SLAVERY, FEAR, AND DISUNION IN THE LONE STAR STATE

TEXANS' ATTITUDES TOWARD

AND THE UNION, 1846-1861

APPROVED:

Graduate Committee:

rofessor

Minor Professor

Committee/Member r. A. Committee Member

Chai the Department^History

Dean of Vhe Graduate School Ledbetter, Billy D., Slavery, Fear, and Disunion in the Lone Star State: Texans' Attitudes toward Secession and the Union, 1846-1861. Doctor of Philosophy (History),

August, 1972. 315 pp., 4 figures, appendix, bibliography,

388 titles.

This work is a study of white Texans' attitudes toward their role in the federal Union and their right to secede from it during the antebellum period. The central question of the study is why did people so strongly Unionist in

1846 became so strongly secessionist by 1861. In tracing this significant shift in Texans' sentiment, the author especially emphasizes the racial attitudes of white Texans, their emotional defense of the institution of slavery, and their strong conviction that the Negroes, if emancipated, would destroy white society. Of special importance to this study is the relationship of Texans' racial attitudes to their attitudes toward the Union.

Since few secondary sources are available for this period of history, research was done almost entirely in primary sources. Of utmost importance to the work were

Texas newspapers. While having some influence on public opinion, the papers generally tended to reflect, rather than formulate, Texans' attitudes. Personal papers, especially letters, were also valuable in this undertaking. Papers of numerous individuals of the period are available at the

University of Texas Library, in the Texas State Library at

Austin, and in the Rosenberg Library in Galveston. Official sources such as Gammel, Laws of Texas, and the Texas state

House and Senate Journals were also extremely important.

Secondary sources, such as articles from the Southwestern

Historical Quarterly and other journals and monographs concerning various aspects of Civil War and Texas history, were used when available to supplement the primary materials.

Essentially this study is organized chronologically, with the exception of the opening discussion of slavery and racial attitudes in general. To Texans, slavery was both a system of labor needed to develop the state's natural resources and a system of race control essential to racial harmony. When annexation occurred in 1846, Texans believed that their institution was secure, but soon the House passed the Wilmot Proviso, which Texans regarded as a direct attack on slavery. Although defending secession, Texans still believed their interests would be protected in the Union, as their willing acceptance of the 1850 compromise indicated.

Then in 1854 the Kansas-Nebraska Act stimulated the formation of the Republican party, dedicated to stopping slavery's growth. In response, Texans formed a strong state rights

Democratic party, which in 1857 elected Hardin Runnels, an ultra state rightist, governor. But as a conservative reaction to his policies developed, Texans elected Unionist

Sam governor in 1859. This conservative mood of the state changed rapidly during the election of 1860, especially with the outbreak of slave insurrections in that year. When Lincoln was elected,several prominent citizens, circumventing , called a state convention, which promptly adopted an ordinance of secession.

Texans' determination to preserve slavery as a system of labor and a means of race control caused them to become a part of the disastrous secession movement. As long as slavery was secure» they wanted to remain a part of the Union, but they were convinced that Lincoln and his party intended

!>• to destroy the institution, upsetting the racial and social structure of the entire South. The result would, they believed, be race war and ultimately elevation of the Negro to a position of equality; most Texans preferred civil war to these developments. SLAVERY, FEAR, AND DISUNION IN THE LONE STAR STATE;

TEXANS1 ATTITUDES TOWARD SECESSION

AND THE UNION, 1846-1861

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the

North Texas State University in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

Billy D. Ledbetter, M. S,

Denton, Texas

August, 19 72 Copyright by

Billy D. Ledbetter

1972

111 PREFACE

On February 19, 1846, state-wide celebrations were the order of the day as the enthusiastically

tied its destiny to that of the United States. Fifteen years later, on March 2, 1861, Texans"^" were again celebrating, but this time the occasion was their cutting of the bonds

that had held them to the Union. During the decade and a half between annexation and secession, the state prospered

at a rate the people had never thought possible under the

uncertain government of the Republic. The population--both

slave and free --increased at an unprecedented rate, while

Texans produced more goods, especially cotton, than ever before; and the Lone Star state seemed well on its way to becoming the "Empire State of the Union" that its leaders envisioned. In spite of the widespread prosperity, Texans1

sentiment toward the Union underwent drastic changes during this period; whereas 94 per cent of the votes cast in the

annexation referendum favored statehood, in 1861, 76 per cent of the ballots cast favored dissolution of the Union. This study is an examination of Texans' attitudes toward the Union

^"Throughout this study the term Texan refers to the white Texan--the accepted ante-bellum meaning of the word.

iv and the institution of slavery and an attempt to determine why a people so strongly Unionist in 1846 had become so strongly secessionist by 1861.

Why did the people decide with such certainty to separate from a nation that had furthered their interests so successfully? Texans became disunionists only when they believed that the election of a Black Republican to the

Presidency immediately threatened the existence of slavery.

They respected the Union and until Lincoln's election felt that their interests were best served within it, but the perpetuation of slavery was far more important to Texans than any abstract principles of nationalism. Slavery was an essential part of Texas' social structure, a means of controlling the Negro race and establishing social order, as well as working the land'. Their belief that the Negro was naturally inferior, and that slavery was the only means of controlling his animalistic nature caused Texans to fear that emancipation would lead to racial warfare, with the Negroes committing all manner of depredations against the whites. Texans, heavily armed with their concepts of state rights, refused to tolerate the election of a Republi- can President because in their minds his party intended to destroy the social structure of the South, by destroying its

v peculiar institution. Thus Texans' racial attitudes became

the most significant factor in explaining secession sentiment

in the state.

VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS vii

Chapter

I. WHITE OVER BLACK 1

II. UNION AND THE ROOTS OF DISUNION 36

III. CONTROVERSY AND COMPROMISE 64

IV. POLITICS AND PARTIES, 1854-1856 92

V. EXTREMISM AND REACTION, 1857-1859 121

VI. THE MOUNTING FEAR 150

VII. THE CRISIS 180

VIII. SECESSION ACHIEVED. . 225

APPENDIX 277

BIBLIOGRAPHY 287

vix LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

1. Population by County, 1860 7

2. Slave Distribution, 1860 8

3. Gubernatorial Elections, 1857, 1859. .... 145

4. Vote on Secession Referendum, 1861 275

VI 11 CHAPTER I

WHITE OVER BLACK

Long before Anglo-American migration to Texas began in the early 1820's, southerners had been developing an elaborate set of myths, ideas, and rules to justify and control the institution of Negro slavery. Unquestioned ideas of the inferiority of the Negro, of his suitability for slavery, and of the need for slavery to develop southern resources--these and many other notions were universally accepted. Migrants to Texas, being primarily from the southern states, brought these ideas to the new frontier and further developed them. Acquiring the necessary labor to develop the vast stretches of undeveloped cotton lands meant bringing a large number of blacks into the state, and

Texans believed that the only means of controlling them and preventing racial strife was the institution of slavery.

Considering any agitation against the institution as a threat to their civilization, Texans were convinced that free

Negroes could not function in white society, and more important, that white society could not function with free Negroes in it. The agitation to end slavery was older than the Union when Texas became the twenty-eighth state in 1846, but in the decade and a half prior to annexation it gained momentum in the North. Only six months after Texas joined the Union, the Wilmot Proviso was introduced, and its passage by the

House of Representatives indicated that a majority of the people in the North opposed further expansion of slavery into the territories. With the introduction of the Proviso issue, slavery was catapulted ahead of every other issue in national politics, a position it retained until the South seceded from the Union. The key to understanding the seces- sion movement in Texas lies in understanding the institution of slavery as it existed during the critical years 1846-1861 and in understanding Texans' attitudes toward slavery and the Negro race. Texans' racial attitudes, coupled with the dependence of their social and economic structure upon slavery, meant that they could not tolerate antislavery agitation.

Immigrants to Texas established the institution of slavery because they believed that it was the best and fastest means of developing their resources, the same reasoning that other southerners had used in adopting it.1 However, in

"'"Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), pp. 5-6, making this choice Texans were unique in that they adopted

slavery at a time when most of the civilized world, including

the northern states, was severely criticizing it. Worldwide,

the nineteenth century was a time of reform movements-- movements to emphasize the dignity of man, to improve man's

social condition, to expand freedom and liberty for the

individual. Other areas where slavery had expanded were

settled when little consideration was being given to social

evils, but Texans had to ignore the trend of world opinion

to embrace it during the latter part of the ante-bellum period. Texas was, in fact, the last area in the civilized world to be developed by the use of slave labor.

The southern variety of slavery legally came to Texas

in 1823 when Stephen F. Austin received a grant from the

Mexican government to establish a colony of Anglo-Americans

in Texas. The Mexican government opposed slavery, which no longer existed in , and did not intend for it to be established permanently in Texas, but Mexican officials underestimated the determination of the southern immigrants.

The Mexican Imperial Colonization law of 1824 recognized slavery as being legal but attempted to make it terminal. It stipulated that all children born into bondage were to be freed at fourteen years of age. During the next several years, the Mexican government realized its mistake in legalizing slavery under any conditions. After several unsuccessful attempts to control the institution, Mexico passed a law in 1832 prohibiting further introduction of slaves into Texas. This law was intended to discourage further North American immigration while limiting the growth of slavery, but it accomplished neither purpose. Many

Americans, especially southerners, were determined to settle 2 Texas and to bring their slaves with them. Thus, Texans established slavery under the administration of a government that was hostile to it, an indication of their determination to have it. Texans would not accept the Mexican government's opposition to slavery any more than they would later tolerate a United States government conceivably controlled by opponents of the institution.

When the United States settlers in Texas declared and won independence from Mexico in 1836, they created the Republic of Texas, but began immediately agitating for admission into the Union. By this time slavery had become a part of

Texans' way of life, and the constitution that they drew up 2 Rupert N. Richardson, Texas: The Lone Star State, 2d ed. rev. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1958), pp. 63-64. guaranteed its perpetuation. The pros and cons of slavery were not points of controversy within the state, since Texas would not have considered annexation unless slavery were guaranteed. But the existing northern and southern states became engaged in a bitter controversy over slavery in Texas, which became the key issue in the question of Texas' annexation. Finally in 1846, Texas was admitted, but only over bitter opposition from the free states. Ironically,

Texans, who had struggled so hard to secure and promote slavery, joined a nation already being torn apart by con- i troversy over the institution.

Slavery in Texas was first a system of labor, one which the regions under development in the state were ideally suited to use effectively. Texas was a new frontier with tremendous natural resources and possibilities for future growth. Unlike some of the older southern states, such as

Virginia and , its soil was fresh and waiting for human energy to develop it. To do this Texans believed that slavery was essential. The frontier situation, the newness of the land, and its immense possibilities, gave

Texans a slightly different approach to the institution.

3 For a discussion of annexation and the slavery issue see Chapter 2. By 1860 only the eastern one-third of the state was populated to any large extent (see Figure 1), and this area was in many ways an extension of the cotton culture of the deep South. The largest portion of the state's 431,294 white inhabitants were settled in the coastal plains, especially the Gulf region, the area that provided the best opportunity for cotton planting. The area of heaviest cotton production, where the largest plantations were located, ran along the coast from Matagorda County inland along the Brazos,

Guadelupe, and Colorado rivers. The soil in this region was excellent for cotton production, and the rivers provided the necessary means of transportation. Some sugar cane, another crop which Texans believed required slave labor, was produced in this coastal region also. The people of northeastern Texas raised cotton as their cash crop, but they also produced grains and vegetables for their own consumption. In all, the state was producing about half a million bales of cotton per year by 1860. The slave population was, of course, heaviest in cotton producing counties (see

Figure 2) but even the people living in areas that were not heavy producers of cotton strongly defended the insti- tution. POPULATION BY COUNTY, i860 (From U.S. Census reports)

m NR NR

NR NR 592 10136

1000 NR 124 4968 10645 3977 4213 15001 4305 \ 5246 NR NR QV 8475 2425 \ \ 5996 "l J0398 ^098 \ 5362 709 ^V^\2005^ ^65 3 6881 u 8292 , 6206 A4537 o>, 244 \^4QZ ° 12750 2666 JKSxeua. \y\ 6781 f 8058/ x,427l ^ 913 ^ 1028 \ \V J / ^riHS3H9 VA7qo ' \ /s ^ ^ / 4392 ^7<^9>r^l4997 >1238 IIOI ^ ^529 \5175z^77^ \8191 8300 v \ / X 's £ 5683 AV ro i \ \ 1353533 / 8080 / \ —-^>2 5479 \3I98 V • 2736 15215 126 \ / 7006, _^ vl^-v A ^ _ >1013v ,u,aw9 \, ™907 0 4030 Y/S448I 11604 5444 1838 ^ 1^454 3380 V~ ^ 7143 yy 1578 X 217) 3384

593 ^l0 / 1600

620

FREE POPULATION 421,649 SLAVE POPULATION 182,566

TbTAL 604,215

NR- No returns in census of I860 Not shown : El Paso- 4051 Presidio - 580

Figure I SLAVE DISTRIBUTION, I860 * * (From U.S. Census reports)

^,oo°S a4 0 o c & * € J 3 «3 0 0 o o

•is'. I i£r-

•f; oVo?c^ * P*e$srK ^ ^°-Ci 0

'ai:a 3\*« 0_« rt oo •JSS5KI

TTTi\\\ x o°.?.« 1

i . • -v*

,' /o ^ sf$ % a; 'o o ;? ^ > t s?- »5 ». Oo > •* a

\'vy> r < „ . i" ki ?*> -3 V- >->0s£o=o^ El - Paso and Presidio ^\\ 4&o° ~"< counties not shown - both less than 10 per cent slave. 40 per cent or more slave

30-39 per cent slave

20-29 per cent slave

10-19 per cent slave

0-9 per cent slave

Figure 2 Ma ffl^nrnr MI lO^A ^ 1. Central and western Texas, the prairie and plains regions of the state, were still largely dominated by the

Indians. The few settlers who did live there were involved primarily in raising cattle. In 1860, the entire state was

in many ways still in the frontier stage of development.

Although several significant cities had developed, they were

surrounded by agricultural regions and sustained by the cotton

economy. The temperament of the people, whether they lived

in the young cities or on the land, was still strongly .

influenced by the frontier experience.

Texas was potentially an extremely wealthy region with

abundant resources, but slave labor was considered necessary 4 to make it the state that its leaders envisioned. Free

labor was insufficient to do the job, even if Texans had

admitted that major southern crops could be produced by

white labor. Many Texans sincerely believed that with the

state's huge expanses of uncultivated potential cotton land

and with slaves to develop it, Texas could become the most

important and richest state in the South, if not in the

entire nation. Their dream was to make Texas the "Empire 4 A Speech on Slavery, Tremont Temple, Boston, 22 February 1855 , Samuel Houston, Writings of Sam Houston, 1813- 1863, edited by Amelia W. Williams and Eugene C. Barker, 8 vols. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1938), 6:175-177; Clarksville Northern Standard, 19 February 1859. 10

State of the Union," and the labor of the bondsman was vital 5 to the realization of this dream. '

As a system of labor slavery was profitable for the

Texas slaveholder, and he was convinced that the entire economy of the South rested upon its perpetuation.^ The general opinion was that the staple crops produced by the slave could not be produced by free labor and that abolition of slavery meant abolition of such important staples as rice, sugar, and cotton. Without slavery economic chaos would grip the entire world. The Texas Almanac prophesized Abolish their production, and we break up the commerce of the civilized world--we destroy the manufactures of Europe and America--we destroy the combined shipping interests--we throw white men of both continents out of employment, and cause anarchy, revolution and inter- necine wars to usurp the paths of peaceful commerce, progress and Christian advancement.

With such frightening predictions being circulated, it is little wonder that Texans so firmly supported, justified, and defended the institution.

5Clarksville Northern Standard, 8 May 1858.

At least Texans believed slavery was profitable both to the individual slaveholder and to the state as a whole. Historians have long debated the profitability of the insti- tution. The best single volume showing both sides of the issue is Hugh G.J. Aitken, Did Slavery Pay? Readings in the Economics of Black Slavery in the United States -(Boston! Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971). 7 Texas Almanac, 1858, p. 133. 11

Believing in the inferiority of the Negro and in the black's capacity to withstand heat and wor.k that would prove fatal to the white man, Texans violently opposed any implications that the state's full potential could be developed without slave labor. In 1858 when J. De Cordova published a volume titled Texas: Her Resources and Her

Public Men, the Galveston Weekly News quickly attacked him for expressing slightly unorthodox views. He stated that slavery was a blessing to the state and praised the slave- white relationship. He believed that attempting to raise sugar cane without slave labor would be folly since the type of labor involved could not be borne by white men. Further, the tract stated that large-scale cotton production required slave labor, but he deviated from the accepted Texas viewpoint when he conceded that cotton could be profitably produced 8 on a small scale by a family effort of white labor.

For this small concession, the newspaper attacked him

in a scathing editorial, stating that, . While the Negro enjoys health in the highest perfection, when working those plantations almost without covering and exposed to a nearly vertical sun, the very same exposure and labor would, in nine cases out of ten,

8 J. De Cordova, Texas: Her Resources and Her Public Men (Philadelphia: Crozet, 1858), pp. 21, 28,"188-189. 12

prove fatal to the white man. Th^s is the consti- tutional difference between them.

Cordova's mere implication, that the white man might possibly do the same work as the Negro disturbed the ardent supporters of the system. He had only offered a possible alternative to the slave system in some cases, but even the slightest

indication that any method other than slave labor might

develop Texas resources drew harsh criticism from Texans.

Although slavery was primarily a system of labor, it was much more than that to the average Texan. To him the

system was equally as important as a means of providing

social order and race control. Proportionately few

Texans owned slaves; by 1860, only 25 per cent of the families

actually owned slaves, but the other 75 per cent supported

the institution almost as strongly as did the slave owner.

The system was an integral part of the state's social

structure, and it was difficult for the average Texan to visualize a society without it.^ It provided the means

9 Galveston Weekly News, 27 April 1858. 10 Ulrich B. Phillips, The Course of the South to Secession (1939; reprint ed., New York: Hill and Wang, 1964), p. 152; Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), 1:11. 11 T.R. Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A History -of Texas and Texans (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 328; Stampp, The Peculiar Institution, pp. 29-30. 13 not only of developing the land but also of acquiring personal social status. The vast agricultural resources held promise that ambitious non-slaveholders could become wealthy plantation owners, and when the Texan thought of

advancement, the image that came to mind was of owning large

12 numbers of slaves.

When he did consider a social structure without slavery,

the Texan envisioned the Negro running wild, raping,

plundering, stealing, and murdering, making the lives of

all white men, women, and children perilous. So much a

part of their conception of society was slavery that Texans

could imagine only racial warfare and complete chaos without 13

it. This fear was just as intense with the non-slaveholder

and the poorer classes as with the slaveowning society.

After all, the liberated Negro would move into their social

stratum, not that of the upper classes. To them the threat

of abolition meant coming into direct social contact with

the Negro, whom they could now regard as their social

12 - Clarksville Northern Standard, 4 February 1860. 13 Austin Southwestern American, 29 January 1851; Austin Southern Intellingencer, 28 January 1857; Clarksville North- ern Standard, 4 February 1860. 14 14 ^

inferior. Fear of disturbing this caste system was a

significant motivating factor in the secession movement.

Thus, one of the major obstacles preventing Texans

from accepting emancipation was the. presence of a large

number of Negroes in their white society, constituting a

social problem which they believed slavery best solved.

Texans, both slaveowners and non-slaveowners, wanted slaves brought into the state as rapidly as possible, legally

through the domestic slave trade and illegally through the 16 African slave trade, but as the number of slaves increased,

so did the need for stricter control. The Texan believed

that Negroes, who by 1860 constituted 30 per cent of the

state's total population, must be relegated to their proper place in the social order and kept there, regardless of the methods. Slavery by its very nature,was designed to prevent

any problems that might otherwise arise because of the presence of the Negro in large numbers. 14 John Townsend, The Doom of Slavery in the Union; Its Safety Out of It; An Address to the Edisto Island Vigilant Association, October 29th, 1860 (Charleston: Evans and Cogswell, 1860), p. 34; New York Day Book as cited in Marshall Harrison Flag, 20 August 1858. 15Chaplain W. Morrison, Democratic Politics and Section- alism: The Wilmot Proviso Controversy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), pp. 68-69. X (3 Austin Texas State Gazette, 18 December 1858. 15

Like the cotton culture, Texans' basic racial attitudes came from the . Only about one third of the white citizens of Texas were born in the state, while the vast majority of the remaining two thirds had lived for a time in the southern states. Only four northern states had contributed over 1,000 settlers to the area, whereas all the southern states that ultimately seceded; with the exception of , were represented by over 9,000 settlers each.^

The belief in the inherent inferiority of the Negro and in his inability to progress to the level of the white man is extremely important in understanding the South's justification of slavery and the fear of emancipation that possessed the southern mind. Numerous myths about the Negro's limited potential developed, and although totally unfounded and unsupportable by empirical evidence, these beliefs seemed to the southerner to be absolute truths. What Texans thought about the black was far more important in the events leading to secession than what was really true. Supporters of the institution demanded that all good Americans uphold

17 Population of the United States, in 1860: The Eighth Census (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), p. 490. 16

and defend slavery, even arguing that everyone should own 18

slaves.

Texans, even those who placed the Union before slavery

in the secession crisis, believed that God intended the 19 Negro to be a subordinate race to the white. According

to the Texas Almanac, the black was "incapable of self-

government, or self-improvement, as proven by his universal

ignorance and barbarism." The only advancement he could

ever make was as "a slave to white men.". If a Negro who had

once been a slave were set free, he would relapse into a

barbaric and ignorant state. "The exception is only where

he remains surrounded by white civilization, as in the

United States, and then he becomes a petty thief and idle

18 Clarksville Northern Standard, 19 February 1859. 19 New York Day Book as cited in the Austin Southern Intelligencer, 28 January 1857. The Da^ Book held that "negroes being a different and subordinate race, and this designed by the Creator for a subordinate position, and are now in their normal condition [slavery], and in accord with the nature and wants and highest well being of both races." A.B. Norton, editor of the Intelligencer, who was strongly opposed to secession in 1861 and had to cease publication of his paper from 1861-1865 because of his pro-union views, in an editorial the same day stated, "No paper in the Union treats the subject with so much philosophy as the Day Book." The Marshall Harrison Flag, 20 August 1858, also praised~the pro-slavery stand of the Day Book. It seems ironic that newspapers, like the Intelligencer and the Flag, staunchly supported slavery when the institution was breaking the Union apart and they were so firmly in support of the Union. 17 loafer." Not only did the Texan believe that the Negro could never adjust socially and economically to freedom, but the myth was also popular that he was biologically inferior. The Texas Almanac announced in an official tone that the Negro could never be. amalgamated into the white race "without producing disease and death to the offspring.

The Mulatto of the fourth degree, unless bred back into 20 pure white or black cannot reproduce himself." Since southerners believed that God intended the white race to dominate the black, slavery was merely carrying out God's plan. By increasing the number of bondsmen in Texas, the slaveholder believed he received two blessings--economic and spiritual. He would, of course, increase his financial holdings, and he believed that he received a spiritual blessing 21 because of his benevolence as master to an inferior being.

The slaveholder reasoned that, in a capitalist society, any time that a natural, God-determined relationship could increase one's earthly, as well as his heavenly estate, it must be good. 20 Texas Almanac, 1858, p. 132. 21 Clarksville Northern Standard, 16 June 1849; New York Day Book as cited in Austin Southern Intelligencer, 28 January 1857; New York Evening Day Book, 17 June 1858, clipping in Guy M. Bryan Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas; Texas Almanac, 1858, pp. 132-133. 18

Texans convinced themselves that the slave was a

"contented cheerful, obedient and a long-lived laborer," who was much more useful and happy than the members of his race in Africa. Only in the mild climate of the southern states could he develop his fullest potentiality, and only there could he be the "happy careless race" which served 22 society best. Slaves, Texans contended, had no reason to be unhappy since they were well treated and given a reasonable 23 work schedule. As Sam Houston explained, traditionally they would "rise with the sun, are allowed half an hour to breakfast and two hours at noon, avoiding the heat of noon- day, and return at night for supper and repose. They are 24 not overworked." Texans argued that as a slave the Negro could attain greater happiness in Texas than in any other state. One Texas newspaper even made the assertion that the slaves actually enjoyed "life far more than their masters, who have nominal supremacy, but carry all the burdens of life; of which the slave carries none that do not end with 22 Texas Almanac, 1858, p. 132. 23 Clarksville Northern Standard, 19 February 1859. 24 Speech on Slavery, 22 February 1855, Writings of Houston, 6:175. 19 25 the day's labor." In an effort to justify the institution,

Texans, like other southerners, romanticized and idealized

it as the very best ever developed by man.

In spite of the supposed contentment of the slaves,

the whites subjected them to a system of laws and justice

different from and more harsh than that applied to white men. Their belief in the inferior nature of the black helped

Texans justify exempting him from just treatment under the

laws. The slave or free Negro, when believed guilty of a

crime> stood little chance of even being heard, less chance

of receiving a fair trial, and even less chance of having

justice served than a white man in a similar situation.

The degree of punishment and the laws themselves depended

in many cases on the color of the defendent's skin, as

Texans devised a separate legal code for free blacks and

slaves.

Traditionally the slave received a more severe punish- ment for a criminal act than a white man convicted of the

same act. For example, such offenses as robbery of a white person and arson were punishable by death if committed by a 25 Clarksville Northern Standard, 19 February 1859. 26 Annual Report of the American An-ti-Slavery Society for the Year Ending May 1, 1860 (New York: American Anti- Slavery Soceity, 1861), pp. 202-206. 20 black but not if committed by a white man. The lash was also a legal punishment for the Negro--both slave and free; 27 whereas its use on the white was prohibited by law.

The number of lashes, determined by the court trying the slave, was unlimited so long as it did not "permanently 2 8 injure or endanger the life of the slave." Whipping was used to punish the slave or free Negro for such offenses as using "provoking language or menacing gestures to a white person," keeping guns or other weapons or ammunition, 29 meeting in unlawful assembly, or making seditious speeches.

The severity with which this method of punishment was used is indicated by the sentence of 750 lashes on his bare back given a slave named Abe in 1860. Governor Sam Houston pardoned him, but not until most of the sentence had been 30 administered. Thus the Negro was not subject to the same laws and could not expect the same treatment under the Texas legal system as could the white. 27 H.P.N. Gammel, editor, The Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, 10 vols. (Austin: Gammel Book Company, 1898), 4:1060-1061. 7 ft Ibid., p. 1060. 29 Ibid., 3:1299. 30 Pardon of Abe, 3 April 1860, Sam Houston Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas. 21

The dual nature of the slave as both property and

human being caused difficulties for the Texas legal system.

As a human being, the slave had to be held accountable for

criminal action, but since he was also a piece of property,

the state had to consider the master's property rights.

Under an 1852 statute, the state of Texas paid the owner

half of the appraised value of a slave that was legally 31

executed. If a slave accused of a crime was summarily hanged by mob action or otherwise killed before being tried, his owner frequently petitioned the state legislature for l compensation. One such petition was filed on behalf of

John S. McClellan of Bexar County, who had two slaves executed for burglary and rape without a trial and another on behalf of D.P. Fowler of Smith County, whose slave was lynched for murder and rape. The grounds for both petitions were that

the slaves were guilty and would have been executed anyway, so the state owed the owners half of their value.32 Generally, however, the state assumed responsibility only for those executed under its laws and by order of its courts. The purpose of offering such indemnity was to encourage owners 31 Laws of Texas, 3:911-912. 32 Texas, Legislature, Senate, Journal, 7th Leg., reg. sess., 24 December 1857, pp. 255-257. 22 of slaves who had committed crimes to help locate them and to turn them over to the proper authorities.

The laws of Texas did guarantee the slave certain rights, such as trial by jury and a court appointed defense 33 council in felony cases. Undoubtedly the laws were designed to protect the limited rights of the slave in the abstract, but the system itself dictated that the slave's rights had

to be limited by his subordinate role, and again his dual nature as both human and property presented a paradox.

Since he was property the owner had to have nearly complete

control of the slave, but still as a human being he was

theoretically under the protection of the state. Unfortunately

for the slave, the owner's property rights took precedence '

over the black's human rights.

In reality the slave was a ward of his master, and the master could do almost anything to him that he desired. No matter how severe or unjust a slave's punishment, he had no

right to resist his- master, even if he thought his own life 34 or that of his family was in danger. Many punishments that

the slaves suffered should have been rendered them only by 33 Laws of Texas, 3:1298-1301. 34 Ibid., 4:1058-1059. 23 a court of law, but because of the owner's control over his property and because of the problems involved in making legal charges against slaves, slaveholders usually punished the blacks as they saw fit and seldom took legal action.

The accepted practice was for the owner to handle such offenses as stealing and vandalism when his own property was involved. The owner realized that he was relatively safe in his actions against a bondsman. Few indeed are the records indicating that whites were punished for offenses against slaves, and many are the accounts of mistreatment of 35 slaves by their masters, even to the point of death. In order to make the slave system effective the master believed that he had to have absolute control over his slaves, even concerning their life or death, and the state was not 3 6 expected to interpose its authority. In a world that so strongly believed in the inferiority of the black man, treatment that kept him in a subordinate role was condoned.

Treatment of the law-abiding, docile slave varied from one owner to another in Texas, just as it did throughout the South. The slave living on a properly conducted southern 35 Annual Report of the American Anti-Slavery Society, I860, pp. 203-206. 3 6 Stampp, Peculiar Institution, pp. 141, 144-146. 24 holding was better off materially than many free Negroes 37 in either the North or the South. Many owners realized the need for humane treatment because of the financial investment that they had in slaves and believed that a slave who was fairly treated would be a better worker than one who was mistreated. Numerous slaveholders shared the sentiments of Thomas M. League, a large landholding Galveston citizen. i He wrote his son, who was attending school in the North,

"My Slaves to me, are part of my Family and I would as soon think of Selling one of My own Children as one of them."

However, not all masters shared his views, because, as he wrote, "some [slaves] are badly treated there is no doubt, but in the main, they are a hundred fold better of [sic] 3 8 than the Free black in the North."

Undoubtedly a number of humane men like League owned slaves and treated them with kindness, satisfying at least their material needs. Abel Smalton Beardsley, a visitor from the North in Anderson, Texas, in 1851, wrote to his sister in Plymouth, Connecticut, portraying Texas slavery in a favorable light. According to his correspondence, he had 37 Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, 1:12. 3 8 League to Thomas Jefferson League, 21 August 1850, Thomas M. League Papers, Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas. 25 never seen slaves treated as well as were those belonging to the man he was visiting. "A happier set I never saw than these negroes, as, there is an abundance of everything provided and they fare just as well as the boarders." He reported frequently seeing "one or two little negroes with

roast beef, beef steak, sweet Potatoes or something of

this kind in hand and grease from ear to ear." But he

speculated that "I suppose all the Slaves in Texas do not 39

fare as well," undoubtedly a correct observation.

Other observers of the institution in Texas, such as

Frederick Law 01mstead, saw another picture. He believed

that the slaveowners of Texas were interested only in their

own economic gains and cared nothing about the health and well-being of the Negroes. He contended that they were treated worse than in the other parts of the South that he 40 visited. Without question the treatment of slaves varied

from master to master and from slave to slave. The real

tragedy was the dehumanizing psychological effect that the 39 Beardsley to Elizabeth Beardsley, 17 October 1951, Abel Smalton and Jane Beardsley Letters, Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas. 40 Frederick Law Olmsted, A Journey Through Texas: A Saddle-trip on the Southwestern Frontier, With Statistical Appendix (New York: Dix Edwards and Company, 1857), p. 59. 26 institution and the racial attitudes of the white had on the black.

Convinced that the Negro was inferior and that only when the black was enslaved could the two races coexist,

Texans were extremely intolerant of free blacks. Believing that their presence upset the social structure, Texans passed laws so oppressive to free Negroes that their number was very small in the state. A law passed in 1840, but remaining in effect after annexation, ordered all free

Negroes from the state and prohibited free blacks from migrating into Texas unless they had special permission from the legislature. Any Negro remaining or immigrating into the state was subject to being sold into slavery for life if he refused to leave after due warning.^ Evidently this law was not always enforced as the United States

Census of 1850 recorded 397 free Negroes in the state. Ten years later the census placed the number at only 355, indicating that while the white population increased by

173 per cent and the slave population by 214 per cent, the

41 Laws of Texas, 2:325-326; Texas, Constitution, 1845, Art. 13, sec. 3 states that all laws not contrary to the United States Constitution would remain in effect upon annexation. 27 42 free Negro population declined by 11 per cent. Even

these low census figures were probably somewhat high because

at least in some instances Mexicans were listed on the

United States census rolls as Negroes while on the county 43 rolls as Mexicans. One such case occurred in the Calhoun

County census of 1860, when nine Mexicans were listed on 44 the United States rolls as free Negroes. Apparently

Texans' hatred for the free Negro, coupled with the possibil-

ities of their being sold into slavery or suffering some

other undesirable fate, was enough to greatly limit the

number of free blacks in the state.^

In the mind of ante-bellum Texans, restrictions on free

Negroes were essential to maintaining the slave system.

They believed, with justification, that the presence of

free blacks endangered the entire institution and the social 42 Statistical View of the United States: A Compendium of the Seventh Census, 1850 (Washington: Beverley Tucker, Senate Printer, 1854), pp. 71, 82; U.S. Census, 1860, pp. 496, 596, 599. 43 Andrew Forest Muir, "The Free Negro in Jefferson and Orange Counties, Texas," Journal of Negro History 35(1950):183 44 Andrew Forest Muir, "The Free Negro in Fort Bend County, Texas," Journal of Negro History 33(1949):79. 45 Earl W. Fornell, "The Abduction of Free Negroes and Slaves in Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 60(1957): 311 • 28 structure of the state. If the free black were allowed

in the state at all, he had to be strictly controlled and 46 kept in constant fear of the white man. The Texan's

attitudes toward the free Negro indicated his paranoia

about racial disorders and his entrenched belief that no

system other than slavery could maintain order. A majority

report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1849

expressed the prevailing opinion concerning free blacks.

Reporting on a request made in the will .of D.L. Richardson

to free two slaves upon his death, the committee held that

there should be no free Negroes where slavery existed since

they made the slaves envious and desirous of freedom. Not

being able to obtain freedom for themselves, they became

discontented and unhappy, "thereby depreciated in value, and

often [became] entirely worthless. And not only so, but as

the number of these, who are free, increases, the evils are multiplied in porportion, and the final result, not unfre-

quently is, insubordination, insurrection and general massacre."

If any slave was set free, the report concluded, he should 4 7 be sent from the state.

46 , Ibid. 47 Texas, Legislature, Senate, Journal, 3d Leg., reg. sess., 12 December 1849, p. 230. 29

Existing somewhere between slavery and freedom, the free Negroes, who were discriminated against in a number of ways, could never hope to acquire financial or social status.

Like the slaves they could not expect fair treatment under

the Texas laws. When accused of a crime, they could be whipped, forced to work on county projects or sold into

slavery, and they were likely to be sent from the state at 4 8 any time. There was no rung on the Texas social ladder

for free blacks, but Texans generously offered them an

alternative to their uncertain status by providing that upon

reaching the age of fourteen any free Negro could choose his 49 master and voluntarily become a slave.

Although the oppressive laws were not always enforced,

free blacks were frequently the victims of discriminatory

legislation. Whites were especially fearful that free

Negroes would tamper with the institution of slavery and

provided harsh punishments for influencing slaves. In 1852,

when several free Negroes reportedly from Boston, Massachusetts,,

were convicted of attempting to entice a slave to run away

from his master, they were sold into slavery for life. Their 48 Laws of Texas, 4:1061. 49 Ibid., pp. 947-949. 30 sentence was in accordance with a law which provided that if a guilty free Negro could not pay a fine equal to the value of the slave tampered with, he would be sold into slavery.

In a slave society this was a terrible offense, one for which black and white men were frequently executed.^

Without doubt opposition to free Negro status increased in the latter part of the 1850's as the number of slaves in Texas increased and the abolitionist sentiment became 51 more widespread and vocal. Texas, which had not always enforced laws controlling free Negroes, began to tighten restrictions as the crisis of 1860-1861 drew nearer, and public opinion opposed manumission of slaves even more strongly. In December, 1856, the Marshall Texas Republican, in a bitter editorial, attacked Gabriel Moore, a large slaveholder, who had provided for the manumission of his fifteen slaves upon his death. The slaves were freed but only under the condition that they leave the state. Moore

and others like him were considered among the worst enemies 52 of the institution. The Texas press, even strongly Unionist

^ Ledger, 12, 19 February 1852.

^New York Day Book as cited in Marshall Harrison Flag, 20 August 1858. 52 Marshall Texas Republican, 6 December 1856. 31 newspapers, like the Austin Southern Intelligencer, violently attacked anyone who freed their slaves by a will. The

Intelligencer contended that, "Of all the enemies to the institution of slavery, those misadvised owners who, by their last wills manumit their slaves are the worse." The same paper editorialized for the state legislature to pass 53 laws preventing manumission in the state.

Undaunted by outside attacks on their system, Texans maintained their tremendous faith in slavery as a workable, profitable, and perpetual part of the southern way of life.

The prices of slaves and the amount of money that Texans had invested in them remained extremely high even after the

Civil War actually broke out. The average field hand brought between $1200 and $2000 in 1860, and even more might be paid for an exceptional worker.54 Females too brought attractive prices. In 1859 William Pitt Ballinger, successful

Galveston lawyer and businessman and later an opponent of secession, took a Negro woman on trial before purchase whose asking price was $1800. In 1860 he took on trial a fifteen-

53 Austin Southern Intelligencer, 5 January 1859. 54 Annual Report of the American Anti-Slavery Society, 1860, pp. 34-35. 32 55 year-old Negro girl whose owner was asking $1225. Since

Negroes brought premium prices in Texas, slave traders from

older slave states brought thousands into the new state. The

number increased from 58,161 in 1850 to 182,566 in 1860, a much more rapid rate of growth than in any other state.^

Another important gauge of Texans1 confidence in the

system was the large amount of capital invested in slaves

as compared to the money invested in farms in the state. In

1860 slaveholders had 20 per cent more money invested in

slaves than all the farmers in Texas had invested in their

farms. The total assessed value of slaves in 1860 was

$106,688,920, which placed the assessed value of each slave

at $672. This average value had almost doubled during the 5 7 decade, the assessed value in 1850 being $362. Since this

assessment was made for taxation purposes, it was probably much lower than the actual value or appraised selling price. 55Diary of William Pitt Ballinger, 13 December 1859, 19 January, 28 July 1860, Ballinger Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas. <

56U.S. Census, 1860, pp. 338, 599. Whereas the total number of slaves in the South increased by only less than 24 per cent, the slave increase in Texas was 214 per cent. The only state which increased its slave population by more than 50 per cent was Arkansas which had an increase of 136 per cent, 5 7 Richardson, Texas: The Lone Star State, p. 162. 33

Even with the high prices that slaves brought and with the traders rapidly importing them into the state, the supply never filled the demand. Annexation had opened millions of acres of land upon which cotton could be produced, and

t Texans were desperate for an abundance of slaves at a reasonable price. By the second half of the 1850 's Texans realized that the domestic and illegal foreign slave trade plus the natural reproduction of slaves would never supply their needs, much less provide the numbers that would be 5 8 necessary if the institution spread into the territories.

This insatiable demand, coupled with the sincere belief that the Negroes' proper role could only be fulfilled in slavery, led to a popular movement in Texas to re-open the African slave trade, which had been closed in the United States since 1807. Since Texas had larger expanses of uncultivated lands than the other southern states, Texans were more anxious than other southerners to reopen the trade. Some southern states, where soil depletion was a problem and most usable lands were already under cultivation, actually had more slaves than were needed. Therefore they could condemn this horrendous 5 8 Austin Texas State Gazette, 18 December 1858; Clarks- ville Northern Standard, 19 February 1859. 34 phase of slavery, but many Texans saw nothing immoral in the trade. Thus not only had Texans adopted slavery at a time when world opinion opposed it, but in the 1850*s they were urging its expansion and demanding more and more slaves, in spite of the fact that criticisms of the institu-

• * 59 tion were growing more intense.

Texans considered the institution of slavery their most important asset as a state in the ante-bellum South and regarded it as an essential part of their social structure.

With it, they could dream of occupying a place in the South, and possibly in the entire Union, second to none. Without it, Texas was just another state among many, one with vast resources but lacking the labor supply to develop them.

Slavery could solve the problem of labor shortage and enable

Texans to reap vast profits from the land. At the same time, the institution provided a system of race control that Texans believed essential to their way of life. Both their desire for a greater labor supply and their racial attitudes made them staunch supporters of the system. Nevertheless, they were strong Union men, and as long as slavery was safe in the Union they expressed strong love for their country. Only 59 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the reopening of the African slave trade. 35 when their institution seemed directly threatened were they willing to renounce this love. They favored anything that

advanced the institution, even the barbaric slave trade,

and opposed anything that threatened it, even the Union.

Texas was first a community that needed and defended slavery

as a positive good and second a community that believed in

the permanence of the Union. CHAPTER II

UNION AND THE ROOTS OF DISUNION

In February, 1846, Texans greeted annexation to the

Union with tremendous enthusiasm, never doubting that the institution of slavery was secure, but before the end of the year the Wilmot Proviso had shaken their confidence in the Union, foreshadowing the crisis of 1860-1861. Texas' reaction to the Proviso indicated that while their Unionist sentiment was sincere in the annexation struggle, they would support the Union only as long as it protected slavery. The people of Texas voted for annexation with the clear under- standing that slavery would be maintained within the state and the sincere belief that it would be expanded. To

Texans, the Proviso was a violation of a sacred trust. Even when they entered the Union, Texans considered interfering with slavery or prohibiting it unconditionally in the terri- tories to be grounds for secession. Being strong advocates of the southern state rights philosophy, they believed that they could leave the Union in much the same manner that they joined it.

36 37

Although Texas won its. independence in 1836, its status as a new nation was uncertain since Mexico refused to recognize independence and threatened war if annexation came

about. The uncertain military situation, as well as the strong social, economic, and political ties with the United

States, made the people extremely anxious for annexation.

They also faced serious economic problems and felt the need for order and stability, which they believed annexation would bring. In 1836 in the first general elections of the

Republic of Texas the people were presented with a popular referendum concerning annexation. They voted overwhelmingly

in favor of joining the United States, the vote being 3,277 for and 91 against. During the next ten years, Texans and

their friends in the United States made several attempts to join the Republic to the Union, but primarily because of

slavery, the northern states blocked these attempts."^

To many Americans, dreams for Texas' development were

a part of the whole concept of manifest destiny of the United

States. Though some Texans dreamed of a powerful independent

republic stretching to the Pacific Ocean, for the most part

1 i Eugence C. Barker, "The Annexation of Texas," South- western Historical Quarterly SO(1946):52-55; George P. Garrison, Texas: A Contest of Civilizations (Boston: Houghton- Mifflin and Company, 1903), pp. 162-164, 255-257. 38

Texas' ambitions were from the first linked with those of the United States. Even while Texas was a part of Mexico* they had looked to the day when it would become a state in the Union. Many Texans believed that with a stable government

Texas could become the most important state in the Union.

The population was small--only 40,000 when independence was secured--and the resources undeveloped, but men like Sam 2 Houston were optimistic about Texas' potentialities.

Unfortunately for Texas, however, the annexation question came at a politically inopportune time in the United States.

At a time when anti-slavery agitation was becoming a major issue in the North and the South was more fearful of this agitation than ever before, both sides realized that "Texas is to be a great Slave country--a market for the Slave breeders of our older Slave States, and a virgin soil for the Cotton 3 and Sugar Planters of the newer States." Thus slavery became the key issue in the annexation controversy. If the institution was to be maintained and expanded, many southerners 2 Texas, Legislature, House, Journal, 1st Leg., reg. sess., 19 February 1846, p. 17; Oran Roberts, A Description of Texas, Its Advantages and Resources, With Some Account of Their Development, Past, Present and Future (St. Louis: Gilbert Book Company, 1881), pp. 21-22; Melinda Ranking, Texas (Boston: Damrell and Moore, 1850), pp. 14-15. 3 New York Tribune, 4 March 1845, clipping in, Harold A. Larrabee Collection, Texas State Library, (Austin, Texas. 39 believed that annexation of Texas was essential. Abel P.

Upshur, Secretary of State in 1843-1844 and a strong supporter of annexation, contended that Texas "cannot maintain that

institution [slavery] ten years [without annexation] probably 4 • i not half that time." While Texas' status was uncertain and

her government unstable, slaveholders were not likely to

jeapordize their property by migrating into the Republic.

Other southern states felt that if slavery failed to gain a

firm hold in Texas, their interests would suffer. Several

state legislatures, among them Tennessee, , and

Mississippi, passed resolutions favoring annexation on the

grounds that Great Britain might win control of Texas, abolish

slavery, and from there attack the institution in the other

slave states.** The southern states also realized that

annexation would extend their power politically, giving them

additional influence in Congress. John C. Calhoun, who became

Secretary of State upon the death of Upshur in 1844, strongly

supported annexation on the grounds that it was necessary to

4 Quoted in Theodore Parker, The Rights of Man in America (1911; reprint ed., New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969) , p. 62.

^U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 1st sess., 1844, 13, pt. 1:408-409; George L. Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 1:691-692; Barker, "Annex- ation of Texas," pp. 60-61. 40 the slave interests of the other southern states. It would prove that slavery was an expanding institution and open the way hopefully for further expansion.^

Anti-slavery men opposed annexation for much the same reasons that pro-slavery men supported it. They believed that "The annexation of Texas is but another name for 'the 7 perpetuity of slavery.'" Northern opposition to annexation indicated that public opinion was opposed to slavery and that the people hoped to prevent its expansion. Northern intellec- tuals, such as William Ellery Channing, a Unitarian minister and Boston abolitionist, had long opposed slavery and now objected to annexation, believing slavery was the real g motivation for it. By the 1840's political spokesmen had become involved in the move to halt the expansion of slavery. Calhoun to Richard Pakenham, 18 April 1844, U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mess age from the President of the United States Transmitting the Rejected Treaty for the Annexation of the Republic of Texas to the United States, Together with the Accompanying Documents, 28th Cong., 1st sess., 1844, H. Doc. 271, pp. 50-53; Frederick Jackson Turner, The United States, 1830-1850: The Nation and Its Sections (1935; reprint ed., New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1965), p. 521; Morrison, Democratic Politics and Sectionalism, p. 5. 7 Theodore Sedwick, Thoughts on the Proposed Annexation of Texas (New York: D. Fanshaw, 1844), p. 38. 8 William E. Channing, The Works of Wi11iam E. Channing (Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1889), p. 759. 41

Charles Hudson, representative from Massachusetts, said that he "opposed the annexation of'Texas because I believe 9 that it was designed to extend the institution of slavery."

John Quincy Adams, House member from Massachusetts, and a number of other northern congressmen in 1843 signed and circulated a petition directed to "The People of the Free

States of the Union." They contended that although other issues were involved, slavery was by far the most significant consideration in the annexation controversy. Contending that annexation was unconstitutional, the congressmen believed that if Texas became a state the free states would be justified in leaving the Union. A number of state legislatures also opposed annexation--Massachusetts, New

Jersey, and Ohio among them--stressing opposition to slavery.^

Clearly, as the New York Tribune stated, the two sections were aligned against each other on the question of bringing 12 Texas into the Union and expanding slavery. Because of Texas' unique status as an independent I republic, the method of annexation posed a major problem for

9 U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Globe, Appendix, 30 Cong., 1st sess., 1848, 20, pt. 2:667. 10Barker, "Annexation of Texas," pp. 60-61; Turner, The United States, pp. 511-513. "^Rives, United States and Mexico, 1:691-692. 12 New York Tribune, clipping in Larrabee Collection. 42 its supporters. The Senate alone has treaty-making power, and since two independent nations were involved, negotiation of a treaty was the most logical and constitutional method of bringing Texas into the Union. But approval required two-thirds agreement in the Senate, and with northern opposi- tion to annexation being so strong its proponents had no real hope of ratifying such a treaty. In April 1844 a treaty was negotiated to admit Texas by this method, but in

June the rejected it by the overwhelming 13 vote of sixteen to thirty-five.

Rejection of the treaty came just in time to make annexation the major campaign issue in the presidential election of 1844. Undaunted by their failure in the Senate, pro-Texas forces continued to press the issue and won control of the Democratic party. Turning down Martin Van Buren, at least partially because of his refusal to support annex- ation, the Democrats chose as their candidate James K. Polk, an ardent expansionist who supported immediate annexation.

The Whig candidate, Henry Clay, tried to take a moderate i r 14 stand, refusing to support immediate annexation. Polk won

13 U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 1st sess., 1844, 13, pt. 1:652. 14 Charles S. Syndor, The Development of Southern Section- alism , 1819-1848 (Baton Rouge: State University Press, 1948), pp. 322-324; Rives, United States and Mexico, 1:623-632. 43 by a narrow margin, but President interpreted the Democratic victory as a public mandate for annexation and pushed for this end vigorously, placing the issue before - 15 Congresr s once again.

Realizing that they had no chance of bringing Texas in under a treaty, the pro-annexation forces now changed their tactics. With the support of the President, they introduced in the House a joint resolution, which needed only a simple majority of both houses to pass. The House passed the resolution with little difficulty on January 25,

1845, by a vote of 120 to 98.^ Upon receiving it from the

House, the Senate referred the resolution to the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations. The committee report on the bill opposed passage on the grounds that it was uncon- stitutional since only the Senate could negotiate an agreement 17 with an independent republic. After a vigorous floor

15 Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, 1828-1848 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 190; Edwin Dale Odom, "The Texas Question as a Factor in the Sectional Struggle" (M.A. thesis, North Texas State University, 1956), p. 112. 16 U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Globe, 28th Cons., 2d sess., 1845, 14, pt. 1:193-194; Van Deusen, Jacksonian Era, pp. 190. 17 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report: The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which have been Referred Sundry Joint Resolutions and a Bill on the Subject of the Annexation of_ Texas, and also Sundry Instructions 44 battle, the resolution passed the Senate on February 27,

1845, by the narrow margin of 27 to 25, but this was all 18 that was needed to offer Texas statehood.

The terms of annexation provided that Texas would be admitted as a state without going through territorial status. Texas was to keep its public lands and apply proceeds from them to the payment of its debts. Boundary questions were to be settled by the United States, and as many as four new states might be formed from Texas territory if the new state agreed. Slavery was to be continued in Texas but prohibited in any state formed above the 36°30' line.19

The people of Texas overwhelmingly supported annexation.

President called a special state convention, as stipulated in the terms of the resolution, to decide whether to accept the terms that the United States Congress offered.

In a last minute effort to keep Texas from joining the Union,

Mexico offered to recognize its independence if the Republic would reject annexation. When the state legislature met, it

0£ State Legislatures, and Memorials and Petitions on the Same Under Consideration, and Report, 28th Cong., 2d~sess., 1844, S. Doc. 78, p. 23. 18 U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 2d sess., 1845, 14, pt. 2:362. 19 Ibid., pp. 362-363. 45 rejected Mexico's offer and by a unanimous vote urged 20 acceptance of the United States terms of annexation.

When the convention met only one vote was cast against annexation before the delegates proceeded to draw up a state constitution. The terms of annexation were submitted to a popular vote in October, 1845, and by a vote of 4,254 21 to 257 Texans approved them. On February 19, 1846, Texas officially became the twenty-eighth state in the Union.

Annexation of Texas was a significant victory for the pro- slavery forces, bringing the total number of slave states 22 to fifteen as opposed to only thirteen free states.

When news of the Senate's approval of annexation reached Texas, the citizens went wild with jubilation;

Union flags were quickly raised, tar barrels burned, powder exploded, bonfires blazed, and liquid refreshments consumed 23 in abundance20 . On February 19, 1846, Anson Jones, the last William C. Binkley, The Expansionist Movement in Texas, 1836-1850 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1925), pp. 127-128; Ralph R. Swafford. "Anson Jones and the Diplomacy of " (M.A. thesis, North Texas State University, 1961) , p. 89. 21 Richardson, Texas: The Lone Star State, p. 123. 22 The balance of free and slave states was upset in 1845- 1846 with the admission of Florida and Texas, but was reestab- lished before 1850 with the admission of Iowa and Wisconsin. 23 Memoirs of Mary Ann Nicholson McDowall, 1832-1852, James Nicholson Family Papers, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas, pp. 6-7. 46

President of the Republic, surrendered his authority to

J. Pinckney Henderson, the state's first governor, amidst a general feeling of enthusiasm for Texas' new status.

Texans were especially proud because annexation had come about with "no violence of the sword . . .; but in the best spirit of the age, . . ., by the free consent of the people of the two republics.President Jones told the First

Legislature of the state that he was very pleased that annexation came about "not by violence and disorder, but by the deliberate and free consent of its citizens; and amid the most perfect and universal peace and tranquility, the sov- ereignty of the nation is surrendered and incorporated with 25 that of another."

Jones' statement was an accurate description of what most Texans believed they had done when they joined the Union; this is, they had merely incorporated the sovereignty that they already held with that of the United States. Never admitting that Texas had surrendered its sovereignty, the people still believed the state to be in full control of its own affairs and expected no interference from national 24 Francis R. Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas, or Memoirs of Francis Richard Lubbock, ed. C.W. Rains (Austin: Ben C. Jones and Company, 1900), p. 177. 25 Texas, Legislature, Senate, Journal, 1st Leg., reg. sess., 19 February 1846, p. 12. 47 2 6 agencies. As the secession crisis drew nearer, Texans used their former status as an independent republic and their voluntary entrance into the Union as justification for peaceful disunion. During their struggle for independence

and during the years of the Republic, Texans had developed

intense feelings of individualism. They reasoned that if a

free people can by popular vote decide to join a republic, 27 they can by popular referendum vote to leave that republic.

To substantiate their position, they needed only to apply

the southern concept of state rights and to this philosophy

add the justification of having existed as a sovereign

republic and having joined the United States voluntarily.

The concept of state rights, as old as the Union itself,

allowed Texans to believe that they had become a state in

the Union without really surrendering authority. The unique

system of government established by the United States

Constitution provided for a federal system with sovereignty

divided between state and national governments. Since the

2 (3 Benjamin R. Wallace to , 16 January 1849, Thomas Jefferson Rusk Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas; Galveston Weekly News, 19 January 1849, 16 January 1850. 27 Austin Texas State Gazette, 11 February 1854, 26 Decem- ber 1857; Corsicana Navarro Express, 16 November 1860; B.T. Archer, "Texas and Her Resources," De Bow's Review, 19 (July, 1855):26. 48 beginning of the Union each time a state or section felt its position to be a minority one, the state rights philosophy had been invoked. Though other sections had used it in the past, by the mid-1800's it was primarily a southern doctrine.

Southerners were becoming conscious of their minority position and felt that the state rights philosophy gave them the theoretical basis they needed to defend slavery in the face of growing opposition. According to the southern interpre- tation, the Union resulted from a voluntary compact between the states, and the ultimate source of political power still rested with the individual states. Since the states had created the national government, it owed its existence to them. They had ratified the Constitution through state conventions, making the national government merely an agency of the states. Because the Union was a voluntary compact made by sovereign powers, the states could, with adequate justification, secede from it. Since most Texans, being migrants from the southern states, accepted this concept of the nation that they were joining, they considered annexation as being little threat to their political sovereignty.

During the fifteen years between annexation and secession, Texas prospered at an unprecedented rate. Realizing the significance of annexation, Texas leaders anticipated the 49 result of the Republic becoming a state. Jones voiced the sentiments of most Texans when he stated that he was well

"satisfied that the happiness and welfare of Texas are placed on a strong and secure foundations" with annexation.

He continued that "With such a population as Texas possesses, a genial climate and a fertile soil, it will be her own fault if she does not reach an importance, and a social 2 8 elevation, not surpassed by any community on earth."

Before long Texas seemed well on the way to achieving this prosperity.

Texans believed that slavery was essential to the realization of their dreams and believed that with annex- ation the institution would not only be safe but would become more important than ever. Oran M. Roberts, a leader in the secessionist movement in 1860-1861 and governor of the state after the Civil War, favored annexation because he believed that in order to grow and develop, Texas needed protection for its property and annexation provided this protection.29

He was concerned primarily with protection of slave property, and when the Union no longer seemed to offer this he became a secessionist. But in the 1840's, he, like most Texans, 2 8 Texas, Legislature, House, Journal, 1st Leg., reg. sess., 19 February 1846, p. 17. 29 Roberts, Description of Texas, p. 21. 50 was hopeful that the state would become a great slave power.

The people of Texas saw 110 limit to what could be accomplished with statehood, and their optimism was not without basis. In the state's first decade and a half in the Union, property value in Texas increased by over 800 per cent, and the population grew at the astounding rate of 30 over 400 per cent. Moreover, slavery was firmly established, and the institution grew rapidly in the .fertile soil of the new state. In 1849, P. Hansborough Bell, governor of Texas from 1849 to 1853, in his first message to the Texas legis- lature stated that since a large portion of the state was suitable for cotton and sugar production, crops which he believed could only be produced by slave labor, the number of slaves in Texas might pass the total in any other state 31 in the Union. Northerners who had expressed the fear that

Texas would become a great slave power seemed justified in their views.

The fires celebrating the annexation of Texas were still glowing when a little-known representative from Pennsylvania,

David Wilmot, introduced a bill in the House of Representatives 30 Richardson, Texas: The Lone Star State, p. 125. 31 Texas, Legislature, Senate, Journal, 3d Leg., reg. sess., 26 December 1849, p. 305. 51 on August 8, 184$, that became an important link in the chain of events leading to secession. Relations with Mexico had become strained when Texas joined the Union, and expansionists in the United States, hoping to gain more territory from

Mexico, had agitated for war, which broke out in 1846.

Many northerners, especially the anti-slavery groups, opposed the war, seeing it as an attempt to gain even more slave territory. Wilmot's bill, known as the Wilmot Proviso, was attached to an appropriation bill to negotiate with Mexico and was intended to prohibit the development of slavery in any territory that might be acquired from Mexico as a result 32 of the conflict. Texas had barely settled into the Union when this bill seemed to threaten all that it had hoped to gain through annexation.

The Proviso was the first concrete expression of the northern stand on slavery that had been developing since before Texas became a state. By the late 1840's the majority opinion in the North was that slavery should be contained where it already existed and not expanded into the territories.

While it could not constitutionally be legislated against in the states where it already existed, preventing its growth 32 Horace Greeley, ed., A Political Text-Book for 1860 (New York: Tribune Association, 1860), p. 71; U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Globe, 29th Cong., 1st sess., 1846, 15, pt. 1:1217. 52 would, northerners believed, ultimately destroy it. Most of the people in the North who opposed the annexation of

Texas did so because it expanded slavery, and the Proviso was intended to prevent expansion from reoccurring. With its introduction, the free states warned the South, including

Texas, that they would allow no further expansion of the 33 peculiar institution. In the next few years, the bill passed the House on several occasions only to be defeated in the Senate. It failed there, not because the majority of the people of the United States opposed it, but because the South held a disproportionate share of power in the

Senate and because some northern Senators were moving more slowly than the people who elected them. As the numerous

House passages of the Proviso indicated, the line had been drawn with the annexation of Texas--there would be no more expansion of the evil institution.34

The Proviso and the northern support that it received indicated to many Texans that a firm stand had been taken 33 James Stryker, "Slavery," American Quarterly Register 2 (1849) : 173; Thedore C. Smith, Parties and Slavery, 1850-1859 (1907; reprint ed., New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 3; Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1964), pp. 8-9; Morrison, Democratic Politics and Sectionalism, p. 53. 34 Stryker, "Slavery," p. 173; Smith, Parties and Slavery, p. 3. 53 against the expansion of slavery, but having seen the North back down from southern threats time and time again, few 35 realized the finality of the stand. The rank and file in

Texas were occupied with making a living and could not become too disturbed about a threat to slavery unless it seemed immediate. Those who did see the bill as a turning point were, in many cases, very vocal, believing that unless the North did back down the next step might possibly be a stand against slavery where it existed. Texans let the world know how they viewed their role in the nation and what action they would take if they ever believed that the •7 £L existence of slavery were seriously threatened. The reaction to the Proviso in both the North and South fore- shadowed the stand that both sections later took on the road to disunion.

An overwhelming majority of the Texans who opposed the

Proviso and threatened disunion over it had approved annexation and were strong Union men, as long as the southern concept of the Union went unchallenged and as long as the

Union benefitted their interests. The southern philosophy 35 Galveston Weekly News, 15 December 1848; Marshall Texas Republican, 20 December 1849. 3 6 Marshall Texas Republican, 11 October 1849; Galveston Weekly News, 19 January, 11 February 1850. 54 of state rights dictated that the North and South had equal rights in the territories and that Congres's, neither through its national agencies nor through territorial governments, could interfere with the institution of slavery before a territory became a state. In opposing the Proviso, Texans made it clear that if the rights of the state as they under- stood them when they entered the Union were ever violated they would take whatever action they deemed necessary, even if it meant secession. They hoped that threats of disunion would cause the North to back down.

In Texas opposition to the Proviso came from many sources, including public officials, newspapers, the state legislature, and mass meetings. Realizing that it was an ' expression of the growing abolition sentiment in the North, public leaders expressed general Texas resentment. Speaking to the Texas legislature in early December, 1847, Governor

J. Pinckney Henderson referred to the Proviso's supporters as aggressors against the right of property. He contended that Texas slaveholders had the right to take their property into the territory acquired as a result of the war and urged the South to meet with force any attempt of the North to 3 7 prevent them from doing so. Later that same month, newly

37 Texas, Legislature, Senate, Journal, 2d Leg., reg. sess., 15 December 1847, pp. 16-17. 55 inaugurated Governor George T. Wood warned of the dangers portended by the Proviso and the growing abolition sentiment 3 8 that it represented. He indicated that before the end of his administration the abolition movement could bring horrible consequences to the South. In his address to the legislature in November, 1849, he summed up what Texans really feared would be the result of the agitation, fears that later lay at the core of the secession movement. He contended that he saw no abatement of the efforts of the abolitionists at the North to agitate the question of slavery. It is respectfully conceived, that there has been already too much said upon this subject--one not admitted by the South to be debateable,--for we cannot view it as a question involving merely the continuance or abolition of slavery. Their interference involves other and far more serious consequences; for the tendency is to foment and encourage servile insurrection--the con- flagrationqof our homes--the murder of our wives and children.

Thus slavery was not the only issue involved; more significant to Texans were the effects that emancipation might have on the state's white population. Both Wood and Henderson had staunchly supported annexation, but they were beginning to realize that the mood of the North was changing.

3 8 Ibid., 29 December 1847, p. 82. 39 Ibid., 3d Leg., reg. sess., 6 November 1849, pp. 21-22. 56

The Texas legislature also expressed fear of the Proviso's

possible ramifications by passing a joint resolution against

it. The state legislature warned "that any attempt on the

part of the Congress of the United States to interfere with

the domestic and internal policy of the States or Territories,

is unwarranted by the Constitution of the United States, and

in violation of the rights of the States." Since the Consti-

tution recognized slavery, Congress had no authority to do

away with it either in the states or in the territories. The

resolution continued, "We will not submit to any law, which

prohibits the citizens of the Southern States, from taking

their property to any territory which may be acquired from

Mexico." In conclusion the resolution pointed out

that we deny the right of Congress of the United States, to pass any law prohibiting any State, that may hereafter be admitted into the Union, from coming in, either with or without slavery, as the popular voice of such State may determine. This principle we will not yield.

Submitting to the Proviso was tantamount to admitting that

slavery was wrong and should be contained.

By far the harshest and probably the most significant

attack on the Proviso and the abolitionists came from the newspapers of the state. In the 1840's Texas editors were almost unanimous in their support of both slavery and the

40 Laws of Texas, 3:132-133. 57

Union, but it was already evident that if they had to choose between the two their choice would be slavery. The Galveston

Weekly News, for example, warned that if Congress persisted in its attempt to interfere with slavery, sooner or later conflict between the North and South woulcf result, as the latter had rather see the nation "dismembered to morrow [sic]" than see it submit "to the imprudent and degrading demands 41 of 'Free Soil.'" The Marshall Texas Republican, after declaring its love of the Union and its desire to maintain it at all cost, said that it would be willing to see the nation disrupted unless the southern state rights interpre- tation was applied to the Constitution. The newspaper editorialized that prohibiting slavery, either in the territories or in the states, would invalidate the compact 4 7 between the states and thus cause disunion.

Protest against the Proviso also came in the form of resolutions passed in public mass meetings across the state.

Such meetings became increasingly popular in the 1850's and 41„ , Galveston Weekly News, 15 December 1849. 42 Marshall Texas Republican, 20 December 1848. For the role of southern newspapers in the coming of the Civil War see, Donald E. Reynolds, Editors Make War: Southern News- papers in the Secession Crisis (Nashville: Vanderbilt Univer- sity Press, 1970). Reynolds contends that the southern newspapers generally reflected rather than established public opinion. 58 early 1860's as the people protested against what they believed to be infringments of their rights. One such meet- ing- -typical of many others--was held at the Harrison County

Court House in early 1848 to oppose the Proviso. The citizens adopted a resolution stating that the federal government had no constitutional authority to interfere with the expansion of slavery into the territories. Since all territories belonged to the states, southern as well as northern property must be protected there, argued the resolutions; furthermore, the Union was made up of sovereign states that retained all powers not granted to the federal government, and any attempt of either the national or territorial governments to limit slavery would give the 43 southern states adequate justification for secession.

Newspapers reported that such meetings were well attended and expressed the majority sentiment of the citizens in the 44 areas in which they were held.

Texans' anger against the non-expansionist principle was further aroused when Congress attempted to organize the

Oregon territory with the Wilmot Proviso attached. After the treaty between Great Britain and the United States in 43 Galveston Weekly News, 16 January 1848. 44 Ibid.; Clarksville Northern Standard, 12 February 1848 59

1846, which established the northwestern boundary between the two countries, the United States was anxious to create a territorial government in Oregon as soon as possible.

In early 1847, the House voted on a bill to organize the new territory stipulating that slavery would be prohibited 45

there. Many congressmen believed that the provision was unnecessary because the Missouri Compromise of 1820 prohibited slavery north of the 36°30' line, and all of the new territory lay well north of that line. When the bill was first introduced, both the representatives from Texas, David

Kaufman and Timothy Pillsbury, supported it, believing that the Proviso made no real difference since slavery was not likely to spread into Oregon anyway.46 But by now the people of Texas were concerned with theoretical rights, and although they realized that Oregon was not likely to become slave territory, denouncements of the representatives who supported A 7 the bill came from mass meetings and newspaper editorials.

In spite of southern opposition, the bill passed the House 45 U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Globe, 29th Cong., 2d sess., 1847, 19, pt. 1:198. 46 Ibid., Appendix, 29th Cong., 2d sess., 1847, 19, pt. 1:154. 47 Ibid., Clarksville Northern Standard, 12 February, 22 April 1848. 60 but did not come to a vote in the Senate during that session. #

In 1848, the bill was reintroduced in the House,

again with the Proviso attached. This time both Kaufmann

and Pillsbury changed their votes, realizing how their constituents regarded the issue. The bill again passed

the House and this time came up in the Senate. One Texas

Senator, Thomas Jefferson Rusk, opposed it, but the other,

Sam Houston, supported it, reasoning that it was in accord with the Missouri Compromise, a principle in effect before

Texas joined the Union. The Galveston Weekly News undoubtedly

expressed the sentiments of most Texans when it harshly

critized Houston's actions while highly praising Rusk, 48 Pillsbury, and Kaufmann. Houston's assailants attacked him on the grounds that voting for the proviso placed him 49 in the anti-slavery camp. These accusations were totally unjustified, as Houston, who owned slaves himself and strongly

defended the institution, had always opposed the Proviso when it applied to any area south of 36°30', but the Old

Warrior's attempt to justify his vote did not satisfy Texans.50 48 Galveston Weekly News, 13 October 1848. 49 Houston to James Gadsden, 20 September 1849, Writings of Houston, 5:102-105.

Ibid. 61

The general feeling in Texas was that including the Proviso was rubbing salt into a very deeply inflamed wound since there was no reason for doing it. Considering their stand a matter of principle, Texans reasoned that it was unconsti- tutional for Congress to legislate against slavery anywhere.

Houston was in the minority in 1848, just as he was to be in 1861. He was one of the few Texans who was willing to place the. Union before slavery, and this was just the first of several occasions on which his sentiments differed with 51 the majority opinion in the state.

The Wilmot Proviso and the principle that it established marked a turning point in public opinion both North and

South. In addition to establishing a firm stand in the North against the extension of slavery, it made the South declare its position more clearly than ever before on the slavery question. Prior to the Proviso both South and North had generally accepted the right of Congress to legislate for the territories, but now southern slaveholders began denying 52 the national government the right to prohibit slavery there.

51 Anson Jones to William B. Stout, 6 December 1856, Sam Houston Files as Governor of Texas, 1859-1861, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas; Speech in the United States Senate, 22 December 1851, Writings of Houston, 5:323-325. *^Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 1:12-13, 26-29; Syndor, Development of Southern Sectionalism, p. 329; William C. Binkley, "The Question of Texas Jurisdiction in New Mexico 62

In the last half of the 1840's the question of slavery or freedom in the territories was clearly set before the American people and remained the most significant issue until Civil 53 War began in 1861. As the issue was discussed across the nation, the minds of those in the South were firmly made up. If they believed for any reason that slaves might be emancipated, southerners would leave the Union, but at this time few people North or South believed that the institution was in danger where it existed.

In the controversy over the Proviso, Texans made it clear how they viewed their role in the Union. They had joined it of their own free will and believed that they could sever relationships in the same fashion. The federal government must not threaten the institution which they believed was so necessary to their way of life and social structure. Any tampering with the slave system would violate their concept of the Constitution and the Union. Almost as soon as annexation occurred, Texans had established their basic position on the nature of the Union that they joined and had declared what would persuade them to leave it,

Under the United States," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 24(1920) : 5; Binkley, The Expansionist Movement in Texas, p. 156. 53„ . Nevmst , Ordeal of the Union, 1:163. 63

positions from which they never deviated. Their decision

to secede in 1861 was consistent with their interpretation

of the Constitution as they saw it when they entered the

Union. The changes that altered their Union sentiment

occurred not in Texas but in the North. With the election

of Lincoln in 1860, Texans had good reason to believe that

their institution was going to be legislated out of existence

and that the only way to save it was by going outside the

Union. CHAPTER III

CONTROVERSY AND COMPROMISE

Although Texans felt threatened by the Wilmot Proviso, they saw no reason for disunion because of it; similarly the sectional crisis of 1850 aroused Texans1 ire but did not t give them sufficient cause for secession. The crisis of

1850 is significant, however, in the evolution of Texans1 attitudes from Unionist to secessionist, because it gave them further opportunity to clarify their theories about the nature of the Union and the Constitution. Several controversies were dividing the Union at this time, and as debate raged, the issue of secession remained constantly before the people. As they entered "tlie debate, Texans became more and more convinced of their right to secede.

Devising and hearing elaborate justification for secession, they were, without knowing it, defining what it would take to make them leave the Union.

When Congress met in 1849, sectional divisions between the North and South had created a critical situation. The primary issue concerned organization of the areas acquired from Mexico in the war. Never having been organized into

64 65 territories, these areas were still governed by military authority. As long as few settlers lived in the far West this was a satisfactory arrangement, but in 1848 gold was discovered in California, causing the population to grow at a tremendous rate. By the end of 1849, about 100,000 settlers had migrated to California, and some kind of governmental organization was essential. However, with the admission of Wisconsin in 1848 the slave and free states were again balanced, and the South now had only an equal vote in the Senate. If California came in as a free state, this balance would be upset and the South, which was already outvoted in the House and the electoral college, would be a minority in the Senate also. Before long other territories would be applying for statehood, undoubtedly with free soil constitutions. The South's minority position, coupled with the growing hostility toward the section's peculiar insti- tution, placed the southern states in a dilemma. Realizing their uncertain position, southerners decided to take a strong stand for the expansion of slavery and to demand other concessions as the price for southern approval of the admission of California.^

The controversy over the admission of California and slavery in the territories touched off other sectional

1Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 1:256-257. 66

disputes. The South used this opportunity to demand a

stronger fugitive slave law, feeling that the northern

sympathy for slaves was costing them millions of dollars

in runaway property, which northerners should be forced to

return. On the other hand, the North was waging a campaign

to abolish slavery in Washington, D.C., considering it a

national disgrace. The South argued that Maryland, a slave

state, had donated the land for the District of Columbia

and that emancipation in the capital city would be an insult

to the entire section.

Nationally, the most significant issue in the contro-

versy of 1850 involved the admission of California as a

free state and the question of slavery in the territories,

but as far as Texas was concerned, the most significant issue

was a boundary dispute that had developed between Texas and 2

New Mexico. Texas claimed as its western boundary the Rio

Grande to its source and then a line north to the forty-second

parallel. If granted, this claim would give Texas the rich

Sante Fe area and most of the settlements of New Mexico.

Over this area Texas and New Mexico were threatening armed

conflict. Although Texas had no firm basis for its claim, 2 Avery 0. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 184 8-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1953) , p. 89. 67 the state had organized counties and tried to extend the authority of the state government there.^ Texans were determined to hold this land and were likely to fight for it if necessary, but at this point, they favored compromise.

By the late 1840's, with these various issues causing a critical division in the nation, a small number of southerners hoped to unite the South to make demands on the North. To discuss southern grievances and present their demands as a section, the Nashville convention was called to meet in 1850.

Radicals were hoping that the result would be secession.

Texans' reaction to this convention indicated their deep desire to maintain the Union and their strong support for compromise. Although they considered other southern complaints serious, Texans were, in 1850, concerned first with their land claims and unwilling to become a part of any disunionist movement.

The Nashville convention developed from John C. Calhoun's attempts to unite the slave states against northern anti- slavery agitation. In April 1848, in a speech to a large

Charleston audience, Calhoun sketched a plan for creating a militant slave state party, which would issue ultimatums to the North concerning slavery and its expansion. If the North

3 Richardson, Texas: The Lone Star State, p. 134. 68

failed to grant the party's demands, the South would secede

in unison. In an effort to achieve this unity, Calhoun

called a caucus of the Congressional members from the slave 4 states. This caucus created a committee of fifteen,

choosing one delegate from each state; Senator Rusk repre-

sented Texas. A subcommittee of five, chaired by Calhoun, on which Texas was not represented, drew up southern demands

and announced them in a document termed the "Southern

Address." Actually written by Calhoun, the "Address" denounced those who attempted to stop the expansion of

slavery and who agitated against the institution itself.

Expressing the real fears of the South, it warned that unless agitation was terminated the North, which would soon have a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Congress, would attempt to abolish slavery and race war would follow.5

The address squeaked by the committee by a narrow vote of eight to seven, southerners not yet being ready to present a united front. Rusk not only opposed the adoption of the address, but resigned from the committee after its passage. On January 22, 1849, the address was circulated

4 Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 1:213, 220-222.

5xt Notes on the Southern Address, 30 January 1849, Thomas Jefferson Rusk Papers, University of Texas Archives, Aistin, Texas. 6Ibid. 69

for the southern Representatives and Senators to sign, but

fewer than one-third signed it. Both Texas Senators,

Houston and Rusk, not only refused to sign the manifesto,

but staunchly opposed it and encouraged other Texans to do 7

the same. In spite of the radicals' failure to gain support

for the "Southern Address," a state convention,

in response to it, called a convention of all southern states

to meet on June 3, 1850, in Nashville, Tennessee. The

purpose was to discuss southern grievances, draw up methods

to stop northern agression, and possibly issue ultimatums 8 accompanied by the threat of secession.

Realizing that disunion might result from a rash stand

taken by a unified South, Texans generally did not approve of the convention. Houston and Rusk, probably the two most

influential men in the state at this time, strongly opposed the convention and spoke publically against it.9 Most major

Texas newspapers, among them the influential Clarksville

Northern Standard and Austin Texas State Gazette, opposed

7 Address to the People of the Southern States, 6 May 1850, Rusk Papers. 8 Clarence P. Denman, The Secession Movement in Alabama (Montgomery: Alabama State Department of Archives and History, 1933), pp. 22-23, 28-32. 9 Address to the People of the Southern States, 6 May 1850, Rusk Papers; Houston to Henderson Yoakum, 13 January 1849> Writings of Houston, 5:71. 70 the convention and agreed that a large majority of the voters were opposed to it also. Opponents of the convention argued that it was the work of radicals and the result of such an assembly might be disunion. Apparently apathetic about arranging for Texas delegates to be chosen to the convention, the state legislature convened in early November, 1849, but did not establish election procedure until February 9, 1850,^ over three months after it met and less than one month before the election date was set. For the sake of convenience, the election was to be held on March 4, the same day that Texans would go to the polls to decide the permanent site of the

Texas capital. Eight delegates were to be chosen, four from each of the two congressional districts.Since time was short and since little statewide interest had been exhibited, the legislature itself assumed the responsibility of nominating delegates. After the session adjourned, legislators and concerned citizens from each of the two districts met to nominate delegates. Only four candidates were named from each district, and no opposition to them developed. Thus the so-called candidates were running unopposed. The whole process took place so quickly, and the.

^Austin Texas State Gazette, 16 March 1850; Clarksville Northern Standard, 13 April 1850. 11 Laws of Texas, 3:609. 71 election occurred so soon that there was hardly time to bring the issues or the candidates before the people, who 12 expressed little interest anyway.

Many Texans who voted on the question of the capital

site refused to vote for the delegates, and some even marked

their ballots against the convention. In a number of counties,

those refusing to vote for any delegate or voting against a

convention amounted to more votes than any one candidate

received. In Harris county, for example, out of a total of 13 302 votes cast, 295 supported no candidate. Although

determining the exact number of votes for each candidate is

impossible, the Austin State Gazette estimated that fewer

than one in one hundred who cast a ballot on the capitol 14 site bothered to vote for the convention delegates. The

Clarksville Northern Standard observed that with few exceptions,

the people "in almost every county passed the thing by with 15 silent inattention." Nevertheless eight delegates had been nominated and chosen, but only one, James P. Henderson, 12 Randolph Campbell, "Texas and the Nashville Convention of 1850," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, in press. 13 Ibid. 14 Austin Texas State Gazette, 16 March 1850. 15 Clarksville Northern Standard, 13 April 1850. 72 attended. The other seven probably failed to attend because they realized the lack of popular support. Response was little better in the rest of the South. Counting Texas, only nine of the fifteen slave states furnished delegates.

The convention merely passed a few weak resolutions and , 1 (3 adjourned. The radicals had not yet won control of Texas or of the South.

The convention's most significant action, as far as

Texas was concerned,was its support of the state's land

claims. The convention urged the entire South to unite in t defense of Texas territory and insisted that the state not

accept monetary compensation for the land. As the controversy between Texas and New Mexico became more intense, various

counties in Texas began to pass resolutions in support of

the Convention's action. The Nashville convention was

supposed to meet again in November, 1851, but by that time

the Texas land question had been solved, and none of the Texas 17 delegates, not even Henderson, bothered to attend.

While the Nashville Convention was under consideration,

efforts toward compromise, not disunion, were being made

in the national capitol. Congress was debating legislation "^Carven, Growth of Southern Nationalism, pp. 95-97. 17 Campbell, "Texas and the Nashville Convention." 73 which would hopefully satisfy both North and South and avert the possibility of disunion. Although some southerners were already strong disunionists, most seemed to hope that compromise could prevent the crisis. Still believing that compromise would work, Texans were more interested in develop- ments in Washington than in Nashville.

Many people, both North and South, feared that the

Union was about to be disrupted over the various sectional controversies. Senator Henry Clay, having established a reputation as the "Great Pacificator," sincerely hoped that he could devise a plan to save the Union. Early in 1850, he introduced an omnibus bill which, although requiring concessions from both the North and South, would hopefully appease both sides. Essentially the compromise provided for admission of

California with its free-soil constitution; organization of the other territories acquired in the Mexican War without mention of the Wilmot Proviso; prohibition of the slave trade in the nation's capitol; a guarantee that slavery would not be abolished there without the consent of Maryland; a stricter fugitive slave law that would be enforced; and assumption of Texas' public debt, amounting to about $3,000,000, 1 8 in return for the land claimed by New Mexico.

18 For the best work on the Compromise of 1850 see, Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict. 74

The major issue that the compromise was intended to settle concerned the extension of slavery, especially as, this affected the question of California's admission, but

Texans were most concerned about a more immediate problem.

They desired the expansion of slavery and opposed the admission of another free state, but in 1850 the land claims in New

Mexico were more important to them. Texas had claimed the

Santa Fe area when it entered the Union, but the United

States had assigned the territory to New Mexico during the

Mexican War and established a military government there.

Texas was eager to assert its authority over the area largely because of the rich trade possibilities. But the people living in New Mexico did not want to see the area become a part of Texas, nor did they want to have the institution of slavery established there, and the military administration opposed Texas' attempts to establish the state's authority there. Texans, determinedly refusing to give up claim to the territory, would not accept Clay's compromise proposals.19

After Clay's omnibus bill had been introduced, President

Taylor, who opposed Clay's compromise in general, thought that he had a better plan to solve the conflict over land claims. He did not think that the land belonged to Texas or

19 Binkley, Expansionist Movement in Tpy« — inn 75

that the government should compensate the state. Instead, he urged New Mexico to call a convention, draw up a consti-

tution, and apply for statehood. He reasoned that since

California was seeking admission without going through the

territorial status, New Mexico could do likewise, although

its population did not warrant statehood. Taylor believed

that if New Mexico became a state without first existing as

a territory the South could not contest its choice to exclude

slavery, since no one had ever questioned the right of a

state to decide its own status. Furthermore, he believed

that immediate statehood would solve the boundary question.

New Mexico would be admitted with the boundaries that it

claimed, and the dispute would be settled by the Supreme 20 Court rather than by Congress.

With Taylor's support, New Mexico called a convention

t in May, 1850, held under the direction of Colonel John Munroe,

commander of the United States Army in that region. The

convention drafted a constitution for statehood, which

prohibited slavery, and submitted it to the people, who over-

whelmingly approved it. The people of Texas found this

arrangement totally unsatisfactory. Under Taylor's plan, New

Mexico was to be admitted with the boundaries that it claimed, 20 Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 1:327-329. 76 and Texas was likely to lose all that it claimed without compensation.21 Texans were willing to discuss the area in question and possibly compromise the issue, but not to acquiesce while the United States turned land that they believed was rightfully theirs over to a newly created free state.

The southern states joined Texas in its demand for a favorable settlement of the claim. Promises came from the

South that if the federal government attempted to take the territory by force, other states would rally behind Texas and defend its claim with men and money, since the cause 22 of Texas in this dispute was the cause of the entire section,

Alexander Stephens, Senator from and later Vice

President of the Confederacy, believed that the land in the

Santa Fe region belonged to Texas and pledged southern support 23 if the state needed it. The South was not willing to allow

New Mexico to enter the Union as a free state, especially when it did not have the population for statehood. Another 21 Craven, Growth of Southern Nationalism, pp. 101-102. 22 Anderson Hutchinson to Bell, 6 September 1850, P. Hans- borough Bell Files as Governor of Texas, Correspondence, 1849-1853, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas; James Hamilton to Rusk, 27 September 1850, Rusk Papers; Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 1:330-331. 23 Stephens to the Editors, 3 July 1850, Bryan Papers. 77 consideration that the South had in mind when it supported

Texas so strongly was the possibility that the state's territory might be broken down and more than one slave state created from it. The terms of annexation had stipulated that as many as four states might be created from Texas territory, and if all of the disputed territory were granted 24 to the state, division was more likely. The northern states, on the other hand, opposed granting this additional territory 25 to Texas, thereby opening it up to slavery expansion.

Thus the boundary question, which to Texas was primarily economic, became to the rest of the nation a part of the sectional struggle.

In the past Texans had expressed strong concern about the expansion of slavery, but in early 1850,the slavery issue faded into second place as prominent Texans, newspaper editorials and mass meetings protested the possibility of the Santa Fe territory being taken by force. The opinion was voiced repeatedly that when Texas joined the Union it retained its sovereignty and that it understood that its land claims would be recognized. A number of Texans threatened armed resistance and secession if the state's rights were 24 Laws of Texas, 2:1229. 25 Louis Filler, The Crusade Against Slavery, 1830-1860 (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 199-201. 78

7 £s not upheld. Texans regarded encroachments on the territory as an insult to the state's integrity, and they probably could have been agitated into using force against United

States military authorities in an effort to keep it. However, secession was obviously not a logical solution to the conflict; at this point, it was more a threat than, a real possibility.

Since loss of the land would not alter the life of the individual Texan in any significant way, it was not the kind of issue that would stir him to actual rebellion. The real significance of Texans* reaction, at this time, was that in

defending their claims, they were building up defenses of

secession as an alternative to submission to federal acts.

Throughout the entire summer of 1850, tempers flared

in Congress over Clay's compromise. Texas was dissatisfied with the land claims settlement tied to this bill, and the

situation was growing critical, with Texas threatening military intervention in Santa Fe and the South offering military aid. Finally, James A. Pearce, Senator from

Maryland, moved to eliminate any reference to the New Mexico

territorial issue from Clay's omnibus bill, and Florida

Senator David L. Yulee, moved that everything regarding Texas

also be eliminated from the bill. Both motions carried, 26 Austin Texas State Gazette, 15 June, 10 August 1850; Marshall Texas Republican, 14 March 1850. 79

breaking up the omnibus bill, which then had to be considered

in peacemeal fashion. Pearce later introduced legislation

to establish the boundaries at their present site, giving New

Mexico nearly all of its claims and in return compensating

Texas with the sum of $10,000,000. This was an attractive

settlement for Texas; if the state accepted, it would lose

the disputed territory but would be able to pay off the large

debt that it retained from the Republic and still hold millions of acres of unoccupied land in the northern and 2 7 western part of the state.

Although the proposed compromise was favorable to Texas,

some Texans still voiced considerable opposition to it, holding out, they contended, because of principle. As these

Texans saw it, the Santa Fe region belonged to the state, and

they unequivically opposed giving it up. One correspondent of Senator Rusk contended, "Texas will do her best to protect her territory. Jesus could be composed under insult, but the people of Texas are a different breed; they will not submit to a government," that tried to take from them what was rightfully theirs. "The volcano disunion is emboweled in Texas, let the Federal government not put it to explosion

27 New York Tribune, 16 September 1850, clipping in Larrabee Collection; Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict, pp. 110-111, 136-138. 80 2 8 by injustice or oppression." Even after the Pearce bill had passed the Senate, but before it passed the House,

Governor Bell contended that he "would not sell a Bit of land as large as a handkerchief for a million Dollars."

He argued that the principle of Texas rights was more 29 important than money. Several newspapers, among them the

Austin Texas State Gazette, Clarksville Northern Standard, and the Houston Gazette, urged that Texas continue to dertiand the land and not accept the money settlement offered by 30

Pearce. Those who were willing to risk disunion over the boundary question seemed to have a substantial following among newspapers and prominent Texans, but the general popula- tion did not always follow the lead of newspapers and public figures, and those who opposed compromise were in the minority.

In 1850 the defenders of the Union were to have their way both on the Texas question and on the other national issues. Both Texas Senators, Houston and Rusk, as well as both House members from Texas, Volney Howard and Kaufman, voted « I for the Pearce bill's passage in Congress, a vote which 2 8 Benjamin Wallace to Rusk, 16 January 1850, Rusk Papers. 29 John H. Moffett to Rusk, 28 August 1850, Rusk Papers. 30 Hamilton, Prologue to Confl i c.t. p. 152. 31 Ibid., pp. 192, 197, 198. Hamilton's excellent appendices break down the House and Senate vote on each of the compromise measures. 81 apparently reflected the majority opinion in Texas. Ashbel

Smith reported to Houston that the people in Texas strongly supported compromise and would support Houston in his efforts 3 2 to bring it about. Texas Representative David Kaufman wrote George W. Smyth, thanking him for hi's support of the bill in the state and expressing pleasure that Texans 33 supported it as they did. Former governor Wood believed that the Pearce bill was a good one and that Texans would 34 -i accept it. John L. Moffett, a state senator, realized, as he wrote in a letter to Rusk, that "A dissolution of the

Union is evidently wished for and contemplated by many persons in this state .... Their main purpose is to fan the flame of discord." Many of these people, like Governor

Bell, were "Seeking Station" politically, but Moffett contended that the people of Texas would not follow them in any move , ,. - 35 for disunion.

The Pearce bill passed in September, 1850, with the stipulation that Texans were to approve it before it went

32 Smith to Houston, 7 June 1850, Madge Hearn Collection, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas. 33 Kaufman to Smyth, 1 November 1850, Houston Papers. 34 Wood to Washington D. Miller, n.d. September 1850, Washington D. Miller Collection, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas. 35 Moffett to Rusk, 28 August 1850, Rusk Papers. 82 into effect. In a popular referendum held later that year, 3 6 Texans accepted the compromise by a vote of 4,400 to 1,900.

Since radical disunionists voted against this compromise, apparently its opponents had mustered little support across the state. In spite of the widespread agitation of this issue, most Texans remained apathetic, not even voting in the referendum.

In 1850 Congress also settled the other sectional differences peacefully. President Taylor's administration had opposed the compromise, but when he died in July, 1850,

Millard Fillmore, an advocate of compromise, became President, opening the way for settlement. From September 6 through

September 17 Congress passed a series of five bills, embody- ing essentially Clay's compromise proposals. The Pearce bill was part of this general plan. In addition, both the

New Mexico and the Utah areas were organized into territories, but the final decision as to whether these areas would enter the Union as free or slave was left for the state constitutional conventions to decide in the future. California was admitted as a free state, upsetting the senatorial balance of slave and free states, but as a major concession to the South, Congress passed a fugitive slave law, which if strictly enforced, would 3 6 Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict, pp. 151-153. 83 greatly facilitate the return of slaves who escaped into free states. The final part of the compromise prohibited the slave trade in Washington, D.C. but guaranteed that slavery would never be abolished there as long as it existed 37 in Maryland and Virginia.

In general Texans favored these compromise measures, although a small group of men in the state continued to 3 8 agitate for disunion. The Texas congressional delegation supported the compromise measures, indicating the approval of most of Texas citizens for them. Houston supported all five measures; Rusk supported three, did not cast a vote on the creation of the Utah Territory and opposed the admission of California as a free state; both Representatives Howard and Kaufman supported three of the bills and opposed two, the admission of California and the abolition of the slave 39 trade in the national capital. The issues of 1850 were

37Ibid., pp. 201-208. 3 8 Moffett to Rusk, 28 August 1850; Rusk to Lemuel D. Evans, 14 November 1850, Rusk Papers. Rusk wrote Evans, who was later elected to the United States House from the Eastern District, "I feel convinced that it was part of a deep laid Scheem [sic] of certain politicians to use Texas as a means of bringing about a colision [sic] for the dissolution of the union." He referred directly to the Marshall Texas Republican as being part of this plan. 39 Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict, pp. 192, 197, 198. 84

not sufficient cause for most Texans to rally to the standards

of those who desired to tear the Union apart.

A general contention has been that the real issue in

the secession movement was the extension of slavery into

the territories and not its abolition where it was already

established. The failure of the North to return fugitive 40 slaves has also been cited as a major factor in secession.

These arguments might apply when the South is considered

as a whole, but cannot be substantiated when Texas is

considered alone. It is doubtful that Texas would secede i because the institution could not be expanded into the

territories, when the state believed that in 100 years it

would not have enough slaves to develop its own full potential.

The Clarksville Northern Standard editorialized, "The South

can find outlets for surplus population or surplus labor

whenever it exists, in a southern direction. Texas alone opens a vast field more than sufficient to employ all surplus 41

slave labor." Texans did staunchly believe that the way

should be left open for slavery to expand into the territories, but the general opinion was that it could not flourish 40 Arthur Bestor, "State Sovereignty and Slavery: A Reinterpretation of Pro-slavery Constitutional Doctrine, 1846-1860," Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 54(1961):127. 41 Clarksville Northern Standard, 20 March, 1858. 85 there anyway. The institution could survive only where

Negroes were found in large numbers, and slaveowners were not likely to take their blacks into a territory that might vote free when it applied for statehood. Ten years after the Utah and New Mexico territories were established and theoretically open to slavery, the former territory had only twenty-four slaves out of a population of 90,000 and the latter only twenty-nine out of a total population of 42 over 40,000. Thus slavery was not spreading into the territories, and Texans realized this.

Texans demanded the right to take slaves into the territories, primarily as a defense of the institution where it already existed. Texans and the South as a whole saw the attack on slavery in the territories as an attack on the system itself, believing that only after expansion was dead could the North hope to destroy it in the South. Had southerners accepted the position that they had no right to carry slaves where they had no intention of taking them anyway, they would have opened the way for attack against slavery where it existed. To admit that the institution should not be expanded would have been admitting that it was wrong and would have been taking the first steps toward 42 U.S. Census, 1860 , p. 599. 86 abolition. The numerous House passages of the Wilmot Proviso, on the one hand, and the generally accepted belief in the

South that slavery had reached its natural limits, unless possibly new areas, such as Cuba, could be acquired, on the other hand, strongly indicated that expansion was no longer 43 possible. Although the Compromise of 1850 gave southerners the right to take their property west, it could not actually make expansion of slavery feasible. Thus the compromise was a southern victory primarily because it postponed any immediate popular attack on slavery where it existed.

The case for the fugitive slave law influencing secession sentiments in Texas is even less tenable. When

Texas entered the Union, the probability of a fugitive slave being returned was less than when she left the Union, ten years after the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850.

The Constitution itself had stipulated that the North would return runaway slaves, and a statute of 1793 asked for the cooperation of northern law enforcement agencies in the 43 Civilian and Galveston Gazette, 11 December 1847; Charles Ramsdell, "The Natural Limits of Slavery Expansions" Southwestern Historical Quarterly 33(1929):100-103, 107; Smith, Parties and Slavery, p. 9. Even the fire-eater realized by 1850 "that not another inch of American soil could be made slave soil. But he fought the Wilmot Proviso tooth and nail, for he was convinced that its passage would so inflame Northern arrogance that the position of the South would become intolerable." Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 1:263. 87. capture and return of slaves to their owners, but it did not demand that help be given. The North had not been cooperating, but it was under this law that Texas joined the Union, and Texans were well aware of its nominal enforcement at that time. Much stricter than its predecessor, the fugitive slave law of 1850 demanded that federal marshalls be aided by law enforcement agencies as well as private

citizens in the capture of runaways in the North. Harsh penalties were to be imposed on anyone who helped a runaway slave or who interfered with or failed to aid federal 44 authorities in the capture of fugitives.

Texas, primarily because of its location and its vast

amount of land, was not plagued with slaves escaping into

the northern states. Although determining the actual number lost each year that Texas was in the Union is impossible,

the census of 1850 and 1860 indicate that in those two years the number of runaways was extremely small. In 1850 with a slave population of 58,161, only 29 were reported as 44 Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, 1850-1860 (Chapel Hill: Univer- sity of North Carolina Press, 1968). Campbell contends that although most of the people in the northern states opposed slavery, only seldom did they oppose enforcement of the 1850 law. The federal courts upheld the law and not one single slave was set free by the personal liberty laws passed by some of the northern states, when a legitimate claim was made. The claim that the South made during the decade that the law was not being enforced in the North is invalid. 88

fugitives. A decade later with a slave population of 182,566,

only 15 were fugitives. A fugitive was defined as any slave who had run away from his master and could not be accounted

for, not necessarily one who had escaped into the free 45

states. A slave had a better chance of winning freedom

from a Texas master by going to Mexico, where slavery was prohibited and the fugitive slave law had no effect; thus most runaways from Texas probably went south and west rather

than north and east. Failure to return the small number of ,*f •

slaves who might have reached northern free soil, did not play a significant role in the secession movement in Texas.

Texans did join in the southern demand for a stronger fugitive

slave law, but this demand was primarily one of principle, not necessity, for Texas.

Thus the major issues involved in the crisis of 1850--

the extension of slavery and the fugitive slave law--were not vital to the interests of Texans. They did not feel that

their institution was directly threatened or that their

interests were endangered within the Union. Nevertheless, in debating the issues important precedents had been established.

The principle of secession had become a vital part of southern rights, and Texans defended this right more strongly and with 45 U.S. Census, 1860, p. 337-338. 89

greater regularity after 1850 than before. With the majority

of the states being free soil states, legislating slavery

out of existence could be a future possibility, and Texans,

realizing this, believed that it was more necessary than

ever to be clearly on record that any attack on slavery where it existed would precipitate secession. The Texas

Republican wrote,

The right of secession, as claimed by the states, has been a great barrier to usurpation. What killed the alien and sedition laws? the fear of secession. What produced the Missouri Compromise? the same principle .... The principle of secession destroyed the protective tariff system. It killed the Wilmot Proviso.

And the fear of secession would, many believed, protect the 46 southern institution of slavery. The Galveston Weekly

News stated that "Willing as we have always been, to submit

to the late compromise, or almost any compromise that would

give the south a quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of their

constitutional rights," Texans demanded that the North 4 7 enforce the compromise. The newspaper contended that

"there would be very little, if any, opposition in the South

to the late Compromise," if the North respected it.48 Thus, 46 Marshall Texas Republican, 29 March 1851. 47 Galveston Weekly News, 6 May 1851. 48 Ibid., 13 May 1851. 90 while agreeing to abide by what they considered a reasonable

compromise, Texans were convinced that the threat of secession had won the victory for their section. No longer could slavery be protected by a balance between slave and free states, but the principle of secession could insure its perpetuation.

Shortly after the passage of the compromise, it was reported that "Texas was never in a more prosperous condition than at present. Universal health, peace and thrift 49 prevails through our entire borders." During the three years following the compromise, the slavery issue slipped into the background all across the South, as most people believed, or at least sincerely hoped, that the major differences between the two sections were settled. Sam

Houston believed that "The condition of our country arising from the Compromise of 1850 was one of unparalleled tranquility,"

Texas grew and prospered at an unprecedented rate, with thousands of immigrants moving to the state each year and 50 many bringing their bondsmen with them. To most people of the state the eventual fate of their institution did not se em

49 New York Tribune, 7 May 1851, clipping in Larrabee Collection.

Speech Delivered at a Know-Nothing Barbecue at Austin, 23 November 1855, Writings of Houston, 6:212. 91 to be an important concern during this period, and they were pleased with their position in the Union.

At the same time, however, some Texans realized that there could never be a lasting compromise between the slave and free states. A. H. Axson expressed this belief in a letter to Guy M. Bryan, a staunch secessionist in 1860.

Jones prophesied that, "Morally the South is vanquished on the Slavery question and . . . [it is only] a matter of time and expediency when social and political change and revolu- tions are to happen in the relation of this question.

Although controversy over slavery was irrepressible, few

Texans realized it in the early 1850's; they sincerely desired peace within the Union. Texas, more than any other state, had justification for secession in 1850 over the boundary dispute with New Mexico, but the people overwhelm- ingly supported compromise. Had a majority of the people been looking for an issue they had one in 1850, but they were unresponsive to the demands of the disunionists at that time.

51 A. H. Axson to Bryan, 13 August 1852, Bryan Papers CHAPTER IV

POLITICS AND PARTIES, 1854-1856

After the compromise of 1850, /Texans turned their attention to other pursuits, reasonably certain that their interests were safe in the Union. However, during the 1850!s political realignments, that would play an important role in the secession movement, were taking place on both the national and state level. Political parties were breaking down as national organizations and taking on a sectional character. In reaction to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the

North further solidified its opposition to slavery expansion by forming the Republican Party. At the same time southerners moved more solidly than ever into the Democratic camp, while insisting that the party meet their every demand. In Texas the most significant result of these national developments was the organization of a strong state Democratic party, one whose purpose was to defend southern rights, including the right of secession. Increasingly Texans turned to the Demo- crats as a means to unite in opposition to the Republican party, which they believed intended to destroy the institution of slavery, not just stop its expansion.

92 93

Although Texans hoped that the Compromise of 1850 had settled permanently the sectional differences over slavery, they soon found that the issue would not lie dormant. In early 1854, it again reared its ugly head, this time over territorial organization of the Nebraska area. The need for organization was not pressing as few white people, other than those employed by the government, resided there. Yet controversy over the area broke the peace and tranquility of the previous three years and "let loose the dogs of war."'*"

On January 4, 1854, Senator Stephen A. Douglas, chairman of the Committee on Territories, reported a bill to organize the Nebraska territory, the central plains area west of the

Missouri River and east of the West Coast territories already organized. Douglas' motives in engineering this act were complex. Undoubtedly he was interested in western expansion, in a transcontinental railroad, in providing a continuous line of settlement to the Pacific, and in reuniting the

Democratic party which was torn by internal dissension. In addition he probably hoped to raise an issue that would gain him support in his planned bid for the Presidency.

^James G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1961), p. 96, 2 James A. Rawley, Race and Politics: "Bleeding Kansas" and the Coming of the Civil War (New York: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1969), pp. 36-39. 94

The territory that Douglas hoped to organize was within the boundaries of the land acquired by the Louisiana Purchase and thus made free by the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which stipulated that no territory north of the 36°30' line would be open to slavery. Douglas needed southern support for his bill, which he could not hope to get unless the restriction on slavery were lifted. The Little Giant hoped to avoid the controversy which he anticipated by leaving the status of slavery uncertain, organizing the area under the same provision that had governed both New Mexico and Utah's organization but without reference to the Missouri Compromise.

Southerners, however, were convinced that unless the compromise was specifically repealed no one would take slaves into the new territory. Surrendering to the demands of the

South, Douglas changed the bill to imply that the compromise would no longer be effective. Not good enough, said southern congressmen. Amending the bill to specifically repeal the

Compromise was Douglas' next move. At the same time, he i agreed to change the bill to create two territories, Nebraska and Kansas. Most of the South welcomed the passage of his bill as a great victory for southern principles.

3 Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 2:92-100. 95

When Texans first received word that a move was under way in Washington to organize the Nebraska territory, they reacted negatively and suspiciously. One journal alleged that "the freesoilers, headed by Thomas H. Benton, were making a desperate effort in the House of Representatives to affix the principle of the Missouri compromise to the Nebraska territorial bill and to disregard entirely the Compromise 4 of 1850." In response to Douglas1 initial plan, Texans contended that it would effectively exclude slavery from the territories, as Douglas himself realized. Even if slavery was not specifically excluded from the territories, they feared that the northern Democratic view of popular sovereignty would be applied whereby "the people of their territorie [sic] through their Legislature have the right to settle the [slavery] question for themselves .... As we look at the question it is like the discussion of the difference between tweedledum and tweedledumdee." If the territory were organized at all it would be free. "As there is nothing to be gained or lost in the controversy, we hold little interest in it," commented one Texas newspaper, believing that whether popular sovereignty or specific exclusion were applied the effect would be the same.** The Compromise of 1850, they 4 Marshall Texas Republican, 4 February 1854.

5Ibid. 96 believed, had overturned the earlier Missouri Compromise and established the principle that only state constitutions could exclude slavery. All that the bill to organize the territory could possibly do was to re-open the question of slavery after "We of Texas, . . . accepted the conditions it [Compromise of 1850] imposed with cheerful alacrity that will ever prove our devotion and loyalty to the confederation."^

Already a seemingly small but significant difference was perceptible between the solutions offered by the northern and southern Democrats to the problem of slavery in the territories. The northern Democrats, of whom Douglas became the leader, contended that the people of a territory could decide the issue for themselves through their territorial government, but southerners contended that Congress must guarantee the institution in the territories until state

constitutions were drawn up. At that time and only at that time could the issue be decided. Texans staunchly supported 7 this position. Thus the people of Texas and the South indirectly admitted that settlers moving west did not want slaves in their midst and admitted that if given a choice they would prohibit it. ^Austin Texas State Gazette, 7 February 1854. 7 Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction, p. 92. 97

Although indifferent to or opposed to the initial form of the Nebraska bill, Texans overwhelmingly supported the act as it finally passed, with the Missouri Compromise specifically repealed and two territories instead of one 8 created. Texans, along with other southerners, believed that they could apply their theories concerning slavery expansion to the bill in its final form. Although exactly when the status of slavery was to be decided was not clarified,

Texans believed that the bill implied it could not be prohibited until a state constitution was drawn up. As the

Galveston Tri-Weekly News editorialized, On the one hand, no power was expressly given by that bill to the territories either to abolish or to establish slavery and on the other hand all the powers that were conceded, expressly limited and restricted by the Con- stitution, because they can only be exercised 'subject to the Constitution.' It follows, therefore, inevitably, that if squatter sovereignty is not recognized and established by the Constitution, neither is it recognized and established by the Kansas-Nebraska bill.

In the Kansas-Nebraska Act the southern principle seemed to have won, and Texans considered it a great victory for the

South.

Furthermore, this act seemed to be potentially a significant victory for slavery expansion, since Kansas--unlike

8 Marshall Texas Republican, 25 March 1854; Austin Texas State Gazette, 13 May 1854. 9 Galveston Tri-Weekly News, 5 June 1854. 98

New Mexico, Utah, and Nevada--seemed at least possibly

adaptable to the institution. Prior to 1854, the South had been concerned primarily with theoretical rights and princi- ples, but Kansas held promise of more concrete gains. Since

slavery existed in Missouri, southerners reasoned that if

they could keep Kansas open throughout the territorial phase

of development, they might win it for their section. The

i act also reassured the South of its power in the national

government and its ability to control the Democratic party.^

In spite of its minority position in the Union, the South

could still have its way.

All of the Texas members of Congress, except Senator

Sam Houston, strongly supported the Kansas-Nebraska bill

and voted for its passage. Houston explained that he opposed

the bill because it was "directly antagonistic to that [prin-

ciple] expressed in the Missouri Compromise." According to

Houston's reasoning, when Texas entered the Union, the people

realized that territory north of the 36°30' line was to be

free, and they had no right now to demand that it be opened

to slavery. Houston contended that "The Compromise of 1850

^Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 2:302-305. With hind- sight, it seems unlikely that Kansas would have become slave territory even if controversy had not broken out, because huge expanses of territory far more suitable to slavery still lay open. When slaveholders migrated they were more likely to go to these safer regions, especially Texas. 99 which had been passed had effectively hushed up the dis-

cussion of the subject of slavery," bringing peace to both

sections. Foreseeing the sectional controversy that would

inevitably follow the passage of the act, Houston unhesi-

tatingly placed the Union above sectional interests.

Although most Texans believed that an important victory was

won with the act's passage, Houston knew better; the entire

nation, not just the state and the South, had lost, because

from this time on the question of slavery occupied the center

stage in American politics, with no serious rival in second

place.

In overwhelming numbers, Texans denounced Houston for

his vote against the bill, and his stand hurt his political

future, playing a major role in his failure to "be returned 12 to the Senate and his defeat for the governorship in 1857.

In January, 1856, the state legislature passed a joint

resolution by a large majority in both houses, "that the

Legislature approves the course of Thomas J. Rusk, in voting

for the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and disapproves the course of

11 Speech Delivered at a Know-Nothing Barbecue at Austin, 23 November 1855 , Writings of Houston, 6:212. 12 Richardson, Texas: The Lone Star State, p. 131; George P. Garrison, Texas: A Contest of Civilization (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1903), p. 280. 100 13 Sam Houston, in voting against it." The Democratic State

Convention in 1856 voiced the sentiments of most Texans when it passed a resolution stating "This convention do most fully and cordially endorse and approve the votes of Thos. J.

Rusk, Geo. W. Smyth and P.H. Bell upon the Kansas-Nebraska

Act, and that we do further most decidedly disapprove of the 14 vote of Sam Houston." Leading newspapers also harshly condemned Houston's vote, accusing him of aligning with the antislavery elements in the country and betraying the South.

When the Kansas-Nebraska Act passed, the general feeling in

Texas was that a congressman should be concerned first about 16 the interests of the South, not the nation as a whole.

Texans regarded the Kansas-Nebraska Act as the final word on the issue of slavery in the territories. In November,

1855, the state legislature passed a joint resolution applaud- ing the act whereby those territories are thrown open to settlement alike by citizens from the slaveholding and non-slaveholding 13 Laws of Texas, 4:265. 14 Ernest W. Winkler, ed., Platforms of Political Parties in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1916), p. 68. 15Marshall Texas Republican, 25 March 1854; Austin Texas State Gazette, 13 May 1854.

"^Anson Jones to William B. Stout, 6 December 1856, Houston Papers. 101

States, as a measure founded in the true spirit of the Federal Constitution or justice to all parts of the Union, and of vital importance to the Southern States of the confederacy, as well as the permanent peace of the Nation.

Texas would consider any repeal or modification of the law

"as an invasion of the true spirit of the Constitution of

the United States, as sectional in its character, as a just ] 7 cause of alarm on the part of the Slaveholding States."

On this issue Texas was taking a stand from which it would

not retreat—slavery was not to be barred from any territory

or attacked in any region.

But the North was not attuned to southern reasoning.

Moreover, it was growing tired of southern threats .and of

the southern victories; pro-slavery advocates again seemed

to have triumphed. Four new territories had been created

in the last four years and, slavery was permitted in all four.

The North believed that the Kansas-Nebraska Act had been

maneuvered through Congress by a few ambitious, self-seeking

congressmen and the slave power conspirators of the South,

and in violation of a principle that had become to the North

almost as sacred as the Constitution itself, the Missouri „ . 18 Compromise.

17 Laws of Texas, 4:263-264. IS Craven, Growth of Southern Nationalism, pp. 180-185, 102

The most significant result of the Kansas-Nebraska

Act was the solidification of the opposition to slavery expansion into a political party which became as uncompro- mising on stopping the expansion of slavery as the South had been in demanding its extension. This party, the

Republican party, emerged from the disaster of 1854 with an unwavering determination to halt the growth of the immoral institution. Since before the annexation of Texas, northern opinion had been increasingly demanding that slavery be contained where it was already established, but now the people were willing to unite behind a party that would act to insure this. According to the individuals who formed and supported this party, concessions had been made to the slave states that were totally unacceptable. It was made up of a diverse group of people, but generally they had supported passage of the Wilmot Proviso, were unhappy with the con- cessions made to the slavery expansionists in the Compromise of 1850, and had finally been pushed to the limit by the

Kansas-Nebraska Act. As the party formed, old Whigs, Anti-

Nebraska Democrats, and former Liberty party members moved into it. While many Republicans opposed slavery and its expansion for economic or political reasons, the grounds that they used to attack it were moralistic. Because it was an evil institution, slavery should be contained as a 103 19 means o£ gradually abolishing it. Indee d, southerners found the party frightening largely,because it presented containment as a step toward abolition.

The early growth of the party in the North was phenominal; never before had a party attracted such a large following in such a short time. Within two months after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill* the term Republican party was already being used as a label. Growing out of mass meetings held in protest of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the party quickly developed political organizational structures on state levels. In the first two years of its existence it captured several state governments in the North and won a plurality of the seats in the House of Representatives, the count being 108 Republicans, 83 Democrats, and 43 American 20 Party members. In 1856, just two years after its origin, the party fielded a candidate who was almost successful in winning the Presidency. Both the new party and the old

Democratic party realized there was a possibility that the

Republicans might win the presidency in 1860, a frightening

thought to the entire South. 19 Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 163-165, 308-317. 20 Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 2:414. 104

To Texans, the Black Republican party, as it was termed throughout the South, "was founded on hostility to slavery, on the ground that it is a moral, social, and political

21 evil, and ought to be abolished." Most Texans refused to accept the contention of the Republican party platform and most of its leaders that there was no intent to abolish slavery where it existed, since it was domestically controlled.

From the emergence of the party at the national level most

Texans believed that the Republicans' mission was to destroy slavery, which they would surely do if placed in a position 22 of power. Texans' fear of this party and what it would do ultimately drove the state from the Union in 1861.

The political realignments taking place nationally, with the development of the Republican party and the death of the Whig party, had significant effects on the Texas political scene. Prior to 1855-1856, political parties did not play an important role in Texas, since it was generally 2 *5 taken for granted that Texans were Democrats. The other major national party during the period of the Republic and early statehood was the Whig party, but because of its 21 Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 2:414. 22 Texas, Legislature, Senate, Journal, 6th Leg., adjourned sess., 13 August 1856, pp. 239-240. 23 Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, p. 22, 105 failure to support annexation, it had never had a large following in Texas. The party was so unpopular, in fact, that in 1848 Houston commented that there were only half a dozen Whigs in the entire state, all of whom were undesirable characters. Although Houston underestimated their numbers, the presidential elections of 1848 and 1852 indicated few

Whigs in the state. In 1848, the Whig candidate Zachery

Taylor, who incidently carried the South and won the election, only received 31 per cent of the vote in Texas. In the next election the Whigs made an even worse showing, polling only 24 26 per cent of the votes cast in Texas. During both of these elections, the Democratic party lacked effective state organization, and a number of Democrats di'd not vote because the Whig candidate offered no real competition.

Until the mid-1850's Texans were generally apathetic about presidential elections, as is indicated by the returns of 1848, 1852, and 1856. In 1848 only 15,177 Texans cast votes in the presidential election; in the next election voter turnout increased by less than 3,000 votes to 18,039.

In 1856, just four years later, however, 46,808 voters cast ballots. Voter interest was being aroused by national events 24 Randolph Campbell, "The Whig Party of Texas in the Elections of 1848 and 1852," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 73(1969) :17, 21, 25. 106 and by the organization of,the state Democratic party. Until the mid-1850's Texans were more interested in state and local affairs than in national elections, turning out in much larger numbers for gubernatorial elections, which were held in odd numbered years. In 1849, 21,696 people went to the polls to choose their governor; in 1851, 28,306; in 1853, 25 35,693; in 1855, 45,412; and in 1857, 61,230. The first time that the number of ballots cast for governor and

President were close was in 1855 and 1856, after the Demo- cratic party had been challenged both at the local level by the party and at the national level by the

Republican party. These figures indicate a tremendous increase in interest in national affairs within the state after the emergence of rival parties, and, at the same time, they show the effectiveness of a state Democratic organiza- tion.

Although the Whig party was never a real threat to the

Democratic party in Texas, a fair number of Texans did align with that party at one time or another. After the Whig defeat in the presidential election of 1852 and the dis- integration of the party on a national level, the former 25 Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, p. 649. 107

Whigs in Texas found themselves with no place to nest. With

the growing abolition agitation in the North many pro-Union

men believed that the nation was in deep trouble over the

slavery issue. The old Whig party had been a force for

conservatism in the Union, and with it no longer a viable

structure, many conservatives were looking for a replacement.

The Republican party, into which most of the northern Whigs

moved, was, of course, totally unacceptable to the former

Whigs and pro-union men in Texas, being entirely a northern

party. On the other hand, the Texas Democratic party was

ultra state rightist, and the Whigs and pro-Union men felt

that it endangered the Union also. Thus the only alternative

acceptable to Texas Whigs and Unionists was the emerging

American or Know Nothing party. This party was anti-Catholic

and anti-foreign, but to the Texan, its most and probably

only really attractive position was that it was above all

pro-Union. There were few Catholics in the state, and the

foreign element seemed to offer no real threat to the native * Texan, so that this aspect of the party did not attract much 9 A support in the state.

2 6 Oran M. Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas for Its Fifty Years of Statehood, 1845-1895," in A Comprehensive History of Texas, 1685-1897, vol. 2, Dudley G. Wooten (: William G. Scarff, 1898), p. 36. 108

Beginning in the East as a secret society in the early

1850's, the Know Nothing party spread to the West and South

as it developed political organization. Its mystical

fraternal order seemed to attract a rather large number of

Texans who were seeking a political home after the break up

of the Whig party. In June, 1855, the new party held its

first state convention, which was disguised as a convention 27 for river improvements, at Washington-on-the-Brazos. The

convention nominated a full list of candidates for state

offices and succeeded in mustering a good deal of support 2 8 across the state. In spite of its early success, the party was never a serious threat to the Democratic philosophy in 29 the state, dying out after the election of 1856. Although

the party was shortlived, a number of influential Texans,

among them Sam Houston, became affiliated with it in its

formation.

Most leading Texans who became associated with the party did so without fully investigating its secret nature

2 7 Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, pp. 37, 63. 2 8 Austin Texas State Gazette, 1 September 1855. 29 Austin Southern Intelligencer, 19 November 1856; Frank H. Smyrl, "Unionism in Texas, 1856-1861," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 68(1964):175. 109

and without fully considering the political consequences 30 of being a member of such an organization. For example,

John S. Ford, editor of the Austin Texas State Times in the

early 1850's and later a staunch secessionist, supported

the party but withdrew from it after the defeat of 1856.

Later apologizing for ever belonging to the party, he stated,

"the act of joining was one of those inconsiderate things 31 men do sometimes." Little correlation can be established

between those who supported the Know Nothing party in 1856

and those who opposed secession in 1861, indicating that many

Texans joined the party for no apparent reason other than as 32 an alternative to the Democrats.

In 1856, the Know Nothings, like the Whigs in the two previous presidential elections, offered the voters the only

alternative to the Democratic candidates, since the Republican

candidate was not even on the ballot in Texas. But the Know

Nothing nominee, Millard Fillmore, did little better than

the Whigs had done in the past, polling only 33 per cent of 30 Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A History of Texas and Texans, p. 333; Ralph A. Wooster, "An Analysis of the Texas Know Nothings," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 70(1967):418-419. 31 John Salmon Ford, Ri£ Ford's Texas, ed. Stephen B. Oates (Austin: University of Texas Library, 1963), p. 211. 32 Smyrl, "Unionism in Texas," pp. 175, 192. 110

the votes and receiving little editorial support in the 33

state. Houston supported Fillmore but was harshly

criticized for it. This election made it evident that the

only party in which the pro-slavery people of Texas had any

faith was the Southern Democratic party.

The fear of abolition instilled in the Texan by the

emergence of the Republican party on a national level,

coupled with the organization of the American party on a

local level, presented the Texas Democratic party with the 34 challenge that it needed to organize. The majority of

Texans refused to accept a party that placed Union above

slavery, believing that such a party would make the task

of the Republicans much easier. During the period 1855-1856,

the heretofore apathetic voter in Texas began to take sides,

and an overwhelming majority of them joined the Democratic

party. As long as this party met southern demands, Texans

enthusiastically supported it.

When the Know Nothing state ticket was defeated in

1855, the Democrats held a large barbecue in Austin to

celebrate their victory. While celebrating, they passed a

resolution calling for a Democratic state convention to unite 33 Ibid., p. 172; San Antonio Herald, 30 August 1856. 34 Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," pp. 35-37. Ill the Democrats of Texas for the upcoming presidential campaign.

This marked the beginning of the formation and unification 35 of a strong state rights Democratic party in Texas.

The convention, which met January 15-18, 1856, was the first fully organized and representative Democratic convention held in Texas and the most representative state political convention of any kind called up to that time. Of the ninety- nine established counties in the state, ninety-one sent representatives. An attempt to hold a statewide Democratic convention a year earlier had drawn delegates from only twelve counties, despite its being a gubernatorial election •7 £L year. The party adopted a number of resolutions and out- lined its general stand and policy for state and national politics. It passed a resolution opposing and denouncing the Know Nothing party, primarily for its secrecy and anti- foreign sentiments. Defending the state rights doctrine, it acclaimed the Kansas-Nebraska Act as a "triumph of the

Constitution over fanaticism and sectional madness." After adopting a resolution that defended the right to carry slaves into the territories, the Texas Democrats instructed their 35 Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, p. 64. 3 6 The Texas Constitution stipulated that the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Commissioner of the General Land Office be elected on odd numbered years and that the Attorney General, Comptroller, and Treasurer on even numbered years. 112

delegates to the national party convention not to support

anyone "who does not approve the nonintervention policy of

the Kansas-Nebraska Act." Indicating one source of the party's new growth, the Democrats thanked all "Whigs who have,

independent of all party issues and party prejudices, united with the Democratic party in taking ground against the fanati-

cal movements of abolitionism and the new-fangled doctrines 37 of Know-Nothingism."

Texans were preparing for a fight in the election of

1856. The Republicans seemed to offer a serious threat on

the national level, serious enough to unite Texans behind

Democratic nominee , a non-controversial, pro-

southern Democrat from Pennsylvania. The Republican candidate,

John C. Fremont, had definite anti-slavery views, and the

party at this point was still essentially an organization

dedicated to stopping the expansion of slavery. Millard

Fillmore, the Know Nothing candidate, had little chance of winning Texas or the nation, especially since the party had

broken apart on the slavery issue. The Republicans conducted

a spirited campaign, accusing the South of trying to extend

slavery across the entire country and promising to halt its

expansion if elected. As the party was sectional in nature, 37 Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, p. 64. 113 3 8 it made no attempt to appeal to the South. The South

took their threats seriously, and, in fact, exaggerated the

dangers that the nation faced if this abolitionist party-

was elected. Threats of secession were louder and more 39 definite than ever before.

The election of 1856 brought about significant develop-

ments in the attitudes of Texans. During this election they

clearly indicated that the state would never tolerate a

Republican victory, and they predicted disunion and war if

Fremont should win. Public officials, newspapers, and

Texans in general reacted to the new party with panic and near-hysteria. A Republican victory would, they warned, give

southerners the right to put into effect their already well

developed doctrines of state rights and secession.41 During this election Texans began to concede that possibly John C.

3 8 U.S., Congress, House, Congress ional Globe, Appendix, 34th Cong., 1st. sess., 1856, 31, pt. 1:598-601; Edward Clark to Rusk, 10 October 1856, Rusk Papers; Galveston Weekly News, 28 October 1856. 39 J.D. Pitts to Henry E. McCulloch, McCulloch Papers; Galveston Weekly News, 28 October 1856; Texas, Legislature, Senate, Journal, 6th Leg., adjourned sess., 13 August 1856, pp. 239-240, 20 August, p. 296. 40 Galveston Tri-Weekly News» 14 August 1856; San Antonio Herald, 30 August 1856; Speech of Anson Jones, 29 July 1856, Jones Papers. 41 Galveston Weekly News, 14 October 1856. 114

Calhoun was right "when he proclaimed that the Union and

the South were in danger from the abolitionists and Free 42 Soilers of the North."

Not only did Texans foresee disunion, but many believed

that war would inevitably follow. Anson Jones, former

president of the Republic, believed that if the Black Republi-

can party won the election civil war would be the result.

For him, as for many Texans, both in 1856 and in the crisis

of 1860-61, peaceful dissolution would be impossible. Summing

up Texans' view of the entire sectional controversy, Jones

explained that the Wilmot Proviso and the Oregon bill had

marked the beginning of the crisis, but in 1854, the Kansas-

Nebraska Act offered a way to peace, which the North failed

to accept. If the North persisted in its attacks on the

sacred southern institution by agitating the issue, a terrible

but short conflict would follow, with the South emerging

victorious. The Black Republicans were intentionally agitating

the slavery issue and making such a war inevitable, contended

Jones, accusing them of "agitation, senseless agitation,

useless, pernicious agitation-- any kind of agitation, is the

42 Speech of William B. Ochiltree, 10 May 1856, Rusk Papers. 115 object--anything to keep the minds and passions of men and 43 women excited."

Other Texans expressed views similar to those of Jones.

Colenel J.D. Pitts wrote to House member Henry E. McCulloch that the election of a Black Republican would mean dissolu- tion of the Union and a "great slaughter" would certainly follow; nevertheless "The South would not permit an abolition- ' 44 ist [Fremont] to reign one hour as President." If secession

and war came about, and the Galveston Weekly News thought it would upon Fremont's election, "there is not a nation on earth 45 that could conquer the South." Realizing the disturbed

condition of his state and section, Houston urged the South

to acquiese if Fremont were elected, but other leading

Texans, such as Thomas Rusk, insisted that the South must

"strike back." Edward Clark, the lieutenant governor in

1861 who succeeded Houston, was horrified at Houston's willing- ness to accept Fremont and agreed wholeheartedly with Rusk.

To Clark, the only alternative for Texas if a Republican +. j .46 were elected was secession. 43 Speech of Jones, 29 July 1856, Jones Papers. 44 . Pitts to McCulloch, 4 August 1856, McCulloch Papers. 45 Galveston Weekly News, 14 August 1856. 46 Clark to Rusk, 10 October 1856, Rusk Papers. 116

Elisha M. Pease, governor of Texas from 1853-1856,

staunch defender of the Union and opponent of secession in

1860-61, also feared the election of a Black Republican.

Prior to the election of 1856, Henry A. Wise, secessionist

governor of Virginia, wrote Pease suggesting an assembly of

the slave states to decide what course the South should 47 adopt if Fremont were elected. Pease replied that he did

not believe Fremont would be elected, but if he were an

assembly should be called after the election. To call a

convention before the fact would be premature, but Pease

was willing to meet with the other slave states to determine

the South's course if a Republican were elected, knowing 4 8 that the results might be disunion. In a speech to the state legislature soon after the

election of 1856, Pease summed up the sentiments of Texans

concerning the Republican party and the status of the state

in the Union.

Our relations with the Federal government, and with the different States composing it, are a subject of deep anxiety to every patriot. The rapid strides made in the last few years, by a party in the Northern States, organized with the avowed object of endeavoring to effect the abolition of slavery as it now exists in fifteen states and some of the territories, has very

47 Henry A. Wise to Elisha M. Pease, 18 September 1856, Elisha M. Pease Papers, Austin Public Library, Austin, Texas, 48 Pease to Wise, 3 October 1856, Pease Papers. 117

justly excited fears for the perpetuity of the Union. Such movements tend inevitably to destroy that harmony which should exist between different ,parts of the same nation, and cannot fail if preserved in, to produce the most disastrous results. The people of Texas are attached to their domestic institutions; they ask nothing for them, from the Federal Government, but those rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and any infringement of these rights will never be submitted to.

Texas newspapers also strongly opposed the Republican campaign and predicted disunion if a Republican victory should occur. The San Antonio Herald, while strongly opposing secession, admitted that if a Republican were ever elected to the White House, disunion would follow. "The election of Buchanan may postpone dissolution for a time," it predicted, "but it will only be a temporary staying in the result .... Fremont's election would be the signal for immediate dissolution."^ The Galveston Weekly News reported that the election of the Black Republican would

"be a death blow to the Union. We cannot suppose, for a moment, that the South will submit to the inauguration, much 51 less the administration of a Black Republican." Newspapers across the state forecast their later stand of 1860 and 49 Texas, Legislature, Senate, Journal, 7th Leg., reg. sess., 2 November 1857, pp. 37-38. ^^San Antonio Herald, 30 August 1856.

^Galveston Weekly News, 28 October 1856. 118

thus prepared the way for secession when a Republican was

elected.

It was not the Republican stand on slavery in the

territories that concerned Texans but the safety of the

institution in their own state if that party gained power.

State senator Guy M. Bryan, who was elected to the United

States House of Representatives from the Western District

in 1857, wrote his old college friend Rutherford B. Hayes

shortly after Buchanan's election explaining the feelings of

most Texans. "I tell you as certain as a sun rises and

sets if the North does not stop the agitation of the slavery

question, this Union will be dissolved; this is no idle

talk, it is truth." He realized that "You and the mass of

the people at the North think this an idle threat, not so.

We will be forced to separate to save our lives." He pointed

out that "There have been insurrections or attempts at

insurrection in almost every Southern State. Some eight or

ten in this State alone." Bryan explained that to "the

South slavery is a practical question; it enters into all

the ramifications of society. With us it is a life and death

question. With you it is an abstract one." The slavery question had to be settled "for ever or disunion." Bryan, who was an influential person in the formation of the state

Democratic party, was deeply concerned about the existence ' 119 of slavery in the South itself, not its extension into the 52

territories. He voiced the sentiments of most Texans when he insisted that the institution had to be perpetuated

in the South and at least quietly tolerated in the North or

the Union had to die.

Texans wanted to preserve the Union in 1856, just as

they later did in 1860-1861, but a union as they saw it--one

that would protect their peculiar institution. Texans'

concept of the Union as a compact made between sovereign

entities never changed. Secession to Texans was not as

serious as it was to their northern contemporaries; if their

constitutional rights, as they interpreted them, were violated,

they would leave the Union. A Texan could be a strong Unionist

and still defend the right of secession; to the northerner this was an incompatible combination.

In 1856, if Fremont had been elected, Texans would probably have reacted much the same as they did in 1860 when

Lincoln was elected. To them the term Black Republican was synonomous with abolitionist, and they could never remain in a Union controlled by abolitionists. The election of 1856 awakened Texans to the possibility of a Republican victory, 52Bryan to Hayes, 1 January 1857, Ernest W. Winkler, editor, "The Bryan-Hayes Correspondence," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 25(1922):217-218. 120 as the citizens were duly warned by their leaders and their newspapers of the horrible consequences of such a victory.

Probably the only reason that discussion of secession was less emphatic than in 1860 was that the Republican rise to prominence had been so sudden that Texans had not fully realized its meaning. But in 1856, Texans realized that success of the Black Republicans was a real possibility; thus the election of 1860 was held in a time of greater anxiety and uncertainty.

By 1856, a tremendous gulf existed between the North and the South on the slavery issue. The majority of northern- ers could no longer accept the indefinite perpetuation of the institution which they rightfully regarded as totally unjustifiable--the worst in the civilized world. But to the South, the institution was a positive good, a domestic

I institution sanctioned by the Constitution of the nation.

The election of 1856 settled nothing; although it seemed to show a conservative reaction in the country, it only gave slavery a short new lease on life. During this brief period the institution gained both supporters and detractors, and it became more and more apparent that the differences were irreconcilable. CHAPTER V

EXTREMISM AND REACTION, 1857-1859

After its organization in 1856, the state Democratic party held yearly conventions and attempted to control state politics throughout the remainder of the decade. From the beginning,the extreme state rights element controlled the party, advocating a basic philosophy that appealed to most

Texans. In the first few years of its organization, the party proved extremely popular as the people of the state remained disturbed by the near Republican victory in 1856.

After electing most of their candidates in 1857, party leaders began agitation that could lead to disunion, issuing ultimatums and raising such controversial issues as reopening the African slave trade. By 1859, as the leaders became more extremist, their appeal began to decline. Even at this late time, most

Texans did not believe that demands and ultimatums were, as yet, necessary. Texans loved the Union as long as it protected their interests, and they did not want it destroyed needlessly.

Seeing no immediate threat to slavery, they felt that needless agitation might endanger both the Union and the institution.

Thus for a brief time in the latter part of the decade, the

121 122 state experienced a conservative reaction, and the party seemed to be losing its grip on state politics.

Early in 1857,the Supreme Court decision in the Dred

Scott Case provided the basis for the stand that the state party later adopted concerning slavery in the territories.

In the case of Scott, a Missouri slave who sued for his

freedom on the grounds that his owner had taken him into

territory made free by the Missouri Compromise, the Court upheld the extreme southern demands. It ruled that Scott was not freed by his having lived in a fre,e territory, because

Congress had no authority to legislate against slavery in

the territories. Since the Constitution forbade the denial

of property rights, the only power that Congress could

exercise concerning slavery in the territories was to

guarantee its existence and to protect the property rights

of slaveowners there. According to this decision, the

Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, and all territories

1

were open to slavery.

When the decision was announced, Texans paid little

attention to it, believing that the Court had merely confirmed

their long held convictions concerning the federal government's

"'"For a thorough discussion of the case see, Vincent C. Hopkins, Dred Scott's Case (New York: Fordham University, 1951) . 123 responsibilities. Little notice was given the decision in

Texas newspapers and less editorial comment was made. The papers that did take notice of it were, of course, in complete agreement with the decision, but generally they pointed out that the principle upheld was nothing new. Furthermore,

Texas editors predicted that the North would never respect the decision but would continue antislavery agitation in 2 spite of it. Thus the decision seemed to be of little immediate importance to Texas. But before the decade had ended, the Court's action played an extremely important role 3 in the formulation of the state Democratic party's platform.

The party and Texans in general would have taken the extreme southern stand on the slavery expansion issue anyway, but later in the decade^ when the party began issuing ultimatums and making demands, this decision seemed to give them a legal basis for their claims.

Meanwhile, important developments were taking place in state politics in 1857, and for the time being, Texans seemed more concerned with state than national affairs. For the first time in a gubernatorial election year, the state Demo- cratic organization fielded a whole list of candidates with 2 Austin Southern Intelligencer, 22 April 1857; Galveston Weekly News, 31 March, 16 June 1857. 3 Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, pp. 78-79. " 124

strong party support. In the past, all of the governors and most state political leaders had called themselves Democrats

and claimed to have the support of the party. But before

1856, no unified and organized party existed, and two

candidates frequently opposed each other with each claiming

to be the party candidate. When conventions were held they

were poorly attended and had little effect on the outcome

of state elections. Candidates might run as independents or

Democrats or as Whigs or Know Nothings,.but whatever their

affiliation, Texas politicians generally adherred to the

state rights philosophy. Thus when an organized Democratic 4 party emerged it was inevitably state rightist.

As the gubernatorial election of 1857 approached, it

was assumed that Houston, who was serving as Senator from

Texas, would announce for election. Since the state legis-

lature, which chose Senators, was firmly in the hands of

the state rights element of the Democratic party, Houston

had no chance of being reelected to that position.^ Because

of his Union policies, Houston was always at odds with that

branch of the party. Both the party and the legislature

^Ibid., pp. 37-41.

^Houston to Rusk, 12 May 1857, Writings of Houston, 6:444; James Reily to Rusk, 14 May 185 7, Rusk Papers; Austin Texas State Gazette, 31 May 1857. 125 having passed resolutions against his vote on the Kansas -

Nebraska bill, the Democrats obviously would oppose his election to any public office.**

The Democratic State Convention, meeting May 4 and 5,

1857, in Waco, Texas, took a strong state rights position, adopting the National Democratic platform drawn up in

Cincinnati the previous year. Supporting the Compromise of 1850 and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, this platform demanded

a congressional non-intervention policy concerning slavery

in the territories. To further clarify its position, the

convention also adopted the state Democratic platform of 7 1856, a strong avowal of southern and state rights. The party believed that victory would come easy for them, assuming

that Houston would be their opponent in the governor's race.

The Dallas Herald contended, "Let the Waco Convention nominate

a popular and acceptable man, one who has the affections of

the people. One who has served his party faithfully and 8 honestly, and he can beat Houston and never open his mouth."

^Laws of Texas, 4:265; Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, p. 68. 7 Proceedings of the State Convention of the Democratic Party of the State of Texas which Assembled at Waco, Monday, May 4, 1857 (Austin: Texas State Gazette Office, 1857) , pp. i-vi. 8 Dallas Herald as quoted in the Columbia Democrat and Planter, 28 April 1857. 126

The party believed that it had such a man in its nominee,

Hardin Runnels, who had outstanding credentials for the

job. He had been a member and speaker of the Texas House

of Representatives and had been elected lieutenant governor

in 1855. His devotion to the party was unmatched, and his philosophy was strongly state rightist. Francis R. Lubbock was the party's candidate for lieutenant governor. Long-

time supporter of the Democratic party and later a Civil

War governor of Texas, Lubbock had held a number of minor

state offices and basically agreed with Runnels' approach to

government.

A few days after the Democratic convention adjourned,

Sam Houston announced for the governor's race as an independent 9 candidate. Although his views were already well known, he

campaigned vigorously, making over sixty speeches across the 10

state. He tried to explain his motives in opposing the

Kansas-Nebraska Act, pointing out that Texas had accepted the

provisions of the Missouri Compromise when it entered the

Union and claiming that he had acted in the best interests

of the entire nation. Calling himself a true Jacksonian 9 Houston to Rusk, 12 May 1857, Writings of Houston, 6:444.

"^Llerena Friend, Sam Houston: The Great Designer (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1954), pp. 248-250. 127

Democrat, Houston spoke bitterly of the state rights wing of the party developing in Texas. Leaders of this element of the party, especially Louis T. Wigfall, William S. Oldham,

and A.P. Wiley, campaigned actively against Houston, who retaliated with insults and accusations, referring to the

Waco group as "cur dogs" and accusing them of all manner of

crimes. If elected, Runnels and his men would plunder the

state treasury, according to Houston."*"* The Old Warrior was harshly criticized for the type of campaign he waged.

The Austin Texas State Gazette accused him of shocking

"female modesty" with his immoral anecdotes and described

"the dirty blackguardism, the filthy allusions to mules,

etc., and the garralous abuse of men" as "things beyond

description.

Houston fought hard, but from the beginning the odds

were against him. He had little newspaper support, and the

Republican campaign of 1856 was still fresh in the people's

minds. According to the Marshall Texas Republican in mid

July, twenty-eight papers opposed him, nine supported him, 13 and several were uncommitted. Since the Republican

^Speech at Austin, n.d. July 1857, Writings of Houston, 7:28-29. 12 Austin Texas State Gazette, 25 July 1857.

13Marshall Texas Republican, 18 July 1857. 128 opposed Houston, its estimation may be somewhat exaggerated, but his newspaper support was undoubtedly slim. Even the

Austin Southern Intelligencer, which became Houston's major supporter in the election two years later, went on record in support of all Democratic, party nominees and urged its 14 readers to support Runnels rather than Houston. The major complaints levied against him were his vote on the

Oregon bill, with the Wilmot Proviso attached, his opposition

to the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and his identification with

the Know-Nothing party, especially his support of Fillmore

the previous year. He was also accused of favoring the 15 abolition of slavery and of fraternizing with northerners.

Texans, still reacting to the election of 1856 and the

threat posed by the Republican party, hesitated to put a

Unionist in office who might not protect the interests of

the state. In addition, the Democratic party seemed to be

the South's best friend, being responsible for a number of

pro-southern measures. Many of the votes for Runnels merely

reflected Texans' support of that party.

At any rate, when the votes were counted, Houston came

in on the losing end of a 32,552 to 23,628 decision. Lubbock

14 Austin Southern Intelligencer, 13, 20 May 1857. 15 Bryan to Pease, 30 May 1857, Pease Papers; Oliver Jones to Anson Jones, 2 May 1857, Houston|Papers; Marshall Texas Republican, 23 May 1857. 129 was elected lieutenant governor over the independent Jesse 16 Grimes. Also in 1857, Guy M. Bryan and John Reagan were elected to the United States House of Representatives, both .with the support of the state Democratic party. Thus when Runnels took office, the Democrats, and especially the state rights wing of that party, were firmly in control of 17 state politics.

On December 21, 1857, Elisha M. Pease, a moderate

Democrat, turned the reigns of government over to Hardin

Runnels, a fire-eater. Pease had done all in his power to maintain good relations between the state and federal govern- ment and to quiet anti-Union sentiment in the state. Runnels, following a different course, issued ultimatums to the national government with the threat of secession as the course of action if his demands were not met. Throughout his administration, he made it clear that he would not hesitate to lead the state out of the Union. He consistently placed the interests of Texas, the South, and the slave power above the interests of the nation.

Runnels revealed his uncompromising nature clearly in his attitude concerning the controversy in Kansas. Since

16 Texas Legislature, Senate, Journal, 7th Leg., reg. sess., 4 November 1857, pp. 41-43. 17 Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A History of Texas and Texans, p. 334. 130 the creation of the Kansas territory in 1854, the North and

South had been engaged in a bitter contest, with each section trying to win the new territory to its point of view. Tensions over the slavery issue caused civil war to break out in

Kansas, as each side accused the other of being the aggressor, and Kansas became a symbol of the entire sectional struggle.

Immigration from the North being much more rapid than from the South, the majority of Kansans opposed slavery, but fair elections became impossible with Missourians crossing into the territory to vote their proslavery sentiments. As a result, the Lecompton Constitution, which permitted slavery, was drawn up and passed in a spurious election. Although the constitution obviously did not represent the will of the people, the South demanded that Kansas be admitted as a slave state and indicated that it would settle for nothing less. James Buchanan, a northern man witli southern sympathies, supported the Lecompton Constitution, but a large number of northern Democrats and, of course, all Republicans opposed it. When a comparatively honest election was held, as a result of congressional compromise, the people of Kansas over- whelmingly rejected the Lecompton Constitution even at the cost 18 of postponing statehood until after the next national census.

18 For the best study of this issue see, Rawley, Race and Politics. 131

Few southerners expressed extremist demands on the

Kansas question more loudly or with greater determination than Governor Runnels. In his inaugural address, he demanded that Kansas be admitted as a slave state and warned that if this demand was not met the South would be justified in 19 seceding from the Union. On January 20, 1858, he delivered a message concerned entirely with the admission of Kansas, in which he predicted that if the North refused to admit

Kansas with its slave constitution, "the time will have come when the Southern states should look to themselves for the 20 means of maintaining their future security."

As a result of this message and similar agitation from other state rightists, the Texas legislature passed a joint resolution allowing the governor to call an election for delegates to meet with the other slave states in convention i whenever the governor believed that such action was "necessary to preserve the equal rights of such states in the Union."

In case Texas ever needed to act alone to defend its rights as a state, the governor was given the power to convene the legislature for the purpose of calling a state convention to take necessary action. This resolution implied secession 19 Texas Legislature, Senate, Journal, 7th Leg., reg. sess., 21.December 1857, pp. 244. 20 Ibid., 20 January 1858, p. 378. 132 and was intended to establish the machinery necessary to take Texas out of the Union. The legislature sent the resolution to all the Texas congressmen in Washington, as 21 well as, to all the governors of the slaveholding states.

The governor now had the authority either to make Texas a party to a southern secession movement or to initiate such

a movement within the state.

Following the lead of their governor, newspapers and

politicians renewed open talk of secession and disunion.

Few newspapers openly advocated secession (as the Jefferson 22

Gazette did, but several alluded to it frequently, indicat-

ing that they would not oppose leaving the Union if the South 23 did not have its way. The newspapers generally supported

the extreme state rights expressions and threats of the

Democratic leaders, but as yet the people would not support

drastic measures. Slavery had not been directly threatened

in the state, although it had, in effect, been excluded in

Kansas, the census of 1860 showing only two slaves in the 21 Laws of Texas, 4:1155-1156. Ironically, Houston attempted to use this act in the crisis of 1860-1861 to head off or delay secession. 22 Jefferson Gazette as cited in Marshall Texas Republi- can, 20 March 1858. 23 Austin Texas State Gazette, 15 May 1858; Marshall Texas Republican, 3 April 1858. 133 24 entire territory. Until slavery was actually in danger

in the state, Texans refused to be a part of any secession

agitation, and they now reacted against the policies of their

chosen leaders.

In fact, the citizens of Texas were repulsed by their

leaders' policies, and a conservative reaction set in during 25 the latter part of 1858 and early part of 1859, lasting

at least until John Brown's raid in October. Being moderates

and conservatives, most Texans hoped that peace could be maintained if agitation from both the North and South could be stilled. William P. Ballinger expressed the sentiments

of many Texans in a letter to his secessionist oriented brother-in-law and congressman for the Western District,

Guy M. Bryan. Ballinger wrote, I have no sympathy--not a particle--for S. Carolina disunion, nullification doctrine--and that the eternal fiddling on the one hope of uniting the South on extreme issues in order to combat the North or to breakup the Union is the discord of devils to my ear.

By 1858-1859, many Texans realized that secession might eventually be necessary, but they opposed unwarranted agita- tion to bring it on prematurely. 24 U.S. Census, 1860, p. 595. 25 Alvy L. King, Louis T. Wigfall: Southern Fire-eater (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970) , p. 67.

26n -. Ballinger to Bryan, 28 March 1858, Bryan Papers. 134

During Runnels administration, the state rights element,

still firmly in control of the Democratic party, believed

that they could outline policy and that the people of Texas would follow their lead. The party leaders' belief that they

could dictate policy was so strong that several times during

Runnels administration they miscalculated Texas sentiment.

Runnels left much to be desired as a chief administrator, especially in dealing with the state's frontier problems.

Having little sympathy with the western settlers, he used even the vital question of frontier protection to agitate sectional controversy. Western Texans felt that the federal government, whose duty it was to provide frontier protection, was not sending enough men and supplies. Rather than supplementing federal protection with state forces, Runnels criticized the national government harshly, attempting to increase anti-Union feeling in Texas.27

His lack of feeling for the frontiersman was indicated in his correspondence with John S. Ford, who was in charge of the rangers on the frontier. Ford frequently asked for more men and money and complained about the problems of providing adequate protection. In a letter of March 10, 18.58,

27 Runnels to Ford, 2 June 1858, Hardin R. Runnels Files as Governor of Texas, Correspondence, 1857-1859, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas. 135

long before Runnels became concerned about reelection, he

wrote Ford, "If men living on the frontier loose a cow or

a Jackass occasionally, only it is because they have placed 2 8 themselves in a position where they might expect it."

He repeatedly told Ford to limit the number of men used in

defense of the frontier because of the expense incurred by 29 their maintenance. Protest of the lack of frontier protec- tion continued throughout his administration, but did little 30

good. Runnels supporters such as John Henry Brown,

secessionist editor of the Belton Democrat, realized that

Runnels would lose the frontier vote but did not think that 31 this would spell defeat for him.

Although Runnels' frontier policy was politically

unwise, it was not the decisive factor that defeated him in

1859. The voters objected to him and other party leaders

who shared his sentiments primarily because of their anti-

Union agitation. One of the major issues that disturbed 2 8 Ibid., 10 March 1858, Runnels Files as Governor. 29 Ibid., 7 March 1858, Runnels Files as Governor. 30 Smothing Iron And the Rest of the Democratic Mountains (Llano County) to Runnels, 5 March 1858, Runnels Files as Governor. This is just one of many letters in the Runnels Files asking for frontier protection. 31„ Brown to Runnels, 22 July 1859, Runnels Files as Governor. 136

Texans was the Democrats' movement to reopen the African slave trade, which seemed to be a deliberate attempt to cause trouble. Agitation to legalize the trade began in

1857, when John Henry Brown introduced in the House of

Representatives a joint resolution to petition the United

States Congress to reopen the trade. The resolution was referred to the Committee on Slaves and Slavery, which returned an unfavorable report, not because it considered the trade wrong, but because of the controversy that the petition might cause. The committee praised slavery and believed that the trade should be reopened, but since there was already so much agitation of the whole slavery issue, bringing it up at that time might have an unfavorable effect on the interests of the South. Opposing the trade for prac- tical, not humane or moral reasons, the committee ordered

10,000 copies of the report printed for distribution across 32 the state.

The more radical element of the party continued the agitation in spite of the trouble that it might cause. During the following year, Texas newspapers intensified the demand for reopening the trade. To those who thought "that slavery

32 — Report and Treatise on Slavery and the Slave Agitation (Austin: John Marshall and Company, 1857), pp. 1-81, passim. 137 is both just and expedient, and that it is in accordance with divine law, and that it is a moral, social, and political 33 blessing," the slave trade could not be wrong. One Texas editor contended that "slavery and the slave trade stand on precisely the same basis, and that the same arguments that condemn the latter will equally condemn the former."

Proponents of the trade argued, "The admission that the slave

trade, when properly conducted, is a moral evil, is fatal 34 to the institution of slavery itself." . Contending that

the Negro was better off as a slave in the Christian South

than in the wilds of Africa, these agitators seemed determined

to make the North accept even this ugliest phase of the

institution.35

In spite of the widespread agitation to reopen the

trade, more sensible minds prevailed. Texans wanted more i slaves and realized that revival of the legal trade would make them available at lower prices, but they also realized

how violently national opinion opposed the inhumane trade.

Texans still hoped that slavery might be expanded into the

territories and still had faith that it would not be bothered

in the South; radical demands to reopen the trade might affect 33 Austin Texas State Gazette, 18 December 1858. 34 Galveston Weekly News, 15 February 1859. 35 Fornell, The Galveston Era, pp. 229, 267. 138 adversely these more important goals. Several Texas news- papers expressed this more realistic view. After contending that the trade was not morally wrong, the Marshall Texas

Republican reported that "the people of the South would in

all probability vote against the reopening of the trade, if

the question were submitted to their decision." The editor believed that if a serious attempt were made it would result 3(3 in disruption of the Union. The Clarksville Northern

Standard doubted "whether in a hundred years we shall have

enough slave labor in Texas to develop it ... . We want more slaves--we need them.--Great numbers of Africans might be greatly benefitted in personal condition, in comforts of

life, and moral advancement," by reopening the slave trade.

Nevertheless, the paper opposed the agitation to legalize the trade, believing it an impossible goal that could only 37 cause trouble. From May 2 through May 5, 1859, the state Democratic

convention met in Houston to adopt a platform and nominate

candidates for the upcoming state elections. In this con- vention, agitation to reopen the slave trade reached its peak with the attempt of' the radicals to make it a part of the

3 6 Marshall Texas Republican, 4 February 1859.

37 Clarksville Northern Standard, 19 February 1859. 139 party platform. After much discussion on the resolution, 3 8 the party rejected it by the large majority of 228 to 81.

Although many party delegates wanted to reopen the trade, they realized by this time that their demands would only cause trouble for the South and weaken the party's position

in the state, since public opinion opposed needless agitation.

Even Louis T. Wigfall, Texas' most vocal advocate of disunion

and soon to be Senator from Texas, opposed slave trade agitation. Like most Texans, he supported it in the abstract, but realizing the problems that it would cause, agreed not 39 to insist upon it. Thus the party did not officially take a stand in favor of the slave trade, but Texans knew that a fairly large number of party members had favored it.

Runnels had supported the movement, and Texans had connected the agitation with the party.^ Texans did not oppose the trade in principle, but their reaction to the attempt to reopen it at this time indicated the conservative mood of the state. 3 8 Marshall Texas Republican, 20 May 1859. 39 Smyth to Reagan, 21 May 1859, George Washington Smyth Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas; Gilbert D, Kingsbury to Warr Kingsbury, n.d. June 1860, Gilbert D. Kingsbury Collection, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas; King, Louis T. Wigfall, pp. 68-71. 40 Austin Southern Intelligencer, 15 June 1859. 140

Although the state Democratic party did not demand the reopening of the slave trade, it did take an extreme southern position in other matters. It again adopted the Cincinnati

Platform of the national party and the state platform of

1856. However, Texas Democrats made a slight but extremely

significant shift in the party's position. Whereas, in the past, the party had strongly supported a non- intervention policy on the part of the national government, it now

supported the Dred Scott decision as the only possible

solution to the question of slavery in the territories and

demanded federal protection of the institution until a 41 territory applied for statehood. This plank was a fore- shadowing of the breech between the northern, and southern

Democrats that was to come in 1860# Were the people of Texas for Union or disunion? This was the question to be answered in the gubernatorial election 42 of 1859. Hardin Runnels and Frank Lubbock were again the candidates of the state Democratic party. Houston, in announcing his candidacy said, "The Constitution and the

Union embrace the principles by which I will be governed if 41 Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, pp. 79-80. 42 Friend, Sam Houston, p. 325. 141 elected. They comprehend all the old Jacksonian National 43 Democracy I ever professed or officially practised."

His opponent represented the ultra-state-rights philosophy, believing that the Union existed as it had in 1787 and that if the states' rights as they interpreted them were not upheld they had a right to leave the Union. Runnels had openly defended the right of secession, and many Texans feared that he might lead the state into disunion and war.

The issues were clear to the voters of Texas. Realizing this, Houston refused to campaign actively, making only one speech in 1859,whereas he had made over sixty, two years before

Everyone knew where he stood, and he was running on his past j 44 record.

Except for Houston's refusal to campaign, the election preparation resembled that of 1857, with most newspapers supporting the Democratic ticket. Runnels received support from the most prominent newspapers, among them the Dallas

Herald, Austin Texas State Gazette, Marshall Texas Republican, 45 and Clarksville Northern Standard. Two major supporters

43 Houston to George W. Paschal, 3 June 1859, Writings of Houston, 7:340. 44 Friend, Sam Houston, pp. 323-325. 45 Clarksville Northern Standard, 7 May, 23 July 1859; Galveston Weekly News, 19 July 1 59; Marshall Texas Republican, 23 July, 30 July 1859; Dallas Herald, 22 June 1859; Austin Texas State Gazette, 31 July 1859. 142 of Houston were the Marshall Harrison Flag and the Austin

Southern Intelligencer, both of which were overshadowed in 46 their city by a major supporter of the Democratic ticket.

If newspapers usually create or shape public opinion, this election was certainly an exception as the results disclosed, for if it had been decided by the state newspapers, Runnels would have run away with it. # Even before the election, several prominent Texans took note of the conservative reaction to the party's radicalism. Elisha M. Pease speculated after the Democratic

Convention, but before Houston announced his candidacy, 4 7 that if Houston chose to run he would win with ease. The ex-governor contended that more than three-fourths of the people of Texas did not believe that the delegates convening in Houston supported their best interest, especially with 4 8 regard to the African slave trade. Agreeing with Pease,

Ferdinand Flake, editor of Die Union, a German newspaper in

Galveston, perceived that the dominant forces in the Democratic 46 Marshall Harrison Flag, 17 June 1859; Austin Southern Intelligencer. 8 June 1859. 47 Pease to Ferdinand Flake, n.d. May 1859, Pease Papers; Pease to Samuel A. Maverick, 16 May 1859, Maverick Family Papers, University of Texas Library, Austin, Texas. 48 Pease to H. Stuart, 5 July 1859, Civilian and Galveston Gazette. " 143 party were not representative of the Texas people. Nor did he believe that the platform, which was quite moderate, represented the true feelings of the leading Democrats.

He contended that the delegates meeting in Houston honestly did want to reopen the African slave trade and that they were too radical to adhere to the moderate planks of their platform. Nor were the masses of the people fooled by the delegates and their candidate, observed Flake, speculating that the people recognized the radicalism of the Democrats 49 and that any good candidate could beat their nominee.

To the people of Texas, claimed the Austin Southern

Intelligencer, Runnels and his party supported "the African slave trade, secession, and disunion," and Houston opposed all three.^

Although thousands of Texans had to change their decision of 1857, their choice was clear and the victory an easy one for Houston. The Old Warrior, who had lost the election in 1857 by almost 9,000 votes, won this one by almost the i same number, the final count being 36,227 to 27,500. Edward

Clark, also running as an independent, won over Lubbock by 49 Flake to Pease, 23 May 1859, Pease Papers. 50 Austin Southern Intelligencer, 15 June 1859. 144 51 a small margin. Figure 3 reveals the extent of the Union victory. A total of 109 counties submitted official returns to the legislature in both gubernatorial election years. In

1857, Runnels carried 76 counties and Houston only 33, whereas two years later the Old Warrior carried 79 counties to only 30 for the disunionist. Significantly, 47 counties that Runnels won in 1857 supported Houston in 1859, whereas only 1 county changed its vote from Houston to Runnels.

Jefferson County gave Houston a 2-vote majority in the first election, but a 16-vote minority in the second confrontation between the two candidates. Also of significance is the

fact that opposition to the fire-eater was statewide, not just on the frontier where he expected to lose votes. Many counties in the coastal plains region, which had a large slave population (see Figure 1, chapter 1) threw their support to Houston after having supported Runnels in the previous election.

The election had revolved around the issue of Union versus disunion, and the voters of Texas chose Houston and

the Union, despite the criticism against him for his vote on

the Oregon territorial bill, his vote against the Kansas-Nebraska

^Texas Legislature, Senate, Journal, 8th Leg., reg. sess., 11 November 1859, pp. 44-47. GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS, 1857,1859 (Based on official returns as reported to the Texas Legislature 1857,1859)

Cc > is*

P y

7TT)1 carried by Houston in 1857 (J Q\ and 1859

carried by Runnels in 1857 and 1859 > carried by Runnels in 1857 and by Houston in 1859

carried by Houston in 1857 and by Runnels in 1859

no returns, for either 1857 or 1859 or both El Paso county not shown- for Runnels in 1857and 1859 Figure 3

lie 146 52 Act, and his support of Fillmore in 1856. Houston's

victory cannot be attributed to his popularity in the state

nor to his reputation as a military hero since he had been

overwhelmingly defeated in 1857. Texans were voting for

Unionism more than anything else.

Not only did the disunionist element in the state

suffer severe losses with the victories of Houston and Clark,

but its candidates for both congressional districts in 1859

were also defeated. General T.N. Waul, a lawyer of distinction

from the southwestern part of the state and a strong state

rights advocate, received the western district nomination at 53 a convention also held in Houston. His opponent was an

independent, Andrew J. Hamilton, ex-attorney general, state

legislator and provisional governor of Texas immediately

after the Civil War. As a strong Union man he opposed the

ultra-Democratic party for the same reasons that Houston

did, and the two men complemented and supported each other 54 m the 1859 election.

52 Marshall Texas Republican, 15 October 1859, King, Louis T. Wigfall, pp. 69-70. 53 Marshall Texas Republican, 20 May 1859. 54 Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," pp. 53-54. 147

The Democratic congressional nomination for the eastern

district was held in Henderson on May 2. Incumbent John

Reagan announced for reelection prior to the convention, and

the party had little choice but to nominate him as he was 55 popular and likely to win with or without their blessings.

Reagan had become unacceptable to many Democrats, especially

the ultra-state-rightists, when he published a circular

letter stating that he was totally opposed to reopening the

African slave trade and to any wild schemes undertaken to expand slavery and promote southern interests. As opposed

to the fire-eaters of the state as he was to the abolitionists of the North, he was first a Union man,who would do all in his power to keep the state in the Union as long as the North did not deny the South its constitutional rights.56 He realized that extreme measures on either side, the North or the South, could tear the nation apart. Although Reagan had been elected in 1857 with party support, this time his nomination caused a split in Democratic ranks. Because of

Reagan's pro-Union policies, a number of radical state

55 Dallas Herald, 18 May 1859; Marshall Texas Republican, 20 May 1859.

Reagan to the Voters of the First Congressional District, 12 April 1859, John H. Reagan Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas; Marshall Texas Republican, 24 June !859. , 148 rightists from the eastern part of the state bolted the convention and nominated Judge William B. Ochiltree. He was a former Whig and had been associated with the Know

Nothing party briefly, but by 1859 he was a staunch state rightist and a well established member of the radical wing 5 7 of the party. When the election results were in, both

Hamilton and Reagan-were victorious, largely because of their strong Union stand, indicating that the people of

Texas were not represented by the Democratic party as it was controlled at the time.

The elections of 1859 were an unqualified victory for the Union. Undoubtedly the Democratic party at this time was ahead of the people of the state in its advocacy of disunion and secession. Texas sentiments had changed radically since the 1856 election when the Republicans threatened victory and possible abolition. In the election of 1857, Texans still seemed to favor radicalism, turning their backs on the Unionist Sam Houston, but as a conservative

reaction developed in 1858, the people realized what their

Democratic party organization and elected leaders had planned for their future, they rebelled against the party. The 57 Ben Proctor, Not Without Honor: The Life of John H. Reagan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), p. 112. 149 people of the state still hoped for compromise between the

North and South over the slavery question, not yet realizing that the issue could not be compromised. CHAPTER VI

THE MOUNTING FEAR

Although Texans remained Unionists until the election of 1860, the slave unrest that they witnessed during the latter part of the 1850's was preparing the way for secession and shaping Texans' attitudes toward their position in the Union. Slave insurrections and milder forms of rebellion, which were frequent enough to justify the fears of the whites, seemed to coincide with the rise of the

Republican party. To understand the development of Texans' attitudes during this period, especially concerning the

Republican party, one must understand their fear of any agitation that might disturb their precarious peace. To

Texans the rebellious activities of the slaves were just a forewarning of what was to come if the Black Republicans elected their candidate to the presidency in 1860. Until the campaign of I860, however, they did not believe that the abolitionist party exercised sufficient power within the

Union to threaten their position.

Fear of insurrections, an inevitable part of the slave system, was no new development, but during the 1850's the

150 151 abolition threat had grown rapidly. Undoubtedly opponents of the institution resided in Texas when the state joined the Union, but for their own well being they remained quiet.

In the 1840's and early 1850's any attempt to abolish slavery within the state would have been futile. But with the northern abolitionist sentiment growing in the mid and later 1850's emancipation seemed a real possibility, and abolition activity became more explicit. The fear engendered by these activities caused Texans to tighten up in their controls and to become even more paranoid about opinions alien to their society.1 In Texas, one did not actually have to be an abolitionist to come under harsh attack by the citizens of the state. All public officials, newspaper editors, and other influential figures were expected to give unequivocal support to the institution and were harshly

2 i criticized if they failed to do so. To remain neutral on the question of slavery was not enough; one had to openly profess to support it to be above suspicion. To Texans, on this issue, "There can be no middle ground--Those that 3 are not with us, must be against us."

"^Abel Smalton Beardsley to Jane Beardsley, 10 April 1851, Beardsley Letters. 2 Liberty Gazette, n.d., clipping in Lorenzo Sherwood Scrapbook, 1851-1855, Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas. 3 Galveston Weekly News, 31 May 1859. 152

Even before the rise of the Republican party Texans had experienced scattered incidents of antislavery sentiment,

but no organized group ever developed to oppose the insti-

tution. Nevertheless, Texans were constantly on the lookout

for such a group and consequently became extremely suspicious

of the Germans. Texans' reaction to these people indicates

the extent to which they feared the development of organized

abolitionists in their midst. Simply because they did not

own a large number of slaves, the Germans were accused of

opposing the system. Nothing could have been further from 4

the truth. Several factors, other than moral objections,

account for their having only a limited number of slaves.

They had the long established custom of agricultural pursuits

being a family endeavor, with the entire family working the

4 The myth about all Germans being abolitionists is still with us in spite of the numerous scholarly works which present overwhelming evidence to the contrary and in spite of the abundance of contemporary evidence available. For examples see, Andreas Dorpalen, "The German Element and the Issues of the Civil War," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 29(1942):57-61; Terry G. Jordan, German Seed in Texas Soil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1966), pp. 181-185; Egon D. Tausch, "Southern Sentiment Among Texas Germans During the Civil War and Reconstruction," (M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1965), pp. 47-53; Austin Texas State Gazette, 29 July 1854, 5 March, 28 May 1859,"l2 January 1860> Galveston Weekly News, 11 December 1855, 16 February 1858; San Antonio Ledger, 24 November 1855; Alex Rossy to Hardin Runnels, 3 March 1858, Runnels Files as Governor of Texas. 153 fields; they were totally unfamiliar with the system of slave labor; generally those who immigrated to Texas had little money and could not afford slaves. Unconcerned about the moral issues involved, they had come to Texas knowing that

the system was a part of the southern way of life and had

little to say about it upon arrival.5

A minority of the Germans did oppose slavery, and their opinions caused trouble for the entire German population.

Most of the antislavery accusations made against Germans

stemmed from a convention held in 1854 in San Antonio that

adopted a platform denouncing slavery and maintaining that 6 it should be abolished. Only a small number of Germans were present at the convention, and they by no means voiced 7 the sentiments of the majority in the state. But the possibility of a large minority group in the state opposing

slavery terrified Texans, and they began condemning all

Germans because of the viewpoints of a few, forcing them to

defend themselves. At this time, the Germans as a group

^Dorpalen, "The German Element and the Issues of the Civil War," pp. 58-59; Jordan, German Seed in Texas Soil, pp. 182-183.

^R.L. Biesele, "The Texas State Convention of Germans in 1854," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 33(1930):253. 7 Austin Texas State Gazette, 29 July 1854. 154 were neutral on the slavery issue, but realizing that in order to survive in the state they had to take a definite 8 stand, they quickly chose the pro-slavery position. Since they were a minority group and anti-foreign sentiment was strong in Texas, they realized the expediency of supporting the majority position. Again Texans had insured unanimity of opinion on this explosive issue.

Dr. Adolf Douai, editor of the San Antonio Zietung

from 1853 until 1856, was one of the few influential Germans 9 who was an admitted abolitionist. As Germans began to

realize the necessity of taking a pro-slavery stand, Douai

came under harsh attack, not only from Anglo-American Texans,

but from his own people as well. Most of those Germans who

had patronized the Zietung cancelled their subscriptions

and refused to advertise in his columns. Although Douai

received contributions from northern abolitionists, such as

Frederick Law Olmstead, to keep his paper going, he was forced

to sell it in early 1856 because it cost more to print than

it made. Before he left the state in 1856 for the North, where he continued to fight slavery, he admitted that he

had been wrong when he said that a majority of the Germans

8 Ibid.; Galveston Weekly News, 11 December 1855. 9 Dr. Adolf Douai, "Autobiography," University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas, pp. 113-116. 155

in Texas opposed slavery. He believed that most of them

remained neutral on the issue, although many strongly defended

the peculiar institution."^

The Germans made numerous defenses and declarations of

their pro-slavery stand across the state, and so convincing

were they that even the most rabid opponents of abolition 11 believed in their sincerity. From 1854 until the Civil

War, Texas Germans defended slavery, partially because they

really supported the institution and partially because they wished to prove their loyalty to the state and the South.

Germans were strong supporters of the Democratic party,

largely because this party had defended them against the

Know Nothing party. They even supported the Democrats in

opposition to Houston, the strong Unionist, because of his

association with the Know Nothings. As the Civil War

approached the Germans supported the right of secession as

strongly as any other group, proving their loyalty to their 12 state and party.

10Ibid., pp. 115-117, 124-126. 11 Galveston Weekly News, 11 December 1855, 16 February 1858; Austin Texas State Gazette, 5 March, 28 May 1859. 12 Tausch, "Southern Sentiment Among Texas Germans," pp. 51-53; Austin Texas State Gazette, 12 January 1860. 156

No one who opposed slavery, regardless of the degree or the purpose, was safe in the state. Writing in 1860,

David 0. Hoover, a farmer, reported that he left Texas for

fear of his life in 1856. He had owned over 1,000 acres

of land but no slaves. Never had he done 'or said anything

that he felt might jeopardize the institution in Texas, and

he did not believe that the federal government had the right

to interfere with it where it existed. He did, however,

oppose slavery as a matter of principle, but he knew when

he moved to Texas that it was an intricate part of the

state's society. In 1856, he voted for Fremont and was

quickly labeled a "Black Republican" and "Damned abolitionist"

and threatened with lynching. Fearing for his and his

family's safety, he fled from the state with only fifty-five

cents in his pocket. In Texas, Hoover said, no one dared

to speak out against the institution or dared to communicate with anyone in the North who might oppose slavery, as all

incoming mail from the North was censored. Hoover's experience was just one of the many persecutions suffered by those who

differed.with the majority on this emotional issue. As a

result of his experience Hoover saw an "irrepressible conflict" 13 developing between the North and the South. Texans who

13David 0. Hoover to Mr. Lingle, 23 October 1860, Lafayette (Ind.) Courier. clipping in John Henry Brown Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin Texas. 157

took such precautions to prevent the growth of even mild

antislavery sentiment obviously would not tolerate the

development of opposition to the system on a national

scale.

As soon as the Republican party was formed, Texans

began connecting it with abolition, not without good reason.

Whether or not the majority of the party intended to destroy

slavery in the South, its objections to the institution,

based on moral grounds, were bound to disturb race relations.

During the presidential election of 1856 Texans realized

how serious the Republican threat to their social structure

was. During this election, abolition activity increased

and slaves became restless, leading to disturbances that 14 horrified Texans. Although they had always experienced

some difficulties with their slaves, the first real abolition-

ist scare occurred in Texas in 1856, the year that John

Fremont was the Republican nominee for the presidency.

Undoubtedly some of the plots described during the election

existed only in Texans' overwrought imaginations, but their

worst fears concerning servile warfare seemed to be material-

izing . 14 Galveston Tri-Weekly News, 9 September 1856; Corsicana Navarro Express, 2 November 1860; Marshall Texas Republican, ,10 November 1860. 158

As Fremont's candidacy ushered in an attack on both real and imagined abolitionists in the state, influential

Texans warned that the time had come for action. In May,

1856, William B. Ochiltree, speaking at the Baptist church in Rusk, warned the people that slavery was "in danger from abolitionists and Free Soilers," and urged that Texas and 15 the South should unite against such people. Anson Jones, speaking a short time later in Washington, Texas, said that although he was sure that no abolitionist was present, if one were there, I give him notice that I devoutly believe an abolitionist must of necessity be either a knave or a fool--the former, I think should be hung for high treason to the Constitution--for the latter . . . I'd put a whip in the hands of every honest man, to lash the scoundrel naked through the world.

Using the term Black Republican "as synonymous with abolition," he believed that if Fremont was elected a war would follow

1 fs because the South could not submit to emancipation of slaves.

As fear of abolitionists rose in the late 1850's, they were pictured as being freaks, perverts, and outlaws. One

Texan, Gideon Lincecum, believed that abolitionists delighted

"in the odor of the Negro," but they could be cured by 15 Speech of William B. Ochiltree, 10 May 1856, Rusk Papers, 16 Speech of Anson Jones, 29 July 1856, Jones Papers. 159 castration which would "disarm the brute that is in them 17 and they will pester your negroes no more." They were the lowest form of mankind who delighted in war and murder.

Texans accused abolitionists of causing slave insurrections by telling the slaves that if Fremont were elected he would 18 emancipate all of them. Undoubtedly the Texans' own ranting about how the Republicans were about to abolish slavery in the South contributed to the unrest among the slaves during these years.

During the late 1850's Texans were almost constantly engaged in witch hunts to discover abolition sentiments or plots, usually hanging, whipping, or banishing the accused parties. An indication of Texans rage at such people can be seen in the treatment dealt Thomas Dougan, a preacher in

Ellis County accused of being an abolitionist, because of the "numerous letters and abolition newspapers he received

through the Postoffice." The citizens decided to punish him with 500 lashes administered by a Negro slave. Over

200 people witnessed the whipping, a minority of whom wanted to hang him. A newspaper reported that after the sentence 17 # Gideon Lincecum to O.R. Snodgrass,'15 May 1857, Gideon Lincecum Papers, University of Texas Archives,Austin, Texas. 18 Clarksville Northern Standard, 17 January 1857. 160 had been carried out he was told, "if found in the county, that he would be hung .... He expected death, but came off simply the best whipped man who ever went through the 19 ordeal in Texas."

As the threat to slavery increased, the Texas legislature took steps to make antislavery activities illegal and to provide punishments.for measures that threatened the security of slave property. When the abolitionist scare of 1856 broke out, the legislature strictly defined what constituted abolition and insurrection and outlined penalties to be assessed for convictions. The law stipulated that "If any person advise or conspire with a slave to rebel or make insur- rection, he shall be punished with death, whether such 20 rebellion or insurrection be made or not." Insurrection of slaves was defined as "an assemblage of three or more, with arms, with intent to obtain their liberty by force."

A five to fifteen year punishment was to be given anyone who attempted in any way to make a "slave discontented with his 21 state of slavery." In practice, insurrectionists and abolitionists rarely received benefit of trial in Texas, but 19 Marshall Texas Republican, 24 October 1857. 20 Laws of Texas, 3:1511.

21Ibid., 3:1061. 161 were handled summarily by mob or vigilante action. Afraid to leave an abolitionist in custody long enough to come to 22 trial, Texans resorted to frontier justice.

Even before the scare of 1856 broke out, the legislature had provided machinery to guard against abolition activity.

Acts passed in 1846 and 1850 authorized a county patrol system, which was given the authority to arrest white people who were found in the company of slaves without the slave- owners' consent and to keep the Negroes in line. Prior to

1856, however, such patrols were not established and used to any extent. In reaction to the insurrections and plots discovered in the latter part of the decade, various counties began to organize them, and there had been earlier demands that these patrols be organized in case a need for them developed.^

Determining the number and extent of real insurrections is impossible. Numerous masters and whites were killed by slaves, but most were isolated cases, not part of an organized insurrection. Such rebellion on an individual basis had always been a problem. As early as 1853, Texans were complain- ing that "The matter of murder by negroes is getting quite

22 Clarksville Northern Standard, 13 August 1853; Corsicana Navarro Express, 14 September 1860. 23 Austin Texas State Gazette, 22 July 1854. 162 too common, and there should be a statute providing for their 24 summary trial and execution." But the real fear was that individual discontent would be organized into mass insurrection and wholesale slaughter.

The first slave uprising of any consequence took place in Columbus, Colorado County, in September, 1856, during the Republican party's first attempt to win the presidency.

In late August, the citizens, becoming suspicious of the activities of some of the slaves in the county, had formed a vigilance committee, which discovered the intended rebellion. The committee reported that approximately 200 slaves under the leadership of a free Negro, who escaped when the plot was discovered, were plotting insurrection.

They supposedly planned to kill systematically all the white citizens in the county, "with the exception of the young ladies, who were to be taken captives and made the wives of the diabolical murderers." The slaves possessed guns, knives, and ammunition, with which they planned to move against every house in' the county and then fight their way 25 to Mexico. Upon discovery of the plot two Negroes were

24 Clarksville Northern Standard, 13 August 1853. 25 New York Tribune, 23 October 1856, clipping in Larrabee Collection. 163 whipped to death and three were hanged "with the unanimous

2 (5 voice of the citizens of the county."

The entire state was disturbed by the narrow escape of the citizens of Columbus, and now other plots began to be reported across the state. Other counties began to form vigilance committees and offer aid to Colorado County.

At least one community, Georgetown, sent aid in the form of arms to be used any way that the vigilance committee saw 27 fit. The Austin vigilance committee immediately investi- gated a Negro prayer meeting and found that it was not really for the "good purpose" which it purported to be.

Instead "Every kind of thieverish plot, incendiary work, and

conspiracy were concocted circulated, discussed, and attempts made to mature them." As a result of the investigation, the 2 8 meetings were promptly ended. In Halletsville, Lavaca

County, the slaves were supposedly about to rise up when the 2 Q white abolitionists who instigated the unrest were captured. 2 6 Ibid.; Also see Galveston Weekly News, 11 September 1856; Austin Texas State Gazette, 27 September 1856. 27 Belton Weekly Independent, 17 September 1856.

2 8 Austin Texas State Gazette, 14 March 1857. 29 Austin Southern Intelligencer, 19 November 1856. 164

In November additional insurrection schemes were discovered 30 in De Witt, Lavaca, and Victoria, counties.

As a result of these activities, masters began to deal more harshly with their slaves, and the white citizens began to take greater precautions against servile insurrections.

Most significant for the secession movement, however, Texans became more determined than ever that a Black Republican could never occupy the white house without disturbing their peace.

They were convinced that the insurrections were connected to the Republican election efforts and somehow inspired by the 31 activities of the northern agitation against slavery. The horrible fear aroused by these insurrections--fear of murder, rape, property destruction, and general social chaos--makes the Texans' decision to secede understandable.

As the crisis of 1860 drew near, antislavery sentiment in the North grew stronger and more dangerous, as some abolitionists began to advocate the violent overthrow of the institution, realizing that political measures and appeals to morality would not accomplish their purpose. Then in

October, 1859, the first violent direct attack on slavery occurred with John Brown's raid. Brown, a fanatical abolitionist

30 Austin Texas State Gazette, 15 November 1856. 31 Ibid., 5 January 1860; Galveston Weekly News, 4 December 1856. 165 who believed that God had appointed him to destroy slavery, had considerable support from northern aboditionists, who knew the nature of his plans. On October 16, 1859, Brown led an attack on the federal arsenal at Harper's Ferry,

Virginia, intending to get arms and ammunition to establish a mountain fortress. From there he planned to incite slave rebellions and provide a haven for fugitive slaves, making slave property unsafe and therefore unprofitable. He intended to expand his operations across the entire South, including

Texas. The raid was a miserable failure, with Brown and his men all being killed or captured. After a hasty trial, Brown was executed for treason on December 2, and northern abolitionists portrayed him as a martyr who died for great principles.

Much has been said about the raid's influence in shaping southern attitudes toward the North. The attack sent a shock of fear throughout the entire South, especially as a number of influential northerners condoned and admired Brown's actions. The tendency in the South was to view the raid as an accurate reflection of northern opinion in general and of

Black Republican sentiment in particular. The reaction was strong, especially in the areas near the occurrence, as 166 southerners feared slave rebellion and abolition more than 32 ever. However, in Texas Brown's raid has been over-rated as a factor in shaping attitudes toward the Union. At first,

Texas newspapers did not even report the raid to be a part of an abolition conspiracy, but said that it was "instigated

and organized by employees on the Government dam at that place in consequence of their having been cheated out of a 33 portion of their wages." Later when more information

concerning the raid had been received, Texans believed it

to be part of an abolitionist plot to overthrow slavery in the South and generally believed that the Black Republicans 34

inspired it. Yet Texans seemed to regard the raid as just

a minor part of a larger, more significant movement going

on in the North. It was merely an expression of what the

Republican party stood for and of the abolition mood develop-

ing in the North. The movement as a whole was dangerous and

frightening, but Brown's raid in itself was of little 32 For the best account of Brown's raid and its signifi- cance see, Stephen B. Oates, T

Although Texans did not feel directly threatened by

Brown's attack, they did, as a result of the raid, begin to seek and find similar plots within their own boundaries.

Reacting violently to abolitionists, they reasserted their determination to prevent such agitation in Texas. A mass meeting held in late November, 1859, in Marshall, home of the fire-eater Louis T. Wigfall, resolved that "There is no greater crime, sin or moral turpitude . . . than . . . being an Abolitionist. And all caught should be dealt with 3 6 accordingly." Contending that abolitionist activity was increasing, Texas newspapers condoned the use of violence to combat their deeds.

One Texas newspaper, the San Antonio Ledger, reported that, "Suspicious characters in every direction are taken up--subject to the closest examination--and when good proof is [found], dressed in a coat of tar and feathers, or held 35 Galveston Weekly News, 22 November 1859. 3 6 Marshall Texas Republican, 3 December 1859. 168 for more condign punishment." Approving such action, the

Ledger continued,

This is all right; it will not do to permit rascals in our midst to meddle with the institution of slavery. When they talk and work against it here they are endangering not only the property, but the lives of thousands, and for the public good, they ought to be severely punished.

The abolitionist was "meaner than the midnight assassin-- for 37 it is assassination in fact that they are gradually inciting."

As a result of the raid, Texans hated and feared abolitionists as never before, but at this point their hatred of abolition- ists did not lead them to dispise the Union because the government was not controlled by enemies of slavery. While the raid certainly contributed to Texans1 hatred of the

North, it did not make them disunionists.

Governor Runnels mentioned the raid briefly in a speech on state rights to the legislature in November, 1859.

Expressing an opinion commonly held in Texas, he, like many

Texans, believed that a "fearful catastrophe" was approaching of which Brown's raid was just an example. He warned, "Witness the recent invasion and attempted insurrection at Harper's

Ferry, and which, though differing in the commission of the t overt act, events have had counter parts in our own state

3 7 San Antonio Ledger, 24 December 1859. 169 3 8 within the last six months, not less ominous." No doubt

the distance from the event and the haste with which Brown was executed contributed to Texans' lack of concern. They

felt that Brown had been dealt with fairly and had received 39 the punishment that he deserved. The raid portended

greater dangers to come, but if this event signaled the

approaching crisis, it was to Texans a very weak signal.

In spite of the relatively mild immediate reaction to

the raid in Texas, historians have cited this event as the

point at which Texans turned away from the Union and became predominately secessionists. The major reasoning behind

labeling Brown's raid as the turning point is the election

of the Marshall fire-eater, Louis T. Wigfall, to the United

States Senate to fill the vacancy created by the death of 40 J. Pinckney Henderson on June 4, 1858. 3 8 Texas, Legislature, Senate, Journal, 8th Leg., reg. sess., 10 November 1859, p. 38. 39 San Antonio Herald, 30 November 1859; Marshall Texas Republican, 10 December 1859. 40 Procter, John Reagan, p. 118, contends that "whatever patriotic and high-minded motives Texans had in the summer of 1859, one act of violence [John Brown's raid], one hated name, obliterated their conciliatory spirit and drove them into the camp of the extremists." Friend, Sam Houston, pp. 326-327, states that Brown's raid "and the resulting fury of antiabolition and radical Southern sentiment made inevitable the choice of fire-eating L.T. Wigfall as Texas senator." 170

Less than six months after the election of a slate of

Unionist candidates to state offices, the state legislature sent one of the most radical politicians in the state to the

Senate. This seems to indicate a significant shift in attitudes. But the question arises, why was the rabid state rightist elected? If he was elected primarily because Brown's raid changed the attitudes of Texans toward the Union, making them disunionists, then the attack was the turning point, but if other factors w

Wigfall's election was a turning point in Texas politics since he was definitely a disunionist, but his election by

the Texas legislature does not necessarily indicate that public opinion now favored secession or disunion.

A close examination of the reasons for Wigfall's election

seems to indicate that although Brown's raid might have

given him the small margin necessary for victory, it was

certainly not the major reason for the fire-eater's election

to the Senate. Even if the raid had not occurred when it did

Wigfall would probably have been elected, since political

conditions in the state favored the election of a man of his

sentiments. Having come to Texas from South Carolina in 1846, 171

Wigfall practiced law in Marshall and served in the state

legislature. An instrumental figure in the formation of the

state party, Wigfall was one of Texas' most ambitious 41 politicians and probably the state's most radical disunionist.

In his campaign for the Senate he openly advocated reopening

the African slave trade and initiating fillibustering campaigns to acquire Cuba and a large slice of Mexican 42

territory. Thus he represented the extremist element of

the party, and his views were well known.

Wigfall, a leader and organizer of the state Democratic I party, won his senatorial position primarily because he had

the support of the party. The regular Democrats controlled

both the House and the Senate, and the party had from its

origins been controlled by state rightists. Having supported

Runnels, Lubbock, Waul, and to a lesser extent Ochiltree,

all of whom had been defeated in August, the party was still

smarting from its sound trouncing. Party men were anxious

to elect a candidate of true Democratic sentiments, one who would prove that state rights had not been repudiated in the 43 last elections. Though Wigfall represented the radical 41 . King» Louj-s T > Wigfall, pp. 48-78, passim. 42 Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," p. 56; Friend, Sam Houston, p. 336; Procter, John Reagan, P- 114; Austin Texas State Gazette, 17 September~l859. 43 Austin Texas State Gazette, 5 November 1859. 172 wing of the party and had opponents among the regular

Democrats, organizing opposition to him proved extremely difficult. The strong Unionists, now referring to them- selves as national Democrats, opposed Wigfall's election violently and feared that it would bring Texas a step closer to disunion, but since his opponents were unable to agree upon a single candidate, Wigfall had no serious rival.

The only candidate who might have defeated him was

John H. Reagan, a moderate, but Reagan had alienated many of the regular Democrats with his pro-Union stand in the last Congressional elections. Just beginning a new term in the House of Representatives, he decided not to seek the 44 office. Wigfall then received strong party support, though some of the regular Democrats still opposed him. To combat this opposition and prevent a split within the ranks of the party, a Democratic caucus was called which officially .45 nominated him. Hopefully this would assure him of united party support, since all who had pledged to support the party would either have to abstain from voting or cast their ballots for the fire-eater. In addition to the support of 44 Reagan to William Alexander, 30 October 1859, Reagan Papers; Austin Texas State Gazette. 19 November 1859. 45 Trinity Advocate as cited in Austin Texas State Gazette, 3 December 1859. 173 the party, Wigfall had widespread newspaper support. Such influential papers as his hometown organ the Marshall Texas

Republican and the Dallas Herald began to advocate his election several months before the legislature made its choice, so that his name had been widely circulated whereas 46 those of other candidates had not.

Wigfall's opponents made a poor showing in combating such organization and support. The Unionists were unable to agree upon a single candidate, and the regular Democrats who opposed him merely abstained from voting. The Unionists, not having a strong candidate, turned to the strategy of nominating several men in an attempt to prevent Wigfall from getting a majority. They also tried opposing him on constitutional grounds, pointing out that according to the state constitution he could not run for the Senate since he already held a state office, but neither of these strategies worked. His opponents were all relatively unknown and the 47 opposition was never able to rally around one candidate.

Even with the opposition disorganized and with party and newspaper support, Wigfall won the election only by a very narrow margin. The balloting began on December 5, 1859, 46 Marshall Texas Republican, 6 May 1859; Dallas Herald, 9 February 1859. 47 Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas, p. 257. 174 at 11:00 A.M. and lasted until 5:30 P.M., during which time thirty-eight roll calls and three ballotings were necessary to give Wigfall a narrow two vote victory over his five opponents. An unsuccessful attempt was made to force the regular Democrats who opposed Wigfall to attend the session and vote, but the legislature agreed to elect him with this 4 8 narrow margin. Obviously this vote does not indicate that he was the overwhelming choice of the legislature, and the people themselves were, of course, not directly represented in his election. Nevertheless, the regular Democrats considered his election a tremendous victory, demonstrating

"that the election of Gen. Houston as Governor of the State did not import an endorsement of his principles or a repudia- 49 tion of the Democratic party." Electing a man of radical principles seemed the best method of demonstrating this.

Although specific reasons for Wigfall's election cannot be objectively determined, evidence indicates that factors other than John Brown's raid were the more influential. Texas newspapers did not tie his election to Brown's raid, and to most Texans the two events were independent of each other.

Texans1 attitudes were not drastically altered as a result 48 Ibid.; Texas, Legislature, House, Journal, 8th Leg., reg. sess., 5 December 1859, pp. 174-181; King, Louis T. Wigfall, pp. 73-76. 49 Galveston Weekly News, 20 December 1859. 175 of the Harper's Ferry incident, and Wigfall's sentiments were obviously more disunionist than those of his constituents.

To Texans, Brown's raid did not threaten slavery in the state, and since the hated Black Republicans were not in a position to abolish it, the state could remain in the Union. True, the winter of 1859-1860 was a time of fearful uncertainty, but more because of the upcoming presidential election than because of events in far away Virginia. Brown's raid and the election of Wigfall are significant because these two events prepared the way for a shift in Texans' attitudes that would come with the election of Lincoln, but this shift had not yet occurred at the end of 1859.

In their reaction to the South Carolina resolutions passed in December, 1859, Texans demonstrated their devotion to the Union and their willingness to follow Houston, up to a point at least. In reaction to developments in Kansas and

John Brown's raid, the South Carolina legislature passed resolutions affirming the right of a state to secede from the Union and recommending that a convention of all slave- holding states be called to decide what action should be taken to prevent northern aggression. Receiving these resolutions from Governor Gist of South Carolina, Houston in accord with executive courtesy transmitted them to the state legislature, 176 along with a special message of his own. He denounced the resolutions for advocating secession and nullification doctrines which he contended were based on false and uncon- stitutional premises. A convention might result in secession, which even if it were constitutional, would gain nothing for the South. Realizing that Harper's Ferry had precipitated the resolutions, Houston said that he could not comprehend the stand taken by South Carolina. The Hero of San Jacinto had gained rather than lost faith as a result of this event, because of the .swift action taken by federal authorities after the raid and because most northerners denounced Brown just as southerners did. He further recommended that the state legislature pass resolutions declaring that secession was not an abstract right and refusing to elect delegates if the convention that South Carolina suggested materialized.50

The legislature would not go as far as Houston suggested in repudiating the principles outlined in the resolutions, but most legislators agreed that such a convention was premature

50Texas, Legislature, House, Journal, 8th Leg., reg. sess. , 21 January 1860, 450-463; Message to the Texas Legis- lature, 21 January 1860, Writings of Houston, 7:429-441. Houston's pronouncements concerning secession are marked by their inconsistencies. Until the crisis of 1860-1861, he usually argued that such action was unconstitutional. Then as the crisis approached, he admitted more frequently that the people did have the right to revolution if their constitu- tional rights were violated. Secession, however, was, he believed, revolution and should be resorted to only in extreme circumstances. 177 and that as yet Texas had no real justification for secession. The legislature neither made a firm commitment nor took a definite vote on the resolutions, but it did submit them to committees for consideration. The reports, which indicated that while the legislators thought secession was constitutional they saw no immediate need for it, out- lined the conditions under which disunion would become a necessity. The Senate majority report contended that the

Republican party sought to gain control of the government so that it could destroy the institution of slavery, an unconstitutional action. The House majority report declared that the committee members would support secession before they would accept a government dominated by the Republican party. Thus the majority reports of both houses upheld the right of secession and declared that that right should be exercised if the Black Republicans gained control, but until that time Texas would remain loyal to the Union and the

Constitution. Minority reports in both houses denied the 51 right of secession.

The legislature never took definite action on these reports or on the resolutions, indicating that it did not

51Sandbo, "Beginnings of the Secession Movement in Texas," pp. 69-71. 178 consider the situation serious enough to warrant united southern action. The failure of the legislature to act had the same effect as a negative vote, meaning that Texas would not at this time cooperate in a disunionist movement;

f less than a year later the same legislature voted almost unanimously to recognize the state secession convention, which would, without doubt, vote for disunion. They took this action when the development they warned against--

Republican victory--had occurred.

Although most Texas newspapers favored the southern convention suggested by South Carolina, they did not press 52 the issue. A majority of Texans at this time probably agreed with the sentiments expressed by the Clarksville

Northern Standard. Realizing that a convention was pre- mature, the paper editorialized, "We are not yet harmed in any serious way .... The masses must bide the true time, when serious action becomes an irrevocable necessity. They 53 Will wait that time."

Texans were willing to postpone action until it was absolutely necessary, but in the spring of 1860 time was running out; slave unrest of the 1850's and the white 52 Galveston Weekly News, 10 January 1860; Writings of Houston, 7:441 f.n. 53 Clarksville Northern Standard, 4 February 1860. 179

reaction to it had created a climate of hate and fear. Soon both the Democrats and the Republicans would hold presidential nominating conventions, and the fate of the institution of

slavery might well be decided. At least since the advent

of the Wilmot Proviso, the majority of the people of the North

had opposed the expansion of slavery; their numbers were

increasing, and in the Republican party they had achieved

political organization. Thus far, no major candidate, with

the exception of Fremont, who had been defeated in 1856, had

opposed slavery, but in 1860 the South might not be so

5 luckyi i . 4

54Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln, 2:204, 226-228. CHAPTER VII

THE CRISIS

The panic that accompanied the election of 1856 became mass hysteria during the campaign of 1860. As the possibility of Republican victory became greater, slave unrest, Texans believed, increased proportionately. Incidents that in less troubled times might have been passed over as insignificant, now came to be considered a part of the giant Black Republican conspiracy to destroy slavery. The Democratic party had protected southern interest in the past, but now that it was torn by internal dissension, Texans began to lose hope.

In the past, northern and southern Democrats had been able to agree upon the principles expressed in the Cincinnati

Platform, the Platform adopted by the national convention meeting in Cincinnati in 1856, and the one under which

Buchanan was elected. The Platform stated that Congress would not interfere with slavery in the territories, and since 1856, both North and South had repeatedly endorsed it.

The Texas Democrats had adopted it in every convention since

1856, contending that it contained the only principles that

180 181 1 could save the Union. But by 1860, the two sections were giving different interpretations to the same platform.

While the South contended that it meant neither Congress nor the territorial legislature could prohibit slavery, the North gave the platform a squatter sovereignty interpre- tation, claiming that the people of a territory could prohibit slavery any time that they chose to do so. t The favorite candidate of the North was Stephen Douglas, but he had made himself totally unacceptable to the South with his Freeport Doctrine, an attempt to reconcile squatter sovereignty with the Dred Scott decision by pointing out that the people of a territory could exclude slavery at any time by not passing laws to protect it. Since this would exclude slavery as surely as the program of the Black Republicans, it was completely unacceptable to the South. Texas Democrats had made it clear that they would accept neither Douglas nor squatter sovereignty. Many southerners, including Texans, attended the 1860 convention determined to adopt a platform """Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, vv. 72-73, 75-76, 78, 81-82. 2 Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction, p. 92. 3 Robert W. Johannsen, editor, The Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 88-90. 182 embodying their demand that the federal government guarantee and protect slavery in all the territories. Northern delegates, however, realized that if they gave in to southern demands and nominated a candidate who favored their point of view, northern voters would not support him and would put 4 a Black Republican in the White House. The South realized that if it went with squatter sovereignty, it would be giving up the possibility of slavery expansion forever and opening the way for attack on the institution where it existed.^

In 1860 the South panicked. Its only hope of preserving slavery and of maintaining its influence in the Union lay in its ability to control the Democratic party. This party had, in the past, been the South's best hope of protecting its interests in the Union, but if the South lost control to the North, the party would no longer serve its purpose. In their disturbed state southerners made extreme demands, thinking the northern Democrats could be coerced into accept- ing their point of view. 4 Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln, 2:204, 207.

''ibid. , p. 403. Southerners realized that as long as the slavery expansion issue was alive and defended by their section, slavery would be safe where it existed, but if they ever ceased to defend slavery expansion that the North would then begin to attack the institution where it existed. 183

Texas Democrats were as determined as any other southern

Democrats to force the nomination of a candidate with southern sentiments, hoping that enough northern Democrats would support him to win the election. The state Democratic machinery was still in the hands of the strong state rightist element, who had not recovered from their past August defeat and were more adamant than ever in pro-southern demands. The state convention was made up of essentially the same elements as the convention of 1859 that had nominated Runnels. The

Union sentiment in Texas was not represented, but the 1860 convention was more representative of Texans, in general, than the previous one, since by 1860, more Texans had lost faith in the Union's ability to protect slavery. Thus as April 2, the day for the convening of the state Democratic party convention approached*the state rightists were enthusiastic about their chances to redeem their past defeat.^

The Democratic State Convention assembled at noon on the appointed day and remained in session until the fifth of the month. The assembling of the state convention had been an annual affair since 1855, and as this was an even numbered year, only the attorney general, comptroller, and treasurer would be nominated for state offices; but it was

^Galveston Weekly News, 6 March 1860. 184 7 unquestionably the most important convention to date.

Apart from the regular nominations and general party business, delegates had to adopt a platform and choose delegates to the national Democratic convention, which was to meet in

Charleston three weeks later. John Marshall, Chairman of the State Convention and editor of the Democratic organ, t^ie Austin Texas State Gazette, addressed the convention on the opening day, setting the tone for the meeting. He believed that the Black Republican party desired to destroy the institution of slavery and pleaded for the slaveholding states to present a united front to prevent this possibility.

The South, he contended, must make its demands clear and 8 stand by them. A violent rival of the Unionist editor of tlie Austin Southern Intelligencer, A.B. Norton, Marshall was a radical secessionist, and his paper became one of the major agitators for the movement. Having served in 1857 as the president of the Texas State Democratic Central Committee and since 1858 as Chairman of the Democratic State Convention, t ^ '9 he was one of the party's leading policy makers. 7 Corpus Christi Ranchero, 10 March 1860. 8 Proceedings of the Democratic State Convention of Texas Held in the City of Galveston, on the Second Day of April, 1860 (Galveston: The News Book and Job Establishment, 1860), p. 4. 9 Larry J. Gage, "The Texas Road to Secession and War: John Marshall and the Texas State Gazette, 1860-1861," South- western Historical Quarterly 63(19601:194-195. 185

After making nominations for state offices, the

delegates got down to the serious business of adopting a platform, choosing delegates to the Charleston convention,

and choosing the Democratic electors for the presidential

election. The platform was more radical than the one adopted

for the presidential election of 1856, representing sentiments

that had been developing within the party and the state

during the past four years. The earlier convention had

adopted the Cincinnati Platform and demanded recognition of

the fact that the federal government had no right to interfere

with slavery in the territories, but the platform of 1860

went further. Although it still upheld the Cincinnati

Platform, it now interpreted that platform to mean that the

federal government's duty was to protect slavery in the

territories. Texas Democrats made an explicit denial of the

squatter sovereignty interpretation in their platform, making

it unlikely that Texans would compromise with northern

Democrats.

The party convention also prepared the way for secession.

Its platform asserted that a state, especially Texas, which

had been a sovereign nation prior to annexation, had the

^Proceedings of Democratic State Convention, 1860, pp. 11-13. 186 right to secede from the Union whenever it believed that its constitutional rights were being violated. Since Texas had joined the Union voluntarily and peacefully, parting "with no portion of her sovereignty, but merely chang[ing] the agent through whom she should exercise some of the powers appertaining to it," the state could leave the Union and . . .11 resume its position as a sovereign nation. The people of the state alone could decide when their constitutional rights were being violated, and the state could leave the

Union any time that they approved. The platform also expressed Texans' fear of the Black Republicans, urging that if a Republican were elected President, Texas should meet with her sister slaveholding states and decide whether 12 or not to remain in the Union.

The last part of the platform clearly expressed Texans' racial attitudes and revealed the basic fear that motivated secession of the state. It reiterated Texans' belief in the supremacy of the white race over the black and contended that slavery was the best means of continuing harmonious race relations. Fear of the Republican party stemmed from

Texans' belief that it would destroy this relationship. "^Ibid. , p. 12.

Ibid. 187

We regard any effort by the Black Republican party to disturb the happily existing subordinate condition of the negro race in the South, as violative of the organic act guaranteeing the supremacy of the white race, and any political action which proposes to invest negroes with equal, social, and political equality with the white race, as an infraction of those wise and whole- some distinctions of nature, which all experience teaches, were established to ensure the prosperity and happiness of each race.

Any effort to elevate the Negro race would, they believed, merely degrade the white race. The government was designed to benefit the Caucasian race and slavery "constitutes the only true, natural and harmonious relationship in which the 13 otherwise antagonistic races can live together."

After the platform had been approved, the convention nominated eight delegates to the national Democratic, con- , . , 14 vention> which was to convene on April 23, 1860. These eight delegates were probably more radical than the average

Texan, being among the most staunch state rightists in the party. The four delegates chosen from the eastern con- gressional district were Hardin Runnels, Elkanah Greer,

F.F. Foscue, and R.B. Hubbard. The delegates from the western congressional district were Francis R. Lubbock, Guy M,

Bryan, Fletcher F. Stockdale, and Joseph F. Crosby. Most

- ' • • • t

"^Ibid. , p. 13. 14 Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, p. 81. 188 of these men were prominent political figures in the state, leaders in the secession movement, and later staunch sup- porters of the Confederacy. Greer was a powerful ultra-state- rightist from Marshall who had served as "Grand Commander" 15 of the Knights of the Golden Circle and had agitated for

Texas to join the other southern states in the convention proposed by South Carolina. Hubbard, a state House member in 1860-1861, served as a colonel in the Confederate Army and as governor of Texas from 1876-1879. Lubbock served as governor of Texas from 1861-1863. Refusing to run for reelection so that he could enter the war as a Confederate officer, he was captured with at the end of the war. Bryan served as United States Representative from 1857-1859 and was one of the leaders of the secession 15 The importance in the Knights of The Golden Circle in the secession movement has been greatly exaggerated. The two best studies on the organization are, Clarence A. Bridges, "The Knights of the Golden Circle: A Filibustering Fantasy," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 46(1941) :287-302. The title indicates the content and Bridges concludes that throughout the entire South "The order had attracted not more than a few thousand widely scattered champions, very limited amounts of money, and only mediocre leadership." Most southern leaders did not know of the existence of the organization and there is no evidence to indicate that those that did ever gave it any "advice, sympathy or money." It was a dream that ended in failure. Ray Sylvan Dunn, "The KGC in Texas, 1860- 1861," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 70(1967):543-573, gives the best account of the activities of the organization in Texas, but his attempt to resurrect the importance of it is less than convincing. 189 movement. Fletcher F. Stockdale, state senator from 1857-

1861, helped draft the ordinance of secession in the 1861

convention and served as lieutenant governor from 1863-1865.

Joseph F. Crosby, who was elected to the state legislature

in 1854, was a strong supporter of the Confederacy and became adjutant general on the staff of Brigadier General

William Steele. None of these men had any sympathy for the

Unionist sentiment.

Upon their arrival at the Charleston convention, these

delegates aligned themselves firmly with those southern

delegates who were determined to defeat Douglas and the

doctrine of squatter sovereignty. The Alabama state con-

vention had adopted a radical stand insisting that the

Democratic party draft a platform promising congressional protection of slavery in the territories and nominate a

candidate who would support such a platform. Alabama

delegates were instructed to withdraw from the convention unless the national.party adopted their position. Hoping

to present a united front, many delegates from seven slave

states, Georgia, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida,

Louisiana, and Texas caucused prior to the convention and

agreed to abide by the Alabama platform. With the threat of bolting the convention, they intended to force the northern 190

Democrats to accept a platform and a candidate representing their principles.'1'6

When the Charleston convention met, a committee on platforms was appointed to write a platform for the con- vention. Being unable to agree on a single platform, the committee submitted two proposals to the convention, a majority platform approved by the fifteen slave states and

California and Oregon and a minority platform approved by the remaining sixteen states. The majority proposal recom- mended adoption of the Alabama Platform, whereas the minority proposal upheld the Cincinnati Platform, stating that the government would not interfere with slavery in the territories, giving the platform a popular sovereignty interpretation, and implying that the courts could decide 17 the slavery issue in the territories. When the convention as a whole voted on the platforms, the minority proposal easily won by a vote of 165 to 138, because of the large number of delegates from the northern states. Once the X 6 Ollinger Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Election of I860 (: Johns Hopkins Press, 1945), p. 37; Roy F. Nichols, The Pisruption of American Democracy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1848), p. 295. 17 John G. Parkhurst, editor, Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention Held in 1860, at Charleston and Baltimore (Cleveland: Plain Dealer Job Office, 1860), pp. 55-59. 191

Alabama platform had been rejected by a majority of the delegates, that state, true to its word, baited the convention, and many delegates from the other deep South states, includ- 18 ing Texas, followed.

Although the Texas delegates had no specific orders, either from the state party convention or from the state legislature, they had agreed to leave the convention unless the party platform provided for protection of slavery in the territories. Although they were acting on their own initiative, the delegates, in refusing to accept Douglas or his platform, were probably expressing the sentiments of most

Texans. Texas newspapers generally supported their actions

contending that the South could not honorably accept Douglas 19 any more than it could a Republican. Mass meetings passed resolutions supporting their actions. Texans raised very

little objection, although the delegates acted without official •+ 20 authority. After the disruption of the Democratic party, the remaining 253 delegates failed to nominate a candidate. In

18 Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, 2:219-221. 19 Dallas Herald, 16, 23 May 1860; Austin Texas State Gazette, 28 July 1860. 20 Austin Texas State Gazette 28 July, 4 August 1860; Clarksville Northern Standard, 29 September 1860. 192 order to receive the nomination, a candidate had to receive a two-thirds majority of the original number of delegates, not of the remaining delegates. In the balloting that followed, Douglas was able to muster neither two-thirds of the remaining nor of the original number of delegates.

Finally on May 1, the convention adjourned, agreeing to meet again on June 18, I860, in Baltimore. The bolters reconvened down the street in Charleston, believing that they would be called back to the national convention. When the northern

Democrats did not oblige them, they agreed to meet in Richmond on June 11, to decide what course to pursue. But the damage had been done; the party was destroyed as a national 21 organization. The northern Democrats were determined to nominate Douglas with squatter sovereignty; southern Democrats were determined not to accept him. Texas papers editorialized that no real difference existed between Douglas and the

Republicans. Texas editors warned that if the South's demands ? 7 were not met the state was ready to leave the Union.

Union sentiment was by no means dead in Texas or in the nation as a whole, but the conservatives had difficulty 21 Nichols, Disruption of American Democracy, pp. 305-307. 2 2 Galveston Weekly News, 6 March 1860; Austin Texas St ate Gazette, 28 July 1860; Donald E. Reynolds, Editors Make War, pp. 34-35. 193 organizing their forces and found it impossible to draft a compromise platform acceptable to both sides. By far the most influential Unionist in Texas was Sam Houston.

He had presidential ambitions himself and was anxious to 23 provide some basis for holding the Union together. On

April 21 , 1,860, an assembly convened on the San Jacinto

Battle Ground and called upon Houston to become the People's candidate for the Presidency. The assembly adopted a report decrying the sectional nature of the major parties and calling upon the people to take the election into their own hands. "The time has now arrived when all conservative men of whatever section who love their country should unite on a common platform of reciprocal justice for»the preservation 24 of the Constitution and the perpetuity of the Union."

The other parties, representing geographical and sectional interests could not, the report contended, name a national candidate. The party evaded the issue of slavery completely, and the only other platform that it propose^ other than support of the Constitution and the Union, was establishing an American protectorate over Mexico, hoping to appeal to expansionist and nationalist sentiment in order to divert 23 Friend, Sam Houston, pp. 270-320, passim. 24 Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, p. 86. 194 25 interest from the slavery issue. This was a feeble effort in the face of such an overpowering question.

Houston did not immediately accept the nomination of the new party, but played a waiting game, hoping that national support would rally behind him. Meanwhile, the national conservative forces were organizing to combat sectionalism. A week after the Democratic convention broke up, the remnants of the old Whig party and the American party held a convention in Baltimore. Convening on May 9, this group established the Constitutional Union party, which Houston sincerely hoped would give him its nomination.

The party hoped to effect a compromise between the North and South by offering a platform for conservatives of both sections to rally behind and defeat the sectional candidates; unfortunately, however, the divisions over slavery were by this time impossible to compromise. Thus the party could only evade the issue and offer a vague plea for support of the Constitution and the Union above all else. Their contention was that if both the North and South abided by the laws of the land the United States could survive the . . 26 crisis.

25Ibid., pp. 85-87. 26 For the best work on the Constitutional Union party see, John B. Stabler, "A History of the Constitutional Union Party: A Tragic Failure" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1954). 195

Texas sent two delegates to the convention who hoped to get the nomination of the party for Houston. Having received some limited support from outside the state of

Texas, Houston's name was placed before the convention; the Old Warrior received fifty-seven votes on the first ballot, only eleven less than Bell, but several other con- tenders were in the field. On the final ballot Bell won, ll defeating Houston by a vote of 138 to 68. Smarting from this defeat, Houston was unable to bring himself to support

Bell, although he did support the platform. Instead of campaigning for Bell, Houston accepted the nomination of his

Texas supporters and on May 24, 1860, announced his candidacy 2 8 as a "People's candidate for President." Hoping to win national support as a compromise Union candidate, he remained in the race until August 18, at which time he withdrew, realizing that no two, much less three or four, candidates had a chance against Lincoln. He pleaded with all men to support the Union over sectionalism, although he still did 29 not throw his support to any one candidate. 27 Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, p. 87 2 8 Houston to Daniel D. Atchison and John W. Harris, 24 May 1860, Writings of Houston, 8:66. 29 Houston to Friends in the United States, 18 August I860, Writings of Houston, 8:121-122. 196

With the collapse of any united Democratic opposition, the Republican party, though only six years old, had an outstanding chance to capture the Presidency. As the election of 1856 had indicated, the Republicans would run a good race against a united opposition, but with their opponents divided they appeared to be almost assured of victory. No one realized this better than the Republican leadership itself, and they did not intend to jeapordize their chances of winning by nominating a controversial candidate. Passing over the leading contended Senator William H. Seward, they nominated a safe candidate, Abraham Lincoln. Taking a consistent stand on the slavery issue, Lincoln had supported the Wilmot Proviso and insisted that slavery should spread no further, but he had also pointed out that the institution was a domestic one and that the federal government had no authority to interfere with it where it already existed.30

The nomination of a seemingly moderate candidate increased the Republicans' already good chance of seeing one of their own take the Presidential oath on March 4, 1861.

On June 11, the seceders from the national Democratic convention met in Richmond and decided to proceed to Baltimore

30 Emerson D. Fite, The Presidential Campaign of 1860 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911), pp. 121-1221 128-129. 197

to see what action the convention meeting there would take.

But in Baltimore a squabble between the supporters of Douglas

and the bolters developed over credentials and the seceders 31 again walked out of the convention. This time the remain-

ing states nominated Douglas as their presidential candidate

with Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia as his running mate.

The southern delegates reconvened, adopted the Alabama

platform, and chose John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky and

Joseph Lane of Oregon as their presidential and vice presi- 32 dential candidates.

For the first time since the election of 1857, the rank

and file in Texas turned back to the state Democratic party

for leadership in the approaching crisis. Since Texans

believed that Douglas' squatter sovereignty platform would

have the same effect as that of the Black Republicans, they

overwhelmingly supported the southern branch of the party.

Thus the radical state rightists, who had long desired dis-

union, began to attract a large following in the state. The

real crisis lay just around the corner, and Texans began

preparing for the possible election of a Black Republican.33

31 Dwight L. Dumond, The Secession Movement 1860-1861 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931) , p." 84. 32 Ibid., pp. 89-91. 33 William S. Oldham, "Memoirs of William Simpson Oldham: Confederate Senator, 1861-1865" (Austin: Texas State Archives), p . 19 5. 198

With so many candidates in the field, the Republican party seemed assured of victory. Still, most Texans, wanting to remain in the Union if slavery could be perpetuated there, hoped that something would happen to prevent Lincoln's election. They hoped the election would go into the House of Representatives, where Breckinridge might defeat Lincoln; or possibly Douglas and Bell might withdraw prior to the

November election date, allowing Breckinridge to be elected; or possibly all three of Lincoln's opponents might withdraw and a fusion ticket be pitted against the Black Republican.

Early in the election, Texans hoped these, or some other developments,might prevent the election of an abolitionist party. But as the election day drew nearer, more and more

Texans began to accept the inevitable victory of Lincoln and were drawn closer to the secessionists.

In Texas the campaign during the summer of 1860 was not really an attempt to elect a President but rather to show the North where the sentiments of the state lay. The

Breckinridge forces, who had an overwhelming majority in the state from the very first, realized that their nominee could not be elected as long as the field was occupied by four candidates, but they believed that they should show the

North that Texans were united on the southern Democratic 199 platform and would leave the Union if slavery were not 34 guaranteed in the territories. The forces supporting

Bell also realized that their candidate had no chance unless the number of candidates was reduced, but they wished to show the nation that they were willing to compromise, or at least delay a showdown on the slavery issue, since their 35 platform was noncommittal. The campaign picture in Texas was somewhat confused by the nomination of Houston as a second Union candidate with the hope that all anti-Lincoln candidates would withdraw and support him. For most Texans the election was not to elect a candidate but to indicate a preferencer . 36 As the election drew near and the victory of a Black

Republican seemed inevitable, almost everyone stressed the right of secession, except the limited number of followers

34 Ballinger Diary, 22 September 1860, Ballinger Papers; Corsicana Navarro Express, 26 October 1960; Marshall Texas Republican, 3 November 1860. 35 Ballinger Diary, 8 September 1860, Ballinger Papers; Marshall Harrison Flag, 29 September 1860. 3 6 Marshall Harrison Flag as cited in Marshall Texas Republican, 12 September 1860; Ballinger Diary, 22 September 1860, Ballinger Papers; Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," pp. 83-84; Leslie Hanks to John M. Brownson, 15 October 1860, James J. Lynch Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas. 200 3 7 of Houston. Generally, the Breckinridge supporters took the position that secession was a right that would be exercised if Lincoln were elected, and threats of secession constituted 3 8 most of their campaign efforts. The Bell men, coupled with a small number of Douglas followers, generally defended the right of secession, but did not believe that Lincoln's election was ample justification to exercise this right. Since

Lincoln had said that he would not interfere with slavery where it existed, these people would wait for an "overt act" 39 against the institution. Only Houston's supporters denied the.right of secession, contending that as long as the Con- stitution was being upheld there was really nothing to consider 40 but the Union and the Constitution. The campaign and the election proved that the vast majority of Texans, regardless 37 Ben McCulloch to Henry McCulloch, 22 January 1860, McCulloch Papers; Clarksville Northern Standard, 4 February 1860; Oldham, "Memoirs," pp. 195-196; Marshall Texas Republi- can , 25 February 1860; Charles W. Hayes, "Island and City of Galveston" (Galveston: Rosenberg Library, 1879), p. 481. 3 8 Marshall Texas Republican, 12 September 1860; Corsicana Navarro Express, 26 October 1860; Austin Texas State Gazette, 29 August 1860. 39 Marshall Harrison Flag, 29 September 1860; Diary of J.H. Baker, 18 October 1860, Baker Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas. 40 Houston to Union Mass Meeting, 22 September 1860, Writings of Houston, 8:145-146, 158. 201 of their political affiliation, at least believed in the abstract right of secession.

Since the state entered the Union, Texans had been preparing the way for secession i£ it ever became necessary to preserve their institution of slavery, although they supported the Union and hoped to remain a part of it. In

1860, even before presidential nominations had been made, t^e Civilian and Galveston Gazette summed up Texans' senti- ments when it stated,

We have uniformly opposed, and still oppose secession and disunion in any shape, under past or existing circumstances, but we have never denied the right to resort to these desperate remedies. The right of revolution, by whatever name it is called, is inherent and inalienable. To declare its existance does no|-^ strengthen it; and to deny it does not destroy it.

Even strong Unionists, for the most part, felt that secession under certain conditions was justified. Shortly before the election of 1860, William E. Burnet wrote his father, ex- president of the Republic, "A dissolution of the Union is, to my mind, the greatest evil that can befall this country; and nothing short of actual and continued oppression by one 42 portion of the country over the other can justify it."

41 Civilian and Galveston Gazette, 7 February 1860. 42 Burnet to Burnet, 4 October 1860, David G. Burnet Papers, Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas. 202

John Reagan, whose election to the House o£ Representatives the previous year was hailed across the nation as a victory for the Union, believed that if Lincoln were elected the

South should adopt "such a course as will secure our rights, 43 in the Union, if we can, but out of it if we must." The election of 1860 transformed many moderates into secession- 44 ists. Texans generally favored both slavery and the Union, but were quick to choose the former over the latter.

With even moderates and Unionists defending the right of secession, the radicals loudly, frequently, and openly advocated disunion. actually looked forward to secession if the southern concept of constitutional rights was violated. He contended that he would rather see the nation "blown into as many fragments and particles as gun- powder could scatter a glass vase," than see the South denied its right to its domestic institutions.45 William S. Oldham, who was later chosen to the Confederate Senate along with

Wigfall, did all in his power to destroy the effects of

Houston's anti-secession speeches. He told his audiences 43 Reagan to George W. Paschal, 19 October 1860, Reagan Papers. 44 Ballinger Diary, 8, 14 November 1860, Ballinger Papers. 45 Quoted in Crenshaw, Slave States in the Election of I860, p. 286. 203 that "The people of each state compose a political community effectively and efficiently commanded and controlled by the people. The people of any state, having the right to choose their own destiny, could secede anytime that they felt their 46 constitutional rights had been violated." As Texas news- papers printed numerous editorials defending the right of secession, the major issue that the campaign of 1860 presented to Texans involved deciding what action they should take if

Lincoln were elected. The people believed that their greatest fear--emancipation of slaves--was likely to become a reality.

As they faced the possibility of abolition,, Texans, who had always hoped to preserve the Union, made it clear that they would secede rather than allow an abolitionist to take «• 47 office.

Naturally, the Democratic party machinery in Texas staunchly supported the southern Democratic candidate,

Breckinridge. Such influential papers as the Austin State

Gazette, Galveston Weekly News, San Antonio Ledger, Marshall

Texas Republican, Dallas Herald, and Clarksville Northern

Standard all carried Breckinridge as their candidate.

46 Oldham, "Memoirs," p. 196. 47 Corsicana Navarro Express, 2 November 1860; Galveston Crisis, 3 September 1860; Marshall Texas Republican, 14 July 1860; Ballinger Diary, 22 September 1860, Ballinger Papers; Lubbock, Memoirs, p. 299. 204

Attempting to convince Texans that "The Black Republican party are [sic] working for sectional supremacy, and the 48 extinction of slavery," these papers argued that the South must support Breckinridge to show the North that it would not accept such a party's elevation to the Presidency. There was never any doubt that he would carry the state, and by

the last couple of months of the campaign, there was no

doubt that he could not win the Presidency; but Texans were urged to vote for the southern candidate to prove their sup- port of slavery and southern rights. Immediately prior to .

the election, the Breckinridge organs were admitting defeat, but still pleading for votes to indicate the feelings of 49

the state.

In addition to their strong newspaper support, the

Breckinridge forces held mass meetings, gave barbecues,

and staged public debates.The most prominent southern

Democrat in the state, Louis T. Wigfall, took the campaign

trail for Breckinridge. As early as July, while on tour 48 Marshall Texas Republican, 14 July 1860. 49 Corsicana Navarro Express, 26 October, 2 November 1860; Marshall Texas Republican, 27 October, 3 November 1860.

^Sandbo, "The First Session of the Secession Convention in Texas," p. 168; Roberts, "Political, Legislative and Judicial History of Texas," p. 83. 205

in the northeastern part of the state, he pointed out that

neither Bell nor Douglas could possibly be elected, nor

could Breckinridge without northern support, which he was

not likely to get. Wigfall's only hope was that near

unanimous support in the South for Breckinridge and threats

of secession might draw the northern conservatives into his

camp to keep the South from leaving the Union. However, he

had little real faith that this would happen; the real

purpose of his campaign efforts was to convince Texans of

the need for secession.

If there ever was any chance of Texans viewing the

campaign and election rationally, it was lost with the out-

break of slave insurrections and incendiary activities that

began in the early summer of I860.52 The series of insur-

rections and incendiary activities of 1860 was alledgedly

a part of an abolitionist plot, although it was poorly 53 executed. Determining the details of the various plots

51 Marshall Texas Republican, 4 August 1860. 5 2 „ Crenshaw, Slaves States in the Presidential Election of 1860, p. 287.

53T , „ Joseph C. Carroll, Slave Insurrections in the United States, 1800-1865 (1938; reprint ed., New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968), p. 199; William W. White, "The Texas Slave Insurrection of 1860," Southwestern Historical quarterly 52(1949) : 285; Wendell G. Addington, "sH^i ^QUI?nCti°nS in Texas»" Journal of Negro History 35(1950): T**7"TfaU# 206

is impossible since Texans were never willing to allow the

accused persons to live long enough to get to the bottom

of them; but whether real or imagined, the plots convinced

Texans that their very lives were in danger if Black Repub-

licanism continued to grow.

Since Texans were never willing to concede that the

slaves themselves were capable of organizing a rebellion,

insurrections, they believed, were always the result of

white or, occasionally, free black instigation. The

agitators were invariably northerners, and Texans believed they % were almost always affiliated with* or at least were in

sympathy with,the Black Republican party.54 Even when

white or free black instigators were not found, the reports

usually stated that they were involved but had escaped or

were unknown even to the condemned slaves.5*' Anyone who

had formerly lived in the North was likely to come under

attack, and itinerants, such as preachers and peddlars,

were considered especially dangerous. Most people agreed with Gideon Lincecum that "The Negroes were incited to rebel

tir , Corsicana Navarro Express, 14 September 1860; Galveston Weekly News, 14 August 1860.

S5T . Lincecum to John Lincecum, 18 August 1860, Lincecum Papers; Galveston Weekly News, 14 August 1860; Townsend, Doom of Slavery in the_ Union, p. 35. 207

by a set of northern fanatics who were prowling about through

the country preaching, selling maps, mending clocks § etc."^

Any contact with slaves or any indication that they opposed

the institution was likely to lead to their being banished

from the area or worse. Late in the decade, a mass meeting

held in Palestine passed resolutions contending that northern-

ers in the state were involved in a plot to instigate

abolition and established committees to uncover any such

plots. Teachers who were born in the North were not to be

hired, trade with the North was to be minimized, and all 57 dangerous books burned. Northern citizens of the state

even feared that letters from their northern friends and C O relatives might endanger their safety in the state.

The most serious slave trouble that Texas had experienced

began on July 8 as a number of fires broke out within a few

hours, doing extensive damage across the northern part of

the state. The first and most destructive fire broke out

about two o'clock Sunday afternoon in Dallas; the estimated 56T . , ,•• T . Lmcecum to John Lmcecum, 18 August 1860, Lincecum Papers. 57 Crenshaw, Slave States in the Presidential Election of 1860, p. 90. " 5 8 Edward Burrowes to Mary Burrowes, 31 December 1860, cited in Charles M. Synder, "New Jersey Pioneers in Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 64(1961):363. 208 59 damage to property was some $400,000. Numerous other fires followed the Dallas disaster, the most destructive occurring in Denton, and beginning less than two hours after the fire in Dallas. Starting on the southwest corner of the Denton square, the fire spread quickly as twenty-five kegs of powder exploded and sent burning debris throughout the town.

Although the fire was quickly brought under control, the west side of the square was destroyed and estimated damage m set at $80,000. The entire state seemed to be going up in flames, as fires broke out at Black Jack Grove, Cherokee

County, destroying property estimated at $30,000; another in

Milford, Ellis County, resulted in about $25,000 in damage; a fire at Pilot Point, Denton County, resulted in the loss of an estimated $10,000; a $25,000 loss was incurred by a store owner in Ladonia, Fannin County, as a result of fire; and a flour mill valued at $10,000 was destroyed in Millwood,

Collin County. In addition to these, numerous other fires were reported in Jefferson, Cass County; Waxahachie, Ellis

County; and Honey Grove, Fannin County, but no estimates of damage were reported, since many were quickly extinguished.60 59 Clarksville Northern Standard, 14 July 1860.

60White, "Texas Slave Insurrection of I860," pp. 260- 261. 209

It is unlikely that such a large number of fires broke out on the same afternoon accidently, and the chances of their being started by secessionists to promote their cause is remote, especially since initially each fire was viewed as an isolated event. Not until several days had passed did the news of the large number of fires reach any one point in the state, and not until this time were accusations of incendiary conspiracies discussed. If the fires had been part of an organized disunion plot, the news probably would have travelled much faster than it did. More than likely, there existed a loosely organized conspiracy of some kind against slavery.

Not until the house of one Crill Miller, a farmer who lived near Dallas, was burned did the alleged conspiracy come to light. Suspecting his own slaves of setting the fire, Miller had them arrested and questioned by the local vigilance committee, whereupon they confessed. According to their horrifying testimony, a plot existed which had been inspired by traveling preachers, who had been run out of the county earlier in the year. The plan "to devastate, with fire and assassination, the whole of Northern Texas."

After this was effected, "A general revolt of the slaves, aided by the white men of the North in our midst, was to 210 come off on the day of [state] election in August." The organizers of the conspiracy had mapped the entire area out in districts for destruction. They hoped by the fires to destroy arms, ammunitions, powder, lead, grain and similar supplies, making the white population more helpless for the approaching massive slave insurrection. The country was 6 X then to be devastated and prominent citizens assassinated.

I Obviously the plot was poorly planned and poorly executed, but it seemed serious enough to terrify the entire state and to disturb the South in general. A witch hunt began in which every northerner, free black, restless slave, or other suspicious character was likely to be implicated

in the plot. Citizens all over the state were anxious to help in any way to find the culprits involved in the plot or plots. As the hunt continued, further grotesque details were uncovered. The slaves, it was reported, had been given strychnine to poison wells and food. The entire white population was to be slaughtered and the property to be 6 2 distributed among the Negroes. In Dallas, on July 24,

"Three negro men, the leaders in the insurrectionary plot, ^Austin Texas State Gazette, 21 July 1860. 6 2 Ibid., 11, 18, 25 August 1860. 211 were executed .... One of them, Pat Jennings, was the man who applied the torch to the town of Dallas." No

trial was considered necessary,as they were clearly guilty 6 3 in the opinion of their executioners.

Ignoring the due processes of law and resorting to

frontier justice, Texas was literally taken over by mob

rule. Mass meetings were held and vigilance committees ft organized, which, apparently with almost unanimous consent

of the people of the state, proceeded to hang anyone who

appeared guilty or suspicious. Citizens en masse expressed

their approval and few seemed concerned that: innocent people might suffer. In an effort to organize the white population

for better defense, a mass meeting was held in Denton on

July 27, 1860, because the citizens believed, There exists in our midst a regular organized band of abolitionists "and scoundrels, who are not only committing outrages and depredations themselves, but are inciting our slave population to the most barbarous acts of murder, arson, and robbery, thereby rendering ourselves as well as our women and children, in imminent danger of nightly assassination.

The meeting resolved that each neighborhood was authorized

to appoint up to fifty-member subcommittees with full power

"to arrest . . . any and all suspicious persons" and turn them over to the Central committee of the county, who could

63 Galveston Weekly News, 14 August I860., 212

if they "obtain sufficient evidence, in their opinion, to

place any suspected person on trial, . . . call a general

meeting of the citizens and after a fair investigation . . .

met [sic] out such punishment as his or their conduct may 64

deserve." Mass meetings of this kind and committees to

investigate suspicious activities were common across the

state. In many areas such action became the rule rather i than the exception, as numerous persons, both black and

white, were executed or whipped without any pretense of a

fair trial. Texans were concerned only with eliminating

abolitionists, not with the course of justice.

As the fires continued through the months of August

and September, such actions became even more common and

panic spread. In early August, Henderson was burned almost

to the ground, with $220,000 worth of damage. A Negro woman

and a white man were hanged as a result. Numerous smaller

fires were reported, each accompanied by a tale of a giant conspiracy that was about to destroy the white population of (3 S

the state. In September hysteria was increased when a

letter was discovered from W.A. Bailey revealing that northern

agents were operating in the state to destroy property, incite 64 Austin Texas State Gazette, 11 August 1860. Ibid., 1 September 1860; Corsicana Navarro Express, 14 September 1860. 213 insurrections, and elect Lincoln to office. Citizens were

# clamoring for extreme action. A Fort Worth public meeting held in reaction to this letter urged that committees be established throughout the state to prepare lists of dangerous opponents to slavery. Two lists should be kept; those on the first list were to be carefully watched, and those on the second were to be "exterminated by immediate hanging."66

The rest of the state hardly needed such suggestions as citizens everywhere were in the process of forming such committees if they did not already exist.

The patrol system was increased across the state, as almost every fire that broke out was thought to be part of another incendiary conspiracy. Any suspicious individuals in the area were arrested, and unless they had a convincing story, they suffered a dire fate. It was reported that over

100 men patrolled the area around Tyler every night;67 a mass meeting in Sulpher Springs, Hopkins County, established a vigilance committee which patrolled the county nightly;68

Gilmer, Upshur County, also increased its patrol system which

66 Austin Texas State Gazette, 22 September 1860.

67Corsicana Navarro Express, 25 August 1860. 6 3 P.T. Richardson to Sam Houston, 18 August 1860, Sam Houston Files as Governor of Texas, 1859-1861, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas. 214 had been used for several months and had already hanged 69 several abolitionists; after the Henderson fire, Rusk 70 County increased its vigilance. Citizens across the state

seemed to be organizing and arming themselves for a defensive

war.

White men, usually northerners, were supposedly the

instigators in almost all of the plots uncovered during that

frantic summer. Sometimes the white men were mysterious

persons who had disappeared or who were unknown even to the

blacks involved. In August, 1860, for example, a Negro

boy was accused of setting a fire to the kitchen and stable

of O.L. Gans of Georgetown. The boy implicated three white

men who had promised him passage to Mexico for the deeds.

Without waiting for the district court to meet, "the citizens

of Williamson County assembled en masse" and "in their way i 71 tried the Negro and hung him about a mile'from town." Texans believed that in each of the towns around Dallas

during the summer there was "a leader who was a white man,

whose name was kept secret from most of the negroes and

that slow matches were furnished by him to the negroes,"

69 Marshall Texas Republican, 1 September 1860. 70 Austin Texas State Gazette, 15 September 1860. 71 Galveston Weekly News, 14 August 1860. 215 72 for use in the incendiary activities. When specific individuals were not found, Texans made blanket accusations against all northern whites.

Executions reached an unprecedented number as alleged white abolitionists and restless slaves were summarily dealt with. Hangings became almost daily affairs during July,

August, and September. In Anderson County two accused white abolitionists were hanged for "inciting insurrection among 73 the slaves of that neighborhood." Some three hundred citizens condemned a preacher named Buley at Veal's Station,

Parker County, reported to be the man who had lost the 74 abolitionist letter. In Waxahachie a young man was hanged 75 for reportedly giving the Negroes poison for wells. "Two white men . . . were hung in Tennessee Colony, Anderson county, ... it was fully proved that they had been guilty 7 6 of inciting the slaves into insurrection." From Long

Point, Washington County, a report came that "a good many of 72 Townsend, Doom of Slavery in the Union, p. 35. 73 Corsicana Navarro Express, 11 August 1860. 74 Ibid., 25 August 1860; Galveston Weekly News, 14 August 1860. 75 Galveston Weekly News, 14 August 1860.

76t, . , Ibid. 216 those godly negro lovers have already been hung up, and as 77 many more are now under examination." A man named Morrison who was charged with stealing a Negro woman and with "incit- ing the negroes to insurrect in [several] counties [was hanged] by the most respectable citizens of Upshur and Wood 7 8 counties." These are only a few of the dozens of similar cases reported all over the state, but they were especially frequent in north and northeast Texas. One contemporary found it unfortunate that by August 12, 1860, "Judge Lynch had had the honor to preside only in ten cases of whites,

(northern Lincolnites) and but sixty-five negroes, all of whom were hung or burnt, as to the degree of their implication 79 in the rebellion and burning." Determining the exact number executed is impossible, but the hysteria took its toll in human life as well as property.

Property loss was appalling, giving the whites reason for concern, as seldom a day passed without one, two, or more fires being blamed on the incendiary activities of the

"Lincolnites." By mid August one estimate held that the fires sweeping the state had already cost Texans between 7 7 Lincecum to D.B. Moore and Emily Moore, 15 August 1860, Lincecum Papers. 78 Marshall Texas Republican, 1 September 1860. 79 Townsend, Doom of Slavery in the Union, p. 37. 217 On

$1,500,000 and $2,000,000. Even more serious, and of more

significance than the property"loss, was the psychological

toll. A correspondent of the New York Evening Day Book

reported that "Women and children have been so frightened by

these burnings and threatened rebellion of the negroes, that

in several instances they have left their homes in their

fright, and when found were almost confirmed maniacs!"81

The Unionists forces realized that the fires were

severely damaging their cause and tried to deny their

significance. Sam Houston accused the Secessionists of

circulating rumors of incendiary plots to bring about dis- O J union in case Lincoln were elected. The pro-Union Austin

Southern Intelligencer took a similar stand., contending that

the incendiary activities had been exaggerated for political

effect and that no actual plots existed.83 Undoubtedly, the

plots were in many instances exaggerated, and possibly some

of the crimes were attributed to abolitionists and slaves

who had no part in them. But the major incidents, such as 8 0 Ibid., p. 36. 8 3 "Ibid. , p . 37. 8 2 Marshall Texas Republican. 10 November 1860; Austin Texas State Gazette. 25 August, 1 September 1860. 83 Austin Southern Intelligencer, 10 October 1860; Reynolds, Editors Make War, p. 111. 218 the burning of Dallas and Denton, were matters of record.

When the Intelligencer made such claims, it came under harsh criticism from all across the state. A mass meeting in

Tarrant county on September 11, denounced the Intelligencer

and other papers and persons who attribute the late fire to accident, and who assert that the hue and cry about abolition incendiarism has been raised for politi- cal effect, as insulting to the intelligence of Texas . . , [and they should] be placed at once on the list of persons whose future course be carefully watched by the proper committee.

Prominent newspapers also attacked the Intelligencer for 8 5

its position. Texans' reaction to any opposition or to

any indication that their witch hunts were unjustified forced

all but the strongest into the vocal pro-slavery, anti-

abolitionist camp.

By September the situation was improving in Texas

because of the numerous committees that had been formed and

the number of hangings that had taken plade. The hysterical

state of the public mind undoubtedly had caused most of the

agitators who had not been executed to flee the state. One

correspondent of the Evening Day Book wrote, "Unless the

churches [of the North] send out new recruits of John Browns,

I fear the boys will have nothing to do this winter, (as they 84 Austin Texas State Gazette, 22 September 1860. 8 5 Ibid., 1 September 1860; Marshall Texas Republican, 10 November 1860. 219 have hung all that can be found,) the school boys have become so excited by the sport in hanging Abolitionists, that the schools are completely deserted." The desire to hang Black

Republican abolitionists was so great that the average school boy "will go seventy-five or one hundred miles on horseback to participate in a single execution of the sentence 8 6 of Judge Lynch's Court." Evidence indicates that the correspondent was right, because incendiary activities and slave rebellions decreased after mid September, although they did not end altogether by any means. After that time anyone who persisted in opposing slavery had to be ready to die for his beliefs. Any continued agitation had to be taken with extreme caution, and it became understandably more difficult to convince slaves to become involved in rebellious activities. Although slave insurrections and incendiary plots waned after mid September, they did continue until the climax of 8 7 secession. After August, secession became a more frequent topic of discussion for both the newspapers and the people of the state. Using the insurrection and incendiary plots to justify and demand secession, the radicals asked what 86„ Townsend, Doom of Slavery in the Union, p. 37. 8 7 „ Galveston Weekly News, 11 September 1860. 220

would the Negro do when freed if he had been a part of such

violence as a slave? Keeping a race of people in bondage

required near unanimity of opinion,and during the late

1850's Texans had witnessed firsthand what happened when

that unanimity was threatened. Texans' reaction to the

various plots against slavery, their horror of race warfare,

and their panicked state of mind during the two campaigns

involving Republicans best explain why the state ultimately

left the Union. The Corsicana Navarro Express editorialized

accurately: "The institution of slavery is now more strongly

fortified in the hearts, heads, and interest of the people 8 8 than ever before."

The fear created by the abolitionist activities in the

state did much to pull support from Unionist ranks, as the

people saw only danger within the Union. The Texas Unionists

were further hampered because the candidacy of Sam Houston

split their sympathizers. Although some of the Texas news-

papers supported Bell, most of the Unionist editors in the

state favored Houston. However, on August 18 , 1860, Houiston

announced his withdrawal from the campaign, improving the 89 situation somewhat in the Union camp.

1 88 Corsicana Navarro Express, 25 August 1860. ' 89 ' Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, p. 88. i 221

After Houston's withdrawal, the contest became one essentially between Breckinridge and Bell, Douglas having only limited support and Lincoln, of course, having none.

But as the election drew nearer, it was obvious that Bell also had few supporters in the state. Realizing this, the

Unionists began to talk more and more about the Union and less and less about Bell. When Houston withdrew from the campaign, he stated, "I call upon my countrymen to forget me and to forget the claims and endorsements of all mere men and support the Union." Refusing to throw his support behind any particular candidate, he said, "I desire to see a union of all national minded men, to defeat dangerous sectionalism, and I leave my friends free to pursue whatever 90 course may appear to them best at such a crisis." Writing to George Washington Crawford, an old Whig and ex-governor of Georgia who now resided in Texas and strongly supported the Union, Houston said that he personally favored Breckin- ridge because of his intelligence and honesty. But he realized that he stood no chance of being elected; this he, believed, was true of all Lincoln's opponents. The only way to defeat Lincoln, according to Houston, was for conservatives, 90 Houston to Friends in the United States, 18 August 1860, Writings of Houston, 8:122. 222 in both the North and South, to vote for a Union ticket--a ticket whose electors would be left free, if elected, to vote for the candidate who had the best chance of defeating

Lincoln.91 The only hope of conservatives was to combine 92 their forces and defeat sectionalism.

Supporting Breckinridge and demanding secession if their candidate failed to be elected, the Texas Democratic party increased its support as the election approached, lessening the possibility that Bell might even make a respect- able showing. In Texas the anti-Breckinridge forces actually had less chance of defeating the southern Democrat than in 93 any other state in the South. Realizing that their chances of success were slim, they decided to form a fusion ticket as Houston had suggested. This ticket consisted of two electors from the Douglas camp and two supporters of Bell; if elected the electors would support the candidate that seemed most likely to defeat the Black Republicans. The

Unionists hoped that this plan would draw support from the southern Democrats since the electors could vote for 91 Houston to Crawford, 8 September 1860, Writings of Houston, 8:135-136. 92 Houston to Union Mass Meeting, 22 September 1860, Writings of Houston, 8:151-157. 93 Crenshaw, Slave States in the Election of 1860, p. 292 223

Breckinridge if he had the best chance of victory. A vote for this ticket would be against Lincoln and not for any 94 particular candidate. The Unionists' strategy did not work, however, and little support was drawn from Breckinridge.

When the votes were counted on November 6, 1860, 47,584

Texans had voted for Breckinridge and only 15,438 for the fusion ticket, giving Breckinridge 75 per cent of the votes cast, a considerably larger percentage than he received in 95 any other state. Only three counties in the entire state gave a majority of their votes to Bell. Nationwide, Lincoln received 180 electoral votes, 28 more than were necessary for election. With support coming entirely from the free states, he was to become leader of the nation on March 4,

1861.

The die had been cast; Texans had already determined what the future of the state would be when this came to pass, 94 Marshall Harrison Flag, 20 October 1860. 95 Crenshaw, Slave States in the Election of 1860, p. 298; Stabler, "History of the Constitutional Union Party," p. 552. Texas, even though it was the only slave state to form a fusion ticket, still gave a much greater per cent of its votes to Breckinridge than any other state. All the lower South states, except Texas, gave less than 60 per cent of their popular vote to Breckinridge, whereas Texas cast over 75 per cent of its vote for the southern Democrat. The strength of the Breckinridge ticket is clearly evidenced when one considers that the Bell-Douglas fusion ticket electors could support anyone who might be able to beat Lincoln, even Breckinridge. No other state had this option. 224 and now they had only to make good their threats. Their activities during the campaign and their vote in the election indicated that they would secede rather than allow a Black

Republican to become their President. They had loved the

Union as long as it was based on their concept of state rights, but when such a Union could no longer be maintained, they must secede. The only question now remaining to be answered was how would secession be accomplished? CHAPTER VIII

SECESSION ACHIEVED

When news of Lincoln's election reached Texas, the

Stars and Stripes came down, and the Lone Star flag unfurled

in its place. Most Texans had little doubt what their course

of action had to be; they must secede rather than submit

to the rule of a Black Republican President. But the strongly

secessionist state faced the embarrassing predicament of

having a Unionist governor. Since Sam Houston had sworn

to do all in his power to keep Texas in the Union, the

secessionists had to circumvent him to accomplish their

goals. But, with public opinion now favoring their position,

the disunionists were able to call a convention, draft a secession ordinance, and after submitting it to the people, make secession a reality. Houston slowed the movement, but at this point no one could stop it.

Even though the election results had for some months been a foregone conclusion, the people were shaken by con- firmation of a Black Republican's election and immediately began expressing their sentiments. Travelling across the state after a visit with her uncle, Charles S. Taylor, chief

225 226 justice of Nacogdoches county, Eugenia Barrett, from Brenham, observed in a letter to her uncle, "Every place I have passed they have hoisted the flag of the 'Lone Star1 and great excitement prevails about the election of Lincoln.

They are holding secession meetings at many places." Her

letter was written on November 9, only three days after 1 Lincoln's election.

Texans clearly believed that the administration of a

Republican would spell disaster for their society. William S.

Oldham expressed the sentiments of Texans in a speech made

in Austin in early December. The Black Republican party is organized upon a single principle, hostility to African slavery in the Southern states .... To Prohibit slavery in the Territories, refuse a new slave State admission into the Union, to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and the slave trade between the States, to confine slavery within its present limits; to reorganize the Supreme Court, so as to prevent any Dred Scott decisions, and finally to abolish slavery by a change of the Federal Constitution.

The Galveston Tri-Weekly News also explained Texans' objections to the election results, stating that the,issue in the contest of 1860 when "stripped of all disguises . . . [was] 'Slavery or No Slavery,'" and the latter had won with Lincoln's election.

Barrett to Taylor, 1 November 1860, Charles Stanfield Taylor Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas. 2 Austin Texas State Gazette, 19 January 1861. Ill

"The vital issue of the extinction or preservation of the

system of labor on which rests the whole social, political

agricultural and business fabric of the South" had been

decided in the contest. Texas must leave the Union to 3 protect these interests.

The election seemed to justify Texans' distrust of northerners. To Texans, the 1,800,000 people who voted for

Lincoln had voted not only for Negro freedom but also for

Negro equality. According to Oldham, these were the same people who had driven southerners "from the Territories by armed mobs," "stolen and inticed" Negroes to leave their masters, burned homes, and "prepared for our Negroes to be employed against us." To Oldham, as to most Texans, the real problem was the antislavery sentiment of the North. He contended, "The only guarantee upon which we can rely in the Union, is that afforded by a change in the sentiments of the northern people, the source of danger," and the South could never expect that since, "The sin of slavery, and the horrors of slaveholding have been taught to the [northern] infant at the mother's breast, to the prattling child in the nursery, to the children in schools, and to the congregations

3 Galveston Tri-Weekly News, 8 December 1860. 228 from the pulpit." Thus the "only alternative that remains 4 to us, is to separate from them."

Texans believed that the results of the 1860 election would destroy white supremacy, upon which the society of

the South was based. Shortly after Lincoln's election, the

Corsicana Navarro Express posed the question, "The North has gone overwhelmingly for NEGRO EQUALITY and SOUTHERN

VASSALAGE! Southern men will you SUBMIT to this DEGRADATION?"5

The citizens of Corsicana answered with a resounding "NO."

Two hundred and seven citizens signed a petition calling for

a public meeting to be held to decide what action should be taken as a result of the election. The petition explained that the meeting was necessary because the Black Republican election meant "The doctrine of Negro Equality is about to be inaugurated in this Government."6 Such meetings and the expression of such sentiments were common across the state.

Especially significant was the fear that through the control of federal patronage the Republicans would elevate Negroes 4 Austin Texas State Gazette, 19 January 1861.

5Corsicana Navarro Express, 16 November 1860.

6Ibid., 23 November 1860. 7 Austin Texas State Gazette, 24 November, 8 December 1860» Galveston Tri-Weekly News, 8 December 1860. 229

into positions of political power so that they would dominate

the whites.**

Prior to the election of 1860, most Texans had supported

the Union, but now Unionists found that their arguments were no longer effective. While not denying the right of secession,

Unionists, among them several leading Texans, tried to convince the populace that it was premature. Milton Stapp, who had come to Texas from Indiana, where he had been a state legisla- tor, lieutenant governor, and a candidate for governor, agreed with Houston that Texas should not leave the Union immediately. The people should, he wrote, "give him [Lincoln] 9 a fair trial before we secede." I.B. McFarland, chief justice of Fayette County, opposed immediate secession, arguing that it would not further the interests of the South.

All it could do was guarantee the perpetuation of slavery where it existed, which Lincoln had sworn to do anyway. By leaving the Union, Texans would forfeit all claim to the territories, along with the right to carry their slaves there. Since the North would no longer be required to enforce the fugitive slave law, more slaves than ever would escape.

8 Steven A. Channing, Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 235. 9 Memoirs of Milton Stapp, Stapp Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas p. 70. 230

Furthermore, slavery would be abolished in the District of

Columbia. Thus secession guaranteed the Republicans all that they wanted,while the South would be the loser.^

Several of the strong Unionists realized the hopeless- ness of their situation. James Harper Starr, secretary of treasury of the Republic of Texas under President Lamar, strongly opposed immediate secession. However, he later wrote in his autobiography that while he "held opinions which were not in accord with those generally entertained by my fellow citizens," he believed that the desire for secession 11 was so great that stopping it would have been impossible.

William Pitt Ballinger, who opposed secession and counciled men against it,realized, much to his surprize, that "many 12 of our wise and good men are in favor of immediate dissolution."

Nor did he believe that it would be difficult for these men to convince the people to follow them. He wrote, "Those who will act with the Disunionists are in much larger majority than I supposed. 10McFarland to Fayette Committee, 17 December 1860, M.H. Bowers Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas. 11 James Harper Starr Autobiography, Starr Papers, Univer- sity of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas. 12. Ballinger Diary, 8 November 1860, Ballinger Papers. 13 Ibid., 14 November 1860, Ballinger Papers. 231

In their attempt to stop secession, the Unionists

tried to convince Texans that they were in no immediate

danger from the Republicans. They argued that all of the people who voted for Lincoln were not in favor of abolition, nor did they favor attempts to elevate the Negro to the

level of the white man, economically, socially, politically,

or in any other way. Their northern correspondents assured

them that this was the case. James S. Cox, a friend of

Ashbel Smith, wrote from Philadelphia explaining that even

though Pennsylvania overwhelmingly supported the Republican

candidate, the people of his state would not allow an attack

on the southern peculiar institution. Although they believed

that the Dred Scott decision was wrong, they would abide by

it until the Supreme Court overturned it.^ David Burnet

also heard from his northern friends that many people who voted for Lincoln did not intend their votes to express a

desire for abolition and that having learned how the South felt 15 would now alter their ballots. Undoubtedly a majority of the people who supported Lincoln did not believe that he would interfere with slavery where it existed. To the South,

the only significant issue in the election was the destruction 14 Cox to Smith, 20 December 1860, Ashbel Smith Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas 15 E.M. Moore to Burnet, 23 November 1860, Burnet Papers. 232

or perpetuation of slavery, but the North considered other

issues as well.

Another appeal that Texas Unionists made in their

attempt to avoid secession was that civil war was sure to

follow. Sam Houston had long believed that war would be

the inevitable result of secession and realized that it

would be the end of slavery.John L. Haynes, representative

to the state legislature from Starr county, in an address to

his constituents explained that civil war and strife would 17 come shortly after secession. Later he again stated his belief that not only would secession mean civil war, but

"the first gun of the revolution will be the death knell of 18 slavery." The Unionists had some newspaper support, and

they too editorialized that civil war would come. The Corpus

Christi Ranchero contended four days after the election of

Lincoln, "Civil war there will be if a single state secedes from the Union--and entail upon the present and future generations the untold miseries of such an unnatural and X 6 9 Houston to Thomas L. Rosser, 17 November 1860, Writings of Houston, 8:199. 17 Haynes to the People of Starr County, n.d., 1860, John L. Haynes Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas. 18 Review of "A Declaration of Causes Which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal Union," n.d. February 1861, Haynes Papers. 233 19 fratracidal strife." Such pleas were common, but none of them fell on receptive ears, as Texans wanted secession regardless of the consequences.

Those arguing for Union generally refrained from denying the abstract right of secession. Undoubtedly some Texans did not believe that a state had the right to withdraw from the federal Union, but they realized that they were a small minority with no hope of convincing the majority of Texans that secession was not an absolute right. Voicing their sentiments would be of no avail but would only alienate the other side. The best that they could hope for was to convince Texans to delay disunion, not to deny the right . 20 ofr secession. The majority of Texans who opposed immediate secession were ardent advocates of slavery, but they believed that the 21 institution was safe in the Union. They were wrong. Slavery was under attack and was doomed in the United States. The

Republican party and Lincoln had sworn to stop its expansion 19 Corpus Christi Ranchero, 10 November 1860. 20 Fred E. Stanford to Mrs. Eliza A. Cramer, 20 December 1860, Eliza A. Cramer Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas; Galveston Tri-Weekly News, 22 November 1860; Smyth to E.H. Cushing, 12 November 1860, Smyth Papers. 21 McFarland to Fayette Committee, 17 December 1860, Bowers Papers; Corpus Christi Ranchero, 10 November 1860. 234 as a step toward its eventual abolition. Whether or not

Lincoln would have interfered with slavery where it existed 22 is a moot question; sooner or later slavery would be 23 abolished in the United States. Some Texans had seen the inevitability of slavery's demise before 1860 and had advocated secession, but now a majority forecast the end of slavery if the state remained in the Union. Texans believed that the only way to avoid emancipation, the worst 24 fate they could envision, was to leave the Union.

The secessionists easily countered all of the arguments to delay secession. To those who contended that Lincoln's election was no immediate threat, they answered that the

Republicans, including Lincoln, believed slavery was a "moral, social, and political evil, and ought to be abolished . . . 22 Arthur C. Cole, "Lincoln's Election an Immediate Menace to Slavery in the States?" American Historical Review 36(1931): 740-767, contends that Lincoln did not intend to interfere with slavery where it existed. The opposite point of view of this contention is found in, J.D. de Roulhac, "Lincoln's Election as Immediate Menace to Slavery in the States?" American Historical Review 37(1932):700-711. Regard- less of whether or not Lincoln would have attacked slavery where it existed, the people of Texas thought that he would. 23 Galveston Crisis, 3 September 1860; Corsicana Navarro Express, 2 November 1860; Foner, Free Soil^ Free Labor, Free Men, pp. 314-315. 24 Austin Texas State Gazette, 24 November 1860; Corsicana Navarro Express, 16 November, 14 December 1860; Fite, Presidential Election of 1860, pp. 195-196. 235

[and] whether by the ballot box and the peaceful operation of the laws, or if driven to it by force of arms; it [the

Republican Party] is determined to sweep away slavery root 2 5 and branch." Overt acts against southern slavery had been committed numerous times, they contended. As examples, the Waco South West cited the refusal of the North to obey the Fugitive Slave law, the invasion of Kansas with rifles supplied by Republicans, John Brown's Raid, and the 2 6 incendiary acts in Texas during the summer of 1860.

Public meetings were held across the state, and militia units were raised to protect the state against possible northern agression, as secessionists warned of the immediate 27 dangers of northern attack after the election. Northern editorials and comments advocating abolition were reprinted in southern newspapers as proof that the Republicans intended to wage an active and immediate war on the institution in 2 8 the South. Reading and believing that their institution

25 Corpus Christi Ranchero, 23 June 1860. 2 6 Waco South West as cited in Austin Texas State Gazette, 17 November 1860. 2 7 R.W. Ford to Houston, 1 December 1860, Houston Files as Governor; Austin Texas State Gazette, 8 December 1860; Galveston Tri-Weekly News, 22 November 1860. 2 8 Corsicana Navarro Express, 30 November, 14 December 1860; Galveston Tri-Weekly News, 8 December 1860. 236 would not be safe once the Black Republican took office, 29 increasing numbers of Texand demanded immediate secession.

The Unionist argument that most northerners were not abolitionists and did not want to free and then elevate the

Negro to an equal status with the white man, most Texans simply did not believe. Lines of communication between the

North and South had completely broken down, and the average Texan knew little about northern public opinionI , the Republi- 30 can party, or Abraham Lincoln. In the years prior to the crisis of 1860-1861, circulation of materials printed in the North was extremely limited in Texas, since the law prohibited distribution of abolitionist material and allowed 31 post-masters to censure the mails. Since possession of abolitionist tracts had on a number of occasions been all that was necessary to execute an individual, the southerner had become increasingly concerned about communicating with his northern friends. One Texas resident, Edward Burrowes, expressed concern in December, 1860. Writing Mary Burrowes in New Jersey he requested, 29 Marshall Texas Republican, 10, 17 November 1860. 30 Annual Report of the American Anti-Slavery Society, 1860, p. 192; Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, 2:277-278. 31Laws of Texas, 4:1461-1462. 237

I wish you would tell the folks sending me papers to stop, for I am afraid that it might get me in a tight place the way things is going now. Their was two men hung in some of the upper counties for taking northern papers and §et t^e same fix if they keep on coming.

Nothing could convince Texans that almost all northerners, 33 especially Republicans, were not abolitionists.

The argument that civil war would follow any attempt at secession had little if any effect in slowing the move- ment in Texas. Many, if not indeed most, Texans realized that the possibility of war following secession was good, although they did not believe that it was inevitable. But if war did follow, so what? Texans believed that they had the right to secede and if war resulted, it would not be 34 their responsibility. They also believed that the South could quickly defeat the North. Milton Stapp, himself a

Unionist who left the state when war came, observed, How often have I heard it here [Texas] that one Southern man can whip 5 Northern men in a fair fight; 32 Burrowes to Burrowes, 31 December 1860, quoted in Synder, "New Jersey Pioneers in Texas," p. 363. 33 Marshall Texas Republican, 10 November 1860; Galveston Tri-Weekly News, 8 December 1860. 34 Reagan to Dr. Joseph Taylor, 23 December 1860, Reagan Papers; Eulogy of Judge P.W. Gray Over the Remains of Col. Thomas S. Lubbock, 21 January 1862, Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas, p. 3; Leslie Hanks to John M. Brownson, 24 November 1860, Lynch Papers. 238

and often go as high as one to ten .... The southern man is more accustom to carry arms than the northern man; is more wreckless of life, and fearless of death, than the northern man.

Although Stapp did not accept this assessment of the Texans1 35 ability he observed that most Texans believed it.

Marmaduke Potter wrote in November, 1860, "that a dissolution

of the Union is imminent .... That we are on the eve

of revolution and war is equally clear," but he believed

that the South would defeat the North. He predicted, "It

[the South] can stand a degree of taxation which would beggar

any other country, and still remain rich and prosperous; and money always commands armies and navies in unlimited abun- 3 6 dance." The South abhorred the thought of a civil war, but seeing no other way to preserve slavery, southerners preferred war to abolition.

Thus Texans in 1860 were listening to the radicals not the Unionists, and the secessionists believed with good reason that the people would support secession if the accepted process for bringing it about could be followed.37 The theory "^Stapp, "Memoirs," p. 71. 3 6 San Antonio Herald, 17 November 1860, Potter to the Editor, newspaper clipping, Reuben Marmaduke Potter Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas. 37 Ballinger Diary, 9 November 1860, Ballinger Papers; Austin Texas State Gazette, 24 November 1860; Reagan to 239 of secession accepted by the South stipulated that only state conventions elected by the people, similar to the conventions that had ratified the Constitution, could disrupt the Union. But Texas secessionists faced a difficult problem since only the legislature under its general powers clause had the authority to call a special convention, and the 3 8 legislature was not meeting. Houston would have to call a special session, and since he hoped to stop or delay 39 secession, he refused to take action. If Texas left the

Union, it would have to be in an extra-legal fashion, and the secessionists might have difficulty devising a method that the people would follow.

Initially the people hoped that Houston would cooperate and call a session of the legislature. Many of his old friends and supporters hoped either that he had some plan in mind to meet the crisis or that he would be persuaded to convene the legislature. A week after the election sixty- five citizens from Huntsville, Houston's home town, wrote

Roberts, 1 November, 7 December 1860, John H. Reagan Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin, Texas; Roberts to Reagan, 25 November 1860, Roberts Papers. 38 < Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," p. 87. 3 9 M.K. Wisehart, Sam Houston: American Giant (Washing- ton: Robert B. Luce, 1962), pp. 592-593. 240 40 to him asking what he proposed to do in face of the crisis.

On November 20, Houston replied that he had opposed the

election of Lincoln, but he believed that as "the Chief

Executive of the nation, he will be sworn to uphold the

Constitution and execute the laws .... Mr. Lincoln has

been constitutionally elected and, much as I deprecate his

success, no alternative is left to me but to yield to the

Constitution." If the Republican administration failed to

uphold the Constitution, Houston did not deny the right of

secession. He continued, "If we must [at some later date]

choose between loss of our Constitutional rights and revolu- 41 tion, I shall choose the latter." But to Houston secession was revolution and it would mean war. Houston believed

that secession was premature since the national government had committed no overt act against the institution of slavery.

If at some later time the compact that had been made between

the independent Republic of Texas and the United States was broken, Texas could return to an independent status. But for now his message for Texans was "Let us wait and see."42 40 Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texasp. 85. 41 Houston to H.M. Watkins and Others, 20 November 1860, Writings of Houston, 8:193, 194. 42 Ibid., 8 :196. 241

The secessionists knew that the large number of dis- unionists in the state legislature would cooperate to get the secession movement underway, but they also knew that

Houston could prevent the legislature" from convening. In early November they began devising a plan to circumvent , him and seeking constitutional justification for secession without a vote of the legislature. Oran Roberts, associate justice of the state supreme court, and other leading Texas politicians and jurists believed that the Texas Constitution 43 offered a solution in the clause providing,

All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for their benefit, and they have at all times the inalienable right to alter, reform, or abolish their form of^overnment, in such manner as they think expedient.

Herein lay justification for calling a convention independent of the executive or legislative branch of the state government,

The secessionists argued that the constitution actually gave no branch of the government the power to call a convention and that in reality this power must rest with the people.

Having provided justification for secession all that the disunionists needed was a ground-swell movement among

43 Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," p. 87. 44 See Appendix 1. 242 the people approving independent action, a movement which developed quickly. Less than a week after the election of

Lincoln, a mass meeting was called in Galveston to review the crisis of the election and to recommend steps that the state should take as a result. The citizens of the Island

City> convening in a mass meeting, petitioned the governor to call a special session of the legislature. Such requests were not unusual, but the Galveston petition went further, informing Houston that if he refused the people would be within their constitutional rights in calling a convention independent of his action.^5 The meeting, which Ballinger reported as "the largest public meeting . . . [that I] have 46 ever seen here," was clearly in favor of immediate secession.

During the next several weeks numerous meetings con- vened across the state. Generally the meetings all followed a similar pattern and expressed similar sentiments, of which a meeting held in Gilmer, Upshur County, was typical. In late November this usually quiet little town, seething with anger over Lincoln's election, called a mass meeting to consider the crisis. At this meeting, which was

"large and a fair representation of one county," resolutions 45 Fornell, Galveston Era, pp. 278-279. 46 Ballinger Diary, 14 November 1860, Ballinger Papers. 243 were unanimously passed and sent to Governor Houston. The citizens of Gilmer declared that Lincoln and the Black

Republicans were "pledged to the support of principles wholly sectional in their aims and antagonistic to the

rights, interests and honor, and subversive of the Sovereignty of the States and of the'institutions of the South." This

being obvious to all southern men, "we will not submit to

the administration of Abraham Lincoln, nor the inauguration

of the policy of the Black Republican party as the rule of

our government." They demanded that the governor call the

legislature into session and that it then call for a state

convention to consider the crisis at hand. The resolutions

warned Houston that if he refused to act, the people would 4 7 call a convention without his approval. The Marshall Texas

Republican reported near the end of December that it had

heard from fifty-three counties in which mass meetings were

held clamoring for secession, and undoubtedly many meetings

had not been reported to the newspaper. Most of these

meetings indicated that Texans wanted to follow the usual

process for convening a state convention, just as the other

47 R.W. Ford to Houston, 4 December 1860, Houston's File as Governor. 244

states were doing, but if they had to go over the governor's 48 head they would not hesitate.

Viewing the increasing popular support for the seces-

sion movement with much concern, Houston attempted in every

conceivable way to placate the people by resorting to

alternate plans and employing delaying tactics. Because he

realized that his position was a minority one in the state,

Houston turned to J.H. Bell and R.T. Wheeler, two state

supreme court justices, and attempted to influence them to

prepare a constitutional argument against ^the right of

secession. Both men, being moderate secessionists themselves,

realized that no matter how valid such an argument might be 49 it would not alter public opinion. Thus they refused to

attempt the useless task.

Houston could not hope with Unionist rhetoric to convince

Texans to delay secession; he had to provide an alternative

and convince the people that it would work. Hopeful that

a convention of the slaveholding states could formulate a policy for dealing with the crisis within the Union, he

initiated a movement to convene such a meeting. On November 28, he sent a copy of the joint resolution passed in early 1858., 48 Marshall Texas Republican, 22 December 1860. 49 Friend, Sam Houston, p. 331. 245 which authorized the governor of the state to call "an election for seven Delegates whenever the Executive of a majority of the slaveholding States shall express the opinion that such a Convention is necessary to preserve the equal rights of such States in the Union," to all the governors of southern states. ^ Ironically, this resolution, passed under the administration of Runnels, was intended to facili- * tate secession, and Houston was trying to use it to impede the movement. Houston asked the southern governors to

consider the possibilities of calling a convention, hoping to buy time while showing the people that he was taking action. He attempted to persuade the people who were petition- ing him to call the legislature into session that if action were taken it should be a cooperative movement of the southern 51 states.

Houston's cooperationist movement got almost no support from Texans. In fact, the attempt that was being made across the South to bring about joint action of the slave states did not reach the proportion in Texas that it did in some

50T . Joint Resolution m Response to the Governor's Message on Kansas Affairs, 16 February 1858, Writings of ' Houston, 8:208-209.

Ibid.; Address to the People of Texas, 3 December 1860, Writings of Houston, 8:206-208. 246 states. Generally, the cooperationists were labeled Unionists because of the obvious difficulties involved in effecting secession in this manner. Although united secession was discussed in Texas, Houston's efforts were the only attempt to join the state to any cooperation movement, and he intended only that the South should unite to redress grievances within the Union. Texans lacked adequate communication with

I the cooperationists in other states, and the secessionists, having to muster all their forces to circumvent Houston, would not listen to compromise proposals that might divide their ranks. Because of the manner in which Texas had come into the Union, few Texans believed that cooperation with 52 other states was necessary. Thus no concerted effort toward unification ever developed in the state. By the time secessionists had circumvented Houston and called a convention,

South Carolina had left the Union, other states were about to follow, and the cooperationist movement had failed in 5 3 the South as a whole. Texans thus were never really faced with a choice between seceding alone or attempting cooperative action. To them such action was linked with Houston's Unionist sentiments, with which most Texans had no sympathy. 52 Brenham Enquirer as cited in Galveston Weekly News, 22 November 1860. 53 Corpus Christi Ranchero, 5 January 1861. 247

Responding to the statewide clamor for a called session,

Houston made a number of excuses, some of them not very convincing, for not calling the legislature. In an address to the people of Texas, December 3, he pulled out all stops in his attempt to delay or avert secession. Pointing out that the state treasury was almost exhausted, he argued that the state could not afford a special session at that time. He also tried to give legal justification for his delay, contending that the legislators elected to the Eighth

Legislature could not legally be recalled. Since the adjourn- ment of the legislature a new apportionment act had gone into effect, making significant changes in the districting of the state. Only legislators elected in the new districts could, Houston contended, reflect popular sentiment because of the tremendous shifts in the state's population. Lastly,

Houston told the people that he was not convinced that a majority of the people wanted him to call the legislature, 54 or that they wanted disunion. However, his appeals fell on deaf ears; Texans wanted the legislature convened and a se- cession convention called.

When Houston's address was issued, almost a month had passed since the election of a Black Republican to office. 54 Address to the People of Texas, 3 December 1860, Writings of Houston, 8:209-211. 248

While other states had already set secession machinery in operation, Texas had taken no action in that direction. Many old friends and supporters of Houston, who had initially hoped that he had some acceptable plan or would give in to the will of the people and convene the legislature, had begun to grow weary of his delaying tactics. His speech indicated that he had not budged an inch from his Unionist stand.

Now even the moderates began to demand action. The strong secessionists had waited patiently, even though many of them realized from the beginning that Houston would never work with them. They had been presenting their case to the people but had taken no definite action until it seemed that even the moderates would support them in calling a convention with- out the help of the governor. Opponents of Houston argued that a convention could more accurately gauge the will of the people than one man and that the delegates did not necessarily have to vote secession. If they did, the people would always have the ballot box to make the final decision. Shortly after Houston's speech, the secessionists realized that a majority in Texas was willing to support or at least acquiese in calling a convention.^

Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," p. 87; Anna I. Sandbo, "The First Session of the Secession Convention of Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 18(1914):178-179. 249

On the same day that Houston made his excuses for not calling the legislature, the secessionists proceeded to call a state convention without the approval of the governor or the legislature. Since before Lincoln's election, the secessionists, realizing what Houston's course would be, had argued that the people had the power to call a convention, but they had acted with caution for fear that they might get ahead of the people or hurt their cause by attempting to circumvent Houston too quickly. But since Lincoln's election events had shown them that the people were on their side. Numerous petitions had been received in the capitol demanding that the legislature be called into session or that the people resort to calling a convention themselves.

Several counties had already begun the process of selecting delegates to a convention that they knew would be called one way or another, and they were suggesting that other counties 57 do the same. Throughout the month of November several prominent Texans who favored immediate secession had been **^Austin Texas State Gazette, 24 November 1860; Marshall Texas Republican, 24 November 1860; Citizens of Houston to Houston, 24 November 1860, Citizens of Washington county to Houston, 20 November 1860, Houston's Files as Governor. 57 Ernest W. Winkler, ed., Journal of the Secession Convention of Texas, 1861 (Austin: Austin Printing Company, 1912), pp. 417-418, 427. 250 meeting in Attorney General George M. Flournoy's office attempting to decide when and how to go about calling a

convention. By early December these men were ready to go 58 into action. On December 3, four prominent Texans, the leaders of

the Texas secession movement and later staunch supporters

of the Confederacy, met in the Attorney General's office

and decided that the time was right. Oran M. Roberts,

associate justice of the Texas supreme court and later a

colonel in the Confederate Army; William P. Rogers, prominent

Houston lawyer who fought for the Confederacy and was

killed at Corinth; John S. Ford, well-known Texas Ranger who

served admirably in the Confederate Army; and Attorney 59 General Flournoy drew up a call for a state convention.

The call clearly indicated that the convention's purpose was

to withdraw Texas from the Union. They posed the question

in such a way that Texans' answer would be obvious, asking,

"Shall the Southern States protect their domestic institu- tions, or shall they submit to the gradual but certain extinction of slavery in the Southern States?" To decide 5 8 Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," p. 87.

59T,. , Ibid. 251 this question for Texas, delegates were to be elected on

January 8, 1861, and would assemble in convention on

January 28.

The convention would undoubtedly be packed with dis- unionists since it was clearly a call for secession, one to which Unionists were not likely to respond. Realizing that charges would be made that they illegally implemented the secession move, some of the strongest advocates of disunion demanded that once a secession ordinance was drawn up and passed in convention, it must be submitted to a vote of the people. The call itself suggested such steps be taken, and once the call began to circulate some of the most vocal secessionists demanded a popular vote on the issue. Signifi- cantly, John Marshall, one of the influential figures in calling the convention and who later died fighting for the

Confederacy, demanded that a popular referendum be held.61

By this time, the secessionists had no doubt what the decision

60See Appendix 1. 61 . Corpus, Christi Ranchero , 19 January 1861. The Ranchero , not having been a secessionist newspaper until after the convention was called, apparently did not understand that secession was popular in Texas at this time and attacked both the Austin Texas State Gazette and the Galveston Weekly ews_ for their insistence that any secession ordinance should be voted on by the people of the state. 252

of the people would be and thus had no qualms about submitting

the question to them.

The convention call was signed by seventy-two Texans

from all parts of the state, many of them well known and

influential citizens and political leaders. Among the

signers were William S. Oldham, politician, lawyer, former

editor of the Austin Texas State Gazette, publisher, and

later Texas Senator to the Confederacy; Clement R. Johns,

state comptroller and a member of congress under the Repub-

lic of Texas; Edward Clark, lieutenant governor under Houston who became governor when Houston refused to take an oath of

allegiance to the Confederacy; and Thomas Jefferson Chambers, influential figure in the and four times candidate for governor. These men endorsed the summons, contending that it represented the majority opinion in their lo- calities. The call was circulated in newspapers, and con- sidered and adopted by countless mass meetings throughout the state as the people rallied behind the secessionists.

Most Texas newspapers enthusiastically supported the con- vention and the citizens who called it, stressing that now the will of the people could be done.62 Since the Democratic

6 2 Clarksville Northern Standard, 22 December 1860; Corpus Christi Ranchero, 26 January 1861. 253

party strongly supported the convention and the secessionists,

the movement had a strong organization in position to

nominate and campaign for the election of secessionist

delegates.^

The Union supporters were not so fortunate; although

some influential Texans were Unionists they had no organiza-

tion to put forward.candidates and campaign for their

election. Among the strong supporters of Union, in addition

to Houston, were ex-president of the Republic David G.

Burnet, former Governor E.M. Pease, United States House member Andrew J. Hamilton, George Paschal, editor of the pro-

Union Southern Intelligencer, E.J. Davis, secession opponent

from the Valley who later raised a Union force during the Civil War, and James W. Throckmorton, a delegate to the secession convention who voted against secession.

These men, along with other Unionists, pleaded with the people of the state not to take irrational action, pointing out that they believed the chance of preserving slavery was better in than out of the Union. In the convention election, however, only a few Unionists even attempted to run, since most of them refused to recognize the legality of the convention. As a result few Unionists participated

63a Austin. Texas State Gazette, 8, 15 December I860: Marshall Texas Republican. 22 December 1860. 254 in the election, either as candidates or as voters. With their efficient organization and the popularity of their movement, the secessionists had little trouble in packing the convention.^

The only Unionist who was in a position to obstruct the convention was Houston. He realized that the people were taking the convention call seriously and that unless steps were taken "to either avert, limit, or destroy the action of the convention," immediate secession would follow.^

Attempting to counter the action of the secessionists, the

Old Warrior, on December 17, 1860, called a special session of the legislature to convene a week before the date set for the convention.^ Houston must have realized that this effort was in vain because undoubtedly the legislature would endorse the convention, but he was gambling on the slim chance that they would issue a call for a convention on their own. This would take time, time for something else to develop, and this was all that Houston could hope for. Some of the secessionists who had previously demanded an assemblage

6 4 Sandbo, "First Secession Convention," p. 181.

65Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," p. 93. 6 6 Proclamation Calling Extra Session of the Legislature, 17 December 1860, Writings of Houston, 8:220-221. 255 of the legislature now denounced Houston for taking this step. They argued that since a convention had already been called an extra session was no longer needed and would u 67 . . be an unnecessary expense. The secessionists also must have considered the slim possibility that the legislature might refuse to recognize the legality of the method used in calling a convention and now attempt to use their authority to call another convention.

Ten days after calling a special session of the legis- lature, Houston, again grasping at straws, called for an election of delegates to a southern convention, even though no such convention had been called. Evidently the southern governors never took action on Houston's suggestion that they 6 8 call a convention to discuss the crisis. Nevertheless,

Houston issued a proclamation calling for the election of seven Texas delegates to be chosen on February 4, 1861, to attend a convention of the slaveholding states. His stated reason for requesting the election at this time was that he believed the South would soon call a conventiot n and that

6 *7 Clarksville Northern Standard, 2 February 1861.

68Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," p. 90. 256 6 9 Texas should have delegates elected and ready to attend.

Undoubtedly this was not Houston's real reason; the slave states had taken no action on his proposal, and he had little if any reason to believe that they would, especially since South Carolina had already left the Union. He probably hoped that if he could convince Texans that a southern convention was in the process of being called they would postpone secession until they saw what action it would take.

Again he was trying to delay, hoping that tempers would cool and that the people of the state would become more rational.

He had been defeated before, only to rally back to victory despite, at times, seemingly overwhelming odds, and he 70 still felt that he had significant influence in the state.

But Houston soon learned that not even he could change the direction of the secessionist movement.

The state continued moving toward secession, ignoring or harshly criticizing Houston's Unionist efforts. Mass meetings and newspaper editorials strongly supported the call for a state convention, while county chief justices called 69 Ordering Election of Delegates to the Convention of the Southern States, 27 December 1860, Writings of Houston, 8:225-226. 70 Marshall Texas Republican, 15 December 1860. 257 71 for elections to be held on January 8. The movement received a great boost when on December 21 news of the secession of South Carolina reached the state. Texans received the news with tremendous enthusiasm, firing guns, lighting bonfires, and waving banners in approval of the 72 Palmetto state's action. By the latter part of December, six states had convened their legislatures, and all of them 73 had called conventions. Compromise efforts and coopera- tionist movements now seemed useless. Clearly the South was leaving the Union, and the Lone Star state would not be far behind its sister states, in spite of Houston's road- blocks .

The new year came with little else being discussed in

Texas besides the election of delegates to the state con- vention, which by this time was being accurately referred to as the secession convention. The Unionists still were able to muster little support, and at times open hostility to them was expressed. In early January, a mob destroyed i 71 Winkler, Journal of the Secession Convention, pp.' 409-452, passim. 72 Ballinger Diary, 23 December 1860, Ballinger Papers; Stephen B. Oates, "Texas Under the Secessionists," South- western Historical Quarterly 57(1963) :205. 73 Dwight L. Dumond, The Secession Movement, 1860-1861 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1931), p. 148." 258 the Die Union, a German newspaper printed in Galveston by

Ferdinand Flake. Because of his strong opposition to secession, Flake had expected a raid on his newspaper and 74 had set up a second press, hoping to continue publication.

Later a citizens committee, realizing that his influence was almost nil and that they did not have to resort to violence to carry secession in Galveston,raised money to 75 pay for a replacement press. Secession delegates would be elected in a fair election.

On January 5, 1861, J.M. Calhoun, commissioner from

Alabama,arrived in the capitol with a message from his state.

He informed the governor that a state convention would assemble in Alabama on January 7 which would immediately take that state from the Union. His mission was to encourage

Houston to pledge participation of his state in the formation 7 6 of a southern Confederacy. Houston completely rejected

Calhoun's proposal, contending that if Texas did decide to leave the Union it would resume its former status as an independent republic rather than joining an uncertain southern 74 Earl W. Fornell, "Ferdinand Flake: German Pioneer Journalist of the Southwest," American-German Review 21(1955): 25. 75 Ibid. 7 6 Clarksville Northern Standard, 26 January 1861. 259

confederacy. Houston felt no obligation to the slaveholding

states like Alabama that had failed to cooperate with his

movement to call a south-wide convention to redress grievances

within the Union. He would cooperate with the southern

states within the Union, but if each acted separately to

secede, he no longer wished Texas to cooperate. Unlike the

other southern states, Texans had a long frontier that was

in constant danger from Indian attacks and needed the federal 77 government's protection. Houston was still holding out

for a cooperationist movement on the part of the South,

although he knew that neither Texas nor the other southern

states would wait for any such movement.

On January 21, 1861, the Eighth Legislature of Texas

met in special session. Addressing a joint session of that

body on opening day, Houston put the dominant issue bluntly,

saying, "The question presses itself upon our consideration, whether 'tis best to abandon the Government, and acknowledge

that our Constitution is a failure, or to maintain in the 7 R Union every constitutional right guaranteed to us." He

continued by saying that he saw no cause for immediate 77 Houston to Calhoun, 7 January 1861, Writings of Houston, 8:226-229. ~ 7 8 Message to the Legislature of Texas, in Extra. Session, 21 January 1861, Writings of Houston, 8:247. 260 secession but did sincerely believe that the Soiith should hold a convention which could make unified demands upon the North. For this reason, he had issued a call in early-

February for Texas to elect delegates to such a convention.

He saw no need for a state convention to meet at the present time. If the legislature decided to issue a call, it should do so only after "calm deliberation" and as a last resort.

He did concede that if the legislature approached the issue calmly and decided to call a convention, he would not oppose it, but he urged them to "frown upon any and every attempt to subvert the laws, and substitute in their stead the will of revolutionary leaders." The issue should ultimately be decided by a direct vote of the people, Houston argued, after all possible efforts had been made to secure constitu- 79 tional rights within the Union.

But, being no more disposed to calm and rational action than the people of the state, the legislature's actions were, a great disappointment to Houston. The legislators believed that to attempt cooperative action so late in the crisis was not only illogical but also impossible, as four states had already left the Union, while others had called conventions where delegates would surely vote for secession.

79 Ibid., p. 251. 261

Rather than cooperating with Houston, the legislature passed a joint resolution that put a stop to his efforts to effect a unified movement. Both houses, by an overwhelming majority, repealed the act of February 16, 1858, under which 80 Houston had attempted to initiate a southern convention.

Next the legislature passed another joint resolution, restat-

ing the right of secession and contending that any attempt on the part of the federal government to prevent a state

from leaving the Union was "in violation of the Constitution,

a dangerous usurpation of power, destructive of the right of

free government, and fatal to the existence of the Union itself, which, formed of equal and independent sovereignties cannot be as between conquering and subjugated provinces." Texas would meet any attempt to coerce a southern state to remain 81 in the Union "by all means and to the last extremity."

The legislature also opposed Houston when it approved

the state convention that had already been called. A joint

resolution, passing by the wide majority of twenty-five to I five in the Senate and seventy to nine in the House, recognized

the convention and gave it "power to consider the conditions

of public affairs; to determine what shall be the future 8 0 Laws of Texas, 5:391. O "I Ibid., p. 392. 262 relation of this State to the Union; and such other matters

as are necessarily and properly incident thereto." If the

convention determined that the state should secede, an

ordinance to that effect should be submitted to the people 8 2 for their ratification or rejection. Not only did the

legislature approve the convention, but the House of Repre-

sentatives agreed to adjourn each day by two p.m. so that the 8 3 delegates could meet in their halls. Houston grudgingly

approved the resolution but protested the convention's

assuming any authority besides the power to decide the

relationship between Texas and the United States. According

to Houston, all that the convention had the right to do was

to decide whether or not they believed that the state should

sever bonds with the Union; then if they passed a secession

ordinance they must submit it to the people and adjourn sin 84 die, without considering any further questions.

The call for a convention stipulated that each district

in the state was entitled to two delegates for each repre-

sentative in the state House, meaning that 180 delegates were

to be chosen. Determining the number of people who cast O J Ibid., pp. 392-393. 8 3 Sandbo, "First Secession Convention," p. 185. 84 Laws of Texas, 5:393. 263 ballots for delegates is impossible, but the Texas Almanac,

1862, estimated 32,000, which is probably a fair approxi- 85 mation. This number is just over half the number of

Texans who voted in the gubernatorial election of 1859, the presidential election of 1860, and the referendum of

February 23, 1861, but the small vote does not indicate a lack of interest. Many Unionists did not vote because of their contention that the election was illegal, and few can- didates reflecting Union sentiments ran. In most districts there was no real contest or choice presented to the people, since the same number of candidates was nominated as the number of positions to be filled and generally these were all secessionists. Thus there was little incentive even for the secessionists to vote in the election, and the turn-out was understandably small.86 No doubt the secessionists were over- represented in convention, but if they did not represent the 8 5 Texas Almanac, 1862 , p. 14; Marshall Texas Republican, 16 February 1861, places the figure around 30,000. As the Chief Justices were not required to submit the votes received by the candidates, determining the total vote is impossible. However, approximately half of the justices did submit vote counts, and a hand count of these shows that over 20,000 votes were cast. There is no reason to believe that if the other half of the justices ha£ submitted a vote count that it would have been less than at least 30,000. Winkler, Journal of the Secession Convention, p. 409-452.

^Galveston Weekly News, 19 February 1861. 264 majority opinion, the people would have a chance to indicate ,• 87 their preference in a popular referendum.

Attendance in the convention was good; of the 180

intended delegates, 177 were seated the first day. From

the beginning the secessionists obviously controlled the

convention, as one of their leaders, Oran M. Roberts, was 8 8 elected president by acclamation on the first day. The

convention wasted little time in announcing its position

concerning secession to the state and nation. On Tuesday,

January 29, the second day of its meeting, John A. Wharton,

a lawyer from Brazoria county, minced no words in a resolution

stating "that without determining now the manner in which

this result should be effected, it is the deliberate sense

of this Convention that the State of Texas should separately 89 secede from the Federal Union." This resolution carried by the resounding vote of 152 to 6, and the convention began 90 trying to attain its goal.

Realizing Houston's opposition to the convention and

hoping to placate him if at all possible, the convention 8 7 Clarksville Northern Standard, 2 February 1861. 8 8 Winkler, Journal of the Secession Convention, pp. 16, 408. 89 Ibid., p. 25.

^Ibid. , p. 26. 265

selected a committee to keep him constantly informed con-

cerning its actions. Appointed to this committee were

Peter W. Gray, John Reagan, John D. Stell, Thomas J. Devine,

and William P. Rogers, all of whom were personal friends of

Houston. Hopefully they could soften the Old Warrior's 91 hostile attitude toward the convention. The committee

called on Houston the day of its appointment, January 30,

and received a written communication from him the following

day in which he explained his position. He stated that he

would recognize the convention because the legislature had

sanctioned it and would cooperate with the committee appointed

to confer with him. He would respect the convention's

decision concerning relations with the federal Union, and

if it drew up a secession ordinance which the people of Texas 9 2 accepted at the ballot box,he would even accept that.

The day before his communication to the committee,

Houston had given the secessionists some hope that he was

changing his position concerning the relationship between

the state and national governments. In a message to the

legislature, he revealed that he had recently received a set 91 Ibid., p. 34; Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," p. 101. 92 Houston to Messrs. Reagan, Gray, Rogers, Stell, and Devine, 31 January 1861, Writings of Houston, 8:253-254. 266 of resolutions from the Tennessee legislature, protesting a resolution passed by New York State. New York had offered the United States government money and men to use in coercing the southern states back into the Union if they attempted 93 secession over the protests of the other states. Houston announced that if the federal government made any attempt to coerce his state, he would fight if necessa.ry. According to Houston's message, he believed that if the state decided for secession, the United States had no authority to prevent • + 94 it.

The decision to secede had been made with the adoption of the Wharton resolution, but the convention still faced the task of drawing up and adopting an ordinance of secession,

On the second day of the convention, a committee on Federal

Relations, consisting of twenty men and chaired by Thomas J.

Chambers, was created and assigned the task of drawing up the secession ordinance. The committee prepared the document and presented it to the convention on January 30. During the next two days the convention debated the ordinance and made a number of small changes. The final document provided 93 Winkler, Journal of the Secession Convention, p. 32. 94 Message to the Legislature, 21 January 1861, Writings of Houston, 8:252-253. 267 that Texas sever relations with the federal government if the people of the state approved. An attempt was made to declare the decision of the convention final without sub- mitting it to a popular vote, the process that the other southern states followed. By a vote of 145 to 29 the con- vention rejected this proposal, again indicating that the 95 secessionists were confident of the people's support.

The ordinance was scheduled for a vote at noon on February 1,

1861, and the governor, lieutenant governor, Supreme Court justices, and district judges were invited to attend the

convention vote. It must have been a sad day for Sam Houston, who sat on the platform at the right hand of President

Roberts, as the ordinance of secession passed by a vote of

166 to 8.96

When the last vote was cast, pandemonium broke out in

the chamber of the House of Representatives. The jubilation

lasted for several minutes, and as order was about to be

restored, a delegation of women from Austin led by Attorney

General Flournoy entered the chamber bearing a Lone Star

flag, measuring sixty by twenty feet, over their heads. They 95 'Winkler, Journal of the Secession Convention, pp. 25, 35-36, 42-44. 96 Ibid., pp. 48-49; See Appendix 2. 268 presented it to Wharton, who accepted it for the convention.

Both he and Flourney made speeches praising the convention's work and complimenting the ladies for supporting their 97 decision. As the news quickly spread across the state, it was met almost everywhere with great enthusiasm and joyous celebrations. To most Texans this was a great day, comparable to the declaration of independence from Mexico almost twenty- five years previous. Texans believed that the state had done everything in its power to remain in the Union but that the elevation of a sectional party opposed to slavery meant that they must leave the Union in order to preserve their institution.

The same afternoon that the convention adopted the ordinance they also passed another resolution stipulating that the legislature and the governor be sent copies of the ordinance and that they be asked to help in conducting the popular election on the issue, which was to be held on

February 23 and the results determined by the 26th.98 On

February 7, the legislature passed an act legalizing the

97 Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," p. 104. 98 Winkler, Journal of the Secession Convention. t>t>. 58-59. : 269 99 election as called and planned by the convention. Two days later Houston issued a proclamation calling for the election. If the people decided in favor of secession, independence would be declared on March 2, 1861, exactly twenty-five years after Texas declared independence from Mexicovr • . 100

The convention's work was not ended with the passage of the ordinance. The delegates felt compelled to draw up a declaration of causes for disunion to justify secession.

A special committee chaired by John Henry Brown was appointed on February 1 to complete this task. The causes were sub- mitted and adopted by the convention on February 2.'1"^

Declaring that "All white men are and of right ought to be entitled to equal civil and political rights" and that the governments were instituted by and for whites, the committee objected primarily to the northern attack on slavery.

Secession was justified because the North had elevated to power a sectional party

based upon the unnatural feeling of hostility to these Southern States and their beneficient and patriarchal

99 Laws of Texas, 5:347-348.

Proclamation Submitting the Ordinance of Secession, 9 February 1861, Writings of Houston, 8:263. 101 Winkler, Journal of the Secession Convention, pp. 53, 59,61-65. 270

system of African slavery, proclaiming the debasing doctrine of the equality of all men, irrespective of race or color--a doctrine at war with nature, in opposition to the experience of mankind, and in viola- tion of the plainest revelations of the Divine Law.

The Republican party, they declared, was dedicated to abolition of slavery throughout the United States. The declaration objected to the Republican stand on slavery in the territories only because of its effect on the institution in the South, contending that the North wished to prohibit slavery there "for the avowed purpose of acquiring sufficient power in the common government to use it as a means of destroying the institutions of Texas and her sister slave- holding States." Again Texans' fear of abolition and servile insurrection was apparent, as the document denounced the circulation of seditious materials, the arming of slaves for insurrection, and the burning of southern towns, averring that northerners had made repeated efforts "to stir up servile insurrections and bring blood and carnage to our 102 firesides." Some reference was made to the failure to provide adequate frontier protection, but obviously this was an invalid reason for secession since the frontier would have less protection after secession.

After the declaration of causes had been approved, the convention turned to the problem of controlling the state "*"^See Appendix 3. 271 during the interim period between February 4, the last day of the first session of the convention, and March 2, the first day of the second session. A Committee of Public

Safety, appointed January 29, was given almost unlimited powers to deal with all emergencies arising during the interim period. Fifteen men served on the committee, which was chaired by John C. Robertson, and the convention resolved that at least eight of these men must remain in Austin, ready for duty at all times. In addition to general powers, the committee was given the authority and responsibility to 103 take possession of all federal property in the state.

The committee was successful in fulfilling this duty. Even before the state officially seceded, all Union soldiers agreed to leave the state, and over $3,000,000 in federal military property had been seized.

Commissioners from both South Carolina and Georgia appeared before the convention explaining the movement under way to form a southern confederacy in Montgomery, Alabama.

Both commissioners urged that Texas join this movement. 103 Winkler, Journal of the Secession Convention, pp. 28, 71, 81-82, 262-265. 104 Ibid., pp. 262-404, passim. The report of the Com- mittee is printed here. 105Ibid., pp. 50-51, 72-73. 272

By the time Texas seceded, six other southern states had already left the Union, and the convention delegates felt that cooperation with these states was desirable. Thus they chose seven delegates to attend the convention being held in Montgomery so they would be in a position to join the confederacy if Texas deemed it /desirable after secession.

This being done, the convention adjourned to reconvene 107 March 2, 1861, the day secession was to become official.

When the convention adj ourned, less than three weeks remained until the election, but by this time most Texans knew where they stood, and secession was certain. The pro-

Union newspapers were now fewer than ever, as several had 10 8 since Lincoln's election become secessionist journals.

Unionists such as E.M. Pease, E.J. Davis, David G. Burnet,

Andrew J. Hamilton, and James W. Throckmorton continued to appeal to the people to vote against secession, but they. must have realized that by this time their appeals were in 109 vain. Campaigning was not extensive on either side, since

~*"^Ibid. , pp. 74, 78.

107 T^ 0r Ibid., pp. 85 . 108Richardson, Texas: The Lone Star'state, p. 186; Crenshaw, Slave States in the Election of I860, p. 294. 109 Allan C. Ashcraft, "Texas, 1860-1866: The Lone Star State in the Civil War," (Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 1960), p. 58. 273 all the arguments had been made several times over, and to repeat them would serve no real purpose. The secessionists were campaigning for more than mere passage of the ordinance, which they were sure of getting; they now hoped to obtain near unanimous support of disunion. They contended that

Texans must show the North how strongly they supported secession by casting a unified vote on the issue. Several secessionist newspapers encouraged all people to vote on the

23rd whether they supported secession or not. Contending that the right to vote one's beliefs belonged to all, these secessionists probably wanted a good turnout in the election so that it would not seem to have been forced upon the people.

Even if some opposed secession, they contended, as soon as the people saw by what an overwhelming majority it carried, they would all fall in behind the movement and present a 111 united front. On February 23, voter turnout was fairly good. When the.ballots were counted they numbered 60,826 ,. about the same number that had cast ballots in the previous presidential election and in the gubernatorial election. Of the votes

110Austin Texas State Gazette, 23 February 1861; Marshall Texas Republican, 23 February 1861.

11 "^Austin Texas State Gazette, 9 February 1861; Marshall Texas Republican, 16 February 1861. 274

cast 46,129 were for secession, while 14,697 were against it; 112 a majority of 31,432 supported disunion. With 76 per

cent of those who voted supporting secession, there can be little doubt that a large majority of Texans supported the movement. At the time, Texas had 124 organized counties, and all but two of these, Presidio and McCulloch, filed returns for the election. A total of 104 counties supported i the ordinance, whereas only 18 voted to remain in the Union

(see figure 4). The secession convention reassembled as scheduled on March 2, but having no quorum it adjourned until March 4. At that time the votes were officially canvassed, and the convention resolved "that the State of

Texas was and has been since March 2nd, A.I)., 1861, a free, sovereign and independent nation of the earth."113 Thus secession was complete.

Secession in Texas had been consumated by the people them- selves. Texas alone among the lower southern states held a popular referendum, and it was approved by a three-to-one vote, although the people had, not many years before, literally fought to become a part of the Union. The secessionists

Winkler, Journal of the Secession Convention. Dt>. 88-90. 113,,.., Ibid., p. 88. VOTE ON SECESSION REFERENDUM, 1861 (From Winkler, Journal of the Secession Convention of Texas)

frill!1!1!!

For Secession

Against Secession

Unorganized Counties

fo.cc Organized County With |CVt, C0 No Returns

El Paso County not shown - for Figure 4 secession 276 were able to win Texas with hardly a struggle, drawing support from all parts of the state. The eastern counties, where the amount of cotton produced and the number of slaves owned was largest, cast the largest vote for secession because they had the most to fear from abolition, but secession was a statewide movement. Taken as a whole, even the frontier favored the movement, a significant indication of the force of secession sentiment. Clearly the vast majority of Texans feared the Republican party and the consequences of remaining in a Union dominated by that party. They were convinced that

Lincoln and his kind intended to destroy slavery, upsetting the racial and social structure of the entire South. The result would be race war and ultimately elevation of the

Negro to a position of equality; most Texans preferred civil war to these developments. APPENDIX 1

CALL FOR CONVENTION

To our fellow citizens of the State of Texas

The election of a president of the United States by the great sectional party of the North has been accomplished.

The insults, threats and aggressions which have been directed at the honor, the equality, and the happy social existence of the people of Texas and the South for the last forty years have reached a climax.

The people of Texas are justly alarmed at the impending destruction of all that is valuable to freemen.

The distinguished governor of our State has been petitioned by a large number of the citizens of Texas to convene her legislature, preliminary to a convention of the people.

Our State constitution has provided that on "extra- ordinary occasions" the governor "shall convene the legis- lature ."

The legislatures of a number of our sister Southern States have already been called. The evidences of alarm, indignation and resentment, together with a most earnest desire to counsel for their own safety, have come up from the people in every quarter of our State.

Governor Houston has not yet seen proper to convene our legislature; there is reason to hope that he will yet do so.

A legislature cannot express as a convention may the sovereign will of the people of the State of Texas.

The constitution does not give either the governor or the legislature the power to call a convention. Their doing so would be a mere consent that the people might act. The

277 278 people have the right to act as expressly provided in our State constitution without such consent. Art. 1st of the Bill of Rights declares "All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for their benefit; and they have at all times the inalienable right to alter, reform, or abolish their form of government in such manner as they may think expedient."

Should the legislature be now called, it could not probably assemble before some time in January, and then it would be too late to provide for a convention, which could not meet until about or after the time of the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln as president of the United States.

If the people proceed now to the election of delegates to a convention (which they have the unquestioned right to do) the legislature will doubtless ratify what the people have done.

Governor Houston very fully recognizes the right of the people to act primarily in this matter, in his letter to the citizens of Huntsville of November, 1860, wherein he justly says, "Has the time come? If it has, the people who have to bear the burthens of revolution must themselves effect the work." It is then clear that he will abide the expression of the people's will.

Therefore, partaking of the feeling of solicitude common to our fellow citizens, and believing that concert of action is universally desired, and it being necessary that some basis should be set forth to ensure such concert, the undersigned citizens of Texas, residing in different portions of the State, having had an opportunity of convers- ing with a large portion of our fellow citizens of the State, and pretending only to an authority equal to that of a similar number of our fellow citizens in any locality, and prompted alone by a most earnest and we trust patriotic desire for concert of action,

Suggest:

That an election of delegates be held on the 8th day of January, A.D. 1861, or as soon thereafter as practicable, when any county may not be able to hold an election on that day, to assemble in a convention of the people of Texas at 279

the city of Austin, on the 4th Monday in January A.D. 1861, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

That said election be ordered unofficially by the chief justice of each county or district, or in case of his failure or refusal to act forthwith, then by any one or more of the county commissioners, or in case of the refusal of the latter to act forthwith, then by a committee of five citizens of such county or district.

That the qualifications of electors shall be the same, and as near as practicable the manner of holding such election be the same, as that provided for by the laws of the State of Texas of force governing elections for members of the legislature.

That the returns of said elections be made to the person or persons ordering the same, as soon after the same shall have been held as practicable; and that the certificate of election be issued immediately by such person or persons to whomsoever shall have received the largest number of votes polled.

And where there is under the new apportionment a representative district composed of more than one county, the votes polled shall be returned to the person or persons ordering an election in the county of said district, the chief justice of which is, under said apportionment bill, made the returning officer of such district; and the certificates of election shall be issued by such person or persons.

That said election be upon the basis of the new apportion- ment bill, approved February 6th, A.D. 1860, except that there be no representation for the senators provided for in said apportionment, but that each county or district elect two delegates for each member of the house of representatives to which it may be entitled; so that the number of said delegates shall be just double the number of members in the house of representatives in said legislature.

That the action of said convention be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection at the ballot box at the earliest practicable time after its adjournment. 280

We trust that the newspapers throughout the State will publish this mode of action and urge its adoption.

We hope that those counties where a slight change of programme will be necessary will not regard such change as uperably objectionable, for we can assure all that the above has been deemed to accord more with the general wish than any particular plan yet proposed by any county, and is arrived at from full and free consultation with a number of persons from all sections of the State.

We further recommend to our fellow citizens that they at once put forward-candidates for said convention. APPENDIX 2

ORDINANCE OF SECESSION

An Ordinance to dissolve the union between the State of Texas and the other States, united under the compact styled "The Constitution of the United States of America."

Sec. 1. Whereas, The Federal Government has failed to accomplish the purposes of the compact of union between these States in giving protection either to the persons of our people upon an exposed frontier or to the property of our citizens; and whereas the action of the Northern States of the Union, and the recent development in federal affairs, make it evident that the power of the Federal Government is sought to be made a weapon with which to strike down the interest and prosperity of the Southern people, instead of permitting it to be as it was intended our shield against outrage and aggression: Therefore

We the people of the State of Texas in Convention to declare and ordain, that the ordinance adopted by our Convention of delegates on the 4th day of July A.D. 1845, and afterwards ratified by us, under which the Republic of Texas was admitted into union with other States and became a party to the compact styled "The Constitution of the United States of America" be and is hereby repealed and annulled; that all the powers which by said compact were delegated by Texas to the Federal Government are revoked and resumed; that Texas is of right absolved from all restraints and obligations incurred by said compact and is a separate sovereign State.

Sec. 2. This ordinance shall be submitted to the people of Texas for. ratification or rejection by the qualified voters on the 24rd day of February A.D. 1861, and unless rejected by a majority of the votes cast shall take effect and be in force on and after the 2nd day of March, A.D. 1861.

Done by the people of the State of Texas in Convention assembled at Austin, this 1st day of February, A.D. 1861.

281 APPENDIX 3

CAUSES FOR SECESSION

A declaration of the causes which impel the State of Texas to secede from the Federal Union.

The government of the United States, by certain joint resolutions, bearing date the 1st of March, in the year A.D. 1845, proposed to the Republic of Texas, then a free, sovereign and independent nation, the annexation of the latter to the former, as one of the co-equal States thereof,

The people of Texas, by deputies in convention assembled, on the fourth day of July of the same year, assented to and accepted said proposals and formed a constitution for the proposed State, upon which on the 29th day of December in the same year, said State was formally admitted into the Confederated Union.

Texas abandoned her separate national existence and consented to become one of the Confederated States to promote her welfare, insure domestic tranquility and secure more substantially the blessings of peace and liberty to her people. She was received into the confederacy with her own constitution, under the guarantee of the federal constitution and the compact of annexation, that she should enjoy these blessings. She was received as a commonwealth holding, maintaining and protecting the institution known as negro slavery--the servitude of the African to the white race within her limits--a relation that had existed from the first settlement of her wilderness by the white race, and which her people intended should exist in all future time. Her institutions and geographical position established the strongest ties between her and other slave-holding States of the confederacy. Those ties have been strengthened by association. But what has been the course of the govern- ment of the United States, and of the people and authorities of the non-slave-holding States, since our connection with them?

282 283

The controlling majority of the Federal Government, under various pretences and disguises, has so administered the same as to exclude the citizens of the Southern States, unless under odious and unconstitutional restrictions, from all the immense territory owned in common by all the States on the Pacific Ocean, for the avowed purpose of acquiring sufficient power in the common government to use it as a means of destroying the institutions of Texas and her sister slave-holding states.

By the disloyalty of the Northern States and their citizens and the imbecility of the Federal Government, infamous combinations of incendiaries and outlaws have been permitted in those States and the common territory of Kansas to trample upon the federal laws, to war upon the lives and property of Southern citizens in that territory, and finally, by violence and mob law, to usurp the possession of the same as exclusively the property of the Northern States.

The Federal Government, while but partially under the control of these our unnatural and sectional enemies, has for years almost entirely failed to protect the lives and property of the people of Texas against the Indian savages on our border, and more recently against the murderous forays of banditti from the neighboring territory of Mexico; and when our State government has expended large amounts for such purpose, the Federal Government has refused reim- bursement therefor, thus rendering our condition more unsure and harrassing than it was during the existence of the Republic of Texas.

These and other wrongs we have patiently borne in the vain hope that a returning sense of justice and humanity would induce a different course of administration.

When we advert to the course of individual non-slave - holding States, and that a majority of their citizens, our grievances assume far greater magnitude.

The States of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan and Iowa, by solemn legislative enact- ments, have deliberately, directed or indirectly violated the 3rd clause of the 2nd section of the 4th article of the federal constitution, and laws passed in pursuance thereof; 284 thereby annulling a material provision of the compact, designed by its framers to perpetuate amity between the members of the confederacy and to secure the rights of the slave-holding States in their domestic institutions--a provision founded in justice and wisdom, and without the enforcement of which the compact fails to accomplish the objects of its creation. Some of those States have imposed high fines and degrading penalties upon any of their citizens or officers who may carry out in good faith that provision of the compact, or the federal laws enacted in accordance therewith.

In all the non-slave-holding States, in violation of that good faith and comity which should exist between entirely distinct nations, the people have formed themselves into a great sectional party,, now strong enough in numbers to control the affairs of each of those States, based upon the unnatural feeling of hostility to these Southern States and their beneficent and patriarchal system of African slavery, proclaiming the debasing doctrine of the equality of all men, irrespective of race or color--a doctrine at war with nature, in opposition to the experience of mankind and in violation of the plainest revelations of the Divine Law. They demand the abolition of negro slavery throughout the confederacy, the recognition of political equality between the white and negro races, and avow their determina- tion to press on their crusade against us, so long as a negro slave remains in these States.

For years past this abolition organization has been actively sowing the seeds of discord through the Union, and has rendered the federal congress the arena for spreading firebrands and hatred between the slave-holding and non- slave -holding States.

By consolidating their strength, they have placed the slave-holding States in a hopeless minority in the federal congress, and rendered representation of no avail in protect- ing Southern rights against their exactions and encroachments,

They have proclaimed, and at the ballot box sustained, the revolutionary doctrine that there is a "higher law" than the constitution and laws of our Federal Union, and virtually that they will disregard their oaths and trample upon our rights. 285

They have for years past encouraged and sustained law- less organizations to steal our slaves and prevent their recapture, and have repeatedly murdered Southern citizens while lawfully seeking their rendition.

They have invaded Southern soil and murdered unoffend- ing citizens, and through the press their leading men and a fanatical pulpit have bestowed praise upon the actors and assassins in these crimes, while the governors of several of their States have refused to deliver parties implicated and indicated for participation in such offences, upon the legal demands of the States aggrieved.

They have, through the mails and hired emissaries, sent seditious pamphlets and papers among us to stir up servile insurrection and bring blood and carnage to our firesides.

They have sent hired emissaries among us to burn our towns and distribute arms and poison to our slaves for the same purpose.

They have impoverished the slave-holding States by unequal and partial legislation, thereby enriching them- selves by draining our substance.

They have refused to vote appropriations for protecting Texas against ruthless savages, for the sole reason that she is a slave-holding State.

And, finally, by the combined sectional vote of the seventeen non-slave-holding States, they have elected as president and vice-president of the whole confederacy two men whose chief claims to such high positions are their approval of these long continued wrongs, and their pledges to continue them to the final consummation of these schemes for the ruin of the slave-holding States.

In view of these and many other facts, it is meet that our own views should be distinctly proclaimed.

We hold as undeniable truths that th£ governments of the various States, and of the confederacy itself, were established exclusively by the white race, for themselves and their posterity; that, the African race had no agency in their establishment; that they were rightfully held and 286 regarded as an inferior and dependent race, and in that condition only could their existence in this country be rendered beneficial or tolerable.

That in this free government all white men are and of right ought to be entitled to equal civil and political rights; that the servitude of the African race, as existing in these States, is mutually beneficial to both bond and free, and is abundantly authorized and justified by the experience of mankind, and the revealed will of the Almighty Creator, as recognized by all Christian nations; while the destruction of the existing relations between the two races, as advocated by our sectional enemies, would bring inevitable calamities upon both and desolation upon the fifteen slave- holding States.

By the secession of six of the slave-holding States, and the certainty that others will speedily do likewise, Texas has no alternative but to remain in an isolated connection with the North, or unite her destinies with the South.

For these and other reasons, solemnly asserting that the federal constitution has been violated and virtually abrogated by the several States named, seeing that the federal government is now passing under the control of our enemies to be diverted from the exalted objects of its creation to those of oppression and wrong, and realizing that our own State can no longer look for protection, but to God and her own sons--We the delegates of the people of Texas, in Convention assembled, have passed an ordinance dissolving all political connection with the government of the United States of America and the people thereof and confidently appeal to the intelligence and patriotism of the freemen of Texas to ratify the same at the ballot box, on the 23rd day of the present month.

Adopted in Convention on the 2nd day of Feby, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one and of the independence of Texas the twenty-fifth. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Unpublished Works

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Crews, Litha. "The Know Nothing Party in Texas." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1925.

Daniel, Mary J. "The Question of Slavery in the Movement for the Annexation of Texas to the United States." M.A. thesis, University of Southern California, 1940.

Dugas, Vera Lea. "A Social and Economic History of Texas in the Civil War and Reconstruction Periods." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1963.

Ellis, Mary H. "Social Conditions in Texas About 1850." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1927. 314

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Engelking, Johanna R. "Slavery in Texas." M.A. thesis, Baylor University, 1933.

Hayes, Charles W. "Island and City of Galveston." Unpub- lished manuscript, Galveston, Texas: Rosenberg Library, 1879.

Head, Nancy A. "State Rights in Texas:. The Growth of an Idea, 1850-1860." M.A. thesis, Rice University, 1960.

Hering, Julia Lee. "The Secession Movement in Texas." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1933.

Hill, James L. "The Life of Judge William Pitt Ballinger." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1937.

Junkins, Enda. "Slave Plots, Insurrections, and Acts of Violence in the State of Texas, 1828-1865." M.A. thesis, Baylor University, 1969.

Kennedy, Maud E. "Sam Houston and Secession.," M.A. thesis, Southern Methodist University, 1930.

King, Alma D. "The Political Career of William Simpson Oldham." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1929.

Langston, Bernadyn H. "The South and the Kansas Nebraska Bill." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1927.

Lewis, Elsie M. "From Nationalism to Disunion: A Study of the Secession Movement in Arkansas." Ph.D. disser- tation, University of Chicago, 1946.

Lewis, Victor T. "Texas and the Nation, 1846-1860." M.A. thesis, East Texas State University, 1940.

Lockhart, W.E. "The Slave Code of Texas," M.A. thesis, Baylor University, 1929.

Lord,. Clyde W. "The Ante-bellum Career of Lewis Trezevant Wigfall." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1925.

Meredith, Mary 0. "The Life and World of Thomas Jefferson Devine." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1930. 315

Miller, Benjamin H. "Elisha Marshall Pease." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1927.

Morris, Elizabeth Y. "." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1931.

Odom, Edwin Dale. "The Texas Question as a Factor in the Sectional Struggle." M.A. thesis, North Texas State University, 1956.

Rateliff, John D. "Unionist of Texas." M.A. thesis, East Texas State University, 1960.

Shook, Robert W. "German Unionism in Texas During the Civil War and Reconstruction." M.A. thesis, North Texas State University, 1957.

Stabler, John B. "A History of the Constitutional Union Party: A Tragic Failure." Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1954.

Sterrett, Carrie B. "The Life of Thomas Jefferson Rusk." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1922.

Swafford, Ralph Robert. "Anson Jones and the Diplomacy of Texas Annexation." M.A. thesis, North Texas State University, 1961.

Tausch, Egon D. "Southern Sentiment Among Texas Germans During the Civil War and Reconstruction." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1965.

Tyler, Ronnie C. "Slave Owners and Runaway Slaves in Texas." M.A. thesis, Texas Christian University, 1966.

Vivian, Jennings. "History of Sam Houston's Governorship of Texas." M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1934.

Wood, Thomas N. "Attitudes of Certain Texas Editors Toward Secession." M.A. thesis, Baylor University, 1968.