912. Wikimedia Commons, URL: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Mikhail_Skobelev_Monument,_Moscow_(Tverskaya)#/media/File:Moscow,_Sko belev_Monument,_inauguration_1912.jpg Even thirty years after his death, the memory of Skobelev’s legend was still strong enough to inspire a new generation of Russian soldiers. Multiple British papers reported that Russian sentries on the Eastern Front had seen “the famous ghost of General Skobelev in a white uniform riding a white horse.”164 This ghost apparently always “marked a critical moment for the armies of the Czar and invariably causes panic in the enemy’s ranks.”165 Not only were Russian soldiers seeing Skobelev’s ghost but they were declaring “new Skobelevs” among their officers. The story

164 Newsvault, “The Ghost of Skobelev,” The Daily Mail, Wednesday, August 4, 1915. 165 Ibid.

61 circulated that a division level officer had begun to emulate Skobelev’s practice of leading attacks personally, with his sabre drawn, and for this his men dubbed him the “new Skobelev.”166 Even thirty years after his death, the memory of Skobelev’s legend was still strong enough to inspire a new generation of Russian soldiers.

Skobelev was not only honored with statues and legends of a heroic legacy, but with cities, steamships, streets. The village of Imetli, where Skobelev’s troops descended the Balkans before

Schenovo was renamed Skobelev in his honor. A treet and park in Plevna bear his name, and the

Plevna memorial, including a bust of the general, stands on the ruins of the Green Hills redoubts his men took during the Third Battle of Plevna. A Russian steamer on the Black Sea was named the Skobelev, and it served alongside the gunboat Geok-Tepe. Many of the markers to Skobelev’s memory in Russia were destroyed under the . His statue in Tverskaya square was torn down in 1917 and replaced with a monument to the First Soviet Constitution. Today the statue of

Yuri Dolgorukiy, founder of Moscow, stands on the site.

166 Newsvault, “Renewed Galicia Fighting,” The Devon and Exeter Daily Gazette, November 24, 1915.

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Figure 3 Anonymous, Skobelev Monument, 2018, Tripadvisor URL: https://www.tripadvisor.com/Attraction_Review-g298484- d15335692-Reviews-Monument_to_General_Mikhail_Skobelev-Moscow_Central_Russia.html.

Today the Skobelev legend has received a rebirth. The White General rides again in a new statue, unveiled in 2014, outside of the Russian Military Academy in Moscow. The four-meter bronze stands on an irregular rocky plinth, evoking the rugged terrain of Central Asia or the Balkan

Mountains. The dedication was attended by the Chief-of-Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and the Russian Culture Minister, who spoke about the importance of Skobelev’s legacy to the

Russian military, his professionalism, patriotism, and dedication to duty. Even more recently

Skobelev was made the first posthumous member of the Russian Geographic Society in 2019. His

63 induction was meant to be put to a vote in January 1883, however, his death meant that the vote never took place. A society member found the documents regarding his admission in an archive and set about to rectify the oversight.167

Skobelev’s legend was forged by war. In many ways the myth surrounding the man was well earned. His own courage and abilities set him apart from his fellows, whose failures in the early battles of the Russo-Turkish War opened the door for him. He was a larger than life figure.

His daredevil courage inspired fanatical loyalty and he led his men to achieve remarkable feats of arms, against extraordinary odds. However, much of his legend is owed to those that created it for their own use. Journalists were eager for a compelling story, and Skobelev, a dashing, young, well- read, well-bred, and handsome officer was an easy figure to hero-worship. To the Western world he was turned into an exemplar of courage, an almost too perfect to be believed paragon of military virtue. For a Russian audience, the newspapers and even more so the lubki, turned him into a religious warrior for god. If the Russo-Turkish War was a holy war, then Skobelev was its chief crusader.

After his death his legend only grew. He died too young to have lost the luster of youth and his popularity could be used to turn him into a powerful propaganda tool. Pan-Slav writers used his image to support their ideology. They spread his legend even further, building on the writing done during his career, creating a paladin for their cause. The Skobelev of Pan-Slav writing was chivalrous, he spared women and civilians, and he was a simple man of common stock who believed whole-heartedly in his mission and his duty. This same heroic Skobelev could also inspire

167 “Commander Mikhail Skobelev May Become the Honorary Member of the RGS. Posthumously,” Russian Geographic Society online, last modified January 24, 2019, https://www.rgo.ru/en/article/commander-mikhail- skobelev-may-become-honorary-member-rgs-posthumously.

64 the patriotism and loyalty of the people. He could be a shining example of dedication and sacrifice for the fatherland. Even today, he is still held up as an example of what a Russian officer should be.

However, there are holes in the legend. Skobelev was not a common man. He was a well- connected aristocrat who served the autocracy with loyalty and skill. His record as a combat commander is marred by the massacre of civilians at Geok-Tepe. His orders to his men to not loot or assault Turkish civilians during the Russo-Turkish War were not out of any sense of the immorality of harming civilians, as F. V. Greene reports Skobelev would have gladly ordered the destruction of a village, if it had served a military purpose. He opposed looting because it would distract from the real objectives. At Geok-Tepe, destruction of the civilian population, demonstrative violence to cow resistance, was the objective.168

Stripping away the myth from the man does not make the man less remarkable. It reveals him in all his flaws and contradictions. He was a man of his times. A son of empire and autocracy who served both for his entire life. Hans Rogger felt that the Skobelev Phenomenon represented the vain struggles of Russian conservatives to navigate the political turmoil of industrialization and modernization. An understanding of the Skobelev Phenomenon is an understanding of one of the many forces active in the Tsarist Empire at the close of the 19th century, and it is impossible to understand the phenomenon without understanding the man who inspired it, and the men and women who created it.

168 Greene, Sketches of Army Life in Russia, 138-139.

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