Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies “Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence
University of Oradea University of Debrecen
Volume 7
Europe and the Neighbourhood
Edited by Dorin Ioan DOLGHI, Gilles ROUET & Zsolt RADICS
References by Fabienne MARON, Vasile VESE
Spring 2009
Eurolimes Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies “Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence Spring 2009 Volume 7 Europe and the Neighbourhood edited by Dorin Ioan DOLGHI, Gilles ROUET & Zsolt RADICS Honorary Members Paul Allies ( Montpellier), Peter Antes (Hanover) , Enrique Banús (Pamplona) , Robert Bideleux (Swansea), Erhard Busek ( Wien ), Jean Pierre Colin ( Reims ), George Contogeorgis (Athene), Gerard Delanty (Sussex), György Enyedi (Budapest ), Richard Griffiths, Chris G. Quispel (Leiden) , Moshe Idel (Jerulalem) , Livio Missir di Lusignan (Brussels ), Jaroslaw Kundera (Wroclaw), Ariane Landuyt (Siena), Gheorghe Măhăra (Oradea), Adrian Miroiu , erban Papacostea ( Bucure ti), Vladimir Pessenko (Rostov on Don), Frank Pfetsch (Heidelberg), Vasile Pu ca , Vasile Vesa (Cluj Napoca), Mercedes Samaniego Boneau (Salamanca), Rudolf Rezsohazy (Leuven), Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (Coimbra), Dusan Sidjanski (Geneve), Goran Therborn (Uppsalla), Maurice Vaïsse (Paris). Advisory Committee Iordan Bărbulescu, Gabriela Drăgan, Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu (Bucure ti ), Teresa Pinheiro (Chemnitz ), Béla Baranyi, Czimre Klára, Kozma Gábor, Szabó Gyula, Teperics Károly, Varnay Ernı ( Debrecen ), Rozália Biró, Anca Dodescu, Alexandru Ilie , Lia Pop, Rodica Petrea, Sorin ipo , Barbu tefănescu, Ion Zainea ( Oradea ), Maria Crăciun, Ovidiu Ghitta, Adrian Ivan, Nicoale Păun, Ioan Aurel Pop , Radu Preda (Cluj Napoca), Margarita Chabanna (Kiev), Serge Dufoulon (Grenoble), Gunilla Edelstam, Thomas Lunden (Stockholm), Didier Francfort (Nancy), Tamara Gella (Orel), Ion Gumenâi, Alla Ro ca, Octavian Tîcu ( Chi inău ), Karoly Kocsis (Miskolc), Iolanda Aixela Cabre, Cătălina Iliescu ( Alicante ), Anatoly Kruglashov ( Chernivtsi ), Renaud de La Brosse, Gilles Rouet (Reims), Giuliana Laschi ( Bologna ), Stephan Malovic (Zagreb), Maria Marczewska Rytko (Lublin), Fabienne Maron (Brussels), Silvia Mihalikova (Bratislava), Misklevetz Ferenc, Csapó Tamás (Szombathely), Ivan Nacev, Margareta Shivergueva (Sofia), Carlos Eduardo Pacheco do Amaral (Asores), Procopis Papastratis (Athens), Alexandru Florin Platon ( Ia i), Mykola Palinchak ( Uzhgorod), Daniele Pasquinucci ( Siena), Stanislaw Sagan (Rzeszow), Angelo Santaugustino (Brescia), Grigore Sila i (Timi oara), Lavinia Stan (Halifax), George Tsurvakas (Tessalonik), Peter Terem (Banska Bystrica) , Esther Gimeno Ugalde ( Wien ), Jan Wendt (Gdansk), Gianfranco Giraudo (Venice) Editorial Committee Ioana Albu, Ambrus Attila, Mircea Brie, Mariana Buda, Carmen Buran, Vasile Ciocan, Sorin Cuc, Lia Derecichei, Cristina Dogot, Dorin Dolghi, Antonio Faur (Oradea ), Fulias Soroulla Michaela Maria ( Nicosia ), Peter Balogh (Uppsala ), Andreas Blomquist ( Stockholm ), Vasile Croitoru, Adriana Dilan ( Chisinau ), Csakbereny Nagy Gergely, Molnar Ernı, Penzes Janos, Radics Zsolt, Tımıri Mihály ( Debrecen ), Bohdana Dimitrovova ( Belfast ), Mariana Cojoc ( ConstanŃa), Florin Lupescu, Simona Miculescu, Adrian Niculescu ( Bucure ti) , Anca Oltean, Dana Pantea, Delia Pop, Adrian Popoviciu, Alina Stoica, LuminiŃa oproni, Marcu Sta ac, Constantin łoca ( Oradea) , Toma Tănase ( Paris ), erban Turcu ( Roma ), Natasha Trajkova (Prilep), Viktoryia Serzhanova ( Rzeszow ) The full responsibility regarding the content of the papers belongs exclusively to the authors. Addres s: University of Oradea 1, Universitatii st. 410087 Oradea/Romania Tel/fax: +40.259.467.642 e mail: [email protected] www.iser.rdsor.ro Image: Nice I., Odessa – Le Boulevard, 1890, „Lucian Balga” University Library, Cluj Napoca, Stampe Collection, quota XIV/M = 38 Eurolimes is a half yearly journal. Articles and book reviews may be sent to the above mentioned address. The journal may be acquired by contacting the editors.
Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies (ISER) is issued by Ioan HORGA (Oradea) and Istvan SULI ZAKAR (Debrecen) with the support of the Action Jean Monnet of the European Commission and in the Co Edition with Bruylant (Brussels)
Proofreading: Dorin I. DOLGHI (Oradea); Editorial Assistance: ing. Elena ZIERLER (Oradea)
Oradea University Press ISSN: 1841 9259
Cuprins ◊ Contents ◊ Sommaire ◊ Inhalt ◊ Tartalom
Dorin Ioan DOLGHI, Gilles ROUET, Zsolt RADICS ◄► Europe and the Neighbourhood Introduction …...... ….5
I. The European Union and the Neighbourhood ………………………….……………. ...…9 Dacian DUNA (Cluj Napoca) ◄► Approaching the Northern and Southern Neighbours of the European Union…………………………………..…….... ….10 Irina POP (Cluj Napoca) ◄► The Assessment of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the South Caucasus: What the European Union can do?...... ….22 Nicolae DANDI (Chi inău) ◄►Cross border cooperation a strategic dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy at the Eastern frontier of the EU……………………………………………………………………………. …. .35 Sinem KOCAMAZ (Izmir) ◄►The EU's relations wit h the Transcaucasian Contries whitin the scope of the ENP……………………………...………... ….49
II. Connecting European Neighbours …………………………………………………... ….67 Gilles ROUET (Reims) ◄►L’Union européenne et ses voisins : une affaire de citoyens ………………………………………………………………………….. .68 Marius LAZĂR (Paris) ◄► Islam and Islamism in Europe. Representations of Identity and Projects of Action………………………………………………. ….. 82 Zuzana IŠTVÁNFOYÁ (Bratislava) ◄► Narrative Fiction as a means of Crossing Borders ...... … .104 Thierry CÔME (Reims) ◄►Erasmus et la mobilité en Europe, vers un dépassement des frontières ?...... … .113
III. Neighbourhood and Crossborder Experience ………………….……………..…….....1 23 Fahrettin SUMER (Richmond) ◄► Turkey, a Special EU Neighbour Patiently Awaiting a “Promised Marriage”…………………………………..……….. …124 Istvan SULI ZAKAR (Debrecen) ◄► The Role of the Euroregions and Eurometropolises in the Etheralization of the Borders in the Eastern Periphery of the European Union……………………………………………. …13 9 Zoltán GÁL (Debrecen) ◄►The Danube Region – Past, Present and Future Prospect of Transnational Co operation as a Playground of the European Integration …………………………………………………………………... …14 8 Vasile NAZARE (ConstanŃa) ◄► Romanian Naval Forces Role in Crisis Management next to the Black Sea...... 159 IV. Focus ………………………………………………………………………………...…….16 7 Carlos E. Pacheco AMARAL (Azores) ◄► Europe: Utopia and Reality. Essence, Meaning and Value of an Idea…………………………………….. ….16 8
Book Reviews ……………………………………………………………………………...… .177
Our Educational Projects .. …………………………………………...... ….19 9 Dorin I. Dolghi (Oradea) ◄► Master Program in Management of European Security ...... ….200 LuminiŃa OPRONI (Oradea) ◄► Master Program in European Communication and Regional Development ...... ….201
About the Authors …………...………………………………………………………………. 203
Europe and the Neighbourhood
Introduction
Dorin Ioan DOLGHI, Gilles ROUET & Zsolt RADICS
In the past two decades, the issue of neighbourhood became an important aspect of Europe’s geopolitical reconfiguration. The European Union and many national interests and preferences of the member states were shifted due to the new context that emerged after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Also, the neighbour states of EU reconfigured their preferences according to the new context. These changes in the regional arena brought in the same degree a large spectrum of challenges and opportunities on both sides. This situation is not an original one for the European experience. Since the Greek Europe, we can identify that different historical contexts contributed to the idea of Europe and the limits of Europe. Therefore, both Europe and the neighbourhood were always in a relationship of mutual influence. Sometimes, the neighbourhood became the enemy, other times the neighbourhood was an opportunity for economic and social development or assimilated (through integration or conquest) but every time each side – Europe and the neighbourhood – had to consider the potential, threat or the potential partnership of the other side. This relationship is very important in order to understand the evolution of Europe, its expectations and behavior towards its neighbours. From a cultural and political viewpoint, Europe cannot be defined without taking into account its neighbours. One of the main issues regarding the limits of Europe was discussed within the framework of “variable geometry”. This concept can be used as an “excuse” for the great challenge to define the dynamics of Europe, but more importantly, it can led to the search of different variables that can affect Europe’s evolution and its interpertation. Indeed, we can approach Europe from different perspectives: geography, history, culture, society, economy, security, values, lifestyle, etc. and each approach can reveal different Europes. Then, a reasonable question arises (again!): How many Europes? The historical and cultural perspective underlines Europe as a space of civilization , based on the heritage from Greeks, Romans and Christianity as the main factors that influenced its evolution. Even if are perceived as “secondary”, the influences of other factors were fundamentally important for Europe: barbarians, Jews, non Christians, migratory people that came into the European space, interacted and contributed with their experiences. For each case, within the first contacts and interactions, the “outsiders” were either isolated, due to a “self preservation” instinct on both sides, or assimilated, due to a mutual recognition of each other or the dominance of the Europeans. Often, a large degree of differentiation was maintained, but the social and cultural exchanges and influences led, during the centuries, to an Europe that contrasts between integration, tolerance and discrimination. Also, the interactions (initially conflicts) within the cultural diversity of Europe had as a result a more tolerant attitude among the Europeans who were “trained” during the history to cope with diversity within their backyard. The interpretation of Europe as a space of civilization must be also related to other spaces of civilization. From the neighbourhood perspective, the Europeans relates to the others in different terms. Firstly, there is a geographical delimitation between Europe, Middle East and Northern Africa. These regions are not always related in geographical terms but perceived in cultural terms. The main differentiations are related to religion, culture, beliefs and values. In the past decades, large numbers of immigrants came to Europe and established communities that participate and interact within the European social system. The “outsiders” manage their 6 participation within European system and manage to influence the perception of the Europeans: from a threat perspective to an opportunity perspective. The Europe that emerged after the World War II had its limits imposed by the international system and the Eastern “enemy” or “threat”. The Cold War Europe was mainly differentiated by ideological preferences/influences of Western Europe (European Communities and NATO) and Central and Eastern European states controlled by the USSR. Even if there was a neighbourhood situation in geographical terms, the neighbour was appreciated as a potential “enemy” and accordingly, the main actions were oriented to cope with divergence and threat management among West and East. Still, centuries of interactions and mutual influences between West and East maintained a cultural heterogeneity that preserved a European identity. This fact was obvious during the transformations that occurred after 1989 and the Europe’s support for the new democracies in the Central and Eastern Europe. The former neighbours became partners and potential members of European organizations. The security gap in the East shifted national preferences toward the NATO. The transition to market economies made possible the option for the economic and political integration in the European Communities. The desire to strengthen democracy led to a large participation within the Council of Europe and other political structures based on common values. These transformations confirm that the European values were recognized by the East Europeans. During the integration processes the Central and Eastern European states developed their status from a neighborhood to a full membership of EU. Consecquently, new neighbours get closer to Europe. The relation with the neigbourhood had to be considered by the past experiences of enlargement, the new context and the preferences of the new neighbours. Therefore a very important challenge occurs for EU because it placed itself in the position where is fundamentally important to eliminate possible feelings of rivalry or competition within the neighbours, mainly created by preferential acces on the European market or due to hopes and expectations related to future enlergements. From the perspective of the EU, the scenarios of enlargement brought into attention new frontiers of Europe, new neighbours and new challenges and opportunities within a different regional system of interdependences. In this context, a functional relation with the neighbourhood became a precondition for political stability and economic development within and beyond the new borders. To this end, the promotion of regional and sub regional cooperation had to be considered within a strategic political framework: the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU offers to its neighbours a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The main argument is to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to involve the neighbours in transnational exchanges that can bring benefits for all parts. To this end, the EU’s enhanced partnership relations with its neighbouring countries 1 must be based on a long term approach of sustainable development and cooperation. In fact, a specific policy toward the neighbourhood was determined due to the interdependences that occurred in the global system and underlined in the regional context. Different transnational challenges and opportunities cannot be managed and exploited without cooperation, especially among neighbours that share common preferences and expectations. Still, the ENP does not imply the replacement of bilateral framework which consists in Association Agreements but to supplement existing policies and arrangements. According to the European Commission, the EU’s approach could therefore be based on the several incentives such as: extension of Internal Market and regulatory structures;
1 The European Neighbourhood Policy applies to the EU's immediate neighbours by land or sea – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. A special strategic partnership was developed with Russia. 7 preferential trading relations and market opening; perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons; intensified cooperation to prevent and combat common security threats; greater EU political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management; greater efforts to promote human rights, further cultural cooperation and enhance mutual understanding; integration into transport, energy and telecommunications networks and the European Research Area; new instruments for investment promotion and protection; support for integration into the global trading system. Based on its own diversity, EU recognized the diversity of the neighbourhood and chooses to implement ENP differentiated, which means that EU will address specific issues of cooperation with each country. This is essential due to the large differences between partners in terms of their political and economic situations, needs and aspirations. While the EU should aim to ensure a more coherent approach, offering the same opportunities across the wider neighbourhood, and asking in return the same standards of behaviour from each of our neighbours, differentiation between countries would remain the basis for the neighbourhood policy. Also, there is a synergy between the ENP and the efforts of other countries and organizations supporting reforms in the EU’s neighbourhood. Depending on the region or country, the cooperation framework involves international organisations (UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, World Bank) and the Action Plans make specific reference to the need to implement obligations arising from membership of such organisations. A regional framework such as ENP should be a model for other regional and sub regional cooperation among the neighbours. The regional experience is encouraged by EU by supporting the association of neighbour states within projects and organisations. For instance, the diversity of the Black Sea Area is supported by EU within a common position regarding the Black Sea Synergy. The Joint Statement of Foreign Ministers (Kyiv, February 2008) identifies fields requiring action at the regional level including energy, transport, communications, trade, the environment, maritime policy, fisheries, migration, law enforcement and the fight against organised crime. Other frameworks are supported in the Mediterranean region. The July 2008 Paris Summit launched the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) with the objectives of providing new political impetus for the EU’s critical relationship with its Mediterranean partners, providing greater co ownership and making this relationship more concrete and visible through regional and sub regional projects. The first set of projects to be developed under this initiative include de pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, establishment of maritime and land highways, civil protection initiatives to combat natural and man made disasters, a Mediterranean solar energy plan, the inauguration of the Euro Mediterranean University in Slovenia and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focusing on micro, small and medium sized enterprises. According to the EU overall assessment, the 2008 was a difficult year for implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Its last few months were marked by crises that could pose long term challenges for this key EU policy. Two violent conflicts broke out: the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 and the Israeli intervention in Gaza in December 2008/January 2009. At the turn of the year Eastern partners and the EU suffered disruptions of gas supplies as a result of a dispute between Ukraine and Russia. These events underlines that some issues are challenging mutual trust and the ambitions for stability need to be strengthen by political dialogue and it will be a long way to meet the expectations of all regional actors. Even if is not designed to deal with conflict management, the ENP addresses indirectly to the potential sources of conflict by tackling underlying issues of governance, lack of economic development, insecurity and stability, in order to help avoid conflicts arising in the first place, to better manage those that do and to contribute to a climate in which they might be resolved. 8 The energy dimension of the ENP underlines the major concerns and expectations both for EU and its neigbours. Integrated energy markets can work in everyone’s favour, whether as a producer, transit or consumer country. The EU’s interest on oil and gas meets the interest of producers from the neighbourhood. Any formulas of cooperation in the field of energy will involve a common framework, clear rules and expectations. Moreover, some other important issues can be addressed within this context. For example, environment question must be approached due to its transnational impact. As we can notice, there are so many interdependencies between Europe and its neighbourhood and we believe that the above aspects clearly demonstrate how important the neighbourhood is for the Europe. Many arguments in this sense are developed in the content of the present issue of EUROLIMES. A particular model as the EU, must develop and implement a particular model of relationship with the neighbourhood. We appreciate that the subject must be further developed because the challenges and opportunities are still under investigation by EU, governments and social and economic actors in the European space.
I. The European Union and the Neighbourhood
Dacian DUNA (Cluj Napoca) ◙ Approaching the Northern and Southern Neighbours of the European Union
Irina POP (Cluj Napoca) ◙ The Assessment of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the South Caucasus: What the European Union can do?
Nicolae DANDI (Chi inău) ◙ Cross border cooperation – a strategic dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy at the Eastern frontier of the EU
Sinem KOCAMAZ (Izmir) ◙ The EU's relations with the Transcaucasian countries within the scope of the ENP
Approaching the Northern and Southern Neighbours of the European Union
Dacian DUNA
Abstract: This paper approaches what may be regarded as two ‘dimensions’ of the EU security and cooperation: the Northern and the Southern. The Northern Dimension is highly institutionalized and it developed a model of partnership and multi level governance which inspired the European Neighbourhood Policy. At the same time, the process in the Euro Mediterranean region has been much slower, due to the deeper divisions between the European coastal states and the African or Asian coastal states. The aim of the paper is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the ENP. It emphasizes the ‘foundational’ moment of 2003 for the new European neighbourhood policy, noticing that much of the challenges and dilemmas have remained intact and still need to be addressed by the EU and its neighbours in their quest for security and identity.
Keywords: European Union, neighbourhood, security, strategy, cooperation
Introduction The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was established in 2003 as an alternative policy for the European Union’s neighbouring countries without real prospects of joining the European Union in the foreseeable future. Even though it addressed soft issues, such as economy and democracy, the ENP has clear geopolitical implications. They are, of course, implicit. First of all, it clearly projects the regional interests of the EU, emphasising what is and what will constitute the frontiers of the united Europe. Secondly, it seems to be a proactive approach towards security in the neighbourhood. Certainly, it is not a classical approach, as those from the Cold War and from previous historical periods, that viewed security as protection from the ‘barbarian Other’. Ulla Holm illustrates the new approach in this definition of the ENP: “The Neighbourhood policy represents simultaneously an institutional closure to the ‘Others’ not the ‘radical’ Other, but the ‘different’ neighbour and an openness to the extent that the ‘different’ neighbour behaves like the Europeans but without being a cultural carbon copy of the Europeans” (Holm, 2005: 3). This paper was initially more extended and more ambitious, comprising the Northern Dimension, and two emerging dimensions of the EU: the Southern and the Eastern. I limited the topic of this paper on the highly institutionalised Northern Dimension and on the processes of institutionalization developing in the Mediterranean, an area dividing or bringing together two more contrasting entities (in terms of politics, economy, and culture): Europe and Islam. My focus is on the foundational moment of 2003, since the general conditions have remained in many ways the same. It is too early to predict the real impact of the latest initiatives, such as the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ and the ‘Eastern Partnership’. In my view, this has to do with the great syncope related to the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, the current state of affairs regarding the Treaty of Lisbon, or, to some degree, an unclear direction of the European Union project. The ENP is inspired from previous EU policies and initiatives like the Northern Dimension. Therefore, the paper approaches also the evolution of the ND and its implications for what can be considered an evolving European approach towards security and cooperation: multi level partnership and governance. This ‘new’ proactive security policy is a mixture of 11 cross border policies, in which there is difficult to separate the internal and external dimensions. The presuming initial euphoria that characterised the framing of the ENP and of the European security strategy may have been misleading. The general prosperity and lack of global enmity experienced by the Western world since the end of the Cold War made a case for some scholars to argue that the West had entered into a post historical period. At the same time, the ‘neighbourhood’ was not so successful in economic and political terms. The liberal triumph had to be projected in concentric manner towards the East and South, covering all aspects from market economy to political freedoms and democracy. The Solana document and the ENP, a package with many common features, epitomized the post Cold War Western beliefs that the West had turned post modern, and the rest had remained behind, a land of failed and sometimes rogue states that need to be helped in order to become ‘friends’ of the EU. The current global financial crisis is a major test for the united Europe. The usual bureaucratic approach of avoiding uncertainty is redundant, as today’s world is full of uncertainty. Europe itself is full of confusion, especially in the realm of values, as most ‘traditional’ values have been dropped out.2 The ENP is an idealistic approach towards some EU neighbours that still tend to view the world in Real Politik terms. Yet, it seems to be evolving from older Western policies towards the East, some dating as back as the Cold War era, especially after the starting of the Helsinki Process. In this case, the long term effects were clearly more important than the short term ones. Some, like the case of the Northern Dimension had been instrumental for other policies, like the enlargement, since some of its initial partners (Poland and the Baltic States) are now member of the European Union. Will the ENP be able to contain the desire of some of its neighbours and partners to join the European Union? Or, instead, as President Sarkozy implied in his Tangier speech 3, Jean Monnet’s functionalism could apply once again.
Background The design of the European Union since its inception in the early 1990s has left the foreign and security policy issues without a concrete resolution. In fact, the CFSP was a loose policy or no policy at all and the Balkan crises of the 1990s demonstrated this fact. Clearly, the EU will probably never be or act like a classical security organization (like NATO, for instance), even though since the Treaty of Nice it has attempted to develop its own identity in matters of security and defence. It was the will of some European leaders like Jacques Chirac or Javier Solana to strengthen the Union’s international role to measure its political and economic force. Nevertheless, the EU has not had so far strategic deterrents, using the logistics and armaments of NATO in the ESDP missions, even these involving light arms in the phases of peacekeeping. The most important civilian instruments that defined the EU’s contribution to the European security have been the financial instruments (like Phare, Ispa, Sapard, Tacis, Interreg, CBC etc.). They are managed by the European Commission. They were all economic rewards through which the Union hoped to obtain a ‘peace dividend’ from the outside neighbouring countries. Coincidentally or not, the regional marks of the CFSP overlap, to a certain extent, with those of the ENP, a relatively new instrument in the European politics, with a clear
2 In an interview for the Euobserver (March 16, 2009), Mr. Davignon, an old Belgian industrialist, a doyen of the European integration project, stated that "How does Europe adjust to that change is the question. There is no objective reason to say that we will fail. There is not yet a clear indication that we will succeed in that test, so the jury's out." and "Against the business community because of the financial excesses. Also, the church has disappeared. The popular reaction is also a consequence of the fact that a number of traditional references have disappeared. People are looking for what is the reference." (see “’Jury's out' on future of Europe, EU doyen says”, Euobserver , March 16, 2009, http://euobserver.com/9/27778/?rk=1). 3 The speech was held in 23 October 2007 in Tangier and developed his ideas of a ‘Union of the Mediterranean’. 12 financial component. In fact, the ENP alongside the cross border policies of the EU are part of the European vision regarding security and stability in Europe, starting from the experience of the European integration project that by creating networks of functional interdependence (including the democratic values), the war can be made impossible.4 This better describes the nature of the EU as a soft power, inclined to employ civilian rather than military instruments in the field of crisis prevention and conflict management. This is what Robert Kagan meant in his famous remark: “Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus” (Kagan, 2003). Of course, this is not only a normative feature, but an institutional organizational one. Another instant of this soft power is reflected in the fact that the EU officials did notice that it is not enough to strengthen the frontiers of the Union in order to obtain the ‘peace dividend’. This could be obtained beyond the EU physical frontiers, by employing an indirect influence upon the neighbours, exercised by financial rewards in exchange of political reforms. Such financial instruments are designed to create the premises of an enhanced cooperation between the EU and its neighbours from North, South, and East, the final goal being the regional stability and societal security, symbolically described as a ‘ring of friends’. Such approach was labelled by the neoliberal institutionalist school ‘soft power’5. In 2003 the European Union had to prepare for a number of important events: (1) the ‘enlargement boom’ of January 1, 2004, comprising ten countries from Central and Southern Europe, (2) the closing of the Prodi Commission’s mandate, (3) the final drafting phase of a constitutional treaty, the ‘Constitution for Europe’. The Central and Eastern Europe had clearly entered into a period of stability and prosperity, the long conflict in the Western Balkans fading into the memory of history. The post 9/11 events put the US and the EU on the brink of their first collision, due to the self assumed American unilateral approach of the war on terror and the European support for multilateralism. On the one hand, it seemed that the European integration could take off once again towards the dream of so many federalists: the United States of Europe. On the other hand, the EU was ‘cursed’ to play a major role on the world’s stage, needing to revive the Common Foreign and Security Policy and its companion, the European Security and Defence Policy. In this context, the Thessaloniki European Council of March 2003 adopted two major foreign policy enterprises. The first one was the ‘Solana Document’ that became the EU Security Strategy entitled A Secure Europe in a Better World – an initiative of the Secretary General of the Council, High Representative for the CFSP, Mr. Javier Solana. The other one was the communication addressed by the European Commission to the European Council entitled Wider Europe’s Neighbourhood: proposed new framework for relations with the EU's Eastern and Southern Neighbours , a document put forward by Romano Prodi, the President of the Commission and Chris Patten, the European Commissioner for External Affairs. These documents were actually follow ups of a joint paper signed by Javier Solana and Chris Patten and a speech of Romano Prodi on a Policy of Proximity. Based on these, the European Council of Copenhagen (December 2002) had already launched the new neighbourhood policy as an objective of the Union. (Kahraman, 2005). The resemblance between the ‘Solana Document’ and the ‘Communication’ is an indication of the collaboration between the Council and the Commission. ‘The Communication’ was part of a wider strategy of the Commission regarding the countries that will not join in the foreseeable future the European Union, but were going to share a common frontier with the EU after the enlargement of 2004 and 2007. This new
4 This is another example of liberal logic that can be found in the works of the democratic peace school, explaining why there was no war among the Western European democracies since 1945. Such arguments are developed further by functionalists and neofunctionalists. 5 The concept was developed by Joseph Nye in two seminal works: Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Basic Books, 1990, and Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics , New York, Public Affairs, 2004. 13 approach on the relations with the Eastern and Southern neighbours 6 was in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council of Copenhagen which emphasised that the enlargement is an opportunity to promote stability and prosperity inside and outside the new frontiers of the Union (European Council, 2008:par 22). The document drafted by the European Commission proposed a strategy for the next decade, starting from what Chris Patten once bluntly stated: “Over the past decade, the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument has undeniably been the promise of EU membership. This is not sustainable. For the coming decade, we need to find new ways to export the stability, security, and prosperity we have created within the enlarged Union” (DANNREUTER, 2006: 187). The Commission’s communication underlines the development of a zone of prosperity and ‘good neighbourhood’, a ‘ring of friends’ 7 with a stake in an internal common market, in exchange for a demonstration of commitment toward the common values of the Union and an effective implementation of reforms (political as well as economic). In his speech from 16 April 2003 in Athens, Romano Prodi masterly underlined the need for an ENP. Apparently, the speech mirrors Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech: “But we need to develop a ring of friends around us, a circle of friendly nations on our borders, stretching from Morocco, along the southern shores of the Mediterranean and up along the eastern confines of our Union to Russia. With this ring of neighbours and friendly countries we intend ultimately to share all the benefits of the Union that contribute to stability and prosperity. All accept our institutions” (Podi, 2003). It seems clear that the ideas presented in the ‘Communication’ and implemented through the European Neighbourhood Policy are part of a new geopolitical vision of the European Union, a new approach towards regional security. The enlarged Europe has the potential to become in matters of security what such ‘neomedievalists’ like Ole Wæver named a ‘metaphorical empire’. In Wæver’s opinion, the functions of this geopolitical organization would be: to maintain the ‘nucleus’ intact (this was the function of NATO’s enlargement waves), to ‘discipline’ the regions situated in proximity of the centre through the formula of asymmetric interdependence (see the enlargement criteria), direct intervention (option available with the emergence of the ESDP) (Wæver , 1997: 66 72). During the last decades, the EU has proven to be effective in securing the nucleus, and disciplining its ‘near abroad’ (through the enlargement boom, most of this has actually become the peripheral region of the nucleus). However, the ‘Wider Europe’s Neighbourhood’ will be harder to discipline, due to the greater discrepancies between the nucleus (the EU) and the new peripheries from the East and South. With the establishment of the ENP, the EU had to find the necessary rewards for a post enlargement strategy to prove workable. The Commission’s strategy paper of 2003 seemed to indicate that the European leaders were actually aiming for an increased global role for the Union, a status that could be forged first of all by gaining a dominant regional profile and later by federalizing the EU and eventually bringing the CFSP at the community level. Some goals were clearly too ambitious since the decision making procedures are still favouring the Member States.
The Northern Dimension The Nordic Europe and the Arctic region were crucial areas in the Cold War games of global supremacy between the superpowers. However, this had not prevented the emergence of a regional ethos that characterises the area even today. The Scandinavian democracies have a
6 The strategy was aiming the relations with the Russian Federation, the new independent states situated in the Western side of the former USSR – Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the countries from the Southern and South Eastern Mediterranean). 7 The expression was introduced by Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commission. See James Wesley Scott, "The EU and 'Wider Europe ': Toward an Alternative Geopolitics of Regional Cooperation?," Geopolitics 10, 3, 2005, p. 429 454. 14 similar profile that provided the incentives of international cooperation. Moreover, due to the complicated nature of their relations with the USSR, they tended to avoid the conflict at any costs. This timid foreign policy was particularly clear in the case of Finland and it was symbolised by the word ‘Finlandization’. The Nordic area remained relatively stable even in the post Cold War world, compared to the Eastern and Southern parts of the continent. In fact, the existence of an institutionalised ‘Northern Dimension’ inspired the division employed in this work of the ENP and of the European security in geographical ‘dimensions’. It was only in March 2009 when a Swedish Polish draft proposal of an “Eastern Partnership” was launched to cover what can be call an ‘Eastern Dimension’. The Northern Dimension is the most institutionalised, even internalised since it was introduced in the EU terminology as early as in 1997. From the EU’s point of view, the ND involves the external and cross border policies of the EU covering the area of the Baltic Sea, Arctic Ocean and the NW of Russia. Its main concerns are: emphasizing the security, stability, prosperity, and the sustainable development in the area, by economic cooperation and positive interdependence between Russia, the Baltic countries and EU, also having an important connection with the common EU strategy on Russia (Knudsen , 2000). The cooperation areas of the ND are environment, nuclear safety, energy cooperation, the Kaliningrad issue, social development etc. The density of various actors involved in the ND 8, makes it an instrument of what I call Nordic governance, or governance of the North. Another interesting feature of the ND is the fact that it is a regional initiative of some EU member states (notably Finland) that has become an EU policy only later. During the Cold War, the Nordic states followed a foreign policy based on avoiding confrontation and limiting superpower intervention in their domestic affairs. This independent perspective, well illustrated by the Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish foreign policies, was abandoned with the end of the Cold War, when the Nordic leaders initiated a debate concerning cooperative security, with an interest in having an active contribution to the setting of a Pan European security system (negotiated by the main European security institutions). They have actually got connected in this way to the coming European political identity (Knudsen, 2000) . In many respects, this has motivated the peoples of the North to get involved in a process of security institutionalisation in the Northern region of Europe. Beside this motivation, the Northern states pursued a pluralistic security model for the region, which dramatically contrasted with the chaos of the South East Europe, related especially to the Yugoslav dissolution and its subsequent crises. The success of the Northern initiative in still very much disputed. First of all, the analysis of the Nordic security’s institutionalisation has been empirical, state centred and dependent on results, devised in an instrumental manner, ignoring its representative role (Joenniemi, 2000) , as some analysts argued. Clearly, it was designed in the context of the 1995 EU enlargement wave. It signalised the entering into the EU scene of new foreign policies and subsequent new national interests. However, it was compatible with the intergovernmental character of the CFSP and the principle of subsidiarity. The ND is implemented within the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia and it involves the participation of all stakeholders in the North: regional organizations, NGOs, academic and
8 The Northern Dimension involves various actors: partners (Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, the European Union) and other participants : regional organizations like the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Arctic Council (AC), the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM); international financial institutions active in the North (for instance, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD); regional and sub regional organizations and commissions in the Baltic and Barents seas; sub national and local authorities; non governmental organization; civil society organizations (notably indigenous peoples’ organizations); universities and research centres; business and trade union communities etc.; observers: USA, Canada (compiled from “The Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document”, effective as 1 January 2007, http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/11865_doc_download1.pdf. 15 business communities, other elements of the civil society. 9 One must also underline that the Northern Dimension did more than to provide a forum for EU Russian talks or intra regional discussions. It also facilitated the accession of the Baltic States and Poland into the European Union by providing a framework for solving the security problems in the area.
Box 1. A chronology of the ND 10 1991 – the Baltic countries (Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) declared their independence from USSR; soon the problem was the affiliation of the Baltic countries to the West and shortly they became favourite candidates to the European integration; 1994 – the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed between the EU and Russia, the two declaring each other strategic partners; 1999 – The EU Common Strategy on Russia; 1997 2000 – The European Union admitted the existence of a Northern Dimension in the foreign and cross border policies of the EU and has adopted the necessary rules for its implementation (the European Councils of Luxemburg, Vienna, Cologne, Helsinki and Feira). 2000 – the endorsement of the European Council of Feira of the Action Plan for the Northern Dimension; the European Commission was invited to play the role of leadership in the implementation of the Action Plan and to present proposals, including the environment and the nuclear safety, the fight against organized crime and Kaliningrad (European Council, 2000) April 2001 – the 2 nd Ministerial Conference on the Northern Dimension held in Luxembourg; June 2001 – the Gothenburg European Council endorsed a Full Report on Northern Dimension Policies that, while taking stock of the activities undertaken to implement the Feira Action Plan, also outlined ideas and proposals for the continuation of the Northern Dimension initiative; August 2002 – ministerial meeting held in Illulisaat, Greenland, discussing possible guidelines for a Second Northern Dimension Action Plan, which were adopted at a ministerial meeting in Luxembourg in October 2002. Following this, the Commission proposed the 2nd NDAP in June 2003, and this was adopted at the European Council in Brussels in October 2003. This 2nd NDAP covers the period 2004 2006; As foreseen under the 2nd NDAP, progress in implementing the Action Plan will be reviewed by meetings of Senior Officials and of Ministers held in alternate years. The first such Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) was held in Brussels in October 2004, and the Ministerial Meeting will be held in the autumn 2005; Annual reports on NDAP implementation are produced by the European Commission; 21 November 2005, the Northern Dimension ministerial meeting held in Brussels approved by unanimity 'the Guidelines for the development of a political declaration and policy framework document for Northern Dimension policy from 2007'.
The Northern Dimension does not cover the so called traditional security policy. It in fact addresses a long range of ‘soft security’ concerns, from pollution, organised crime, uclear power disasters, maritime accidents, smuggling of arms and other hazardous goods, illegal migration, great economic and social inequalities etc.” (Archer, 2000: 11 17). At this reference points, we can add the impact of the latest enlargement of the EU over the relations with the Russian Federation, country with whom the Union has signed in 1994 an Association and Partnership Agreement. Russia is involved in the Northern Dimension
9 See the article “Northern Dimension”, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Dimension . 10 Partly compiled from the article “Northern Dimension”, Wikipedia. 16 and remains the main strategic actor for the Northern security. The integration of Poland and of the Baltic countries to the EU, formally effective since 1 May 2004, extends impressively the common frontier of the EU and Russia, while the EU combines more and more the attributes of a civilian power with the ones of a military power. For much time, the EU has not been perceived by Russia as a strategic partner and it could not have been so due to the amplitude of the economic and political asymmetry between the two entities and also to the different normative fundaments of their policies. However, as Marius Vahl noted in 2001, the development of the European Defence and Security Policy could induce a strategic dimension in the EU Russia relationship in the nearby future (Vahl, 2001). Comparatively, NATO has institutionalised much better its partnership with Russia. NATO has credibility as a strategic partner because of the American presence in the Alliance. Being in search for its own identity regarding the defence and security, out of NATO control, the EU must find a more credible solution in its relations with Russia and its post Soviet neighbours (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldavia), if it wants to grant strategic relevance to its security and defence policy. Another problem is to establish the relationship between the ND and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ND pre dates the ENP and it influenced its framing. The ND experience was widely used in the design of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The partner oriented and multilevel model developed under the Northern Dimension has clearly inspired another cross border policy of the EU: the ENP. Also, the implications of the 2004 enlargement have led to a simplification of the financial co ordination procedures, the idea of uniting the cross border financial instruments into a single Neighbourhood Instrument from 2006 onward (Lannon; Elsuwege, 2004: 33 34). This is important for one particular aspect: the ND is mainly an instrument for the cross border cooperation between the EU and Russia, adding of course Norway and Iceland, two countries more compatible with the European Union. Russia is not involved in the ENP due to its will of being treated exceptionally by any international actor, including the EU. Nevertheless, since 2007 al the CBCs (Interreg, Tacis, Phare, Meda, and Neighbourhood programmes) have been united into a single cross border financial instrument, one set of rules applying both inside and outside all the Eastern and Southern frontiers of the EU, including Russia. Another consequence on the EU Russia relations brought by the ENP is the sharpening of the strategic dimension. The Russians rejected the ENP by emphasizing that they rather prefer a ‘strategic partnership’. While the EU US bilateral talks have become a marking element in the transatlantic relations during the last decade, the new EU Russia strategic partnership illustrates even further the emergence of the European Union as a global player.
Case study: Kaliningrad The region ( oblast in Russian) of Kaliningrad is an exclave of the Russian Federation, with approximately 15100 square km and 1.3 million inhabitants, most of which Russians, but also with some Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians. The region is isolated from the Russian Federation by Lithuania and Poland and is currently a Russian enclave within the European Union since May the 1st 2004. Being surrounded with EU territory and yet being a part of the Russian Federation, Kaliningrad will be equally influenced by two systematically different political entities. The Kaliningrad oblast (the former Königsberg which was a part of Eastern Prussia before 1945), is currently one of the poorest regions in northern Europe, having the greatest number of people with AIDS per capita in Europe, a spreading organized crime, a collapsing economy and high unemployment etc. (Husmain, 2002). A short history of this Russian region comprises 700 years, a time during which Königsberg had been a part of Prussia and later by Germany, becoming a famous university centre and a symbol for the Eastern Germans. The Red Army has occupied both the city and the region in 1945 at the end of World War II. During the Cold War, the newly named Kaliningrad was to become a forbidden city fortress, strongly 17 militarised, the main northern strategic point of the USSR. Kaliningrad harbour, Baltyiska, was the main naval base of the Soviet fleet of the Baltic. Presently, the oblast cannot be separated from the Russian Federation for many reasons: it maintains a certain strategic importance for Moscow (the Baltic fleet is still anchored at Baltyiska, because other harbours are not available during winter); Russian’s territorial integrity cannot be disputed, and the last but not the least, Kaliningrad is inhabited mostly by Russians (the Germanic inhabitants have been deported out of the region after the Second World War). The paradox created by the geographical, political and economic alienation of Kaliningrad and the EU enlargement towards the east – the membership of Poland and Lithuania in this case makes the city and its surrounding region one of the important problems of the Nordic security and maybe even of the European security at the beginning of this century. Certainly, this problem will not involve only the Nordic states of the Baltic Sea, but especially two ‘Great Powers’ of Europe: the EU and Russia. Kaliningrad could be a test for the ESDP, and also for the new policy sanctioned by the European Council in 2003, the European Neighbourhood Policy. What perhaps does make Kaliningrad an excellent study case for the scholars of international relations (the literature approaching this subject is abundant, especially in the Scandinavian security studies but also in other research institutes even from southern Europe) is the fact that the presence of this Russian enclave inside Europe’s frontiers could lead to a collision between what represents inside and outside the Union, internal and external security dimensions (approached by different EU policies). On the other hand, reasons presented above claim a very strict border control that could isolate even further Kaliningrad. In turn, this could be perceived by Moscow as a direct consequence of the EU enlargement and could lead to freezing relations between the European Union and Russia, already marked by a relative mutual disappointment (Lynch, 2003). The internal/external security paradox consists in the fact that keeping good relations with Kremlin necessary in order to strengthen the Union’s external security, should mean a decrease of strictness in the frontier regime with Kaliningrad and even its partial integration, while this could undermine the internal societal security of the Union (Browning, 2003) . Undoubtedly, Kaliningrad became a security dilemma not just for the EU but also for Russia. Among the few practical results of the Action Plan of the EU on the Northern Dimension (2001), it was the formation of a committee with the purpose of studying the Kaliningrad problem. Russia introduced in its medium term strategy concerning the relationship with the EU (1991) a clause concerning the Kaliningrad oblast as a possible ‘pilot region’ in which a ‘special arrangement’ could be made between the EU and Russia (Vahl, 2001). Although the committee’s study concerning Kaliningrad was published, up to the present the results of the EU Russia negotiations concerning this problem are rather modest. The cooperation between them is still focused on some easier aspects to solve, Russian EU relations being still marked by mutual doubts. However, the remarkable stability showed by the northern region of Europe during the post Cold War years, makes us believe that the Kaliningrad dilemma will not feed a new European conflict.
The Southern Dimension Although there have been several attempts to institutionalise a ‘Southern dimension’ within the CFSP, the results of this have been relatively modest because the EU has focused for a decade on the enlargement policy toward Central and Eastern European countries. At the same time, the EU has been involved in the process of stabilizing and securing the Western Balkans and South Eastern Europe. The ‘Southern Dimension’ is not an accepted verbal construction in the EU official documents as is the case of the ‘Northern Dimension’. Only during the last years, the EU leaders, notably Nicolas Sarkozy, have proposed a more clear definition of the EU Southern Dimension. During his 2007 electoral campaign, Nicolas Sarkozy 18 came with the proposal of creating a Mediterranean Union that might bring together politically, economically and culturally the coastal states of the Mediterranean (Emerson, 2008). The proposal actually represented an alternative for Turkey’s accession. His proposal was widely criticized by other European leaders that expressed concerns about: the exclusion of other EU Member States from the project, the unnecessary duplication of institutions and financial programs etc. The proposal was refined in 2008 when the EU officially launched the Union for the Mediterranean, as a development of an earlier project, the Barcelona Process. This paper does not identify South Eastern Europe in conjecture with the Southern dimension (thing that could considerably emphasize the last one). Actually, the EU Balkan policies could be judged in the context of the Union’s policies on Central and Eastern Europe. Even Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria have been geopolitically identified in a larger concept of South Eastern Europe (see the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe), especially for their proximity with former Yugoslavia and their role in the crisis. In fact, the EU involvement in former Yugoslavia overshadowed its relations with the countries of Southern Mediterranean and from the Middle East, the ones that form in fact what I call the ‘Southern dimension’. Also, the weight of economic cooperation (especially concerning per capita foreign investment) with the so called CEECs has totally surpassed the weight of European investments in Northern Africa and the Middle East. However, just as François Heisebourg once noted, former Yugoslavia will not remain for long the main strategic focus of the EU in the region, and certainly not for its security and defence component ESDP. In fact, this strategic focus will slide more to the South, towards the Southern Mediterranean region (Heisbourg, 2001). This assumption was confirmed by recent documents of the European institutions and by the increasing role of the EU in the Middle East peace process. During the Cold War the Southern Mediterranean had been perceived as a secondary source of threats due to the alliance of some Arab states with the USSR (like Egypt, Libya or Syria), but also to the rising potential of horizontal escalation of regional conflicts (the fear of a Israeli Palestinian conflict escalation) (Albioni, 2002). The current threats to the European security, coming from the Mediterranean region do not result from using the state power of some nation states against continental Europe, but of the partial or total collapse of political authority exercised in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. 11 Other sources mentioned by many scholars are terrorism, lack of economic performance, control of the energy, demographic changes, migratory flows, Islamic fundamentalism, cultural differences, drugs trafficking, and the depletion of natural resources and proliferation of the conventional and non conventional weapons (Withman, 1998). This apparently bleak image is not quite different from that of other regions of the world. However, it is eloquent enough to illustrate the belief that this region is widely different (at least culturally speaking) from the EU to ever hope in attaining an integration level compared to that attained by the CEECs. 12 First of all, the Mediterranean currently divides two social, political and economic entities (Ortega, 2003: 90). There is a growing asymmetry between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, both in terms of economic development and of intra regional dialogue and cooperation. Even so, a hypothetical free trade agreement (let’s name it MEFTA – Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement) is not inconceivable for the future. The globalisation pressures (see the challenges coming from NAFTA, or APEC) and the economic power of the European Union could call it.
11 Javier Solana mentioned the economic stagnation, social discontent, and unresolved problems of the Southern Mediterranean region. 12 In fact, any country attempting to become a EU candidate has to fulfil at least three minimal conditions: to be geographically European, to be a democracy, and to be unanimously accepted by the other Member States (art. 49 TEU). 19 The European Union’s discourse regarding the area is ambivalent. In fact, according to Ulla Holm, there are two competing discourses present in every EU document on the region: a dominant view of the Mediterranean as a ‘conflict ridden’ zone and one viewing the area as a common sphere of shared identity (Holm, 2005: 13). According to Martin Ortega, the EU Mediterranean policy used to be based on three pillars (in fact four if we consider the neighbourhood policy) and five objectives (Ortega, 2003). 1. The EU stance on the Middle East conflict (beginning with the Venice Declaration of 1980) based on the ‘European approach’ opposed to the ‘realist approach’, supporting the peaceful resolution of conflicts based on regional cooperation; 2. The ‘Barcelona Process’ or the Euro Mediterranean partnership (launched in 1995) related to the first, and facilitated by the positive perspectives of the Israeli Palestinian peace process in 1995 13 ; 3. The Mediterranean dimension of enlargement related to Turkey as a candidate country in the complicated geopolitical context of the Middle East; 4. The European Neighbourhood Policy. The five principles mentioned by Ortega concern the two pillars of EU Mediterranean and are present in the Barcelona Declaration 14 and in the EU common strategy on the Mediterranean adopted by the European Council of Santa Maria da Feira (2000): negotiated solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (based on the existence of two independent states – ‘peace for territory’); the peaceful resolution of every disputes from the region (like Western Sahara, Cyprus, Israel versus Syria, the Western Balkans); the promotion of economic development (based on the association agreements, trade, economic reform and EU financial help); the establishment of a regional dialogue over the political, security, economic, social and cultural fields; regional rapprochement in all fields, respecting every state’s nature (Ortega, 2003: 92). In fact, the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ is not different from the other pillars of the EU Mediterranean Policy, since it is regarded as an advancement of the ‘Barcelona Process’. Today it is clear that the Mediterranean and the Middle East have an important place in the EU policies. It is also clear that the EU will play a major role in the evolution of these regions, due to the interdependent character of the relations formed between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries during history, including in what concerns security, especially in the post September 11 context. During the latest years, the European Union has played a pivotal role in the Middle East peace negotiations, essential for the security and stability of the whole region, which is sustained by these arguments: Facilitator of dialogue in the Israeli Palestinian peace process – by participations in the meetings of the involved parties, visits of the European leaders, of the European Troika or of the Special Envoy in the region; CFSP declarations and common actions supporting the peace process; Transatlantic dialogue and cooperation within the MEPP; A facilitator of the regional dialogue through the Euro Mediterranean Partnership; Signatory of the Euro Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability elaborated by officials from 27 states; Economic support: main donor of non military economic help for the MEPP and the Palestinian Authority, and the main commercial partner of Israel;
13 The Middle East Peace Process was launched in Madrid in 1991. 14 The Barcelona Declaration was adopted during the Euro Mediterranean Conference taking place in Barcelona between November 27 28, 1995. 20 Economic and financial cooperation with the MEPP involved parties through the MEDA program. The Middle East Peace Process is essential for the establishment of future relations between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean states. Still, the MEPP is a classical diplomatic process. However, the European Commission in its 2003 communication entitled ‘Wider Europe’s Neighbourhood’ launched the most important initiative of the EU in its relations with the states of the ‘Southern dimension’ (and not only them). This was lately developed in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The Commission’s ‘Communication’ of 2003 left the impression that it has as a long term objective the perspective of future EU accessions (of some neighbouring partners) or some particular forms of associations between the Union and these partners. The document presented at the European Council of Thessalonica talked about the establishment of an integrated market involving the EU and its friendly neighbourhood (a ‘ring of friends’) from Southern Mediterranean and the Northern and Eastern Dimension: “The establishment at pan European level of an open and integrated market functioning on the basis of compatible or harmonized rules and further liberalization would bring significant economic and other benefits to both the EU and the neighbourhood” (COM, 2003: 9). The ENP is a complex policy, in many respects perhaps too complex. The policy is inter linked with the EU Security Strategy based on Javier Solana’s strategy paper entitled “A Secure Europe in a Better World”. The ENP could be analysed also as a case study regarding the growing role of the European Commission inside the CFSP bodies. Among the most notable ‘successes’ of the ENP regarding the EU relations with the ‘Southern Dimension’, are the Accession Agreements signed with some countries in the area. Many developments are still uncertain making the ENP a still not yet tested policy. One particular concern still exists. The prerequisites of the neighbourhood policy make it more vulnerable to the complexity of incompatibilities existing between the states from northern Africa, Asia and Europe. Up to the present, mutual mistrust and cultural differences caused the demise of many pan regional initiatives involving the Southern Mediterranean, but most of them have been the victims of the serious governmental problems that the states of this region face, a field in which the EU can play a substantial role. Another element that still raises possible questions is the fact that many regimes of this area are not compatible with what we, the Europeans, perceive as democracy and rule of law. More or less, they are alienated from their subjects. And even though some elites are open for the prospects of modernization and democratisation, the foundations of the Islamic societies still rest on traditionalism, rejecting what we term ‘democratic values’.
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The Assessment of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the South Caucasus: What the European Union can do?
Irina POP
Abstract : The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is now the flagship policy of the European Union towards its neighbours. Although the ENP did not include the South Caucasus countries from the beginning, last years brought important changes in this respect. The development of the ENP in the South Caucasus can be understood as the result of the European internal debates, of the institutional corrections made by the European Commission and of the external events’ influence over the Union. The European Neighbourhood Policy still needs further improvements, especially concerning the Eastern neighbours. In this paper, I will try to assess the ENP in the South Caucasus, analysing the following aspects: the EU interests in the region, the bilateral relations before the ENP, the Action Plans, the EU’s assistance, the perspectives open by the Eastern Partnership announced for spring 2009. The paper will finish with conclusions and recommendations regarding the improvement of the ENP in the South Caucasus.
Keywords : interests, geopolitics, Country Strategy Papers, Action Plans, EU’s assistance, Eastern Partnership.
Introduction The 2004 and 2007 enlargements have brought the European Union (EU) much closer towards what is now conceived as the “new neighbourhood”, especially in Eastern Europe. Inspired by the existing legal and institutional arrangements and instruments, this policy was launched by the Wider Europe Initiative, from 11 March 2003. The document proposed that “the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co operative relations”. The European Union offered “the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital” (COM (2003) 104 final: 4). The objectives settled for the next decade are: to work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity based on deeper economic integration, intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross border cooperation and shared responsibility for conflict prevention between the EU and its neighbours; to anchor the EU’s offer of concrete benefits and preferential relations within a differentiated framework which responds to progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform (COM (2003) 104 final: 9). Although the Wider Europe Initiative offered few incentives about the ENP development, it was not received with much enthusiasm. “It was not clear which countries would be involved. It was not clear what would happen to existing contractual arrangements; or whether there would be extra money to support the initiative; or what programmes and policy areas would be open to the various countries; or who would draw up the proposed Action Plans and establish benchmarks for Progress” (Cameron, 2007: 107 108). The European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, from 12 May 2004, included the South Caucasus countries into the ENP. This covers: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, Ukraine and Syria. Already in 2006, there was a strong feeling about the necessity of strengthening the ENP. The European Commission produced a Communication with key improvements: enhancing the economic and trade component, facilitating mobility and 23 managing migration, promoting people to people exchanges, building a thematic dimension to the ENP, strengthening political cooperation, enhancing regional cooperation, strengthening financial cooperation (COM (2006) 726 final: 4 12). The 2007 EC Communication added other proposals: further economic integration; mobility; regional conflicts and political dialogue; sector reform and modernisation, in fields such as energy security and safety, climate change and environment protection, transport system; information society, education and human capital, employment and social development, health cooperation, maritime policy, regional policy (COM (2007) 774 final: 4 9). The European Neighbourhood Policy can have a positive impact at least in three areas: economic commercial cooperation, cross border cooperation and governance, but it is weakened at least by two factors: the neighbour states are poorer and more different than the Central European states, and the policy is not a satisfactory substitute for the statute of Member State. Therefore, the European Neighbourhood Policy has attracted extensive criticism. Different scholars have exposed the weaknesses of the policy and the limits of its effectiveness, such as: 1. Vague provisions in the texts, imbalance between the commitments of the EU and those of its partners, perception of non fulfilment of commitments already made (Nikolov, 2008: 30 31); 2. Weak performance in respect to the exertion of influence on autocratic regimes; oscillation between normative priorities and obvious strategic interests; budgetary constraints and competing regional priorities within the policy framework; structural weakness of the system of conditionality (Gebhard, 2007: 14); 3. Asymmetry, in terms of budgets and the distribution of ENPI between Eastern and Southern partner countries (Longhurst, 2008: 10), etc. The Country Strategy Papers, the Action Plans and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (2007 2013) begin to be evaluated. They must demonstrate their efficiency in motivating the neighbour states to political, economic and social reforms. The assessment of these documents for the South Caucasus will be made in the next sections.
The European Union’s interests in the South Caucasus The EU’s policy makers comprehend the South Caucasus region in many ways and their actions depend on the mental maps they use. The South Caucasus is associated with Europe, considering the presence of the European values and features in the region. Secondly, the South Caucasus is compared with the Balkans, taking into account the regional conflicts and ethnic issues. Thirdly, the region is perceived in the context of a broader energetic Caspian Central Asian region and, also, as a transit route to Europe. Fourthly, the South Caucasus is linked with the North Caucasus, subject of the Russian influence. Finally, the region is connected with the Middle East, (peace processes, Muslim factor, energy, and drug trafficking). The European Union is gradually beginning to realize the existence of important interests in the South Caucasus, although it does not articulate its interests in a clearly and coherent way. The European Security Strategy asserts that “[…] it is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region” (European Security Strategy, 2003: 7 8). The European Union’s interests in the South Caucasus refer to security, energy and democracy. Other regional challenges are: extremism, separatism, terrorism, territorial disputes, regional arms race, transnational organised crime, migration and environment degradation. Conflict resolution is a high priority on the European agenda. The territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan represents the classic example of “frozen conflict”. It has several implications. “First, conflict on Nagorno Karabakh is the major conflict which divides the region on two blocks and prevents Caucasus states from the trilateral security cooperation, in 24 which EU shows significant interest. Secondly, it prevents realization of the European vision of the regional and trans regional economic cooperation and transportation routes. Thirdly, it blocks democratization and reform process and thus European integration process. Fourthly, it leaves the ‘grey zones’, where the control over the illegal trade and activities is complicated” (Alieva, 2006: 13). In the EU’s vision, the settlement of this conflict constitutes a precondition to further European engagement in the region. The European Union’s growing interest in diversification of the energy supplies pushes it towards closer cooperation with the South Caucasus. The energy issue was constantly present in all the documents referring to this region: Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Country Strategy Papers, Action Plans, regional programmes and initiatives (TRACECA, INOGATE, Baku process). The consortiums built for the exploitation of the Azerbaijan energy reserves contain European corporations. Recently, the memorandum on EU Azerbaijan energy cooperation includes the development of the energy demand management policy, technical cooperation and the exchange of expertise, and stresses the importance of Azerbaijan as a producer and a transit country for the hydrocarbon resources. The South Caucasus, connecting two seas – the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, provides a convenient transit from the Central Asia’s oil and gas resources in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Europe. The promotion of democracy, human rights and cultural cooperation represents a constant and long term interest of the European Union all over the world. The application of the European or of the international financial institutions’ rules, standards and indicators, the visits made by European officials in the South Caucasus, the information campaigns about the European Union, can contribute to the harmonization of the cultural values, to the development of the mutual tolerance. The European Union can become a model of peaceful cohabitation of various ethnics for the South Caucasus. The efficiency of the European interests and objectives in the South Caucasus depends on the European Union’s capacity to understand the articulation of their foreign policies, to meet these countries’ expectations and to act strategically, not tactically, assuming a geopolitical approach. The foreign policy orientations of the South Caucasus states are quite different and the religion does not seem to play a major role in shaping the foreign policy. Armenia has closer relations with Russia and Iran, while the Armenian Turkish relations are almost non existent. It also has good relations with the United States and France. Azerbaijan cooperates with Russia, Turkey, Georgia and the West, but it has tensions with Iran in the Caspian Sea and regarding the Azeri minority in this country. Georgia puts strong emphasis on its relations with the United States, European Union, NATO and Turkey, but it has a deteriorated relationship with Russia. As we have seen, the South Caucasus is subject of rivalry between global powers, Russia and the United States of America, respectively between regional powers, Turkey and Iran. The European Union is a late actor in the South Caucasus and it has adopted more a neutral position. Some specialists asserted once that “although the EU spends roughly the same amount of money on Georgia as the United States (about $ 100 million a year), it does not think strategically about the South Caucasus”. So, “it has thus extracted much less leverage from its aid to the region than it could have” (Leonard and Grant, 2005: 6; 1). This is an extremely important observation. The European Union’s perception of the South Caucasus as “a region of the frozen conflicts” and the sensitiveness of the EU Russia relationship offered an excuse not to involve more in this area. But the European Union cannot avoid the geopolitical implications of enlargement, firstly because of its concentration of wealth and territorial extension, and, secondly, because it is perceived as a major geopolitical entity by its neighbours and Russia (Gomart, 2006: 7). The democracy versus stability dilemma still persists in the European thinking. A very strong emphasis on democracy promotion can determine the region’s political regimes to reject the European Neighbourhood Policy because their fears to lose the power. Secondly, the absence of the membership perspective to the EU is perceived as a major weakness of the ENP by these countries. Also, “by requiring readmission agreements as one of the main conditions for 25 developing the partnership, the EU is indirectly delimiting the frontiers of its neighbourhood” (Gomart, 2006: 12). This situation does not send a positive signal for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, because suggests that the Europe’s frontiers are permanently changing.
The European Neighbourhood Policy in the South Caucasus After the recognition of the South Caucasus countries’ independence, the European Union and its Member States remained weary of involvement during the regional conflicts in early 1990s. The exception was given by the roles of Italy, Sweden and Finland in the OSCE Minsk Group on the Armenian Azerbaijani conflict (Cornell and Starr, 2006: 11). The presence of the European energy corporations in the Caspian projects, such as British Petroleum, Total Fina Elf and Statoil, attracted other European countries in the region: France, Germany, United Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland. The visionary projects TRACECA and INOGATE further enhanced the importance of a relationship between the European Union and the South Caucasus. In this context, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) were signed in 1996 and entered into force in 1999. These agreements are based on the respect of the democratic principles and human rights, regulating the political, economic and commercial relations between the European Union and the partner countries. According to the PCAs, all three Caucasian countries have a bilateral Cooperation Council, Cooperation Committee and Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. Minor differences include the EU Azerbaijan cooperation having a Sub Committee on Trade, Investment and Energy, while the EU Georgian cooperation has a Sub Committee on Trade, Economic and Related Legal Affairs. Georgia joined the Council of Europe in 1999, followed by Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2001. The military operations in Afghanistan, in late 2001, increased European and American perceptions of the strategic value of the Caucasus corridor to Central Asia. In spite of this fact, in spring 2003, when the EU launched the neighbourhood policy, the states of the South Caucasus were left out. But in July 2003, the EU appointed an EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus, the Finnish ambassador Heikki Talvitie, followed in February 2006 by the Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby. The Georgian “Rose Revolution”, the economic growths of the three states and the pipelines projects (Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan and Baku Tbilisi Erzurum) determined the Brussels European Council of 17 18 June 2004 to include the South Caucasus in the European Neighbourhood Policy. But, “while Georgia is endeavouring to move closer to the EU, Azerbaijan is giving priority to a phased approach and Armenia currently does not view EU membership as a vital element of its foreign policy” (Nuriyev, 2007: 2). The ENP Strategy Paper, from 12 May 2004, asserts that “the European Union has a strong interest in the stability and development of the Southern Caucasus”. “The European Commission […] recommends that a decision be taken by the Council to include Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Each country should be given an equal opportunity to develop its links with the EU within this framework. The EU should consider the possibility of developing Action Plans with these countries in the future on the basis of their individual merits” (COM (2004) 373 final: 10 11). The strategy also emphasized the role of the increased efforts to promote the settlement of the conflicts in the region and to develop good neighbourly relations. “Cooperation should also be developed in the area of energy, as the Southern Caucasus is an important region both for the production […] and the transit of energy” (COM (2004) 373 final: 11). The Country Strategy Papers (CSP) for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia cover the period 2007 2013, being structured in the following chapters: objectives of bilateral cooperation, policy agenda of each South Caucasian country, descriptions of the political, economic and social situations, overviews of the past and ongoing EC assistance and the EC response strategies. They have been drafted with the view to identify the most appropriate “policy mix” for these countries, which implies ensuring coherence between all available EC external instruments. The assistance priorities are described in compliance with the individual Action Plans. The documents mention the priorities financed by the European Union, which can be 26 found in the National Indicative Programmes, too, emphasizing the complex character of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.
Action Plans (APs) The European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper asserts that “the Action Plans will be put forward by the Commission, with the contribution of the High Representative on issues related to political cooperation and the CFSP, following exploratory talks with the countries concerned. It is suggested that they be approved by the respective Cooperation and Association Councils” (COM (2004) 373 final: 4). The ENP Action Plans for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were agreed in 14 November 2006. They serve as a primary agenda–setting and benchmarking instrument for progressing EU relations with these countries. They are set to cover 5 years and they have a vague and neutral language.
Table 1: EU South Caucasus countries Action Plans’ priorities
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia 1 Strengthening of democratic Contribute to the peaceful Strengthen rule of law through structures, rule of law, including settlement of the Nagorno reform of the judicial system (e.g. reform of the judiciary and combat Karabakh conflict. penitentiary system, state of fraud and corruption. institutions). Strengthen democratic institutions and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in compliance with the international commitments of Georgia. 2 Strengthening of respect for human Strengthen democracy in the Improve the business and rights and fundamental freedoms, country, including through fair investment climate, including a in compliance with the and transparent electoral transparent privatization process international commitments of process, in line with and continue the fight against Armenia. international requirements. corruption. 3 Encourage further economic Strengthen protection of human Encourage economic development development; enhance poverty rights and fundamental and enhance poverty reduction reduction efforts and social freedoms, in compliance with efforts and social cohesion, cohesion, thereby contributing to the international commitments promote sustainable development the long term objective of of Azerbaijan. including the protection of the sustainable development, including environment, further conversion of the protection of the environment. economic and administrative practices. 4 Further improvement of investment Improve the business and Enhance cooperation in the field of climate and strengthening of investment climate, particularly justice freedom and security, private sector led growth. by strengthening the fight including in the field of border against corruption. management. 5 Further convergence of economic Improve the functioning of Strengthen regional cooperation. legislation and administrative customs. practices. 6 Development of an energy strategy, Support the balanced and Promote peaceful resolution of including decommissioning of the sustained economic development internal conflicts. Medzamor Nuclear Power Plant. with particular focus on diversification of economic activities, development of rural areas, poverty reduction and social/territorial cohesion; promote sustainable development, including the protection of the environment. 7 Contribute to the peaceful Further convergence of Cooperation on Foreign and settlement of the Nagorno economic legislation and Security Policy. Karabakh conflict. administrative practices. 8 Enhanced efforts in the fields of Strengthening the EU Transport and Energy. regional cooperation. Azerbaijan energy bilateral 27 cooperation and energy and transport regional cooperation (2004 Baku ministerial conferences’ objectives). Azerbaijan 9 Enhancement of cooperation in the field of justice freedom and security, including in the field of borders managements. 10 Strengthen regional cooperation.
The Action Plans have the following structure: 1. Introduction, 2. New Partnership Perspectives, 3. Priorities for Action, 4. General objectives and actions, 5. Monitoring. Firstly, there are mentioned the common provisions (principles), such as: conditionality on commitments to shared values (commitments to political, economic and institutional reforms as well as the approximation of laws, norms and standards of each partner country to those of the European Union) and responsibility in conflict prevention and resolution. “The level of ambition of the EU’s relationships with its neighbours will take into account the extent to which these values are effectively shared” (COM (2004) 373 final: 3). The Partnership perspectives can be: a stake in the internal market, increased scope and intensity of political dialogue, deepening trade and economic investment, lowering of tariff barriers, assistance for regional integration, enhanced dialogue on the movement of people, participation in the Community programmes, etc. There are a number of differences in the individual plans. Azerbaijan Action Plan has a reference to the political dialogue on security issues that affect the interests of both sides, while Georgia Action Plan includes provisions on: closer cooperation in justice, home affairs and border management, enhanced cooperation in energy, transport and the environment sectors, financial and technical assistance for compliance with the EU norms and standards. Concerning the priorities for action, the Azerbaijan Action Plan has 10 priorities in comparison with the two other Action Plans, with 8 priorities each. Some of the priorities for action are similar. Azerbaijan priority 1, regarding the peaceful settlement of Nagorno Karabakh conflict, is similar to Armenia priority 7. Armenia priority 3, which encourages further economic development; enhance poverty reduction efforts and social cohesion […], is comparable with Georgia priority 3, and Georgia priority 5, concerning the strengthening of regional cooperation, is similar to Armenia priority 8 and Azerbaijan priority 10. But even in these situations, the importance given to a certain issue results from its rank in the Action Plan. The Action Plans have few priorities beginning with the expressions “further convergence”, “further improvement”. These can be seen as an implicit recognition that the present Action Plans are perfectible frameworks. The EC Non Paper, from December 2008, is a proof of this fact. The document asserts that the successor documents should: more fully reflect the principles of differentiation and joint ownership and be based on partner’s own reform agenda; aim for greater precision, while offering the possibility of flexible adaptation to changing circumstances, and continue to be political (Successor Documents to current ENP Action Plans, 2008: 1). The European Commission will report on progress at regular intervals and will invite the partner countries to provide the necessary information for reports. The joint bodies established under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements will advance and monitor the implementation of the Action Plans. In conclusion, there are several inconsistencies in the Action Plans that need to be redressed. They are imprecise, cautious and not specific in policy operational detail, particularly with regard to political and social issues; they are not supported by clear indications of the incentives offered to the partner states and on what conditions; they provide no specific data or modalities for implementation (Comeli and Pacielio, 2008: 71).
EU Assistance 28 The European Community has provided assistance to the South Caucasus, between 1992 2007, through a broad range of instruments, the most important being TACIS, the Food Security Programme (FSP), EC Humanitarian Office (ECHO), European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Rehabilitation and Macro financial Assistance (MFA), Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) and Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) programmes. In the period 1992 2005, Armenia got more than 380 million EUR, Azerbaijan obtained almost 400 million EUR and Georgia received 505 million EUR in grants, according to the Country Strategy Papers 2007 2013. But the various assistance tools have failed to meet their objectives in terms of impact and have run into a plethora of bureaucratic and implementation problems. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which was announced through a Communication of the European Commission from 1 July 2003, is governed by a single regulatory framework, improving the EU’s performance in this area. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, approved for the 2007 2013 period, consists of: ENPI national allocations, ENPI Eastern trans national/regional programme, ENPI cross border cooperation (CBC)/Neighbourhood and Partnership Programmes, ENPI Interregional Programme (TAIEX, TEMPUS and the new Scholarship Programme), ENPI Thematic Programmes. The Governance Facility, with an indicative allocation of 50 million EUR a year for the period 2007 2010, would provide additional support to partner countries that have made progress in implementing the governance priorities in their Action Plans, while the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), with 250 million EUR, would support lending to ENP countries from 2008 on. (Com (2007) 774 final: 10) The Eastern neighbours have also access to the Democracy and Human Rights Instrument, Nuclear Safety Instrument and Stability Instrument. There are several observations to be made, regarding the EU’s assistance to the South Caucasus. Firstly, in terms of budgets (2007 2010) and the distribution of ENPI funds, the Southern neighbours gain proportionately more than those in the East, the rough formula being two thirds for the South and one third for the East (Longhurst, 2008: 10). Secondly, the ENPI funds for the South Caucasus are higher than the previous TACIS budget lines (2003 2006), but they do not reflect the European rhetoric on the commitments in the region. Finally, the Eastern neighbours are practically divided into two groups, from the financial assistance perspective. Within the Eastern neighbours, the South Caucasus countries receive considerably less funds than Moldavia and Ukraine. The bilateral dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy is obvious in the EU’s assistance towards the South Caucasus countries (ENPI national allocations). The National Indicative Programmes 2007 2010, for the states of the South Caucasus, define in greater detail the operations of the Country Strategy Papers, in order to guide planning and project identification by defining a limited number of priority areas, together with the objectives and results to be achieved. Comparing the priorities settled by the three National Indicative Programmes, we see that they are almost similar in content and financial allocations. The differences are represented by: the EU’s support for legislative and economic reforms in the transport, energy and environment sectors, in Azerbaijan, respectively the support for peaceful settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts (ENPI Armenia National Indicative Programme 2007 2010: 4, ENPI Azerbaijan National Indicative Programme 2007 2010: 4 5, ENPI Georgia National Indicative Programme 2007 2010: 3 4). The ENP Strategy Paper says that “the Action Plans will provide a point of reference for the programming of assistance to the countries concerned” (COM (2004) 373 final: 4). The Country Strategy Papers also assert that the EC assistance priorities have been identified on the basis of the priorities mentioned in the Action Plans. We have observed that the Action Plans’ priorities and the National Indicative Programmes’ priorities are not convergent. The individual 29 and differentiated approach of the Action Plans does not reflect in the similarity of the priority areas funded by the European Union. There were critics regarding both regional integration and bilateral relations in the ENP official documents, the latter being predominant. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument tried to respond to this challenge, but there still is a lack of coherence between its various programmes. The ENPI Eastern Regional Indicative Programme (2007 2010) will make available a total EC grant of 223.5 million EUR, having the following priority areas: networks (transport, energy, SME regional cooperation); environment protection and forestry; border and migration management, the fight against transnational organised crime, and customs; people to people activities, information and support; landmines, explosive remnants of war, small arms and light weapons (ENPI Eastern Regional Indicative Programme 2007 2010: 4). The Central Asian states, funded by the previous TACIS programme, have been separated from the South Caucasus countries, being covered by the Development Cooperation Instrument for the period 2007 2013. The European Commission have allowed the Central Asian states to take part in the regional programmes of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, especially in the energy and transport sectors (Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007 2013: 32). Table 2: ENPI national allocations Indicative budgets 2007 2010 for the South Caucasus
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Priorities areas Mil. Priorities areas Mil. Priorities areas Mil. EUR EUR EUR 1. Support for 1. Support for Democratic 1. Support for democratic Strengthening of Development and Good development, rule of law and Democratic Structures 29.52 Governance 30.00 governance 31.5 and Good Governance 2. Support for 2. Support for socio 2. Support for economic Regulatory Reform and economic reform, fight development and ENP AP Administrative Capacity 29.52 against poverty and 32.00 implementation 31.5 Building administrative capacity building 3. Support for Poverty 3. Support for legislative 3. Poverty reduction and social Reduction Efforts and economic reforms in reforms 39.36 the transport, energy and 30.00 38.4 environment sectors 4. Support for peaceful settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts 19.0 Total allocation 98.4 Total allocation 92.00 Total allocation 120.4
The ENPI Cross Border Cooperation programmes intend to: promote economic and social development in regions on both sides of common borders; address common challenges (environment, public health and prevention of and fight against organised crime); ensure efficient and secure borders; promote local cross border “people to people” actions (ENPI Cross Border Cooperation Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme 2007 2013: 5). The ENPI CBC programmes 2007 2013 have a total budget of 1118.434 million EUR. For the South Caucasus countries, the Black Sea programme is the most relevant, with a budget of 17.306 million EUR (ENPI Cross Border Cooperation Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme 2007 2013: 20; 29 32). The European Union considers that “the Black Sea basin faces considerable economic, social and ecological challenges. Frozen conflicts in the Southern Caucasus and wider regional security concerns continue to impede the social and economic development of these transition economies. Nevertheless, the Black Sea region and its links with the Caspian, plays a key role in the energy sector”. (ENPI Cross Border Cooperation Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme 2007 2013: 9) 30 The ENPI Interregional Programme will focus on: promoting reform through European advice and expertise; promoting higher education and student mobility; promoting cooperation between local actors in the partner countries and in the EU; promoting implementation of the ENP and the Partnership with Russia; promoting investments projects in ENP partner countries (Neighbourhood Investments Facility). For the period 2007 2010, it will have a budget of 523.9 million EUR (The ENPI Interregional Programme Strategy Paper 2007 2013 and Indicative programme 2007 2010: 2 3; 11). From the five ENPI Thematic programmes, the most relevant programmes for the Eastern neighbours are “Migration and Asylum” and “Non state actors and local authorities”.
Eastern Partnership (EaP) The conflict in Georgia, in August 2008, confirmed the vulnerability of the Eastern neighbours. Consequently, the European Council of 1st September 2008 asked that work for an “Eastern Partnership” to be accelerated. The EC Communication, from 3 December 2008, sets out proposals for an Eastern Partnership. This should bring “a lasting political message of EU solidarity” and should go further in order to “offer the maximum possible” (COM (2008) 823 final: 2 3). The Eastern Partnership will be developed both bilaterally and multilaterally. Deeper bilateral engagement brings many innovations. Firstly, the Association Agreements (AAs), superseding the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, will be negotiated with partners that are willing and able to take on the resulting far reaching commitments with the EU. Their content will vary and will be differentiated according to partners’ objectives and capacities, and their implementation will be facilitated by successor documents to the current ENP Action Plans. The European Commission designed a Comprehensive Institution Building programme (CIB), within the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, in order to improve administrative capacity in all relevant sectors of cooperation. Secondly, the Association Agreements will include the goal of establishing a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) with each of the partner countries that have joined the WTO. The longer term goal will be the creation of a network of bilateral agreements among the partners, possibly leading to the creation of a Neighbourhood Economic Community. On the other hand, the European Union will offer neighbours “Mobility and Security” pacts, including both the mobility aspect and the conditions required to ensure the secure environment. Fourthly, energy security continues to be a very important issue. The European Commission proposes: “energy interdependence” provisions in the Association Agreements; Ukraine’s and Moldova’s membership in the Energy Community; conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding on energy issues with Moldova, Armenia and Georgia; full integration of Ukraine’s energy market with that of the EU; enhanced political engagement with Azerbaijan as the only EaP hydrocarbon exporting country to the EU; participation in the Intelligent Energy Europe programme. Finally, the European Commission proposes: Memoranda of Understanding on regional policy; additional funding for the regional development programmes; participation in transnational programmes; extending of the ENPI funded cross border cooperation. (COM (2008) 823 final: 4 8) Multilateral cooperation will function at four levels: meetings of EaP Heads of States and Government at every two years; annual spring meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; four thematic platforms (democracy, good governance and stability; economic integration and convergence with EU policies; energy security; contacts between people) and their panels. Flagship initiatives, focusing on multilateral cooperation, can be represented by: Integrated Border Management Programme; SME Facility; Regional electricity markets, energy efficiency and renewable energy sources; Southern energy corridor and the Prevention of, preparedness for, and response to natural and man made disasters (COM (2008) 823 final: 9 12). 31 The innovations of the Eastern Partnership will require additional financial resources. The EC proposal asserts that the “fresh and reprogrammed funds will bring the total amount of resources devoted to the new initiatives […] to EUR 600 million” (COM (2008) 823 final: 13). We must point out few observations about the Eastern Partnership and its importance for the South Caucasus countries. The European Commission’s proposal is a very ambitious project. Firstly, although the European Union wants to enhance its European Neighbourhood Policy, offering a viable alternative to enlargement and sending positive signals to the Eastern neighbours, the Union must be realistic that its actions will have to be sustained a long period of time. Secondly, the Eastern neighbours are still learning to work with the existing programmes within the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. The fast and dramatic changes of the legal frameworks and assistance programmes can bring chaos into the ENP. Thirdly, the necessary amounts of money for the Eastern Partnership will be hardly obtained, considering that the EU Member States are facing now an important financial crisis. Fourthly, the Eastern Partnership is relevant for the South Caucasus countries especially in the fields of economic cooperation and energy security, but the issue of conflict resolution is not mentioned in the document, being a major weakness of this initiative.
Conclusions and recommendations After the enlargement of the European Union, the South Caucasus acquired greater importance for Europe. The inclusion of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the European Neighbourhood Policy represents an opportunity for both parts to develop their relations. The absence of the immediate prospect of membership represents a weakness especially from the Georgian point of view. Armenia and Azerbaijan have been much more cautious in the development of relations with the European Union. The specific documents of the European Neighbourhood Policy for the South Caucasus countries still have many problems to surpass. The unsatisfactory role of the European Union in the conflicts resolution from the South Caucasus, the asymmetry of commitments between the EU and these countries, the insufficient promotion of the mutual benefits, the absence of clear indicators and deadlines, the reduced assistance comparing to other EU neighbours and the complex bureaucratic processes, the insufficient coordination with other EU foreign policies, are just few of the ENP weaknesses in this region. On the other hand, the European Union should have a wider vision over the South Caucasus. The influence exercised by various actors, global or regional, the political parties’ orientations; the perception of the civil society over the European Union must also be taken into account. The perfect recipe for the South Caucasus is neither easy nor fast. The European Union and its Member States must be aware that the objectives pursued in the South Caucasus need time to be accomplished. The European Neighbourhood Policy in the South Caucasus is perfectible. Therefore, we make several suggestions in order to improve its outputs. 1. The European Union should be creative, flexible and realistic in its policy towards the neighbourhood. The EU should find other methods than replication of enlargement. The political, economic and social conditions of the South Caucasus countries, respectively the international context are much more complex than those of the Central European countries in the 1990s. 2. Because the European Neighbourhood Policy does not offer the perspective of enlargement for the Eastern neighbours, the European Union should identify other tangible benefits for these countries in order to motivate them to significant reforms according to the international or European Union’s standards. The Eastern Partnership can be a good initiative in this respect and can balance the situation between the Southern and Eastern neighbours. 3. The documents’ preparation for the South Caucasus countries can stimulate the consultations between the European Union and these states. The Partnership and 32 Cooperation Agreements’ joint bodies Cooperation Council, Cooperation Committee and Parliamentary Cooperation Committee can have a greater role in this process. 4. The EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus can have a greater role in the political lives of these countries and should collaborate more with the EU Special Representative for Central Asia. 5. The EU public diplomacy in the South Caucasus countries must be improved through: official visits, including the level of members of the European Parliament; information campaigns, in order to improve the perception of the European Union in these countries; transparent programmes of the NGOs in order to encourage civil society and governments’ trust; networks and think thanks between the researchers from the South Caucasus and the European Union; mobility of students; opening of European Institutes; encouraging the Member States to develop bilateral relations with these countries. 6. The successor documents to current ENP Action Plans for the South Caucasus countries should maintain the principles of differentiation and joint ownership, become clear and more flexible. The selective adoption of the acquis can be a solution when there are problems in the negotiating process. In time, with patience, the results can be the same. 7. Better management of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, inclusively through the strengthening of the multilateral approach and additional financial resources are needed for the achievement of the ENP ambitious objectives in the South Caucasus. The European assistance needs to be maintaining in the long term. 8. Thinking beyond the existing strategic framework and a clear identification of the ENP priorities in the South Caucasus are needed in order to establish different levels of involvement in the region and its limits. 9. The European Neighbourhood Policy must be congruent with other EU foreign policies: EU Russia “common spaces”, EU Ukraine relations, EU Central Asia relations, EU Turkey relations, Black Sea Synergy, etc. 10. The transatlantic relationship and convergent positions over the South Caucasus and Russia can strength the impact of the EU policies in this region. 11. The European Union should play a meaningful role in resolving the “frozen conflicts” from the South Caucasus. Possible mechanisms can be: proposals and participation in specific missions, push for a co chair position in the Armenian Azerbaijan conflict and the Georgian internal conflict. 12. The European Union should support the multilateral cooperation through encouraging accession to the international organisations. The EU OSCE relations must be revitalized and they can improve their coordination regarding the specificities of the South Caucasus. 13. Implementation of a European energy strategy and a more geopolitical thinking on energy questions are needed. The European Union should take advantage of negotiations with Turkey in order to ensure the security of pipelines. Memoranda of Understanding on energy issues can be negotiated with Armenia and Azerbaijan. The TRACECA and INOGATE programmes should be revitalized and the promotion of regional programmes within ENPI should be promoted with the Central Asian countries. 14. The European corporations involved in the Caspian region projects can be more consulted and protected. The signing of the Energy Charter Treaty by as many as possible actors should also be a priority for the European Union.
BIBLIOGRAPHY: 1. Documents: Commission of the European Communities (2007), A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy , COM (2007) 774 final, Brussels, 5.12.2007. Commission of the European Communities (2008), Eastern Partnership , COM (2008) 823 final, Brussels, 3.12.2008. 33 Commission of the European Communities (2004), European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper , COM (2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12.5.2004. Commission of the European Communities (2006), On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy , COM (2006) 726 final, Brussels, 4.12.2006. Commission of the European Communities (2003), Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument , Brussels, 1.7.2003. Commission of the European Communities (2003), Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours , COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11.3.2003. Council of the European Union (2003), European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World , Brussels, 12.12.2003. Council of the European Union (2006), Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan in the field of energy , Brussels, 7.11.2006. European Commission (2008), European Neighbourhood Policy: Economic Review of EU Neighbour Countries , Brussels. European Commission (2008), Succesor Documents to Current ENP Action Plans (Non Paper), Brussels. European Community (2007), Armenia Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013 , Brussels. European Community (2007), Armenia National Indicative Programme 2007 2010 , Brussels. European Community (2007), Azerbaijan Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013 , Brussels. European Community (2007), Azerbaijan National Indicative Programme 2007 2010 , Brussels. European Community (2007), Georgia Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013 , Brussels. European Community (2007), Georgia National Indicative Programme 2007 2010 , Brussels. European Community (2007), ENPI Cross Border Cooperation Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme 2007 2013 , Brussels. European Community (2007), ENPI Eastern Regional Indicative Programme 2007 2010, Brussels. European Community (2007), ENPI Eastern Regional Programme Strategy Paper 2007 2013, Brussels. European Community (2007), ENPI Interregional Programme Strategy Paper 2007 2013 and Indicative programme 2007 2010, Brussels. European Community (2006), EU Armenia Action Plan , Brussels, 14.11.2006. European Community (2006), EU Azerbaijan Action Plan , Brussels, 14.11.2006. European Community (2006), EU Georgia Action Plan , Brussels, 14.11.2006. European Community (2007), Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007 2013 , Brussels, 22.06.2007.
2. Secondary sources: Aliboni, Roberto (2005), “The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy”, in European Foreign Affairs Review, No. 10, pp. 1 16. Alieva, Leila (2006), EU and South Caucasus , Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research Center for Applied Policy Research, December. Avery, Graham and Nasshoven, Yvonne (2008), The European Neighbourhood Policy: Challenges and Prospects, Trans European Policy Studies Association, Brussels. Browning , Christopher S. and Joenniemmi, Pertti (2007), Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Danish Institute for International Studies, Working Paper No. 9, Copenhagen. Cameron, Fraser (2007), An Introduction to European Foreign Policy , Routledge. Cameron, Fraser and Balfour, Rosa (2006), The European Neighbourhood Policy as conflict prevention tool, European Policy Centre, Issue Paper 47, June. 34 Cianciara, Agnieszka K. (2008), Does the Strengthened European Neighbourhood Policy Restore the Balance Between Southern and Eastern Partner Countries? , The Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw. Cornell, Svante E. and Starr, Frederick S. (2006), The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe , Central Asia Caucasus Institute. Gebhard, Carmen (2007), Assessing EU Actorness towards its ‘Near Abroad’ The European Neighbourhood Policy, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht. Gomart, Thomas (2006), The EU and Russia: the Needed Balance between Geopolitics and Regionalism, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Paris, May. Leonard , Mark and Grant, Charles (2005), Georgia and the EU: Can Europe’s neighbourhood policy deliver? , Centre for European Reform. Longhurst, Kerry (2008), Injecting More Differentiation in European Neighbourhood Policy: What Consequences for Ukraine? , Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Paris. Meloni, Gabriella (2006), The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation ?, European University Institute. Nuriyev, Elkhan (2007), EU Policy in the South Caucasus: A View from Azerbaijan , Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, July. Tulmets, Elsa (2008), „The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Flavour of Coherence in the EU’s External Relations”, in Hamburg Review of Social Sciencies , Vol. 3, June, pp. 106 140.
Cross border cooperation – a strategic dimension of European Neighborhood Policy at the Eastern frontier of the EU
Nicolae DANDI
Abstract : Each stage of the enlargement policy, with each wave of new countries that joined the European Community, has brought new neighbours that are not only neighbouring countries of the recently adhered states, but also become neighbouring countries of a community with common legislation and “rules of the game”. The strengthening of neighbourhood relationships is accomplished through cross border cooperation within a more formal framework (euro regions) or direct contacts between authorities and citizen groups in border areas. By means of this article we argue that cross border cooperation becomes an important dimension via its role in the achievement of the ENP general objectives, which are established both by European documents of this policy and by Action Plans of the countries included in the ENP. External financial assistance through Neighbourhood Programmes for 2004 2006 as well as through the ENPI for 2007 2013 with cross border and inter regional Programmes are purported to draw the neighbouring communities close to European standards and cooperate for ensuring stability, security and prosperity on the entire European continent.
Keywords: Cross border cooperation, European Union, Neighbourhood Programmes, ENPI, frontier
The relationships between the EU and other states, either direct neighbours or not, are built on the basis of principles of friendship and peaceful relations, sovereignty and observance of the states’ integrity, acknowledged on the European and international level. In the preamble of the United Nations Charter signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, at the end of the United Nations Conference regarding the international organization, which came into force on 24 October 1945, is asserted the states’ necessity “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours”. Alan Henrikson observes that this provision from the Charter’s preamble in English version – “good neighbours” , in French version is formulated like “esprit de bon voisinage” (in English translation – spirit of good neighbourliness) whereas in Romanian instead of “ca buni vecini” it will be translated as “în spiritul bunei vecinătăŃi”. Some authors accept the idea that the “policy” and the “principle” of good neighbourhood is not a concept clearly and legally defined. The words used to formulate this concept do not fully express its meaning (Henrikson, 2000: 124). A terminological dictionary in international law admits that the concept of “good neighbourliness” (bon voisinage) “is not a precise juridical concept”, which would rather signify a spirit of reciprocity, understanding and confidence (Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international, 1960: 94). The attitude towards the EU neighbours in the context of the enlargement process, as well as their role in advancing the integration of the adhered countries, engendered discussions and concerns of the decision making factors at the Community level throughout the whole process of European construction. However, the concerns in this sense have known a remarkable impetus once with the EU enlargement eastward and with the substantial growth of the border between member and non member states. Beside the geographical aspect, a different role in formulating proposals with regard to neighbouring countries was performed by the economic factor, which invoked huge disparities on different indicators between 15 EU countries and 12 adhered in 2004 and 2007. Considering the desideratum of the EU enlargement policy to promote stability and prosperity beyond the EU borders, in 2002 there was launched an ample debate at the European 36 level regarding the establishment of a neighbourhood policy in a new context with more member states. Nevertheless, the countries benefiting from the future policy were not nominated, whereas the concept of neighbours was more or less clearly defined, and all this due to the vacillating character of these countries’ approach, to the lack of planning and of divergences of visions between the Member States (Delcour, 2006: 8). The idea of a more active policy of the EU towards the new neighbours, other than Russia, such as Ukraine and Moldova, was first proposed in 2002 by the ministers of foreign affairs of Great Britain and Sweden, because Ukraine and Moldova, alongside Russia and Belarus 1, were to become direct neighbours on the Eastern border of the Union after Poland and Romanian adhesion. On 11 March 2003 the European Commission presented the document titled “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” (COM (2003) 104 final) . According to the Commission, the geographical vicinity sets forth opportunities and challenges both for the EU and its neighbours, so that these neighbourhood relationships need to be approached with the idea of intensifying the cooperation in order to create an area of prosperity and good neighbourhood on the EU borders. The EU desires to create around itself “a ring of friends” with whom it will be able to establish a fruitful and peaceful cooperation 2. Since the launching of the ENP, there have been sought mechanisms by means of which this policy should be implemented so that to create a favourable foundation for promoting cooperation on multiple areas with neighbours. On 1 July 2003, the European Commission adopted the document “Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument” (COM(2003) 393 final) which proposed for 2004 2006 to launch the Neighbourhood Programmes as a forerunning stage for the creation in 2007 of the New Neighbourhood Instrument along with the launching of the new budget execution of the EU for 2007 2013 3. The Communication of 2003 envisages the creation of a New Neighbourhood Instrument for the promotion of cross border cooperation along the external border of the enlarged EU. However, considering the number of legal and budgetary questions to be resolved, the Communication sets out a two phase approach: 1) For the period 2004 – 2006 , Neighbourhood Programmes will be introduced, based on enhanced coordination among existing instruments. This implied the Commission’s adaptation of the INTERREG Programme taking into account the concepts of Neighbourhood Programmes and the geographic beneficiary areas, adding up the new eligible countries and regions (regions from the south part of Spain, France, Italy and Greece) and the allotment of financial resources for cooperation of Neighbourhood Programmes within the framework of CARDS, Meda and PHARE CBC on the Bulgarian and Romanian border with the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and West Balkan states for 2004 2006. 2) After 2006 , a New Neighbourhood Instrument will be established. The Communication of July 2003 provides that the New Instrument, which refers to the period after 2006, although with different agendas for different regions, shall: combine cross border cooperation with regional cooperation on the EU external borders that will ensure the continuity of some activities accomplished within already existing financial instruments and learn from their previous successful experience; combine the external policy objectives, including the geopolitical ones, with economical and social cohesion objectives; avoid the difficulties and the problems that could be met while applying previous financial instruments (COM(2003) 393 final). The communication provides that the Commission will put forth more detailed proposals about the New Instrument and will establish orientations for the next financial perspective, taking account of the conclusions of the Third Cohesion Report, which suggests that sharing
1 Although an Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between Belarus and the EU was negotiated in 1995, it did not come into force yet. As a result, in accordance with the rhythm of democracy edification in this country, the EU will start to apply the ENP mechanisms. 2 According to O Europă extinsă – Vecinătatea: un nou cadru pentru relaŃiile cu statele vecine din Est i Sud , DelegaŃia Comisiei Europene pentru Ucraina, Moldova i Belarus, Kiev, 2004, p. 4. 3 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/enp/index.htm 37 good practices and experience at the European level shall be promoted and supported by ways of organizing different networks involving regions and countries 4. The ENP objectives were established in line with the European Security Strategy (adopted by the European Council in December 2003) in order to contribute to stability and good governance in the immediate EU neighbourhood, although this document is being updated and adapted to the new geopolitical context. Within the adaptation framework of mechanisms of the ENP objectives achievement, on the 11 October 2004, the European Commission published the Regulation regarding the New European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Among the four neighbouring countries on the Eastern land border of the EU, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, only the last two countries have aspirations for European accession. The EU Russia relationships are based on a Strategic Partnership and it did not assert the intention of its accession to the EU, refusing to be included and treated as other partners in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Belarus is one of the 16 countries included in the ENP, but the president’s authoritarian regime and the massive Russian influence on this country do not allow the activation of collaborative mechanisms between this country and the EU, as it is happening with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. The establishment of good neighbourhood relations with the countries the EU has common border with is an EU priority included in all documents mentioned above, which constitute the normative framework of the ENP. However, bilateral relations between the countries on the EU external border with neighbouring countries are obviously the most important aspect that determines the collaboration degree from a double perspective, on the one hand, the EU and the Member States on the external border and, on the other hand, the neighbouring countries. The cross border cooperation between the EU and the Eastern EU Border States thus becomes a strategic dimension in the bilateral relations, especially with Ukraine and Moldova that continue their efforts to elaborate and implement reforms in the European accession process. Ensuring secure borders, cooperation regarding visas and illegal migration, cross border delinquency are just some of the highly important subjects in this cooperation format. The cross border cooperation of Ukraine with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and of the Republic of Moldova with Romania are border segments which would have to hesitate about their entrenchments, even if we admit for a medium or long term period the prospective of their EU accession. The EU Eastern border stretches between eight Member States and four neighbouring countries, from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea of approximately 5000 km; in the South East between five West Balkan states and six Member States; in the South between eight Member States and ten neighbouring countries, yet there is a prevailing sea border of roughly 5500 km. Both for Ukraine and for the Republic of Moldova the Neighbouring Programmes for 2004 2006 have made up an important stage in strengthening the cross border cooperation with the neighbouring countries members of the EU since 2004 and 2007, as well as an incentive for promoting reforms, assuming the experience and good practices of these countries. The Commission’s Communication of 1 July 2003 proposed a list of Neighbourhood Programmes for 2004 2006, based on the INTERREG and PHARE CBC Programmes, including for the future member states regarding the assistance on the EU external borders, in order that the borders of the wider Europe Union shall be covered. The table below presents the Neighbourhood Programmes for 2004 2006, wherein the Eastern EU four Border States were involved. Ukraine and Moldova, the two countries with the EU accession aspirations, participated in 4 and 2 programmes respectively.
4 Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion , p.xxxi, Available on: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion3/cohesion3_en.htm 38
Table 1. The list of the Neighbourhood Programmes (2004 2006) wherein participated Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova*
Neighbourhood Programmes Countries involved Nord (Kolarctic) Finland, Russia , Sweden and Norway Karelia Finland, Russia South East Finland/Russia Finland, Russia Estonia/Latvia/Russia Estonia, Latvia, Russia Latvia/Lithuania/Belarus Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus Lithuania/Poland/Russia Lithuania, Poland, Russia Poland/Ukraine/Belarus Poland, Ukraine , Belarus Hungary/Slovakia/Ukraine Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine Romania/Ukraine Romania, Ukraine Romania/Moldova Romania, Moldova Baltic Sea Germania, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Norway, Russia , Belarus . CADSES Germania, Italia, Greece, Czech, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Albania, Ukraine , Moldova , Serbia and Montenegro, Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
*Source: Communication from the Commission, „Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument” COM(2003) 393 final, Brussels, 1 July 2003, p.14.
As arises from the common programmes of each Programme for each one of the 4 states, there has been established the following eligible areas for participation. 1) Russia : Murmansk oblasts, Republic of Karelia, St Petersburg City and Leningrad, Pskov and Kaliningrad oblasts are eligible for cross border programmes. In the Barents regional co operation, Archangelsk Oblast and Nenets Autonomous Area (Nenzen Okrug) can also be included. In the Transnational Baltic Sea Programme, in addition to the above mentioned regions, Novgorod oblast is eligible. In all cases, no region outside the North West Federal District (Okrug) will be considered eligible. 2) Belarus : Brest, Grodno, Vitebsk as border regions, and Minsk oblast as given its proximity to the border. 3) Ukraine : Volynska, Lvivska, Zakarpatska, Ivano Frankivska, Chernivetska and Odesska Oblasts. For the Transnational CADSES programme regions adjacent to the border regions, e.g. Ternopilska oblast may be considered eligible. 4) Moldova: The whole of the Republic of Moldova is eligible. Each Programme established its priorities in accordance with each region, formulated however in the context of four major objectives set out in the Communication of March 2003, as follows: promoting sustainable economic and social development in the border regions; working together to address common challenges, in fields such as environment, public health, and the prevention of, and fight against, organized crime; ensuring efficient and secure borders; promoting local “people to people” type actions. Each Neighbourhood Programme drew up indicative budget allocations for the whole period (2004 2006), from PHARE and TACIS resources. 39 Aiming at effective co ordination and synchronization of the assistance instruments, existing in the field of cross border cooperation between the wider Europe Union and neighbouring countries, and at widening the geographical coverage from 1 January 2004 of PHARE Programme, including on the external borders of Bulgaria and Romania, the Commission amended the PHARE CBC Regulation (EC) No 2760 of 1998 (OJEC, 1998: 11) via Regulation (EC) No 1822 of 2003 (OJEC, 2003: 9). The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) financed the field of cross border cooperation in the EU border regions (including the ones on the external borders) since 1991 through INTERREG Programme. Within 2000 and 2006, the total allocated funds for financing the projects of the Member States as beneficiaries, on the EU external borders, made up approximately 230 million Euros per year. Within 1996 and 2003, for cross border cooperation within the TACIS Programme’s framework, 250 million Euros have been allocated, for such priorities as: border infrastructure; support for local and regional cooperation through TACIS Small Project Facility; support for environmental projects, for economic cooperation and for private sector development. Before the Instrument’s establishment, the EU external assistance in the field of cross border, sub regional and trans national cooperation had been realized through different community Programmes (TACIS CBC 5, INTERREG Community Initiative 6, CARDS 7, PHARE CBC 8, Meda 9), each financial programme instrument being regulated by a specific normative framework adopted by European institutions. For Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, the EU offered assistance for cross border cooperation through TACIS Cross Border Co operation (CBC) programme since 1996. A detailed Cross Border Cooperation assessment can be found in the Indicative Programme for 2004 2006 presented to the EU Member States at the TACIS Management Committee of 15 October 2003, which was adopted by the Commission on 21 November 2003. In line with programming documents of this instrument of financial assistance “The ‘proximity benefits’ include shorter transport costs and cultural linkages, which will certainly promote cooperation between border regions. Cross border cooperation contributes to the creation of greater opportunities for people in the border regions and enhanced regional cooperation can contribute to economic development and integration at the grass roots level as well as better mutual understanding and confidence building across the borders.” For the Republic of Moldova, and for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the Commission launched the “Regional Capacity Building Initiative (RCBI)” Project (COM, 2005). The main objectives of this project are: to build project and programme management capacity and skills in the regions along the eastern border of the Union stretching from Murmansk to Odessa;
5 TACIS CBC Programme supports the cross border cooperation on the western borders of the following countries: Russia, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and Belarus. The legal basis of the Programme is the Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 99/200 of 29 December 1999. 6 INTERREG Community Initiative is a financial instrument within the framework of the EU Structural Funds and supports the cross border and trans national cooperation between Member States and neighbouring countries. The financial resources allocated via the programme can be spent only on the EU territory. The legal basis of the Programme is the Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 26 June 1999 and INTERREG Guide III, Official Journal of the European Union C143 of 23 May 2000. 7 CARDS is an important instrument in the process of association and stabilization in West Balkans. The legal basis of the Programme is the Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000. 8 PHARE CBC Programme supports the cross border cooperation between the EU and candidate countries. For 2004 2006 this programme expanded its assistance to the external borders of Romania and Bulgaria. The legal basis of the Programme is Commission Regulation (EC) No 2760/98 of 18 December 1998. 9 Meda Programme supports regional cooperation between the countries from the South and East Mediterranean Sea. The legal basis of the Programme is the Council Regulation (EC) No 2698/2000 of 27 November 2000. 40 to raise awareness for the Neighbourhood Programmes in local areas along the entire stretch of the eastern EU border; to train and assist potential partners to prepare sound project applications under the Neighbourhood Programmes. The project’s assistance, especially relating to increasing European funds absorption capacity of potential applicants, was useful not only for Neighbourhood Programmes as a result of the completed trainings, but also for employing to the best advantage the financing opportunities in the field of cross border cooperation as part of the ENPI 2007 2013. Within the framework of the project, there has been created a database of organizations/institutions interested in developing partnerships and joint projects, available on the project’s Web page, which currently contains data about 2000 institutions (NGOs, local public authorities and other institutions). Although the project started off with 4 countries, at this time in the assistance and consultancy process, 15 beneficiary partner countries from the East and South have joined. The project will finish in December of 2009 10 . Nearly all the eligible regions in the Neighbourhood Programmes (2004 2006) of the four countries are members of different euro regions, where a certain experience and cooperation customs exist in formal or informal structures at the regional and local authorities’ level. The legislative differences between countries, political will and identification of common problems on both sides of the border are some of the aspects that explain the activism and cooperation degree for overcoming the problems from these euro regions. One of the most important factors that determine the collaborative relationships and the interest towards cross border cooperation between these countries is the concentration in border regions of ethnic groups or entire ethnic communities of neighbouring countries, taking into consideration the particularity of the relationships between Romania and the Republic of Moldova where the population share the same history, culture and language. Among the EU exigencies towards the countries on the EU external borders, the political will of these countries’ authorities is probably the most important factor that will dynamize and bring closer the communities on the common border. The tight cooperation between the Council of Europe and the Europe Union contributes to reconciling the legislative disagreements for cross border co operation between the EU states and the neighbouring ones and complies with the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (Madrid, 1980) and with two additional Protocols. The first and the most important operational instrument of the ENP is Action Plans. These documents are negotiated and signed between the EU and each ENP country, proceeding from the necessities and the capacities of the respective country and from the interests of each party country. The priorities identified and determined in Action Plans ought to be not only ambitious, but also practical, accurately formulated, so that they can be measured and the progress resulting from their implementation be monitored. There is a Strategic Partnership between Russia and the EU, whereas Russia is not included in the ENP. Belarus, although included in the ENP, does not participate in it yet. Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova signed the Action Plans with the EU in February 2005. The country reports presented by the European Commission in May 2004 were elaborated with the aim of identifying priorities which will be the focus of future Action Plans with the ENP countries, taking into account the Conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 14 June 2004 and the provisions of the Agreement on Partnership and Co operation (APC), previously signed with these countries. The Action Plans, in particular, have to contribute to developing cross border cooperation. The Republic of Moldova and Ukraine Action Plans pay special attention to their participation in the Neighbourhood Programmes (2004 2006) strengthening the cross border relationships in the cultural and socio economic field. At the same time, particular attention is also devoted to border management, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, the
10 More information about the project is available on: http://www.rcbi.info/pages/24_1.html 41 Transnistrian conflict being directly referred to. The EU Ukraine Action Plan provides that both the EU and Ukraine “are determined to work together, through the implementation of this European Neighbourhood Action Plan, to help ensure that no new dividing lines are drawn in Europe […] agreed to enter into intensified political, security, economic and cultural relations, including cross border co operation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution”. “Cross border co operation regimes on the EU external border have a function of ensuring security of the EU and of its member or accession states located on this border through resolutions and the prevention of potential conflicts between bordering counties” (Czimre, 2007: 78 89). Similar objectives for both state parties are included in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for 2007 2013 and National Indicative Programme (NIP) for 2007 2010. A particular significance of the Republic of Moldova cooperation with the EU and Ukraine lies in the establishment of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) 11 by signing on 7 October 2005 the Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission, the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Government of Ukraine on the European Commission Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and to Ukraine. Within the framework of EUBAM, on 1222 km of Moldova Ukraine border, more than 200 employees are working, among whom over 100 Customs experts and Border Guards from 22 EU member states, representatives of few CIS countries from the UNDP levy, and personnel from Moldova and Ukraine. The Mission’s experts are located within six territorial offices – Basarabeasca, Chisinau and Otaci, in Moldova, and Kotovsk, Kuciurgan and Odessa sea port, in Ukraine. On 24 October 2006, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe adopted the Regulation Laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006, 24 October 2006 ), proposed by the Commission, which constitutes the legal basis of the New Instrument with all its components. The document was published in the Official Journal of the EU on 9 November 2006 and in line with Article 32 of this document, it shall apply from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2013. Article 1, Title 1 of this document, establishes the general scope of the ENPI “to provide Community assistance for the development of an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness involving the Europe Union and partner countries 12 … Community assistance may be used for the common benefit of Member States and partner countries and their regions, for the purpose of promoting cross border and trans regional cooperation … The Europe Union is founded on the values of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law and seeks to promote commitment to these values in partner countries through dialogue and cooperation.” Article 4, Title I, of the Regulation of 26 October 2006 emphasizes three basic principles in the process of the ENPI objectives achievement: Complementarity, Partnership, and Co financing. These principles are justified, because, with regard to the first principle, the supported programmes and projects shall conform to national, regional or local strategic planning. The second principle underlies a normal establishment of partnership between the Commission and the beneficiaries, whereas the partnership shall involve national, regional and local authorities, economic and social partners, civil society and other relevant bodies. Considering the fact that the Commission’s support is partial, supplemental financial resources are necessary for carrying out the projects mentioned in the Applicant’s Guide for each programme.
11 www.eubam.org 12 Regulation of 26 October 2006 has an Annex with a list of partner countries that will benefit from the ENPI resources, as follows: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine and Russian Federation. 42 According to Article 6, Title II of the Regulation, the Community assistance within the framework of the New Neighbourhood Instrument will be implemented through: Country strategy papers and indicative programmes; Trans national programmes (projects between two or more partner countries at regional and sub regional level, in which the Member States can participate); Cross border programmes (refers to collaboration between one or more partner countries and one or more Member States, taking into consideration the regions on the external border of the EU where these are located); Other programmes referred to in Article 15 of the Regulation. Trans national programmes can also include measures of trans regional cooperation, which, under this Regulation, signify cooperation between the Member States and the partner countries regarding problems and subjects of common interest and can be carried on anywhere on the territory of the Member States and of the partner countries. There will be adopted Strategy Papers for each country and trans national programme, which not only will reflect the priority objectives for each country or region in accordance to contractual documents between the partner country (countries) and the EU, but also will be in line with the established principles of the Regulation. The strategies are established for a period of time compatible with the priorities set out within the policy and must contain multi annual indicative programmes, including multi annual indicative financial allocations. They also must be revised in a medium term period or when it is necessary in keeping with the procedure foreseen in Article 4 and 7 by Council Decision 468/EC of 28 June 1999. Under Article 7 of the Regulation, it is provided that “in establishing country and multi country programmes, the Commission shall determine the allocations for each programme, using transparent and objective criteria and taking into account the specific characteristics and needs of the country or the region concerned, the level of ambition of the European Union’s partnership with a given country, progress towards implementing agreed objectives, including those on governance and on reform, and the capacity of managing and absorbing Community assistance.” In addition, one or more strategies will be designed for cross border cooperation, which will comprise indicative multi annual allocations and territorial units eligible to partake in the programme, while the allocations will be determined by the Commission according to features characteristic to each border region, population of eligible area, other factors that affect the cooperation intensity and management and absorption capacity of the community assistance. According to Article 12, Title IV of the Regulation, for each Programme, action programmes shall be adopted, generally on an annual basis, on account of the Strategy, setting out the pursued objectives, the expected results, the management procedures and the total amount of financing planned. Additionally, they shall describe the operations to be financed and the amounts allocated for each operation; define the type of performance indicators that will be monitored, as well as an indicative implementation timetable. The Commission will adopt joint programmes for cross border cooperation, in accordance with Article 9 of the Regulation. The action programmes within country and trans national programmes and the joint programmes within cross border cooperation programmes shall be presented by the Commission to the European Parliament and Member States for their information. In line with Article 29 of the Regulation, the total amount of financing of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument planned for 2007 2013 is 11.181 billion Euros, out of which a minimum of 95% shall be allocated to country and multi country programmes and up to 5% to cross border programmes. We consider that 5% out of the total amount allocated to cross border cooperation projects is insufficient, even if, in this context, actions will be carried out within multi country programmes. Article 30 of the Regulation stipulates that the Commission shall submit until 31 December 2010 a report of the ENPI implementation for three years under the provisions of the Regulation adopted in October 2006, which regulates the legal basis of this Instrument, and, in due course, a legislative proposal introducing the necessary modifications to it. Taking into account the types of programmes through which assistance 43 within the ENPI will be offered, and correlating thematic objectives with geographic ones, the Commission established and adopted on 7 May 2007 the Inter Regional Programme, the Sothern Regional Programme, the Eastern Regional Programme, the Cross Border Cooperation Programmes and Country Programmes, establishing the Strategies papers of these programmes for 2007 2013 and their Indicative Programmes for 2007 2010. The financial assistance of cross border cooperation programmes as important mechanisms of the ENPI, according to the Strategy for 2007 2013, is ensured from two sources: from own financial allocations of the ENPI under Article 29 of the ENPI Regulation of 26 October 2006 and from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) under Regulation of 11 July 2006 (Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, 11 July 2006). Thus, out of 583.28 million Euros as indicative allocations for cross border cooperation programmes for 2007 2010, 274.92 million Euros come from the ENPI and 308.36 million Euros come from ERDF. But, for 2011 2013 out of 535.15 million Euros allocated indicatively, 252.23 million Euros come from the ENPI and 282.93 million Euros from the ERDF. ENPI Cross Border Cooperation 13 is a significant mechanism for accomplishing an integral part of the ENP and the Strategic Partnership with Russia. The Strategy for 2007 2013 regarding cross border cooperation programmes asserts general objectives of the EU in this field, examines the political agenda relevant to this cooperation and the socio economic situation in border regions of the partner countries, offers a general presentation about previous accomplishments in this field and includes the cross border cooperation programmes within the contents of other relevant cooperation programmes and policies. The cross border cooperation programmes for 2007 2013 defined four key objectives: To promote social and economic development in regions on both sides of the common border; To collaborate for addressing challenges in fields such as: environment, public health and the prevention of and fight against organized crime; To ensure secure and efficient borders; To promote cross border “people to people” actions. These programmes shall be edified on the basis of both cooperation experience and established structures within the first stage (2004 2006) of the Neighbourhood Programmes. The Strategy provides that programme’s partners establish and adopt joint cooperation programmes, which are put forward for the Commission and are adjusted to the provisions of the Regulation of October 2006 and to the Implementation Rules of August 2007. When these joint cooperation programmes are adopted by the Commission, they are submitted to the European Parliament and the Member States. The cross border cooperation programmes will offer assistance to relevant European policies that produce major effects in considered regions and acquire indicators through concrete actions, with strategic repercussions on the population of the EU border regions with partner countries. Among priority fields, the Strategy for 2007 2013 distinguishes: issues related to trade policy, including the regulation for local border trade along the EU’s external border; the Schengen acquis, including the Schengen Facility that offers support for the new Member States for border investments; migration policies, visa issuing, illegal migration and the fight against organized crime; operational cooperation coordinated by FRONTEX 14 and Europol;
13 ENPI Cross Border Cooperation, Strategy Paper (2007 2013) and Indicative Programme (2007 2010), available on: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_cross border_cooperation_strategy_paper _en.pdf 14 FRONTEX Agency is an institution with juridical personality that became operational on 3 October 2005, with the headquarters in Warsaw (Poland). Its staff totals around 164 employees who contribute to the implementation and the gradual development of the EU’s Integrated Border Management System. The Agency is managed by an executive Director and an Administrative Council composed by 44 environment and maritime policy, including external dimensions of fisheries policy. For 2007 2010 the Indicative Programme defines the geographical areas and regions’ eligibility within the programmes, as well the objectives and the expected results from 15 cross border cooperation programmes, among which – 9 land border programmes, 3 sea crossing programmes and 3 sea basin programmes. In Table 2, there are listed the programmes and the indicative allocations for each cross border cooperation programme within the ENPI for 2007 2013. The four countries on the Eastern border of the EU (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova) are involved in almost all these programmes: The Baltic Sea Region Programme (adopted on 21 December 2007), the Romania Ukraine Republic of Moldova Programme (adopted on 29 July 2008), the Hungary Slovakia Romania Ukraine Programme (adopted on 23 September 2008), the Poland Belarus Ukraine Programme (adopted on 6 November 2008), the Black Sea Programme (adopted on 27 November 2008), the Lithuania Poland Russia Programme (adopted on 17 December 2008), the Estonia Latvia Russia Programme (adopted on 17 December 2008), the Latvia Lithuania Belarus Programme (adopted on 18 December 2008), the Kolarctic Russia Programme (adopted on 19 December 2008), the South East Finland Russia Programme (adopted on 19 December 2008), the Karelia Russia Programme (adopted on 22 December 2008).
Table 2. Indicative allocations for each cross border cooperation programmes within the ENPI for 2007 2013 Land Border programmes 2007 2010 2010 2013 2007 2013
(mil. Euro) (mil. Euro) Total (mil. Euro) Kolarctic/Russia 14.728 13.513 28.241 Karelia/Russia 12.101 11.102 23.203 SE Finland/Russia 18.871 17.314 36.185 Estonia/Latvia/Russia 24.915 22.859 47.775 Latvia/Lithuania/Belarus 21.766 19.970 41.737 Lithuania/ Poland /Russia 68.908 63.222 132.130 Poland/Belarus/Ukraine 97.107 89.094 186.201 Hungary/Slovakia/Ukraine/Romania 35.796 32.842 68.638 Romania/Moldova/Ukraine 66.086 60.632 126.718 See Crossing programmes Spain/Morocco 81.738 74.993 156.732 CBC Atlantic Programme 16.773 15.389 32.162 Italia/Tunisia 13.138 12.054 25.191 Sea Basin programmes Black Sea 9.025 8.281 17.306 Mediterranean Sea 90.539 83.068 173.607 Baltic Sea region (ENPI’s 11.791 10.818 22.608 contribution to the Baltic Sea integrated programme) Total 583.283 535.152 1.118.434 *Source : ENPI Cross Border Cooperation, Strategy Paper (2007 2013) and Indicative Programme (2007 2010), p. 29.
a representative of each Member State and two representatives of the European Commission. See: Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union L 349, 25.11.2004, pp. 1 11. More information about FRONTEX is available on: http://www.frontex.europa.eu 45 Besides the cross border cooperation programmes, opportunities will be created for projects with cross border impact – ENPI Eastern Regional Programme and the Black Sea Basin Cooperation Programme. All four countries on the Eastern land border of the EU will participate in these two programmes. ENPI Eastern Regional Programme covers seven countries from the Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus included in the ENPI (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia). The Strategy and the Indicative Programme adopted formally by the Commission on 7 March 2007 for these countries complement the Strategies and Indicative Programmes of each one of these countries and, therefore, they ought to be regarded on the whole. The Regional Strategy was developed in the process of establishment, through consultancy with partner countries’ authorities, the EU Member States and other donating institutions. The main objective of the EU cooperation in this region, according to the Strategy of this programme for 2007 2013, is to develop and increase the established relationships, proceeding from previous cooperation levels to a gradual economic integration, in addition to intensifying the cooperation at the political level. The Assistance to the Eastern Regional Programme within the ENPI will be focused on 5 priority areas included in the Regional Indicative Programme for 2007 2010: Creating networks (in fields such as transport and energy), regional cooperation at the level of Small and Medium Enterprises; Environment protection and forestry; Border and migration management, the fight against trans national organized crime, and Customs; “people to people” activities, information and support. The EU assistance for the whole period covered by the Strategy, through this Programme, aims at strengthening the collaborative relations between countries in the region and between them and the EU, supplementing the assistance provided at the national level through the one at the regional level. On the whole, they shall contribute to the ENP implementation and the Strategic Partnership on the four common areas of cooperation between the EU and Russia. In order to ensure the continuity of the Regional Cooperation Programme for 2000 2006 and the assistance of the TACIS Regional Programme, five Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) 15 can as well benefit from the assistance within the Eastern Regional Programme under Article 27 of the Regulation regarding the ENPI of 26 October 2006. The Indicative Programme for 2007 2010 of the Eastern Regional Programme within the ENPI earmarked allocations of 223.5 million Euros. Another programme within the framework of the ENPI, which raises a possibility for regional and cross border cooperation of the Republic of Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, is the Black Sea Basin Cooperation Programme for 2007 2013. The EU policy in the Black Sea region was stated through the Communication from the Commission on 11 April 2007 – Black Sea Synergy – a new Regional Cooperation Initiative (COM(2007) 160 final, 11.04.2007) . In accordance with this document, the Black Sea region includes Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and West Moldova, Ukraine and Russia in North, Georgia, Armenia and East Azerbaijan, and South Turkey. Although, Armenia, Moldova and Greece are not littoral states, history and geographical proximity make them natural regional actors. The objectives set out in the programme for this region are, as follows: Sharing experience and good practices between the countries in the region; Introducing common standards for saving and exchanging information; Increasing political involvement for avoiding regional conflicts, and addressing ongoing regional conflicts;
15 The respective countries are considered in the Development and Cooperation Instrument for Central Asia Regional Strategy. Thus, two instruments of the EU assistance are intercalated coherently in this region. 46 Supporting regional transport cooperation and construction of new energy infrastructure; Facilitating the development of contacts between communities, cities, universities, cultural institutions, civil society organizations in the Black Sea region; Establishing a strategic environment cooperation, enhancing the implementation of multilateral environment agreements in the region; Supporting the cooperation between the countries in the region in the social, scientific fields, strengthening cross border cooperation. This programme was established on account of both socio economic reasoning, by the fact that five countries in the region are member states of the ENP, for which the EU has specific cooperation mechanisms, and political and geopolitical reasoning, by Romanian and Bulgarian accession to the EU on 1 January 2007 – a fact that leads to cooperation in the field of regional security. From a financial point of view, the EU will support the achievement of the objectives mentioned above by use of the resources of the national, regional and cross border cooperation programmes under the ENPI, and by other instruments of the EU external assistance, as well, for the Member States, by the European Regional Development Fund. In this sense, the regional activities of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, and the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (with the headquarters in Thessaloniki) can offer new possibilities for the creation of common funding mechanisms. The total budget of the programme is approximately 17 million Euros. On 19 June 2008, the European Commission published a Report on the first year of implementation of the Black Sea initiative, in which the efforts of the party countries in the region are appreciated for the fulfilment of common objectives and interests for the EU and the partner countries (candidate or participating in the ENP) (COM(2008) 391 final, 19.6.2008). The EU policy in the Black Sea region takes on a particular importance by the fact that this region becomes a new strategic border for Europe, Russia and the United States of America, in terms of energy security, frozen conflicts, trade ties, migration and other key policies. The Black Sea Synergy brings the EU closer to the ENP’s partners and to Russia, especially that the EU has gained in general a positive collaborative experience with Russia in North in the Baltic Sea region, and would like to develop similar cooperation in the Black Sea Basin (Emerson, 2008: 265). The EU policy in this region and Georgia and Ukraine’s aspirations to adhere to NATO raises questions regarding the expansion, on the one hand, of these two organizations, and the opposition, on the other hand, of Russia to this issue. In addition to the financial assistance through the programmes mentioned above, the neighbouring countries on the EU Eastern border will benefit from the financial assistance through country programmes. Thus, according to the indicative multi annual allocations from the EU for 2007 2010 for country Programmes within the ENPI, the four countries are allotted: Ukraine – 494 million Euros, the Republic of Moldova – 209.7 million Euros, Russian Federation – 120 million Euros, Belarus – 20 million Euros 16 . An important problem, which impedes or explains certain aspects of cross border cooperation between border localities, lies in the free movement of people, in particular the visa problem. The advancement of the accession process of the adhered countries in 2004 and in 2007 required from them certain reforms with concern to ensuring secure borders from the perspective of accession to the Schengen space. Nearly all countries that adhered to the EU in May 2004 adhered to the Schengen space in December 2007, whereas the other two countries that joined the EU in January 2007 will adhere to the Schengen space in March 2011. Since 2000, at the EU inquiry, candidate countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania had to set up a visa regime with their neighbouring non candidate countries – Russia, Moldova and Ukraine. The effects can be truly understood only when we take account of historic, cultural, linguistic and economic ties between these countries (Jileva, 2002: 686 700).
16 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/0703_enpi_figures_en.pdf 47 A particular case is the Kaliningrad Region of Russian Federation, which has a 206 km borderline with Poland and 227 km borderline with Lithuania. As an objective set out by the Action Plans within the ENP and the Strategic Partnership, the EU signed Agreements on visa facilitation with Russia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. For Russia, it came into force in June 2007, while for Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova – in January 2008. The visa problem is tightly bound to the problem of border and migration management. With the aim of securing the EU external borders, the Commission proposed to create a European Border Surveillance System – EUROSUR FRONTEX, which shall give an analysis of risks in order to determine the areas of Member States’ external borders that need to be covered by a national surveillance system, a comparison between this analysis and the plans presented by the Member States, and an infrastructure report regarding the existing surveillance and the one necessary in selected neighbouring countries. The EU considers that the application of the surveillance instruments can provide the Member States’ authorities with up to date, functional and less expensive information about external border and pre border areas surveillance (COM(2008) 68 final, 13.02.2008). In 2009, depending on the recommendations of the Member States, the Commission shall put forward to the European Parliament and the Council of Europe information about the measures to be undertaken for achieving the objectives established by the Commission. In conclusion, it ought to be mentioned that, if in the South the EU has a natural definite border, in the East it is provisional and is subject to debates not only in political environment, but also in the academic one, in the context of the question – to what extent will the EU be enlarged? Among the four countries on the EU Eastern border – Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova (Dandi , 2008: 17 32), only the last two countries nurture EU accession aspirations and are active within the European Neighbourhood Policy. Proceeding from the ENP objectives to build in the EU neighbourhood “a ring of friends”, a space of stability, security and prosperity, this thing can be achieved specially through advanced political and economic relations with neighbours. The relationship improvement with them begins with the political will of the party countries and multiple cross border cooperation projects at the level of border communities, between the citizens of these communities, either belonging to an ethnic group or not. Russia’s endeavours to maintain its influence both in Moldova and Ukraine delay the accession process of these countries to the EU. The cross border cooperation effects on the EU Eastern border transform the cooperation field between border regions in strategic dimensions of the ENPI not only for 2007 2013, but also for a longer term period, taking into account the geopolitical and geo economic factors. Although, the results obtained within the Neighbourhood Programmes for 2004 2006 were modest, without a major cross border impact, they will build the foundation for a more fruitful cooperation within the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for 2007 2013 at the level of bilateral and multilateral relations. Relatively insufficient funds available for these programmes did not allow the establishment and the implementation of big projects in the field of infrastructure. However, even if only partially, they succeeded in establishing cooperative relationships between the territorial administrative units and the organizations in the border regions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY: Czimre, Klára (2007), “Cross border co operation in Europe: scientific research”, In: Eurolimes, vol. 4, Oradea University Press, pp.78 89. Communication from the Commission: Paving the way for a New Neighborhood Instrument , COM(2003) 393 final, Brussels, 1 July 2003, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_393_en.pdf Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Black Sea Synergy a new Regional Cooperation Initiative, COM(2007) 160 final, Brussels, 11.04.2007, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_160_en.pdf 48 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Report on the first year of implementation of the Black Sea Synergy. COM(2008) 391 final, Brussels.19.6.2008, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/blacksea/index_en.htm Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions , Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) , COM(2008) 68 final, Bruxelles, 13.02.2008. Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund , OJ L 210, 31.7.2006. Dandi , Nicolae (2008), Perspectives of cross border cooperation of the Republic of Moldova within the frameworks of the ENPI (2007 2013), In: EuroEconomica , issue 1(20), p.17 32. Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international ( 1960), Paris: Libraire du Recueil Sirey. Delcour, Laure. La politique de voisinage et les relations russo europeennes: partenariat strategique ou lutte d’influence? 30.03.2006, p.8. in Revue en ligne „Etudes Europeennes”, available at: www.etudes europeennes.fr Emerson, Michael. The EU’s New Black Sea Policy (2008) In: Hamilton, Daniel and Mangott, Gerhard (eds.), The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives . Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations. ENPI, Cross Border Cooperation, Strategy Paper 2007 2013, Indicative Programme 2007 2010, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_cross border_cooperation_ strategy_paper_en.pdf ENPI Cross Border Cooperation, Strategy Paper (2007 2013) and Indicative Programme (2007 2010), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_cross border_cooperation_strategy_paper_en.pdf ENPI Eastern Regional Programme, Strategy paper (2007 – 2013), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_eastern_rsp_en.pdf; ENPI Eastern Regional Indicative Programme (2007 – 2010), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_eastern_rip_en.pdf European Commission (2005), Neighbourhood programmes 2004 2006 Electronic Newsletter , Issue 3, july 2005, available at: http://www.cadses.net/media/files/np_newsletter3_07 05.pdf European Commission, „ Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours ”, COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, , available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf Henrikson, K. Alan. Facing across Borders: The Diplomacy of Bon Voisinage . In: International Political Science Review , Vol.21, No.2, April 2000, pp.121 147. Jileva, Elena. Visa and free movement of labour: the uneven imposition of the EU acquis on the accession states. In: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol.28, No.4, October 2002, pp.686 700. Phare CBC Regulation (EC) No 2760, Official Journal of the European Union L 375, 23.12.1998. Regulation (EC) No 1822, Official Journal of the European Union L 267, 17.10.2003. Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument , Official Journal of the European Union L 310/1, 9.11.2006, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/oj_l310_en.pdf O Europă extinsă – Vecinătatea: un nou cadru pentru relaŃiile cu statele vecine din Est i Sud, DelegaŃia Comisiei Europene pentru Ucraina, Moldova i Belarus, Kiev, 2004. Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion , p.xxxi, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion3/cohesion3_en.htm
The EU's relations with the Transcaucasian Countries within the scope of the ENP
Sinem KOCAMAZ
Abstract: The geopolitical reconfigurations in Europe after the EU enlargement brought into European Agenda some issues that will fundamentaly infuence the East West relations, in term of politics, economics and security. The proximity of Caucasian states to EU makes possible different scenarios on cooperation and mutual influence. The main reason that turn EU’s attention to this region is based on the great potential of oil and gas in a context where EU wants to develop alternative routes of energy in order to “escape” from Russia’s influence. Therefore, the EU has taken major initiatives within its European Neighbourhood Policy in order to generate the political environment that can allow common projects and investments.
Keywords: Neighbourhood, Caucas, policies, energy, partnership, strategy, cooperation
Introduction One of the important issues shaping the agenda of the EU is the Neighbourhood Policy which was adopted in 2004 and the relations with the Transcaucasian countries which are in the scope of this policy. The EU, for the need of diversifying its energy supply; for sustaining the stability and security in its borders; for preventing the regional conflict nearby; for developing the infrastructure of commercial and transportation routes and for providing security, increased its interest on the region of Transcaucasia and needed to readjust its relationships with the countries of the region within the scope of the Neighbourhood Policy. The Neighbourhood Policy put the former relationships with the Union into a more concrete ground and a road map was tried to be written for the regional governments by means of Action Plans. The aim of this study is to analyse whether the EU's Neighbourhood Policy will play a significant role in the rearrangement of the relationships with the countries of the region in the future and to examine to what extent this policy could be an alternative for the countries like Georgia which aims for the EU membership. In this sense, the study will try to evaluate whether the EU, whose former relations with the region were very limited, will develop a new initiative with the Neighbourhood Policy; to what extent the countries of the region attach importance to close relations with the EU and what developed relationships with the EU will gain these countries and how it will affect their historical bonds. In the study, while looking for answers to these questions, we will try to analyse what the region and its countries mean to the European Union. We will also examine how the relationships with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are arranged within the scope of the Neighbourhood Policy; the changes brought by the policy and the general perceptions of the countries towards it. Moreover, in terms of determining the scope of the EU's sphere of influence, the other two effective actors in Caucasia: the US's and Russia's roles in the region will also be evaluated. In the following section, the evaluation of the EU's bilateral relationships with the countries is the main source of analysis. In this sense, each country's Action Plan's contents will try to be examined and the perspectives, demands and critics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia are analysed in terms of their internal political dynamics. In the concluding remarks, in the light of all these data, the present day and the future of the relationships between the EU and the Transcaucasian countries will be evaluated.
50 The Importance of Transcaucasia for the EU Caucasia has become a region of increasing importance in terms of both economy and security but also of different possibilities of conflict. The US, Iran, Turkey, Russia and the EU are involved in the processes of conflict and democratisation; they are playing important roles for preventing conflicts and sustaining stability in the region. However, it would not be wrong to say that these actors have diverse interests and strategies in the region. The main determinant factors for the region are economic (oil) and ongoing conflicts. When assessing the importance of the region for the EU, geopolitics is the primary element. “It is not possible to neglect such a region that is in the middle of Russia, Central Asia, Iran and Turkey and also next to Caspian Sea. The region is in the intersection point of very different balances. Russia, despite having lost its former strength, is an important world power. Central Asia, which is a new subregion like Transcaucasia, is in the point of determining its relationships with Russia. Iran is a significant power of the Middle East and its relations with the US could reflect as diverse polices in terms of the Europe” (Demir, 2003: 364). The EU expanded its borders to the Black Sea in the last enlargement process and became neighbour with a region where the mentioned powerful countries are acting. Therefore, current conflicts, possible instabilities, the different actor's strategies in the region and their relations with each other became more important in terms of the security of the EU. In the meantime, the most important aspect of the Transcaucasian Region for the EU is the rich energy resources of the Caspian and its role as a bridge in the transportation of this wealth. The EU Commission stated that if necessary precautions are not to be taken, the Union's current energy demand of 50% will rise to 70% in the upcoming years (Eigenhofer, 2001). The price of external dependency in the energy sector for the EU is quite high. The EU, which consumes 16% of the world energy supply, is the second largest consumer of energy in the world. If current policies continue, it is estimated that the Union's oil import rates will reach to 90%. According to the 2006 statistics of, the EU’s oil production accounts only for 2.8% of the world, yet the consumption of is as high as 18.2%. In terms of coal production, the EU has a share of 3.9%, while it produces 34% of the coal in the world 1. As these statistics show, the EU's energy demand is high but its reserves and production are limited. For instance, only 8% of the world’s oil reserves, 12% of natural gas reserves and 3% of coal reserves are in the EU. Moreover, these reserves' production costs are above the world average. The Union's most considerable oil reserves are in the North Sea but their improvement costs are high. This entire picture brings together the dependency on imports (Pamir, 2005:75 79). The EU imports oil from OPEC countries (51%), from Norway (21%), and from Russia and the Community of Independent States (18%) (Pamir, 2005: 75 79). The EU sustained the resource diversification in the oil imports but in terms natural gas, its import rates are increasing, additionally import is sustained from few countries, so a risky situation appears in the context of supply security. Especially, the dependency on Russia is in serious proportions. The International Energy Agency estimates that current natural gas imports of the EU, which is approximately 200 billion m 3 will triple and rise to 632 billion m 3 in the year 2030. In this sense, the wealth of the Caspian region is quite important for the EU in terms of resource diversification. Another important factor in the relations between Transcaucasia and the EU is the region's stability and security. The solution of the problems of the three significant conflict zones, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh and Southern Ossetia are vital in that matter. A poor, unstable region in the conflicts could negatively affect the future plans of the EU. Considering the fact that drug dealing, international crimes and possible wars and conflicts in its neighbourhood could occur in the long term; this could result in very unfavourable
1http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statisti cal_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_f ull_report_2007.pdf 51 consequences for the EU. For that matter, the EU is working to solve the conflicts, sustaining economic development, the importance of democratic institutions, and the support of infrastructure with several projects and the necessity of developing civil dialogue with the regional countries. The EU, since it cannot propose membership to Armenia and Georgia in the short term, should find new appealing instruments. Throughout the 90s, the EU acted in the same manner with the Transcaucasian countries as it did with other former Soviet countries. The political relations with the regional countries began to develop especially after the Commission determined its strategy towards the regional countries in 1995. Cooperation with the Transcaucasian countries which were overwhelmed by the conflicts and heavy economic problems came to agenda; the EU suggested a strategy containing technical support, economic, humanitarian aid and developing projects for restructuring. The EU's efforts reached a turning point when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 2 was signed in 1996 and came into effect in 1999 3. It is decided that the Agreement will be supported with the TACIS 4 (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) programme. The Commission published Strategy Documents for each country between 2002 and 2006. Yet, the unresolved problems among the countries blocked this process and aims of the Agreement became superficial targets. In the meantime, the Union decided to include Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to its Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 to reify its presence in the region. Before the Neighbourhood Policy, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which is the main instrument of relations could be evaluated as an important step in the Union's relationships with the regional countries.
The European Neighbourhood Policy The Neighbourhood Policy is an interesting synthesis and a significant tool of foreign policy for the EU's enlargement policy. The EU's borders which expanded in the last enlargement process brought new opportunities and needs. In March 2003, the Commission prepared the document called “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” and formed the Wider Europe Task Force. On 12 May 2004, it published a main document of Neighbourhood Policy called “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper. The EU's Neighbourhood Policy includes 16 countries Israel, Jordan, Moldavia, Morocco, Tunisia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Lebanon, Algeria, Syria and Belarus which are close to having candidate status 5.
2 The Agreement, of 79 pages, generally includes economic and technical issues. Aims also include goals for political dialogue, commercial and investment issues, economic cooperation and proprietary rights and establish institutions among the partners. The above mentioned institutions are the Partnership Council meeting once a year, the Cooperation Commission and the Parliamentary Cooperation, which meet more often. 3 http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/icg380/index.html 4 The TACIS programme, which was initiated by the European Commission in 1991, has become the most important foreign aid programme of the EU. Its purpose is to help neighbouring countries (Moldavia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan) which after the dissolution of the USSR are having difficult times and in a process of transition to an independent, democratic government and a market economy. It became a priority for TACIS to sustain democratisation process and economic development in the Independent States Community which formed after the USSR and it tried to provide fast technical support for this process. TACIS’s action plans are as follows: Aid for institutional, legal and administrative reforms, public sector and economic development, support for the solution of the problems created by the transition period, development of the infrastructure networks, support for environmental protection, operating natural resources and development of agricultural economy. The Union financed 4 billion 226 million Euros in the projects which were realised in the countries that are in the framework of the TACIS programme. 5 http://www.legalisplatform.net/ozel_dosyalar/Kom%C5%9Fuluk%20Politikas%C4%B1.pdf 52 The EU's strongest foreign policy instrument is these countries' expectation of 'candidacy'. However, the EU has not been able to solve the problems related with the enlargement process and it could not establish clear cut boundaries of enlargement. Additionally, the EU wishes to hold the countries that have strategic importance under control. For this reason, the EU established the Neighbourhood Policy formula which is a loose integration form but includes a more firm financial and technical cooperation. The former president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, clearly stated in 2002 that the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy is not full membership (Prodi, 2002: 2). The Commission's explanation of Neighbourhood Policy as 'all but institutions' underlines that the target is not membership (Smith, 2005: 763). The goals of the Neighbourhood Policy are determined to be supporting bilateral relations, strengthening security and cooperation, removing the insulating borders among the neighbours in the enlarged Europe and providing political, economic and cultural cooperation (Wallece, 2003: 10). 'Action Plans' are the most significant tool of the Neighbourhood Policy. Action Plans are usually shaped according to each country's needs and capacities, its relations with the EU and its expectations from the EU. The failure of the EU Mediterranean Policy to give concrete results led to a detailed preparation of the plans which include almost the same criteria expected from candidate countries. An important aspect that is taken into consideration in the Action Plans is preventing governments from a problem in domestic politics. The aid to be taken by the EU is used for the neighbour countries as 'carrots' and the reforms they have to perform are used as 'sticks' (Biscop, 2006: 25 29). After Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were included in the Neighbourhood Policy, Action Plans for each country came into the agenda. However, each country has different perceptions regarding the Action Plans. While Georgia is eager about the goals of the Plan, Azerbaijan does not show much interest. The differentiation in the perceptions changes in respect with the level of expectancy for the candidacy. The negotiations for the preparations of the Action Plans began in 2005. According to the Action Plans, first priority for Georgia is to end internal conflicts peacefully. Georgia perceives integration with the EU as a solution to its internal conflicts 6. Although Georgia welcomes the EU's economic aid until today, it expects deeper rooted political and military adjustments. Georgia perceives the Action Plan as a friendship treaty in which the EU is also committed in the security matters. It does not want direct involvement of the EU in the conflicts of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, so that the EU could have constructive effects on the decisions of Russia 7. In spite of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia expect an initiative of the EU in the field of security and foreign policy. In this sense, they kept their demands from the EU in a limited context about security and conflicts. Armenia gives as much importance to its relations with Russia, Iran and the US as with the EU and it follows a strategy to avoid taking sides between the Brussels and Moscow (Nuriyev, 2007: 5). In the same manner, Azerbaijan's foreign policy includes a balance among the US, Russia and the EU. Azerbaijan is not as dependent on the EU as the Georgia for the solution of its internal conflicts; so, there is not any phrase about sovereignty and protections of its borders in the Action Plan (Nuriyev, 2007: 5). Yet it states that the EU could play a role in the solution of the Nagorno Karabakh problem. Armenia's priorities in the Action Plan are promoting Turkey to open its borders and the EU's improving and normalising role in the solution of the Nagorno Karabakh problem. The EU observes Armenia's and Azerbaijan's legal institutions as inadequate and thinks that Russia still plays a great role in the decision making processes and thinks that especially constitutional amendments are needed to be taken (Lavanex, Schimmelfenning, 2006: 146 147). The European Commission determined four main action fields rather than concrete solutions for the conflicts in the draft Action Plan of 2006. These are:
6 http://www.euobserver.com/9/22861 7 http://www.eu integration.gov.ge/eng/speeches 53 • Helping the peaceful settlement of the conflicts • Continuous support for the peaceful settlement • Supporting OSCE Minsk Group 8 in the negotiation process • Strengthening the bilateral relations 9. The EU's economic aid to the region is the main factors in the shaping of relations with the regional countries. Between 1992 and 2004, TACIS provided 111 million € to Georgia, 123 million € to Azerbaijan and 99 million Euro to Armenia 10 . The EU provided technical and economic aid to the region with programs like TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia), INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) and BISTRO which are included in TACIS. TRACECA is a program which was initiated in 1993. It aimed to form an east west corridor over the Central Asia, Caspian Sea, Black Sea and Europe. In the scope of TRACECA, 28 projects were supported and totally 40 million Euros were granted between 1995 and 1999. INOGATE program includes goals like rehabilitation of oil and gas transportation; development of energy production in the regional commerce; creation of alternative facilities for the transportation of hydrocarbons in the Caspian and Central Asia to the Europe and the Western market; creation of alternative options for the transportation of oil and gas (Kılıçbeyli, 2006: 191 192). BISTRO program is used for financing short run projects of 9 months and 100 thoUSnd Euro worth. The EU gave economic and technical aid to the regional countries in these programs for a long time. Nevertheless, it changed the economic aid programs in the scope of the Neighbourhood Policy. It is projected that designated aims should merged in a single target for helping neighbour countries to reach their goals in the Neighbourhood Policy and for promoting the cooperation with the European Union, for that matter, ENPI (The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) was established. It is decided that the ENPI should replace the geographical and thematic programmes. On the 1 st January 2007, old programmes like TACIS and MEDA were abolished with the new organisation and for the period of 2007 and 2013, 14.929 million € were allocated in the framework of the ENPI.
(Effective) Actors which Play a Role in the Relations between the European Union and the Transcaucasian Countries While the EU develops policies for the Transcaucasian countries, it also takes the countries that have significant power in the region into consideration. In this sense, a careful analysis of the EU's relations with the Transcaucasian countries needs the analysis of the actors' effects in the region and their relations with the EU. It is highly unlikely that an initiative in the region takes place without the influence of Russia and the US. Especially Russia as the most important actor in the region influences regional countries' foreign policies. Russia wants Transcaucasian Region to be stable, economically developed and its conflicts solved; yet for Russia, the importance revolves around the actor who sustains this stability rather than its existence. Since Russia is against the US's and the NATO's role of referee, it prefers the EU's existence and activities in the region. But as long as the EU is only an economic actor, it is appropriate for Russia. It could not approve a deeper future strategy of the EU in the political and military sense. Russia evaluates long term envisioned strategies as actions threatening its national interests. As it has become difficult for Russia not to think that there is no involvement of the EU in the colourful revolutions of Ukraine and Georgia
8 It is a group formed as result of a conference in Minsk on March 1992 with the effort of the UN and OSCE for the ceasefire in Karabakh and the retreat of the parties in which 11 states participated (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Czech Republic, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, the US) 9 www.ciaonet.org/wps/icg380/index.html 10 www.ciaonet.org/wps/icg380/index.html 54 especially after new governments showed their eagerness to become a member of the EU (Deghoukassian, 2006: 10). On the other hand, for Russia, accepting the activities of the OSCE and the Council of Europe in the region is a better option than the involvement of the US and NATO. For instance, Russia has never been against membership of the Baltic countries to the EU but regarding the membership to NATO, it proceeds cautiously. Russia assents the actors to approach to the region only in the context of economic aid (Dekanozishvili, 2004: 7 8). In terms of the EU, as Michael Emerson points out, cooperation with Russia is a necessary and appropriate strategy for the Union. It appears that both for the prevention of conflict and instability in the region and for the transportation of oil and gas resources, Russia's reaction must be considered and its cooperation should be developed (Emerson, 2000). Another actor in the region is the US. The US's Middle East strategy and its policy to fight against terrorism made it more active in the region. Generally, the EU's and the US's approaches to the region resemble and even these two Western powers are in cooperation about providing stability, making democracy and rule of law basic principles, economic developments of these countries and solution of conflicts. The US stresses the importance of cooperation with the Russia for the stability of the region. The US's policy towards region shows two diverse properties especially in two periods. Between 1991 and 1994, the US considered the Transcaucasian Region as the backyard of Russia and applied a strategy of respecting Russia's superiority in the region. In this period, the US mostly cooperated with Georgia in the region. Military cooperation is an important pillar of the cooperation between the two countries. For instance, the US gave 64 million $ to Georgia in 2002 in this framework (Amineh, Houweling, 2006: 215). In the second period between 1994 and 1999, the US began to increase its activities in the region and the region became more important for the US in terms of energy resources. Multilateral companies made great influence in this strategy change. In this second period the US began to make efforts for the formation of energy corridors. (Baku Ceyhan). The US which stayed away from the problems between Azerbaijan and Armenia for the stability of the region called for the solution of problems in South Ossetia and Abkhazia but its efforts were unsatisfactory. The attacks of 9/11 made the US, which had already decided to be active in the region, to become more active. From then onwards, the US gave more importance to the relations with the regional countries parallel to its Middle East and antiterrorist policies. For instance, joint works have been done with Georgia and Azerbaijan to supply equipments necessary for the border control. After the 9/11, it is possible to say that the US’s relations with the region in general and with Azerbaijan in particular advanced. Especially in the Iraq War and Afghanistan interventions, it needed to cooperate with Azerbaijan which is a neighbouring country in the Middle East. Another reason for the interest in Azerbaijan is to hold an energy source which is not a member of the OPEC. Besides Azerbaijan, the US made some progress on its relationships with Georgia. For example, it established the Georgia Training and Supply Programme in 2002 to train Georgian soldiers (Amineh, Houweling, 2006: 215). The US targeting to be more active in the region in the recent years observes the EU as a good partner for cooperation in sustaining stability and solving conflicts and supports the EU’s initiatives towards the region. However it could be said that the US is much more sensitive than the EU about Iran’s exclusion form security matters and economic accounts in the region. When taking steps towards the adoption of the Neighbourhood Policy, the EU should take the US and Russia into account, as they are significant actors in the region. Without convincing Russia and taking support of the US, the EU could not succeed by simply adopting strategies in the scope of the Neighbourhood Policy. First of all, the regional countries’ significance for Russia with that for the EU is incomparable. Additionally, the Transcaucasian region, despite its frozen conflicts, is not the most unstable region in the European Neighbourhood Policy; at least their solutions are not 55 urgent and crucial. Besides, since the Union being without a common foreign and security policy is constrained in the foreign relations, the Balkans and Kosovo are more immediate matters for the EU.
The Relations between the European Union and the Transcaucasian Countries. Georgia – EU Relations For a better analysis of the relations between Georgia and the EU, it is necessary to undertake Georgia’s geography and its peculiar repercussions on it. The factor which comes into question in the relations between Georgia and the EU is primarily the Caucasian energy zone (Dekanozishvili, 2004: 10). Georgia is an exact passage way in the route from the Caspian’s wealth to Europe. The region in general is also a historical trade route for Georgia. The Silk Road’s route, which brought wealth from Asia, China and the Middle East to Europe passed through those lands. Another reason for the interest in Georgia is the desire to revitalise the historical Silk Road. Therefore, the EU would be able to trade with Asia directly. Sustaining security and stability in the region carries importance for the EU. In this respect the EU focuses its attention to the solution of frozen conflicts 11 like South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 12 These conflicts are called frozen because they go back to 10 15 years, they are bloody, and many people became refugees because of them; later conflicts stopped but unresolved (Fall, 2006: 201). But for the EU, an unstable Transcaucasia means immigration, drugs and weapon smuggling and organised crime. For example, 260.000 people became refugees in these conflicts (German, 2007: 363). Another important factor in the EU’s concentration on Georgia is about terrorism. The EU is not in a luxury to let both Georgia and other regional countries into poverty, conflict and instability. With the membership of Romania and Bulgaria, the borders of the EU expanded to the Black Sea and the Union got close with the regional countries geographically. In this sense, the EU would definitely feel the negative effects of a failed Georgia (Tangiashvili, Kobaladze, 2006: 17). As mentioned above, for Georgia, the main target is to get rid of the Russian pressure and to get as much support and assurance as it can from the EU. Yet, the EU has not shaped a security and defence strategy for the Caucasus in general and for Georgian in particular. The US always thought and acted strategically about the Caucasus. Before the Rose Revolution, the US provided financial and military support to Georgia and tried to motivate it for the solution of the frozen conflicts. Despite the fact that the EU helped Georgia economically (100 million dollars per year) it could not approach to the region and to the country as strategically as the US did. However, in the last three years, the European Security and Defence Identity has been developed and Georgia is included in the security interests of the Union. In the European Security Strategy paper of 2003,
11 www . ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 12 The problems in South Ossetia and Abkhazia emerged after the dissolution of the USSR and the independence of Georgia. Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia do not accept to live within the borders of Georgia. Although these sectarian movements are backed by Moscow, each side has different goals. South Ossetia and Abkhazia aim to gain their independence, while Moscow tries to increase its influence. These regions are actually aware of Moscow’s intentions and they take into account the fact that Moscow may betray them and cooperate with Georgia to reach its own purpose. On the other hand, while Abkhazia considers only independence, South Ossetia considers integration with Russia as an alternative to independence. The conflicts in Abkhazia which was one of those autonomous regions and is in the borders of Georgia began in 1993. Before the beginnings of the conflicts, population was ethnically 50 % Georgian and 17 % Abkhaz. South Ossetia was also an autonomous region during the USSR period. The conflicts began in 1991 because Ossetia’s language is not accepted as an official language and because of expressions about integration with North Ossetia which is within the borders of Russia; its autonomous status was removed. Although it is argued that the conflicts in the South Caucasia are frozen, in fact their solutions are frozen. See: Đlyas Kamalov, “Güney Kafkaslar’da Neler Oluyor?”, http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=1244&kat1=6&kat2= 56 Transcaucasia is defined as a neighbouring region. In this document, it is mentioned that it is desired to have a ring of well governed and threat free countries around the EU 13 .
The Neighbourhood Policy and Georgia The Neighbourhood Policy is an important motivating element for Georgia to implement the necessary reforms. Although the EU declared that this policy does not include membership, politicians think that as the reforms that the EU wants for the future vision are realized in due process, membership could be possible. The comments like “Georgia will become a member of the EU in the near future” are one of the indicators of that point of view. In his speech, Saakashvili said that: “Georgia is returning to the family of Europe to which it belonged for years; Georgia is politically, economically and culturally a part of Europe and in this sense intends to integrate with the Europe; this aim is a national priority and Georgia is taking important steps in this matter” 14 .Moreover, public opinion has great support towards the EU. For instance, 49% of the people lean towards the idea of becoming part of Europe; 29% of them do not care much about being a member of the NATO. It is already mentioned that Action Plans are significant parts of the Neighbourhood Policy. Action Plans, like the other countries, for Georgia, has been a much more distinctive and legal ground than the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The priorities in the Action Plan of Georgia are as follows 15 : • The reform of the judicial system, rule of law and rebuilding state institutions, strengthening democratic institutions and respect for human rights • Increasing investments, pursuing an active privatisation process and fighting against corruption • Encouraging economic development, reducing poverty, promoting sustainable development • Enhancing cooperation in the field of justice, security and border management • Strengthening regional cooperation • Promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts • Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy • Transport and Energy It has been said that the EU and Georgia have different expectations from each other. Although the EU is a very important actor for Georgia, especially before the Rose Revolution, Georgia was far and not a very important country that was under the influence of Russia. The EU’s approach to the country, despite having changed by the effects of terrorism, enlargement and the Rose Revolution, is still distant. Insomuch as, Georgian Foreign Minister’ difficulty in getting appointments from Germany, France and Britain is an epitome of that 16 . Nevertheless, Georgia does not want to be bracketed together with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Georgia considers itself in a complete process of reform and much more European country than the other two Caucasian countries. For that matter, it is disturbed by the possibility that the Union’s problems with Armenia and Azerbaijan might encumber its progress. Yet, the European Union assesses the region as a whole and do not keep Georgia separate from its regional policy. Besides Moldavia and Ukraine are far ahead of Georgia in terms of their Action plans; although the two countries are about to complete their Action Plans, Georgia is half way across the process. Another unresolved issue between the Union and Georgia is that although Georgia demanded for easiness in the visa procedures of students, academicians and tourists, the
13 www. ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 14 www.ciaonet.org/wps/icg380/index.html 15 http://www.ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf 16 http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_georgia_sept05.pdf 57 EU did not agree 17 . In this sense, when the EU is planning its strategies for the country, it should consider Georgia’s demands from the Union. Possible strategies which the EU may apply for those demands are as follows: • Firstly, for the promotion of the EU identity and a long term membership perspective, so that reforms may become more functional. • Solving frozen conflicts and supporting regional stability and peace, removing the Russia’s agitating effect, controlling the borders of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Chechen under the scope of Common Foreign and Security Policy. In the near future, the Caucasus will be a new opportunity for testing the European Union’s foreign and security policy and for the NATO as well (Dominese, 2005: 26). • Active functioning of the European Neighbourhood Policy for preventing Georgia from deviating democratic path that would help the healthy sustainment of democratisation movement. • Supporting Georgia’s membership of the NATO and sustaining Georgia to accomplish its commitments in the framework of the NATO Action Plan 18 . • Proposing Customs Union to Georgia economically and easing visa procedures for students and agricultural labourers.
Armenia – EU Relations The relations between Armenia and the EU are composed of three phases. First phase is the beginning of the cooperation with the EU institutions and organs and bilateral relations under the TACIS program after the dissolution of the USSR. Armenia was recognised on 31 st December 1991 on the same day with Azerbaijan and diplomatic relations began on 10 th August 1992. The second phase of the relations between the Union and Armenia is aiming for developing the relations by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, sustaining political dialogue in foreign policy and mutual interests, cooperating against drug traffic and enhancing harmonisation in diverse fields like economy and commerce. The third phase is the appointment of Heikki Talvitie as the EU Special Representative for the region and the inclusion of Armenia in the Neighbourhood Policy in 2004. The Neighbourhood Policy, as is the case in Georgia, caused the relations between the EU and Armenia to gain more prominence and affected its integration with the EU greatly.
The Neighbourhood Policy and Armenia The Neighbourhood Policy carries a great deal of importance in terms of providing new insights for the solution of important conflicts in the region rather than the goals like establishing democratic institutions, regional cooperation and sustainment of security, realisation of economic development. This statement becomes concrete in the solution of Abkhazia and South Ossetia problems for Georgia and for Armenia; it means the solution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue. In addition, the Neighbourhood Policy carries importance in enhancing cooperation on security, defence and foreign policy matters. Beyond the political and regional goals, the Neighbourhood Policy is economically significant for Armenia. The EU is an important commercial partner which shares 40% of Armenia’s exports. In terms of its approach to the Neighbourhood Policy, Armenia is a different picture than Georgia. It underlines the fact that the main goal of the cooperation process is not membership. Armenia states that the actual goal is to sustain the supremacy of democracy and to reach the EU standards by strengthening democratic institutions in the country. Actually, behind this reluctance in the EU membership we can find the country’s preference in a balanced foreign
17 http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_georgia_sept05.pdf 18 http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_georgia_sept05.pdf 58 policy. For Armenia, its relations with Russia are vital and get support especially from Russia in its problems with Azerbaijan. Although the EU is one of the new actors, it is not possible to compare its influence with Russia and the US. In this respect, the relations between the two sides are closely related with the US Armenia and Russia Armenia relations. Yet, as mentioned above, the country needs cooperation with the EU for promoting the reform process. Besides, it gets financial aid from the US and the continuous flow of aid is in the interests of the country (Deghoukassian, 2006: 12). Considering the Armenia’s relations with the other Caucasian countries, it is seen that Azerbaijan is evaluated as a hostile country while Georgia is evaluated as a rival country. In this sense, the difficulty of sustaining stability and security in the region as a basic goal of the Neighbourhood Policy is apparent. Especially the continuation of the Nagorno Karabakh problem as one of the frozen conflicts is creating difficulties for the development of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia (Coppieters, 2000:1 2). The priorities in the Action Plan of Armenia are as follows: • Human rights and fundamental freedoms (freedom of speech and press, freedom of religious organisations, respect for the protection of minority rights, developing the structure of civil society, preventing torture and creating suitable conditions in the penitentiaries in line with the human rights) • Strengthening of democratic structures, the rule of law, the reform of the judiciary (change in the election system, training judges and personnel in the judiciary system, etc.) • Public administration reform, civil dialogue, fight against fraud and corruption • Socio economic development and trade (Improvement of investment climate and transparency, reducing corruption levels) • Preventing regional conflicts (The solution of the Nagorno Karabakh problem) • Cooperation in the fields of foreign policy and defence (Crisis management and cooperation against terrorism) • Regional cooperation (Especially when Turkey becomes a member, opening the borders of Armenia Turkey and the development of Turkey’s eastern regions will become a priority and in that sense cooperation between Armenia and Turkey is important for the EU) • Cooperation in science, education, culture, technology and immigration 19 .
If the Action Plan is considered as a long term programme, there is a long way which Armenia has to go. Armenia observes the integration with the EU not only as an opportunity of political and economic reform but as a process of structural transformation of the country.
Azerbaijan EU Relations Before inspecting the relations between the EU and Azerbaijan, it is useful to elaborate on the peculiar properties of Azerbaijan. Caspian oil and natural gas, the Nagorno Karabakh problem and wide Azeri population in Iran are the basic factors determining its internal and foreign politics. Just as in the other former Soviet Republics, Azerbaijan oscillates between Russian influence and rapprochement with the EU, between autocracy and democracy. In terms of energy resources, Azerbaijan has 1.37 tcm natural gas reserves which accounts for 90% of the Caspian natural gas reserves (Mavrakis, Thomaidis, Ntroukas, 2006: 1672). Azerbaijan is twentieth in the line of the countries with the richest oil reserves. Research shows that the total reserves in the region are about 40 60 billion barrels. Regional oil reserves comprise 5% while natural gas reserves comprise 10% of the world’s total reserves 20 .
19 www.delarm.ec.europa.eu/en/press/16_11_2006.pdf 20 http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN016499.pdf 59 Azerbaijan is both a producer and a transporter country. The country which is a producer since the discovery of the ahdeniz region is also planned to be a transition country for the Kazakh and Turkmen gases. Since Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan pipeline passing through the country bypassed Russia and saved the country from being dependent on Russia, it is a project that has been supported by the US. Azerbaijani oil is drilled by a consortium called the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) managed by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and British Petroleum (BP). According to the experts, the yield of oil to the internal market is about 60 70 million dollars per year. The country owes its 10% growth in its gross domestic product that began in 2000 to oil and gas exports. In this sense, energy sector is the main pillar of the economy 21 . The oil industry comprises 40% of the budget incomes and 90% of the exports. Estimates show that Azerbaijan’s incomes from the energy will bring 140 billion dollars to the country in the following 20 years (Waal, Matveeva, 2007: 4). The direct foreign investment to Azerbaijan in the energy sector between 1995 and 2001 was about 6.8 billion dollars 22 . In the Nagorno Karabakh problem, between 1992 and 1994, as a result of the clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, 30 thoUSnd people died and one million people were forced to immigrate. Armenia not only invaded Nagorno Karabakh but also some South eastern parts of Azerbaijan. In 1996, Nagorno Karabakh’ integration to Azerbaijan as an autonomous region was projected but since Armenia declined the proposition, the Nagorno Karabakh problem became a frozen conflict (Coppieters, 2000:1 2). The Nagorno Karabakh problem has tried to be solved since 1994, international organisations like the UN and the OSCE have been intervening for the solution of the problem. In spite of all these, because of the divergence in the demands of the sides and the problems due to the effects of other actors in the region, no solution has been yet found. 23 The EU’s approach to Azerbaijan could be evaluated on the basis of the above mentioned two factors: energy resources and Nagorno Karabakh. Actually, in terms of the applicability and the security of the current and future transit roads, the solution of the Nagorno Karabakh problem is significant for the EU. In the first periods of the problem, the EU kept itself distant from it and did not intervene directly. It declared its support for the OSCE’s initiatives and stressed the necessity of sustaining peace. The EU and Russia published a joint declaration in 1992; the presidency of the Council made statements about the importance of ceasefire and the necessity of human aid. Throughout 1994, the EU called for a ceasefire and supported the integrity of Azerbaijan and called for the necessity of ceasing clashes. In the same year, the European Parliament asked the EU and the member states for pressing the sides for peaceful resolutions and supported economic and political reforms in Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Parliament made a decision for a Caucasus Peace Process Support in 1999. In this decision, the peace plan made by the Minsk Group was supported. Respect for human rights, sustaining a lasting peace and eliminating the factors which were creating the conflicts were accepted to be the most important elements in Nagorno Karabakh (Demir, 2003: 75). On the other hand, the EU was late in playing a role in the solution of the problem than the other international organisations. The Union, which is devoid of a common foreign and security policy, is not in a position to press for concrete solutions. For that matter, the European Commission usually
21 www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Azerbaijan/NaturalGas.html 22 www.unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN016499.pdf 23 The argument mentioned by Armenia and Russia that the recognition of the independence of Kosovo would be an example for Nagorno Karabakh caused new activities in the region. Yet, Kosovo and Karabakh are very different cases from each other. Similar exemplifications were also made for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. When many diverse criteria like righteous cause, sovereignties of states, reconciliation of international public opinion step in, equal circumstances couldn’t be applied to all sectarian movements. Each sample has specific qualities. On the other hand, though it is not the same conditions, the EU’s position in Kosovo raises the expectations in the region. That may possibly result in high tensions between the regional countries and the EU in the future. 60 works for the rehabilitation of the region by giving infrastructural aids like reorganisation of schools, providing energy supply, sustaining potable water and repairs of railroads (German, 2007: 369). Geopolitical factors and the approaches of the actors in the region should not be ignored when assessing the Nagorno Karabajh problem. For instance, Russia did not make any efforts for stopping conflicts until 1994 and generally followed a policy supporting Armenia. However, when Azerbaijan’s importance and effect on the energy resources increased, Russia began to stress the importance of sustaining stability in the region. The transportation of Azerbaijan’s energy over Georgia to Turkey instead of Russia disturbed the country. It was disturbing for Russia that the routes of the pipelines seemed to indicate a rapprochement between Azerbaijan and the US. Especially during Putin’s term, it is not wrong to say that a lack of confidence was in the foreground between Azerbaijan and Russia. On the other side, the relations between the two sides are able to soften in parallel with the common trade connections. Such as, while Russia’s direct investments in Azerbaijan are considerably high, it should not be forgotten that 25% of the Azerbaijan’s population works in Russia (Yunusov, 2003: 145). In the sense of the relations between the US and Azerbaijan, while the US disregarded the problem at the beginning with the effect the Armenian Diaspora, later it began to attach importance to the stability of the region for the security of the investments it made in the energy sector. Furthermore, after the attack of the 9/11, the deployment of US troops to Iraq and Afghanistan caused it to pay more attention to the relations with Azerbaijan (Yunusov, 2003: 145). The EU provided support to the Minsk Group for solving the conflicts. Yet, since France which was influential in the group, was affected by the Armenian lobby, its approach was determining. A multi dimensional analysis gives a clue why these problems couldn’t be solved after such a long time.
The Neighbourhood Policy and Azerbaijan The relations between Azerbaijan and the EU are centred on the Neighbourhood Policy and the Action Plan as in the other two countries. The priorities which were determined for Azerbaijan in the Action Plan are as follows: • The solution of the Nagorno Krabakh problem (Supporting the efforts of the Minsk Group, strengthening the one to one dialogue) • Strengthening the democracy in the country and employing a transparent electoral process The political and economic system of Azerbaijan is functioning in the framework of patronage and corruption. The president and his family on top of all this and the prevalence of corruption are creating deadlocks in the system. Especially bribing civil servants is a common practice. The executive generally does have a higher influence than the legislative. The president appoints the ministers and determines the cabinet. Parliamentarians are usually loyal to the Prime Minister and only few people from the opposition party are represented in the parliament. In the higher hierarchies of the New Azerbaijan Party, mostly Haydar Aliyev’s relatives from the immediate family are in the highest positions. In short, the power in Azerbaijan is centred on the Aliyev family and all the administrative offices are under the influence of the family. It is not wrong to say that the media, which support the opposition party, are usually under pressure. Five of the thirteen television networks belong to the state. For instance, Lider TV belongs to Cousin Adalat Aliyev and Space TV belongs to Đlham Aliyev’s Sister Sevil Aliyev. Aside from these negative properties of the administration, the 2003 elections forced the EU to put a phrase about the transparent electoral process in the Action Plan. Although more than six hundred observers were sent from 35 countries, the election performance could not realise the OSCE’s standards and even improper implementations were present 24 .
24 www.unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN016499.pdf 61 The sensitivity about the elections also continued in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Three basic subjects cause Azerbaijan to worry about the elections. Firstly, as it is mentioned, the shady elections of 2003 and its worrying reflections in the international public opinion affected the country’s democracy record. The practices like the arrests of the members of the opposition party and the dismissals of the public officials who had supported the opposition party enlarged the bad picture. In this sense, the government felt under more pressure in the 2005 elections. For example, the US started a campaign of clean ballot box in the parliamentary elections of 2005. Another factor worrying Azerbaijan is the colourful revolutions in Ukraine and Kirgizstan. For that matter, the government felt compelled to be more careful about internal unrests in order not face with similar consequences. Another factor is the energy sector. 2005 is the year in which the export of hydrocarbons came into prominence. Therefore, what happens in Azerbaijan attracts more attention in the international public opinion. Although the pressures are felt due those factors, the election processes of the country have not undergone a major change (Walden Publishing, 2006: 29). • Strengthening human rights, the rule of law (Ratification of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, promoting growth of civil society, making arrangement about accessibility to information) • Improving the business and investment climate, strengthening the fight against corruption (Catching the standards in the conventions like the UN Convention against Corruption and the OECD Convention on combating bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, transparency in the functioning of customs) • Balanced and sustainable development, preventing poverty, development of rural areas, the protection of the environment • Reform in the economic and administrative regulations • Developing bilateral cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan about energy and its transport The Memorandum of Understanding on energy partnership signed by the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso and the President of the Azerbaijan Republic Đlham Aliyev is an example of cooperation in the energy sector. Harmonisation of Azerbaijani legislation with the Community legislation in the energy field leading to the convergence of the electricity and gas markets, enhancing the safety and security of energy supplies and transit systems from Azerbaijan and Caspian basin to the EU, development of a comprehensive energy demand management policy and technical cooperation in the energy sector are some of the articles of the Memorandum 25 . • Cooperation in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security, including in the field of border management • Strengthening regional cooperation 26 The contents of the Action plan of Azerbaijan are directed towards the democratisation of the country, making necessary reforms in the legal regulations and sustaining transparency in the administration. However, it is observed that the necessary importance is not given to the solution of the problem related with the conflicts which is required for the stability of the region. As it is mentioned before, the EU refrains from becoming a party to the solution of the Nagorno Karabakh problem and wants to act as a mediator. Such as, in the Azerbaijan’s Action Plan it stresses the integrity of the borders, while in the Armenia’s Action Plan stresses the right of self determination and in this respect acts politically for the demand of the parties (German, 2007: 367).
25 www.azsam.org/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=165 26 www.ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf 62 For all the countries in the region in general and for Azerbaijan in particular, the EU’s avoidance from foreign policy and security matters is creating discontent in these countries. When the EU’s influence on the region is compared with the other actors, it is limited and this absence is also seen in the relations with Azerbaijan. Moreover, the problems in the formation of a Common Foreign Security Policy, which is one of the basic problems of the EU, prevent the Union from taking a role that meets the expectations of the regional countries. It gives us an idea why the EU’s policies in the Caucasus are limited when we think of the facts that France shows more interest in the Mediterranean region, Germany’s main interest area is the Eastern Europe and Britain attaches more importance to the Baltic countries ( Amineh, Houweling, 2006: 229). In spite of that, for Azerbaijan in particular, it is possible to say that Germany has important economic interests in the country. Today, about 50 German corporations are doing business in the energy sector of Azerbaijan; companies like Deniex, Grunewald, Deutag, Gaberg and BASF Wintershall are among them. Italy is rather interested in the hydrocarbon resources of the country. Belgium’s Prime Minister Jean Luc Dehaene is the first EU leader to visit Azerbaijan and in return the Belgian company Petrolina took its share from the Azerbaijani energy sector (Dekmejian, 2003: 145). Azerbaijan’s relations with the members of the EU are concentrated largely on bilateral ones and energy comes in to prominence as a diplomacy tool. The relations with the Union advance in a way of sustaining stability without harming other actors’ interests.
Conclusion Considering the difficulties the EU is having in energy dependency, it is seen that the importance of the Transcaucasian countries which are on the route of the transportation of the Caspian resources to Europe has increased. The relations between the Union and the regional countries gained speed after the EU included them in the Neighbourhood Policy in 2004. Previously, policies that were shaped on the basis of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement entering into force in 1999 and financial aid provided in the TACIS programme did not suffice to solve the frozen conflicts of the region. Because of that, the EU aimed for more concrete developments with the Neighbourhood Policy; especially the necessity to make arrangements for easing the reform processes of the regional countries was stressed. When the approaches of the regional countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) are analysed, it is observed that especially for the solution of their problems, these countries consider that the EU’s initiatives would be beneficial and they expect it to play an active role. Even from Georgia’s point of view, the relations with the EU should be kept at the highest level and it eventually would lead to a membership. However, as it is declared in the Neighbourhood Policy, it is not providing a membership perspective for the neighbouring countries. As a result, neighbouring countries criticise the inelasticity of the EU about the membership issue. Besides, the role that the EU plans to take in the scope of the Neighbourhood Policy is far from satisfying the Transcaucasian countries. The Action Plans which are the most significant tools of the European Neighbourhood Policy demands concrete initiatives and serious reforms from the neighbouring countries and envisage economic and democratic reforms. In this sense, the Action Plans are shaped in the framework of the conditionality principle. Nevertheless, as the EU demands for the reforms, its inadequacy in meeting the expectations of these countries is criticised and it is mentioned that the Union does not give enough importance to the main problem of the region which is the resolution of the frozen conflicts. In the scope of this analysis, it appears that the EU’s interest in the region will rise in the following years and the sustainment of the stability in the region and the security of the energy routes will continue to carry importance for the EU. Aside from the energy problems, while the EU wants to keep immigration and border problems and conflicts away from its borders, it will continue its activities in the region. Nonetheless, in order to achieve these goals, the EU should approach to the region more strategically, should quit being just a financial donor, evaluate the demands of the region better and shouldn’t let the Neighbourhood Policy to turn into a policy of empty goals like the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The EU’s 63 comparatively less activity than the other actors in the region, its unresolved problems in the enlargement policy, Balkans priority over the Caucasus and the lack of a common foreign security policy are serious constraints for the Union. Yet, the EU should be more sensitive to the demands of the regional countries and increase its activities for sustaining the stability and the security of the energy routes which were designated for the region.
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II. Connecting European Neighbours
Gilles ROUET (Reims) ◙ L’Union européenne et ses voisins : une affaire de citoyens
Marius LAZĂR (Paris) ◙ Islam and Islamism in Europe. Representations of Identity and Projects of Action
Zuzana IŠTVÁNFOYÁ (Bratislava) ◙ Narrative Fiction as a means of Crossing Borders
Thierry CÔME (Reims) ◙ Erasmus et la mobilité en Europe, vers un dépassement des frontières ?
L’Union européenne et ses voisins : une affaire de citoyens
Gilles ROUET
Abstract : This article explores the relationship between the perceptions of Europe from European and several national perspectives. Different cultural experiences led to different interpretation of Europe and its limits and accordingly, different neighbours. The national visions of Europe had an influence upon the conceptualization of the neighbourhood which has been a predominant cultural orientation.
Keywords : European Union, neighborhood, citizenship, proximity
Introduction Les termes « voisin » et « voisinage » se sont imposés dans le cadre de la nouvelle politique de l’Union européenne. Romano Prodi, dans son discours de décembre 2002 qui introduit cette démarche de « politique de proximité comme clé de la stabilité » (Prodi, 2002) utilise 23 fois le mot « voisins »1. Cette terminologie, à usage apparemment externe (les « voisins » seraient ainsi pays comme citoyens des Etats à la « frontière » de l’Union européenne), permet à la fois de définir des partenariats d’un genre nouveau et de rassurer en interne comme en externe sur l’administration des nouvelles frontières, désormais contrôlées et surveillées : atténuation de la violence de la nouvelle « forteresse » ou bien, à l’inverse, institution d’un nouveau rapport avec les pays voisins. Néanmoins, ce nouveau dispositif partenarial dont dispose l’Union européenne, doit être légitimé par les citoyens, alors que justement la citoyenneté de l’Union européenne reste en projet et que c’est bien ce projet qui permet de construire un voisinage, de reconnaître le voisin, en interne comme en externe. Une réflexion sur les voisins, le voisinage et les frontières ne peut donc que renvoyer au problème de la citoyenneté de l’Union européenne, qui n’est pas citoyenneté européenne.
Citoyens de l’Union et voisins de l’Europe Après des décennies de quasi désuétude ou d’utilisation spécialisée, le terme de citoyen est largement utilisé depuis quelques années dans tous les pays démocratiques, sur des registres différents du discours comme des écrits, dépassant ainsi dans son usage son strict contour sémantique. Et c’est peut être ainsi que les concepts s’étiolent, perdent consistance, deviennent « mous » car généralisés dans un discours vague. Ce terme a pourtant une signification précise car la citoyenneté procède d’une légitimité politique tout en étant source d’un lien social. Juridiquement, le citoyen dispose de droits civils et politiques, jouit de libertés individuelles : liberté d'expression ou de croyance, liberté de mouvement ou liberté de se marier. Il a le droit à un traitement égal et équitable, notamment dans le cadre de la défense en justice ou bien vis à vis des autorités policières ou administratives. Il peut participer à la vie politique ou être candidat à toutes les fonctions publiques. Le citoyen a également des devoirs : de respecter les lois (qu’il n’est donc pas censé ignorer), de contribuer aux charges de la collectivité en fonction de ses ressources et de défendre le corps social dont il fait partie, en cas de menace. Mais ce citoyen abstrait et théorique, sujet de droit, est aussi fondateur, par principe, de la légitimité politique en même temps qu’il détient une partie de la souveraineté politique. Cela justifie parfaitement le processus électif du choix des gouvernants par l'ensemble des citoyens qui acceptent l’obéissance aux ordres parce qu’ils savent qu’ils sont bien les maîtres du choix collectif.
1 Dans un discours de moins de 3 300 mots. 69 Cette citoyenneté semble naturelle, synonyme de démocratie, intériorisée, même si, à l’échelle de l’histoire des sociétés, la mise en application pratique de ces idées anciennes reste relativement récente 2. Pour autant, cette citoyenneté n’est pas naturellement acquise (Schnapper , 1994) car il s’agit d’une construction historique, issue de deux histoires presque parallèles : le citoyen libéral de la tradition anglaise, qui revendique les libertés fondamentales de penser, s’exprimer et d’agir et le démocrate de la tradition française, pour qui la souveraineté collective fonde la liberté politique. Ainsi il existe évidemment plusieurs définitions de la citoyenneté, déterminées culturellement, socialement et selon des rapports de forces politiques ou économiques. Des mêmes termes peuvent recouvrer des réalités différentes, des principes différents et aboutir à l’organisation d’institutions différentes. Il suffit de vivre quelques temps dans un pays étranger d’une autre culture, qu’elle soit slave ex socialiste ou anglo saxonne pour s’en convaincre : la citoyenneté est un concept pluriel. Ainsi, les systèmes politiques sont variés, tout comme les modes de scrutin, les constitutions qui déterminent le partage des pouvoirs, les organismes qui règlementent la vie sociale ou culturelle, ou encore la délimitation et le rôle assigné aux partis politiques par les électeurs 3. Même s’il est rassurant de considérer la citoyenneté actuelle (les citoyennetés) comme universelle, tout individu physique pouvant revendiquer un statut de citoyen, l’universalité n’est pas de règle au niveau des structures et des quotidiens qui fondent les expressions même de la citoyenneté et, in fine , sa définition. C’est dans ce cadre pluriel qu’il convient de participer à la construction d’une citoyenneté européenne. Si l’Europe existe, le citoyen européen n’est ni un citoyen français changeant d’échelle, ni un citoyen anglais quittant momentanément son île. Aucune solution n’est absolue, aucune construction définitive et chaque démocratie reste particulière. A ce titre, une expérience d’expatriation au sein d’un des pays ayant transformé son régime politique, comme la Russie, ou modifié ses frontières, comme la Tchéquie, ou encore, comme dans le cas de la Slovaquie, ayant découvert une identité, est plus instructive que la lecture de dizaines d’ouvrages savants. La citoyenneté européenne, si elle existe, se nourrira des échanges et de la mobilité, cela ne fait aucun doute, mais sur quelles bases, à partir de quels contenus, de quels éléments conceptuels ? Peut être que c’est justement au niveau du lien social que la citoyenneté européenne est à chercher, en attendant, en parallèle, une convergence relative de certaines institutions. L’Union européenne établit des liens entre des peuples, des nations, des citoyens, à l’intérieur comme à l’extérieur. Ces liens, pour être légitimes, doivent être politiques et non seulement économiques et c’est bien à partir d’une organisation politique unique, intégrant les particularités des Etats membres, qu’un lien social politique peut devenir légitime. C’était bien le projet du Traité pour une constitution européenne, refusé par les Français, mis en cause depuis par d’autres citoyens d’Etats membres. Les habitants de cette Union européenne, ensemble de citoyennetés juxtaposées, ont besoin à l’évidence d’une délimitation sociale et culturelle, intégrant diversité, complémentarité et cohérence, ce qui reste difficile à établir en partant de ces entrées. Il est peut être plus facile de construire une citoyenneté européenne ou une citoyenneté de l’Union qui ne soit pas supposée exister à partir d’un élargissement national des citoyennetés installées depuis plus ou moins longtemps dans des contextes différents, en suivant, notamment, Jürgen Habermas qui prône une citoyenneté européenne particulière, construite à partir d’une Europe acceptée comme
2 A partir des révolutions politiques en Angleterre, aux Etats Unis et en France, aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. 3 Le traitement par certains quotidiens français des résultats des élections parlementaires slovaques de juin 2006 témoigne parfaitement d’une méconnaissance de ces aspects de la diversité européenne : par exemple, l’analyse des votes des citoyens slovaques pour les partis nationalistes est effectuée en référence avec les critères politiques français. 70 Etat de droit et non par rapport à des spécificités nationales culturelles ou historiques (Habermas, 1990). Mais justement, une des difficultés du projet reste la délimitation d’une Europe qui ne peut pas rester un Etat de droit abstrait et qui exprime de plus en plus des revendications culturelles diverses. Même si elle reste difficile à imaginer en perspective, l’hypothèse d’une citoyenneté s’installant à partir d’une identité culturelle collective aboutit à une démarche convergente avec l’option de Jürgen Habermas, qui repose sur l’adhésion des individus à un système supranational : l’Union européenne se construit alors politiquement et non pas économiquement, comme il apparaît aujourd’hui, non seulement à partir des traités existants mais aussi de nombreuses revendications collectives liées à l’emploi, l’assurance maladie ou encore le financement du système de retraite ou d’enseignement. L’opposition de l’économique et du politique est évidemment ridicule : le problème est bien de poser des bases politiques, une légitimité politique à un fonctionnement économique, malgré ou avec la mondialisation des capitaux ou des échanges. Et c’est peut être justement ce projet d’une Union politique partagée qui est en déficit, comme l’indiquent clairement les votes des citoyens français, pour autant qu’on accepte l’idée d’un vote négatif motivé non par un rejet de l’Union, mais par un besoin d’adhésion à un projet. L’Acte unique européen de 1986 prévoit un espace sans frontière qui commencera à être effectif en 1993. Durant ces trente années, l’économique « tire » ou justifie la construction européenne, même si cela apparaît de plus en plus insuffisant. Ainsi, l’espace européen ne peut plus construire une citoyenneté uniquement basée sur des rapports économiques et, en 1990, le droit de séjour est étendu aux personnes n’exerçant pas d’activité économique, à la condition cependant qu’elles disposent de ressources suffisantes et d’une couverture sociale. Il s’agit bien d’un droit de circulation et de séjour repris en 1992 dans le traité sur l’Union européenne. En effet, si cette question des « droits spéciaux » conférés aux ressortissants de la Communauté économique avait été évoquée dès 1974, lors du Sommet de Paris, ce n’est qu’à partir du Traité de Maastricht de 1992 qu’une citoyenneté de l’Union européenne est créée : la Déclaration du Conseil européen de Birmingham précise en octobre 1992 que « la citoyenneté de l’Union confère à nos citoyens davantage de droits et de protection, sans se substituer en aucune manière à leur citoyenneté nationale »4, ainsi une citoyenneté particulière est enfin définie, conférant à tout citoyen de l’Union un droit fondamental et personnel de circuler et de séjourner sans référence à une activité économique. En corollaire sont prévus le droit de vote et d’éligibilité aux élections du Parlement européen et aux élections municipales dans l’Etat de résidence et même le droit à la protection diplomatique et consulaire au sein des pays tiers en l’absence de représentation nationale. Depuis 1997, la citoyenneté de l’Union, acquise de droit aux nationaux d’un Etat membre, permet de disposer de droits supplémentaires et complémentaires à la citoyenneté nationale. Enfin, même si la compétence officielle de l’Union ne concerne pas la politique éducative des Etats membres, un alinéa a été inséré dans le préambule du Traité : chaque Etat membre s’engage à fournir « le niveau de connaissance le plus élevé possible […] par un large accès à l’éducation et par la mise à jour permanente des connaissances ». Il s’agit bien d’intégrer au sein des droits des citoyens de l’Union un droit à la connaissance (Zorghibe, 2005). Cette approche juridique et institutionnelle permet de mieux comprendre la mise en place d’une citoyenneté de l’Union européenne qui est par essence institutionnelle tandis qu’une conscience citoyenne européenne devrait être culturelle. De plus, la question des devoirs citoyens reste en suspens puisque n’ont été définis que des droits : la citoyenneté de l’Union n’accorde que des droits supplémentaires à la citoyenneté nationale. Mais encore faut il que ces droits soient effectifs, concrétisés. C’est bien dans ce sens qu’à Nice, en 2000, le Conseil a insisté sur des mesures destinées à accroître et démocratiser la mobilité au sein de l’Union.
4 Le Traité d’Amsterdam de 1997 modifie les articles instituant la citoyenneté européenne : « la citoyenneté de l’Union complète la citoyenneté nationale et ne la remplace pas ». 71 Lever les obstacles ne suffit évidemment pas et cet « espace européen de la connaissance » ne peut qu’être porté par les échanges. L’économique apparaît depuis évidemment porté par le culturel : la mobilité des citoyens nationaux, rendue possible par l’intensification de la formation en langues et la capacité à travailler et évoluer dans un environnement plurilingue, est devenue un facteur jugé déterminant de la compétitivité de l’économie européenne. L’approche culturelle et sociale s’impose donc à la fois par elle même et par référence à l’économique, ce qui est assez nouveau en définitive. L’identité, l’appartenance à une communauté, la conscience d’une délimitation géographique et d’une organisation sociale et politique, autant d’éléments constitutifs d’une citoyenneté s’appuyant sur un territoire et sur un groupe. La citoyenneté de l’Union européenne, de ce point de vue culturel, ne s’imbrique pas forcément avec la citoyenneté locale car il s’agit bien plus d’une conscience, d’une reconnaissance de niveaux d’appartenance : d’une région à l’Europe elle même, certains individus appartenant à des minorités d’Europe centrale peuvent construire simultanément une citoyenneté locale et européenne, sans pour autant se reconnaître dans un Etat. Le découpage national après la chute du Mur de Berlin n’a en effet pas tenu compte des identités culturelles ou traditionnelles qui s’expriment désormais au sein d’Etats membres, ce qui entraîne des tensions et des incompréhensions évidentes. Le passeport peut être d’un Etat mais le sentiment d’appartenance et, en définitive, la conscience des droits et des devoirs citoyens sont encore souvent liés à la communauté culturelle. La place de la société civile est fondamentale dans la construction de ces citoyennetés, autant au niveau de l’éducation familiale et communautaire qu’au niveau du système éducatif. Cette problématique est cruciale, et sous des formes différentes, à l’Est comme à l’Ouest de l’Union européenne, car, comme l’a déclaré en juin 1999 Ion Caramitru, Ministre de la culture de Roumanie 5, « les enjeux sont communs : construire un nouveau contrat social, véritable alliance entre l’Etat et la société civile qui puisse mobiliser l’ensemble de nos sociétés ». Ce contrat, fondement d’une citoyenneté de l’Union européenne, permet d’envisager le voisinage non pas en opposition, en négatif, mais en complémentarité, en positif. Il s’agit bien, alors, d’installer une logique de partenariat dans cette démarche citoyenne et d’envisager les voisins dans cette démarche. Mais l’utilisation souvent synonymique d’Europe et d’Union européenne contribue à la confusion de ce projet et au déficit de légitimation. Hubert Védrine, dans son « Rapport sur la France et la Mondialisation »6 rappelle qu’il y a « plusieurs façons d’être européen ». Mais il est bien plus facile de décréter certains pays « européens » et d’autres non que de tenter de définir ce qu’est un Européen, entité indéfinissable ni par rapport à l’espace, à l’histoire, à la culture, à la langue ou encore à la religion. L’Europe n’est ni une nation ni un Etat, ce qui n’empêche pas la citoyenneté européenne, c’est à dire, en fait, celle de l’Union européenne, d’avoir un sens. « Plus on s’éloigne de 1989, plus on confond l’Europe avec l’Union européenne », ce qui, en effet, perturbe le débat (Reszler, 2004: 35 45). Si l’Europe ne se confond pas avec l’Union européenne, cette dernière est, par son Traité constitutif, au moins, a priori en Europe, puisque ne peuvent en faire partie que des pays « européens ». Mais l’Union européenne est encore peu légitimée par des citoyens qui ont bien des difficultés à s’accorder sur une délimitation de l’Europe. Nous cultivons en effet une ambiguïté qui s’avère parfois utile, l’Europe et l’Union européenne sont des constructions distinctes mais liées dans une confusion conceptuelle, dans des représentations culturelles et sociales construites et par les usages sémantiques. La première n’est pas définie clairement, ni par l’histoire, ni par la géographie, à l’Est en tout cas, tandis que la seconde, institutionnelle peut être plus que politique, fait rarement l’objet d’une identification citoyenne, même si un espace public européen semble émerger, à l’occasion, notamment de manifestations simultanées
5 Conférences parlementaires, ONG, Strasbourg, juin 1999. 6 Rapport pour le Président de la République rendu le 4 septembre 2007. 72 dans plusieurs Etats membres 7. Pour autant, alors que des territoires sont réunis par un traité, que des frontières ont presque disparues et qu’une monnaie unique facilite les échanges dans une grande partie de l’Union, aucun « espace européen » n’est clairement délimitée et, surtout, ne correspond pas à un espace public permanent. Quelle responsabilité collective portent médias, écoles, institutions, ONG, gouvernements ? Globalement, la confusion est permanente au point où c’est bien l’Union européenne elle même qui semble diluée dans la confusion des limites de l’Europe, ce qui ne contribue évidemment pas à l’affirmation d’une citoyenneté de l’Union. L’information sur l’Union européenne est évidemment nécessaire, informations institutionnelles, économiques, politiques, et de nouvelles stratégies d’information sur l’Union européenne ont été mises en place par la Commission européenne dès 2005, la France ayant relayé cette démarche en 2007 : « Le retour de la France en Europe doit s’accompagner d’un retour de l’Europe en France » (Jouyet 2007) . La France, comme les pays satellites de l’Union soviétique qui ont rejoint l’Union européenne en 2004 et en 2007 n’avaient évidemment jamais quitté l’Europe, tant est large le consensus qui accorde à ces pays une européanité, géographique et historique. Mais ont rejoint également l’Union des territoires dont, justement, le supposé caractère européen de va pas du tout de soi, ainsi Chypre 8, par exemple, dont l’adhésion est à l’origine d’arguments à la fois pour et contre l’admission de la Turquie car d’une part l’intégration de Chypre lève la contrainte géographique et d’autre part la permanence du problème politique de la partition de l’ile fournit un nouvel argument aux opposants à l’intégration de la Turquie. L’enjeu de la légitimation par les citoyens de l’organisation politique communautaire est évidemment de taille après les non français et hollandais au référendum sur le Traité instituant une Constitution européenne, en 2005, puis après le non irlandais de 2008 qui fait douter de la ratification du Traité de Lisbonne par les Etats membres. Différentes analyses de ces résultats négatifs, qui ont évidemment retardé la construction politique européenne souhaitée par l’ensemble des gouvernements, montrent que le niveau d’information des Français, au moins, est effectivement relativement faible, mais, surtout, que la légitimité même de l’Union européenne pose problème. Informer sur l’Union européenne est donc très important. Une tâche qui appartient aux institutions communautaires elles mêmes mais aussi à chacun des Etats membres. Pour autant, cette information ne suffit pas et il est fondamental de chercher à développer les conditions de réception de cette information, une réception critique qui pourrait permettre de limiter le poids de la représentation partagée, en France notamment, d’une Union européenne principalement procédurière et bureaucratique. Car l’information ne donne pas les outils suffisants pour comprendre et appréhender l’espace européen. Il faut aussi enseigner l’Europe (Chovancova ; Rouet , 2008) et l’Union européenne, en tentant de fournir des éléments susceptibles d’aider les futures générations à se construire une identité européenne et une citoyenneté de l’Union car si la légitimité de l’Union repose sur une citoyenneté active, l’appartenance à l’Europe est une affaire d’identité et non de citoyenneté.
Enseigner l’Europe et l’Union européenne Dans les livres d’histoire et de géographie de mon enfance, l’Europe politique était coupée en deux. A l’Est du rideau de fer, les représentations cartographiques laissaient supposer un « bloc » indifférencié, un espace soviétique unitaire. C’est en séjournant en Russie puis au sein de pays d’Europe centrale que j’ai pu remettre en cause mes représentations : les pays
7 Ainsi le 15 février 2003, sur les 15 millions de personnes qui manifestent contre la guerre en Irak, 12 millions sont citoyens de l’Union européennes et s’insurgent contre l’intervention militaire américaine sans aval de l’ONU et sans preuve de présence d’armes de destructions massives. 8 Mais aussi Ceuta, alors que le Maroc n’a pas été accepté comme candidat du fait de sa non européanité. 73 « satellites » de l’URSS étaient bien séparés par des frontières plutôt étanches et les situations politiques et sociales, comme les cultures, différaient. Ces cartes m’avaient donc incité à idéaliser une abstraction particulière, renforcée par les expressions consacrées des livres d’histoire : « bloc soviétique » ou « bloc de l’est », alors qu’on n’évoquait évidemment pas de « bloc de l’ouest ». La dissymétrie de traitement était manifeste, au point, d’ailleurs, où je n’avais pas conscience de l’existence d’une « Europe centrale ». Depuis, cette Europe centrale est revenue, s’est imposée aux générations qui avaient suivi ces enseignements. La carte impressionne et réalise la construction de l’espace, et même si « la carte n’est pas le territoire, elle nous donne seulement une représentation de celui ci à l’aide de symboles, de signes conventionnels », elle contribue évidemment à la création des représentations, qui, sans proposition alternative, ne peuvent aboutir à la prise en compte des « multiples visions du monde » de Grégory Bateson qui décrit les processus de transformation entre cartes et territoires, entre noms et choses nommées. La carte est bien un formidable instrument de focalisation, de fascination, qui produit ainsi un territoire car si la représentation graphique ou symbolique ne peut pas être ce qu’elle représente, elle rend l’objet, le territoire, l’espace, intelligible. L’Europe est multiple, selon les critères choisis, et proposer un certain type de cartographie peut procéder, parfois explicitement, d’une démarche plus idéologique que pédagogique. L’utilisation de techniques de projections cartographiques alternatives, en premier lieu, permet de relativiser l’impression sur les élèves. Notre Europe n’est en effet pas la même que celle de nombreux habitants de l’hémisphère sud qui ont l’habitude d’utiliser, par exemple, en Nouvelle Zélande, des projections différentes (Rouet, 2009). Mais l’utilisation de cartes « conventionnelles » peut s’avérer insidieuse, parce que, justement, cette représentation de l’Europe, dans nos contextes, semble aller de soi. Ainsi, les cartes suivantes peuvent contribuer à la mise en place de représentations et donc de consciences divergentes relativement aux limites de l’Europe.
Carte n° 1 : Une Europe par les anglo saxons
La première carte est disponible sur plusieurs sites anglais ou américains. 9 Quatre zones sont représentées : la plus claire concerne, évidemment, les territoires non européens. Les deux autres zones, plus foncées, représentent l’Europe, avec cette frontière improbable de l’Oural, proposée par Vassili Nikititch Tatichtchev à Pierre le Grand (Foucher, 2009) et popularisée bien plus tard auprès des Français par le Général de Gaulle. Il y aurait donc bien une Russie
9 Par exemple sur http://alabamamaps.ua.edu/contemporarymaps/world/europe/index.html 74 européenne et une Turquie européenne, représentées en deux couleurs sur la carte, Europe et « extensions » européennes sur l’Asie. Les trois Républiques caucasiennes sont « physiographiquement » situées en Asie mais considérées comme européennes pour des « raisons culturelles et historiques », écrit la légende ! La Mer Caspienne est ainsi traversée par une frontière « contestée », en pointillée, qui constitue bien une frontière de l’Europe.
Carte n° 2 : L’Europe vue de Lituanie
Prenons un autre exemple. En Lituanie comme dans d’autres pays, des cartographies différentes sont proposées. Ainsi la carte n° 2 (Vilaça, 2003) exclut la Turquie et les Républiques caucasiennes, intègre l’Islande également mais la couleur affectée à la partie de la Russie jusqu’à l’Oural la situe clairement en Europe. La troisième carte, issue d’un site américain, reprend cette logique d’exclusion de la Turquie de l’Europe mais intègre les Républiques caucasiennes 10 , établissant ainsi une frontière « naturelle » entre l’Asie mineure et l’Europe dont est cependant exclu le Kazakhstan.
Carte n° 3 : Une Europe vue des USA
10 Sur www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/eu.htm 75 La carte numéro 4, extraite d’un site russe, envisage une Europe moins précisément délimitée, zone frontière avec la Fédération de Russie, intégrant la Turquie mais dont le cadrage ne laisse pas apparaître les Républiques caucasiennes, ce qui n’a rien d’étonnant. Les logiques de construction des cartes divergent en fonction des politiques extérieures 11 même sur des sites relativement anodins car consacrés au tourisme. S’agit il de constructions délibérées ou d’habitudes conventionnelles ? L’Europe, produit de l’histoire, concept ou idéal, a donc besoin d’une diversité de représentations pour être le mieux possible appréhendée et afin d’éviter une contamination idéologique presque inconsciente, car toute convention répétée devient habitude et construit ainsi un territoire normalisé, non critiquable.
Carte n° 4 : Une Europe vue de Russie
L’analyse des manuels scolaires français de géographie réalisée par Brigitte Manoukian et Murièle Desportes Massé est cependant rassurante, au moins pour les classes de première. En classe de quatrième, les auteurs indiquent que globalement, « il y a peu ou pas d’interrogation sur la Turquie », les cartes des reliefs sont limitées à l’Oural ce qui indique implicitement une limite « naturelle » de l’Europe, certains manuels ayant recours à l’Histoire pour justifier cette limite culturelle. Les élèves de ce niveau n’auraient donc pas suffisamment de sens critique pour être amenés à s’interroger sur la diversité d’approche de l’Europe, ou bien cette question est elle considérée comme secondaire dans le « programme » ? Heureusement, en classe de première, « les documents invitent à la réflexion et posent la question des frontières incertaines, problématiques, contestables, introuvables ». L’Europe « jusqu’où ? » est une question centrale à travers les manuels qui, cependant, ne parviennent peut être pas complètement à compenser les représentations normatives proposées hors du temps scolaire, tant la permanence des conventions cartographiques est pesante, autant en ce qui concerne le cadrage du territoire représenté que les méthodes utilisées. Comment l’administration européenne elle même propose cette Europe aux internautes ? La carte numéro 5 est une carte « officielle » proposée par la Commission européenne, sur une page qui porte en titre « Europe ». Les territoires extra européens sont décrits dans un encadré. La confusion est donc largement entretenue puisque la logique de la carte est uniquement institutionnelle.
11 Sur www.gotoeurope.ru/karta 76 Les trois pays candidats sont en grisé : Turquie, ARYM et Croatie, une couleur intermédiaire entre celles réservées aux pays membres et la couleur claire, neutre, affectée aux pays ni membres, ni candidats, comme la Norvège, la Suisse, l’Islande ou encore la Russie ou l’Ukraine. La logique de cette carte est donc bien d’opposer membres et candidats aux non membres non candidats. De plus, le cadrage de la carte ne suggère pas de limite à l’Oural ou d’intégration des Républiques caucasiennes.
Carte n° 5 : L’Europe pour la Commission européenne
Cette carte, en définitive, s’affranchit des limites géographiques de l’Europe pour mettre en avant la logique de l’Union européenne, en ne faisant apparaître ni l’histoire des élargissements (par les choix des couleurs des pays membres), ni une intégration de l’espace méditerranéen (qui est coupée au sud) ou de frontière avec la mer Caspienne 12 . Il s’agit bien d’un leurre, de l’entretien de la confusion entre Europe et Union Européenne, une construction bien utile, rassurante, en définitive, qui installe en potentiel la Turquie qui deviendrait partie de l’Europe une fois intégrée à l’Union européenne. De la même façon qu’il est nécessaire d’enseigner l’Europe et la confusion de ses limites, les multiples visions cartographiques comme les usages politiques des représentations, il est également fondamental d’enseigner l’Union européenne, d’intégrer les éléments de la construction européenne dans les programmes scolaires, de présenter les éléments constitutifs de la citoyenneté de cette Union politique, dans sa complexité et dans son articulation avec la citoyenneté nationale des membres. Ce projet est difficile car l’Union européenne est une
12 Sur http://europa.eu/abc/maps/print_index_fr.htm 77 construction politique unique, ni un Etat (et encore moins un Etat nation), ni une Fédération comme dans le cas de la Suisse ou bien dans celui des Etats Unis d’Amériques. Il y a bien, en effet, une nation suisse et une nation américaine, mais il n’existe pas de nation européenne. Du moins pas à notre échelle temporelle. La supranationalité originale de l’Union européenne est en construction, et la plus grande difficulté n’est pas d’ordre institutionnel mais bien, comme on l’a vu précédemment, d’ordre culturel et identitaire. C’est très justement qu’en 2003, le Premier ministre tchèque Vladimir Spidla déclare qu’« avant de s’interroger sur l’’être européen’ il faut savoir ce qu’est l’Europe » (Pasquier, 2003). Si les citoyens des Etats membres de l’Union européenne se revendiquent européens, sans toujours pouvoir bien évidemment l’expliquer, ils ne légitiment pas pour autant une Union européenne politique et souveraine. Il est illusoire de croire que l’intégration, à terme, des Balkans ou de la Suisse permettra de faire coïncider l’« Europe » avec l’« Union européenne » (ou vice versa). Les Russes, par exemple, peuvent être européens sans être citoyens de l’Union, et les Turcs peuvent très bien devenir citoyens de l’Union européenne sans pour autant avoir construit une identité européenne, à condition, bien évidemment, de rejoindre cet espace public européen, ce qui sous entend une légitimation de l’adhésion par les citoyens des Etats membres. Pour autant, existe t il un « socle commun » qui pourrait justifier à la fois l’appartenance et l’intégration à l’Union européenne ? Une « identité européenne » induite transcenderait alors le projet politique d’union tout en le légitimant de fait. Cet « euronationalisme » reste difficile à concevoir, dans un contexte multiculturel complexe, d’un bout à l’autre de l’Union actuelle, alors que la géographie de notre péninsule européenne est évidemment imprécise, à l’Est au moins, et que la globalisation économique tient peu compte des proximités culturelles ou des disparités religieuses. Il devient fondamental de tenter de désolidariser les deux débats : une Europe des racines et de la « culture européenne », d’une part, et un projet d’Union politique légitime et performant qui s’appuie sur une démarche d’adhésion acceptée à partir de la construction d’un espace public, d’autre part. Pour Robert Frank, « Habiter en Europe ne suffit pas à définir l’Européen, car ce faux continent, qui est seulement la partie d’un plus grand ensemble, l’Eurasie, est difficile à délimiter à l’est, dans sa frontière précisément avec l’Asie. Ce qui définit mieux l’Européen, c’est, semble t il, sa culture » (Frank, 2004 : 6 9). La notion de « culture européenne » renvoie évidemment à la problématique de l’identité au sein de l’Union européenne, en tenant compte à la fois des possibles prochains élargissements (les Balkans) et de la politique de voisinage à l’Est et au Sud mais dans un environnement désormais consacré de « diversité culturelle », qui semble s’être imposé depuis deux décennies dans le cadre d’un combat plutôt économique. Une « culture européenne », née de racines plus ou moins communes et d’intégrations plus ou moins anciennes, mais dans un contexte d’identités plurielles et surtout de multiplicité d’expressions. L’« exception culturelle », argument mobilisé pour l’économique, s’est transformée en « diversité culturelle » en élargissant son champ. Cette notion est en effet mobilisée à la fois dans les discours politiques, au niveau des Etats comme de l’Union européenne mais aussi au niveau du débat concernant les industries culturelles. La société civile elle même a investi la « diversité culturelle » et s’attache à un modèle de société pluridimensionnelle. Le « voisinage » doit être replacé dans ce contexte.
« Anciens » et « nouveaux » voisins Le terme « voisin », complété ensuite par la notion de « voisinage », est donc devenu incontournable dès qu’il s’agit de la politique extérieure de l’Union européenne (mais, bien évidemment pas du tout au niveau interne). Cette évolution sémantique constitue évidemment un compromis : il s’agit de définir un nouveau type de partenariat tout en développant un discours « rassurant » en interne comme en externe, relativement à l’administration des nouvelles frontières, terrestres ou maritimes. Ce « voisinage » atténue ainsi la mise en place de ces nouvelles portes de l’Union européenne, qui ne se veulent ni limes impériales, ni marches féodales. Notre « forteresse » érigée et renforcée avec Schengen est donc en même temps fermée 78 et ouverte, vigilante et accueillante pour nos « nouveaux voisins » qui ont aussi, peut être, la possibilité de se détourner, de chercher à conclure d’autres alliances. A partir de 2004, une nouvelle méthode est mise en place avec des plans d’actions bilatéraux entre les pays de ce nouveau « voisinage » et l’Union européenne. « L’objectif premier de la Politique Européenne de Voisinage est de donner un nouvel élan à la coopération avec les voisins de l’Union européenne après l’élargissement. L’expérience accumulée dans le cadre du soutien accordé au processus de transition politique et économique ainsi qu’au développement économique et à la modernisation des nouveaux Etats membres et pays candidats constituera, le cas échéant, un enrichissement pour les relations avec les pays partenaires » (COM(2004 ) ). Le cadre d’action est donc très largement inspiré de la politique de préadhésion qui s’est avérée efficace pour les 12 pays des élargissements de 2004 et de 2007. En 2006, un nouvel instrument financier, l’Instrument de Politique Européenne de Voisinage, devient le support des programmes d’assistance et de coopération (Rouet, 2009). Dans la sémantique utilisée à partir de 2004, une différenciation se généralise : sont des « Etats » les pays ayant adhéré à l’Union européenne, les « Etats membres », tandis que les pays du voisinage n’accèdent jamais à ce qualificatif. Cette évolution sémantique est peut être justifiable dans la logique administrative et juridique de rédaction des actes et avis de l’Union, mais elle conduit cependant à la suppression systématique du mot « nation », à la différenciation donc de l’intérieur et l’extérieur de l’Union. En utilisant ce terme vague de « pays » : « espace géographique délimité par des frontières, habité par une collectivité humaine et doté d'un État souverain »13 , le voisinage devient imprécis, flou. Le vocabulaire utilisé est révélateur du sens même de ce voisinage : une zone définie par opposition à l’Union européenne (et les candidats « reconnus »). Les mots nous renvoient ainsi à une quête de sens sur le « voisinage », désormais, de fait, paradigme européen ou plutôt paradigme de l’Union européenne, comme sur les frontières de l’Union, et, en définitive, sur l’identité européenne. Revenons au voisin. Il relève évidemment de ce concept de proximité , point de départ de la démarche exposée dès 2002 par Romano Prodi. Le voisin habite « à côté », un « à côté » imprécis cependant, dont le commencement est relatif à la définition même de celui qui considère l’autre comme son « voisin ». L’Ukrainien d’Uzgorod est « voisin », sans aucun doute, du Slovaque de Michalovce, mais est il pour autant « voisin » du Français de Lille ou de l’Italien de Naples ? Et même, au niveau du quartier, de la rue, de l’immeuble, où commence la délimitation, la définition du « voisin » ? Cette notion est donc bien difficile à définir dans l’espace, entre une « proximité immédiate » et une sorte de « proximité théorique », construite, parfois peut être imposée. La proximité immédiate est vécue plus que représentée, dans le cadre des relations sociales, dans un quartier, une rue, sur un même palier d’immeuble ou encore à une table voisine au restaurant. Cette proximité ne peut pas être définie, à l’évidence, par la géographie, elle est intuitive, immédiate, ressentie. Cette proximité n’est pas forcément positive : le voisin est souvent imposé, voire subi, on choisit rarement ses voisins. Et même si les déterminations induites par les logiques d’urbanisation ou de peuplement des territoires, sociologiques comme historiques, installent des voisinages de connivence sociale et provoquent des proximités de classe, l’appartenance à un même groupe social n’estompe pas le caractère imposé du voisin. Le « voisinage » est complexe car polysémique, induisant des logiques d’intérieur, d’extérieur et de proximité. La Politique Européenne de Voisinage s’appuie justement sur une nouvelle conception de la proximité : une proximité intellectualisée, de représentation de l’autre : il y aurait donc des voisins et des autres, en dehors des citoyens de l’Union européenne, une nouvelle conception, donc, basée sur une logique de frontière. C’est que cette proximité des « nouveaux » voisins constitue à la fois menaces et opportunités : menaces sur la sécurité de l’Union, opportunités avec les effets des élargissements. La gestion des frontières de l’Est, notamment avec l’Ukraine et la Biélorussie, compliquent évidemment le problème des flux migratoires et les relations en
13 Dictionnaire Encarta de Microsoft. 79 Méditerranée sont liées à l’exportation du terrorisme international. La Politique de voisinage s’appuie sur un impératif sécuritaire : c’est bien en contribuant à l’évolution démocratique, économique et sociale des pays voisins que de nouvelles conditions sont créées pour la sécurité de l’Union. Le projet politique du voisinage n’est cependant pas défini uniquement par la menace. L’Union européenne, « en panne » après les « non » de 2005 et de 2008, après la recherche d’un sursaut politique, installe cette politique qui semble bien s’affranchir de cette origine et on peut espérer que les moyens mis en œuvre pourront aboutir à des résultats entraînant, de fait, une redéfinition même du projet politique européen. La PEV « a été mise en place dans le but de renforcer la prospérité, la stabilité et la sécurité mutuelle de l’UE et de ses pays voisins »14 : ces trois concepts sont inscrits dans une logique «mutuelle » fondamentale : il s’agit ensuite de convaincre du caractère gagnant gagnant de la stratégie pour installer de véritables partenariats. Le voisinage européen, interne comme externe, est différemment défini par les frontières. Au niveau interne, la logique de coopération transfrontalière s’est largement installée dans le quotidien des citoyens concernés pendant que l’espace Schengen détruisait les dernières traces physiques des frontières. Les frontières à l’intérieur de cette zone n’ont plus donc de consistance, de réalité. Ces frontières sont désormais théoriques, construites par les citoyens à partir, notamment, des cartes et représentations utilisées dans l’enseignement, les médias, la littérature, etc. Au niveau externe, en revanche, les frontières de l’Union ont bien changé en quelques années et l’extension de la zone Schengen a renforcé, a contrario, leur caractère contraignant. Ainsi, en inscrivant dans les paysages les limites de l’Union, ces nouvelles frontières ont créé à la fois de la distance et de la proximité. Distance car des habitudes ont été bousculées et certains échanges ont été rendus plus difficiles. L’inversion du pôle d’attraction des nouveaux pays intégrés en 2004 et en 2007, d’Est en Ouest, est peut être légitime au niveau politique mais reste beaucoup moins fondé au niveau social ou culturel. Par exemple, les Ukrainiens sont désormais plus distants pour les Slovaques, qui ont intégré l’espace Schengen en décembre 2007. La frontière constitue une limite du social, physique puis mentale, et impose une altérité. L’extension de Schengen a renforcé le caractère contraignant des autres frontières extérieures et, si les citoyens de l’Union passent les frontières, les autres doivent les franchir, quitte à les transgresser. Des espaces transfrontaliers ne deviennent pas pour autant de nouvelles marches mais devraient constituer des zones de médiation qui, justement, peuvent installer la frontière dans un rôle accepté par tous. La PEV a besoin de frontières pour délimiter ses voisins, les voisins de l’Union européenne, mais pas ceux d’une Europe introuvable. De quelles frontières s’agit il en effet ? Certainement pas de celles de cette Europe délimitée en 1994 par la résolution 1247 du Conseil de l’Europe, qui comprend 46 pays dont la Russie, la Turquie ou encore l’Azerbaïdjan ? La question de l’adhésion à la Turquie a ravivé ce débat 15 . Le projet de l’Union européenne n’est pas celui du Conseil de l’Europe et les deux espaces ne sont pas superposables. Entre fédéralisme, intégrationnisme et souverainisme, entre projet économique et projet politique, l’Union européenne délimite difficilement son projet, et, en conséquence, ses limites. L’incertitude sur l’avenir institutionnel ou les conséquences de l’intégration des nouveaux adhérents sont autant d’arguments pour un statu quo temporaire, cette « pause » devant permettre à l’Union de consolider son projet politique et, surtout, de le légitimer auprès des citoyens. La PEV aurait alors comme fonction de fournir une réponse temporaire car les pays concernés ne sont pas considérés comme des candidats à l’adhésion. Le voisin, on l’a vu, induit proximité, spatiale avec les frontières qui s’apparentent à une mitoyenneté mais aussi historique et culturelle : ces pays voisins qui deviennent ou pourront devenir partenaires particuliers (notamment ceux du Sud) s’inscriraient ainsi notamment dans
14 Cf. IP/07/1263, Bruxelles, 30 août 2007. 15 En 1987, la candidature du Maroc avait été repoussée par application du critère géographique. 80 une proximité multiple et non dans un simple rapport centre périphérie. Car cette logique de voisinage est souvent mobilisée pour justifier la schématisation de l’Union européenne en cercles concentriques dans une vision évidemment multipolaire. Il s’agit bien de réinstaller des « marches » de l’Union européenne, ce qui pourrait estomper les effets négatifs des nouvelles frontières à l’Est ou, de fait, rapprocher l’Union européenne à l’Afrique centrale grâce au nouveau rôle affecté à l’Afrique du nord. Ce schéma est simpliste, euro centré, et n’intègre évidemment pas la réalité politique de l’Europe à 27 tandis que les institutions évoluent et que la politique européenne, enfin, tente de mettre en évidence un destin « commun » dans cet ensemble complexe de voisins. Le voisin n’est pas un étranger, ou plutôt le voisin est un type particulier d’étranger, un étranger connu, à la fois proche et différent. La relation à ces voisins, dans le cadre d’une proximité construite, met en jeu des représentations plutôt que des intuitions, dans un paradigme différent du schéma centre périphérie, intégrant une Union européenne polycentrique. Dans cette démarche, le voisin est aussi « l’autre » citoyen européen, dans cette citoyenneté de voisinage et non de références communes, ni culturelles, ni politique, ni historique, dans ce projet et ces espaces publiques qui sont plus ou moins proches, plus ou moins étrangers. Il n’existe pas de citoyens européens vis à vis de voisins mais de voisins dont certains sont intégrés dans un espace économique et politique spécifique, et qui induit un rapport aux frontières particulier. L’Union européenne s’est constituée à partir d’un projet politique centré sur l’économique, et a rendu proche des populations éloignées, transformant des étrangers en voisins qui cultivent leur identité tout en construisant une identité européenne, composée justement à partir de ce voisinage. Les pays de l’Est ou du Sud sont désormais des « nouveaux voisins », mais, pour autant, les pays de l’élargissement sont ils désormais, déjà, des « anciens voisins » ? Le voisinage se renouvelle autant dans la proximité du quartier que dans la représentation de l’autre, mais avec un changement d’échelle, bien évidemment. Comme on l’a vu précédemment, le voisin, en dehors de l’Union européenne, a parfaitement la latitude de se considérer comme européen, de cultiver une « identité européenne » sans pour autant devenir citoyen de l’Union européenne ! La Politique européenne de voisinage, mécanisme défensif qui limite ou retarde de futurs élargissement de l’Union européenne, constitue peut être, indirectement, un outil de mobilisation pour une nouvelle identité européenne, centrée sur l’Union européenne. Une nouvelle citoyenneté « entre voisins » internes et « avec les voisins » externes peut se nourrir de l’émergence d’un espace public rendu à la fois possible, nécessaire et légitime par l’intégration de nouvelles limites, de nouveaux partenariats, d’un nouvel espace (Rouet, 2009). Voisins plus ou moins proches peuvent s’inscrire en effet dans un projet d’un type nouveau, intégratif à terme, aux citoyennetés liées à terme. Le retour des institutions et du politique, conséquence des crises financières puis économiques constitue, de ce point de vue, une opportunité évidente de lier le projet européen aux partenariats avec les « voisins ».
Un projet pédagogique européen L’européanité, attitude née de l’identification européenne, se nourrit du dépassement des traditions : l’innovation est bien issue de l’échange et des différences. Et comme cette reconnaissance des différences permet de concrétiser la démocratie et les droits de l’homme, le projet européen est bien alors d’utiliser les rapports de force au lieu de les nier ou de les minimiser, de fournir la base et les fondements même à une nouvelle construction citoyenne. Le rôle de l’éducation, on l’a vu avec les exemples cartographiques, est fondamental. Il s’agit bien de développer un projet pédagogique européen, de cultiver la curiosité et d’inciter à comprendre la richesse des confrontations culturelles. Les historiens également peuvent tenter de construire de nouvelles histoires, intégrant le transfrontalier, les voisins, les passifs comme les différentes interprétations. Il ne s’agit pas de réaliser un manuel européen idéal, objectif illusoire, décalé et dangereux, mais de proposer de nombreux manuels franco allemands, 81 slovaco hongrois, germano polonais, nés d’un travail collectif d’intercompréhension, livrant les confrontations aux élèves. Il en est de même pour l’ensemble des sciences humaines et sociales qui forment l’esprit critique et installent des représentations. Si la « dimension européenne » doit être intégrée aux programmes scolaires, encore faudrait il trouver une délimitation à cette dimension. L’Europe n’existera que si les enfants la découvre et les moyens autorisant cette découverte existent partout. Car la logique de l’interculturel est justement celle de la découverte et de l’appropriation de l’autre, des autres, des voisins. Le pluriculturel est l’acceptation du composite linguistique et culturel, pour l’évolution des démocraties d’unité à une démocratie « européenne » des différences et de la tolérance 16 , pour accompagner l’évolution d’un espace public européen, condition d’émergence de cette, de ces citoyenneté(s) européenne(s).
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Bateson, Gregory (1984), La nature et la pensée, Paris, Seuil. Chovancova, Katarina, Rouet, Gilles (dir.) (2008), Enseigner l’Europe , Enigma, Nitra, Slovaquie. Commission Europeenne (2004), Communication de la Commission , „Politique européenne de voisinage”, document d’orientation, 12 mai 2004, COM(2004) 373. Foucher, Michel (1987), L'invention des frontières , Paris, Fondation pour la défense nationale, 1987. Frank, Robert, „Les métamorphoses de l’être européen”, CAES Magazine , No.74, printemps 2004. Habermas, Jürgen, Ecrits politiques , Paris, Cerf, 1990. Prodi, Romano, „L’Europe élargie – Une politique de proximité comme clé de stabilité”, discours prononcé à Bruxelles dans le cadre de la sixième conférence mondiale du réseau ECSA (Projet Jean Monnet), 5 et 6 décembre 2002. Reszler, André, „‘L’autre Europe’ et l’idée européenne », dans L’union européenne en débat : visions d’Europe centrale et orientale ”, sous la direction de Jean Denis Mouton, Nancy, Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 2004. Rouet, Gilles, „L’Europe et L’Union européenne : cartes, territoires et identités”, dans Hommage au Professeur Marcel Bazin, Reims, Presses universitaires de Reims, 2009. Rouet, Gilles (dir.) Les journalistes et l’Europe, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2009. Schnapper, Dominique, La Communauté des citoyens, sur l'idée moderne de nation , Paris, Gallimard, 1994. Zorghibe, Charles, Histoire de l’Union européenne , Paris, Fondation Robert Schumann, Albin Michel, 2005.
16 Pour paraphraser une citation de Guy Hermet, « Conclusion, « Multiculturalisme » et démocratie en Europe ? » dans Quelle identité pour l’Europe ? Le multiculturalisme à l’épreuve , Riva Kastoryano, dir., Paris : Les Presses de Science Po, 2005, p. 345. Cf. également Tolérance et différence , Colloque européen organisé les 28, 29 et 30 septembre 2006 par le Département de langue et de littérature françaises de la Faculté des Lettres de l’Université de Presov, les Associations Jan Hus et Sens Public, publié en ligne sur http://www.sens public.org/spip.php?article337.
Islam and Islamism in Europe. Representations of Identity and Projects of Action
Marius LAZĂR
Abstract: One of the most challenging issues of Europe today is to cope with the large cultural, ethnic and religious diversity and interactions that occur within a transnational society. The present article is covering the impact of Muslim population and Islamism on the European cultures. The Islamic communities in Europe form a much more diverse and even contradictory landscape than common perception would have it. More often than not, the Muslim populations now settled in European countries have brought here not only their own cultural and solidarity practices but also the various oppositions, rivalries and conflicts which exist in the complex geo political puzzles of Maghreb, Masreq or the Indian sub continent.
Keywords: Islam, Muslims, immigration, identity, diversity
Introduction. The complexity and difficulties of European Islam. For decades, the emergence of a Muslim population and identity has been one of the most urgent challenges facing European countries. Initially invited as a cheap labour force, in great demand to enable the development of Western economies, Muslim populations have settled in Europe permanently. This, together with the birth of subsequent generations, has significantly changed the traditional demographic and cultural European landscape. For many Muslims, the major difficulty has been to integrate into their host communities efficiently, to adjust to new behaviour and cultural patterns and often to relegate their religious identity to a private field. Other Muslims (in general those who failed or refused to accept the system of values and social practices of Western countries) have exhibited feelings of aversion and rejection towards Europe, sometimes even perpetrating violent actions in the name of a radical Islamist ideology. However, it must be emphasized that the Islamic identity of the populations that have settled in Europe does not fully explain all their existential and behavioural motivations. More often than not, resorting exclusively to the label "Islam" in order to account for their situation is an over simplification, which fails to do justice to the whole complexity of the lives of European Muslims. It is true that in the Islamic world religion still significantly impacts a large section of the private and often public life; however, even there religion is experienced mostly in a cultural or traditional dimension. It is only for the followers of the new trends of the Islamic renaissance (whose influence unavoidably reverberates on the Muslim communities in the West) that Islam becomes the unique standard of religious, social and even political life. This process of re Islamisation, which has affected the Muslim world for the last three decades, has been experienced in a sometimes even more powerful manner within Europe. Here, this phenomenon has caused identity changes, community allegiances and complex forms of activism that occasionally deviate into terrorist activities. As a result, various segments of the Muslim communities have been changing their attitudes towards their own status in the West, as well as towards the Western civilization as such. This increasing visibility of European Islam – multi faceted, unpredictable, involved in various exogenously motivated strategies, hailing more or less openly its breakaway with the values of the Western civilization – causes unavoidable reactions both from the public opinion and from the security experts of various European institutions. The recent terrorist attacks directed against the West have fostered a growing Islamofobia, which nevertheless tends to ignore the fact that Islamic militantism is only one of the facets of Islam today. This anti Islamic feeling has led some experts to contemplate a hypothetic geo political scenario according to which an increasing Islamic activism and 83 deliberately pursued higher birth rates among the Muslim communities result in Europe joining the Arab Muslim world to form a new Euro Mediterranean entity which Bat Ye’or, the main supporter of this theory, calls Eurabia (Bat Ye’Or, 2005) . In fact, the Islamic communities in Europe form a much more diverse and even contradictory landscape than common perception would have it. More often than not, the Muslim populations now settled in European countries have brought here not only their own cultural and solidarity practices but also the various oppositions, rivalries and conflicts which exist in the complex geo political puzzles of Maghreb, Masreq or the Indian sub continent (Cesari , 2002). It is difficult to specify with any precision the number of Muslim people in Europe, given the constant flux of illegal immigrants as well as the high birth rates. The closest estimate seems to be 20 million, but there are inflated Islamic conjectures which place the figure up to 50 million. The main difficulty for European countries with a large number of Muslims has been to find the best modalities to integrate into their own systems of cultural and socio political values these people who define their identities in terms of different religious and cultural traditions. Several strategies can easily be identified in various European countries. The French model is based on the principle of the secular state that keeps an equal distance from all religious groups and practices. Originating in the well known 1905 law, which marked the separation between the French state and the Catholic Church, this principle makes room for religious pluralism but officially regards it in a sociological rather than theological light: all religious communities, without any exception, have the legal status of private associations (Mayer , 2007). France has been cultivating a strongly integrationist social model, according to which one's identity is given by his/her being a citizen of the republic and not by belonging to a specific ethnic group or religion. All religious communities are recognized and accepted on condition that they do not disrupt public order and observe the French laws. However, the republican individualist model, based on the principle of all citizens' equality of rights and obligations, irrespective of religion or ethnicity, renders rather undesirable the idea of a particular identity derived from allegiance to an ethno religious community, as well as that of a mediation between the community's leaders and the institutions of the French state. However, the 1981 law of associations represents a landmark in the systematisation of the Islamic and Islamist French landscape because it allowed foreigners to constitute legally recognized private associations. As a result, various Muslim groups, often financially supported from abroad, find a legal institutional framework within which they can freely pursue their projects (Ferjani, 2001: 66 77). The law was initially motivated by the desire to facilitate the emergence of a "French" Islam which, as argued by a number of French islamologists (Mohammed Arkoun, Gilles Kepel, Bruno Etienne), was to enhance the sense of a French identity within the Muslim communities while preserving their Islamic religious values and allegiances. After the 1960s, when the development of French economy demanded a massive influx of population from Maghreb and former African colonies, the social landscape of the French Republic changes, particularly so in the large cities (Cesari , 1994: 109 126). Taking advantage of the 1972 law, which recognized the right to family regrouping, these immigrants prefer to settle in France where they are granted temporary residence, and eventually citizenship. Until the beginning of the 1990s the objective of most immigrants from former colonies, now living in France, Great Britain or other European countries, was to find the best manner to integrate into the new social and professional environment. Islamic identity became largely effaced in the political discourse and community actions were mostly economically motivated – i.e. meant to respond to the high unemployment rates among the new comers and to the dramatic lack of accommodation, the latter problem being solved only after whole new low cost neighbourhoods (HLM – habitation à loyer modéré) were built on the outskirts of the large cities. Since the 1975s, in the wake of the massive social protests of the Maghrebian employees in large French companies, the state officials have tried to limit the impact of leftist ideologies by resurrecting Islamic values among immigrant populations (these values came to be regarded as conducive to social peace and a stable sense of identity). Therefore, many factories now open prayer rooms, 84 thus contributing to gradually rendering official the Muslim religion in the French public arena. Most of these prayer rooms will fall under the influence of Tabligh and various new Islamic associations sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood or by Saudi sources. During the 1980s hundreds of mosques and other Muslim places of worship are built across France with the aid of Muslim states and of such trans national organizations as the Muslim World League, which now find themselves in increased competition for securing the loyalty of the French and other European Muslims. The impact of the Iranian Islamic revolution and the emergence of Jihadist brigades in Afghanistan have contributed to a radicalization of international Islam which reverberated in Europe as well (two examples are the militantist mobilizations prompted by the controversy over the Islamic veil in France and the unprecedented public aggressiveness of Islamic circles in Britain in the wake of Khomeini's fatwa against Salman Rushdie) (Kepel , 1991) . The appeal of Islamist ideologies (pietistic, political or radical) is significantly stronger to the second generation of immigrants who have now reached adulthood. Some of these young people (also known as beurs ), born in France of immigrant parents, undergo a powerful process of acculturation and experience an identity crisis largely generated by their difficult professional integration and marginally successful appropriation of the French system of values (Roy , 1994: 54 66) . For these reasons, in recent years state institutions have expanded their collaboration with the many associations competing for the loyalty of French Muslims in order to compensate for the failure of official integrationist policies and to counteract the increasing delinquency of young French people of Arab origin. If the large majority of French immigration comes from Maghreb and the former African colonies, British immigration originates from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, although an increasing number of Muslim immigrants come from the Middle East and Maghreb (Lewis 1994). Initiated in the 1950s, the process of immigration of Asian populations towards Great Britain reflects the same classical logic of responding to economic demand which has been illustrated in other European countries. The first immigrant populations were largely recruited from the poor rural areas of their countries of origin; once settled in Britain, these people mostly kept unchanged their social and cultural practices. The reason is that, unlike France which has made efforts to promote an integrationist social model, Great Britain has opted for the multicultural alternative, thus allowing the autonomy and preservation of the cultural and religious values of each community, as well as the social structuring of these communities according to their specificities. London's traditional policy has been to delegate the task of maintaining social order to the various community leaders, who also act as mediators between the people they represent and the state's institutions. The British model is based not on religious but ethnic differences: the immigrant populations now settled in Britain are identified according to their ethnic origin, not their religion. One immediate result is the obvious geographic distribution of population in the larger cities, which host Pudjabi, Bengali , Gurajati, or Pathan neighbourhoods. Correspondingly, there is a specific structuring according to religion, or more precisely according to the various confessional or spiritual religious orientations (Husband, 1994: 79 97). The Muslim populations from the Indian sub continent have transferred to Britain, along with their traditional loyalties to tribes, regions and cultures, their loyalty towards the main branches of the Sunni Islam from their respective parts of the world – Barelwi , Deobandi, Jama’at e Islamiyya (the political trend founded by Mawdudi), and the Tabligh movement. The Barelwi School, founded in India by Ahmad Ridā Khān (1855 1921), is closer to popular Islam and allows devotion to saints and Sufi religious practices (very widespread in Central Asia), placing special emphasis on the person of the Prophet (Sanyal , 1996). Although primarily interested in the mystical side of Islam, at the end of the 1940s the school generates a more activist movement at Karachi, which is later to become involved in Pakistani political life: jam’īyat ul ’ulamā’ i pākistān (JUP). In Great Britain the number of Barelwi followers has remained significant. Since the beginning of the 1960s, under the leadership of Pîr Maruf Hussein Shah, the movement becomes structured in a number of associations, the most 85 important of which being the World Islamic Mission 1. Apart from some efforts at proselytism among the Muslim immigration, these associations become involved in public mobilizations on the occasion of various holidays and thus manage to put together a widespread network of followers, thereby also bringing important economic benefits to the movement. The Deobandi School is founded by Muhammad Kāsim Nanotawi (1832 1879) and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1829 1905) in India (at Deoband, near New Delhi); it later brings on its side large numbers of Muslims form India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Unlike Barelwi , the Deobandi School opposes devotion to saints and promotes a very conservative education which recommends, in a manner similar to that of the Wahhabis, a return to the original sources of Islamic doctrine, the Koran and the Sunna. The school's impact in the Indian sub continent is largely due to the wide network of madrasas , the religious schools in which students follow a strict canonical interpretation of Muslim principles and in which the ulemas have a strong authority (Metcalf, 1986). In 1945 the movement created a political party in Calcutta, which was later to become involved in Pakistani political life. In 1967 the Pakistani ulemas settled in Great Britain and registered here a branch of the party, under the name of Jama'ati Ulema, which was to promote Deobandi interests among the Muslim population, particularly with the aid of private school. Jama'at e Islamyyia programmatically encourages a political perspective on Islam, together with the same classical goal of reforming Muslim societies according to the tradition of the first years of Muslim history. The movement comes into being in 1941 and finds its roots in the doctrine of the most important Islamist ideologist from the Indo Pakistani region, Abū al A’lā al Mawdūdī (1903 1979). Supporting the idea of an Islamic state, he believes that the foundation of such a state should not be the individuals belonging to a nation (as it is the case in the Western world) but rather Islam alone. The Islamic state is to be based on a complete implementation of Shari' a , which is regarded as the expression of "divine suveranity" (hakimiyya ) on earth and to which, therefore, all other institutions and laws have to conform. Members of Jama'at e Islamiyya who have settled in Britain will found here an association which aims to promote the movement's interests: in 1963 the UK Islamic Mission is opened. Its goal is less the ultimate maximal one – that of supporting the idea of an Islamic state – but rather the pursuit of religious and social control over the Muslim British communities, in particular those of Pakistani origin. To this effect, the movement will resort to its network of ulemas and preachers (most of them originating from Pakistan, many having graduated from Saudi theological universities and therefore being in a position to facilitate contacts with the Wahhabi religious institutions, the world's major sponsor of Islamic programmes). Since 1973 the British, then European, centre of Mawdudism has been established in Leicester under the name of the Islamic Foundation 2. Along the years, Deobandi and Jama'at activists have tried to integrate in the British social structures while remaining faithful to the Islamic doctrines they have embraced. Given the incompatibility between these two options, a large majority of the activists, who have successfully integrated, have renounced their initial militantism and attempted to find a middle ground between Islam and modernity. However, those failing in their integration efforts will embrace more radical forms of Islam especially after the 1990s (Thomas 2003: 18 19). The British system has allowed a much more concrete socio economic and sometimes political implementation of communitarism (on a local, though not a national level), as well as maintaining more effectively the cultural, ethnic, behavioural and religious specificity of immigrant peoples now living on British soil. In the late 1990s Great Britain hosted more than 800 mosques and over 950 Islamic organizations (Ansari, 2002: 8), which generally reflected the ethnic and religious diversity of British Muslims, while at the same time being engaged in a certain competition for the symbolic capital of Islamic identity and for securing the loyalty of the believers. Since the 1980s the Islamic currents of Indo Pakistani origin have been gradually
1 http://www.wimnet.org . 2 http://www.islamic foundation.org.uk/. 86 joined by those promoted among Arab immigrants, which favoured a much more radical and political understanding of Islam. The situation has largely developed in this manner because British authorities have been permeable to the arrival of the most diverse political and religious leaders who, having been exiled form their home countries, find in Great Britain propitious ground for publicly expressing their convictions. London in particular becomes a favourite location for Islamic movements and leaders of all persuasions: the Muslim Brotherhood (expelled from Egypt by Moubarak's regime), various Iraqi Islamist movements, the radical Algerian leaders of FIS ( Le Front Islamique du Salut ) and GIA ( Le Groupe Islamique Armé ), Pakistani Islamists who took refuge against Mousharaf's repressive policies, as well as the new generations of Jihadi revolutionaries following various Salafi movements, who appropriate from al Qaeda a symbolic identity rather than any specific organizational structure. Therefore, in the 1990s London is labelled "Londonistan", becoming the site of a freedom of expression for Islamic propaganda which would be unimaginable in any other Muslim or even European country. It is true that such lack of political constraint is also motivated by a classical strategy of British intelligence services, which prefer a high visibility (and therefore easy control) of Muslim leaders and movements to an unpredictable clandestinity which, should it drift into radicalism, would be more difficult to contain. However, this tolerance has also fostered the ascent of Salafi Jihadism in Europe, after London has given refuge to a significant number of radical leaders who have been exiled from their home countries or expelled from various other European countries. A peculiar case of the relationship between Muslim communities and the European states is illustrated by Belgium and Holland, countries in which the Islamic religion has long been officially recognized. Belgium in particular, which has implemented what is probably the most complex strategy for integrating Muslim structures in the state apparatus, has recognized Islam (since 1974) as one of the official religions together with, then, Catholicism, Protestantism, Anglicism and Judaism. This legalisation has triggered a number of positive consequences, not only because it allows free expression of Islamic norms, but also because official Islamic organizations can benefit from funding and subsidies provided by the Belgium state (Bousetta, Maréchal, 2003). However, the unavoidable result of this legalisation and liberalization of Islam has been the emergence of a fierce competition among various Muslim currents and movements, which have all targeted places of worship and confessional schools. One important advantage of securing these would be financial support from the state, given that the Ministry of Religious Affairs provides money for the salaries and pensions of all those employed by one of the officially recognized religions (el Batiui, Kazmaz, 2004). In Belgium, this rivalry has long been dominated by the Saudi organisations, due to a special relationship of cooperation between the Belgian state and the Saudi monarchy. The Islamic Cultural Centre in Bruxelles 3 was founded in 1970 and has become the most important Islamic institution in Belgium. For a long time it was the only institution to which the Belgium Ministry of Education assigned the task to nominate the persons who could teach Islam in schools, especially after the centre opened, in 1989, a Muslim Institute of Theology (Sfeir, 2001:162 163). This exclusivist hegemony has been strongly criticized by the other Islamic organizations: Tabligh , the Muslim Brotherhood, the Turkish Islamist movements, or the Shi’a Iranians, all of which have attempted to engage the Belgian authorities in a dialogue with their own communities. In 1992 the Islamic Supreme Council of Belgium was founded in answer to the state's efforts to reconcile and bring together the various Muslim currents, but also to diminish the powerful segregation which still characterized the Muslim immigration. As they largely originated from the less educated categories of the home population, the Muslim immigrants found it very difficult to adjust to the Western society and values; therefore, they mostly remained faithful to their old community allegiances and forms of solidarity. Mosques and religious associations too, with the exception of Tabligh , were usually based on the criterion of nationality. However, like in France, the new
3 http://www.centreislamique.be . 87 generations of Belgium born Muslims found themselves more and more estranged from Belgian Islam, rigid and bureaucracy ridden, which seemed to offer them few solutions to the classical problems of social and professional integration or identity seeking. Consequently, in Belgium too, their orientation towards more militant ideologies and associations became unavoidable. The Netherlands have, like Great Britain, adopted a multicultural model and have moreover offered constitutionally granted freedom and equality for all religions and cults, either Christian or non Christian. The Dutch political system does not define the foreign populations now living on Dutch territory as "immigrants" (as it is the case in France) or "foreigners" (as the German term Gastarbeiter, "guest worker", suggests) but as "minorities", which enjoy the same public and partially political rights as the local population. Therefore, the 1983 law concerning the right to vote and the eligibility of foreigners in municipal elections has occasioned the political integration of many Muslims on this local level (Shadid, Koningsveld, 1994). The situation in Holland has encouraged an active social and institutional Islamic mobilization, which has more often than not taken place along national lines, involving the three large Muslim groups (Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese) and, more recently, the Somali community as well. Germany, on the other hand, represents a special case with respect to its official position towards immigrants. Since nationality can only be obtained by birth or by marriage to a German citizen (not, however, by mere residence on the country's territory), most Muslim immigrants now living in Germany have a juridical status inferior to that of the local population, which further complicates their social and economic situation. Numbering more than three million, the Muslims in Germany usually come from Turkey, some Arab countries (especially Morocco), the former Yugoslavia, Iran or Afghanistan, and live on the outskirts of the large cities from the former Western Germany. Like in the other European countries, the process of attracting a predominantly Muslim immigration started in the 1960s, mostly as a result of the lack of cheap labour force needed to support the economic expansion of post war Europe. This was the reason why in Germany the newcomers were called by a name that best defined the status they were ascribed: Gastarbeiter , guest workers. Unlike the immigrants who settled in France and England and who, having come from former colonies, were familiar with the language and culture of the host country, the immigrants who arrived in Germany were usually ignorant of both local language and customs, which contributed to a strong social segregation. In addition to the difficulty of receiving citizenship, this segregation increased the sense of exclusion of the Muslim population, which therefore preferred to return to its own cultural and community allegiances. This is the reason why, until the 1980s, the public visibility of Islam in Germany is very limited: most immigrants choose to express their religion privately rather than publicly, and most of them have almost no sense of belonging to the German community. It is only after the right of family regrouping is granted that a gradual process of sedentarisation emerges, which triggers a number of consequences. Firstly, the idea of a long term residence on German soil has prompted Muslim communities, despite their inferior status, to mobilize more effectively in order to protect the rights of the Muslim population. Since the 1980s various associations have been founded, mostly according to ethnic criteria, but with reference to their religious identity as well, the latter regarded as an essential element of their public identity (Amiraux, 2002). However, since Islam did not have an "official" status in the former Western Germany, it could not benefit from the facilities derived from the status of a legally recognized public organization (which would have allowed, for instance, raising a "religious tax" from the believers, which could then be given to the official Islamic organizations). Instead, in Germany, Islam was only ascribed the status of a legally recognized private association (like all religions in France), which granted the freedom of assembly and association. As a result, the German Muslims, and in particular the Turkish community, gathered in several associations, the most influential of which were Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren, Türkisch Đslamische Union der Anstalt für Religion, Milli Görüs and Kaplancï organization (Blaschke, 2004: 94 111). The first of these is the German branch of the powerful conservative Turkish sufi order Suleymanci, whose German 88 headquarters are in Köln. In fact, the large Turkish sufi orders, especially Nurcus, Nakshbandi, Suleymanci, have contributed from the beginning to the preservation of the identity of Turkish Islam in Germany and to the emergence of the first forms of community structures and religious schools. This has mainly been due to the fact that, given Turkey's secular policies, many leaders and organizations preferred to exile themselves in search for a better ground to recruit followers. For the same reason, Ankara will attempt, in its turn, to maintain a religious control over the Turks from abroad by opening branches of the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs ( Türkyie Diyanet Vakfi ). In Germany, this official Turkish Islam is represented by Türkisch Đslamische Union der Anstalt für Religion (Diyanet Đ leri Türk Đslam Birliği – DITIB), founded in 1984 with its headquarters in Köln 4. Through this institution, Turkey has made efforts to win the loyalty of Turkish immigration and to immunize it against the influence of sufi orders or new Islamist movements which have emerged from its midst and have been regarded as destabilising the values of the republic (International Crisis Group , 2007). However, a large number of preachers and religious teachers sent by Ankara and assigned the task to teach Islam in the schools attended by Turkish students have, in fact, been 'appropriated' by the Islamist movements from Turkey, most prominently by Milli Görüs (which in the 1990s will become extremely influential among the Turkish immigrants in Germany). The development of this political Islam on German soil has facilitated, in subsequent years, the emergence of new Islamist currents, in particular that of Salafism. Therefore, radical movements connected to GIA or al Qaida have found followers in large cities such as Hamburg and Frankfurt. However, the Islamist threat in Germany is less constant than in other European countries; social peace has been fostered since 2000, when the federal government finally took the decision to grant citizenship to people born on German soil, which has reduced the frustrations of the Muslim population. In any case, all these models have proven their limitations, given the fact that especially since the 1990s the main problem of a part of the Muslim community in Europe is no longer that of cohabitating in a milieu whose culture and values are different from those of Muslim countries, but rather that of dominating this foreign milieu in the name of their own traditions. Clearly, the geo cultural conflict in which Europe finds itself unwillingly involved is still visible mostly at the level of representations, and has been prompted by a small radical minority among the Muslim populations. However, unlike many parts of the Muslim world, Europe has long been a peaceful region, experiencing no violent political and social unrest or bloody confrontations. Therefore, it can become an easy prey, to the extent to which the violence defining the strategy of the new Islamist movements has been transferred on its own soil. The attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005) as well as those in the USA (September 11, 2001) are a significant indicator of the destabilizing impact on the Western population's sense of stability and security, and on the political and economic environment at large. To understand Islamist issues in contemporary Europe, one has to become aware of the very multiplicity of Islamist movements now residing in Europe and of their diverse ideological positions, which very often are founded in a theological understanding of the destiny and identity of the Muslim population. However, European Islamism, like that in the Muslim world, only represents one option, embraced by a certain section of the Muslim population. We must avoid oversimplifying generalizations, which are too hasty in their search for sociological structures much too abstract for the real state of affairs. As a matter of fact, Islam is far from being monolithic (not only as it emerges in Europe at large, but even in each particular city); instead, it has transferred to Europe the various divisions and political, religious and personal rivalries which it experienced in the Muslim countries. A large section of the Muslim population has in fact been integrated to various degrees into the social, economic, and even political system of the states in which Muslims have settled or were born. These people have bonded to the classical values of the Western world without cultural or identity traumas, and many
4 http://www.ditib.de . 89 specialists in the Islamic phenomenon regard this adjustment as a positive sign for a possible transformation of Muslim societies according to the Western model. The main problem has been and still is, perhaps even more pressingly, that of the Arab Muslim populations, which encounter difficulties in their striving for professional and social integration into the various European states. The underprivileged, including university graduates who find themselves not having equal opportunities compared to the local population, have always been the favourite pool for militant Islamist movements. In the 1970s and '80s the most important such movements were Tabligh , the Muslim Brotherhood and various Saudi religious organizations. Despite their rivalry and competition, all of them share their adherence to non violent policies, arguing for a bottom up process of Islamisation through powerful social activism. In the last decade of the 20 th century they encountered strong competition from newly emerging ideologies and from Salafi militantism, which has made the rejection of the cultural, social and political Western system one of it main goals.
The Tabligh movement . In France, Great Britain, and Belgium Tabligh long dominated the outskirts of the large cities, promptly providing an alternative sense of identity to the Islamic immigration confronted with a crisis, but also to the second generation immigrants who found themselves separated from the cultural milieu which could have fostered their Islamic identity (Diop 1994 : 145 155) . Tablighi jama'at , "the society for the dissemination of faith", in short Tabligh , was founded in India by Muhammad Ilyas in 1928. The main goal of the association was to find a solution for the Indian Muslims who were in danger of losing their religious identity after coming in contact with the Hindu culture or the European tradition brought by the British. The return to Islam is accomplished by religious practices based on a close and faithful imitation of all the acts of the Prophet ("the effort to follow the path indicated by the Prophet" – al Minhajj al Nabi (Abderahim, 2001: 58)), as they are expressed in Hadīth . This idea is not innovative to Islam because the whole Sunni tradition believes that Muhammad's words and deeds are the second source of inspiration next to the Koran. It is in fact a literal observance of Shari' a : all rules of behaviour, dress codes and spiritual attitudes are to be strictly observed exactly as they were prescribed by the Prophet. The purpose is to provide a new sense of belonging to 'umma , first to the Indian Muslims, then, as the movement spreads across the world, to all Muslims who find themselves in a minority and pressured into secularization after relocating in the West, or simply disconnected from tradition and searching for a religious identity. Its social impact on all the regions where Muslims live is largely due to the activism of its members, who travel and preach in different countries (in a manner similar to that of Protestant itinerant preachers), thereby creating and supporting an efficient network of personal connections. Missionaries and Tabligh representatives have made a decisive contribution to reinforcing Muslim patterns of behaviour in the Western world even if they are much simplified (in an attempt to maintain an orthopraxis strictly limited to the acts of the Prophet), and much impoverished in their intellectual content. Tabligh is opposed on principle to any political involvement, which on the one hand has allowed its faster penetration into Europe (since it was regarded as presenting no danger to public security) but on the other hand has generated rejection from the Islamist movements with a political agenda. In Europe, the movement's strongest influence was manifested in the 1970s an '80s, especially in France, where it was represented by the associations Foi et Pratique and Tabligh wa Da'ouat Allah, both led mostly by leaders of Tunisian origin (Kepel 1991: 179 209), both holding an important place in the new Conseil Français du Culte Musulman . At the time, Tabligh exerted a considerable influence on the first generation of Muslim immigrants settled in the developed West and generally coming from a social milieu with no higher education, few economic prospects and little integration in the culture of the Western world. These young people responded to a system that preached a highly schematized and simplified existential and religious model, which transcended national identities and the various Sunni rites (Khedimellah, 2001: 1 18). However, once the first 90 generation of Europe born immigrants reached maturity, a generation which had already assimilated the general framework of Western culture and civilization without truly appropriating it, the lack of intellectual scope and excessive simplification of Tabligh practices made the new movement become less and less relevant for the sophisticated expectations of the youth. Therefore, since the 1990s Tabligh has started losing its appeal and encountered ever stronger competition from new organizations which hope to secure the loyalty of European Muslims: the Salafi movements and numerous Muslim associations, many of which follow the tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood. The latter benefited from the financial support provided by the Golf states in order to promote various charity and propaganda actions. It should also be mentioned that starting with the 1980s some Tabligh members join more militant movements, especially after receiving ideological and military training in countries such as Afghanistan, Chechnya, Somalia, Bosnia, and more recently Iraq. This is a phenomenon widely spread throughout the Muslim world, which testifies to the fact that many people who adhere to Islamism increasingly tend to move beyond a strict ethic, behavioural and missionary dimension towards involvement in action. This will be directed either against ruling Muslim elites, regarded as illegitimate from the point of view of Islamic values, or against the whole non Muslim world, which Jihadi organizations envision as the target of a global holly war.
The Muslim Brotherhood putting down roots in Europe. Traditionally all organizations connected with the Muslim Brotherhood have favoured a non violent political activism and at the same time a community activism which hopes to revive the old moral, social and juridical values which defined the early times of Islam (Olivier, Michaud, 2001). The movement started spreading in Europe after the World War II, given the increasing Arab immigration towards Europe, but also because many leaders or members of the Brotherhood were persecuted in their home countries and took refuge in Europe. Founded in 1928 in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, whose reformatory project aims at the entire Umma , has managed to create from the very beginning several "national" branches in various countries from the Middle East and North Africa. With the arrival of Muslim populations in Europe, a large number of members and whole networks will settle here, most often in the official form of Islamic organizations and institutes which help to promote the Brotherhood’s specific goals in the new territories now inhabited by Muslims. It is important to notice that the Muslim Brothers’ attitude towards Europe springs from the decision taken by their main leaders, especially after 1989, to define Europe as Dar al Islam, a territory under Muslim law and regulations. This is more than a theological issue because it involves a whole set of practical consequences which impact European security. In the traditional Islamic geopolitics, as it was already defined by Muslim legal experts during the classical age of Islam, there are two large interpretations of the concept of territory according to whether it is under the Islamic law or not. A territory inhabited by Muslims who observe and put Shari'a into practice is described as Dar al Islam . On the contrary, a territory not yet under Islamic legislation is called Dar al Harb , land of war, against which jihad is legitimate. After 1989, the main leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood come to accept as a fact the settlement of Muslim populations in Europe, which triggers a dogmatic change of its status towards further legitimisation. Obviously, the target of Islamist ideologists is only the Muslim population itself, in an effort to make the most of its new status, that of belonging to non Muslim states. Influential leaders such as al Qaradhawi believe that in this way Shari'a can be put into practice in Europe, on an individual basis, by each Muslim; this is called "Minority Shari'a ". The ideology and strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood have undergone significant changes since the movement's classical period; in fact, its endurance over decades is also due to this pragmatic flexibility, which responded to the evolution of regional and international geopolitical contexts. After the 1970s the moderate militantism of the Brotherhood and of all similar Islamist movements ( Refah and then the Justice and Development Party, Turkey, 91 Jama’at e Islami Pakistan, the Justice and Development Party – Morocco) has contributed to their being gradually accepted by the ruling powers and even to their involvement in the political games of some states (Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, the Palestine territories). A full awareness of the specificities of each state in which the Brotherhood exists has unavoidably led to a "nationalization" of its various branches, which identify themselves with the national identities of the countries where they function and even come to appropriate such an identity in an effort to turn to their own advantage the nationalistic symbolic capital traditionally 'confiscated' by the ruling powers: “A la fin des années 1990, on peut constater que presque tous les mouvements islamistes sont devenus plus nationalistes qu’islamistes. Leur champ d’action est limité à un seul pays.”(Olivier : 36). This real politik clearly moves away from the utopian goals of the first Islamist ideologists, who envisaged the foundation of an "Islamic state" ( Dawla Islamiyya) in which political power itself would be legitimized by Islam. Over the years, many networks of the Muslim Brotherhood chose to pursue a moderate project, partly because of the practical impossibility of overthrowing the political systems in place in the Arab Muslim states, partly because of rethinking their strategies for action. The main purpose was to ensure as effective as possible an observance of Shari'a, both privately and publicly, by the Muslim population without however openly challenging state authority. Therefore, the Muslim Brothers took political, juridical, and social action especially in the form of lobbies and pressure groups, thus attempting to promote their own agenda, which generally aimed at a thorough re Islamisation of legislation and public regulations. Many associations, organizations and institutes, especially in France, England, Germany and Switzerland claim connections with the Muslim Brotherhood (for example, the national branches of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, whose headquarters are in London). In France, the Brotherhood is mainly represented by the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF) 5. Founded in 1983 by two Tunisians, the union was initially only the French wing of the Islamic Tendency Movement, the latter initiated in 1979 by Rachid Ghannouchi and representing in fact the Tunisian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (Lamchichi, 1989: 196 201 ). The increased repression of Tunisian Islamist movements by the Bourguiba regime determined many Islamist leaders to leave for France, which was thus to become a basis for their reorganization and action (Amghar, 2005). One immediate consequence was an increased activism towards the French Islamic community, which became the new target for the movement's agenda. The official goal was to help preserve Islamic identity amidst the secular values of the Republic and to contribute to a highly visible community mobilisation in order to configure a coherent structure of the French Islam, which would serve as the starting point for spreading Muslim values across Europe. In fact, the movement pursued the classical goal of Islamic tradition, that of da'wa, i.e. the appeal to the whole of humankind to join Islam (Kepel, 1996 : 276). To this effect, UOIF established over the years a large community network for the French immigrants of Islamic religion, which consisted of more than 30 cultural centres, about 250 associations, organizations for youth ( Jeunes musulmans de France 6, Etudiants musulmans de France 7) or for women (Ternissien , 2007: 161). Initially UOIF mainly promoted an offensive militantism, which constantly attempted to become visible by engaging in a confrontation with the secular values of the French Republic (for example, the conflict over the Islamic veil). Gradually, however, especially after the shift of power in 1993 the union has seemed more and more willing to collaborate with state institutions in order to provide official legitimization to its agenda and to compete better with the other institutions and organizations which contend for leadership over the Muslim communities in France. As a consequence of this strategy of integration, UOIF becomes in 2002 the most important member of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (Zeghal, 2005), an institution founded with support from the then
5 http://www.uoif online.com . 6 http://www.jmf.asso.fr . 7 http://www.emf asso.com . 92 minister of internal affairs, N. Sarkozy. The state thus attempts, unusually for traditional French politics, partially to delegate to an institution of the French Islamic community the task more efficiently to control problematic Muslim social milieus. However, this very collaboration with French political institutions has alienated many of UOIF’s supporters, mainly the young and underprivileged generations who criticize the clientelism and bureaucracy of the UOIF leaders and especially their passive attitude towards the crises with Islamic implications (the 2004 law that forbade wearing the Islamic veil in schools). Therefore, they have turned to the Salafi ideology and movements, which better echo their social and economic frustration and identity issues (International Crisis Group, 2006: 6 8). Due to its important position in the European Islamic landscape, Great Britain represents one of the countries in which the Muslim Brotherhood have established strong roots. The main centres that promote their interests are the Islamic Information Centre in London, the Muslim College also in London, the Muslim Students' Society, the Federation of Student Islamic Societies and the Muslim Association of Britain . In Germany, the most important such centres are: the European Muslim Union, with headquarters in Bonn, the German Islamic Association ( Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland ) – Munchen, and especially the movement called the Fighting Vanguard . The last was founded and led until the end of the 1990s by a legendary figure of the Muslim Brotherhood, Issam al Attar, former leader of the Syrian branch, who managed to escape Assad regime’s violent repression of the Islamist rebellion in Hama from February 1982. The main locations of the movement are the Islamic centres in Aachen, Köln, München and Berlin but the core centre of the Brotherhood in Germany is Bay tal Islam (located near Frankfurt), which itself is subordinated to the European centre of the movement in Geneva (Vidino, 2005 ). Without any direct connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, but sharing its agenda of implementing a political Islam by institutional means, there is the main Islamist movement of the Turkish immigration from Germany and Europe, Avrupa Milli Görüs Teskilati – the Islamic Community of the National Vision in Europe ( Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs – IGMG) 8. Founded in 1971 in Braunschweig by Necmettin Erbakan, it was intended as the European branch of the newly founded Islamist movement led by Erbakan in Turkey, which was to take power there in 1996 as the Refah party. In 2000, the Milli Görüs leaders maintained that the movement had more than 30 associations, 511 mosques, 2137 organizations for youth, women and students and 252.000 followers across Europe (Beuker, 2002). The relationship with the original Turkish party remained ambiguous, especially after Refah was dissolved and its successor, Fazilet Partisi , divided in 1999 into two new movements: a conservative one ( Saadet Partisi – Prosperity Party), which pursued the radical project of the social and political Islamisation envisaged by Erbakan, and a pragmatic one ( A K Partisi Justice and Development Party) that has been in power since 2005. In recent years, Milli Görüs has been following its strategy of implementing a politicized and conservative variety of Islam among the Turkish populations in Europe. On the other hand, it has been committed to directing this militantism from abroad towards influencing political life in Turkey, although officially there is no institutional connection between IGMG and the Islamist parties from the Turkish Republic (International Crisis Group, 2007). Switzerland is one of the key countries for the most important Islamist trends from all over the world. Unlike the other European states, in which the social basis of Islamic movements largely comes from underprivileged milieus, Switzerland hosts an Islamism that tends to be elitist, recruiting followers from the upper classes, people with a successful work insertion, often practicing liberal professions or joining the banking system. The Helvetic Confederation provides two great advantages for the Islamist movement: the diplomatic opportunities (especially in Geneva) and the classical Swiss banking system as illustrated by the financial milieu in Zürich (Patrick , 1998 : 36 51) . As a result, the European headquarters of the Muslim
8 www.igmg.de . 93 Brotherhood are in Geneva, and so are the European branches of Saudi Islamist organizations (the Muslim League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Islamic Development Bank). Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahhabi movement have been in obvious competition for securing a hegemonic position from which to coordinate the European Islamic landscape. The Muslim Brotherhood's arrival in Switzerland can be traced back to Saïd Ramadan, the son in law of Hassan al Banna (the Egyptian founder of the movement). In 1961, Ramadan opened the Islamic Centre in Geneva, which has become the movement's core location in Europe 9. The current leader of the centre is Ramadan's son, Hani Ramadan; however, the main ideologist and most important public figure of the Brotherhood in Switzerland as well as the whole of Europe, is undoubtedly Tariq Ramadan 10 . In Zürich, the movement has strong connections with some Islamic banks such as al Takwa , which enable both the cash flow of the Brotherhood and the implementation of various social and cultural projects that target Muslim communities. If Tabligh has usually recruited its followers from underprivileged communities, with few intellectual aspirations, the organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood have mostly targeted the elitist Muslim populations, and in particular the students. In this latter respect, the Muslim Brotherhood (like all other Islamist movements) has taken advantage of the sharp decrease in the influence of leftist ideology and activism, once the main source of student mobilisation in most European universities. In the wake of the now lessened appeal of the communist left of the 1970s 80s, students belonging to European Muslim milieus, as well as other European students or those originating in Islamic countries, are much more responsive to the ideologies and programmes which Muslim organizations promote in Europe. The perfect example is provided by the students' branch of the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France , Etudiants Musulmans de France , which is a charity that offers support to Arab students with low financial means but also provides an opportunity for their social and cultural interaction with the Islamic milieu. The goal is to smoothen the students’ successful social and professional insertion in the French society, while maintaining their full Islamic identity and even enhancing it by proselyte activities 11 . As a consequence, the numerous charitable and social projects implemented with generous financial support from the Brotherhood's network of organizations or from Islamic institutions based in the Golf states have aimed at creating an Islam oriented space in Europe. This is to function according to the norms of Shari' a without, however, ignoring European institutions and regulations but rather turning them to the best advantage in order to promote the interests of the Muslim population. By resorting to non violent activism, largely based on propaganda and the social or even political insertion of its followers in the countries which they now inhabit (Western countries included), the Muslim Brotherhood seems to have embraced – at least at the level of official discourses and actions – the most flexible and profitable attitude. In Europe, it has taken advantage of the very liberal and permissive legal framework herein implemented, which allows the free expression of the ideological positions of various religious movements to an extent that would be all but impossible in Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Morocco. The Tabligh movement has kept a low profile and exhibited some xenophobia towards non Muslim populations, while the Salafi organizations have remained more or less clandestine and primarily directed their message towards the Arab Muslim communities. Unlike these movements, organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, given their official and legal status, have made themselves much more available to a dialogue with European media, which thus becomes one of the favourite means by which they promote their principles. The best known example is again the famous controversy over the Muslim veil which started in France in 1989 and has not yet found a final solution; it has been given media coverage and legal support
9 http://www.cige.org . 10 www.tariqramadan.com . 11 Les étudiants musulmans de France : entre islam et laïcité , www.animafac.net/IMG/doc/emf.doc . 94 by Union des Organisations Islamiques de France . This media exposure has often been used in order to secure acknowledgment of Muslim symbols and rituals by the official institutions of European states and it has managed to gain the solidarity of other representatives of the civil society, from anti racist organizations (e.g. SOS Racisme – in France), ecologist, altermondialist and leftist movements, to those of a far left persuasion. At the origin of this large interest lies the fact that Islamic organizations have increasingly taken upon themselves the role of defenders of the "disinherited" members of the capitalist society. Therefore, this explicit seeking of visibility is a defining characteristic of the Muslim Brotherhood among the other Islamist movements. It is best illustrated in the person of Tariq Ramadan, the charismatic figure of the "European Islam", who best exemplifies the double discourse promoted by Islamist ideologists by supporting at the same time the conservative line encouraged by the Brotherhood's Islamism and the idea of an Islam open and attuned to modernity.
The nebulous Salafi movements in Europe. The Salafi movements, which islamologists such as Olivier Roy have also labelled "neo fundamentalist", decline to integrate Europe in the area of Dar al Islam and regard the European territory either as Dar al Solh (land of the pact, in which Muslims take no violent action against the non believers – this is the position of pietistic Salafism) or as a part of Dar al Harb . This option carries considerable weight because it motivates the attitude of rejecting the cultural and religious Western values, as well as legitimising radical actions taken in the name of a Jihad against the non believers. However, like the Muslim Brotherhood, European Salafism should be understood in all its complexity, since it is nothing but a generic term that covers a diverse range of movements and tendencies in constant rivalry and disagreement with one another. Salafism represents a conservative interpretation of the Islamic doctrine and of the political history of the Muslim world, which emerged in the first years of Islam. In fact, its very name testifies to its origin: Salaf al Sahilin, "the pious ancestors", that is the Prophet, the circle of his followers and the first four caliphs, regarded as authentic models for Muslim behaviour and religious practices. Along the centuries, some Sunni theologians have often interpreted the religious or political failures of the Muslim world as a consequence of the estrangement from this original archetype. For this reason, they will suggest successive reformations of the society and of Islamic conscience in order to restore them to their authentic, original state. The best known of these reformers are: Ibn Handbal, 9 th century, Ibn Taimiyya, 13 th 14 th centuries, Muhammad Abd ul Wahhab, 18 th century, Jamal al Din al Afgani (1838 – 1897) and, more recently, Abdelaziz Ben Baz (former great mufti of Saudi Arabia until 1999) and Nasir ud Din al Albani (1914 – 1999). Any attempt at classifying the Salafite movements, whether in the Muslim world or in Europe and other countries, first needs to differentiate between the pietistic and the radical Salafism, the latter also known as Jihadist. "Shaykhist" Salafism . The pietistic Salafi movements are also known as "shaykhist" because they strictly follow the teachings of various sheiks and ulemas in the Arabic Peninsula (apart from Ben Baz and al Albani, the most important ones were or are Ibn Uthaymin (who died in 2001), Salih al Fawzan, Rabi Ibn Hadi al Madkhali, Al Cheikh – the new great mufti of the Saudi Kingdom, and Muqbil ibn Hadi (who died in 2001) (Burgat, 2005: 32 39). These pietistic movements generally promote a conservative vision of Islam in the manner of Wahhabism. They place emphasis on developing a universal type of Muslim, with no specific cultural allegiances, whose identity is based on the strict observance of a clearly spelled out theological and behavioural catechism. Their founding principle is that social changes meant to increase observance of Islamic norms must be based, above all, on improving individual behaviour. In fact, the emergence of Salafi movements, especially in Europe and North America, comes as a consequence of the transformations brought about by globalisation: "déstructuration des sociétes traditionnelles, refondation de communautés imaginaires à partir de l’individu" (Olivier, 2002: 144). Their ideology is founded on observance of a rigid set of rites, obligations 95 and interdictions which define the 'abstract' Muslim, who is completely detached from any cultural or social influence (Islamic or not, such an influence is regarded as unacceptable). Therefore, such a person is no longer the representative of a culture and becomes a homogeneous code, ready to adjust to any society: "le néo fondamentalisme est très clairement un produit et un agent de la déculturation des sociétés musulmanes, ce qui explique et son succès et son transnationalisme" (Olivier, 2002: 145). Thus, the Salafites refuse to build a multicultural Muslim community; instead, they criticise local Islamic traditions, ethnic based communities, modern legal definitions of identity (citizenship), as well as any form of assimilation to Western culture (Abderahim, 2000: 40) . Such an understanding appeals to those in search for an identity: "le nouveau communautarisme se construit sur l’individualisme, c’est à dire à partir de l’adhésion individuelle, par le retour personnel à la pratique religieuse stricte, celle du code"; the fact that Salafism has been successful mainly among Muslim communities living abroad is explained by its compensating for, as well as being a product of, a "crise de l’autorité" (Olivier, :152 153) . Although there are various ideological approaches and a strong rivalry within the Salafi movement, all its directions focus on several main themes: the superiority of Islam over the Western world, the decay of Muslim societies because of their estrangement from the true faith, the need for a return to the original Islamic teachings, an apocalyptic vision of a global battle between good and evil, fought by two generic entities called the Islam and the West (similar to the Weltanschauung of the American neo conservatives but in reversed axiological polarity). Unlike the Muslim Brothers, Salafi representatives oppose any political involvement and disregard national identity; most Salafi movements strongly reject contemporary political concepts (state, nation, citizenship) and regard their implementation in the Muslim world as an essential cause for the "separation" ( fitna ) which has fragmented the Islamic community. The only legitimate reference is made to 'umma , the congregation of all Muslims, irrespective of their geographical location. Therefore, Salafism presents a very special geopolitical vision, which is focused on two main concepts: Muslim individuals defined as such and their unity of religion and identity as represented by 'umma . Apart from these two elements, all other references to politics, culture or ethnicity are regarded as illegitimate and rejected. There are some Salafists, however, in particular those who have responded to the Jihadist message, who believe that the return to an authentic Islam is not possible without resurrecting the institution of the caliphate, a fundamental category in the Muslim political tradition, the only legitimate source of authority. In Europe, this estrangement from the local cultural and political environment is further enhanced by the aversion felt by the Salafites (in contradiction with the ecumenical orientation of traditional Islam) against Christianity, Judaism and other religions. The concern for ritual purity, which is a central aspect of Salafi behaviour, becomes exacerbated in Europe and in any other non Islamic regions, as Salafism is defined by favouring an interpretation of Islam with detailed focus on ethics and behaviour, based on strict observance of what is allowed ( halal ) and rejection of what is forbidden ( haram ). All these norms, set by Muslim Sunni ulemas with theological and legal authority, are carefully presented in textbooks, and more recently on television and the Internet. It is an important characteristic of Salafism that it gives central importance to the authority of ulemas, whose fatwas or decisions are meant to provide for their followers a canonical hermeneutics, both of the Islamic tradition and of the various innovations and challenges that confront the Muslim believer in the contemporary world. Whether they are integrated in the official state system of Muslim and non Muslim countries or they are independent, ulemas play an essential part in the ideological mobilization and subsequent actions of their followers. Benefiting from the countless mosques and religious centres spread across the regions where Muslims live, Salafi ulemas act most efficiently at the level of micro communities. The Muslim Brothers, Tabligh , the Saudi networks and the various Salafi movements are engaged in a competition over domination of the most important religious centres and mosques of a community, each of them attempting to win over the believers to its 96 own position. The allegiance of the imam or the religious leader in a mosque can significantly influence the attitude of the congregation; he can efficiently direct the religious zeal of his followers towards pietism or, on the contrary, towards violent jihadist action. The best known European example is provided by the London mosque of Finsbury Park, which, after falling under the influence of Abou Hamza al Masri, has pushed towards jihadism many of the worshipers. One cannot overemphasize the importance of ulemas as agents of the ideological and behavioural mobilisation of the Muslim population, irrespective of its geographical location. The personality of the religious ruler, whether he is the average preacher of a neighbourhood mosque, or a high profile leader of international reputation, is always decisive for the behaviour of a large part of the people who acknowledge his authority. Since Sunni Islam does not recognize any unique and universal religious authority that could provide a unified and uncontroversial perspective on religious dogmas, this situation has made room for a constant ‘liberalisation’ of Muslim religious theories and attitudes. Thus, alternative interpretations become possible, as well as the differential attachment of the believers to various forms of understanding and practising Islamic tradition. While maintaining its own identity, the Salafism of recent decades has largely been the result of Wahhabi ideology, and its global expansion has chiefly been fostered by Saudi policies of promoting a conservative vision of Islam, which began after Faysal became king in 1964, and increased with the availability of petrodollars in the 1970s. Since then, Saudi Arabia has attempted to gain geopolitical influence over the whole Sunni Muslim world by redistributing oil wealth towards the implementation of Islamisation projects and the recruitment of an elite who, taught in Wahhabi schools, was to bring Saudi Islam to their own countries, very often to the detriment of local Islamic tradition. The main instruments for exporting this "soft" Islamism – in principle, non violent and essentially directed towards adopting conservative Muslim attitudes – have been the many pan Islamic Saudi institutions and organizations, Muslim charities and Islamic banks. All these will unavoidably end up targeting the Muslim communities in Europe, where Saudi programmes compete with those of Tabligh and the Muslim Brotherhood, each movement fighting for the symbolic capital of the Islamic tradition. To a certain extent, each of them also claims an exclusivist canonical superiority, which tends to cancel out the relative liberalisation of the Sunni landscape occasioned by the theological and legal pluralism of the four official rites. Thus, the most important non governmental Saudi organization, the World Muslim League 12 (al Rabita al islamiya al ’alamiya ), founded in 1962 and whose main function is to support Muslim minorities from non Muslim countries, has a regional Islamic council for Europe (with headquarters in London) which aims at giving financial support to Islamic projects (mosque building, schools, Muslim institutes, cultural programmes etc.) (Antoine, 2002: 147). In France in particular, but also in Spain and Italy, where most Muslims originate from Maghreb, Rabita also faces competition from the official institutions of Maghrebian states (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), which in their turn propose projects meant to win the loyalty of their former citizens. For instance, Algeria has long been able to secure some important control over a part of France's Muslims by establishing a special relationship, ever since the 1950s, with the imams of the Great Mosque in Paris (and with the rectors of the Muslim Institute it hosts). The Great Mosque is the most important theological institution of French Islam, whose recent imams have been Si Hamza Boubakeur and, after 1995, his son Dalil Bonbakeur. Usually, however, the League's financial resources are much larger than those of such Arab states, which are also immersed in domestic economic and political difficulties; therefore, Saudi money often comes first. The League also coordinates the International Council of Mosques, whose role is both to finance places of worship and to coordinate and control them; its European headquarters are in Bruxelles. Rabita is certainly not the only source of financing and promoting Salafi (or Islamic) projects in Europe and across the world. One must also mention the importance of other Muslim
12 www.muslimworldleague.org/mwlwbsite_eng/index.htm 97 banking institutions: the Islamic Development Bank (founded in 1973 by the Organization of the Islamic Conference) but also Dar al Mal al Islami , a private Islamic bank founded in 1981 with headquarters in Geneva, and Dalla al Baraka , founded in 1982 by a group of Arabs led by the Saudi billionaire Salih Abdallah Kamil (Parigi, 1989). With an initial capital of one billion dollars, the bank has grown rapidly and even managed to enter the European markets by opening in 1984 the International Islamic Bank in Copenhagen, which has become the bank of choice for most European Muslims. Some of these financial institutions have played an important part in transferring private Saudi money towards various Islamic programmes in Pakistan, Europe or the United States. Finally, in addition to these institutions, a series of non governmental organizations have also emerged, the best known of which are the Islamic Relief Organization and the Islamic Relief Agency , both first functioning as links to support mujahedin (Ghandour, 2002) resistance in Afghanistan, later directing their attention towards Bosnia. In the 1990s an important role in steering private Saudi money to support "the Islamic fighters in Palestine, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Algeria" is played by the UK Islamic Mission. Another important British association, which promotes Wahhabi interests and strives to win the loyalty and financial support of European Saudis, is the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs . The main problem of all these institutions and associations remains that often a certain amount of money is not used for its official purpose – to support Islamic programmes – but rather directed towards various radical movements. The complexity of the social milieu which absorbs financial resources from the Golf states makes possible such practices, given the fact that the people involved can easily lean towards militant positions. This situation, in fact, only mirrors the classical ambiguity that has for decades characterized Saudi Arabia: a strategic ally of the United States, it has at the same time supported the Salafi current, whose ideology fuels many contemporary radical movements 13 . However, contemporary Salafism has moved beyond the institutional structure promoted and supported by private or public Wahhabi agents. It has become, first of all, a "state of mind" whose visible shape is given by various local figures, less motivated by the coherent strategy of some centre of power and more by their adherence to the same message and cultivation of personal Internet mediated contacts. Salafism is the perfect example of a trans national movement, based on a horizontal inside the network form of interaction, with no pre established hierarchy. In Europe, it is characterized by the strict observance of Shari'a , the deliberate refusal of any political involvement, a strong social control over its followers (especially over women) and the tendency to keep a distance from the surrounding non Muslim environment. Salafism has followed a logic of the ghetto; more precisely, its followers attempt to reiterate, in a new geographical context, the famous "retreat" of the Prophet from pagan Mecca to Medina, where he founded an authentic Islamic society which is taken as the mythical reference by all Islamist movements. Therefore, this breakaway with the values and social structures of the Western world is motivated by a principled rejection, on the grounds that such values are not in keeping with Islam. In some cases, Salafi leaders have gone so far as to advise their followers to leave Europe and return to their Muslim home countries, for fear they might be corrupted by Western lifestyles (Amghar, 2006: 72). However, their aversion against the West does not prevent Salafite supporters from taking advantage of its technological innovations: one of the most important characteristics of those who have embraced Islamism is their use of the Internet, which becomes a kind of virtual ‘ Umma, anticipating the hoped for de facto unity of all believers. There are numberless Salafi websites and blogs, either in Arabic, Urdu, various Oriental dialects, or in the European languages. Above all, these are a major instrument through which Salafi sheyks and preachers disseminate their canonical advice among the believers and
13 This is the reason why, after September 11, 2001, people like the French analyst of Rand Corporation, Laurent Murawiec, have officially denounced the fact that Saudi Arabia supports international terrorist networks, and have pleaded for a "de saudisation" of the kingdom, La Guerre d’aprés , Albin Michel, 2003 . 98 answer their queries concerning the observance of Shari’a in the contemporary world. However, such websites and blogs also represent the most readily available opportunity for promoting a neo fundamentalist ideology and recruiting new followers 14 . Moreover, the Internet becomes a space where people and groups can freely criticize one another, in terms of theological positions, politics or unavoidable personal arguments. The European penetration of Salafi structures is a relatively recent phenomenon, originating mainly in the foundation of Front Islamic du Salut (FIS) in Algeria in the late 1980s. It quickly spread its influence over the large Algerian diaspora in France, the main European center of the Salafi movement. Although FIS had a principled orientation towards a political agenda, and even won the local elections in 1991, the ideology of one of the movement’s important wings (the most prominent representative of which was the popular preacher Ali Benhadj) shared Salafism’s rigurous approach, which it actually attempted to implement in the Algerian milieus it could influence, especially on the outskirts of the large cities. The fact that FIS was outlawed in 1992 as well as the subsequent repression against its leaders triggered an exodus of many of them towards European countries, France and Belgium in particular. Thus, the founder of the Salafi movement in France was Abdel Hadi Dudi, the imam of the al Sunna al Kebira mosque in Marseille and leader of the Salafi wing which would generate FIS (Abdel Hadi Dudi had been expelled from Algeria in 1987). He would convert from the old political militantism of FIS to the pietistic orientation of Saudi Shaykist Salafism and become the only authorized representative in France of Rabi al Madkhali, the foremost canonical authority for the French Salafism. Indeed, since the second half of the 1990s the Saudi influence over French Salafism has become essential, especially after the new generation of Muslims, educated in the Arab Peninsula, return to France, and after Saudi missionaries and preachers open religious centers in highly populated Muslim neighbourhoods. Here they promote an increased activism, mainly targeting the youth; the most important means of disseminating Salafi principles are durus , the study groups linked to mosques or places of worship. Their imams, often self proclaimed, attract and mobilize followers, who are frequently people that used to support, but were disappointed by, the classical Islamist movements, Tabligh and the Muslim Brotherhood. Embracing Salafism involves countless nuances, as it is ultimately the expressions of a particular private experience. From a sociological perspective, however, the movement’s very focus on the individual believer as such makes Salafi Muslims join preferably small groups, often consisting of people who either are relatives or belong to the same social circles (friends or even band members) and who believe they belong to the “saved sect” ( firqa najiyya ). This decision to break away from the social milieu of the “non believes” results in very little public involvement and visibility on the part of most European Salafites, in clear contrast with the integrationist policies of the Muslim Brotherhood. This in also one of the reasons why it remains difficult to acquire adequate knowledge of the Salafite networks and of their members, intentions and actions (Smolar , 2005).
Jihadist Salafism The transition from pietistic to radical Salafism is often easy, given the fact that followers of both share the same Weltanschauung and only differ in their methods and the limits of their actions. Obviously, this shift towards a militant or even violent position is accompanied by a complex rationale of justification, which includes ideological and religious motivations, socio economic and political causes and, no less importantly, the followers’ personal histories. In Europe, these people have various origins: first, they are the war veterans from Afghanistan who are members, more or less openly, of al Qaida, GIA, Chechen networks, Islamic Jihad or Gama’al al Islamiyya in Egypt, and who have taken refuge in Europe. Under their influence, and responding to their proselyte action, the Muslim immigration from various European
14 http://www.marok1.com/page.html . 99 countries has become radicalized, in particular the young Muslims born in the West who undergo crises of identity both in terms of religion and culture. There are certain favorite methods for their recruitment: in the large cities, the mosques that have fallen under Jihadi influence (Finsbury Park – Londra, al Quds – Hamburg, Chatenay Malabry – Paris, al Tawfik – Bruxelles), but also the family connections or friends, and the Internet. Prisons, refugee centers and immigrant aid units are also places where Jihadi influence can be exerted and potential followers targeted. The Islamist conversion of some delinquents is one of the most widespread phenomena of recent years, mainly taking place in countries with a recent Muslim immigration such as Spain and Italy. These new immigrants, usually coming from Maghreb, face a much more difficult social integration than the older generations of immigrants, or those born in Europe to immigrant parents (Khosrokhavar, 2004). The underprivileged milieus on the outskirts of the large European cities represent important locations for disseminating the Salafi militantist ideology; however, not all the movement’s followers originate in here. Social and economic reasons do not provide an exclusive motivation for embracing Jihadism and violent action: a significant number of radical members and followers are recruited from the wealthy and well educated Muslim population. In addition to those born or permanently settled in Europe, many of them come from the Golf states, and their adherence to militant Salafism is motivated by ideological commitment rather than psycho social circumstances. Educated in Western universities and/or having lived in Europe for some time, familiar with the cultural codes of modernity, accomplished speakers of several international languages, these Islamists nevertheless utterly reject Western values and are most willing to apply their cosmopolitism to the advantage of trans national networks, which preach a global Jihad (Khosrokhavar, 2003: 271 301). For many of these people, national identity has lost any relevance and the only valid reference remains the sense of belonging to ‘umma , which transcends such “pagan” categories as state, borders, ethnicity. Aversion against the axiological system of the West, together with a belief in the spiritual, cultural and political superiority of Islam, does not invite a social “retreat” (as Shaykhist Salafism claims) but, on the contrary, calls for confrontation, in keeping with the historical archetypes of the Prophet and the first caliphs. This sublimated imagery and vision of war, which belongs to the Islamic tradition, is expanded on a global scale. Therefore, the various fatwas , or religious decisions, issued by Jihadi leaders now offer religious legitimization to acts of aggression against Western countries, which are regarded as mere abstractions on the battlefield of an apocalyptic imaginary confrontation between Islam and the West. Unlike Islamist attackers motivated by nationalist causes, whose potential victims retain a precise identity that explains their very choice as targets (the Jews for Hamas or the Islamic Jihad, the Iraqi for Iranian suicide bombers, the Russians for Chechen terrorists), Jihadi Salafites regard their victims as only “un signe dans une sémiologie abstraite, sans visage spécifique. Leur seul caractère identifiable, c’est d’être des “Occidentaux”, pour le simple raison qu’ils vivent en Occident” (Khosrokhavar, 2003: 295). The most compelling example of this prototype of the Jihadi militant is provided by the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and London (2005), many of whom were people with a successful professional and social integration. The alleged leader of the USA attacks, Mohammed Atta, belonged to a fairly wealthy Egyptian family, and was himself an architecture graduate from the University of Cairo. His conversion to Jihadi Salafism only took place in Europe, after Atta arrived in Hamburg for post graduate studies. During the 1990s he would attend religious services at the al Quds mosque and fall under the influence of Mohamed Haydar Zammar. An Arab Afghan war veteran and prominent member of al Qaida in Europe, he was to introduce Atta to the movement’s leaders in Afghanistan, where the latter would enrol in several military training programmes before settling in the USA (Finn, 2002 ). One more recent category of supporters of the radical Islamist ideology consists of the new converts, whose relatively low numbers are compensated for by their intense activism and by the public impact triggered by media coverage both in the Muslim countries and in the West. Many of those who embrace militant Islam belong to the well educated middle class and are 100 motivated not so much by spiritual as by ideological reasons since they regard Islamist ideology as the new form of anti establishment opposition, which has replaced the old fashioned and outdated leftist ideologies. More often than not, conversion is prompted by the influence of charismatic figures or, as in the case of the young people living on the outskirts of European cities (especially in France, where the official secular education has resulted in the disappearance of Christian religious and cultural landmarks), by long proximity with the Muslim population. Social interaction sometimes leads to support for, and identification with, the Islamic system of values or with the political agenda of the Muslim world. Conversions are not always towards radicalism, when they are mediated by movements such as Tabligh or by various imams and preachers that recommend pietistic Salafism; however, just like the Muslims by birth, the new converts always have the option to move towards militant activism (Stemman, 2006). Some of them even take part in military training, and sometimes conflicts, in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya or, more recently, Iraq – the new jihadi El Dorado. Apart from the zeal that characterizes all the new followers of a religion, Islam converts bring the additional advantage that, due to their Western origin, they can be more easily used for actions taking place in Europe. The emergence of radical Salafism in Europe in the 1990s has therefore been the result of two Islamist phenomena, which originated in the Muslim world but whose influence has reverberated in Europe as well. The first event is the exodus of a certain number of Afghan Jihadi fighters to Europe (either as refugees from their home countries or after they also spent some time involved in combat in Bosnia, Chechnya etc.). The second source of the expansion of Salafite networks in Europe is the Algerian civil war during the 1990s. Given the large Algerian diaspora in Western countries, particularly in France (more than three million), the political unrest, ideological currents and various changes that have affected Algeria along the decades have unavoidably impacted the Algerian population living abroad. As a result, the increase in the influence of Islamist movements during the 1980s (which culminates with the union of various groups and currents in Front Islamique du Salut (FIS)) is equally visible among the Algerian population settled in Europe. The annulment by the political and military leaders of the election results of January 1992, which proclaimed FIS the winner of the general elections, the outlawing of the Front and the arrest of its leaders have led to the radicalization of a part of the members and supporters of the Algerian Islamist movement. They give up any political strategy to win power (which has become an impossibility) and choose instead violent action directed, in principle, against the authorities but which has often resulted along the years in the massacre of civilian population (Labat, 1995). Several radical movements emerged after 1992, which were led by various “emirs” (with one national “emir” recognized by all the regional ones) and which came to be known generically as Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA). They embraced Salafi principles, became involved in mutual contestation and bloody conflicts, and perpetrated paroxystic violence which, although given a religious justification by ulemas such as al Qatada, was actually motivated rather by pathological aggressiveness. Engaged in an open conflict with the Algerian authorities, GIA (although often infiltrated among the members of the security services) ended up expanding its actions outside the country. Networks of financial support, arm traffic and propaganda were implemented within the Algerian communities in various European countries, especially in France. However, after 1994 the French authorities pursued an efficient policy of eradicating GIA members and supporters, more so in the wake of the attacks on the Paris metro (1995). Without being openly claimed by GIA, these attacks were, however, the result of a decision taken by the new national “emir”, Djamal Zitouni, to expand jihad on French territory in the hope that his action would persuade France to withdraw support for the Algerian state, thereby weakening it (Zerrouky, 2002). The prompt repressive reaction of the French officials, as well as the public disavowal of the attacks by most Islamic organizations in France led to the dissolution of the French GIA networks. These were mainly located in Paris, Lyon and Lille and consisted of militants that had purposefully come from Algeria as well as young Muslims recruited from the underprivileged neighbourhoods on the outskirts of French cities. Some of the French 101 members of GIA would be arrested while others would seek refuge in other European countries, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Switzerland and especially Great Britain (Lia, Kjøk , 2001). France programmatically pursued a policy of restricting militant and radical activism for fear that it might involve the French Muslim population, in particular the youth in underprivileged neighbourhoods, in violent actions against the social order and public security. However, in other European states (such as Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries) Islamist members and organizations from the entire Muslim world would find, until the September 11 attacks, a great freedom of speech and action. Some of the radical Egyptian leaders fleeing the repression of Moubarak’s regime, as well as GIA members, would settle in Sweden and Denmark, countries with a long tradition of granting asylum to political refugees and to all those suffering discrimination. GIA members would publish here the movement’s bulletin, al Ansar , mostly written by Islamist ideologists living in London (Sander, 2004: 218 223). In fact, throughout the 1990s the European center of Islamism would be the British capital – hence the name, already become a classic, of “Londonistan”. Taking advantage of the unparalleled permissiveness of British legislation concerning the granting of the right of residence to political refugees, large numbers of leaders and members of the most diverse Islamist groups and currents would settle in Great Britain. More than 30 opposition movements originating in the Muslim world used London as a basis for communication and financial support. This was also due to the fact that, given its advantageous global financial position, London was the place where many petrodollars from the Golf states were directed, and which attracted the great investors of the Arab world. The City of London hosted the European branches of Arab banks such as Dar al Mali al Islami and al Baraka , as well as those of the Muslim World League and of many charities, all of which operated with enormous sums of money worldwide. Besides, London became the world capital of Arab press and publishing houses, surpassing even the traditional centers, Cairo and Beirut. Most of the Arab daily newspapers and periodicals that circulated internationally were published in the British capital; in addition to these, there were many other publications issued by various organizations and currents in the Muslim world, either legal or dissident. However, after September 11, 2001, the British policy towards Islamist leaders and movements in Great Britain has become much less accommodating. In fact, the new anti terrorist strategy begins in May 2000 when the Terrorist Act 2000 is passed (later to be rectified, in March 2001), which bans verbal, financial and military support for terrorist organizations. As yet the law has its limitations, since it mostly targets the large radical nationalist Islamist movements and focuses less on restricting transnational Salafi networks. It is passed in response to the pressure from countries directly affected by Islamist violence (the USA, Egypt, India, Israel). London continues to decline the expulsion of Islamist militants charged with terrorist acts, such as the Algerian Rashid Ramda, leader of the GIA networks from abroad, a suspect in the 1995 terrorist attacks in Paris. It is only after the September 11 attacks that the Anti terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 is passed, which allows the arrest of any foreigner who is suspected of endangering national security. This law has led to restricting the media, financial and militant activities of British Islamist movements, and some of their leaders have been arrested after 2002 or expelled. However, the measures taken against the high profile representatives of British Islamism have not brought to an end the influence of Jihadi ideology among the Muslim populations in Great Britain. Some members of the community have chosen secrecy and a social mimetism that could render them less conspicuous to the authorities; other have preferred relocating in the north of England, or even in Ireland, regions under less security surveillance than the large cities in the south. The London underground attacks of July 7 and 21, 2005 were perpetrated by the new generation of Islamists, recruited from among those persuaded by the radical teachings of such well known Londonistan ideologists. Some of the attackers had a successful social and professional integration, which did not prevent their adherence to the conceptual and existential ideology of Salafism. It is a characteristic of many Salafi Jihadists involved in attacks (suicidal 102 or not) perpetrated in Europe that they display forms of behaviour which make them blend perfectly into the surrounding social environment (in clear contrast to the dress code and assertive behaviour of classical Salafi and Tabligh members, who thus conspicuously proclaim their identity). The discretion manifested by the members of radical Salafism in Europe is motivated by a Shia principle, that of takiyya , of concealment (when necessary, even concealment of one’s religious beliefs). It is difficult to anticipate the European destiny of all these ideological currents and movements of Islamism. The process of re islamisation, which has been affecting many Muslim societies for decades, has constantly reverberated across the Western Islamic community as well, prompting its members to a much stronger mobilization based on their asserting their Muslim identity and values. The fundamental problem for European states (and, in fact, for any country with a polemic Islamic activism) was, and has remained, that of identifying the most appropriate cultural, social, economic and security measures which could diminish the radicalism of some of these movements.
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Narrative Fiction as a means of Crossing Borders
Zuzana ISTVANFOYOVA
Umelecká literatúra nerieši životné problémy: ona ich rozkrýva. 1 Peter Zajac
Abstract: This study explores the relationship between fiction narratives and endorsement of multiculturalism and how reading of foreign authors can enrich the reader’s experience and help crossing mental or opinional borders of people. In other words, the aim of this paper is to support reading in general. Education (usually understood as factual information) is commonly used to prevent or eliminate negative effects of xenophobia, racism or any other conflicts between groups of people. Existing work in this field advocates mentioned idea but they do not stress enough emotional side of the problem. Education holds very important role in representation of multiculturalism, on the other hand it very often lacks the emotional aspect of educating which can be found in fiction. The aim of this paper is to display various ways of how (narrative) literature or prose can be useful in bringing nations closer to each other. Literature combines both aesthetic and informative functions and thus explains the cultural background of its author. To know something about a certain entity is only a step to understanding it. Today’s Europe needs to function on this kind of principle, it needs to understand. Besides political, economical, sociological etc. cooperation, the cultural one represents a very interesting way of how to open borders for our geographical neighbours. The borders that are usually the most difficult to open are those mental ones. Subsequently, all the other questions or conflicts can be dealt with much more easily.
Keywords: multiculturalism, identities, cultures, literature, border, diversity
Introduction Over the past few years it has become increasingly important to comprehend the psychological impact of multiculturalism on human behaviour and on the character of various societies. Cultural diversity and different cultural identities are becoming integral part of modern society of European Union (EU). The fact that EU continues to loosen its internal borders and migration of people has become relatively easy and desired has resulted in a need to solve several problems connected with diversity of cultures, religions, political attitudes and other opinions for purpose of protecting human rights and support antidiscrimination. This is especially important as we can recall numerous war conflicts that originated in dominance of one group which had enough power to suppress the rights and freedoms of another one. War conflicts are almost always sustained by emotions like anger, hate, fear etc. and they almost always result in win – lose situation or lose – lose situation. Psychological approach to conflict usually tries to solve the situation with win – win result, which can only be achieved by proper communication and openness to compromise. Knowledge of antidiscrimination practice is thus very important aspect of informing people that democratic society can only function when it protects the freedoms and rights of all its members and when the politics it open to maintain this processes. Rational analysis of the problem is, however, often not sufficient. People usually create their opinions on emotional basis, with the impact of their close surroundings and influence of public opinion (nowadays formed mainly by mass media). A positive means of this kind of emotional influence in favour of multiculturalism and thus crossing the borders that
1 Artistic literature does not solve life problems; it uncovers them. (translation by the author) 105 restrain openness and positive attitude to ‘otherness’ could be achieved by increasing emotional understanding – via fiction narratives. Before we start focusing on literature in particular, it is necessary to lay a brief historical background of the political and literary situation at least for the past fifty years or so. We are aiming mainly at Central European provenance (especially Slovak). We believe, however, that the outcomes of this paper can be generally true for any national literature. Historical background European Union has changed to a great extent over the past decades. Political changes (e. g. Treaty of European Union, Maastricht, 1992 but mainly Amsterdam Treaty, 1997) have helped social changes and raised issues concerning social life in general. Amsterdam Treaty meant a greater emphasis on citizenship and the rights of individuals. The Article 6 of the treaty affirms: ‘1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. 2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law (...)’ (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997) The respect of fundamental human rights and freedom is according to this protected by law. On the other hand, the enforcement of the law can be sometimes more difficult to assure and of often needs a great deal of other aspects to be accomplished. Some of the former socialist states entered European Union in 2004 and have brought new cultural and opinional heritage with them. Cultural diversity is considered to be a positive aspect of modern society but it needs to be regulated at the beginning, it needs to be understood by all the members of a particular society and it needs to be brought into practice. Cultural pluralism has been becoming an everyday state of virtually all member states and in this sense we can agree with Kelly that pluralism concerning the intermingling of national, ethnic and religious cultures through group migration has created ‘circumstances of multiculturalism’ (Kelly, 2002). Multiculturalism on one hand and globalization on the other one create a complicated and fairly dynamic environment within European Union. The abovementioned two aspects are of rather opposite nature. While the term multiculturalism is commonly used as ‘applied ideology of racial, cultural and ethnic diversity within the demographics of a specified place’ (Wikipedia), the central feature of globalization is that of transnational economic influence (Castles and Davidson, 2000). The relationship of ideology and economy could be found in any society and the way they cooperate essentially influences the range of endorsement of multiculturalism in it. Consequently, it influences the relationship of various groups in the particular society.
Literary background According to American literary critic and Marxist political theorist Frederic Jameson literary periods are closely connected to various stages of capitalism of a particular society. He describes three basic stages of capitalism: the first one is a capitalism linked to the market and industrialization which in Western Europe and the United States of America takes place throughout the 18 th century and lasts basically to the end of the 19 th century. This stage is connected to the development of technologies and aesthetical movement called realism. The second stage of Jameson’s triad is represented by a monopol capitalism which the author places more or less within the period from the end of the 19 th century till the mid 20 th century. The stage is typical for its electric internal combustion engines and aesthetic movement of modernism. The last stage (in which, according to Jameson, we live now) is an international or consumption focused capitalism which is mainly focused on marketing, selling and consumption of commodities (i. e. not their production) and which is connected to the aesthetic movement of postmodernism. 106 It is sometimes very difficult to state whether literature is really that closely connected to the economical development of a particular country as Frederic Jameson describes in his studies. Especially when we look closer at the narrative writings of Central and Eastern European literature and realize the historical situation after World War II. (socialism/totalitarianism) we can see that talking about capitalism would not be exactly appropriate. In spite of that we could find authors who were then representatives of e. g. postmodernism in literature. How is that possible? The answer could be found in thinking about postmodernism in general. As we know it, postmodernism is generally defined as ‘a cultural period after modernism, or aesthetically philosophical concepts and cultural configurations of the period’ (Nünning, 2006, p. 621) and it is closely connected to artistic, political and media changes in the 1960s in USA. From another point of view it can be described as ‘the first literary and artistic movement originating in Northern American continent (Žilka, 2000, p. 43) and as that it is a reflexion of the social circumstances of the time and place – i. e. influenced by the cold war, McCarthy era 2, the Korean war, the Vietnam war, ecological threat, arms race of the superpowers and many other events. This kind of uncertainty led in literature to questioning of general truths, mocking of grand narratives (the use of radical irony and satire is typical for postmodern works of art) and to major fragmentation of both, the form and the content. Because of this, ‘postmodern ‘mini narratives‘ are always situational, provisional, contingent, and temporary, making no claim to universality, truth, reason, or stability’ (Klages, 2003). The contrast between modernism and postmodernism is also crucial. It helps to uncover the way we perceive the world from the philosophical point of view. Marie Laure Ryan writes: ‘The passage from modern to postmodern fiction is described as a switch from an epistemological to an ontological dominant. Whereas modernism was haunted by the question ‘what can I know about myself and about the world,‘ postmodernism asks more radically: ‘What is a world? What kind of worlds are there, how are they constituted and how do they differ? What is the mode of existence of a text and what is the mode of existence of the world (or worlds) it projects?‘’ (Ryan, 1992, p. 548) The abovementioned atmosphere of fear and uncertainty could be found in Central and Eastern Europe during the period of the cold war (in former Czechoslovakia until the Velvet revolution of 1989) as well. Czechoslovakia was then a satellite of the Soviet Union and in literature similarly to other Central European countries, was limited to one official method of writing fiction. This method was called socialist realism and to a great extent it dictated not only the form but also the topics and themes of literature. The outer influence on literary life of this period is thus quite obvious. It meant less of originality and aesthetics and more of functionality in literature. The much more obvious influence could be seen in enormous mental distance to literature behind the Iron Curtain. Although it was possible to read translations from those countries behind it, the books were highly influenced by the selective method in choosing particular texts, translations and eventually official literary criticism which was trying to influence public opinion. One positive about this censorship was avoiding literary kitsch and low quality books from abroad, on the other hand it also meant getting only very few foreign 3 quality books. This kind of official approach can be thus described as modernistic in the meaning that good education was important even though the information were selected. ‘In modern societies, knowledge was equated with science, and was contrasted to narrative; science was good knowledge, and narrative was bad, primitive, irrational (and thus associated with women, children, primitives, and insane people). Knowledge, however, was good for its own sake; one gained knowledge, via education, in order to be knowledgeable in general, to become an educated person. This is the ideal of the liberal arts education. In a postmodern society, however, knowledge becomes functional – you learn things, not to know them, but to use that knowledge.’ (Klages, 2003)
2 Also called McCarthyism, term describes the intense anti communist suspicion in the United States in a period that lasted roughly from the late 1940s to the late 1950s. During this period senator Joseph McCarthy persecuted those American citizens who were suspicious of being sympathiserx of the communist party. This led to the atmosphere of fear and displeasure to appear on the blacklists. 3 Meaning from behind the Iron Curtain. 107 The postmodern can thus be seen as opposition to modern, equally to the opposition unofficial –official literature. This logically leads our attention to the unofficial group of writers who were naturally inclined to something opposing the official method of socialist realism and what is now associated with postmodernism. Here is the answer to the question why postmodern quality could be found in writings of authors from socialist countries. The atmosphere, the opposition and the impossibility to write grand narratives about the presence naturally led to the use of mini narratives, fragmentation, deconstruction, hidden irony and sarcasm, use of puns etc., i. g. to typical characterizations of the western type of postmodernism in literature. We are now speaking about a number of writers who were loyal to their own talent and refused to write according to the official method. Even though it was much more difficult and they had to restrict certain themes (especially writing about presence in judgemental way or criticizing the political situation of the time) they managed to publish high quality books without using the method of socialist realism. The other two groups of writers are represented by a group of dissidents publishing mainly abroad and the writers who prefered not to publish at all and wait for an unrestricted period in society. Especially the beginning of the period 1969 – 1989 is severely marked with the unsuccessful ‘Czechoslovak Spring’, occupation of Czechoslovakia by the army of Warsaw Pact and the following ‘normalization’ and ‘consolidation’. The literary scene changed its character – some authors emigrate (J. Blažková, L. Mňačko), some are banned to publish (D. Tatarka, L. Ťažký, P. Karvaš, A. Hykisch, P. Hrúz). This period means that Slovak literature was divided into three parts: exile, samizdat and official. When we look at the historical background like this, it is fairly clear that this kind of mental border between two blocks – leading to (but also based in) limited possibilities of reading literature of the neighbour – caused a huge deal of stereotypization. Not knowing and having no interest in knowing usually leads to dangerous simplification and can cause misunderstandings and conflicts of various forms. Iron curtain had effected the way people thought about ‘those’ behind it. They predominantly saw them in either too optimistic light or on the contrary in too negative, pessimistic point of view. Realistic aspect was often missing.
Neighbourhood and borders in Slovak literature Following lines have the ambition not only to describe neighbourhood and borders in Slovak literature, they should also serve as an example of fiction narrative itself and how it can open and explain the topic of human consciousness hidden in the books by authors from a former socialist country. Deeper understanding of the problem and greater openness towards multiculturalism would, however, need closer look to every particular work of art, which, indeed, cannot be done in this article. Hence further analysis of this problem should be performed in the future. As an example of those kinds of motifs (attitude towards neighbours and crossing borders as a way to freedom) that can display neighbourhood and borders in fiction literature we are going to briefly discuss two Slovak writers – Rudolf Sloboda and Pavel Vilikovský. They both started publishing their books in the 1960s and have some features in common. In particular, it is their focus on every day life and inner monoloque of the main characters.
Rudolf Sloboda Poriadok bol aj v Osvienčime, aj v ruských gulagoch. Zato ťažko hovoriť o poriadku na dedinskej svadbe. A kde je viac harmónie? (...) Umenie nemá s poriadkom nič spoločné. 4 Rudolf Sloboda
Rudolf Sloboda enters Slovak literature in 1964. Regularly more and more Slovak authors start to publish in the 1960s and the official control is benevolent as never before or
4 An order was also in Auschwitz. and in Russian gulags as well. But you cannot speak about an order in village wedding. And which is more harmonic? (…) The art has nothing to do with order. (translation by the author) 108 after. Sloboda has opportunity to study many foreign philosophers and novelists and decides to leave school so he can start working. He works for mines and metalworks and during these years he reads works by Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger but also prose writers Homer, Ovidius, Cervantes, Tolstoj, Dostojevskij, Kafka, Joyce, Proust, Wu ťing c´ and many others. He was influenced by American transcendentalist H. D. Thoreau whom he follows not only in his writings but in the real life as well. Rudolf Sloboda lived whole of his life in a village cottage without advanced means of civilization and tightly connected to nature. In 1995 he committed suicide. The artistic talent Rudolf Sloboda had is a great example of how easily we can understand the inner world of somebody else by just reading their thoughts. During his life, the author was regarded as a weirdo and his literary characters are also perceived as strange and a bit funny. Only careful reading can uncover deeper meanings and help to understand psychological nature of a human being. Once we understand the characters we might actually start liking them. The border of misunderstanding can be crossed. Dream, vision, rapture have become the real goals of literature because our new poets understand in these times of the ends what was understood by their predecessors a long time ago: it is not enough to tutor and amuse. They are convinced that miraculousness and fantasy (which let the spirit to be free from the body) have to survive in this machinelike world – maybe in changed shape or transformed, but they surely cannot be destroyed or expelled. (Welsch according to Leslie Fiedler, 1989) Dreams are something very natural in Sloboda’s books and they are closely connected with coexistence of low and high, or trivial and subjective and philosophical and objective. ‘... to ‘existenciálne nízke’ a prípadne hodnotové negatívne a to ‘onticky vysoké’ a hodnotovo pozitívne alebo hodnotovo sporné vystupuje v Slobodovom diele ako dialektická jednota protikladov’ 5 (Šútovec, 1988, p. 24). The artistic work of Rudolf Sloboda contains also an intertextuality and that is connected with the migration of his characters from book to book. This feature is also closely linked with postmodernism. It comes from the belief that everything has been already invented and that an author cannot do anything else but borrow (e. g. a literary character) from the past. Other important part of his work is radical irony which ‘R. Sloboda azda najpregnantnejšie dokázal inkorporovať do textu’ 6 (Žilka, 1995, p. 20). This is often displayed by well known sentence: Man suffers and God laughs, or ‘Boh sa smeje, pretože človek rozmýšľa (ba navyše: koná nezmysly), a zatiaľ mu skutočnosť preteká medzi prstami.’ 7 (Žilka, 1995, p. 11). Rudolf Sloboda represents that sort of writer whose characters are typical outsiders 8. Especially his last books (published in 1991 and 1994) use the method of migration of characters thus representing a serial type of novels and dealing with a new free political situation. The main character has autobiographical features and can be described as an unfortunate and seemingly unimportant person. His attitude towards death (he perceives it mostly as something positive, or thinks about it from philosophical point of view) and people (especially his neighbours whom he sees as unknown enemies) is sometimes paradoxically comical. Too much attention to trivial situations and on the other hand deep philosophical and religious insights make him a very
5 …that ‘existentially low’ and eventually negative in the value and on the other side ‘ontically high’ and positive or controversial in its value act in Sloboda’s work as dialectic unity of oppositions. (translation by the author) 6 R. Sloboda was able to incorporate in his work probably in the most prolific way. (translation by the author) 7 God laughs because man thinks (and in addition does nonsense), while the reality is slipping through his fingers. (translation by the author) 8 According to Colin Wilson: ‚The Outsider’s case against society is very clear. All men and women have these dangerous, unnamable impulses, yet they keep up a pretence, to themselves, to others; their respectability, their philosophy, their religion, are all attempts to gloss over, to make look civilized and rational something that is savage, unorganized, irrational. He is an Outsider because he stands for Truth.‘ (Wilson, 1956, p. 13) 109 interesting character to read. His hostility to the neighbours (which is at the same time a mutual one) displays how even an intelligent person can misunderstand and misjudge various situations in life. He is more or less closed towards people and this is also a reason why he refuses to visit Austria (when the borders are opened after 1989) – he is an introvert and a type of romantic who does not want to spoil his image of an unknown country. In the novel, the character keeps only looking through the frontier but does not use the possibility to actually get to know the neighbouring country and its people. His private experience leads to passivity. On the other hand, the main character thinks actively in terms of general knowledge. His fears, his human quality and his wisdom by which he tries to solve even emotional problems make him a type of wiseacre. Here is an example of his theories in which it seems he tries to overcome his fear by its verbalization:
‘Dnes už každý bez váhania prijme teóriu, že jadrové zbrane sú niečo nad človekom, a treba ich bezpodmienečne zlikvidovať. To je pravda, lenže túto teóriu môžeme vzťahovať na všetky zbrane. Ak nebude na svete nijaká zbraň, ozaj sa nemôže začať vojna. Teória však zabúda na to, že nijaká veľmoc nemá donucovacie prostriedky voči inej veľmoci. Dokonca veľmoc dnes prestáva vládnuť aj nad maličkou susednou krajinou, ktorá ju ničí terorizmom a atentátmi – ako sa to deje v Severnom Írsku.’ 9 (Sloboda, 1991, p. 26)
It is quite clear that the character is able to understand how international conflicts appear and that there is a potential way to avoid them. On the other hand he is not able to see that his conflicts with the neighbours (literary people) are of the same nature but on a much smaller scale and that is why he does not even try to be on good terms with them. The characters in texts by Rudolf Sloboda are very authentic and atypical at the same time. Their consciousness is able to communicate with a reader because human beings in his prose texts are to some extent exceptional, atypical but also ‘low’, ‘small’ and unimportant. Such extreme reflection of reality which cannot be pointed is probably one of the most truthful artistic creations of actual world that has been achieved in Slovak literature after 1989.
Pavel Vilikovský Byť sám, to je číra matematika, netreba ani pohnúť prstom, ale osamotenosť si vyžaduje aktívnu prácu vedomia. 10 Pavel Vilikovský
The second chosen personality – Pavel Vilikovský – is an example of an author who decided not to publish his works during the period of strong official control of literature. He published several novellas in 1989 and has continued to write. His recent books are full of emotionality and radical irony and to a great extent they lack a complicated storyline. The motif of stereotypization is shown in his novel Posledný kôň Pompejí (Last horse of Pompeii, 2001) where the main hero travels to London to accomplish his research in literature. Distance is displayed from his perspective as he feels lonely and is not able to get accustomed in the new environment. He also describes the perspective of his English professor who labels him because
9 Today everybody without any hesitation accepts the theory that nuclear weapons are something above human beings and thus need to be liquidated. That’s true but we can apply this theory on all weapons. If there are no weapons, there really cannot be a war. But the theory forgets that no superpower has the coercive measures towards the other superpower. A superpower today is not even able to dominate a tiny little neighbouring country which is destroying it by terrorism and bomb attacks – as it is happening in Northern Ireland. (translation by the author). 10 To be alone – that’s pure mathematics, you don’t need to do anything, but loneliness needs an active work of consciousness. (translation by the author) 110 of his nationality. As the protagonist is Slovak, the professor gives him a task to write about Slavic emotionality in the works of Joseph Conrad. It is obvious that the professor expected that he would (at least in the paper) believe in Slavic emotionality. Scepticism arises out of the fact that he cannot chose the topic himself and that he should pretend to believe in something that according to him does not exist. As the story takes place in London in the 1970s it is natural that the protagonist is alone and realizes the distance towards foreign country – he is too closed and thinks about the complicated situation in his homeland and his position in new circumstances. The paradox is that he does not feel lonely: ‘Bol som dlho sám. Niežeby som sa sťažoval, naopak. Páčilo sa mi to. Nebol som obstavený predmetmi ani ľuďmi, všade som narážal na seba.‘ 11 (Vilikovský, 2005, p. 541) The lack of communication causes that all the other characters perceive him as lonely. Whether it is his professor (whom he calls Okey Dokey) or his companion Mac who understands pictures of naked girls on his walls as substitute for real people. Although London is a cosmopolitan city the protagonist misses something:
‘Bol tu Londýn, veľké, do očí bijúce nebo, zelený kanál, vlečné člny, (…) bola tu, ktovie prečo, horúca ruská step, drevené domce, blatistá ulica s rozjazdenými, na kameň stvrdnutými koľajami, bola tu Varšava, kde som nikdy nebol, ale také hlboké tiene vrhajú iba polozrúcané domy vo vojnových filmoch (…) bolo tu, hneď vedľa mňa, dievča, ešte trochu zadychčané z tej dlhej cesty, veľké čierne oči prižmúrené pred slnkom. Bolo tam, slovom, všetko, len ja som nebol .‘ 12 (Vilikovský, 2005, p. 627, highlighted by the author)
The mentally or emotionally not being present is the key to understanding how borders between anybody – people, nations etc. – arise. People vary in their personalities and to some extent nations do, too. Of course, speaking about the general characterization of a nation would be as unwise as giving certain characterizations to any other group of people. The best explanation of this principle thus can be found in the following words by Peter Zajac: ‘Teda: ide aj o plnosť, vnútornú rozľahlosť, pluralitu a mnohotvárnosť života, o jeho pulzovanie, vlnenie, vibrovanie, oscilácie, rezonancie, pruženie, kmity a zákmity, o jeho balans, o životný rytmus, pulz, dych; o to, čo je v živote živé, životodarné (a patrí sem nielen vznik, rast, plnosť, ale aj pokles, zánik, smrť ako možnosť ďalšieho života). Ide však aj o životnosť literatúry, o jej privrátenosť k životnému svetu, o jej prepojenie s hodnotami životného sveta, o jej vrastenosť do životného sveta, z ktorého čerpá a ktorý čerpá z nej.‘ 13 (Zajac, 1990, p. 7) In Vilikovský’s work we can first of all detect a clear motif of emigration which is incorporated to his novel not only through the consciousness of the main protagonist/narrator, but which is also further raised firstly by frame texts (of completely different provenance – first one is a part of naïve student short story, the second one is historic text about a tinker from the
11 I was alone for a long time. I wasn’t complaining, far from it. I liked it. I wasn’t surrounded by things and people, everywhere I bumped into myself. (translation by the author) 12 London was here, the huge, eye striking sky, green canal, towboats, (…), who knows why but the hot Russian steppe was here, too, wooden cottages, muddy street with rutted, rock hard tracks, Warsaw, to which I have never been, was here, but those deep shadows can be only cast by half ruined houses in war films, (…) a girl next to me, a little breathless after the long journey, was here – big eyes narrowed because of the sun. In a word, everything was there, only I wasn’t. (translation by the author) 13 So: we are speaking here about the fullness, inner vastness, plurality and variety of life, about its pulsation, ripple, vibration, oscilation, resonance, stretching, swings and flashes, about its balance, life rhythm, pulse, breath; about what is living in life, life giving (and this contains not only formation, growth, fullness, but the decrease, termination and death as an opportunity for a new life). It is also about the vitality of literature, about its adherence to the real world, about its connection to the values of the real world, about its roots in the real world from which it draws and which draws from her. (translation by the author) 111 19 th century), and secondly by letters from friends – emigrants. While the frame texts are of the same kitscher sensitivity of an emigrant – Slovak out of his homeland, the letters from friends outline that the consciousness will deal with completely different problems and solve completely different questions than those ‘at home’. The fiction worlds are cumulated in the text on the basis of reflection of diverse cultural, time and space contexts, which eventually causes that ‘… v rámci Vilikovského rozsiahleho textu dominuje metafora nomádstva a kultúrnej vydedenosti, vykorenenosti, reprezentovaná rozprávačom, ktorý tvaruje modalitu svojho postoja k svetu od neutrálnych, cez úvahové, satiricko ironické až po sebaironické polohy. Rozprávač sa prostredníctvom intertextuálnych súvislostí ocitá v pozícii pozorovateľa a komentátora rozličných ľudských osudov, z ktorých je každý konfrontovaný s iným kultúrnym prostredím.’ 14 (Kušnír, 2003, p. 21) Crossing the border of psychological distance is obvious in the discussed novel Posledný kôň Pompejí. The author was able to elaborate the consciousness of his character to extremely broad contexts and to point at complexity of human existence. This kind of detailed perception on one hand caricatures the time, on the other hand it displays people in their human (ahistorical) natural spontaneity. It clearly shows that several needs of human being are necessary to be satisfied. One of them is group affiliation which has the same (or probably bigger) value for real, living people.
Conclusion Literature as a potential means of understanding of not only general facts about certain nations but their cultural and emotional aspects as well can be very important in increasing mutual tolerance among states and countries. Reading is a process which helps to overcome stereotypes and fear of unknown entities and can be useful in accepting the mentality of somebody else. Geographic borders are becoming less important within European Union but we can still see various barriers that prevent the complete crossing of mental borders (it can be a language barrier, stereotypes, factual distance etc.). Therefore translation and exchange of literary artefacts could be a step towards better understanding while at the same time the cultural heritage would be kept. This, on the other hand, requires willingness to read books. A proper education is thus necessary. The openness towards multiculturalism and the possibilities of fiction as a means of crossing the borders and barriers are enormous. Further analysis of this problem should be performed in the future to outline positive outcomes of supporting intercultural (international) exchange of literary experience via fiction artefacts. ‘Individualism had a negative effect on multiculturalism [for both groups].’ (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2005) On the other hand liberalization and cultural openness might dissolve geographic borders without endangering unique cultural heritages of particular nations. This article tries to outline connection between reading fiction and endorsement of multiculturalism. According to the surveys, less than 9 per cent of Slovak population read belletristic texts. If the situation improves it might have positive effects on relationship with neighbours or any other group of people who now seem to be ‘different’ in a negative way. As Zygmunt Bauman once said: ‘What we really know is not the world as it is but what we do with the world.’ (Bauman, 1996).
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
14 within Vilikovský’s extensive text the metaphor of nomadism and cultural disinheritance is dominating. This dispossession is represented by the narrator who shapes the modality of his attitude towards the world from neutral, through reflective, satirical and ironical up to self ironical postures. Through intertextual coherence the narrator has found himself in the position of an observer and a commentator of various human fates while every one of them is confrontated with different cultural environment. (translation by the author) 112
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Erasmus et la mobilité en Europe, vers un dépassement des frontières ?
Thierry CÔME
Abstract : Two decades of Erasmus experience had an important impact on the perceptions of Europe and its meanings. Also, the language, cultural and political frontiers were challanged by the educational mobility promoted within EU and the neighbouring countries. A brief evaluation of the Erasmus programme demonstrates that the educational exchanges were a sucess for all the parts involved (individuals, universities, states and the EU) and led to the convergence of a European educational model. The new regional context after the past EU enlargements underlines new cultural frontiers and brought opportunities with regard on the acces of new neighbours within the Erasmus programme.
Keywords : Erasmus, mobility, identity, education, transfrontier, culture, youth
Le programme Erasmus 1, à plus de 21 ans, est assurément un acteur majeur de l’identité européenne. Il est aux yeux de l’opinion publique européenne l’un des symboles les plus cités dans les sondages de l’intégration européenne 2. Pour José Manuel Barroso, président de la Commisssion, « Erasmus est le symbole de ce que l’Europe fait de mieux. Une Europe du concret, une Europe des résultats . » (Barroso, 2007). Les éventuelles critiques faites à ce dispositif dans quelques colloques par des spécialistes n’ont pas porté ombrage aux différentes manifestations organisées en Europe à l’occasion de son vingtième anniversaire. Erasmus a été fêté comme une réussite européenne. La mobilité des étudiants, des enseignants et des chercheurs apparaît dans de nombreux discours politiques comme le préalable à une connaissance commune de l’Europe et de ses institutions. Elle est associée à la Stratégie de Lisbonne (Côme, 2004 : 151 183) et a été une des préoccupations de la présidence française de l’Union Européenne 3. En particulier, à travers le programme Erasmus, la mobilité intra européenne est la marque d’une ouverture d’esprit et le catalyseur de projets multinationaux de formation et de recherche, autant d’éléments nécessaires à l’établissement de relations durables et équilibrées, préalable nécessaire à la construction d’une identité européenne commune. Cependant, malgré cette image symbolique forte et la réussite indéniable du projet européen, le programme Erasmus présente des limites qui ne lui permettent pas d’atteindre le niveau de ses ambitions de départ, à savoir la mobilité d’un étudiant sur dix au cours de ses études. De plus, l’examen de la réalité de la mobilité étudiante en Europe montre une tendance à l’uniformisation des pratiques, en particulier linguistiques, et une permanence de comportements de mobilités restreintes en contradiction avec l’idée européenne de diversité et de découverte culturelle. Certes, grâce au dispositif Erasmus 4, les notions de frontière comme séparation linguistique, culturelle, politique ou de zone d’échange et de continuité perdent leur dimension géographique. Ainsi les étudiants belges vont plus en Italie et en Espagne qu’aux pays Bas ou en Allemagne. Toutefois les frontières sociales demeurent. La mobilité intra européenne a un coût
1 Acronyme signifiant EuRopean Community Action Schema for the Mobility of University Students 2 Erasmus : Histoires de réussite – l’Europe ouvre des possibilités , Luxembourg, Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes. 3 Voir l’étude réalisée par Yves Bertoncini à la demande des ministres Besson, Jouyet et Pécresse dans la perspective de la Présidence française du Conseil de l’’union européenne, Encourager la mobilité des jeunes en Europe, orientations stratégiques pour la France et pour l’Europe , Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, n°15, La Documentation Française, septembre 2008. 4 La présentation du programme Erasmus par le site du parlement de Strasbourg se fait sous le titre évocateur de « L’éducation sans frontières ». 114 difficilement supportable pour les jeunes issus des milieux ouvriers, voire des classes moyennes. Elle reste réservée à une élite. Cependant la notion de frontière comme lien ou continuum entre deux espaces et éventuellement lieu particulier, spécifique, dialogique qui n’est ni une partie ni une autre mais qui nécessite les deux parties, qui les rapproche sans les fondre pour ne pas disparaître, se rapporte aux comportements corporatistes des étudiants Erasmus qui, faisant passer leurs points communs avant leurs différences nationales, construisent un groupe en opposition/intégration avec les étudiants d’origine de leur université d’accueil, l’étendent ensuite de manière réticulaire et créent ainsi les bases d’une identité européenne. « Grâce à ces programmes de mobilité, les étudiants se construisent un imaginaire collectif à propos du Vieux continent, à des lieues de l’Union européenne économique telle qu’elle a été pensée à la base et bien loin également de la concurrence des formations étrangères, d’outre Atlantique ou d’ailleurs. » (Haërtel, 2007 : 2).
Erasmus: une image symbolique forte, un projet européen réussi Le programme Erasmus bénéficie d’une notoriété et d’une image fortement positive auprès des étudiants et du grand public. Le succès du film de Cédric Klapish décrivant les pérégrinations d’un étudiant français, interprété par Romain Duris, se construisant une identité et une personnalité grâce au programme Erasmus en est un des révélateurs. Lancé en 1987, avec le soutien de François Mitterrand et la bénédiction de Jacques Delors, Erasmus constitue pour beaucoup un indéniable succès. Ainsi Bernard Maris, idéologue français du non au référendum sur la constitution européenne, reconnaît pourtant que « au fond, il n’y a que deux réussites en Europe : Erasmus et l’Euro. » (Maris, 2007). Intégré au programme éducatif Socrates depuis 1995, il a réussi à convaincre chaque année toujours plus d’étudiants (3244 en 1987/88, 79 874 en 1996/97, 159 324 en 2006 /2007, soit au total sur 20 ans 1 683 928 5) d’effectuer une partie de leurs études (entre 6 et 7 mois en moyenne dans l’Europe des 27 depuis cette date) dans un autre pays européen et il a ainsi également « considérablement encouragé la mobilité des jeunes européens » (Perez, 2008). Ces étudiants Erasmus représentent aujourd’hui le deuxième contingent d’étudiants poursuivant un cursus à l’étranger (2,9 millions en 2006). Erasmus montre ainsi qu’une initiative de l’Union européenne peut se transformer en un symbole fort de l’Europe. En effet, Erasmus a permis une relative mise en cohérence des formations universitaires, au sein d’un Espace Européen de l’Enseignement supérieur, à l’origine du processus de Bologne. Le rapport Cox, du nom de son président, pointait dès 1978 les problèmes existants en matière de reconnaissance des diplômes universitaires académiques et les entraves à la mobilité qu’ils entraînaient. Le système ECTS (European Credits Transfer System) est lancé à titre expérimental en 1989 puis proposé depuis 1995 à l’ensemble des établissements d’enseignement supérieur européens pour répondre à ces problèmes. Dans le même but, la Convention de Lisbonne d’avril 1997 qui prône la reconnaissance mutuelle des diplômes et l’inscription d’un Supplément au Diplôme 6 est établie entre le Conseil de l’Europe et l’UNESCO et ratifiée depuis par la plupart des états européens. Ainsi, du point de vue pédagogique, l’harmonisation des cursus progresse grâce à la validation des semestres effectués en mobilité Erasmus qui implique une base commune dans le contenu, l’articulation et l’évaluation des matières suivies. Le système des ECTS a ainsi trouvé non seulement une justification mais aussi une occasion d’utilisation. Toutefois, l’Erasmus Student Network (ESN) a fait remarquer qu’en 2006, seule la moitié des étudiants Erasmus avait pu bénéficier de la reconnaissance du diplôme obtenu dans une faculté étrangère à leur université d’origine.
5 Chiffres tirés du site de la Commission Européenne. 6 Le supplément au diplôme est un document annexé au diplôme d’études supérieures. Il décrit la nature, le niveau, le contexte, le contenu et le statut des études accomplies avec succès par l’étudiant. Il améliore la transparence internationale et facilite la reconnaissance académique des qualifications. L’Europe n’en est pour l’instant qu’au stade de la mise en œuvre. 115 Du point de vue gouvernance et évaluation des universités, le programme Erasmus par l’uniformisation des méthodes et des évaluations de la mobilité a également joué un rôle dans la convergence vers un modèle universitaire européen. Les universités, et de manière générale les établissements d’enseignement supérieur ont une autonomie de plus en plus large en Europe mais leur mode de gouvernance est loin d’être unifié, d’où une source de complexité. Implantées dans un territoire national ou régional, les Universités européennes diffèrent considérablement en termes de systèmes de décisions, de cadres légaux ou administratifs, d’organisation interne, de modes de contrôle, voire d’implication des acteurs, notamment les étudiants et les entreprises. Le concept d’autonomie est différent d’un pays à l’autre : en Angleterre, le Council Board, composé de représentant académiques ou professionnels choisis par l’université, nomme le président, valide le budget et approuve les orientations stratégiques ; en Autriche, le gouvernement peut choisir la moitié des membres des conseils d’administration ; en France, le président est élu par un collège des représentants élus de toutes les catégories d’acteurs de l’Université. Pourtant une approche commune est possible et revendiquée par l’A.U.E : l’autonomie des Universités, c’est leur responsabilité reconnue et assumée en matière de qualité. Haug et Kirstein constatent d’ailleurs que la tendance générale à l’autonomie s’accompagne de l’instauration de procédures plus strictes d’évaluation de la qualité. La déclaration de Salamanque insiste sur ces deux points essentiels : l’autonomie et la qualité. La convention de Graz conclut également sur une interdépendance entre autonomie, qualité, évaluation et responsabilité. Le programme Erasmus entre dans cette logique. En effet, le programme Erasmus, et les financements qui l’accompagnent, est strictement encadré et de la même manière par toutes les agences nationales. Les différents rapports exigés à tous les bénéficiaires de financement permettent de mettre à jour les dysfonctionnements éventuels des universités et l’effet de menace crédible que constitue le retrait d’une accréditation de la Charte Erasmus de l’établissement ne respectant des règles minimales, dans un contexte concurrentiel exacerbé entre universités, du fait notamment des difficultés de financement de la plupart des Etats incite à une relative harmonisation des pratiques administratives. Erasmus a aussi contribué à mettre la mobilité des étudiants, des enseignants et des chercheurs au centre de la stratégie de Lisbonne car en juin 2000, l’Europe des universités n’est pas un objectif à atteindre dans les dix ans : elle est déjà concrétisée dans le public. Grâce aux échanges d’étudiants mais aussi d’enseignants, Erasmus a permis la création d’une culture universitaire européenne. Les OM (Organisation de le Mobilité) et les TS (Teaching Staff) servent de base à de nombreux séjours d’universitaires en dehors de leur université d’origine, point de départ à des collaborations futures et des accords de recherche. Erasmus participe ainsi à la mise en réseau de nombreuses universités européennes. Cependant son succès le plus important est d’ordre psycho politique. Parce qu’il donne, malgré ses imperfections, la possibilité à tous les étudiants européens de faire une partie de leurs études dans une autre université, Erasmus a élargi leur horizon territorial : l’Europe est une réalité concrète, un élargissement de l’espace de décision des jeunes : ce sont des lieux d’études éventuels, voire des lieux de stages et même des lieux de travail. Même si dans la réalité la mobilité augmente peu, grâce à ce changement de références, à cette extension du possible, la jeunesse d’aujourd’hui se sait vivre en Europe et se sent plus citoyenne européenne que ses aînés.
Erasmus : des ambitions à la réalité Il n’en demeure pas moins que le programme Erasmus présente de nombreuses incohérences et limites qui rendent nécessaire son évolution. Les objectifs qui lui ont été fixés par la commission européenne sont encore d’actualité. La découverte de l’autre, le dialogue interculturel, la prise de conscience d’une connaissance commune européenne sont toujours nécessaires à la réussite de l’Union européenne. Cependant la méthode choisie, privilégiant le long terme (un semestre minimum), le contrôle institutionnel (le choix des étudiants doit être validé par les universités d’origine et d’accueil) sans pour autant donner aux étudiants les 116 moyens réels de partir, et de fait limitant l’accès à l’Europe aux plus favorisés n’est peut être pas la meilleure manière de promouvoir la mobilité. Certes la mobilité a obligé les universités du Vieux Continent à s’européaniser, c'est à dire à sortir des discours et des références culturelles communes (le Moyen âge, Humbolt, Condorcet) pour proposer des solutions concrètes permettant d’accueillir des étudiants sans cesse plus nombreux, de leur donner des formations équivalentes, de les évaluer selon des critères communs. Cette européanisation est d’autant plus poussée que, comme l’indique l’Agence Europe Education Formation France (nouveau nom de l’agence Socrates Lonardo), «le programme a maintenant une bonne notoriété et il devient difficile pour une institution de taille significative de rester en dehors du système » (Agence Europe, 2007). Cependant l’harmonisation européenne des diplômes reste à faire (ESIB, 2006), même s’il est clair pour les instances européennes que cette harmonisation ne doit pas, sous peine d’estomper l’originalité du système européen d’enseignement supérieur et de provoquer une vague de refus de la part des échelons nationaux ou régionaux, se transformer en uniformisation qui rendrait caduque l’expression des particularités culturelles, politiques et sociales des différents membres de l’Union et rendrait donc la mobilité académique inutile. C’est la diversité des formations qui est la condition du succès de la mobilité mais c’est elle aussi qui en limite la croissance. C’est bien là la complexité du problème ! Ainsi, malgré les avancées du processus de Bologne et la volonté politique sous tendant la construction de l’Espace Européen de l’Enseignement Supérieur, l’hétérogénéité des systèmes universitaires européens reste la règle en termes de ressources et de mode de gouvernances (Come, 2004: 151 183). La multiplicité des procédures qui en résulte dans le domaine des relations internationales, en particulier dans l’attribution des bourses aux candidats à la mobilité et dans la définition de leurs programmes d’études, est parfois contradictoire avec l’uniformité affichée du programme Erasmus. Cette contradiction se retrouve également avec le public visé : les étudiants européens. En effet, l’étudiant n’a pas de statut en Europe, ce qui compte tenu de l’hétérogénéité des niveaux de vie pose de nombreux problèmes financiers aux participants au programme Erasmus. Le coût de la vie étudiante en Europe, même s’il diffère peu de celui des dépenses des autres jeunes non scolarisés, n’est pas uniforme. Des différences considérables existent selon les pays, le contexte socio économique, l’âge et l’origine sociale de l’étudiant entre les montants globaux des budgets et entre l’importance relative des ressources (travail rémunéré, aides de la famille et aides de la Collectivité). Une constante néanmoins pour tous les pays : les aides à la mobilité accordées par la Commission européenne, notamment dans le cadre du projet Erasmus, sont insuffisantes. La diversité des modèles familiaux et des politiques d’aide à l’enseignement supérieur ne permet pas, au nom du principe de subsidiarité, la création d’un statut social de l’étudiant européen, ce qui constitue une entrave certaine à la mobilité, notamment pour les plus pauvres des étudiants. L’équité du modèle européen de l‘enseignement supérieur n’est pas garantie même si une certaine tendance à la polarisation de l’aide vers les plus démunis existe. L’étudiant n’a pas la possibilité en tant qu’étudiant d’aller étudier où il veut : les contingences financières l’emportent. Quand il est français, il va trouver un champ de mobilité dans les pays de niveau de vie équivalent ou moindre (13 universités espagnoles figurent en tête du palmarès des établissements d’accueil des étudiants français mais le succès du film de Klapish y est certainement aussi pour quelque chose). Les Allemands privilégient la France. La difficulté est évidemment plus grande encore pour les étudiants des pays récemment intégrés. La mobilité n’est donc possible que pour une certaine élite sociale ou intellectuelle dont les résultats brillants lui permettent de bénéficier de financements autres (type bourse du Ministère des affaires étrangères) ou pour les enfants des classes aisées. Or, la logique du système est bien de permettre à l’ensemble des étudiants, pas seulement aux meilleurs ou aux plus fortunés, de bouger dans toute l’Europe. Comme le rappelle clairement le Traité de Maastricht, la construction de l’Europe doit être fondée sur une logique de solidarité et le public défavorisé ne doit pas être exclu des programmes d’échanges d’étudiants. Ce problème sera bien 117 évidemment plus accentué pour les jeunes des pays candidats à l’entrée ou des pays méditerranéens, concernés par le nouveau programme Averroès intégré dans la politique d’Union pour la Méditerranée. La mobilité déséquilibrée constitue une autre limite du programme. Les contrats Erasmus signés par les établissements partenaires prévoient un équilibre des échanges entre les étudiants in et out et entre les enseignants. Dans la réalité des échanges, cet équilibre est rarement atteint. Des pays se spécialisent dans l’accueil, d’autres dans l’envoi. L’exemple français est significatif d’une part parce que les étudiants français 7 sont le contingent le plus nombreux, d’autre part parce qu’il est représentatif des déséquilibres. Les étudiants en provenance de Roumanie et de Pologne occupent la 5 ème et 6 ème place des étudiants Erasmus reçus, les étudiants français à destination de ces pays occupent la 18 ème et la 12 ème place des étudiants français sortants, avec des effectifs 6 fois et 2 fois moins nombreux. D’une manière générale, les financements sont insuffisants pour atteindre les objectifs fixés. Le soutien à la mobilité, initialement porté par le programme Erasmus adopté au printemps 1987, est, depuis le traité de Maastricht inscrit sous forme d’action inscrit dans un programme cadre unique, Socrates, intégrant les différents financements européens sur l’Education. Ce programme a été renouvelé en 1999 pour une période de 7 ans (2000/2007) avec un budget de 1,85 milliard d’euros. Erasmus, qui finance les bourses de mobilité n’en représente que moins de la moitié, l’action qui finance les échanges d’informations et les colloques près de 30 %. Il semble urgent de répartir autrement les financements au sein de l’enveloppe globale, d’autant plus que tous les étudiants Erasmus ne bénéficient pas d’une bourse et que le montant de celle ci ne représente que 22% du revenu mensuel moyen des étudiants partants à l’étranger. Ce problème est reconnu par la commission, notamment par Jan Figel, commissaire à l’Education qui a déclaré en décembre 2007 : « les bourses Erasmus sont trop faibles pour permettre aux étudiants issus des milieux financièrement défavorisés de profiter du programme »8. Même si de nombreuses Collectivités Locales, voire des banques (la banque Santander en Espagne finance de nombreuses bourses Erasmus,) offrent des financements complémentaires, ceux ci ne sont pas suffisants pour décider à partir à l’étranger de trop nombreux étudiants obligés de travailler pour payer leurs études. En réponse, les institutions européennes ont choisi l’ambition en prévoyant de faire partir 1,5 million d’étudiants entre 2007 et 2012, soit autant qu’en 20 ans, et en augmentant significativement le budget en le faisant passer à 3,1 milliards d’euros sur la période. Bernard Coulie, le recteur de l'Université Catholique de Louvain, abonde dans ce sens. «Bologne a été lancé il y a vingt ans, en 1991, et le processus s'étendait jusqu'en 2010. En Belgique, on est en ordre et la plupart des pays le sont. Mais après, on fait quoi? Il faut définir les objectifs suivants. Avec par exemple un programme de financement de la mobilité. Financer, c'est le grand défi. Bologne a créé les conditions techniques de la mobilité mais ne la finance pas. Il y a bien Erasmus, mais c'est tout à fait insuffisant.» 9 Ces différences financières expliquent en partie que les objectifs soient loin d’être atteints. La mobilité intraeuropéenne et internationale en Europe reste faible. En 2000, seul 2,3% des étudiants européens poursuivaient leurs études dans un autre pays européen et la mobilité dans le cadre du programme Erasmus ne concerne annuellement que 120 000 étudiants (soit 0,8% du total). D’une manière plus globale, la Commission estime que seuls 2,4% des étudiants européens (RDT info, 2003) poursuivent leurs études en dehors de leur pays d’origine. L’objectif initial de Jacques Delors de porter ce chiffre à 10% d’ici 2012 est loin d’être atteint. Jean Pierre Jouyet, secrétaire d’Etat français reconnaît pourtant dans un entretien à France Culture les difficultés à développer ce programme car « d’une part [il] reste un projet élitiste…essentiellement un projet universitaire… ce n’est pas un programme
7 Il faudrait écrire les étudiantes françaises puisque ces dernières représentent 58% des étudiants Erasmus. 8 www.cafebabel.com , 24 janvier 2007 9 «Etudes à l’étranger : Erasmus insuffisant », actu24.be, 18 septembre 2008 118 démocratique…D’autre part, c’est plus coûteux que complexe. Il faut que nous trouvions de véritables marges de manœuvres budgétaires pour pouvoir l’élargir . » (Jouyen, 2008). Tous ces points posent le problème de l’efficacité du programme Erasmus. D’autres programmes moins onéreux pourraient être aussi performants en terme d’acquisition de connaissances des cultures européennes Avec Erasmus, l’Europe a un projet en phase avec les européens mais qui n’est simple ni à mettre en place ni à évaluer d’autant plus que la forme choisie (institutionnelle et semestrielle) d’un dispositif lourd et coûteux n’est peut être pas la mieux adaptée à l’objectif recherché d’une connaissance plus approfondie de la diversité européenne. Franck Biancheri (Biancheri, 2002), président en 1987 de l’Association des états généraux des étudiants de l’Europe (AEGEE) qui a permis l’adoption politique d’Erasmus, prône par exemple de soutenir les réseaux et associations d’étudiants qui par leurs nombreuses interactions font plus pour une culture européenne commune qu’une expérience d’enseignement limitée à l’étranger. Cependant, l’orientation professionnelle du programme Erasmus à travers le financement des stages à l’étranger, le développement de cursus communs de formation (en co diplôme ou en diplôme conjoint), la mise en place de plate forme d’enseignement à distance 10 , devraient permettre à terme de renforcer l’efficacité du dispositif Erasmus.
Erasmus vers une nouvelle frontière ? Même si des problèmes se posent, notamment la permanence de discriminations sociales, le comportement des étudiants Erasmus constitue en soi un phénomène digne d’intérêt et notamment de recherches (Ballatore, 2008), ne serait ce que parce qu’ils constituent la future élite européenne. En effet, les étudiants Erasmus sont le prototype de ce que pourrait être le citoyen européen. Par leurs attitudes, leurs réactions communes face aux problèmes posés par leur relatif déracinement (relatif car choisi et situé dans une aire culturelle proche), ils créent une nouvelle citoyenneté, une nouvelle identité de moins en moins dépendante de leur nationalité d’origine. Placés dans un contexte culturel présentant des différences avec leur contexte national original, quelle que soit leur nationalité et quelles que soient ces différences, ils se trouvent confrontés de fait aux mêmes difficultés. Généralement regroupés dans les mêmes résidences universitaires, assistant aux mêmes cours dispensés souvent en anglais et aux UE de découvertes linguistique et culturelle de leur université d’accueil, fréquentant les mêmes lieux de loisirs (restaurants, cafés, boites de nuit), participant aux mêmes réunions et soirées, de plus présentant les mêmes profils sociaux et psychologiques ils ont tendance dans une logique de sécurisation et de constitution de groupe (qui se ressemble s’assemble) à se replier sur le groupe élargi à tous les autres étudiants Erasmus et non plus seulement sur ceux qui viennent de leurs pays ou qui parlent la même langue. Ainsi la notion de frontière disparaît. Comme l’écrit Patricia Kohler Bally, « Ils ne parlent plus de nationalité mais d’une nouvelle identité les regroupant à travers le programme d’échange » (Bally, 2001 : 78). Pendant un semestre, parfois deux, les étudiants en échange évoluent au sein d'un environnement multiculturel dont la nouveauté relative présente de nombreux points communs avec leurs conditions de vie étudiante initiales : cursus et organisation pédagogique relativement proche grâce au processus de Bologne, aux ECTS et au modèle universitaire européen ; pratiques culturelles similaires de par l’âge et la mondialisation de la culture (mêmes musiques, mêmes films, mêmes icones, centres d’intérêts souvent identiques 11 ) ; mêmes usages et habitudes technologiques (portable et jeux vidéo). Les Erasmus
10 Les universités de Reims, Banska Bystrica et Oradea ont ainsi déposé dans le cadre du programme Erasmus Multilatéral Curriculum Development un projet de diplôme conjoint, COREPE, basé sur la mobilité des étudiants et sur la création d’une plate forme multilingue d’enseignement. 11 Ainsi l’attachement à un club sportif n’est plus une marque nationale. Les supporters du F.C Barcelone, Manchester United, FC Liverpool, Milan A.C ne sont plus seulement anglais, espagnols ou italiens, ils se recrutent dans tous les pays européens. La diffusion des images des championnats anglais, espagnols ou italiens sur toutes les chaînes européennes et la présence d’internationaux de tous les pays du monde dans ces championnats font que tous peuvent y trouver un centre d’intérêt et un point d’appui à un 119 comme ils se définissent, forment une communauté au sein de l'université d'accueil, forgée par toutes ces ressemblances et le refoulement de son identité originelle. Une identité Erasmus , qui prend sa source dans une représentation culturelle de l'Europe, vient alors s'ajouter à l'identité nationale. Les étudiants Erasmus partagent une idée d'Europe qui ne se superpose pas à une frontière physique et qui pose les bases d'une identité européenne.
Distorsion des frontières traditionnelles Les notions de frontières existent toujours dans les échanges internationaux d’étudiants. Ainsi d’après l’OCDE, « C’est vraisemblablement à la proximité géographique et aux différences de conditions d’entrée sur le territoire qu’il faut imputer la concentration d’étudiants autrichiens en Allemagne, d’étudiants belges en France et au Pays Bas, …Les considérations linguistiques et les traditions académiques expliquent certainement aussi la propension des étudiants anglo saxons à se rendre aux Etats Unis…Par ailleurs, les réseaux migratoires jouent un rôle, ainsi qu’en atteste la concentration d’étudiants portugais en France, d’étudiants turcs en Allemagne… » (OECD, 2008: 235). Pourtant la mobilité Erasmus montre des différences par rapport à ce modèle explicatif.
La proximité géographique n’est pas toujours un facteur significatif. Lorsqu’on regarde les trois premières destinations des étudiants Erasmus de chaque pays participant au programme (31 pays), hormis ceux issus des pays baltes et de la Slovaquie qui privilégient les pays proches géographiquement (3 des premières destinations), les étudiants des autres pays recherchent des destinations plus lointaines. En particulier pour 17 pays participants au programme, les destinations privilégiées sont pour au moins deux sur les trois premières en dehors d’une proximité géographique. Les réseaux migratoires jouent également un rôle moindre. La France n’est que le troisième pays de destination des étudiants Erasmus portugais et malgré la présence d’une forte minorité italienne en Wallonie, l’Italie n’est que la 6 ème destination des étudiants belges, même s’il est vrai que l’Allemagne reste le premier pays de destination des étudiants turcs.
En dehors de toute proximité géographique, les politiques de relation internationale des Universités jouent un rôle important, ce qui peut également expliquer les spécialisations constatées des échanges Erasmus : les universités inscrivant dans une stratégie globale de développement les échanges internationaux. Deux modèles semblent émerger : le modèle espagnol concentrant sur quelques universités l’essentiel des mobilités et le modèle français saupoudrant sur l’ensemble des établissements les échanges tant entrants que sortants. Ainsi 17 universités espagnoles sont classées parmi les 50 premières institutions européennes envoyant le plus d’étudiants en mobilité et 7 nouvelles parmi les 50 suivantes. Alors que les français représentent le premier contingent d’étudiants Erasmus, la première université française (Nantes) n’est que 53 ème et seules 4 nouvelles apparaissent dans les 100 premières. Il en va de même pour la mobilité entrante. Seules 4 universités françaises apparaissent dans les 100 premières alors que l’Espagne classe 8 de ses universités dans les 10 premières (dont les 4 premières) et 28 dans les 100 premières. Les traditions académiques semblent donc ne pas jouer un rôle significatif dans le choix des étudiants.
En ce qui concerne la proximité linguistique, le constat est plus nuancé car une des principales motivations des étudiants pour partir est justement l’apprentissage et la pratique linguistique. La généralisation des cours en anglais destinés aux étudiants Erasmus dans de nombreux pays (la France échappe pour l’instant à ce phénomène) a
comportement de supporter. Le même phénomène est constaté également avec le championnat nord américain de Basket. 120 permis de compenser les difficultés rencontrées par les étudiants pour aller en Angleterre (en particulier du fait du nombre limité de places). Cependant, la proximité linguistique explique en partie que l’Allemagne soit le premier pays de destination des étudiants autrichiens (même si l’Autriche n’est que le 7 ème pays de destination des étudiants allemands). De même l’histoire permet également de comprendre pourquoi la Tchéquie et la Slovaquie sont mutuellement les premières destinations de leurs étudiants Erasmus.
Emergence d’une nouvelle frontière culturelle Le réseau social tissé lors d'un séjour Erasmus est à la fois vaste et privilégié : Vaste par la diversité des participants et privilégié par leur appartenance aux mêmes classes socio économiques et culturelles. Les participants au programme conservent souvent, des années après leur séjour, un carnet d'adresses bien fourni. Grâce aux compagnies aériennes à bas prix, ils sont nombreux à continuer à sauter par dessus les frontières (Ouest France, 2009) et à se rendre dans d'autres pays européens, logeant chez l'un ou chez l'autre, guidés sur place par des habitants du lieu. Les exemples sont nombreux de mariages mixtes issus de ces échanges et même si aucune étude n’est faite sur leur pérennité, les cérémonies constituent en soi un motif supplémentaire d’entretenir des liens sociaux. Les étudiants Erasmus forment une véritable communauté sociale émergente, avec des rites, un langage, une pratique commune. L’apprentissage commun de la mobilité se traduit par des comportements communs, une facilité à surmonter les difficultés, une compréhension interculturelle qui perdurent dans la vie professionnelle. Les employeurs ne s’y trompent pas qui recrutent plus facilement les étudiants Erasmus. Bénéficiant déjà, de par leur situation initiale de réseaux sociaux influents, la mobilité Erasmus donne à ces étudiants un coup de pouce qui les placent d’emblée dans l’élite européenne. En finançant ce programme, la Communauté européenne consolide bien sûr sa place dans le domaine de l'éducation supérieure, confirme le modèle universitaire européen face à la concurrence d'outre Atlantique ou d'Asie et participe ainsi dans le cadre de la Stratégie de Lisbonne à faire de l’Europe l’économie de la connaissance la plus performante au monde. Mais plus encore elle crée un imaginaire européen fort et commun parmi les décideurs de demain. Lorsque ceux ci seront aux commandes, ils penseront l'Europe selon les mêmes critères de Bergen à Bucarest et de Lisbonne à Berlin. La mobilité aura réussi là où les politiques ont échoué: créer le noyau d’une future identité européenne, et il n’est pas anodin que la Turquie participe à ce programme. Les frontières au sein de l’Europe sont désormais considérées plutôt comme des liens ou des ponts que comme des bornes, des limites, des obstacles. A l’image du Rhin ou du Danube, la frontière est une opportunité économique mais c’est également une opportunité politique. Le problème crucial pour l’avenir de l’Europe de la reconnaissance des droits des minorités peut, grâce aux frontières vues comme un pont, s’en trouver atténué. Ainsi selon Cathal Mc Call « un fort niveau de coopération transfrontalière peut contribuer à ce que des pressions ou des tensions ethno nationales apparues dans le périmètre de l'État se dissipent. Plus il y a d'échanges avec ceux de l'autre côté de la frontière, plus les chances de se comprendre, de se respecter mutuellement peuvent se réaliser » (McCall , 2008) . Avec le programme Erasmus et la communauté sociale qui en résulte parmi les étudiants, les notions de frontières géographiques s’estompent, au plus grand profit de la construction d’une identité européenne mais elles sont remplacées par des frontières culturelles et socio économiques, peut être beaucoup plus difficiles à franchir.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Agence Europe (2007), Education Formation France, Statistiques 2005 2006 , Mobilité Etudiante, mars 2007. Ballatore, Magali (2007), L’expérience de mobilité des étudiants Erasmus, les usages inégalitaires d’un programme d’ « échange » : une comparaison Angleterre / France / 121 Italie , thèse de sociologie des universités de Turin et d’Aix Marseille 1, soutenue le 18 décembre 2007. Bally, Patricia Kohler (2001) Mobilité et plurilinguisme : le cas de l’étudiant Erasmus en contexte bilingue , Fribourg, Editions universitaires. Barroso, José Manuel (2007), “Erasmus a 20 ans “, 24 janvier 2007. Bernard, Maris (2007), “Europe : par quel bout le chantier ? “, in Le nouvel Economiste , mars 2007. Biancheri, Franck (2002), “Erasmus… et après ?!”, newropeans.org, 12 novembre 2002 Côme, Thierry (2004) „Mobilité des étudiants en Europe et stratégie de Lisbonne ”, in Quel avenir pour l’Union Européenne ? , Editions Bruylant, Bruxelles. Haërtel, Mélissa (2007), Erasmus ou la construction d’un espace culturel européen , Institut Européen de l’université de Genève. National Students Union in Europe ESIB (2005), Black Book of Bologna Process . OCDE (2008), Regards sur l’Education, rapport 2008. Perez, Elsa (2008), „Erasmus : 20 ans de réflexion”, in Animafac , 28 mars 2008. *** Erasmus : Histoires de réussite – l’Europe ouvre des possibilités , Luxembourg, Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes. *** „Erasmus : les étudiants qui sautent par dessus les frontières” , Ouest France , 19 mars 2009
III. Neighbourhood and Crossborder experiences
Fahrettin SUMER (Richmond) ◙ Turkey, a Special EU Neighbour Patiently Awaiting a “Promised Marriage”
Istvan SŐLI ZAKAR (Debrecen) ◙ The Role of the Euroregions and Eurometropolises in the Etheralization of the Borders in the Eastern Periphery of the European Union
Zoltán GÁL (Debrecen) ◙ The Danube Region – Past, Present and Future Prospect of Transnational Co operation as a Playground of the European Integration
Vasile NAZARE (ConstanŃa) ◙ Romanian Naval Forces Role in Crisis Management next to the Black Sea
Turkey, a Special EU Neighbour Patiently Awaiting a “Promised Marriage”
Fahrettin SUMER
Abstract: This article summarizes Turkey EU relations from historical and formal perspectives and discusses the main challenges during the accession talks toward full membership. In doing so, it presents the main debates about Turkey’s possible membership and argues that whatever the EU ultimately decides, it will be consequential not only for Turkey’s future but also for that of the EU. The EU’s admission of Turkey will cause significant changes within the EU, enhancing its international standing, energizing its economy, and contributing to its security and foreign policy goals. Turkey’s future direction will be anchored to that of the EU. The EU’s rejection of Turkey’s membership will limit the EU’s future foreign and security policy capabilities and make the EU a “Christian Club” in the eye of the Muslim World. Turkey will seek an alternative course to EU membership and even if their economic partnership continues, Turkey’s future foreign and security policies will gradually depart from those of the EU.
Keywords: Turkey EU relations, Accession Negotiations, Debates about Turkey’s Possible Membership
Introduction Although Turkey’s status as a European country has always been a source of debate, it has a long history of interaction with Europe. The Ottoman Empire was a European empire before it became an Asian / Middle Eastern Empire. The admission of the Ottoman Empire to the Concert of Europe in the 19th Century affirmed its presence in the European interstate system. Starting from the early 19th century, first the Ottoman elite and then the founders of modern Turkey sought to modernize the country by European standards. Modern Turkey from the very beginning turned its face to Europe and severed its Middle Eastern and Islamic bonds. Following the Second World War, Turkey joined the Council of Europe, NATO, the OECD, and applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959. From the very start Turkey ambitiously sought to become part of the European integration project. It has been about 50 years since Turkey’s first application to and 46 years since the signing of the Association Agreement with the EEC. The Association Agreement, known as the Ankara Agreement, “promised” full membership to the Community at a future date. After a preparatory period of about 6 years, the EEC and Turkey signed an additional protocol in 1970 (which went into effect in 1973) to establish a custom union following a transition period of 22 years. Before the custom union was finalized in 1995, Turkey applied for a full membership in 1987. Although its application was turned down on economic and political grounds, and not explicitly on cultural grounds, its eligibility as a candidate country was not rejected. During the 1990s, EU Turkey relations were intermittent and cumbersome. Nonetheless, the Helsinki European Counsel in 1999 recognized Turkey as a candidate country and cleared the way for improved relations between the parties. On December 17, 2004 European leaders decided to begin “open ended” accession talks with Turkey, which began on October 3, 2005. Even though this has been a major milestone in Turkey EU relations, Turkey’s full membership is still not assured. Moreover, the question of whether Turkey is European is still debated in many European quarters, primarily due to its cultural differences. Turkey, as an EU neighbour, is experiencing candidacy fatigue. The EU’s decision on Turkey will not only determine Turkey’s future direction, but will also 125 determine the EU’s own future direction and place in the World. Let us hope that the relationship ends with a happy marriage.
Turkey has lived in the European Neighbourhood for Centuries Is Turkey European? Yes, Turkey is European but different than mainstream Europe. Historically, the Ottoman Empire from the 13 th to the 16 th centuries was a European Empire. It grew on the same territories that housed the Byzantine and Austria Hungarian Empires. Throughout history the Asia Minor or Anatolia has been considered part of Europe, even though geographers view the Bosporus as a border between Europe and Asia. Early Christianity took root on this territory. Only after the Ottomans conquered Mesopotamia and important city centers, such as Baghdad and Cairo in the Middle East during the early 16 th century, has the Empire become an Asian as well as European power (Steinbach, 2005: 6). During those centuries the Ottomans represented the “other” for Europeans, helping to consolidate Europe’s Christian identity (Barkey and Taspinar 2006). When the Empire began to decline from the 18th through the 19th centuries, Europe’s major powers showed an ambivalent attitude towards the Empire. On the one hand, they posed the “Eastern Question” about the future of the Ottoman Empire and its territories, and contributed to the Empire’s eventual collapse at the end of WWI. On the other hand, “by the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had become a sort of partner in the concept of the concert of European powers; it came to be considered a sort of European power in its own right” (Steinbach, 2005: 6). In the meantime, the ruling Ottoman elite, starting in the early 19 th century, began to reform military, legal and political structures, inspired by those of Europe. Although the 19th century Ottoman modernization could not save the Empire, it opened doors for Western education and European influence for the political and military elite. Traditional and modern institutions coexisted until the collapse of the empire. Nonetheless, modernization, understood as the same as westernization, gained momentum and resulted in strong and more radical reforms, first carried out by the Young Turks, and later by the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938). Ataturk’s reforms not only ended the traditional Ottoman institutions, such as the Sultanate, Caliphate, and Madrasa (traditional Ottoman schools), but also sought to Westernize the country in every aspect. The reforms aimed at reaching the level of “contemporary civilization,” represented then by Europe. With this vision, the country’s new military, political, and legal systems were modeled after those of Europe, European dress codes were introduced, the Latin alphabet was imposed, women were given voting rights, and many cultural reforms followed. In addition, Islamic institutions were abolished and secularism was firmly established. Thus, Turkey turned its face to Europe and severed its historical and cultural ties with the Middle East, which was colonized by the British and French at the end of WWI for a few decades. Europeans welcomed Turkey’s European orientation. At the end of the Second World War, the European international system went through a radical change. No longer was Europe the old Europe, nor was Turkey “Ottoman.” Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe in 1949, and under communist threat, became an integral and valued member of NATO in 1952. Turkey is also a member of the OECD and associate member of the Western European Union. During the Cold War years Turkey was a frontline country at the borders of the Soviet Union. Having turned its face toward the West, Turkey’s economic relations with Europe also intensified.
Turkey and EEC/EC/EU Relations for the Last 50 Years Turkey, after becoming a member of all major European organizations, chose to seek close cooperation with the fledgling EEC in 1959. Along with Greece, Turkey applied for membership in the EEC. Thus, Turkey and Greece, as two NATO members, followed a similar path during the 1950s and 1960s. “Brussels accepted both countries as associate members of the Community, with the prospect of becoming full members of the EEC at a future but indefinite 126 date. The Association Agreement or Ankara Agreement with Turkey was signed in 1963 and took effect December 1, 1964, after difficult negotiations with Brussels” (Yilmaz, 2008: 1). “The preamble and article 28 1 of this agreement clearly mention the prospect of Turkey eventually becoming a member of the European Community” (Rehn, 2006). Moreover, then European Commission President Walter Hallstein 2 emphasized that Turkey was “part of Europe” (Akçakoca, 2006: 8). The Ankara Agreement was the EEC’s first ever contractual arrangement with a third party and it still constitutes the legal basis of the Association between Turkey and the EU. The Agreement aimed at a full economic union between the EEC and Turkey by 1995. Even though the keystone of the agreement was the establishment of a Customs Union for the free circulation of goods, it also envisioned the free movements of natural persons, services, and capital. In addition, it included the EEC’s financial assistance through financial protocols to help Turkey with its economic integration with the Community. “The Customs Union that was to be established between the Parties went much further than the abolition of tariff and quantitative barriers to trade between the Parties and the application of a Common External Tariff to imports from third countries, and envisaged harmonization with EEC policies in virtually every field relating to the internal market” (Secretariat General for EU Affairs). The Customs Union was to be achieved in three stages. After the successful completion of the first “preparatory period,” the Association Council decided to move to the so called “transitory period.” Details of how to achieve the Customs Union were determined by the Additional Protocol, which was signed in November 1970 and came into force in 1973. The Protocol called for abolishment of all custom duties and non tariff barriers on manufactured goods (with some exceptions) according to a timetable containing two calendars set for 12 and 22 years. It also called for the harmonization of Turkish legislation with that of the EEC in economic matters during this period. Moreover, it envisaged the free circulation of natural persons between the parties in the next 12 to 22 years (Yilmaz, 2008: 2; Secretariat General for EU Affairs). Although the Association agreement worked smoothly from 1964 to 1973, the relations between the parties were intermittent in the following years and decades. During the transitory period, necessary steps towards the Customs Union were not taken as scheduled by the Protocol. “Due to economic factors that Turkey faced at different levels and periods, the country was not in a position either to fulfill its commitments gradually to reduce its customs duties against the EC countries or to reduce tariffs in accordance with the Common External Tariff of the Community. It was only in January 1988, and after Turkey’s application for full membership on April 14, 1987, that Turkey actually began to satisfy the conditions and its obligations as set out in the Ankara Agreement” (Yilmaz, 2008: 4). The free movement of labor was supposed to be permitted in 1986, but the German government blocked the implementation of related provisions of the Agreement. Further discussion on the matter has been put off. The first three financial protocols were implemented and the Community granted $705 million to help protect the Turkish economy from the negative impacts of the integration process. However, the fourth financial protocol, consisting of ECU 600 million, was not delivered because of Greece’s veto and the September 1980 military coup in Turkey (Yilmaz, 2008: 4).
1 In the Preamble, the Parties already recognized that “the support given by the European Economic Community to the efforts of the Turkish people to improve their standard of living will facilitate the accession of Turkey to the Community at a later date.” Furthermore, in the well known Article 28 they emphasized that “as soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community” (Lannon 2005, 5 6). 2 When the association treaty between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey was signed in 1963, Christian Democrat Walter Hallstein, then president of the EEC Commission, said: "Turkey is a part of Europe." 127 Greece applied for a full membership in 1975 and became a full member in 1981, after its transition to democracy following the collapse of its military regime. In the meantime, Turkish EEC relations deteriorated. “The Cyprus War of 1974 strained relations with Europe, and the second half of the 1970s constituted a period of economic and political crisis” (Onis 1999, 123). Military rule was installed in September 1980 for three years. “Once Greece became part of the EC, given the nature of the bilateral conflicts between the two countries over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, Turkey's ability to extend and deepen relations with the EC was progressively constrained. The community had been relatively neutral in its approach to the two NATO allies in the early post World War II years, but following Greek entry into the EU, its foreign policy decisions became progressively biased in Greece's favor”(Onis, 1999: 124). Starting with the 24 January 1980 economic decisions, the Turkish government took radical steps toward moving its economic policy from an inward looking import substitution model to a free and open market economic strategy in the 1980s. Through comprehensive structural reform programs, Turkey opened its industries to international competition. In addition, the parliamentary democracy was re established in Turkey in November 1983. Under the new economic and political conditions, the Turkish political and business elite desired to renew and deepen relations with the EEC. Following improved relations between Turkey and the EEC, the Turkish government under Turgut Özal’s premiership formally applied for a full membership based on Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome 3 in 1987. “For the vast majority of the Turks, full membership was a natural and inevitable step in the process that had started with the Ankara Agreement. Full membership would represent the final step or the climax in Turkey's progression toward becoming a secular, Western oriented state…” (Onis, 1999: 124). For them, a membership to the EC/ EU would make Turkey a more economically prosperous, politically stable and democratic country. The Turkish application for full membership did not create the same excitement on the European side. Neither the Commission nor the member countries showed favourable support. Nonetheless, only Greece openly opposed a possible Turkish membership from the outset. The EC delayed to give an answer for two and a half years and, at the end, decided that Turkey was not ready given the economic gap between the two sides and it did not meet the required political criteria. The Cyprus dispute between Turkey and Greece was also pointed to as an obstacle for a possible membership. Naturally, the Turkish public was shocked by this decision and became bitter towards the EC. In order to revitalize the relations on the basis of existing agreements, the Council of Ministers required the Commission to prepare a comprehensive rapprochement package. In 1990 the Commission prepared the so called “Matutes Package” which aimed at the completion of the customs union, the renewal of financial cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation, and increased political and cultural links (Yilmaz 2008, 5 6). However, Greece blocked the adoption of the package by the Council. Despite Greece’s objections, completion of the customs union became the focal point in the relations between Turkey and the Community in the 1990s. First, it was the final years of the transitory period for the customs union as stated in the Ankara Agreement and scheduled by the Additional Protocol. Secondly, in Turkey, “the impulse to belong to Europe gained further momentum with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ankara increasingly felt that its place in the New World Order was in the progressive and increasingly democratic institutions that Europe represented” (Barkey and Taspinar 2006). Thirdly, Turkey would not want to miss the next wave of the European Integration process. Moreover, “the strategic importance of Turkey’s role in international politics and for Western interests remained and was even enhanced” as, for example, the final communiqué of the 1992 European Council in Lisbon emphasized the
3 Turkey's request for accession, filed not under the relevant provisions of the Ankara Agreement, but those of the Treaty of Rome and underwent the normal procedures. The Treaty of Rome’s article 237 which gave any European country the right to apply for a full membership (Secretariat General for EU Affairs). 128 significance of Turkey’s role in Europe’s political situation. In this new international political environment, a meeting of the Turkish and EU Council Association took place in Brussels on November 9, 1992. The Turkish government affirmed its intention to complete the transitory period by January 1996 and participate in the EU’s customs union fully. Both sides agreed on improved and intensified political dialogue on foreign policy issues of mutual interest as well (Yilmaz, 2008: 6). The Turkey EU Association Council, which was composed of the foreign ministers of Turkey and the EU member states, finalized the talks on the customs union on March 6, 1995 and decided to complete the customs union between Turkey and the EU on industrial and processed agricultural goods by December 31, 1995. Financial aid through the Financial Protocol would continue in order to ease Turkey’s adjustment process and to close the gap in economic development between the two sides. When the customs union went into force, Turkey abandoned all duties and equivalent charges on imports of industrial goods from the EU. Thus, the transitory period ended and in the final period Turkey would continue harmonizing its tariffs and equivalent charges on the importation of industrial goods from third countries with the EU’s Common External Tariff, along with adapting itself to the EU’s commercial policy. This process was to be completed in five years. Trade in agriculture and steel products between Turkey and the EU was regulated by separate preferential agreements. A preferential trade regime for agricultural products had been adopted on January 1, 1998 (Secretariat General for EU Affairs). With the establishment of the Customs Union in 1995, EU Turkey trade increased fivefold (Rehn 2006). Today, about half of Turkey's trade is with the EU. About 56% percent of its exports and about 40 percent of its imports are from the EU . Turkey has also been a recipient of EU foreign direct investments (FDI), which reached almost € 9 billion in 2007. This is about two thirds of total FDI inflows to Turkey. “Turkey’s main industrial imports from the EU continue to be machinery, automotive products, chemicals, iron and steel. Its main agricultural imports from the EU are cereals. Major EU imports from Turkey include textiles and cloth, machinery, and transport equipment” (European Commission, EU Turkey Relations). The Customs Union raised different expectations in Turkey and the EU. “From the EU perspective, a customs union would be the final step in the direction of developing strong economic relations, based on free trade, with an important country on the south eastern periphery. It would be a closing stage in the process that had been initiated with the Ankara Agreement some thirty years before, when the EU itself was essentially a customs union agreement with an arrangement involving free mobility of labour among a core group of founding states” (Onis, 1999: 124 125). From the Turkish side, an overwhelming majority of the elite believed that full membership in the EU was inevitable, and the customs union “constituted the first and necessary step in a transitional period on the path to full EU membership…. Hence, the economic content of the customs union agreement, itself, did not generate significant controversy in Turkey, given the expectation that the benefits associated with full membership would overcome, in time, any possible short term adjustment costs” (Onis, 1999: 125). As a result of the difference in expectations mentioned above, the December 1997 Luxembourg summit declaration shocked Turkey. After the historic two day summit, the EU leader announced “the dawn of a new era” and opened their doors to the former communist dominated Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEECs) and Cyprus (Greek), but did not list Turkey among candidate countries. Negotiations were to start with Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Cyprus on March 31, 1998. The less prepared countries of Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania were “included in comprehensive pre accession partnerships and annual screening arrangements designed to accelerate their progress towards membership” (Yilmaz 2008, 6). The Luxemburg Council, however, offered Turkey “strategy of rapprochement” and asked Turkey to improve its human rights records, treatment of minorities and to compromise on issues related to Greece and Cyprus. Although Turkey was no worse than many of the CEECs in terms of economic development, legacies of authoritarian 129 structures, and democratic deficiencies, the EU was much more receptive to the idea of including the CEECs than Turkey, in spite of its long term relations with Turkey. Economic weakness and the deficiencies of the democratic regime were noted as obstacles for Turkey’s membership, but not for that of the CEECs. The summit highlighted the view that the EU is essentially a civilizational project. As a result, crisis erupted between the EU and Turkey. Ankara was very upset about being left out of the enlargement process and for being invited to the 1998 European Conference on certain conditions. Turkey announced it would cut off political dialogue with the European Union and rejected taking part in a pan European conference in 1998. In the meantime, European newspapers reported statements by European politicians that Turkey was eligible and Turkey’s candidacy would be judged by “the same criteria” as the other applicant states (Onis, 1999: 107 108; Yilmaz, 2008: 6 9). In fact, both the EC’s December 1989 response to Turkey’s 1987 application and the Luxemburg Summit recognized Turkey as eligible for a full membership. Morocco’s similar application was turned down by the Council on the grounds that Morocco is not a European country. Turkey was found ineligible on the basis of economic and political grounds. Logically, if Turkey fulfills the EU’s Copenhagen political criteria, and economic criteria, it would become a candidate country. Two years after the Luxemburg summit, the EU Heads of States and governments granted Turkey the status of a candidate country in Helsinki in December 1999. Turkey as a candidate country was “destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States” (Rehn, 2006). Thus, the EU reversed the position of the Luxemburg Summit in the Helsinki European Council, established the legitimacy of Turkey’s application and rejected suggestions that “the boundaries of Europe should be drawn at the Bosphorus”(Jørgensen, 2007: 17). This summit was a turning point in Turkey EU relations as Turkey was offered the concrete prospect of full membership of the EU. “Recognition of Turkey’s eligibility for EU membership, and its candidacy status like that of other EU candidates, was perceived as an end to centuries old discussions about the country’s Europeanness. It was a widely shared feeling among many pro EU advocates in Turkey, and their European supporters, that the only issue that remained was to fulfill the so called Copenhagen political criteria on democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (Tekin, 2008: 728). Another positive development that Turkey EU relations was that Greece and Turkey improved their relations following catastrophic earthquake in Turkey on August 17, 1999 and a less severe one in Greece during the same month. Turkish and Greek foreign ministers decided to intensify their countries’ cooperation on undisputed issues such as tourism, culture, environment, and combating organized crime, as well as to establish a new basis for bilateral negotiations. Since then, Greek Turkey relations have improved and Greece has stopped inhibiting EU relations with Turkey. The EU released €4 million of emergency aid after the earthquake and made another €30 million ready to support the package in the rehabilitation phase (Yilmaz, 2008: 11). Moreover, following short lived coalition governments in the 1990s and an economic crisis in 2000 2001, a new government with an overwhelming parliamentary majority came to power in Turkey following the November 3, 2002 elections. The newly founded Justice and Development Party (abbreviated in Turkish as AKP or AK Parti), under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, former mayor of Istanbul, speeded up the EU related reform process in Turkey. At the 2002 Copenhagen summit, European leaders promised that the EU 15 would open accession negotiations with Turkey, on the basis of the Commission’s 2004 Progress Report on Turkey, which came out on October 6, 2004. In the meantime, Turkey completed the essential changes in its laws to meet the EU’s democratic conditions for opening talks. These changes were in fact a continuation of the radical reforms that the Turkish parliament passed during the past several years (BBC News 2004). As a result, the report stated that “in view of the overall progress of reforms, and provided that Turkey brings into force the outstanding legislation mentioned above, the Commission considers that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be opened” (Communication from the 130 Commission). Based on this recommendation, on December 17, 2004, the EU Heads of State and Government made a historic decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey, starting on October 3, 2005.
The Accession Negotiations and Debates over Turkey’s Potential Membership The EU’s decision to open the accession talks is just the beginning of a long road where there are multiple challenges to overcome before a full membership is possible. The negotiations are expected to last eight to ten years and will be one of the significant factors determining economic, political, and legal developments in Turkey (Jørgensen, 2007: 12). The outcome of the accession negotiations, however, cannot be guaranteed beforehand. If the accession negotiations can be completed successfully, the next final step will be ratification of Turkey’s membership by the EU’s member countries. The ratification process requires winning the hearts and minds of the European public and governments. There might also be a long transition period before Turkey would enjoy all the benefits and resume all obligations of a full membership. In a narrow sense, the process of accession negotiations involves ministers, diplomats, and experts, and is on economic, political, and legal issues. The accession intergovernmental conference includes Turkey’s chief negotiator and his experts, as well as the EU’s permanent representatives representing Council ministers. The General Secretariat of the Council provides a secretariat for the conference. In addition, the European Commission (DG Enlargement) is closely involved and the European Parliament is also involved. In a larger sense, the process involves multiple actors from political parties to the public, from journalists to academics, from parliamentarians to interest groups and NGOs (Jørgensen, 2007: 16, 27). It generates multiple debates not only on economic, political, and legal issues but also on cultural matters, identity, and historical views. The Accession negotiations started with a screening process, i.e. analytical examination of Turkey’s legislation in October 2005. This process went smoothly and ended on October 13, 2006. There are 33 chapters of Turkish legislation which need to be aligned with EU law. In 2006, the EU closed provisionally meaning that agreement has been reached—the Science and Research chapter in June 2006, and opened negotiations on seven chapters (Akçakoca, 2006: 8 9). Additional chapters were opened in 2007 and 2008. 4 The opening and closing of chapters requires the agreement of all 27 EU Member States, including Cyprus, and no single chapter can be ‘closed’ formally until all of them are (Akçakoca, 2006: 8 9). Here, the Cyprus conflict shows up as an important handicap during the accession negotiation.
The Cyprus Conflict and the Negotiations Turkey has not recognized the (Greek) Cyprus government since the 1970s. Without Turkey’s recognition of all twenty seven EU governments the negotiations will be challenging. Since Turkey’s military intervention with the conflict between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 1974 as a guarantor state, the island has been de facto divided. After multiple failed efforts to resolve the conflict, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan offered another plan, called the Annan Plan, in 2002. It was supported both by the US and the EU. Hopes for peaceful settlement of the conflict were high in 2003, since both Greek and Turkish Cypriots agreed to use the plan after being revised four times as a basis for resolution of the conflict. In addition, the parties agreed to take the plan to simultaneous referenda in both communities on April 24, 2004. At the referenda, the majority of Greek Cypriots rejected the plan, whereas a significant majority of Turkish Cypriots accepted it. Had both sides accepted the Annan Plan, Cyprus would have joined the EU as a unified federal state and the conflict would have ended. The EU admitted the
4 The chapters opened in 2007 and 2008 are Enterprise and Industry (March 2007) and Financial Control and Statistics (June 2007), Trans European Networks and Consumer and health protection (December 2007), Intellectual property and Company law (June 2008). (European Commission, EU Turkey relations). 131 Greek Cypriots into the EU on May 1, 2004, along with the CEECs, without the resolution of the conflict, partly because of Greece’s threat to veto the CEECs admission, if Cyprus was not admitted with them (Sumer and Anastasiou, 2004). If the EU did not admit (Greek) Cyprus without the approval of the Annan Plan by both communities, the conflict may have been solved by now. The Greek part of Cyprus, representing the whole of Cyprus, is in the EU, and the EU no longer has the leverage to pressure Greek Cyprus for a resolution. Even though reunification talks resumed in the island in 2008 following the Greek Cypriots selection of president Demetris Christofias, the conflict has yet to be resolved. The Cyprus conflict has been one of the major issues in Turkey EU relations, and it became a handicap following the admission of (Greek) Cyprus into the EU in 2004, without a resolution of the conflict. Even before opening the accession negotiations with Turkey in December 2004, the EU demanded that Turkey recognize (Greek) Cyprus. After two days of tough negotiations and heated talks, Turkey signed a protocol that cleared the way for entry talks and tacitly acknowledged the Cyprus government for the first time without formally recognizing it (BBC News 2004). Thirteen months after the start of negotiations in October 2005, relations between Turkey and the EU deteriorated again, because Turkey refused to open its seaports and airspace to the Republic of Cyprus (Akçakoca, 2006: 9). Ever since Turkey signed the Additional Protocol in 2005, which extended its existing customs union with the EU to the new Member States (including the Republic of Cyprus), the EU has insisted that Turkey must open its sea and airports to the Greek Cypriots. The EU Commission’s 2006 progress report warned Turkey that the negotiations will be frozen partially, if Turkey fails to implement the Protocol obligations in full. There was no demand for Turkey’s immediate recognition of Greek Cyprus under international law (Marchetti, 2007). Following the Commission’s report, the EU Council decided not to open eight relevant chapters and not to close any other chapter provisionally, until Turkey fulfilled its commitment in December 2006. 5 The EU Commission’s 2007 Enlargement Strategy Paper also warned Turkey to fulfill its obligations. The Turkish government announced its willingness to implement the protocol in full if the EU members lift the economic embargo and isolation of Northern Cyprus (European Commission, Enlargement Strategy 2007; Bahri, 2008: 21). The Greek Cypriots tried to prevent an end to the Turkish Cypriots’ international isolation. A successful completion of accession negotiations requires that both Turkey and the EU not fall hostage to any single issue, including the Cyprus problem. The acceptance and implementation of the acquis communautaire 6 should remain the primary component of negotiations. Turkey has already made good progress in this area, although many changes still need to be made. In 2008, the reform process slowed down, partly due to a lawsuit at the Constitutional Court of Turkey to ban the governing party in the first half of 2008. Fortunately, the Constitutional Court made the right decision not to ban the largest political part of Turkey. If it had been banned, Turkey would have experienced a political crisis and its relations with the EU would have deteriorated severely. If this year the Turkish government speeds up the remaining reforms and exhibits the implementation of them, it will send a positive signal to the EU in terms of showing Turkey’s commitment to adopting and implementing the acquis communautaire .
The Cultural Differences Debate On the official EU papers, every objection raised against Turkey’s claim to full membership has been on economic, political, and legal grounds, more specifically on acceptance
5 The eight chapters are: Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, and Customs Union and External Relations (European Commission, EU Turkey relations). 6 The body of law that aspiring member states have to subscribe to before joining. 132 and implementation of the acquis communautaire and the Copenhagen political criteria. There has been no predominant cultural content and no cultural encounter between Turkey and the EU (Jørgensen, 2007: 11). There are no explicit, well defined cultural criteria that could be applied to candidate countries. Nonetheless, “in debates on relations between the EU and Turkey generally, and the 1987 Turkish application for EU membership specifically, cultural factors figure prominently among master variables, sometimes almost by default, constituting the seemingly most relevant or powerful explanatory factor. Thus, on the one hand, we have more than a dozen previous accessions that were ‘culture free’, but on the other, in the case of Turkey’s potential accession, the ‘cultural factor’ has been introduced as a key nodal point in public and political discourse” (Jørgensen, 2007: 11). Since the majority of Turkey is Muslim, some voices in Europe point at the Christian Muslim divide and cultural differences. This raises the question of whether the EU will really welcome Turkey if it one day fulfills all of the conditions. It should be recalled that European and Islamic Civilizations have and continuous to borrow from one another. Historically, the European Renaissance in many ways adopted the scientific and philosophical contributions of Muslim civilizations. The translations of the texts of Aristotle, Plato, and Protagoras by Muslim scholars in various learning centers of the Islamic civilization, such as Baghdad, were rediscovered during the Renaissance (Taspinar, 2005). In addition, Turkish and European cultures have been blending, especially in much of Eastern and Southern Europe. Through Westernization movements in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, many elements of Western European culture have been adopted by Turkey. Of course, this is not to deny strong Islamic and Asian influences on Turkish culture. However, Turkey is the only pluralist secular democracy in the Muslim world and has always attached great importance to developing its relations with other European countries. Turkey is the country where East and West meet, and could serve as a bridge between them. According to Taspinar, there are three ways to view Europe: geography, culture, and values. Culture is often used as a euphemism for religion and identity , and the European project is not about religion and religious identity. It is primarily about values, such as liberty, solidarity, pluralism, tolerance, and human rights, Olli Rehn, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, agrees. Europe is primarily about constructing an entity which would make war obsolete in Europe. It is about sharing sovereignty. Therefore, Europe’s possible quest for cultural purity and religious homogeneity and its questioning of Turkey’s cultural identity contradict the idea of constructing Europe based on multiculturalism, pluralism and democracy (Taspinar, 2005). Although Turkey has democratic deficiencies, it, with the encouragement of the EU, has been moving toward liberal democracy. According to scientific research, “…people in Turkey support democracy to the same extent as people in EU member states…” (Dixon, 2008: 681). When noting at cultural differences between Turkey and the EU, one should also remember that Europe is already a multicultural and multi religious continent. There are cultural differences between Turkey and European countries, but there are cultural differences also between East Europe and West Europe, between Orthodox Christians and Catholics. There are 15 million Muslims already living in Europe. What unites Europe is not its religion and culture but its secular and liberal democratic values. Some argue that Turkish EU membership could help Turks living in Europe, particularly in Germany, and Muslims at large living in Europe to better integrate into their societies. The existence of a Muslim country in the EU would make European Muslims feel more at home and identify themselves more with Europe than with their original homelands.
Other Arguments for and Against Turkey’s Membership As compared with recent members of the EU, Turkey represents a bigger challenge and a bigger opportunity for the EU. Turkey’s size, population, level of economic and social development, its geopolitical location, and its cultural and religious identity can be seen as 133 structural liabilities or strategic assets depending on what side of the argument one is. Here let us review a few of such arguments. Some argue that Turkey will be a strategic asset for the EU in terms of its security and foreign policy goals. Turkey was a frontier country for European security during the Cold War years and it still maintains its strategic importance, as the high stakes of the Cold War are replaced by other more complex challenges. Turkey is a regional power in a strategic location and one of the major players in the crises of the wider Middle East. Turkey’s participation in the UNIFIL force in Lebanon and its active mediation efforts between Syria and Israel as well as between Palestinians and Israel shows that Turkey could play a very constructive role in the wider Middle East region. Turkish membership will help strengthen economic relations between Europe and the Arab Islamic World. In addition, Turkey’s successful integration into Europe will send a strong message to fundamentalists that this is not a war between civilizations and that democracy and Islam can be compatible. Turkey could become an anchor of stability and a benchmark of democracy in the unstable and dangerous region. The possible role model function of Turkey under the EU umbrella necessitates that the country preserve its Islamic identity and cultural characteristics. The accession of Turkey will also contribute to the peaceful coexistence between the Western and Islamic worlds and have positive repercussions on European relations with the Arab Islamic world. The “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative, launched by the Spanish and Turkish Prime Ministers Zapatero and Erdogan, aims at the same goals (Rehn 2006; Noureddine 2007; Taspinar 2005; Straw 2005). Moreover, Turkey could contribute to European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) significantly, as its participation in the EU led police missions in Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Congo, demonstrated. Turkey also participates in the EU NATO strategic cooperation based on the “Berlin Plus” agreement (Rehn 2006). Some others do not buy these arguments. For example, Erich Reiter argues that the EU is not an effective foreign and security policy organization and has not developed an adequate degree of effectiveness in crisis and conflict management. Therefore, “Turkish membership would bring no tangible benefits because the EU is not yet ready to tackle major security policy challenges” (Reiter 2007). Following the U.S led war in Iraq, the EU was inclined to avoid the growing turmoil in the Middle East, rather than contribute to the transformation of the region along liberal democratic norms. As a significant number of Europeans began to define Islam as a security issue, skepticism towards Turkey’s membership also grew in the post 9/11 and the post Iraq war era. Skeptics are afraid of the Islamization of Europe rather than Europeanization of Islam, once Turkey joins the EU. They prefer to have a “fortress Europe,” leaving Turkey and Islam out (Oguzlu and Kibaroglu 2008: 952 953). The supporters of Turkish membership argue that Turkey is turning into a major energy hub 7 for supply to Europe from Central Asia, the Middle East and even North Africa. Therefore, Turkey EU cooperation on energy will be vital in the coming years and decades (Rehn 2006). The recent problems with Russia’s gas supply to Europe showed that the EU needs to diversify its energy lines. Turkey is in a perfect location for secured and diversified transit routes for the supply of energy from the Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and Iran. Having Turkey as an EU member, the supply routes through Turkey “will reduce the EU’s dependency on unpredictable Russian energy supplies and will make it easier for European energy companies to be involved in business with the Caspian region and Central Asia” (Bahri 2008: 17). According to the “stabilization argument,” placing Turkey in the framework of EU law will strengthen the country’s democracy and human rights regime, as was the case for Greece,
7 There are two natural gas pipelines from Russia to Turkey and one from Iran to Turkey. In addition, there are pipelines being constructed from South Caucasus to Turkey and from Turkey to Greece and Italy. There are also projected natural gas pipelines, namely, Trans Caspian, Nabucco, Samsun Ceyhan Haifa, and Iraq Turkey pipelines. The exiting oil pipelines include Baku Tbilisi Ceyan (BTC) and Kirkuk (Iraq) Ceyhan. Kazak oil to the BTC pipeline and Samsun Ceyhan pipeline are projected too. 134 Spain, and Portugal after they had come out of dictatorships, as well as for the CEECs following the end of the Cold War. Prior to and following the accession negotiations, Turkey experienced impressive progress through courageous reforms. For example, Turkey abolished the death penalty, permitted children to learn in Kurdish, started a Kurdish TV channel, and placed a civilian in charge of national security. These were unimaginable just 15 years ago. Of course the EU membership incentive played a significant role in these changes (Grabbe 2004: 2). Some fear that in the absence of the possibility of full membership, these changes could be reversible and the process of democratic consolidation could be destabilized. The strong alliance among moderate Islamists, moderate Kurdish nationalists, overall civil society, the press, military, and civilian bureaucracy to join the EU will collapse. Turkey’s secular identity might erode and the EU could over time be seen as a rival and unfriendly (Oguzlu and Kibaroglu 2008: 252 253; Taspinar 2005). Economic interdependence between Turkey and the EU is another factor that must be considered in a decision for full membership. As discussed before, the EU and Turkish economies integrated under the customs union. Turkey’s most important trade partner is the EU, accounting for more than 50% of Turkey’s trade volume. The EU’s exports to Turkey have grown more than 20% per year since 2001. In 2005, for example, the EU had around an 8.4 billion euros trade surplus with Turkey. As an emerging economy, Turkey’s economy experienced high growth rates from 2002 to the present. A growing Turkish economy will lead to growing consumption as well as more imports from the EU. Growing trade relations means that tens of thousands of jobs in both Turkey and the EU depend on the continuation of good relations (Rehn 2006). Would Turkey flood Europe with cheap labor? There is a fear in Europe that unemployed Turkish labor will go to Europe and take their jobs. However, as the Turkish economy grows quickly, unemployment rates will continue to decrease. By the time Turkey becomes a member, its unemployment rate will likely catch up with that of the EU. In addition, “Turkey’s young and increasingly well educated labor force could help the EU meet not only the serious demographic problem of an increasing aging population but also keep the European economy more competitive in international markets”(Bahri 2008: 17). Some analysts question the capacity of the EU to take on Turkey as a member. Turkey, a country with one third of the EU’s per person income level, could impose costs on the rest of the EU. They think the EU should focus on its internal problems, rather than enlarge or play a greater international role. It is hard to predict Turkey’s possible impacts on the EU’s budgetary, cohesion and agricultural policies over the next 15 20 years. Nonetheless, Turkey will likely receive significant financial assistance from the structural, regional and Common Agricultural funds, if the EU’s current polices do not change. At the end of the accession negotiations, if EU leaders consider that the EU is not ready in terms of its “absorption capacity,” 8 they could say “we are not ready yet,” and postpone Turkey’s full membership (Emerson et al. 2006 ;Bahri 2008: 13, 16). Another early consideration is how Turkey would fit into the institutional framework of the Union. Due to the size of Turkey’s population, it would become one of the “big” member states and would be represented in all of the European institutions at the same level as Germany, France and the United Kingdom. This situation also concerns some who are against Turkey’s membership. But, the actual situation will be determined not only by when Turkey will become a member but also by the EU’s institutional developments by then.
A Divided Europe on the Issue of Turkish Membership The European public and governments are deeply divided on the issue of Turkey’s future accession to the Union. At this point, Austria, France, the Netherlands, and the German
8 It refers to the capacity of the EU’s internal market, labor market, budget, eurozone and institutional system to absorb new member states. 135 Christian Democrats do not want Turkey to become a full member. Countries like Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Finland, and the German government’s Social Democrat partner are in favor of Turkey’s entry to the EU. The EU’s Central and East European members are not opposed to Turkey’s membership as well (Schröder, 2007). Greece has also been in favored of Turkey’s EU membership thus far. Leaders of supporting countries highlight strategic, energy, and economic benefits that Turkey would bring to the EU. Politicians from opposing countries point out possible costs to the EU and imply that the negotiations could stop short of full membership. Some of them also endorse a status less than a full membership. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the one hand allow accession negotiations with Turkey to continue. On the other hand, they propose alternatives to full membership. Merkel along with Austria’s government introduced the “privileged membership,” 9 and Sarkozy proposed the concept of a “Mediterranean Union.” During the accession negotiations, the Turkish government made it clear that any other alternative other than full membership will not be acceptable to Turkey (Bahri 2008, 16). Sarkozy, based on the cultural differences argument, wants to secure Europe against Turkey. Ironically, France was a model for Turkey to emulate during Turkey’s early years (Senocak 2007). Public debates on Turkish membership are also heavily politicized. Debates on the Constitutional Treaty mixed with debates on Turkey’s membership (Jørgensen 2007: 12) and its ratification were poorly managed. Voters in France and Holland voted down the Constitutional Treaty in May and June of 2005, partly due to the perceived threat to their lifestyles from the accession of ten poorer and needier countries, shocking the leaders of the fifteen pre enlargement EU states (Bobinski 2005). The rejection of the proposed Constitutional Treaty generated debate on the drawbacks of enlargement. High level European politicos across Europe demanded a slow down, freeze or even a permanent halt to enlargement (Emerson et al. 2006). Of course, the case for a pause in enlargement would probably postpone a possible entry of Turkey (and probably that of Croatia) to the EU. Public surveys show that those who oppose Turkey’s entry to the EU are against it not only based on technical and legal difficulties but also on perceived cultural differences (Marchetti 2007). In contemporary Europe, support for European integration is not only affected by “hard” economic and utilitarian predictors, but also by “soft” predictors such as feelings of identity and attitudes towards immigrants. On the issue of Turkey’s membership, soft predictors identity consideration and anti immigration sentiment outweigh the role of “hard” predictors (de Vreese et al. 2008). A majority of current public opinion views Turkey’s entry as negative. Turkey needs to recognize that the European public will play an important role in the admission and ratification process and should strategize for winning the hearts and minds of the European public as well as European governments . The CEECs did not have to face a referendum on their membership, but Turkey will (Marchetti 2007; Grabbe 2004: 3). Referenda have already been promised in Austria and France. The supporting EU leaders would also engage in persuading the public about Turkey’s potential entry for Turkey not to be turned down in a referendum. Along with the European public, the Turkish public opinion needs to be monitored for accession negotiations to end with Turkey’s entry. “If some member states continue to act reluctantly and hesitantly and play for time, it might be that the interest of the Turkish public would decline – as the latest polls indicate” (Bahri 2008: 20). Turkish patience will be severely tested by the constant demands of the European Commission for adaptation to the acquis and by demands on sensitive issues such as Cyprus, the Kurdish problem, and addressing Armenian claims (Bobinski 2005). A research finding concludes that “Islamic values are not incompatible with being part of the West and attachment to Islam does not affect attitudes toward the West, as has been suggested especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001. When it comes to joining
9 Turkey would then have the same obligations as all other EU members, but would have no say in shaping EU policies. 136 the EU, people evaluate accession on the basis of its influence on national identity and contributions to the national economy in Turkey” (Kentmen 2008: 487).
The EU’s Final Decision will be Consequential In five to ten years, the accession negotiations will be complete and the EU will face a historic decision. It is obvious that the EU has two options: to embrace Turkey as an equal member country, or turn Turkey away at the EU door after 50 years of knocking. Both options are very consequential; not only for Turkey’s future, but also for that of the EU. The options are about whether Europe will expand its boundaries to build a wider community of stable prosperous democracies and reach out the world, or turn inward on itself and close the doors to its neighbours. The EU decision will be about whether it will become a “Christian Club” or become a multicultural model that inspires peace and tolerance across the globe. The EU will no longer be able to stand on the excuses of economic, political, or legal grounds when Turkey completes the reforms to comply with economic and political criteria and adopts and implements the acquis communautaire . After Turkey fulfills all the requirements, it will be increasingly difficult for the EU to find reasons not to admit Turkey. If Turkey is rejected, however, the EU will send negative signals to the Islamic world, and Ankara will seek alternative affiliations. In the end, Europeans “can either decide to keep Europe culturally homogeneous by excluding Turkey and use cultural arguments to exclude Turkey. Or they can see Europe as an opportunity to spread democracy and prosperity with European values to the troubled periphery of Europe” (Taspinar 2005). Cultural factors did not play any significant role in previous accessions and should not play in Turkey’s admission. “If the EU blatantly blocks Turkey’s way, it will have inflicted damage on the one and only pillar that holds the EU together and that is pacta sunt servanda ” (Kirisci 2008). The EU will lose credibility with the rest of the world as well. Europe should rethink Turkey as Turkey will increasingly play a significant role in the EU’s energy supply and energy security along with its security roles within the NATO framework. In the long run, Turkey’s membership will be in the security and economic interests of Europe. Turkey’s membership, as with previous enlargements of the EU, will not impede upon the stability and prosperity of current member states, but enhance them. It will spread European peace to a larger area and increase the EU’s influence in the wider world (Straw 2005). Clearly, Turkey’s entry into the EU will significantly change both Turkey and the EU in economic, cultural, and political terms. “In order to make sure that this change will be for the better, both sides need to develop a common vision aimed at a win win and forward looking outcome from the outset” (Ögütçü 2005: 5 6). The vision should not be based on short term concerns and interests, but on the long term prospects. Hopefully the Cyprus Problem will be solved by the time Turkey is ready to become a full member. Even if there is no a solution, it should not be a pretext for Turkey’s denial. Cyprus (Greek) was admitted into the Union without a resolution and Turkey should be admitted as well a solution is not found by the end of negotiations. The EU has already made a historic decision to open the accession negotiations. This decision has started the process of integrating Turkey into Europe in all fields, and has encouraged the Turkish government and administration to push ahead with radical reform. In order to end this process with a “happy marriage,” EU and Turkish leaders need to show joint determination, strong will, and persuade their publics. If the EU’s public opposes, or the Turkish public loses its interest in the project, a marriage will become increasingly difficult. Turkey and the EU will gradually depart and go their separate ways.
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The Role of the Euroregions and Eurimetropolises in the Etheralisation of the Borders in the Eastern Periphery of the European Union
István SŐLI ZAKAR
Abstract: On the basis of empirical research carried out in the border regions, euroregions and eurometropolises, elaboration of innovation oriented, cross border economic development, human resource development and partnership programs can be a general aim. Supporting these aims was the ultimate goal of creating euroregions and eurometropolises in Western Europe. The system of euroregions and eurometropolises has been spreading from Western Europe to the Eastern territories in order that border regions can exploit the comparative advantages being present in border regions even better. The most important aim in border regions, euroregions and eurometropolises is to create an advantageous economic, innovative, academic and social climate by introducing various institutions that can widen the space of successful economy and human resource development, and together with this they can improve the success of regional development planning and human resource development in the border regions of neighbouring countries.
Keywords: etheralisation of the borders, euroregions, eurometropolises, eastern periphery of the EU
Introduction Based on Western European examples there was hope – already at the beginning of the 1990s – for possibilities of diverse cross border relationships in contrary to earlier times to which new dimension can be given by political changes already commenced in Eastern Central Europe. This hope was realised more or less and a specific geostrategic situation was formed by today in which relationship between the regions on the both sides of the border was changed fundamentally. Their co operation can be further developed on a new basis regarding the letter NATO expansion and EU joining. Considering Hungary and its neighbours conditions of the formation of border side regions, euroregions and eurometropolises are different in each country (Balogh, Papp, 1998). Leaders of the seven neighbouring countries (neglecting a few exceptions) support co operations in their political statements. However, our neighbours are new or re formed states – except for Austria – that are operated in a centralised way leaving limited opportunities for regional and local participants, neglecting the principle of subsidiarity and furthermore they have nationalist suspicion for cross border co operations (Hardi, 2001). Thus frequent spectacular declaration of CBC co operations (state level) involved no concrete actions and diplomatic statements were regarded only as part of the PR work preparing the joining of the EU and part of developing the image of a “good student” state (Suli Zakar, Cimre, Tepercis, Patkos, 2001). In world economy – and especially in Europe – such changes occurred that require ever more urgently the rethink of borders and cross border relationships. Intensifying – and more and more determinative – international division of labour results in the movement of capital, labour and products over the borders. As a result, border side regions experience substantial function changes as they are not periphery areas any more but important transfer zones of international division of labour where in the cost factors of both companies and individuals large scale changes can be performed within small distances (Aschauer, 1996). In this way the border became a cost factor, however, it is influenced greatly by the type of the border, the maturity of the CBC relationship and the development of the particular euroregions, eurometropolises. 140
Antecedents In the eastern part of Central Europe in the state socialist regime regional processes were determined by the decisions – neglecting completely border side regions – of the centralised state economy (branch, large scale company) together with the centralised distribution of regional development sources. Local assertation of the counties (county centres) and the utilization of local resources were limited to the central areas of the counties. Increasing number of researches prove – at least in the eastern border side regions of Hungary – that the periphery areas had least direct connection to international economy (Lengyel, 2000, Suli Zakar, 1996; Baranyi, 2002). A good example for this that there are larger and smaller border side counties and districts in the Carpathians Euroregion but the euroregional co operation agreement was signed in Debrecen in 1993 not by the leaders of the local governments in the euroregion but by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Local government leaders were only sidemen at the event. It was also “characteristic” when the leaders of two border side Romanian county (Maramures and Satu Mare) stated that they wished to join the Carpathians Euroregion but the Romanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs impeded them in doing so. Later the Romanian government lead by Emil Constantinescu in one of its first measures assented to restoring the full right membership thus the Romanian counties participated in the work of the Carpathians Euroregion as full right members. Similarly the rightist Slovakian government impeded the full membership of eastern Slovakian local governments for years (Ludvig, Suli Zakar, 2000).
Present position of border side regions in the eastern periphery of the EU Reassessing borders and border side regions was inevitable for the countries of Eastern Central Europe as well. Socialist economy that reigned for decades was – due to the characteristic hierarchic and centralised structure – completely insensible for distance and geographical position. Integration of the economy of the countries into the international division of labour took place through the governmental external trade organisations, i.e. through the capital. Regarding international economic connections the location of producers and consumers was not important. In this situation the fact that a border side producer was very close to the business partners of a neighbouring state meant no advantage. Following the regime change monopoly of central external trade companies terminated and companies together with individuals created direct relations through the borders. This new situation requires the transformation of borders and cross border connections in Eastern Central Europe. The other consequence of the regime change is the spread of private economy and its entering international economic relations. Spreading of private companies was triggered primarily not by privatizing state owned companies but the establishment of new private companies and “green field” foreign investments. A private company counts its business interest when selecting a locality for its premises and it regards as advantageous much less number of settlements (regions) than a state company (Rechnitzer, 1999). Of course border sidedness is not predominating uniformly in the entire country as those areas the conditions of which in national and international – especially in Eastern Central European – contexts seemed to be more competitive attracted international and domestic capital faster (e.g. Poland, Slovakia, Romania and along the western border of Hungary). Private economy is in a relatively early state of development thus its present strongly polarized concentration may ease significantly. In Eastern Central Europe already economic, R+D, university and civil representatives dominate in CBC relationships but they are divers considering ownership and their decisions are autonomous. Establishment of the local economy (local owned, local decisions, based on local relationship network) has been started. Local governments received important roles while civil social organisations (local and regional associations, societies) are new participants. Despite all these changes, assertation of border side regions is still not sufficient and due to the nature of 141 things the role of governments were modified only slightly. In the changing eastern central Europe the major basis of regional development is still the regional distribution of central budget sources (Enyedi,2004), however, the role of EU development bases is increasing. It is an important change that the units of the economy becoming autonomous decide themselves where to place premises and where to invest, etc. It became clear which settlements have what kind of advantages as settlement disadvantages that were not taken into consideration by the market neglecting investment and social paternalism of the state owned economy veiled. Despite these the eastern border side regions of Poland, Slovakia and Hungary provided no real advantages for investments in the 1990s, nor in the first years of the third millennium (Baranyi, 2002). Most significant unemployment and impoverishment affected those rural regions that had hard fate before as well and where side fields of production associations were terminated, town industry were eliminated, the number of in agriculture was reduced to its third or quarter within 10 12 years based on statistic data (Suli Zakar, 1997). Rate of unemployed and non studying people among inhabitants is highest in these regions. Reduction in investments and construction works made high number of long distance commuters – unskilled labour and semiskilled labour – redundant. Formerly the handicap of rural areas was not found in economy but in the state of infrastructure and public services. Income of rural families was not far behind of households in towns or cities because of their wide range of income sources. Since the regime change, these sources have been reduced significantly therefore border side regions in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary became impoverished and disreputable rapidly. In Hungary numbers of the gypsy ethnic group and the illiterate people are increasing significantly in the border side regions (Suli Zakar, 1998). In the new democracies the state re distribution system did not favoured border side regions until most recent times. Measures of the individuals and the state thus lead to negative tendencies strengthening each other. These were accompanied by special factors at places like distrust in ethnic groups or advantages of solidarity among ethnic groups. Examples for the latter are certain ethnic villages (having strong cultural traditions) that could retain there schools, local governmental separateness, etc. even at the time of eliminating rural institutions (zoning tendencies), although, no doubt, there were political reasons behind these as well (Enyedi, 1994; Ludvig, Suli Zakar, 2000). Relationship between border sidedness and minority groups – that leads to the development of a regional state through ethno regionalism – has a great importance in eastern central Europe. Ethnic diversity in this region makes this question a hot political – security political and national political – issue. At present the regional differentiating unit is pertinence in crisis, capability of adjusting to market requirements. In this an important role is played by the geographical position of the birder side region, preparedness of its society (education, innovation sensitivity, civil traditions). At present for example only one dynamic region with the capability of structural technological renewal can be determined: along the Budapest Vienna axis (the agglomeration of the capital and North western Transdanubia) and the South Hungarian cities and west Transdanubian districts increased their value as well. Extensive areas – with middle sized town centres – got into uncertain position (e.g. in Middle and South Transdanubia, in Southeastern and Eastern Great Hungarian Plain) where decrease is presumed to be only transitional as they have the social condition of renewal. Extensive, inner, rural, market town periphery areas of the Great Plain together with the industrial areas of Northern Hungary suffering from economic turndown are the areas least capable of renewal. However, even more hopeless are the border side (outer) periphery areas of East Northeast Hungary (Suli Zakar, 1992/a, 1998, 2001). The other reason for the development of regional differences hides in the qualification and education of labour that also influence the capability of reacting to new challenges. Closing up of regional units is helped greatly by increasing education and knowledge of the population as adaptation and innovation capability can thus be increased as well. Despite differing training systems and employment structure conditions are given in several fields to co operate and to 142 utilize differing conditions. Differences in training systems can be a stimulating factor in completing commenced cross border educational co operations (Kozma, Forray, 1998; Kozma, 1992) and strengthening cross border regional universities (Kozma, 2006). In the new economic space (following decrease in the 1960s and 1970s) the role of larger cities is strengthened (Enyedi, 1993, 1994). Modern city has services, there are no production in it as city infrastructure and labour are too expensive for industry. Large company centres, directorates of financial institutions are strengthen in tercierizing cities providing better future for border side regions located near the vicinity of cities. Again border side cities and their immediate smaller regions can relish the positive effects of rapidly developing city cultural economy and the positive consequences of the development of cross border eurometropolises. The city is the centre of information (collection, processing, transmitting) and modern informatics enables long distance quick leadership. Cities become the major innovation centres. Cities compete with each other to obtain international functions and they may co operate in these functions. A city emerges from its direct area of attraction and even in some degree from the territory of its own country as well and they are connected to each other via connections to several cities of developed states in high quality financial, cultural, research and (upper) educational services (Enyedi 1993, 1994). Therefore cities are the most important beneficiaries of cross border relationships and the engines behind eurometropolises. In the eastern part of Central Europe it would be possible to recall the former close relationship between towns on the two sides of the border via eliminating the borders. Traditional development of the economic district – based on town attraction regions and the inter company connections of the local economy – is limited and is overtaken by the international network of cities and economic systems associated with them (Sassen, 1994). Thus cities near the borders of Eastern Poland, Eastern Slovakia and Eastern Hungary may contribute significantly to the developing city network of a “Middle Europe in the future (Suli Zakar, 1998). In this respect we consider the cross border co operation of Debrecen and Oradea as highly important.
Future In recent years the countries of Eastern Central Europe reached significant successes in diplomacy that resulted in that they belong to the most developed countries of the World having strongest democracies. As members of OECD, NATO and the European Union the security of the countries is much better than it was before. Positive changes in the world political situation of Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary naturally involve the possibility of positive changes in their border side regions as well. Joining the Atlantic organisation of Hungary protects the country from regional uncertainties, war conflicts and it reduces the intensity of negative outer effects. Eastern Central Europe and especially its border side regions are the last areas of stability from where trade towards the Middle and Far East can be directed as a base. In consequence border side regions of Hungary will have special capital attracting characters as a specific transfer zone. It could have been noted earlier that the border side regions of the Common Market and the European Union were favoured regions of investment. Cities near borders are in especially favourable position as they attracted significant investment as bases of multinational companies and organisations due to their gateway function. Diplomacy, financial life, international marketing role, significance of education and conference tourism of such cities increase rapidly. This kind of role – due to their special characteristics – presents a development opportunity primarily for Debrecen, Szeged, Békéscsaba and Nyíregyháza. In the case of Szeged the closeness of Serbia and the problems over there presented a significant impeding factor (Suli Zakar, 1999). Traffic conditions, accessibility of North eastern Hungary were improved greatly by the construction of the M3 motorway. Although our recent empirical studies revealed mostly the regional development problems arose due to the missing of the M3 motorway but we also note the positive changes induced by the marking of the track and the continuation of the 143 constructions for example in the region of Polgár. It became clear that the lack of the motorway impedes regional development and the new motorway sections provide enormous locality energy increase where its track runs through. Locality energy means the advantages resulted by the traffic position of the area. This increasing of the locality energy changes the position of the area – presently the North Great Plain – within the country and the space structure of its wider surroundings also changes. Construction of the regional airport network would also improve significantly the accessibility of Eastern Central European Countries and their border side regions. (We are sure that among them the international airport of Debrecen could have an important role). Businessmen coming from Western Europe and North America prefer to travel by the same carriage, usually plane. Regional airports will have special importance – especially following the changing of the borders of the “to be member” states into Schengen borders – in strengthening the transfer role. Alteration of the economic structure in the regions on the two sides of the borders require changes in re training and further education systems, institutions and methods together with occasional harmonization of them in certain regions. Outer effects may play an important role in the ascension of a region but the type and intensity of outer effects nowadays depend largely on the local welcome, local resources, especially the quality of human resources. In the former dropping out of Eastern Central Europe backwardness of human resources played a highly important role (Kozma, 2006). Higher education of the region, however, experienced a significant quality and quantity development in the 1990s. Training fields and methods required by the social and economic demands were spread and regional universities were formed. It can be regarded as positive that the rate of local students increased in the higher education institutes in the region. This means that local cities become more and more perspective for young intellectuals (Suli Zakar, Ludvig, 2001). There are regions in the border side areas of Hungary that formed close co operation in the past. Villages and towns in them were separated by the new borders of the Trianon Treaty that eliminated or paused the natural social and economic connections of the involved settlements. Former co operation of neighbouring regions could be reset by elimination of the borders. These traditional co operations of border side regions could be re activated again forming new dimensions in the relationship of the regions. Positive examples are the results of Debrecen and Oradea and the euroregion of Hajdú Bihar and Bihor. Re evaluation of borders and border sidedness will be influenced by the specific geo political situation as well. The small territory of Hungary is bordered by seven neighbouring countries the relations of which in the Schengen system are very diverse even today. Besides the already EU member Austria, Slovakia and Slovenia became members together with Hungary while Romania became a member only in 2007. Joining of Serbia and the Ukraine is planned only in the future. Euroregions and eurometropolises in Western Europe were formed several decades ago in order to give a joint reply by the regions and cities of the neighbouring countries for common challenges and to exploit common energies and to eliminate the negative effects of borders impeding social and economic development. As a result dissection of Western Europe by borders was eliminated. Following the regime change, numerous euroregions were formed in Eastern Central Europe as well, like the Carpathians Euroregion or the Hajdú Bihar – Bihor Euroregion that are successful along north eastern border of Hungary in improving geopolitical position, developing economic connections and initiating higher education (e.g. Association of the Carpathians Euroregion Universities) co operations. In recent years, co operation between border side cities intensified in the eastern periphery of the EU as well in the course of which near border towns are intended to make steps in order to harmonize their economic, medical and educational activities and services. There are fine examples in Western Europe for successful co operation of near border cities like Basel 144 Mulhouse Freiburg in the core are of Regio Baseliensis, or border side metropolises, Maastricht Aachen Liege Hasselt of Euroregio Mass Rhein. Similar good example of co operation is found in the Goodstadt (Lille Tourcoing Roubaix Ieper Kotrijk Tournai) eurometropolis where measures in order to solve border side and cross border problems (e.g. mass transport, economic development, health care, development of human resources, air quality and waste management). Joint cross border plans and aims of these eurometropolises are supported strongly by the cohesion politics of the EU. Among the CBC institutions of Hungary and Romania it is regarded to be a novelty to work for a successful eurometropolis by Debrecen and Oradea (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Debrecen Oradea cross border eurometropolis (2007 2013)
On the other hand it is beneficial that the two close cities separated by a border try to harmonize their activity in several fields. There are already – or currently under establishment – workgroups that intend to help to harmonize human resource development, to improve accessibility, to develop joint infrastructure, to harmonize tourism and health, to develop inter ethnic connections and common economy. This may lead to the establishment – with the help of EU cohesion support – of the educational, R+D and health tourism innovative cluster of Debrecen Oradea. In forming the cross border innovative cluster of Debrecen Oradea Eurometropolis the co operating universities of the two cities will have an important role.
Conclusion Based on the experiences of empirical research carried out in border side regions general aims are establishing innovation oriented, cross border joint economy development and co operation programmes and establishing eurometropolises and euroregions. System of eurometropolises and euroregions spreads from Western Europe towards east in order to enable 145 associated regions to utilize comparative advantages along borders better. The primary goal in border side regions is the establishment of a preferable economic, innovation and social atmosphere that with forming variable institutions extend the space for successful economy and increase the regional development success of border side regions in neighbouring countries. Cross border co operation is an important element of the European integration process. From the 1990s – following the fundamental political and economic change in the Central and Eastern European countries – fundamental political conditions are present for such co operations in most of the border side regions of Europe. Wish for co operation is indicated by the growing number of euroregions and other types of cross border co operations (e.g. eurometropolises) especially in the countries of Central Eastern Europe. Besides this beneficial fact it is important to note that the practical results of cross border co operations are impeded by different factors. Especially Central and Eastern European border side regions have limited separateness (thus limited experiences as well) for preparing and realizing co operation programmes. Power and involvement of central authorities can be disturbing especially in cases where co operations target to solve political, ethnic and psychological problems originating from the past. Border side regions try to close up and integration (that should result in better co operation between areas located on the two sides of the border and better relationship of the regions with associated national economies) from underprivileged situation due to their geographical position and disadvantageous economic state. Therefore developing higher education that establishes the modernization of the economy and developing the infrastructure are especially important. Number of these and their scope, however (as these involve mainly investments of great cost) are way behind that would be favourable. A general problem is presented by financing cross border co operations. Worst situation is found in Central and Eastern Europe (especially at non EU borders). Most important outer financing sources for euroregions were the EU founds ( before 2007 INTERREG, PHARE CBC and TACIS CBC ), however, obtaining sources from these funds was greatly limited by the lack of separateness and experience of the regions mentioned before. Problem associated with financing is that the private sector participates in cross border co operations in very limited extent limiting the role of the euroregions to cross border discussions and institutional network reconstruction instead of realizing systematic regional development goals (Scott, 1989, 2000). Apart from the above general factors, co operation is made significantly difficult by the frequent major differences between the areas on the two sides of the border. They are reflected not only in the economic situation but in the institutional system, the separateness and authority of the regions and partners participating in the co operation. Based on the experiences it can be stated that eurometropolises and euroregions can operated most effectively where the changes of the economic attitude were also made towards co operation. United Inner Market was established through the sequence of such steps in which cross border co operations have to face much less technical difficulties (however, they also have to face new challenges with the elimination of strictly protected borders) than before. Introduction of the euro undoubtedly reduces further the technical economic separating factors at the common borders of the associated countries. Intensifying of all these may affect beneficially those border side regions besides the regions of the new inner border of the EU that give the outer border of the EU. However, in these latter border side regions co operations will be made rather difficult by the setbacks (visa requirements) to be introduced (or partially already introduced) as a consequence of the Schengen Agreement. In the case of Hungary this affects primarily the Ukraine and Serbia. Countries of Central and Eastern Europe had to – as part of the preparations for the joining of the EU – prepare for the above changes in the conditions of cross border co operations. Increasing the organizations separateness and stabilizing the financial state of the regions is inevitable in order to help both the better utilization of the effects of positive changes and the reduction of the effects of negative changes. In order to realize the latter apart from 146 direct financial support an important role is played by the theoretical and technical preparation for participation in EU funded projects and tenders. It is essential to let co operations not to fail despite technical difficulties increased temporarily. Even if the economic results of euroregional co operations are behind the preferred values it is important to maintain and improve direct relationships (Ludvig, Suli Zakar, 2002). In 2009 in the transforming Eastern Central Europe there are no such border sections across which euroregions and eurometropolises would not help city or regional co operations and the elimination of historical and ethnic traumas together with the realization of common regional development duties. It is sensible therefore to state that euroregions and eurometropolises became part of the everyday life in the eastern periphery of the EU (Suli Zakar, 2008).
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The Danube Region – Past, Present and Future Prospect of Transnational Cooperation as a Playground of the European Integration
Zoltán GÁL
Abstract: The study is focused on the forms of types of territorial and interregional collaboration in the CEE and South Eastern Europe that effects the economic and social development of these regions and deepens the European integration of the area providing further impetus for the enlargement. The Danube region itself is situated between the CEE and South Eastern Europe (The Balkans) where nations are linked by their borders, traditional political and economic relations separating by political conflicts as well as in the past and the present. The paper gives a historical overview on the (geo)political and territorial transformations and integrating attempts within the Danube region. The second section analyses the most important territorial co operation programmes (e.g. CADSES) initiated by the EU in relation to enlargement and cohesion policy. The paper ends with the policy issues of the common problems and dangers of the stabilization and future integration of the Balkans region.
Keywords : Danube, transnational cooperation, integration, opportunities, challenges
The transformation of political spatial structures in the Danube states at the turn of the Millennium Europe is facing one of its biggest challenges at the turn of the millennium. The globalisation generated competition, the establishment of the frameworks and the internal regional structures of European integration, the challenges of the eastern enlargement of the EU , the competitions with the economic power centres of America and Asia make the old continent gather its energies at a large scale. It is not only the expansion of the external borders of the EU requires heavy preparatory work but and the preparation of a prognosis on its new geopolitical changes. All these changes may have serious impacts on the small states of East Central Europe who are unprepared for integration. Not only because their economy and democratic institutional system need serious further efforts to meet EU requirements, but also because the establishment of their inner regional structures requiring the decentralisation of the state may face serious problems in these countries. The revival of nation states after the change of regime was very often accompanied by strong centralisation efforts, which resulted in a total absence or a weakness of decentralised institutional system and autonomies in the region’s countries . At the same time, this very region may be the largest beneficiary of macroregional level cooperations. During the 20 th century the borders of small states – very frequently established irrationally – are politically the most disputable as they are not matching with ethnic borders and they are strongly limiting the economic, cultural and residential interrelationship of lands historically bound together (Illés, 2002). In the 1990s, the fundamental changes in macroregional relations created new historical situations, challenges and risks for the quite often conflicting regional transformation processes. While West European regional cooperation is actually an integral part of a comprehensive process and macroregional cooperation systems are parts of the integration process of member countries East Central European macroregional cooperations with their internal decentralisation processes and strengthening interregional cooperations may be regarded as the ‘test areas’ of European accession.
149 The integrating and disintegrating role of river Danube in the East Central European region from a historical perspective Besides drafting future development programmes studying the changing historical role of river Danube in the formation of life, natural economy, the settlement network and the transport structure of Danube countries, seem to be another issue of equal weight. River Danube is the second longest river of Europe (2850 kilometres) connecting ten countries of East Central Europe and the Balkans (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Moldavia). The only major river flows eastward from Western Europe and connects very heterogeneous territories of the continent. River Danube is not only a geographical notion but also it is also a transport corridor and was a major conflicting point of several ecological, political and economic issues . Its economic importance, its role in waterway transport was always changing with times but the river itself had always minor role in the international division of labour.
Table 1 The Danube as a border river Length of the The Danube as a The Danube as a The Danube as a Country Danube in a given international border regional border internal river (km) country (km) (km) (km) Germany 647 cca. 25 cca 4 cca 618 Austria 350 cca 35 cca 35 cca 280 Slovakia 172 cca 150 0 cca 22 Hungary 410 140 cca 230 cca 40 Croatia 188 188 0 0 Yugoslavia 588 cca 408 cca 90 cca 90 Bulgaria 470 470 0 0 Romania 1075 cca 853 cca 60 cca 62 Ukraine 163 163 0 0 Source: Illés (2002)
River Danube was served several times as a natural border between civilisations, political systems and governments. River Danube was already an important frontier zone separating the barbarian and civilised world at the age of Romans and later on the borders of several empires and very important military roads were crossing the river and its zone (Avarian, Frank, Byzantine, Bulgarian empires). From the early Middle Ages the commercial activity of Danube nations has increased but natural obstacles (river falls), the Black Sea’s peripheral location and the fragmentation of feudal powers all hindered the use of Danube for long distance commercial purposes. For several centuries, the Central Danube Basin was a frontier zone between Christian Civilisation and the Ottoman Empire. For several centuries river Sava and the line of Lower Danube served as a kind of frontier for Europe separating the civilised world from the Balkans which should be regarded in civilisation sense as a gateway to the East 1. The Iron
1 The marking of the geographical borders of Balkans Peninsula and Danube region (Danube space, Danube landscape) is hindered by the fact that both space categories are identifying a changing political, cultural and value content not only in geographical but also in historical sense. The geographical borders of Balkans Peninsula are marked by river Sava and the Lower Danube but in political sense the northern border of the Balkans cannot be exactly located. Some experts are marking Balkans Peninsula as the areas having remained from the 18 th century others are identifying the Balkans with the territory of Balkans states including the new states having been formed after 1918 (Romania and Yugoslavia) ( Jelavich 1996 ). The frequent changes in the geopolitical relations between the Balkans states and the countries of Central Europe are further complicating the marking of the 150 Curtain set up following World War II was also following the Danube region separating the Eastern and Western world. During the 20 th century the river’s role as a natural state border was questioned several times which further enhanced the river’s separating functions (Gál 2003a). (Table 1) From geographical aspects, the Danube region is considered as a land locked continental area, although even in the early Middle Ages very important trading routes were set up in east west direction along the river’s zone. For centuries, these routes were serving as important innovation channels and considered as the axis of Western civilisation . The Rhine Danube axis in east west direction had key functions as the continent’s terrestrial and waterway transportation routes had reached Levante area along river Danube. After the 16 th century the transportation role of the Danube axis was re evaluated. Until the mid 1900s, the Danube states were serving as carriers of agricultural products for the industrialised West European countries in the European spatial division of labour. Within this system, first the waterway route of river Danube and later on the railway lines following the Danube axis had a key role (Gál, 2002). From geopolitical and economical aspects, the eastbound flow of river Danube from West Europe to the European peripheries is disadvantageous for the countries of Danube region, which may strongly work against the river,’s integrating force and role. The accessibility of the Black Sea by river Danube was hindered by several factors . On natural side PorŃile de Fier (Iron Gate) was the major obstacle, which until the regulation of the river at the turn of the 19 th and 20 th centuries and until the 1960s was hindering both the navigation of the river and the accessibility of the Black Sea (Stephen G., 1964). On economical side it was a problem that unlike several other smaller but more important from navigational aspects rivers in its neighbourhood river Danube was avoiding the Adriatic space and was targeting Black Sea, an economically more disadvantaged, locked up and peripheral area situated outside the major routes of international marine transportation. Apart from the lower Romanian section, being important in cereal goods export the river’s shipping traffic was very low (in 1913 the whole length of the river produced a lower traffic volume than the lower section of river Rhine) (East, 1935). The volume of shipped goods decreased after World War I. The homogenous customs area of Austria and Hungary was broken up and the successor states of the Austro Hungarian Monarchy introduced high customs duties at seven new independent customs areas. The first peak period in the history of Danube shipping was the expansion of the Nazi Germany’s military spatial economy to Southeast Europe, which at the same time put an end to the freedom of navigation. Imported food, Romanian crude oil and raw materials for military use were mostly shipped by the Danube into Germany and the turn of the 1939 40s was the top year considering the volume of shipped cargo (Ránki, 1983). In geopolitical sense, the Danube Basin’s landlocked character was emphasized by the fact that political (empire) borders surrounded it and the river’s area turned into the rivalry site of the great empires. Granting the rights of free shipping was the fundamental condition for the navigation of river Danube. International treaties signed by the representatives of the Danube region’s great empires and by the Danube states granted this. The Paris Treaty in 1856 and the Versailles Treaty in 1919 declared river Danube an international waterway and set up Danube Committee, which was authorised with the competences in the administrative issues of Danube navigation. With the election of Danube Committee, an international organisation was created for granting free rights for shipping on river Danube.
The role of river Danube in the political formation of space in the 19 th and 20 th centuries
border between the Balkans and Central Europe. This is based on the fact that the ‘Huntington’ civilisation (religional, cultural) frontiers are not only separating but in several cases dividing the Danube region – the common terrain – in a mosaic like pattern. 151 The historical political dimension of the Danube region and the area’s political tension increased in the 19 th century , which turned into several bloody conflicts during the 20 th century. The spatial possibilities of creating nation states showed very different perspectives from that of in Western Europe. While in Western Europe nation states have been resulted from the integration of smaller regions into a homogenous state in the ethnically most mixed ‘Danube’ region of Europe the multinational ‘nation states’ were formed at a later stage only after the disintegration of supranational (Habsburg, Russian, Turkish, Soviet) empires (Breu, 1971) (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Political map of the Danube region in the early 20 th and the late 20 th century Source : drawn by the author
Unfortunately, the establishment of the area’s nation states in the 19 th century coincided with the increasing influence of superpowers and this led to such a situation where the decisions of the borders of the newly formed Balkans states depended mostly on those superpowers most capable for articulating for their interests in the Danube region (Macartney, C.A., 1944). In the Danube region, a homogenous political structure was always created by the pushing force of an external power or by economic pressure. During the 20 th century, the Danube Valley was a conflicting point of the interests of four superpowers (Germany, the Habsburg Empire, Turkey 152 and Russia/The Soviet Union). From the political structures of the Danube space, the Habsburg Empire could maintain an economically sustainable integration for 400 years. The confederational efforts of the past two centuries emphasizing the need for the cooperation of Danube nations against the external superpowers were also associated with river Danube and considered it as a symbol of linking the confederation of small nations (Hanák, 1990). However, the voluntary integration of the Danube Valley nations had no feasible alternatives all its ideas and concepts were mere plans. In the Danube region only the superpowers were in decisional situation, consequently only the superpowers contacting with the area’s peripheral zone could maintain integration systems quite often endangering each other’s power ambitions (Gál 2003b). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of empire integrations, the Danube region still missed the preconditions for a conflict free integration. Only the EU’s initiative for gaining a ‘Common Europe’ can be a real alternative for the countries of the Danube region.
Possibilities for territorial cooperation in the Danube region at the turn of the Millennium River Danube is not only a transport corridor, a constant conflicting point of ecological and political issues but it is also an important spatial organisational power that may serve as a framework for interregional cooperation as well . At the turn of the 1980s/90s with the disintegration of the last great empire the Danube space is again disintegrating into nation states which process is more intense than it was after the First World War. The three socialist pseudo federations with the collapse of the Soviet Union Czechoslovakia and with the disintegration of Yugoslavia resulting in a bloody war the Danube region continued its way towards ‘cantonisation’ (today the region has 22 states). Parallel to the region’s fragmentation a regional self organisation and integration process is going on at the other side of Europe within the supranational framework of the European Union. In the 1990s, three alternatives seemed to be possible to follow for the countries of the Danube region reviving their old conflicts: (1) the confederational integration of the region’s small states (a new renaissance of the Central European idea) which was deemed to failure from the beginning. (2) The redistribution of the territory among superpowers, which may be compensated by the collective defence, guarantees of the NATO’s eastern expansion and by the weakening powers of Russia. (3) The EU accession of the area’s certain countries could be the real alternative but this would also create breakpoints but would also create breakpoints among the nations of the Danube space (Illés, 2002). The problems of integrating the Danube countries into a broader European space may be solved only be the accession, which may also terminate unreal expectations and worries. Being aware of the different scenarios, we can now see that macro regional cooperation covering the area of East Central Europe may have special role in case of integration in the intensification of internal decentralisation and in terminating mutual trusts and worries. There is an increasing and a widening trend in the cooperation crossing the borders of the past iron curtain states and the expanded EU. The site and the role of the Danube Basin cooperation should be examined from this aspect. The Visegrád countries’ initiative, the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) in 1991, the Central European Initiative proposed by Italy in 1988 for the replacement of Pentagonale and the cooperation of Danube regions in the institutional form of Danube Region Working Community since 1992 might all be regarded as the precedents of macro regional cooperation of the Danube states. Real macro regional cooperation should meet two criteria: more than two countries should participate in cooperation and not all participating countries’ full territory should be involved in it. Macro regional cooperation are initiated not by the EU but rather by the participating regions or by a third party. Macro regional cooperation may operate in the following forms: twin city cooperation, interregional cooperation (Danube regions) cross border 153 cooperation, macro regional cooperation (CADSES), environmental, water management and tourism oriented professional cooperation (Illés 2002). The increasing importance of crossborder regional cooperation in Europe is a very significant phenomenon of the last decade. From the several reasons of this tendency, two are worth mentioning. The first originates from the very nature of economic and environmental issues. Environmental problems are not stopping at the border their efficient management requires crossborder cooperation. Economic issues are crossing the border because a more efficient division of labour requires a better utilisation of competitive advantages. However all these demand roads, railway and infrastructure which require cooperation on international level. In East Central Europe, the political motivation for this cooperation is even higher. Regionalism has democratic functions too, which may counterbalance the predominance of the power of state in the centralised state systems of East Central Europe. The importance of macro regional cooperation in East Central Europe should be higher than in other parts of Europe. The countries of Central and Southeast Europe are small continental states with long terrestrial and non natural borders in the majority of cases. While 80% of the borders of EU 15 member states are sea borders this is true only for 10% of Central and Southeast European countries. This explains why these countries are in need of international regional cooperation. Finally yet importantly, the present state borders of Central and East European countries have recently been formed only as until the mid 1990s these countries had lived in an empire without borders separating them in the majority of cases. The intensive division of labour followed this pattern but today’s new state borders are separating such areas that used to be integrated in the past. Of the 19 nations of Danube space with the exception of the Czech nation, no nations are living in full number within the borders of their state. There are 10 ethnic groups in the region having more than one million members living outside the borders of their own state. In this context, there is no need to emphasize the importance of crossborder cooperation. The European Union has been supporting macro regional cooperation in East Central Europe since the mid 1990s only. It was initiated in the middle of the 1990s that beyond the support limited to local crossborder cooperation only a comprehensive strategy should be prepared for larger regional structures. This cooperation strategy involves the following targets: − The intensification of macro regional integration processes within the region, the increase of the region’s internal cohesion with the promotion of decentralisation processes; − The organisation of ‘actions’ and institutions for facilitating the closing up and preparing the region for EU integration; − The testing and involvement of the peripheral areas outside the EU as an interest sphere into partnerships. This may be interpreted as and incentive for integration or as an initiative for creating a federal and influence zone as an external impetus for non EU states for integration. The Community Initiative INTERREG was prompted by the rapidly growing awareness of two essential truths: (1) the growing interdependencies of various components of the European territory and (2) the considerable impact of many Community policies on territorial development and planning. Realising these challenges, the Commission of the European Communities – at its meeting on 15 th of June 1994 – decided to establish a Community Initiative concerning cross border co operation (INTERREG II A) and selected energy networks (INTEREG II B). Almost two years later, at its meeting of 8 May 1996, the Commission further decided to include a third strand (INTERREG II C) concerning “transnational co operation on spatial planning”. The main objectives of INTERREG II C were to contribute to balanced spatial development in the EU, with the reduction of development differences and to improve the spatial impact of Community policies with regard to spatial development; in the next INTERREG III B programming period (2000–2006) transnational spatial planning cooperation 154 programmes were continued. The Commission of the European Communities decided on 28 April 2000 to establish a Community initiative concerning trans European cooperation (INTERREG III B) for this period.
Figure 2. CADSES: Central European, Adriatic, Danubian and Southern European Space Source : ESDP The INTERREG II C in the previous period allowed the acquisition of some experience regarding cooperation over seven larger transnational territories (Northwest European Metropolitan Area, Baltic Sea, Southwest European Space, North Sea, West Mediterranean and South Alps, Atlantic Area, CADSES), involving national, regional and local authorities, with a view to achieving a higher degree of territorial integration of these territories. The main challenge for INTERREG III therefore was to build on the positive experiences and progressively develop structures for such cooperation across the Community and with neighbouring countries. Due attention was to be given to 155 – the external borders of the Community, in particular taking into account enlargement; – cooperation concerning the outermost regions of the Community; – cooperation to further the stabilisation and association process in the western Balkans; and – Cooperation concerning insular regions. Of the present macro regional initiatives, the Danube region is involved in CADSES (abbreviated as Central European, Adriatic, Danubian and Southeast European Space) programme. The delineation of the CADSES area (Central European, Adriatic, Danubian and Southern European Space) was one of the most debated issues of transnational cooperation, the reasons for which are manifold. The original definition of the CADSES area was not based on geographical criteria (Figure 2).
The CADSES area is one of the biggest co operation areas among the INTERREG III B areas, with its 18 co operating countries (the largest number among all co operation areas) covering a total area of 1.814 million km2 and a population of 209.6 million (46.5% and 45.8% of the EU25, respectively). The primary and basic reason for defining and delineating the CADSES area in 1996 was that it comprised the member states (Germany, Austria, Italy and Greece) neighbouring the eastern enlargement area and other neighbours beyond the external EU border. The fundamental goal was to establish spatial cooperation across the external border (former Iron Curtain) of the EU with larger spaces than the narrow border area. A specific goal was for Greece to develop co operation links with EU partners to the North. CADSES programme by no means homogenises these countries but it is also drawing the attention of the EU on countries excluded from it in the first period and involves them to some extent into the integration processes (Illés, 2002). In the second programming period (1997–99) the CADSES cooperation fulfilled the task2.Various kinds of cooperation networks were established, despite the fact that there was no or very modest EU funding for non EU partners. In 1999, at the end of the programming period, the European Commission proposed to split the space into two cooperation areas, by arguing that it was too large (including 18 countries) and hardly manageable efficiently. However, the historic moment was not suitable for implementing this change and the Commission changed their mind on that issue. This time 79 percent of the area covered by the CADSES programme is outside the EU15 territory and 63 percent of the population lives in these areas. Obviously, these non EU15 regions have some common challenges with the regions of the EU15, but they have a lot of challenges and tasks specific to these countries and regions. The large number of partners and the great degree of heterogeneity significantly increases the difficulties of CADSES programme management for several reasons: a. Though the number of countries incorporated into the CADSES area was very high (18), the number of EU member states among them, with full eligibility for ERDF financing was only four. There is no other cooperation area with so many eligible countries (the second largest is the Baltic Space with 8). The number of eligible NUTS2 regions is 110 (the next highest number is 96 in Northwest Europe). It is certainly a very large managerial and administrative burden for the respective institutions. b. Embracing old and new member countries into the same cooperation area is justifiable and even desirable. Nevertheless, the experiences of two programming periods demonstrated and proved that spatial planning problems, priorities of old, and new
2 Macroregional initiatives are bound to the geopolitical considerations of the EU 15 member countries selecting the regions they wish to establish a closer connection with for the enhancement of their (market and investment) relations. In CADSES the four participating member states are located in different regions thus they have different interest areas (Greece – Southeast Balkans, Italy –Adriatic Space, Austria South Eastern Europe, Bayern Danube axis). 156 member states are in many respects very different. What is a serious and fundamental problem in the new member states (agricultural overpopulation, dramatic lack and weakness of SMEs, high number and share of Roma population, large and deteriorating urban housing estates, lack and weaknesses of regional administrative and management structures, consequences of recent mass privatisation and so on) are not problems in old member states. Problems of old member states (large immigration, guest workers, placement of workplaces to cheap labour areas and so on) are not (yet) problems in the new member states. Even in issues of common concern (environment, accessibility, natural and cultural heritage) the dimensions and priorities are different in the two groups of countries and regions. Therefore, to find common priority themes in these mixed cooperation areas is not a simple task. The facts that CADSES has a rigid management mechanism and the activity of tendering system is appropriate only in the EU 15 member states are originating from the region’s heterogeneity as well. The macro regional cooperation of Danube countries is hindered by the fact that the development potentials and the economic structure of the Danube Valley impacting 14 countries of Europe shows significant spatial differences in the utilisation of river and there are further differences in the state of natural environment of the participating countries. The delineation of Danube region as a geographical unit is neither an easy task as the river’s water catchment area (817,000 km 2) is strongly fragmented lacking a homogenous geographical space. It is a region of extreme differences in economic development as both Baden Württemberg and Bavaria Europe’s and Germany’s richest regions are located in the Danube Valley but Europe’s poorest regions can also be found in the Danube area. The difference between the GDP of Upper Bavaria and Teleorman, a county in Romania, is twenty fold. Cooperation should be planned in such kind of circumstances. The introduction of more intensive forms of cooperation is hindered by several factors. The low utilisation of river Danube as an international waterway is not only the outcome of the Yugoslavian crisis. The low values of shipped cargo volume started to appear in the 1980s (between 1980 1994 the volume of cargo shipping dropped to ¼ of the initial value) and with the deteriorating infrastructure the opening of the Danube Main Rhine Canal further decreased the volume of shipped goods on river Danube (Erdısi, 2002). The shortage of bridges is a hindering factor of crossborder cooperation over the river’s two banks. River Danube is a natural border between countries on nearly 1,000 kilometres (996 kilometres precisely) which is 36% of its total length. This means that in these sections cooperation on river Danube is at the same time a bi or (trilateral) crossborder cooperation. Eight bridges cross this 1000 kilometre section of the river only. Every 125 kilometres section of the river has one bridge as an average. In these circumstances river Danube as a border river has rather separating than linking role. It is very striking that the 470 km section between Romania and Bulgaria is crossed by only one bridge. This situation is unique in Europe (even if there are five ferry crossings within this section). 149 public road bridges cross river Danube. Of them 99 are located in Germany, 20 are in Austria and the remaining 30 are on the further sections of the river. The coordination of environmental and water management tasks is a problem to be solved. Although river Danube is not among the most polluted rivers of the European continent (thanks to its self cleaning ability) but in the vicinity of large cities and at the meeting point of some of its side rivers carrying ‘lethal’ pollutants for the river’s ecosystem (cyanide, tin) the values of pollution are by far exceeding the environmental limits. Environmental and water management problems can be managed only in the framework of international cooperation as 96% of Hungary’s , 87% of Moldavia’s , 83% of Romania’s and 79% of Yugoslavia’s surface waters are originating from other countries. There are some issues, which should be solved by the involvement of not only Danube countries but of the whole river catchment area. Such issues are water management and the protection against floods. The CADSES area as a whole, but within it especially in the Danube area is seriously exposed to flood hazards. Probably due to 157 human activities (deforestation in the Carpathians, reduction of the natural vegetation cover etc.), the level of floods and their frequency is increasing from year to year. Border areas and border regions should enjoy specific attention not only in cross border, but also in transnational cooperation. The reason for this is that half of the length of European land borders (16,000 km) can be found in the CADSES area. The countries of the area are small states (7 of them land locked) with long continental borders. Sixty five percent of the territory can be regarded as border region and the same percentage of the population is living there (the respective percentage in the EU15 is only 17 percent). Crossing these borders is still a problem in many spaces, both in respect to infrastructure and to control and administrative procedures. Considering the development level of the area, the conditions of entrepreneurship and sustainable growth should be one of the priority topics of cooperation. Support for and strengthening of SMEs is a specific problem here, considering that 15 years ago SMEs did not exist in these countries. Rural areas and their common problems have special importance in this space. The share of agricultural and rural population is still much higher than in the countries of Western Europe. In some countries, 20 to 30 percent of active population is still engaged in agriculture. In centrally planned economies the method of solving the employment problems in small and medium size cities was to locate there one single large industrial plant. In the period of transition a large part of these plants are proved to be non competitive and were closed down, consequently several of these cities remained totally without economic base. This is a typical problem in the Eastern half of the CADSES area; therefore a common analysis of best practices would be very useful. While East West transport and telecommunication corridors have developed dynamically, the development of North South corridors is lagging – for the time being – behind. For the development and integration of the area, they are of equal importance. Since the establishment of the CADSES area, circumstances have changed substantially. The original motivation was to group member and non member states along the Eastern external border of the EU into one common cooperation area. In the meantime, however, the EU external borders have moved several hundred kilometres eastward and they will move even farther at the beginning of 2007. Germany, Austria and Italy are not the Eastern border states of the EU any more. There are, however, other reasons for cooperation, first of all integration between the core area and the peripheries. However, this reason requires new configuration and delineation of cooperation areas. The original definition of the CADSES area was not based on geographical criteria due to the main factor defining the space was the external border of the EU. Therefore, applying geographical criteria means substantial changes in the present constitution of the area. It belongs now to the catchment area of four European seas (Mediterranean, Black Sea, Baltic Sea and North Sea). Consequently, – by applying the geographical and hydrological criteria – it should be divided into four parts. A comprehensive spatial planning perspective should be prepared not only for the cooperation areas as a whole, but also for their important and distinctive sub areas, like the Danube Basin, the Adriatic Basin, and the Carpathians.
Conclusion The Danube region’s sharp economic and social inequalities, the intensive conflicts, the low degree of decentralisation and the absence of a comprehensive integration process may limit the possibilities of cooperation in short term. The different development level and socio economic structure of Danube territories do not exclude the possibilities of a broader territorial cooperation but surely raise difficulties in its implementation. Crossborder and twin city cooperation on a smaller scale are indispensable on the one hand as complementary programmes to macro regional cooperation on the other hand for the benefit of the territories and cities involved. This cooperation enables the participants for breaking out of the locked up situation originated from the river’s state or regional border character. The management of these territories within the framework of macro regional cooperation requires different development 158 techniques in a similar way to the EU’s community support programmes for the development of crossborder cooperation. To sum it up we can declare that the integration and the coalition of Danube countries have not provided well adaptable examples yet. The Danube as a cultural and transport axis raises positive associations with the meanings of openness, the exchange of goods, ideas and the common fate of Danube nations. During the past two centuries instead of integration efforts one could rather see differentiation processes and political powers overstressing national interests, confronting even against the interests of integration. In its Europe 2000+ Report, the European Union refers to the Danube Valley as a potential axis, which might turn into a new power line for the development of the East Central European region and a territorial basis for the new division of CADSES macro region. The river’s water catchment area can be a new direction for the enhancement of the integration process. Some common geographical, social and cultural features and river Danube as an integrative line may bring a chance for the continuation of macro regional cooperation and their complementary interregional cooperation.
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Romanian Naval Forces Role in Crisis Management next to the Black Sea
Vasile NAZARE
Abstract : The outcome of the power quest from the Black Sea region – in the new geopolitical and geostrategical context: the NATO and EU expansion towards east, the raised interest for Caspian energetic resources, the appearance of new and asymmetrical risks and threats – will influence the peaceful and stable climate both European and global. Starting from the indivisible security premise, Romania as NATO and EU member, must become a “dynamic vector” of stability and wealth in the Pontic area. Naval Forces, part of state’s maritime power, play an important role in projecting and protecting national interests, assuring security and maintaining stability in the nearby neighbourhood. Solving problems around the Black Sea, securing Caspian and Siberian energetic resources transport pipes, preventing asymmetrical threats (terrorism, smuggling, all kinds of traffic favoured by maritime space), all these have amplified the geopolitical and geostrategical role of Romania’s Naval Forces.
Keywords : crisis, border conflicts, crisis and conflicts management, regional security, maritime power, military capabilities
The Black Sea region geopolitical and geostrategical role development According to Romania’s Military Strategy, our country is situated in a space of sensitive interest for the military strategy that is monitoring influences from the four areas: a) Central European (future place for regional prosperity); b) South Eastern Europe (instability generator); c) C.I.S (which confronts a legitimacy crisis); d) the Black Sea area (of strategically importance for the South border of NATO but also a transit route for Central Asian energetic resources). Starting from a political military obvious reality – „the rising of Black Sea’s importance in Europe’s energetic and security concerns” – The Romanian Security Strategy (2006) establishes a new target for medium to long term plans: "building a prosper and secure climate along the Black Sea region", process in which Romania as NATO and EU member has to become a „dynamic vector” of stability and wealth in the Pontic area. The Black Sea region has significantly increased its role, transforming Romania into an important character that must be listened. This new status can be evaluated by the following criteria: a) the geopolitical argument (The Black Sea is located at the interference of three zones of special geopolitical importance: Europe, The Middle East and Central Asia, space of numerous conflicts, exporting risks and threats to Europe; the Black Sea region is laid at the confluence of the two most important religions and peoples – Christianity and Islamism, the Slavs and the Muslims; the significant regional powers: Russia, Ukraine and Turkey – have their conceptions, strategic, political and economic doctrines based on the important role and the wide space of the Black Sea); b) the geostrategical argument; Romania is situated at the confluence of seas’ axis (The Caspian Sea, The Black Sea and The Mediterranean Sea) not to mention rivers or canals (Rhine – Main – Danube) which link the Northern Sea to the Black one, the latter being a strategic connector, linking the Euro Atlantic community (as security provider and energy consumer) to the Middle East area the Caspian region and Central Asia (as energy supplier and security consumer); it represents the interference space of three geopolitical and geostrategical zones which are considered to be the most fragile environments regarding security and stability (Southern and Eastern Europe and The Middle East); it represents the gateway to the Planetary Ocean for Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and the Transcaucasian countries; according to Brzezinski, resources and map position make Romania a strategic pivot, „a destination for all strategic interests” both European and American, permitting the development of military 160 cooperation (Blackseafor); c) the geoeconomic argument; Romania is also located at geoeconomic axis’ crossroad of West East (Western Europe The Eastern Former Soviet Area) and North West – South East (Germany and Central Europe – Minor Asia and Near East); the Black Sea region is a very attractive market made of over 320 million inhabitants; it becomes the first transit route for Russian and Caspian energetic resources and it is the main transport area and source for the consumer called Europe; the resources of the Caspian basin are estimated at 200 billion barrels and the ones of the Caspian seaside at 25 billion metric tons (representing 15% of global oil and 50% of world’s natural gas); it has important submarine resources, a wide web of seaports and sea facilities, showing off an attractive and marketed seaside, offering a wide range of touristic and commercial cooperation; d) the challenges’ argument: it’s the default crisis area; „the threat of a major military confrontation in Europe has significantly faded”; nevertheless, the region has to deal with asymmetrical and transnational risks: the international terrorism, the WMD development, the local conflicts (after the former USSR disintegration; the East: The Moldavian Republic, the Nistrean region; the East and North of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Osetia; Western Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh; the South of Russian Federation – Chechnya and other republics or autonomous regions from the Northern Caucasus), drugs and human beings traffic, illegal immigration and inefficient administrations (NeguŃ, 2005:241; Serebrian, 1998: 9). In the now existent balance of forces and security climate established within international relations, the Black Sea has acquired new and significant geopolitical, geostrategical and geoeconomic valences, becoming e true challenge for the West which aims for the integration of regional specific issues into a global conception having well underlined goals: the propagation of democratic ideals and values, the establishment of a secure area in order to fight and eradicate the terrorism phenomenon while consolidating world wide stability and peace. The Black Sea region is in everybody’s sight, whether certain countries are directly involved or not (China, EU, NATO and US), because of its huge importance in oil’s and gas’ transportation towards Europe and also because of its nearness to Middle East and Caucasus area (Damian, 2002). The NATO Istanbul Summit (2004) recognizes in the final document, 41st paragraph, Black Sea’s importance regarding Euro Atlantic security. The Alliance shows its availability to sustain and cooperate with the river side states, gesture followed closely by the EU which in 2006 integrates this zone into European maritime space and by US which declares Black Sea’s space as being of strategic interest.
Changes and tendencies in the regional security environment Becoming areas of asymmetrical and unconventional risks, South Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region require a new thinking in the individual and collective security strategy domains. The security environment from the Black Sea region reveals new aspects: a) neighboring countries’ affinity for NATO and EU integration; b) their increasing dependence of Russian energetic resources; c) Russia’s efforts to recreate its traditional alliances and influence zone; Moldavia and Ukraine being positive in their relations with the Kremlin (Moldavia – neutrality and warranties for Russian properties from Transnistria; Ukraine – slowing down its NATO integration, privileged status as a Russian speaking country, certain advantages for Russian investors; Moscow backs up this orientation with the following arguments: Moldavia – guaranteed status for Transnistria along with the territory and boundaries of Moldavia, natural gas’ price, rising the embargo for wine industry; Ukraine – reasonable price for natural gas); d) internal crisis are intensifying in certain countries belonging to the region (Ukraine – the political fight for dominating internal and external policy between president and prime minister; Georgia – the energetic problem, the Russian troops’ presence, the separation tendencies of Osetia and Abkhazia and Georgia’s steps towards West); e) the delicate approach seen in Turkish diplomacy regarding the Black Sea security, the general security domain separation from the maritime security which is treated as a distinct level of regional security; certain 161 countries’ trend to become regional leaders (Greek and Turkey); f) the tendency to isolate Russia (NATO’s expansion towards East; the establishment of military bases in Romania, Bulgaria and other CIS members – Ukraine, Georgia; the antiballistic shield from Czech Republic and Poland, which according to Russian magazine Nezavisimaia Gazeta will lead to a double surrounding of Russia through the two circles drawn by the military powers of NATO and US; a Russian military official said that after the process will be over, Russia’s geopolitical situation will get even worse; one of the goals is limiting the action area of Russian navy from the Black Sea, Baltic Sea and Pacific Ocean, another one could be that of cutting off the distance to the main military and economical Russian targets, the geostrategical interest zone – Asia or The Middle East – while enforcing the striking capabilities of NATO and US forces), throwing it out of the Caspian energetic resources transport and distribution (through building new gas and oil pipe lines avoiding the country). Troubled by West’s aggressive strategy, Putin warned in February 2007: "We have to think and to think, undoubtedly, to assure our external security and all our retaliations will be asymmetrical but of a high efficacy level. We already have antiballistic defence systems: the new Topol M, as you probably know", this way he transmitted the American defence secretary, Robert Gates, Russia’s concern regarding US intention to establish military bases on Romanian and Bulgarian ground. "For the first time in history", Putin warned, "devices belonging to the American nuclear system are located in European territory. For us, the shield looks like a display of forces from Pershing to our boundaries, it is an identical threat. These systems will control Russian space spreading towards Ural Mountains if steps to strike back will not be taken, but we will." (Marin, 2007). At the Oslo Summit of the 26 NATO member states, dating April this year, inside the NATO Russia Council, we have seen Lavrov Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, saying that the whole European security architecture is in danger due to the ongoing events. Russia’s decision was to suspend the Treaty regarding Conventional Forces in Europe the symbol of Cold War’s ending. I. Baluevskii (in "Krasnaia Zvezda"), chief of Russian Army’s Major State, trying to complete his president declaration, asks the country to reconsider its strategy and move from a symmetrical to an asymmetrical military construction. Nowadays, "Romania’s security as European state can be seen and defined only within NATO and EU, depending on the policy of the two organizations." Through this perspective, the way it is shown by "The White Book Of National Defense and Security", our security is „defined at the crossroads of supranationalism, multinationalism and regionalism" and aims for the following goals: "fighting against organized crime, illegal human beings, drugs, forbidden substances and weapons traffic", trying to secure national boundaries which "in the near future become the boundaries of democratic and united Europe." 5 S.Celac, attempting to redraw the area’s geopolitical importance rising in the new international political context, pleads for the active involvement of West into the Black Sea region for the following reasons: a) the involvement of the wide Black Sea region in the democratic stabilization process, sustaining economy in the Middle East; b) creating a new additional programme for NATO and EU cooperation in an area where their interests coincide; c) the enforcement of NATO capabilities to engage operations outside the area – The Middle East – and sustaining partners outside the alliance; d) positively approaching Russia by taking into account its legitime security interests which are easier to implement in a stabile and prosper environment; e) developing a region identity for the Black Sea as a valuable West partner through wise politics and coordinated actions of EU, NATO and US (Celac, 2004: 139 146).
5 According to the Romanian Governments, the Minister for National Defece (MapN), Carta albă a securităŃii i apărării naŃionale , www.mapn.ro/ download/Cartea%20Alba% 20 2004 VF_ro.pdf, pp.122 123. 162 Becoming NATO and EU member (in 2007) Romania became a military factor on the South Eastern border of NATO, a status validated by our involvement in operations from Golf, Bosnia, Serbia, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Naval Forces' importance in the power games at the Black Sea Naval Forces, a division of Romanian Army, represents for sure a crucial component of our country’s maritime power. According to the Military Strategy , "it is and will remain a fundamental institution which assures security". If by its first directive, the army has to "be prepared to prevent, to discourage and only if necessary to defeat a possible aggressor which threatens the security of Romanian state, in the same time with the participation at different operations in order to avoid conflicts, to end crises or help collective defense in the neighboring area", Naval Forces have the responsibility of "protecting the country from any kind of threats from sea or rivers, taking care of naval Romanian interests in the same time with the participation in operations regarding regional peace and stability, independent participation or in cooperation with the Allied Forces. No matter the level of combat actions, strategic, operational or tactical, Naval Forces with their specific units – surface ships (frigates, corvettes, missile carrier ships, motor torpedo boats, mine dredgers, mine layers, artillery ships, river motor boats, special ships and logistical ones), submarines, military divers, coast missiles, naval infantry and navy air force –, classes and types of ships in service, take part in specific operations. A comparative analysis of riverside states from the Black Sea – Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia and Romania – gives us the necessary information to evaluate the role that each state could have in the context of these power games having place in the new geopolitical and geostrategical context. Romanian Naval Forces, at the beginning of 2007 were making use of the following capabilities: 1 submarine, "Killo" class; 3 frigates, 2 type "22" and 1 type "M"; groups of navy helicopters (3); 3 NPR, "Tarantul II" class; 3 motor torpedo boats, "Epitrop" class; 4 corvettes, "Tetal" class; 4 maritime dredgers, "Musca" class; 1 mine layer, "Cosar" class; 3 monitor,"M. Kogalniceanu" class; 5 bullet proof motor boats, "Rahova" class; 12 river motor boats; 1 marine infantry battalion; 1 diving ships division (combat and deep dive); 1 demagnetizing ship; 5 rescue tugs, "Viteazul" and "Grozavul" class; 2 oil tanks; 2 maritime command ships ("Egreta" and "Luceafarul"); 3 river command ships ("Siretul", "Mure ul", "Fortuna"); 1 river rescue and transport motor boat; 4 intervention ships, "Saturn" and "Marte" class; 2 logistic support ships, "Croitor" class; 1 hydrographic ship, "Emil RacoviŃă" class; school ship "Mircea", transport school ship "Albatros", 1 diving vessels, "Antipa" class, 1 ferry river and ceam (Vâlsan, Haganu, 2006: 191 192). After the disintegration of the former USSR, the Black Sea Russian fleet had between 300 and 635 ships along with a 70 000 personnel; following 1995, it possessed 14 submarines, 31 coast and surface ships, 125 fighter planes, 85 helicopters and 40 000 people. It was also assisted by: a coastal defence division consisting of 175 tanks, 450 armored conveyors, 72 artillery pieces and an infantry brigade of 50 tanks, 218 armored conveyors and 45 artillery pieces. In 2002, the Russian Naval Forces (neighbouring the Black Sea region) were made of: 2 divisions of surveillance submarines (14 subs "Foxtrot" and "Killo" class; only 10 of them being operational); 1 helicopter carrier cruiser; 2 missile carrier cruisers; 2 missile carrier destroyers; 2 missile carrier frigates (having SSN 25, SSN 4); 12 antisubmarine frigates; 6 missile carrying vedettes (SSN 2, SSN 22, SSN 6C); 11 torpedo boats; 1 mine hunter; 10 mine dredgers; 5 roads dredgers; 10 troop transport vessels; 9 landing craft; 2 air cushion boats for troops; 2 troops transport hovercrafts; 12 patrol boats; 6 electronic scouting ships; 7 supporting ships; 7 bomber aircrafts; 22 multi role jet planes; 10 hydroplanes; 4 scouting planes and 70 combat helicopters. If the Soviet era in this area were 60 of the marine submarine. Admiral Vladimir Masorin, commander of Russian Black Sea Naval Forces, announced that in the near 163 future the fleet will have up to 12 15 submarines with diesel propulsion and one submarine of the Northern Fleet will be transferred in the Black Sea, after Ukraine’s approval. Russia aims to build by 2012 a naval base at Novorossijsk and in the next two decades to become the second force in world shipping (Vâlsan, Hanganu, 2006: 116 120; Ionescu, 2005: 45 46; Scrieciu, 2005: 62). Furthermore, admiral Vistovshi indicates that the Black Sea Fleet could grow to 100 ships, compared to 35 currently. Black Sea Russian Fleet, in May 2007, has the following structure and equipment: the 30th Surface Warship Division consisting of the 11th Anti submarine Ship Brigade (1 guided missile cruiser –"Moskva", "Slava" class; 3 asw destroyers – "Kerch", "Ochakov", "Smetlivy", "Kara" and "Kashin" class; 2 guided missile frigates – "Landny", "Pitlivi", "Krivak I" and "Krivak II" class); the 197th Amphibious Brigade (7 landing ships "Nikolay Filchenkov", "Orsk", "Saratov", "Tseyar Kunikov", "Azov", "Yamal", "Alligator", "Ropucha I" and "Ropucha II" class); the 247th Submarine Battalion (2 attack submarines – "Alorsa", "B 380", "Kilo" and "Tango" class); the 68th Coastal Defence Warship Brigade formed of the 400th Antisubmarine Ship Battalion (5 asw corvettes "Alexandrovets", "Povorino", "Suzdalets", "Muromets", "Vladimirets") and the 418th Minesweeper Battalion (4 seagoing minesweepers "Kovrovets", "Ivan Golubets", "Turbinist", "Vice Admiral Zhukov", class "Natya"); the 41st Missile Boat Brigade with the 166th Novorossiysky Small Missile Boat Battalion (4 guided missile corvettes "Bora", "Samum", "Shtil", "Mirazh", "Bora" and "Nanuchka III" class) and the 295th Sulinsky Missile Boat Battalion (6 missile boats "Matka", "Tarantul II" and "Tarantul III" class); the 84th Novorossiysk Coastal Defence Brigade (2 small antisubmarine ships "Eysk", "Kasimov", "Grisha III" class; 2 seagoing minesweepers "Zheleznyakov", "Valentin Pikul"; 2 base minesweerpers "Mineralnie Vodi", "Leytenant Ilyin") and Black Sea Fleet Naval Aviation (Independent Anti submarine Helicopter Regiment – HQ at Kacha Ka –27; Independent Composite Air Regiment – HQ at Kacha An 2, An –12, Be –12, Mi –8; Independent Naval Shturmovik (Assault) Air Squadron – HQ Gvordeskoe S 24) 10 Russian Fleet can perform the following tasks: destroying enemy’s seaside assets; engaging and destroying naval squadrons from ports; blocking enemy’s attempt to penetrate their communications; surveillance over maritime communications from the Black Sea via geostationary satellites; troops transportation and unloading in crisis areas like Kosovo, Transnistria, Chechnya and so on. Turkey enjoys advantages of both geopolitical and legal nature. The Montreaux Convention allows this country to make full use of its naval units wherever needed, within the two marine basins: the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea. Between 2002 and 2005, Turkish Military Navy was made of: 15 submarines ("Preveze", "Ay", "Hizierreis" and "Muratreis" class); 19 frigates ("Barbaros", "Knox", "Gabya" and "Yavuz" class); 1 destroyer; 21 missile carrier motor boats; 1 mine layer; 5 mine hunters; 16 mine dredgers; 7 ships for tanks transportation; 2 school ships; 38 automatic unloading vedettes; 22 patrol vedettes; 2 logistic ships; 5 fuel tanks; 6 water tanks; 2 transport ships for liquid or solid merchandise; 1 submarine rescue vessel; 1 rescue assisting vessel; 5 maritime transport tugs; 2 divers rescuing boats; 2 special ships; 2 hydrographic and oceanographic research ships; 1 scientifically research ship; 8 school motorboats; 30 fighter planes and 20 Asm helicopters; 3 attack helicopters and 7 school planes (Vâlsan, Hanganu , 2006: 185 190). Turkish Military Fleet, available in autumn 2007, had the following operational capabilities: 12 submarines, Atilay, Preveze and Gur class (construite după 2000); 18 frigates, Yavuz, Barbaros, G (constructed 1998 2003) and Tepe class; 6 corvettes, Milgem and B class (constructed 2000 2003); 25 patrol craft (missile); 12 patrol craft , Klic, Yaldiz, Dogan and Kartal class; 24 mine warfare ships, Edincik, A, S, F and K class; 5 amphibious ships (large), Osmangazi, Sarucabey and Ertugrul class; 41 amphibious ships (small), Edik LCT class; 87 coast guard Sg, Sar, Kaan 15 and Kaan –29 class; 64 auxiliary ships (survey ships, support
164 ships, training ships, salvage ships, tugs); aircraft by struggle (11 Ab 212 ASW/EW, 3 Ab 2004 ASW, 7 SH 608 Seahawak, 8 Ab –412, 6 TB – 20 Trinidad, 9 Cn 235) (Vâlsan, Hanganu 2006: 121 128; Băhăreanu, 2005: 42 46; Topan, 2002; Nazare, 2008: 117 118). This represents the most important force; it can execute specific peace, crisis and war missions: surveillance, research, information gathering operations as well as it can maintain peace, do search and rescue missions and furthermore cooperate with the Allied forces against international terrorism and organized crime, destroying enemy’s seaside assets, executing antisubmarine or mine hunting operations, maritime interdiction and maritime traffic naval control. Ukrainian military fleet in 2000 consisted of 4 corvettes, 3 frigates, 1 submarine, 26 auxiliary ships, and 35 naval aircraft. In early 2003, Ukrainian fleet was endowed with: surface combatants (2 frigates "Krivak II" and "Krivak III" class); submarines (1 patrol submarine, "Foxtrot" class); patrol vessels (4 large patrol corvettes, "Grisha II" and "Grisha V", "Petya II" and "Petya III" class; 1 large patrol corvettes/training ship; 6 large missile boats, "Tarantul III", "Pauk I", "Matka" class; 2 large patrol boats, "Pauk I" class), mine countermeasures vessels (2 patrol minesweepers, "Yakhont" class); amphibious ships (1 large landing ship, "Ropucha I" class; 1 medium landing ship, "Polnocny C" class; 4 large air cushion landing craft, "Pomornik" class); auxiliary ships (1 fleet oiler, "Dubna" class; 1 repair ship, "Amur" class; 1 command ship; 1 cruise missile transport, "Lama" class; 2 fleet tug, "Goryn" and "Sorum class"; 2 ocean tugs, "Okhtenskiy" class; 1 eletronic surveillance ship, "Moma" class; 1 degaussing/deperming ship, "Bereza" class; 2 acoustic trials ships, "Onega" and "Modified" class; 1 cable layer, "Klaz`ma" class; 1 large mooring/buoy tender, "Sura" class; 5 coastal survey ships/buoy tender, "Moma", "Biya", "Kamenka and "Muna" class; 1 coastal water tanker, "Voda" class; 1 coastal logistics ship, "Keyla" class, 1 weapons trials ship, "Potok" class). We should also mention the Naval Aviation composed of: 8 Suhoi Su 25; 13 Mig 29; 7 An –26 (transport); 8 transport helicopter Mi 8; 5 anti sbumarine helicopter Mi 14PL; 16 assault transport helicopter Ka –29; 21 anti submarine helicopter Ka –27/28. (Toppan, 2002; Vâlsan, Hanganu , 2006: 125 131). Ukraine’s military fleet at the Black Sea is capable of the following types of missions: discouraging aggression; neutralizing enemy’s naval forces; destroying enemy’s means of transport; protecting Ukraine’s own bases and communication lines; protecting its own submarine space and water territory; guarding over the commercial fleet and state’s oil industry; the defense of economical maritime area; the terrorism combat; the participation in international peace maintaining actions. Bulgarian Military Navy Forces consisted of: surface combatants (1 light patrol frigate, Smeli class), submarines (1 submarine, Slava class), patrol vessels (1 large missile boat, Tarantul class; 6 large patrol boats, Poti and Pauk I class; 4 patrol boats, Osa II class), mine warfare vessels (3 coastal minelayers/landing craft, Vydra class; 8 coastal minesweepers, Briz, Vanya class), auxiliary ships (1 logistics tanker, Atya class; 1 training ship; 1 degaussing tender/training ship, Berza class; 1 survey ship, Moma class; 1 coastal logistics class tanker, 650 class; 2 costal logistics craft, Polnochny class; 1 small salvage tug); naval aviation (2 transport helicopters and 8 search and rescue helicopters, Haze A class). To comply with NATO standards, the Bulgarian Navy had undergone a serious process of reform and modernisation. Since 2005, Bulgarian military fleet is equipped with: 1 submarine; 6 frigates, "Koni", "Riga" and "Welingen" class; 3 corvettes, "Tarantul" and "Pauk" class; 3 missile boats, "Osa" class; 18 naval helicopter (12 "Haze" class and 6 "Panther" class). Georgia’s Naval Forces are small: 1 patrol ship, "Lindau" class; 3 patrol frigates, "AB 30", "Dilos" and "Zhuk" class; 2 missile carrier motorboats, "Stenka" and "La Combatant" class (Vâlsan, Hanganu , 2006: 193 194). If we were to make a naval power ranking of the riverside states from the Black Sea, taking into account their troops, ships’ features, aviation and technical capabilities, it would probably look like this: Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia. The first two 165 can independently perform every type of operations, while the others only partial and preferably in cooperation. We must not forget that Russia and Ukraine are countries that posses weapons of mass destruction as well as nuclear ones. The possible usage of this kind of trump card can anytime change the ranking above.
Conclusion Naval forces of the Black Sea littoral countries contribute to: building confidence between states through the institutionalized forms of regional cooperation: BSEC, Blackseafor and Black Sea Harmony (OBSH); b) securing the transport routes for Caspian and Central Asian energy resources towards Western Europe; c) creating a legitimate field of action for NATO and EU; d) controling frozen conflicts in this region; e) having the appropriate responses to new risks and asymmetrical threats: terrorism, arms, drugs human and other forms of traffic, organized crime, poaching or pollution; f) securing the maritime borders of riverside states, increasing navigation safety of shipping routes both civil and military within the Black Sea Basin.
BIBLIOGRAPHY :
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IV Focus
Carlos E. Pacheco AMARAL (Azores) ◙ Europe: Utopia and Reality. Essence, Meaning and Value of an Idea
Europe: Utopia and Reality. Essence, Meaning and Value of an Idea
Carlos E. Pacheco AMARAL
Abstract: The basic argument of this essay is that Europe has no frontiers. No physical frontiers, to be more precise. And, accordingly, no fixed identity either. No positive identity that may be pinned down with precision, and raised to the condition of instrument both of inclusion, at least potentially, of all those who happen to share the characteristics and values it encompasses, and of exclusion of all those who happen not to share them and choose different ones. Instead, it is argued, at the heart of European identity we encounter a systematic commitment, both to self questioning and to plurality. The denial of a fixed ascriptive identity and the willingness to remain open to receiving from the outside – and incorporating – multiple values and identities, namely all those that, in the rawlsian formulation, manage to pass the test of our reflected judgement and may constitute an occasion for Europe to grow.
Keywords: Europe, Utopia, Identity, Frontier Culture, Liberalism, Communitarism.
Denis de Rougemont, one of the great advocates of the European ideal in the last century, liked to underline two aspects that he considered to be of the greatest importance. On the one hand, that, instead of being a datum of history, economy, religion or any other cleavage, Europe is a product of the spirit, something that needs to be crafted. And it is for this reason that Europe is not only a subject worthy of philosophical enquiry, it is, in the words of Acílio Rocha, “a privileged archetypical theme of philosophical discourse” and “the cognitive beloved of philosophy” (Rocha, 2003: 7 8). In this context, Denis de Rougement liked to resort to the epistemological dimension imprinted by the ancients onto mythology and refer to the myth of Cadmos, in particular. Cadmos, the brother of Europa, who leaves the family and departs from ancient Phoenicia, in present day Lebanon and Siria, in the lap of the Mediterranean, their common birthplace and original home, and heads Westwards, in search of her sister that had been seduced and raped by Zeus, transformed into a bull, docile and extremely handsome. Cadmos, who in his search and in obedience to the Oracle, takes a cow for a guide and follows it until the animal drops dead of exhaustion. And who, always in obedience to the Oracle, establishes a city in the exact spot where each cow dies, bringing to that place the civilizational matrix of the East, cradle of Europe. And that is how, according to the myth, Cadmos ends up founding the various great cities of the Mediterranean basin, one after the other. In a word, it is while searching for Europa, his sister, that Cadmos ends up founding Europe, the continent, the social unit that would be baptized with her name. In his search for Europa, the Phoenician princess, Cadmos, her brother, becomes the father of Europe, the continent, the social and political community. In the end, and always according to the myth, Cadmos never finds his sister, never managing, therefore, to complete his task. Which points to a second aspect that Denis de Rougemont liked to underline: the fact that the process of European integration, the process of building Europe, can never be assumed to have been closed and completed. Instead, it seems to be condemned to forever remain in a constant process of completion. Europe is not built. It is not a datum, or a phenomenon, that can be discovered or that can be adhered to. Europe needs to be built. And it is, therefore, the offspring of Europa that are convoked to continue the task of Cadmos – with the certainty that, like the mythological Cadmos, we too will never be able to complete that task. And yet, construct Europe we must (Rougemont, 1968: 22 25). 169 This much becomes clear in the first part of the well known myth of the kidnapping of Europe – much less quoted, yet no less interesting and meaningful. According to the narrative, on the night before being kidnapped, a little before dawn, Europa, the princess, is sound asleep and in her dreams she finds herself being disputed by two lands. One of them is identified by name: it is Asia, her birth place. The other is only referred to as “the land in face”. In her dream, Europa, the virgin princess, sees herself being disputed by Asia and by a nameless continent, identified simply as the land that lies “in face” of Asia. And it will be to this incognito land that Europa will be kidnapped: a land that is as virgin as the princess that it will host. In this early appearance on the world stage, Europe, the continent, is so devoid of identity that it does not even have a name, adopting, in the end, that of the Asian princess whose beauty had seduced the father of gods 1. Just as the empiricist tradition presents the human mind, at birth, as a blank slate, radically empty, yet ready to receive the data that may be furnished to it by the senses, so too the myth introduces Europe on the world stage as a continent without identity, without even a name. So much so that the only thing that can be said of it is that it exists, that it is a land laying there, in front of Asia. In its most pristine dimension, the identity of Europe does not appear to ensue from the phusis , from any concrete physical attribute, much less from the fact that it constitutes an appendix, or a type of cape of Asia leaning towards the West, on the known characterization of Paul Valéry 2. After all, Asia knows a plurality of other appendixes and none of them would ever know the projection that Europe would acquire with the passing of time. On the other hand, it is certainly not the climate, nor the orography, that on a neo Darwinian fashion are the main agents of European identity. If not for anything else for the simple fact that, at least since Herodotus, Hippocrates and Aristotle, the same characteristics of climate, territory, and even of the human species are identified by some as being the cause of specific attributes, such as superior intellect, vigour, creative capacity, labour, initiative etc., whereas others impute to them opposite responsibilities 3. On the contrary, just as for the empiricist tradition, knowledge emerges from the imprinting upon the previously empty human mind of what we manage to obtain from the outside world through our senses, so too Europe emerges as a construction of the spirit. So much so that the very identity of the previously empty “land in face” is condemned to be continuously forged through time by the spirit that it receives from the outside, namely from the old continent where it was born. True European identity will then ensue directly from this original spirit, and from the specific ways in which it manifests itself and unfolds in its new homeland. And it is precisely this condition that raises the essence of Europe to the condition of Utopia, already millenary. Instead of being a product of this or that ascriptive attribute, Europe can best be understood by the dialectical interplay of two major phenomena. On the one hand, by the original matrix it receives as the “land in face”, of the East, of Asia, which will then become its phusis , its fortuna . And, on the other, by the civilizational patrimony it has accumulated through the centuries from the concrete application and investment of the primeval spirit Europe received from its Asian matrix – expression of its virtù , in the sense of Maquiavelli, or of its “plastic power”, in that of Nietzsche. The Communitarian conception of identity appears to be far less useful than its Liberal counterpart for a proper understanding of European identity. In the Communitarian perspective, identity ensues from the possession of a predetermined set of attributes, many of which are beyond our capacity of choice. We are not free to have them, since they do not ensue from a free
1 For the full text of the myth cf. Mosco, “Europé, ou la terre d’en face”, apud Hersant and Durand Bogaert, 2000, pp. 12 16. 2 Cf. Paul Valéry, “La crise de l’esprit”, apud Hersant and Durand Bogaert, 2000, pp. 401—414. 3 Cf. Heródoto, Gens et lieux , apud Ahrweiller, 1963, pp. 14 16; Hipócrates, Trattato dell’Aria, delle acque, dei luoghi , apud Pozzoli, 1999, pp. 16 18; and Aristotle, 1962, pp. 269 271. 170 act of will. Quite frequently, on the contrary, they simply come with the type of person that each of us is, and instead of us choosing them, they simply define the type of person that we are. It is these attributes such as race, language, religion, lineage, etc., that raise those who possess them to a condition of unity and, correlatively, their absence, throws those who do not possess them to a condition of being strangers, aliens, with no place in the community to which those attributes correspond. In the Liberal conception, instead, rather than an objective imposition, identity ensues from a common will and a common project of community construction. To the communitarian mind, each person, and, correlatively, each community, emerges upon the stage of public life already with a set of attributes that is responsible for the definition of who they are. Instead of the blank slate of the empiricist tradition, communitarians perceive persons, and communities, as being thickly situated selves, that are as entities whose identity ensues from the possession of a set of attributes that are connatural to them. So much so, that, both at the individual and the collective level, persons, and communities, are unable to even understand themselves as the specific type of persons, and communities, that they are, outside of those attributes and of the identity that they imprint upon them 4. In the liberal perspective, instead, identity does not translate into a set of material attributes and characteristics that are connatural, in this case, to Europe and which, therefore, are responsible for determining those who can present a claim to Europe, who are the Europeans, and those who can not, that is those who are not and can not become European. To the Liberal mind, European identity is perceived, in good Rawlsian manner, as ensuing from each one’s willingness to adhere to the European project and, therefore, to integrate, and enlarge, the spiritual stream that shapes it. In other words, rather than ensuing from the sharing of a more or less previously fixed set of ascriptive attributes, European identity is seen to be grounded upon a willingness to be a part of the ”overlapping consensus”, daily legitimated regarding what it is that Europeans want Europe to become 5. E = M C²: is how Denis de Rougemont defines Europe resorting to the celebrated equation proposed by Einstein to express the theory of relativity. Adapting each of its terms, E, instead of Energy is used to identify Europe, M, Mass, expresses the ensemble of physical attributes of the continent (including its territorial expansion, its natural resources, its demography, its orography, its climate, etc.) and C, in place of the speed of light now stands for Culture, European culture. “This then is the meaning of E = M C²: Europe is equal to a promontory of Asia multiplied by intensive culture”. It is, therefore, in its culture, in the “remarkable concentration of pluralist institutions in tension in this permanent contention between tradition and innovation” that lies the nuclear elements of definition of Europe (Rougemont, 1965: 54 55). What Denis de Rougemont has in mind, however, is not just any conception of culture – and certainly not a conception of culture in the communitarian sense. That which constitutes Europe is not a merely patrimonial idea of culture, like the one expressed in the Euro bills, assimilated to wealth or to something material that can be possessed and that one seeks to preserve, in museums or in the reserved sections of libraries. Something that is treasured in so far as it is the concrete inheritance of a delimitated number of people and it is in the possession and sharing of such attributes that resides the foundational elements that agglutinate them making them members of a concrete community, and shaping their common identity. A process in which all those who do not share such patrimony and lack those attributes are necessarily thrown to the condition of foreigners, aliens, according to the modern paradigm. Should the common possession of such cultural attributes be responsible for making one European, then, their absence would also, necessarily, throw a person to the condition of being a non European. If one were European because of the possession of a determinate set of attributes, then those
4 For a broad overview of the communitarian perspective cf. Amaral, 2008. 5 For a major presentation of the liberal dimension of identity and of the liberal project, as a whole, cf. Rawls, 1971. 171 who did not possess them would, necessarily, neither be European nor eligible for becoming European – unless, somehow, they managed to drop the ascriptive cultural attributes fixing their identity, and fill the ensuing empty space with the “appropriate” European ones. Instead, what Denis de Rougemont underlines is a critical perspective of culture, grounded upon constant unsatisfaction and questioning, in the terms of which, pluralism and diversity, at all levels, stand out as essential traits in the definition of European culture. Thus, his appeal that Europe be apprehended, simultaneously, as a singular, yet radically plural unit. It is in its vocation to question and to problematize, in its permanently multiform character, constantly open to otherness, to innovation, to utopia, that, according to him, lie the more characteristic traces of European culture, and, accordingly, of the continent’s identity and wealth. The Éditions de la Baconnière published in 1947 a French translation of a book by Léon Brunschvicg intent on capturing the European Spirit , as announced in its very title. To that effect, the author resorts precisely to philosophy, to such an extent that the book resembles a synoptic picture of the History of Philosophy, presented as the most genuine expression of the very spirit that captures European identity (Brunschvicg, 1947). It is Philosophy that best expresses this vocation of the European for assuming responsibility for its self construction through the refusal of fatality and the replacement of dogmatic certainty for questioning. Therefore, European culture seems to be bent on never closing itself upon itself. Instead, it strives to systematically open itself to alterity so as to be able to constantly check itself, question itself, and integrate innovation, whenever appropriate, so as to better be able to fulfil itself. Europe demands alterity: that which is not Europe. Not as an enemy, from which one must insulate itself and stand guard, or as a foe, one must fight and ultimately destroy. But as utopia, a measure or an indication of possible futures through which it may systematically temper and build itself. Or, in the limit, as an enriching element, that must be integrated, so as to assure that Europe may continue to guarantee its continued planetary projection and growth. Its historical moments of intolerance, persecution and outright barbarity notwithstanding, such seems to always have been the core of European identity, from the dawn of historical time. “From the Atlantic to the Urals [writes Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro], from the North Cape to the Mediterranean, Europe of physical geography is a space crossed by an immense diversity of peoples. Its pre Indo European substratum would be demographically submersed and culturally assimilated by the Indo European peoples. Century after century, Europe was permeable to migrations and «invasions» of peoples. European civilization and its dynamics reveal this capacity for the assimilation of foreign «worlds» and «barbarians»” (Ribeiro, 2003). From the Atlantic to the Urals, or from San Francisco to Vladivostok, in the conception of the German President Carl Friedrich von Weisacker, Europe has never been confined to a predetermined space or a specially elected and strictly defined and delimitated people. Instead, it opens itself to all the universes where its civilizational impact is felt. Europe, utopia, will then be the original matrix of the continent, but also that of all the spaces and all the peoples shaped by it, independently of their respective geo strategic location and reach. That which constitutes the central element in the fixation of European identity, however, is not just any sort of culture. Much less a conception of culture perceived according to the modern mind in a unitary, homogeneous and uniform way. On the contrary, it is paradigmatically plural and ever open to incorporate the alterity with which it may be faced and which, in the end, is the source of its very wealth and vitality. So much so that, in the words of António Teixeira Fernandes, “Europe is, in truth, a mosaic of cultures, within the context of a single civilization. In this sense, it is an abstract reality, and therefore, a European identity must of necessity have a nature that is exactly equal to that of the substratum it nourishes and supports.” (Fernandes, 2006: 330). 172 The culture that gives concrete shape and form to Europe is of an abstract nature, and it is for this reason that it is capable of assuming a plurality of concrete manifestations (both throughout time and space), survive and grow. Correlatively, it is this abstract character of European culture that opens to European identity the way to the universal, allowing it access to the rich kaleidoscope of material expressions that one can encounter in the old continent , at the same time that grounds it as a major theme of philosophical enquiry. From the dawn of time, from its pre history, in its most genuine expression, the idea of Europe has always reached for the universal and the timeless. To be European, in a deep sense, is synonymous of unsatisfaction and rebellion; unsatisfaction with the present, whatever it may offer, rebellion against the human condition. It is to possess a will to excel, to question and to reach for utopia and the possible futures that may await for us, may they sing or cry. And it is also to search for the truth and the good life, that deserves to be lived. In the celebrated words of Paul Valéry, in its essence, Europe is a “workshop” of the human condition, never completed, and of maximums, never accomplished, for always desired and forever escaping our reach 6. Confrontation with alterity becomes, therefore, essential for grounding European identity. Not, however, in terms of exclusion, nor as an instrument for the definitive fixation of a sameness that may be confronted with the difference that marks the identity of others. In this conception, the other of Europe will never be either the Muslim, or the communist, the atheist or the believer in this or that specific religion, ideology or social, economic or political system. Europe must, indeed, have a place for them all, if not for anything else, for the simple reason that it belongs to none. Europe must have a place for all that is specifically human, not as a matter of mere tolerance, but because it is from the dialectical confrontation of plurality, of all of these different religions, ideologies, cultures, and projects of life that Europe extracts its very essence, its enduring energy, and is capable of progress, change and civilization. In the words of Julien Benda, the alter of Europe, as a political idea, is the sovereign nation State and the respective proposal of social and political organization (Benda, 1933: 33 and following). And, the same way that the national idea imposed itself throughout the European space (starting with Portugal, most probably, already in the 14 th century, and enduring until the XX century, and even to the present) in opposition to the antecedent feudal paradigm, so too, the contemporary world demands the idea of Europe, in opposition to the modern idea of the sovereign nation State. Just as the national ideas of Portugal, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, etc., evolved and asserted themselves in face of the debilities of both the idea of Empire and the municipal and regional ideas of Oporto, Pays d’Oc, Galicia, Tuscany, Bavaria, etc., prevalent in feudal times, so too, in the contemporary world, the idea of Europe gathers its strength and imposing power from the crisis of the modern State and its manifest incapacity to continue to constitute an adequate framework of social and political organization. And, if at an infra national level, the superation of the sovereign state translates into regionalism and the recognition of regional autonomies, at the supranational level it demands European integration, pointing to the need for the concrete implementation of the idea of Europe as an innovative form of the political. In face of its very nature, instead of pointing towards the construction of a grand State, at the limit, of the size of the continent, a “fortress Europe”, the idea of Europe opens itself, instead, towards the outside, in the limit, towards the universal. As a counterpoint to Fichte, and his conception of culture and of the German nation, Julien Benda places the construction of Europe, not in the cultivation, in the exaltation or in the service of that which is specific to a people, or to a closed set of peoples – be they 6, 9, 10, 12, 15, 25, 27, 30, or more, the little Europe, as David Mitrany wisely insists to call it (Mitrany 1930) – but in the study, in the respect and in the defence of the humanities, that is, of all that is specific to the human condition, of the studia humanitatis , in the old Jesuitical conception. Which drives Benda to
6 Cf. Paul Valéry, “Note (ou l’Européen)”, apud Hersant and Durand Bogaert, 2000, pp. 401—414. 173 resort to Goethe in the identification of the type of culture that shapes the European project: culture in the more genuine Greco Roman sense as the cultivation of the Good and of the Beautiful “which belongs no specific country” (Benda, 1933: 57 58). This fundamentally cosmopolitan vocation of the European spirit, of openness to alterity and willingness to integrate it, is present already at the genesis of the idea of Europe. We find it clearly expresses in the etymology and in the foundational myths of Europe, both Greek and Jewish. Europe, the daughter of Phoenicia and of Greece, who would be raped by the king of the gods himself, and carried Westwards to a nameless land that, receiving her, would also receive her values and her civilization and, in the end, adopt her very name. Europe, the product of the Semitic civilization that would start with Abraham – the father of all believers – himself born in Ur, in ancient Sumeria, Chaldea, modern day Iraq. A Semitic civilization that, for the fulfilment of its most genuine vocation, would install itself in the Middle East, in the land that was promised to it by God himself. And, finally, a civilization that, under the shape that was given to it by the Son of God, would fulfil its universal vocation expanding Westwards, to the then new continent , and, from there, to the entire world. The Greek civilizational matrix offers us two grand visions of Europe. On the one hand Europa is the name of a woman, of the beautiful daughter of Agenor, king of Phoenicia, present day Lebanon, for whom Zeus falls in love and ends up kidnapping and bringing westward. And, in this context, it is interesting to underline the force of the traditional anthropomorphic representation of Europe as a fully robed woman, particularly when the Iberian Peninsula is portrayed as the “noble head of the continent” and my country, Portugal, as its face. A face that is turned towards the West, to the new worlds, as if in premonition of the Portuguese saga of the great discoveries of the XV century through which the country would open the world to Europe and lead the Europeanization of the World 7. And Europa is also the daughter of Cadmos who, fulfilling the instructions of the Oracle regarding the way in which he should look for her, ends up being the first great mentor of the idea of Europe. Yet Europe is also one of the attributes of Zeus himself. The Homeric hymns tell us about a Zeus Euruopè . Signifying broad sighted, it is an epithet formed from the conjugation of two terms: eurus , large, spacious, and ops , a poetic expression of the eyes, seeing, and, by extension, the face. In the terms of the conclusion reached by Denis de Rougemont, “Zeus Euruopè signifes «perspicatious Zeus, who sees far». Euruopè , then, is a woman with broad eyes, with a loving face, a beautiful woman. The relation between Europe and the Homeric epithet of Zeus becomes, therefore, obvious” (Rougemont, 1968: 28) 8. Pointing, in this manner, to a “broad face”, a “full moon”, fertility, Europe emerges in opposition to the sun, the crescent, that Islam, the original “other” of Europe, would adopt for its symbol. And Denis de Rougemont concludes with two particularly curious additional complementary references. The first has to do with the Enciclopédie , which derives Europe from the Phoenician Uroppa , signifying “white face”; the second, is related to the Semitic derivation of Europe from Ereb , a concept expressing the evening, the setting of the sun. Accordingly, associated to the moon, Europe will emerge as “the land of the setting sun”, in opposition to the Asian characteristic of being the continent of “the rising sun”. Identified with the Semitic concept of Ereb , Europe will then mean West , in the same way as the word Arab , with identical origin, initially expressed the condition of being an inhabitant of the Westernmost part of Asia, and, in a parallel relation, in Portugal, the Algarve, will be, not the
7For a particularly interesting and powerful example of this anthropomorphic image of Europe, and of Portugal, cf. the discourse of Vasco da Gama presenting the continent, and his country, to the King of Melinde, in India, narrated by grand chronicler of the Portuguese discoveries, Luís Vaz de Camoes in his renowned epic poem, Os Lusíades , the Portuguese, esp. Chant III, verses 6 to 23. (Camoes, 1971: 77 82). 8 In a similar sense, cf. the discussion developed by António Alvar Ezquerra in the article “Europa en el imaginário de los poetas latinos”. (in Oliveira, 2005). 174 Southernmost, but the Westernmost parcel of territory of the country – and of Europe (Rougemont, 1968: 26 27). For the Ancients, mythology assumed an important didactic dimension. The Ancients would often present a myth as a metaphor, a complement or an alternative to more “scientific” methodologies. Not because they believed that the myth constituted a factual description of historical events, but because of its narrative, of the story it told, a story through which particularly complex phenomena could be explained and understood. It is in this context that, throughout his political philosophy, Plato, for example, often lays hand to mythological narratives and, when Socrates is asked to explain a particularly complex or interesting concept or event, he often asks his interlocutor which way he prefers for the explanation to proceed: the “scientific” or the mythological. And, quite often, he proceeds with the adoption of both methods, telling a story and presenting a rational argumentation. The myth, as Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro keenly observes, “functions as a paradigm” for the understanding of the world (Ribeiro, 2003: 35). In spite of the centuries that have elapsed and the transformations we have witnessed, the ancient myths constitute precious aids to the understanding of the nature, essence, meaning and value of major phenomena and events. And that is precisely why it remains useful to turn to the founding myths of Europe: to the Greek myths of the kidnapping of Europe, but also to the Judaic Christian conception of the division, after the flood, of the earth, of the three continents then known, Asia, Africa and Europe, among the three children of Noah, Shem, Ham, and Japheth (Holy Bible , Genesis: 18 27), and to the way the Christian Middle Ages would interpret this episode. To the cursing of Ham, the hot headed, who would receive the Africa, and be condemned to be the slave of his brothers. To the blessing of Shem, “the named”, who would be given Asia. And to the exaltation of Japheth, interpreted as meaning “width”, “enlargement”, since he his predestined to “dwell in the tents of Shem”, and make them his. To “dilate” them, imprinting upon the civilization they house a dimension that they never knew at the hands of their original possessor 9. As we were able to see earlier, according to the report of Moscos, on the night before she was kidnapped, Europa, the Phoenician princess, dreams that she is disputed by two continents, Asia and “a land in face” – a land that is so radically without identity that it does not even have a name. So much so that, according to the myth, the only two things that can be said of it is that it exists and that it is located in face of Asia. When Europe makes its entrance in history it is but a “blank slate”, in the more orthodox empiricist tradition, or, according to the liberal tradition, radically dispossessed of ascriptive attributes, material or spiritual, that may be adopted to identify it. And it is precisely in this context, that Europe is capable of receiving the form and the content – the identity – that its inhabitants may rationally choose for themselves. In a curiously parallel manner, the Greek and Judaic myths cross each other. The Biblical episode involving the three children of Noah would be interpreted in the Christian West in such a way as to lead to a conception curiously similar to that ensuing from the Greek kidnapping. According to the biblical episode, Shem, the named, possesses a strictly defined identity. The Universe to which he belongs is at the origin of civilization and of the Good itself. It was in the continent that he inherited, Asia, that our civilizational process originated, as we all learned, in the fertile valley between the rivers Tiger and Euphrates, that is, in modern day Iraq. And it was in that continent, in the Middle East, that our Lord Jesus Christ, the son of God himself, was born. Japheth, on the other hand, possesses no innate identity, knows no inner good that may imprint upon him a specific identity. He is, therefore, “indifferent” with regard either to civilization or to religion. So much so that his inheritance is the “land in face” of that of his brother Shem: the pagan European universe. By inhabiting the tents of Shem, he will take for himself an identity that previously belonged to his brother. Just as through its conversion to Christianity, Europe will
9 For a particularly interesting discussion and interpretation of this episode of Genesis and of the commentaries it received in the Middle Age following the wok of Saint Augustine, ensuing in the identification of Europe as Japhethia, the Land of Japheth, cf. Hay, 1957, pp. 1 15. 175 assume an identity that previously belonged to the Middle East 10 . He will accede to the tents of his brother, Shem, and acceding to them he will enlarge them, give them a new meaning, and make them his. Asia may have been the birth place of our Lord Jesus Christ, but it is Europe that, having adopted Christianity, through its Saints, will give that religion its true meaning. And that is why, although having been born Jewish, Christianity is, in truth, a Greek and Roman religion, that is, a European religion. It will be, therefore, through the alterity of Shem that, in the end, Japheth will identify himself, in so far as he will be able to appropriate himself of its characteristics of value. It is not, therefore, because of the phusis , because it enjoys a climate that is more or less rigorous, or characterized by a “just mid term” between amenity and rigor, that Europe will define itself; neither through its climate nor through its geography or its natural resources. Instead, Europe appears to be, above all else, a product of the spirit that identifies the continent demarcating it from those with which it shares the world stage. Europe takes its identity voluntarily for itself, as the etymology and the Greek and Jewish myths seem to indicate. The idea of Europe emerges and unfolds in a context of subsidiary integration. Instead of denying freedom and plurality, reducing them to the imperial unity of the dominating sovereign power, the more genuine idea of a united Europe strives, on the contrary, to welcome and serve plurality and the spirit of individual initiative that can be found at the very roots of this grand project. Not as a concession of a majority to the minorities, or to the individuals, or as a matter of mere tolerance. As Philippe Nemo underlines, a plurality of voices and projects in Europe, instead of weakening or diminishing its capacity for action and projection into the world, constitutes instead, from the very beginning, “the secret” of its wealth, prowess and dynamism (Nemo, 2004: esp. chapter 6, pp. 93 and following). Since its birth, the precise date of which, according to Herodotus, the father of History, remains irremediably lost (Herodotus, “Histoires” in Ahrweiller, 1963: 14 16), Europe has grown old in the economy of the world continents, particularly when confronted with the new worlds opened up to the West through modernity. And again, Europe needs to chart and rechart its place in the world. At a moment when the nature and the projection of the culture, the identity and the frontiers of Europe and of the project of European construction itself are themes that acquire an acute urgency in the contemporary agenda, it is important to keep in mind this paradigmatically cosmopolitan and liberal vocation of the idea of Europe. Ever since the very genesis of the continent and of the emergence of the Idea of Europe, it is from this vocation, underlining both individual energy and freedom, and common integration and solidarity, at the limit of mankind and of the entire planet, that Europe gathers its strength and civilizational wealth – at the risk of enclosing itself behind closed borders in a “little Europe” as David Mitrany liked to denounce, that is incapable of freeing itself from the spell of modernity. A “little Europe” that, in the end, will accomplish no more than the transposition to a civilizational or continental dimension of all the vices of the modern sovereign State model of political organization, therefore, aggravating them exponentially. Worse yet, denying and rejecting its millenary history and nature, Europe would not be far from signing its very own death certificate.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Ahrweiller, Jacques (1963), Écrits sur l’Europe , Paris, Éditions Seghers. Amaral, Carlos E. Pacheco (2008), “Comunitarismo”, in Rosas, João, org., Manual de Filosofia Política , Coimbra, Almedina. Aristotle (1963), The Politics , Harmondsworth, Penguin Books.
10 And regardless of the references to Christianity that may me inserted in a Constitutional Treaty of the European Union – or deleted from it –, or in any other instrument of the process of European construction, for that matter, the fact remains that throughout the Middle Ages it was Christianity that first imprinted a sense of unity upon Europe. But that would be the theme of a different essay. 176 Benda, Julien (1933), Discours à la nation européenne , Paris, Gallimard. Brunschvicg, Léon (1947), L’esprit européen , Neuchatel, Éditions de la Baconnière. Camões, Luís Vaz de (1971), Os Lusíadas , Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional. Fernandes, António Teixeira (2006), Monotonia democrática e diluição das regulações sociais , Porto, Afrontamento. Hay, Denys (1957), Europe, the Emergence of an Idea , Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press. Hersant, Yves and Durand Bogaert, Fabienne (2000), Europes – de l’Antiquité au XXe siècle , Paris, Éditions Robert Laffont. Holy Bible, King James Version (1999), New York, American Bible Society. Mitrany, David (1930), “Pan Europa – a Hope or a Danger”, in The Political Quarterly , vol. 1, nº 4, September December. Nemo, Philippe (2004) Qu’est ce que l’Occident?, Paris, PUF. Oliveira, Francisco de, coord. (2005), Génese e consolidação da ideia de Europa . Vol. III. O mundo romano, Coimbra, Imprensa da Universidade. Pozzoli, Francesca (1999), Europa, la piú nobile, la piu bella , Milão, Edizione Tascabili Bompiani. Rawls, John (1971), A Theory of Justice , Cambrigde, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Ribeiro, Maria Manuela Tavares (2003), A Ideia de Europa. Uma perspectiva histórica , Coimbra, Quarteto. Rocha, Acílio (2003), Filosofia da Europa: questões sobre a Europa , offprint of Diacrítica, Filosofia e Cultura, vol. 17, nº 2. Rougemont, Denis de (1965), The Meaning of Europe , Liverpool, Sidwick and Jackson. Rougemont, Denis de (1968), The Idea of Europe , Cleveland and New York, Meridian Books, the World Publishing Company.
V. Book reviews
Gilles ROUET, Peter TEREM, Elargissement et politique europeenne de voisinage / Enlargement and European neighborhood policy, Etablissements Emile Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2008, ISBN 978 2 8027 2666 1, 501pag.
The last enlargements are generally considered a success, and enjoy the new and old member states. That is reassuring for the eventual coming enlargements. However, these future memberships will require a clear democratic support from the EU population at the same time that the last enlargement must be consolidated: the EU needs to function efficiently and to be legitimized by its citizens. The result of the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty confirms the urgency of setting place a communication policy at both the Union and each Member State or candidate. The paradox is clear: the enlargement would be beneficial while the Union remains elusive, bureaucratic and remote from citizens’ rejection. What is true for the ''old'' members, is also valid for the new ''probable'' and ''future'' ones: the Commission wants, and each government or parliament, to mobilize the assets of previous enlargements and inform the citizens on the success of the Union, it is not only to predict future enlargement but also to obtain the support of people to consolidate the Union. The strengthening of social cohesion and democratic accountability is needed to increase efficiently: the problem largely exceeds the citizen. The challenge, of course, the integration capacity of the EU, is related not only to institutions but also, now, to the public. The neighborhood policy it is also concerned because the establishment, in cooperation with States border, is a ''zone'' neighborhood, functioning democratic, compatible and organized within the states law, respecting human rights. The connection provided between the enlargement and neighborhood policy which exceeds this politic aspect, is rather abstract. The ENP evolution based on extensions that change the boundaries, define the neighborhood and, in consequence, determine the content of the ENP. The re launching of the Barcelona process (the sea) as the establishment of the regional cooperation in the Black Sea region (for land) illustrates this determination. The origin of the neighborhood lies in the evidence from the process of enlargement itself. The entry of ten new countries has not only changed the border of the Union but also gave rise to new reflections on the stability, security, trade and relations to be established with these new neighbors not necessarily to be integrated, and with the neighbors of these neighbors. Thus, the EPI was launched a few months after the 2004 enlargement. Another similarity more concrete can be seen in the tools and instruments used in the framework of the ENP, which are very close, if not in their methods in their financial volumes, those used for the pre accession support for adhesions. The positive evaluation of these tools does not complete these similarities. In particular, the assistance instruments created to facilitate the transposition and implementation of the community’s re launch can be found in the EPI (especially Twinnings and TAIEX), which indicates the desire to achieve compatibility with the EU. This determination has a limit: the ENP can not only be compared to the consequences of enlargement, the political will of the EU or the relevance and effectiveness of the proposed instruments, but relies primarily on a logic of cooperation and therefore, relies on the relations’ history between EU states and the neighborhood states, the caller is now the EU itself. The evolution of the Euro Mediterranean partnership illustrates this logic. These reports are also found in the historical logic of the integration in the ENP because even if the ENP defines neighbors as ''states with a land or sea border with the EU'', this delimitation is not sufficient because some ''real'' neighbors are not covered by the ENP, while ''false'' neighbors are. For example, the Balkan states, which have to join the EU in the short or medium term, can not be incorporated into the ENP. Other examples are: Iceland, which has a sea border with the EU, Switzerland has four land borders with the EU, or Norway, which has land and maritime borders with the EU are linked to the European Union by other types of agreements (including the European Economic Area) and are integrated into the Schengen area. Therefore, these countries do not fulfill the 179 objectives of the ENP. Belarus, Ukraine and Moldavia have land borders with countries of the European Union, the ENP can not rely on pre existing agreements with regard to Belarus. Russia is not included in this program but to a specific logic (''Four Common Spaces''). By contrast, in the Caucasus, Georgia has a border with the Union since the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, but the neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan has land and maritime borders with the EU and yet relevant to the ENP. Maritime borders seem more functional than land borders and it appears that South countries concernes are almost the same as those of the Barcelona Process (the Euro Mediterranean), outside of Mauritania and Albania. But the door of France to the Mediterranean ''Union'' should extend the approach to Libya or Syria, for which the ENP is not ''activated''. Thus, overall, the EU's neighbors, as defined by the ENP, are not only located in the ‘’periphery'' of the Union but also have at least three other characteristics: they have to make progress with regard to human rights, they volunteered to cooperate with the Union in the framework of an asymmetrical relationship ''with it''(which explains the special nature of EU Russia) and they did not, in the medium term, join the EU (Turkey is not integrated in the device of the ENP). Ultimately, this EPI is ambivalent: both enlargements without the Community institutions and political instrument of a European Union intend to assert its power. Contributions proposed in this book assume explicitly the link between enlargement and ENP and implicitly, often, this ambivalence. In the first part of this work, ‘Neighbors and Neighborhood (s)’, after a reflection on the European identity and neighborhood (Gilles Rouet), Igor Kosir develops models of integration and Gerard Links the plurilingvism plans under the ENP. Several contributions are then specific countries: prospects in the Western Balkans (Slobodan G. Markovich), Turkey and Human Rights (Robert Istok and Tomas Klus), the case of Belarus (Katiarijna Zhuk), cooperation with Russia (Natalia Zaslavskajia and Tamara Gella) and the specifics of Moldavia in the ENP (Sophie Gutierrez). This section concludes with three contributions of a more general nature on a migration policy in the ENP (Martina Bolecekova and Dagmar Hoschekova), the problem of the evolution of management of universities in Europe (Thierry Come) and the contributions of the University to the ENP through inter university cooperation (Ioan Horga and Mircea Brie). The second part, ‘Practice and Changes’ is introduced by a contribution of Radovan Gura who gives his historic vision of French foreign policy on the integration of Central Europe, from Mitterrand to Chirac. The recall of French proposals on certain conferences or the Stability Pact is very interesting in the context of the implementation of the proposed Mediterranean Union. Rastislav Kazansky explains the success of the V4 cooperation for the development of the ENP. Serbian media and the independence of Kosovo, the analysis suggested by Renaud de la Brosse highlights the role of media in the democratic transition. Tatiana Kasperski returned to Belarus to present cooperation on the Chernobyl disaster. Several contributions deal with economic issues: for example Bednarova Pavla and Lenka Sojkova bring the related economic development and competitiveness of the Czech Republic, the first with the influence of mechanism adjustment, the second with foreign investment. Svetlana Serdyukov then analyzes the evolution in Kazakhstan then Dimitri A. Levi describes the new lobbying strategies in Russia and the EU. Peter Skulski analysis an example of a Polish company and its international strategy and Miroslava Lungova illustrates the beneficial effect at economic level, accession of the Czech Republic to the EU in developing the example of the region Liberec. The latest round of contributions of this part focuses on social aspects (the status of the Turkish minority in Germany with Adriana Mikuleikova) training (training for new European Balintova Helena and Jana Palkova) and, finally, research (presentation de l'Institut de la Mer Noire by Serge Dufoulon). The conclusion of this volume has two voices: Fabienne Maron develops the challenge of new frontiers that must now be administered and Peter Terem links the three concepts of globalization, integration and neighborhood in his final contribution. Composed from the confrontation of academics from a dozen other countries, ''former'' or ‘’new'' of the EU, ''neighbors'' or accession, this article therefore sometimes in detail, and 180 logical to extend this neighborhood with tone largely determined by its center of gravity located at East of the EU. Diana COVACI ([email protected])
Yves LACOSTE, Géopolitique de la Méditerranée , Paris, Armand Colin, 2006, ISBN 9782200268404 [ Collection Perspectives Géopolitiques ]
In 2006 the work of Yves Lacoste, Géopolitique de la Méditerranée was published by Armand Colin’s in the collection Perspectives Géopolitiques. This is a 479 page work, illustrated with 31 maps. This work, an authentic outline, that approaches the whole formed by the sea and the countries that surround it, analysing it as a stage or the cause of big confrontations, is probably one of the best since the publishing of the Dictionnaire de Géopolitique , in 1993 by the same author. The proposed study is, as the one made by Fernand Braudel, extremely precise and complete. Yves Lacoste, a geographer and a historian, is considered the architect of the rebirth of geopolitics in France. Born in Fez, Morocco, in 1929, where he spent his childhood, he was a teacher in Argel (1952 1955), where he participated in the fight for its independence. While he moved from Marxism to Neogaulism in terms of ideology, in geographical terms, Yves Lacoste always remained faithful to the banks of the Mediterranean, where he was born and where he taught. He was a professor in the University of Paris VIII, where he started teaching in 1968. A born nonconformist and provoker, he published in 1976 La Géographie ça sert d’abord à faire la guerre , a shocking title meant to make geography come out of its simple condition of school subject. In the same year he named the geography and geopolitics magazine after the first great Greek historian and geographer, Herodotus, whose Histories , were already then, 2.500 ago, geopolitics. In 1989 he founded the Centre de recherches et d’analyses de géopolitiques, that became in 2002, under Béatrice Giblin’s administration, the Institut français de géopolitique. There he is in charge of the seminar Méthodes d’analyses et représentations géopolitiques . The work we are analysing, after an introduction – where the author clarifies the meaning and the importance of the expression géopolitique and accounts for the title of his work – and a retrospective about the Mediterranean Sea and the great geopolitical Mediterranean whole, is divided into three books. The first one is devoted to the Mediterranean West, the second to the Mediterranean East, and the third book to the Near East. The three books are subdivided into parts and chapters, and the last ones are dedicated to the different States that form the Mediterranean area. The Mediterranean is, as Yves Lacoste stresses, "le seul grand ensemble géopolitique à être désigné par le nom d’une étendue marine". Surrounded by a huge amount of States, it suited the direct interactions between them. It is also reachable by the other nations of the globe, through the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Channel. The relations between the contiguous Sates of the Mediterranean offer an abundant diversity of interpretations. One can not summarize them as a simple confrontation between the North and the South, or as a civilizational shock between the Islam and Christianity. In order to understand the nature of the relations between the different States of the basin of the Mediterranean Sea, the author appeals in the main to the geo history. "Il n’est pas possible de comprendre, même à grands traits, une situation géopolitique sans savoir comment on en est arrivé là", explains Yves Lacoste. The work considers an area that stretches over 8,000 km, from the east to the west, from the south of Portugal as far as Afghanistan. The author points out yet other countries, as he 181 considers that to understand “la Méditerranée, mer géopolitique”, one needs to go beyond its boundaries, its borders. Because the confrontation between forces, even if they are distant from this place geographically, has enormous consequences in the countries that tack the Mare Nostrum . After a general vision over the big regions, the author approaches several countries separately, and comes up with answers to questions extremely up to date, such as the nature of the Catalan separatism, the tumults of 2005 in France, the process of accession of Turkey to the European Union. The book has about thirty maps, which are not too many to understand promptly situations that are many times intertwined, like the one of Israel and Palestine and the Balkan States.
Clara Isabel SERRANO ([email protected])
Pierre GROU, Roland GUILLON, Dominique MERTENS SANTAMARIA, Khelifa MESSAMAH, VERS UNE TRES GRANDE EUROPE Quelle taille minimale pour l’Europe dans la mondialisation du XXIe siecle? L’Harmattan, Paris, 2008, ISBN: 978 2 296 05743 2, 130 p.
The authors of this book are economists and sociologists, university professors who are very interested in the future of Europe, its space and the world globalization. As true followers of the founding fathers of the European Union, their purpose is to offer a 21 st century framework for the future development of Europe as a continental space, a “Very Large Europe”, a stage seen as a passage from the nation state, which came into being with the Industrial Revolution, towards the global state of the first half of the 21 st century. The work raises the question of the role the geographical space has in the present day globalized economy. It uses a definition of the economic space that is based upon the technological development and demography and explains that the United States of America’s dominance over the world in the 20 th century was determined by the highly developed technology and great demography on a certain geographical space. The researchers sustain the necessity of a technological continental space for research projects and great technological programmes and go on presenting the background of the existing continental spaces and their contribution to the global space from the point of view of population and economic growth. The studies done up to this point in the book have the purpose to help the authors build the methodology by means of which they should be able to define the European minimal dimensions of the 21 st century. They conclude that a real Europe can exist only if there is a Western space, an Eastern one and a Mediterranean one and they analyze the three different spaces, their development, dynamism, the activity of the leading classes and propose a new acquis in accordance with the new continental space. They make a survey of the European Union from its very first years, up to each enlargement with the changes brought about by each new wave. The reader can find the most important things about the candidate countries to the Union, about Russia’s most specific features and also Maghreb’s. Their analysis goes deep into economic, political and ideological fundaments, natural resources, financial, human and social capital, technological and industrial networks, cultural identity, the specific characteristics of limes , the Mediterranean new frontier , intercultural relations, the historical conflicts and influences, security, partnerships in this very large Europe they propose. On their opinion the European continental space must be the ground of great scientific and technological cross projects open to large space and demography as Europe must enlarge Eastward in Russia and Southward beyond the Mediterranean Sea in spite of the lack of will to accede to the European Union expressed by Russia and Israel. 182 In the end the writers give solutions to the problems raised by the development of the “Very Large Europe”, such as: a founding meeting, great projects and programmes that are to create a final perspective in which Turkey’s accession to Europe appears as a natural fact. They conclude that in spite of the vastness of their programme it is very important to start it as soon as possible and suggest a reunion of good will people that is meant to establish the targets to be fulfilled and also to settle a common identity framework and an efficient structure to lay the basis of the “Very Large Europe”. The work expresses very interesting points of view, one of them being the concept of minimal continental dimension. It is very clear, easy to understand, every idea, notion is well explained. It is also very well structured, at the very beginning the authors draw the outline of the problems that are to be put under discussion and analyzed, they ask questions and give immediate answers. On the whole the work is a pleading for the enlargement of Europe to the size of a continent and further and offers solutions.
Dana PANTEA ([email protected])
Sorin IPO , Mircea BRIE, Sorin SFRENGEU, Ion GUMENAI, Frontierele spatiului romanesc in context European, Editura Universitatii din Oradea, Editura Cartdidact din Chisinau, Oradea/Chisinau, 2008, ISBN: 978 973 759 559 1, ISBN: 978 9975 940 70 2, 483 p.
The ceaseless territorial changes that are characteristic of the development of international system have not changed the role of the concept of border worldwide and particularly on the European continent after the establishment of the European Union so far. In a world of fast change, the concept of border is still important and up to date. The disappearance in itself of the physical borders entailed the appearance of other types of borders, such as the ethnical, linguistic, religious, social, or cultural ones. The movement of the European Union eastern border after Romania’s accession in January 2007 fulfilled the “western dream” of the Romanians. The much wished freedom of circulation to the west was finally acquired. After reaching these objectives, the joy for a better life made the Romanians forget for a minute about their brothers beyond the Prut. The border determined by the ill fated historical events was deepened, doubled by the settlement of the European Union border. Thus, “paradoxically, this act created new borders between the Romanians, reviving fears and bringing back to the foreground issues that seemed to belong to the past” said Prof. Dr. Ioan Aurel Pop. It is precisely these realities that determined the endeavours of the four coordinators at the University of Oradea and the State University of Moldova, Sorin Sipos, Mircea Brie, Sorin Sfrengeu, Ion Gumenai , to organise a conference on Borders of the Romanian Area in a European Context that brought together 40 specialists from Romania and the Republic of Moldova in Oradea. “The meeting in Oradea started from the difficulty of the Romanian – Romanian cohesion with the Prut as a European political barrier, a new, painful and imposing reality. Now, it becomes natural and pressing the need to open our eyes and watch, to see the borders, whether difficult or easy, opaque or permissive, to see that there are several types of borders, that they are not equal for the Romanians; to see that the Romanians exist between several kinds of borders and where they are, that they are treated differently. The need to define and clearly describe the phenomenon of this unnatural discrimination is pressing”. Sorin ipo , who had the initiative to organise the abovementioned event, noticed the resemblance between the tsarist policy in Bessarabia and the policy of the Habsburgs in Transylvania. “Of course, there are some taints, but it is basically the policy of some empires towards the conquered provinces and aims at integrating them to the new political entity”, the historian pointed out after a conference held in Chisinau. 183 The volume bears the same title as the event organised in Oradea and is made up of 6 chapters approaching interdisciplinary research topics on the border starting from the political and ethnic past, then based on tradition and modernity and reaching the existing contemporary realities between the two sister countries, Romania and the Republic of Moldova. In its approximately 500 pages, the book shows the role of universities, cultural and educational institutions in general, in breaking the existing official barriers in an ever changing world and in bringing people closer despite distance of any nature that separates them. Consequently, irrespective of the opinion on the external border of the European Union, the dialogue generated at all society levels through inter university cooperation is a means providing communication needed for good neighbourhood, which contributes to eroding stiff borders. In conclusion, the book is highly valuable as it brings together articles by specialists in different fields of activity of science and research. It is an interdisciplinary book accessible to all, although not concerned with history.
Alina STOICA ([email protected])
Natan SZNAIDER, Gedächtnisraum Europa. Die Visionen des europäischen Kosmopolitismus, Eine jüdische Perspektive. transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, 2008, ISBN 13: 978 3899426922, 153 p. A personal experienced cosmopolitism, the relation of universalism and particularism, human rights and their connection to the Holocaust, Jewish political thinking and action are some of the topics Natan Sznaider reviews in this boook. The German born sociologist holds a chair at the Academic College in Tel Aviv, Isreal where he focuses on Cultural Sociology and Political Theory. Cosmopolitism and its several forms and characteristecs are the core of the essay which is structurd by fifteen particular essays banding together to a consistent argumentation. It presents an ecplicit Jewish perspective on the mentioens topics. Sznaider’s reflections are located in the tension between pre and post war Europe, the United States and the state of Israel, as all of them offer different ideas and ways of cosmopolitan life in his regard. The Holocaust builds the obvious linchpin of all reflections. For the author cosmopolitism is not only an noble idea that roots back to the ancient Hellenic philosophers and the enlightmebt with Kant, but far more is a reality that has been lived by the European Jews before the Second World War. In this book the establishment of a “realistic cosmopolitism” is the task for the contemporary world. Sznaider takes the reader on a journey through time and space. Each essay is closely connected to certain cities and historical events the took place in them. These cities and events themselves reflect the tension between the Old and New World and Israel alike. The discussed events and exchanges letters are from time before, during and after the war.and clarify how certain points of view have been influenced by it The reader is not the only companion on Sznaider’s fictive journey. He are joined by philosopers that are directly or indirectly connected to the places. Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers are the most prominent and important to mention. Sznaider presents and discusses their ideas and how they corrsponded by letter exchange on the other’s thougths as well as on the question of being Jewish and how to locate Jewish life in the post war world. Looking back into European history and Jewish history which he regards as independent and connected at the same time he analyses the possibility of a synchronism of both, unity and diversity. This synchronism has been lived by the European Jews. Before the war and the Holocaust they were “to universal to be particular and to particual to be universal” [trans. MH]. A reflection on their reality is in Sznaider’s view a chance that offers new perspectives for the present day cosmopolitan Europe. The reality of being in between noticed 184 by many in the contemporary Western world offfers a bond to the similar Jewish expierence which is now of meaning for all people. One of the core points in this essay is the connection between the Holocaust and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On the one hand, Sznaider clarifies, the Jews suffered as Jews and were killed by Germans and their helpers just for the reasin of being Jewish. So the suffering is a unique one, neither the dead nor the survivors are abstract. The human rigths were established to prevent a disaster like this for the future. By their establishment on the other hand the Jewish victims became universal, a part of the global heritage. Their story and their suffering are raised to an universal and abstract level that belongs to all humanity and threatens their identity. And commemoration. For Sznaider the European Jews are even in their death in between different worlds and spheres. The human rights are universal, the victims of the Holocaust were particular. Like here he shows many examples of how those terms overlap in the history and identity of European Jews. Reconsidering Arendt’s ideas Sznaider disputes with new forms of European cosmoplitism that seem to be independent from Jewish experience and praxis Also the writings of Ulrich Beck and his perception of universalism and cosmoplitism appear at several points in this essay. As in Europe for him an active Jewish life does not longer exist and in Israel it lost its connection to its European roots Sznaider favours the possibility offered by the United States, where the individual can be American and Jewish at the same time. By insisting on their Jewishness in times of globalization Sznaider sees a solution for Jews to be cosmolitans even today. Sznaiders essay invites to observe the history and the present of an integrating Europe from a certain perspective, usually not mentioned. Not only new ways of analysing and thinking about Europe and international politics are offered, far more a trace is led to the first days of social sciences when Jewish thinkers from their position of being cosmololitans “in between” played a very active role in describing societies.
Martin HOFMANN ([email protected])
Frédéric DESSBERG; Frédéric THEBAULT, Sécurité européenne. Frontières, glacis et zones d’influenc e. De l’Europe des alliances à l’Europe des blocs (fin XIXe siècle milieu XXe siècle) , Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Réseau des Universités de l’Ouest Atlantique, 2007 ; ISBN 978 2 7535 0359 5, 260p.
According to the title, the book, coordinated by M. Dessberg and M. Thébault, deals with the issue identifying the problems concerning the borders for European and extra European environment. The above mentioned book consists of a number of studies assuming a spectrum of approaches. The authors of the studies are: Frédéric Dessberg; Bruno Jude de Larivière; Philippe Garraud; André Paul Comor; Pierre Journaud; François Pernot; François Cochet; Marie Ducet Huillard; Georges Vidal; Martin Motte; Bernard Bruneteau; Kyrillos Nikolau; Mariusz Wolos; Fabien Guillot; Magdalena Revue and Stéphanie Plouvier. The collective volume starts with a consistent general presentation, being realized by Jean Pierre Bois, concerning the historical evolution of the frontiers within the scope on feudality and nationality items. M. J. P. Bois underlines some important aspects highlighting the lack of political frontiers being specific for the feudal period; also considerable attention is paid to the advancement of the political and military frontiers of the modern Europe. Despite its heterogenic character, the book avoids the establishment of a certain hierarchy of the studies; therefore we can distinguish some categories of topics and approaches. The following configurations can be singled out: i./ theoretical; ii./ focused on extra European frontiers (African and Asiatic); iii./ oriented on the different European frontiers in unlike historical periods, and iv./concentrated on the imaginary and the borders. 185 The theoretical studies belong to Bruno Jude de Larivière and of Martin Motte. The first article is a critical approach of the historical geographic debate concerning the European frontiers, while the second study deals with the place of the frontiers in the classical geopolitical studies. On the other hand, among the three articles focused on the extra European frontiers, two of them identify France as a principal actor, consequently in two different geopolitical spaces. The case study of one of the researches is the question of the northern African frontiers during the decolonisation process and the other concerns the frontiers of Indochina during the second world war, a sensitive period both for France and the above mentioned eastern Asian space. The last article, written by F. Guillot, examines a very sensitive geopolitical space, that of Israel Palestine. The third part of the book is the largest and the most heterogenic. The topics, being in the spotlight, are diversified according to different period and subjects. The authors represent various perspectives on the frontiers. So, Ph. Garraud approaches the subject of the Maginot line, highlighting the importance of this defence system during the Second World War. As for the other author, Fr. Pernot, is interested in the problem and the role of the little states and regions (e.g. the kingdom of Belgium and Rhine state or Walloon) during the conflict episodes. The article of M. Fr. Cochet concerns some military aspects, and approaches the problem of the frontiers and of fight camp on the eve of the Second World War. At the same time we should mention the article written by Mrs Revue analysing the concept of “Zonengrenze” and the German fight to influence the OTAN strategy. Apparently S. Plouvier in her study dwells on the problems of Austrian Alps in front of the soviet menace (i.e. 1945 1955). Also the other two articles concern the Balkan and the north eastern European regions. K. Nikolaou put in evidence the Balkan space between the Congress of Berlin and the First World War, i.e. the disputed borders of Bosnia Herzegovina, Bessarabia, Cyprus, Crete and South Caucasus. M. Mariusz Wolos, in his turn, is interested in the Eastern part of Europe, concentrated on the subject of the Polish Pomeranian region, the big Poland and the High Silesia as zones of German influence during the two World Wars. The last part of the book concerning the borders in the collective contains the studies of Marie Ducet Huillard and Bernard Bruneteau. First study refers to the French representations on the Rhin between 1945 and 1963 (a very important period for the process of the European integration). The later identifies the problem of Nazism, more precisely the transnational totalitarian imaginary. The great heterogeneity can be observed but this should not be considered as a lack, as the book coordinated by Dessberg and Thébault can be useful both for researchers interested in the various aspects concerning the borders and for those oriented on the specific characteristics of periods highlighting the evolution of the concept and the reality actually being are the frontiers.
Cristina DOGOT ([email protected])
“Security Sector Reform. The Political Usage of Conflicts. European Security and Defence Policy”, in: Western Balkans Security Observer , No. 11, October November 2008, Belgrad. ISSN 1452 6115.
La grande actualité de la problématique relevée par le titre de la revue qui apparaît à Belgrade, peut susciter d’un coup l’attention des chercheurs intéressés par le sujet de la politique extérieure et de sécurité commune de l’Union européenne, et spécialement à ceux qui, fortement compétents dans le sujet, savent bien l’importance de la reforme de ce secteur de politiques communes européennes. La deuxième partie du titre, concernant l’utilisation politique des conflits, n’est pas du tout moins intéressante, même il n’est pas très facile de soupçonner les 186 conflits en question. Un court regard sur le sommaire de la revue nous donnera toutefois la réponse. Comme dans les autres numéros, la revue belgradoise est très clairement partagée en sections distinctes, chacune agissant sur un sujet concret et bien déterminé. Ainsi, le présent numéro de Western Balkans Security Observer (WBSO ) contient trois sections d’articles, chacune reflétant une des trois parties du titre, et une section de révisions. La première section comprend l’article de Jelena Radoman sur le concept de la réforme dans le secteur de la sécurité, et celui de Barry Ryan, sur la réforme du politique en Serbie. L’article de J. Radoman s’appui sur un sujet assez récente dans les recherches académiques, un concept qui a ses fondements dans les changements politiques de la fin des années ’80 et le processus de démocratisation et d’accès aux différents structures supranationales parcouru par les anciens États communistes. La portée du concept est de plus en plus claire si on considère l’importance de la reforme dans le secteur du sécurité pour les nouvelles démocraties européennes devant leur entrée dans les structure de l’OTAN, par exemple. J. Radoman met également en évidence les trois directions d’étude du concept de la réforme dans le secteur de la sécurité, à savoir les relations d’entre l’espace civile et celui militaire, les études du développement et de la sécurité. L’autre article de cette section réalise une histoire de la réforme d’espace politique en Serbie à partir de la monarchie constitutionnelle jusqu’à la période de transition qui a suivi l’époque de la guerre. Même si l’auteur a effectué une très bonne exposition générale, l’étude n’est toutefois suffisamment profonde, spécialement pour la période d’après la guerre, sur laquelle les études claires et profondes sont encore peu nombreuses. La deuxième section d’articles, concernant l’utilisation politique du conflit, rassemble les articles de Jelena Radoman sur la relation d’entre la deuxième guerre tchétchène et la stratégie politique promue par V. Putin ; l’article de Věra Stojarová et Miroslav Mareš sur le rôle de la République Srpska dans le processus d’intégration européenne de la Croatie, et l’article de Tatjana Petrović concernant les divergences d’entre les politiques de sécurité de l’Union européenne et de la Russie, avec un étude de cas sur Kosovo, Bessarabie et Georgie. En ce qui concerne l’article de Jelana Radoman, celui ci commence avec une très précise mise à point du cadre politique régional caucasien (la deuxième guerre tchétchène) et le début d’un nouvelle situation politique dans la fédération russe (l’arrivée au pouvoir de V. Putin et le début d’une nouvelle étape dans l’histoire politique de la Russie). Le mérite de l’auteur est celui d’avoir mettre en évidence la capacité de mobilisation de V. Putin dans un certain contexte géopolitique, mobilisation dont les effets ont été bénéfiques pour le recommencement du système politique et également de l’État russe. Assez importante sont, pour J. Radoman, les bénéfices que le président Putin a su bien en profiter : la fortification des pouvoirs présidentiels et la création d’un besoin pour un dirigeant puissant, charismatique et même dominateur. Le deuxième article de cette partie, celui de Věra Stojarová et Miroslav Mareš sur le rôle (plus ou moins important) de la République Srpska dans le processus d’intégration euro atlantique et européenne de la Croatie, un rôle interprété par les biais de différents conflits où la République Srpska a été impliquée à partir des années 1990, quand la dite république a obtenu son indépendance. L’auteur réalise une très ample description de la scène politique du petit pays et souligne tant les influences des situations conflictuelles que des hommes et de partis politiques radicales et nationalistes. Le dernier article de cette section, celui de T. Petrović, s’appui aussi sur un sujet sensible et longtemps discuté dans le monde politique et de l’analyse politique contemporaine. Comme l’auteur elle même affirme, l’article essaie à réaliser une parallèle entre la manière de traiter les conflits de l’Union européenne et celle de la Russie, à partir de trois conflits importants, ceux du Kosovo, Transnistrie et Georgie (en ce qui concerne la dernière, sans le conflits déclanché le 08 août 2008). Le point de départ de l’article le constitue la possible influence de la déclaration d’indépendance de Kosovo sur les régions de conflits « gelés » de l’ancienne Union Soviétique. Le sujet est devenu très commun pendant les débats (européennes et russes) sur l’indépendance du Kosovo et également après la Déclaration d’indépendance de cette province. Comme conclusion, T. Petrović affirme que la Déclaration d’indépendance de la 187 province Kosovo a eu plusieurs effets, parmi les plus importants étant le surcroît de divergences politiques d’entre l’Union européenne et la fédération russe, l’impossibilité d’établir un accord à long temps entre les deux parties mentionnées, chacun de deux acteurs internationaux envisageant l’application de son plan politique. L’auteur met en évidence les réactions de leaders politiques de Bessarabie et de Georgie, les deux inquiétés sur la nouvelle situation géopolitique et ne reconnaissant pas le nouveau statut du Kosovo. Pour la fin de l’article, l’auteur reprend l’idée du début, concernant la déstabilisation de la relation UE Russie à cause de la politique extérieure de l’UE. La dernière section d’article contient uniquement l’article de Dragana ðurašinović Radojević relatif au contrôle parlementaire sur la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense, et spécialement sur les instruments et les méthodes utilisées par le Parlement européen dans ses démarches. D. ðurašinović Radojević evidencie très bien le rôle militaire de plus en plus important de l’Union européenne, tant dans le conflit de l’ancienne Yougoslavie qu’en Afrique ou en Asie, mais considère le rôle du Parlement européen encore peu important dans le processus décisionnel concernant le Politique Extérieure et de Sécurité Commune (PESC), le Conseil et les parlements nationaux des États membres étant encore plus importants que l’institution européenne mentionnée. De point de vue de l’auteur, la possibilité d’adopter des résolutions, recommandations, rapports ou décisions sur les missions PESC, doublée par le contrôle budgétaire et les interpellations que le PE peut les adresser à la Commission européenne ou au Conseil ou par les groups de travail sur les problèmes de politique extérieures et défense (groups que le PE peut bien les organiser) ne sont pas suffisantes. Ce qui est important pour ðurašinović Radojević est la pré approbation du PE pour toute mission PESC déclanchée par l’Union européenne, devenant ainsi une partie active dans le processus décisionnel. Même une très courte regarde sur le contenu du numéro 11 de la revue Western Balkans Security Observer peut être suffisant pour nous faire une impression sur la qualité et l’actualité des sujets abordés. Toutefois, il ne faut pas rester au surface des choses, parce que les auteurs de cette revue viennent avec leur propre vue sur les événements européens et internationaux sorte souvent de tout chablon et nous offre une autre point de vue, parfois de l’intérieur de certains faits moins connus.
Cristina DOGOT ( [email protected])
La Slovaquie et ses régions, nouveaux partenaires européens, sous la direction de Gilles ROUET, Collection Voisinages Européens no. 2 , Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2008, 280 p., ISBN 978 2 8027 2515 2
The volume La Slovaquie et ses régions, nouveaux partenaires européens is the second book of Voisinages Européens collection edited by the prestigious Edition Bruylant. It reflects the contributions made by the local authorities and mostly by the academic sector concentrated on the decentralization process of the region, originated within the scope of the annual franco slovakian decentralization cooperation in Nitra, 2005 and in Presov, 2006. The book opens with the words of the French Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Slovakia, Mr. Jaacques Faure (2003 2006). His Excellency underlined the importance of cooperation of different communities between Slovakia and France leading to the exchange of expertise and good practice. At the same time, the book conveys in itself the good coverage of Slovakia, as the European partner within the framework of the European Union. This small big country , this is how Slovakia is often called, has been successful in its development after the collapse of Czechoslovakia just eleven years ago and in 2004, side by side other new European countries, Slovakia has been integrated into the large family of the independent countries –The European Union. Quite rapidly, Slovakia has been involved in the harmonization process of decentralization, meeting all the European directives; besides the 188 development of tax policy inspired the investing climate in the country contributing to the economic development of the country. Structurally, the book is organized within two parts: the first part deals with the following topic: Slovakia and its Regions: Movements and Challenges. A considerable attention is paid to the decentralization of the country, explaining very exactly the organizational structure of different state institutions and territorial communities. We can also find mentions to the sustainable development in Slovakia, to the development of tourism in different regions of the country, together with maps, statistics and concrete facts. The second part of the volume: The Regions of Slovakia and the European Construction emphasizes the issue concerning the bilateral cooperation of Slovakia with the European institutions. Thereby, we know about the assessment and the perspectives of European funds received by Slovakia, about the instruments of financial assistance pre and post accession, about new perspectives for the development of job places and other perspectives of Slovakian regionalism and european cooperation. In conclusion, it should be mentioned that the european territorial cooperation beyond the EU borders remains to be the principle objective. The aims is to eradicate the gap between the regions and EU states, so that the European Politics and the Neighborhood Policy could reconfigure the relations with the EU, its neighbors and their neighborhood environment overall. At the end of the book, in the Annexes, each region of Slovakia is described synthetically within the economic framework. The descriptions are accompanied with maps reflecting precisely the localization of the region on the national environment, being represented also with the blazons of these regions and its flags. The book La Slovaquie et ses régions, nouveaux partenaires européens is enthralling and very readable. Its logical coherence, its good organization and the relevance of the material presented demonstrate a general and complete image of Slovakia and its regions within the european policies. Mariana BUDA ([email protected])
Manuela du Bois Reymond, Europas neue Lerner – Ein bildungskritischer Essay , Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen & Farmington Hills, 2007, ISBN 13: 978 3866490772, 191 p.
European politics influence and transform an increasing number of areas of citizens’ daily lives. Manuela du Bois Reymond, profesor emeritus of pedagogy and sociology of adolescents at the Leiden University/NL uses her scientific expertise and her international research experience to examine the connections between European Youth and Educational Policies and the reality of today’s young learners. She calls her book “ bildungskritischer Essay ”, an essay critical on education. This critical approach refers not only to her evaluation but also her procedure. Each section begins with a thesis on its main topic that is contrasted with an antithesis. After an analysis of the situation both are evaluated again and revised on their plausibility. For the author many new developments in Euroepan educational systems try to create the impression that circumstances for laerning and education turn to the better at the moment. Though, she detects a major problem. The motivation to learn is still extrinisc while it should be intrinsic to prepare for the current social reality in the best possibel way. Students in Europe attend schools that not longer prepare them for the challenges in the so called “information society” with a knowledge based economy where learning itself has become one of the main activities. The author considers learning not only as a personal value but far more as an important ressource for the society. The appeal of du Bois Reymond’s essay it that she is combining current discourses in educational politcy with the results of scientific reasearch in the fields of pedagoy, sociology of adolescents and educational psychology. Thus, political ideas are 189 grounded by the reality of learners whose needs, as she concludes, are often not met. The empirical data she refers to is mostly from Germany and the Netherlands. Two main developments characterise learning in contemporary Eurupean societies: a longer adolesence with increasing amounts of time spent in institutions of secondary or tertiary education and a growing gap between the labour market and the educational systems. Many young adults chose a way of learning that is contrary to the possibilities the educational institutions offer them. They function within a different logic and the reality of learning has changed profoundly since the last debates on learning and education in the sixties and seventies. The analysis shows a parallel, though, in so far as also then central problems of education had been pointed out without being really solved. The mentioned research projects reveal the learning and educational biographies that exist in Europe nowadays which include successful as well as frustrating experiences. A typology of learners that covers all current types of learner and institutions is developed by du Bois Reymond and she describes the phenomenon of network learning to close with her ideas for scientific researches of the future that also meet the needs of the socities and the learners themselves. She proceeds as follows. The debates on the reform of the school systems in Germany and the Netherlands are in the focus of the first analytical chapter. Many attempts have been started to change the three sectional system in these two countries which only have partly been set into practice. But even growing international pressure and European integration do not lead to an automatic continuation of the reform; the old institutions are enduring. The author notices that questions of equality and justice are not longer the main focus of the process. The following chapter describes the development of the European educational policy of the last thirty years. Especially the concept of lifelong learning and its influences on national politics is reconstructed. Many national reforms and development have been initiated on a Euroepan level. But du Bois Reymond is still missing a proper European policy of education. The national systems become crosslinked but in general remain as they are. One reason in her regard is that the European Union has not a single definition what a knowledge based society might be, although it is often referred to this term Another inportant insight is that formal and non formal education start to interfuse without the prospect that their inner contradictions will be solved. The author continues with European youth policy where she shows how the focus changed from civic education to a fixation on the labour market. Employability and the labour market have become more important than overcoming social exclusion of youth in a much broader sense. In the next step the author enters the field of sociology of adolescents to demonstrate how relevant the debates on education and youth policy are. Biography research since the eighties show the changin conditions of growing up. Where sociology used to emphasise positive effect of more options it has become more pessimistic and criticises the “force to force oneself” to chose in times of economic insecurity.The positive effects of participitory learning on the sustainability of education and the attempts to establish all day schools in Germany and the Netherlands are the content of the following chapters. In three case studies of learning and professional careers du Bois Reymond draws a picture of the reality of European youth that shows how important networks have become in the professional careers. She discusses whether these case studies present a new cultural model of learners or if they are exceptional examples like they have existed at all times. Altogether five diefferent types of learners from two generations are introduced. She concludes that the information society supports and demands network learning but was, until now, not able to find a solution how to include it into the institutional systems of education. For du Bois Reymond the attempts to widen the concepts of learning and education are not due to an utopian idea of giving everyone the chance to develop into his/her full potential. The main reason is the economic fear not to survive in international competition. In the economical restructuring of the European 190 educational systems she detects a disadvantage for all learners, but the most affected group consists of the already rather badly qualified. Finally the author starts to develop an agenda for European research on these topics. Explicitly the author critisises the educational policies and realities in European schools as today. She regards it as irresponsible that societies do not take more care for the “learning capital” of their young generations. But she does not turn to political calls. Instead she remains on the scientifec sideand demands four points to be on an European research agenda: intercultural comparison, interdisciplinarity, a combination qualitative and quantitative studies and cohort studies. Independent from the conclusions one might draw from the discussed material the only weak point of this essay is one of its strongest at the same time. The focus on Germany and the Netherlands has to neglect the empirical situation in other European countries. On the other hand du Bois Reymond’s expertise lies exactly on the mentioned countries what makes her analysis so convincing. The demand for a pan European agenda of research meets exactly the potential conscerns.
Martin HOFMANN ([email protected])
Journal of East European and Asian Studies (JEEAS), Vol. 1, No.1, April 2009, Center for East European and Asian Studies (CEEAS), National School of Political Studies and Public Administration in Bucharest (NSPSPA), Romania, ISSN 2065 9970, 169 p.
The most recent editorial initiative of Center for East European and Asian Studies (CEEAS) brings into our attention a journal that contributes within the new geopolitical approaches of Europe’s neigborhood and proximity. The Journal of East European and Asian Studies (JEEAS) has the main advantage to cover a particular dimension of international relations at the beginning of the 21 st century, which consist in the analysis of internal and external dynamics in Eastern Europe and Asia. The systemic change and the emergence of new global competitors, the development of new economic trends are all factors we must aknowledge when we take a closer look at the region and its development perspectives. The Europe today and its proximity must be understood only in relation with other international and regional entities. The globalization determined different functional ties among regions and continents and the international system and opened various connections that can be approached within a large spectrum of variables: threats, challenges and opportunities. According to the editors, the journal aims to offer a forum for academic debate, where the main trends and events are to be discussed and analysed, encouraging an interdisciplinary approach to these issues. To this end the Center for East European and Asian Studies gatheres vairous experts and Ph.D. candidates in the field of international relations, comparative politics and security. The first issue of Journal of East European and Asian Studies , covers a large spectrum of the main questions that are in the contemporary debate and are organized in two main sections: Regional Politics: Studies and World System: Essays but the content of each section is clearly demonstrates the interdependences between regional and global/systemic issues. The issue of cultural and ethnic diversity in Central and Eastern Europe is analysed in two contributions that gathers different perspectives. A case study is critically relates the crisis management in Bosnia&Herzegovina with the important role of international community. Other interpretations of cultural diversity are focused in a contribution that explores democracy, human rights and ethnic conflicts in eastern Europe and Asia in the processes of European integration and globalization. Here we can discover the two sided relationship between democracy and human rights both as a potential to help eliminate or mitigate ethnic tensions and conflicts or as a framework to create a fertile climate for biases, hatred and conflicts. 191 An interesting analysis is focused on the dynamics of the political configurations in some former USSR states (case studies on Ukraine and Georgia) and it brings an excellent framework to relate democratical change in Eastern Europe with the Moscow’s influence. The article is a very good example of an analysis that underlines the fact that after the collapse of USSR, Russia did not change its ambitions to influence the East through its policy of “controlled instability”. Another important aspect that became very sensitive in the past years is the issue of energy, analysed from a geo economical perspective is covered in two articles. The first one is analysing the energy diplomacy among the EU, US and China and the second one contributes with a detailed analysis on the Russia’s foreign policy in the pipelines politics in the Black Sea region. Within this interpretations we can find several fundamental arguments that are influencing the change in states preferences and behaviour with regard to the national and international security approaches. Therefore, we salute the initiative of our colleagues and recommend the Journal of East European and Asian Studies as a fundamental reading for those who wants to have a more update comprehension of the geopolitical dynamics in the area. The journal can be visited online at www.jeeas.org and other informations regarding the activities of the Center for East European and Asian Studies can be found at www.ceeas.ro. We also encourage your involvement with comments, questions and contributions that can add value to the ambitious effort of our colleagues.
Dorin I. DOLGHI ([email protected])
Ioan HORGA, Grigore SILA I, Istvan SULI ZAKAR, Stanislaw SAGAN, coord., The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy, Oradea, Oradea University Press, 2009, ISBN 978 973 1881 17 1, 278 p.
The volume “The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy” was published as a result of an international seminar “European Parliament to campus for Intercultural Dialogue and the European Neighbourhood Policy” organized by the Institute for Euro regional Studies from Oradea on 4 11 June, 2008. The itinerant locations were the seminar took place were Timisoara, Oradea, Debrecen, Kosice, Rzeszow. The seminar was organized with the support of Jean Monnet Action of European Commission. The papers included in the present volume are grouped in four sections: (1) The European Parliament and the Intercultural Dialogue; (2) The New Frontiers and the Intercultural Dialogue; (3) The Intercultural Dialogue by particular experiences; (4) The Intercultural Dialogue and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Regarding these issues, authors from different countries presented interesting studies: Hugh R. McMahon, Michael Elliott, Joke Swiebel, Christine Oddy, Fabienne Maron, Esther Gimeno Ugalde, Margaryta Chabanna, LuminiŃa oproni, Eleni ZerZelidu, Natasa Simeunovic, Kristina Moravkova, Grigore Sila i and Alexandra Dogaru, Maurice Buangi Khonde, Martin Hofmann, Gergely Tagai, János Pénzes and Ernö Molnár, Urszula Doliwa, Sinem Kocamaz, Octavian łîcu, Svyetlov Oleksander, Eljana Mosko, Ioan Horga and Mircea Brie, Constantin łoca and Anca Oltean. The subjects approached in the studies of this volume range from the role of European Parliament and Education, Training and Cultural Programs in promoting intercultural dialogue, diversity that exists in different EU countries, European frontier, multilingualism as a strategy of European Union, intercultural dialogue in Charpatian Euroregion, to the regional brand frontier, the condition of Roma as reflected in Serbian and international media and the situation of Roma population in Slovakia, the observation of relational space in Oradea, the intercultural dialogue in Romanian Banat, the aspects of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Transcaucasian countries, in Israel or its effects on interuniversity cooperation at the external frontiers of the European Union, the project concernig crossborder agglomeration in Oradea and Debrecen and other interesting studies. 192 We would like to point out the study of Hugh R. McMahon who writes about the importance of the role of European Parliament in promoting intercultural dialogue and European Neighbourhood policy. In this sense he quotes the speech of Romano Prodi from ECSA –World Conference who asked „What do we have to offer to our new neighbours?” mentioning that proximity policy does not exclude nor promise the membership to EU. Michael Elliott explains how Education, Training and Cultural Programmes of EU helped to the development of intercultural dialogue among the peoples of the European Union. He brings into discussion European programmes such as Erasmus, Leonardo Da Vinci, Lingua, Grundtvig , Erasmus Mundus. Joke Swiebel in the article „Intercultural dialogue and diversity within the EU” explains how promoting diversity, the European cultural heritge will be preserved. Multiculturality will conduce to integration, is the opinion of the author. Christine Oddy discusses how the display of paintings will conduce to the sharing of cultural values of different peoples. Fabienne Maron in her article „Les nouvelles frontières de l’Europe: repenser les concepts” shows how EU enlargement pushed more far away the frontiers of EU. An important question raised by the author is if EU should enlarge or should deepen the integration process among the current member states. Esther Gimeno Ugalde writes about the relationship between borders and language. She writes about the languages which developed in regions of border. She emphasised multilingualism, a strategy of European Union, “a way of understanding the relation between borders and language”. LuminiŃa oproni has as a target region Northern Transylvania region and she makes an economic portrait of this region trying to define „The regional brand – frontier or dimension of the New European Identity”. The papers of Natasa Simeunovic and Kristina Moravkova brings into discussion the Roma minority which continue to face enough discrimination. Grigore Sila i and Alexandra Dogaru analyzes in their study the interculturality and multilingual practice existent in Romanian Banat. Martin Hofmann observes the relational space of the city of Oradea. He emphasizes diverse theories of space in sociology and defines the relational space of Oradea by providing different photographs of the city and explaining their meaning. Concerning the concept of European neighbourhood policy, Sinem Kocamaz emphasizes the importance of Transcaucasian countries for EU because of the European Union’ need of energy supply and its wish to develop infrastructure for comercial routes and to prevent conflicts. Ioan Horga and Mircea Brie considers that interuniversity cooperation at the external frontiers of EU promotes valuable neighbourhood relations between the neighbouring countries in Europe. Constantin łoca brings the attention on the „Project of the Debrecen Oradea Cross border Agglomeration” which envisages 700 000 inhabitants in this area. The volume brings together several points of view on European issues such as intercultural dialogue, European diversity, multilingualism, the impact of European neighbourhood policy, multiculturality. It also brings together authors from different universities and former members of the European Parliament. It has all the features of a well documented academic work.
Anca OLTEAN ([email protected])
Michel SIVIGNON, Les Balkans. Une géopolitique de la violence , Berlin, Paris, 2009, ISBN 978 2 7011 4939 4, 207 pp
The book is a highly complex approach of realities in the Balkan area. Without intending to be a history of the Balkans, the work uses several historic arguments in order to explain certain contemporary behaviours and realities. The debate is well argued through an interdisciplinary 193 approach often referring to geography, cultural anthropology, sociology, international law, history of mentalities, etc. Right from the beginning, the author proposes in Introduction a debate on the Balkans from different perspectives bringing to the foreground the relationship Europe – Balkan area. An image of Les Balkans année 2008 is shown right in the first chapter. From cultural identitary debates to international issues with inferences on the Balkans, the topics are stressed by the much controversial independence of Kosovo. The author brightly seizes NATO interference in the region often competing with the European Union. The analysis focuses then on finding possible explanations of the geopolitical situation in the Balkans. Violence is at home. Special attention is granted to La guerre des Balkans: 1991 1999 (chapter 2). The fall of communism and escalation of nationalism in former Yugoslavia have led to chain reactions against Beograd. A series of successive wars have brought to the foreground once again the Balkan “gunpowder barrel”. The third chapter, Les Balkans par les mots définitions debates sensitive issues in the region. The debate on “Oriental issues” and the end of the Turkish domination is completed by an analysis on symbolism and mentalities of peoples in the area. The author notices an extremely interesting fact: most peoples prefer not to be considered as “Balkan”. Balkan is rather superposed on an inferior, sub cultural and “non European” status. Starting from this point, the author finds it difficult to clearly identify the limit of the Balkan area. Therefore, he speaks of a more expanded Balkan area including Romania and of an extremely expanded one including Moldova and Hungary. More and more often is mentioned the Western Balkan area, that is, the area covering the former Yugoslavia and Albania. The debate is well completed by a geographical approach of the Balkan area in chapter 4 ( Les terre balkaniques ). The sea (Black, Adriatic, Ionic, Aegean), climatic contrasts, relief (from lower flooded fields to massive mountains), or hydrographical networks acting as main means of transportation complete the Balkan area as a “German isthmus” as well as a “way to the East”. The chapter La construction des nations: des peuples aux États makes an interesting analysis on the formation of nations in the Balkans. Before the debate on Balkan peoples, the author lays stress on religious and linguistic realities in the region. The presentation of contemporary realities as compared to the underlying issues and their historical origin confers more consistency to the approach. Les peuples premiers (chapter 6) makes an interesting classification of Balkan people making reference to the concept of “first” people, a concept often mentioned in the history of these peoples. The Greek, Albanese, Romanian and Slavic peoples are successively introduced preserving the order of their appearance. Germans, Italians, Hungarians and Turks are considered peoples peripheral to the Balkan area. Besides, the author identifies and insists to show another category of peoples: people with no territory (Wallachians, Aromanians, Roma and Jews). Chapter 7 ( Les peuples des nouvelles nations ) attempts to approach the identity of new nations: Cypriot, Moldavian, Macedonian, Bosnian, as well as the birth of the Kosovar people. It is an opportunity for the author to present the debates on the formation of national identities. There are pros and cons concerning what a multiple perspective provides and offer a general picture although the author is sometimes inspired by unilateral bibliographic sources, thus making confusions sometimes (e.g. when approaching the Moldavian issue, the author underlines the idea that Moldavian identity dates back to the glorious epoch of the Moldavian ruler “Michel le Brave” – it is easy to infer that the period the author makes reference to is the time when Stefan cel Mare ruled). It is impossible to trace Balkan states’ borders without “mutilating” peoples and cultural ethnographic realities. From this point of view, chapter 8 Les peuples balkaniques par la carte , as well as chapter 9, Les cicatrices cachées et les nouvelles frontières show the often conflicting perspectives between conceptual approaches. The work ends with an interesting presentation of the European perspective that Balkan peoples have.
Mircea BRIE ([email protected]) 194
Constantin HLIHOR, Politica de securitate în mediul internaŃional contemporan: domeniul energetic , Institutul European, Ia i, 2008, ISBN : 978 973 611 555 4, 182 p Le livre écrit par Constantin Hlihor propose un sujet peu abordé dans la littérature de spécialité de Roumanie: les études de sécurité. Comme l’auteur souligne dans l’introduction, pour qu’un acteur perçoive un problème comme sécurité ou insécurité (deux concepts qui se retrouvent dans tous les chapitres du livre), les acteurs du système international ont besoin d’un consensus en ce qui concerne la référence. C’est pour ça que l’auteur propose aux lecteurs avisés (informés) ou aux ceux qui sont intéressés par le domaine une „grille” de lecture, partant de l’idée que la sécurité ou l’insécurité représentent des conséquences du comportement humain, produit par des certains facteurs objectifs ou subjectifs. Dans ses quatre chapitres, le livre offre aussi quelques instruments conceptuels et quelques lignes directeurs nécessaires pour projeter les politiques de sécurité pour diverses secteurs de la société ou domaines du milieu international. Particulièrement, l’auteur étudie la sécurité du secteur énergétique, qui sera, dans le futur, l’un des plus graves problèmes non seulement pour les sociétés qui produisent l’énergie, mais aussi pour ceux qui le consomment. Le premier chapitre qui s’appelle „Des évolutions dans les études de sécurité” couvre les aspects généraux de la sécurité: la perception de la sécurité dans la société contemporaine n’est plus une classique (c’est à dire la protection face au ménaces classiques: des agressions militaires ou des guerres) parce que les menaces se sont diversifiées (et comme réponse les secteurs de la sécurité se sont aussi transformés: la sécurité économique, politique, sociale, identitaire etc.). Il y a aussi plusieurs niveaux de la sécurité: un niveau individuel, la sécurité d’un groupe (politique, ethnique, economique etc), d’une société ou d’un peuple, d’une région etc. L’auteur analyse aussi les principales écoles de pensée de la théorie des relations internationales qui ont abordé la problématique de la sécurité: l’école réaliste (avec des représentants comme E. H. Carr, H. Morgenthau, K. Waltz, J. Mearsheimer, H. Bull, B. Buzan etc.) et l’école libérale (de J. Bentham et I. Kant jusqu’au W. Wilson et F. Fukuyama). En essayant à adapter les paradigmes de la sécurité aux changements du milieu international l’auteur pense que le constructivisme peut apporter de la conciliation entre le paradigmes et, en même temps, une plus appropriée perspective pour comprendre les problèmes de la sécurité du monde contemporain. Le deuxième chapitre présente la politique de la sécurité dans le milieu international contemporain et commence avec la construction des politiques de sécurité. Une politique de sécurité se construit avec le concours de plusieurs acteurs et facteurs qui, dans une société démocratique, rassemblent les faits, les interprètent et finalement ils discutent les conclusions. Pour mieux comprendre la manière de la construction et de l’adoption d’une politique de sécurité, l’auteur pense qu’il est très important de connaître le courant de pensée au qui adhère ce qui décide ou ce qui fait l’expertise. La politique de sécurité est différent perçue par les élites politiques et le mass media d’une côté et par l’opinion publique de l’autre côté. Finalement, pour élaborer une politique de sécurité, certaines étapes sont nécessaires. La perception des menaces, l’estimation du temps de réaction et l’analyse de la capacité d’agir ou réagir d’un acteur contre une menace sont aussi importantes en ce qui concerne une politique de sécurité. Le titre du troisième chapitre est „La politique de sécurité énergétique” et ce qui est vraiment utile pour le sujet abordé par l’auteur et pour ceux qui sont intéressés par l’impact de la sécurité énergétique dans la société internationale contemporaine sont les graphiques, les cartes et les schémas. À leur aide, le lecteur peut se rendre compte des secteurs de la sécurité énergétique, de l’importance des sources de l’énergie qui ont varié de temps à temps pendant l’histoire, des principaux pays et régions ou on a trouvé du pétrole (l’auteur pense que la plus riche région ou il y a du pétrole est le Moyen Orient, où, à présent se retrouvent environ 70% de la production totale du pétrole du monde), de l’inégalité de la consommation d’énergie dans le 195 monde et des principaux oléoducs et routes pour le transport du pétrole. Dans le futur proche, la plus grave menace ne sera plus le terrorisme, mais la rareté de ressources et leur prix élevé à cause de leur rapide épuisement. Par conséquent, l’humanité devra trouver des substituts pour le pétrole et les produits pétroliers surtout dans les transports et le problème sera plus difficile à cause de la croissance de la consommation des ressources énergétiques chaque année. L’auteur présente aussi dans ce chapitre quelques projets initiés par différents acteurs internationaux, surtout des instituts pour recherche (importants pour identifier les risques et les menaces pour que les décideurs puissent éliminer l’insécurité énergétique). Le dernier chapitre contient quelques suggestions en ce qui concerne la théorie et la pratique d’élaborer les politiques de sécurité énergétique. Les scénarios sont très importants pour pouvoir éviter les situations d’insécurité – „pensant l’impensable (thinking the unthinkable)”. Pour conclure, le volume de Constantin Hlihor est une source qui doit être consultée par tous ceux qui veulent s’approcher sur les études de sécurité, par ce qui désirent se perfectionner dans le domaine, mais aussi par un simple citoyen, car, comme l’auteur dit dans ses conclusions, „les citoyens qui forment les états comme entités politiques caractéristiques à la société contemporaine se confrontent aujourd’hui avec un problème en ce qui concerne la sécurité: plus de sécurité mais renoncer aux certains droits fondamentaux du citoyen ou plus de liberté et moins de sécurité?”
Valentina Tania SECHE AN ([email protected])
Democracy in the Islamic Reality: In Search of Democratic Values (Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy )
The determining rules of the religions are same as in their own books, those rules are accepted as the words and commandments of the God, so it is not possible to act against the book or modify them according to our modern life because the nature of the religions which is living in the advice of the holly books can be considered as following the taboos, because they tell us taboos instead of giving advices about what will we ought to do, if we look from the general perspective, we will see that this situation makes our lives dependent to those taboos of the holly books; another important point, created because of this situation, is the existence of belief conformations according to each religion, it means that each belief conformation is the ignorance of the other so it creates differentiations between our beliefs and also creates huge gulfs between lifestyles within the society, societies are retreat from taboos in daily life as just same amount of modification of the holly books and social peace achieved by agreeing on minimum conjugates; this agreement reduces the pressure of the society over the individual and it generates improvement of the society. Religion is based on concept of acceptance and ignorance, it is easy for people to accept or ignore that they do not know clearly, the aim of religious governments is not to explain what they do, but just apply what they do, especially in the Islamic governments it becomes an important problem because their practices are not domestically harmful also globally harmful, as a reason, the societies which are adopting Islamic rules in their government system are moving away from democracy, and day by day it becomes hard to stabilize democracy in those societies. The only way to solve this problem is to educate people: educating people for learning their religion truly and increasing popularity of the holly books in society, the absence of the clergy in Islam permits people to interpret Islam according to people’s own thoughts and knowledge, in Christianity, existence of clergy gathers all power of the religion in one hand and bans the societal clash between different ideas, the separation of religion from the politics makes people think individually and raises democracy in society, the main issue is that religions are not 196 for making our life hard, religions help us to live our life in a harmony with their rules, the main goal deals with the identification of the religious rules clearly as mentioned before. The best way to identify religions is to educate people about religion, answering their questions by looking and interpreting truly from the holly books. Correspondingly in this process non governmental organizations (NGO’S) play the most important role because NGO’S are the actors that can educate people in a society very effectively; if NGO’S attends this issue effectively it will increase the level of democracy, there is an important example that clarifies the increasing level of democracy in a society, particularly in the Muslims society: CSID: (Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy). The Center for the Study of Islam & Democracy (CSID) is a non profit organization, based in Washington DC, dedicated to studying Islamic and democratic political thought and merging them into a modern Islamic democratic discourse. The organization was founded in March 1999 by a diverse group of academicians, professionals, and activists both Muslim and non Muslim from around the USA who agree on the need for the study of and dissemination of reliable information on this complex topic. The mission of CSID is to work to produce scholarship that clarifies to what extent such Western principles are halal (permissible) from an Islamic standpoint (i.e., based on the Quran, the sayings of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (saw), and other essential components of the Islamic tradition) in the hope that this will spread knowledge in the Muslim community and better equip it to deal with today's challenges; at the same time, CSID strives to improve the mainstream American community and policymakers understanding Islam's approach towards individual freedom, civil rights, and political pluralism by producing scholarship that counters widely held prejudices and misconceptions. CSID Events: The activities of the Center for the Study of Islam & Democracy (CSID) include the following: Seminars and lectures at mosques, churches and think tanks around the country by noted scholars and activists on Islam & Democracy. International workshops on Islam & Democracy in Muslim countries, CSID has held several workshops, in Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Turkey, Jordan, Yemen, also twenty Five Activists from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain Participating in a Workshop on Islam and Democracy, There collaboration with other Islamic organizations as The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), also Muslims in America (CSAM). There publications include books and articles in both languages Arabic and English, and they are published in USA also in Arab countries .For example, can Muslims be good Americans? Another example, the situation of human rights in Syria. An annual academic conference on Islam and Democracy. CSID's conferences bring together specialists, activists and policymakers to share ideas. Attendees and speakers have included high ranking government officials (e.g., Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Lorne Craner, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East William Burns) and internationally renowned scholars (e.g., Fathi Osman, Tariq Ramadan, Khurshid Ahmed) and activists (e.g., Saad Eddin Ibrahim) from the Muslim world. RESULTS of their activities: The work that CSID is doing is remarkable, they are promoting the democracy at the practical level, in this regard has provided a lot of services through education and social activism, the workshops were groundbreaking in their success in bringing together a wide collection of political actors Islamist as well as secularist to discuss democracy in the Islamic world, the seminars, lectures and articles increased the level of democracy in the Muslim society, the support to the women activities, freedom and rights has increased, also to encourage them be able to exercise their economic and political rights. For example, to participate in politics, especially in the Golf Arab countries which are more 197 conservative, three Golf Arab countries showed improvement in it which are: Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar , till now more than 3000 trainees have benefited from the workshops, which turned trainees into trainers in their local settings, and the number is increases, also they opened a lot of dialogues between Muslims and Christians, which leads to improve the relation between them. For example, there conference under the title of “Catholics, Muslims begin to value how much they share across faiths” they wanted to show that if these religious traditions come together there will be a great, bright future for humanity, there is also efforts to promote understanding also have spawned cross cultural dialogue in settings that were not exclusively religious. During the last 10 years, professionals from both faith traditions have been involved in the Rumi Forum in Washington and the Rumi Foundation, a similar undertaking in Cleveland, both organizations have introduced programs to promote understanding, the two organizations take their name from 13th century Persian poet, Islamic jurist and theologian Jalal ad Din Muhammed Rumi, he believed poetry, music and dance were paths for reaching God Rumi, whom many consider a mystic, believed that all people can live in peace regardless of their faith and cultural backgrounds. The CSID activities were also educated for the American society (non Muslims), by explaining what Islam is and answering many questions about Islam. For example, is it reality that Muslim men are instructed to marry four women, also are they beating there women? The effect of clarifying what is the reality of Islam to American has real results; because many people convert there religion to Islam, the fastest growing Religion in America is Islam and now has become the second largest religion in the United States (in this case have to be mentioned also the role of other Islamic organizations on American societies), but the role of CSID becomes much difficult after 11 of September, because they needed huge efforts to prove that there is no relation between Islam and Terrorism and that September 11 was also an attack on Muslims and Arab Americans, too who have paid a high price for the actions, also that Muslims are like any other peoples who inhabit the USA can love the country or any other country where they settle, without hating others, it is a hard mission for all Islamic organizations in USA, but there efforts brought important results, specially in the currently American policy, the President Barack Hussein Obama in his speech on 21 of January,2009 said that“… we are a nation of Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus and non believers ” he also added “… to the Muslim world we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect…” we also cant ignore that his first visit as a president was to Turkey (Muslim country), and he attended there a reception of the United Nations alliance of civilizations, co – hosted by Turkey and Spain to bridge the gap between Western and Islamic countries, Obama’s administrative policy urged to push for democracy in the Muslim world, and there support is clear. For example, Hilary Clinton is one of the invited speakers to CSID 10 th annual conference, which is affirming the USA new supportive policy with Muslims, but if we will ask why Obama’s administrative adopted this new policy? President Obama declared during his visit to Turkey that he want a good relation with Muslim countries, because he needs there help to solve the current confrontations from Iraq to Afghanistan, so USA will be supportive to Islamic democratic organizations as CSID in USA, because they have deep relations with Muslim countries, which can be as an important effective link between USA and Muslims. CSID has a hard task, but under the current USA policy, there is a real hope for a better democratic Muslim society. Conclusions : the activities of these kinds of NGO’S can develop the process of stabilization of democracy in Islam, the most important event that proves the democracy and Islam can work together is, the prophet of the Islam Mohammed’s experience, in his time there were various kind of religions and beliefs existed in the city of Medina, people were living in tolerance and peace within that city, that peace and tolerance were based on an agreement, according to that agreement Mohammed was only chief executer of religion in Medina and all rules are executed by Mohammed so there was no misinterpretation in articles of the agreement, therefore, it shows us Islam and democracy can work together only if the execution is right, and that what CSID is trying to achieve, in the modern world we have really big problems: problems 198 of poverty, problems of health, problems of war, problems of anarchy, youth who are living dangerously, here is where religions can come together to find solutions for the problems , the combined populations of Christians and Muslims make up 55 percent of the world's population, which can be a great, bright future for humanity.
Suzana MAHD ([email protected])
Our Educational Projects
Master Program in Management of European Security
For the academic year of 2009 2010, the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations from the University of Oradea, launches a new master program in Management of European Security. The program is opened to all graduates interested in the new approaches of security within the international and European society and it comes as a need of specialization of security studies from a multi disciplinary approach that must consider the social, economic, political and security challenges and interactions that affect the present evolutions within all levels of the European system.
The initiative for this Master program is based on the acknowledgement that the security is not longer associated with the specific activities of special institutions (Army, Police and Intelligence). Daily life and the particular interdependences of the European system underline different types of security threats to whom the society must respond with adequate means. These threats ca be found in each institutional and organizational component of public and private structures and they are directly associated to the needs of continuously adaptation to the realities and challenges of the contemporary society.
An extended perspective of security aims several fundamental issues such as national security, trans national security, environmental security, communication and mediation, social security, economic security, energy security, management of non conventional threats, etc.
The main objective of the Master program in Management of European Security aims the training of our students, based on a rigorous methodology of teaching and research which combines both theoretical aspects with the practical dimension of security issues.
The Master program in Management of Security Studies has several specific objectives: ♦ to specialize the security studies as a professional competence in the management of security issues; ♦ to ensure a vocational training to follow a substantial level of knowledge and development of necessary skills for the understanding, analysis, synthesis and prediction of events and phenomena that affect the contemporary society; ♦ to develop the scientific research in the field of security and to generate and promote models of security management in all levels and dimensions of daily life which are exposed to security threats; ♦ to train our students and develop their analytical and management skills in order to contribute to the design and implementation of security policies; ♦ to open a dialogue with social partners and create a framework of debate within the civil society on issues related to the security threats
The program is organized for two years (four semesters) and the curricula is developed taking into consideration the diversity of challenges and opportunities that can occur from the security approaches of different interactions at international, national, local levels.
Contact: Dr. Dorin I. Dolghi ([email protected])
Master program in European Communication and Regional Development
The MA program in European Communication and Regional Development , organized by the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations through the Department of European Studies and International Relations is designed having in mind the important role of communication within the regional development at European level.
Its mision is to train specialists on regional development in order to aquire the necessary skills of understanding and communication within different cultures, to be able to organize and manage international teams, to strengthen their abilities to manage different types of relations with different actors within the European regional framework. The initiative is based on the relationship between regional identities and the communication ties among all the actors, both public and private, involved in different interactions at regiona/European level.
The program will start with the academic year 2009/2010 and is organised in four semesters. The teaching staff involved in the program is provided by the Department of European Studies and International Relations of the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations from the Oradea University. Other professors are associated from different departments from Oradea University, the National School of Political and Administrative Sciences, the Reims Champagne Ardenne Univeristy (France) and Aristotel Univeristy of Thessaloniki (Greece).
The main objectives of the MA program in European Communication and Regional Development are: ♦ to train specialists able to deal with the complexity of Euroregional issues within multicultural teams in different projects (political, administrative, economic, cultural, environment, etc.); ♦ to understand of the important role of intercultural dialogue in the management of European diversity and the importance of communication within an enlarged multicultural Europe; ♦ to underline the important dimension of negotiation and mediation within the particular processes and relationships of the social and economic contemporary environment; ♦ to develop management skills within an intercultural context; ♦ to understand the role of mass media tools in the management of cultural diversity; ♦ to train our students to integrate and aply their knowledge ♦ to promote academic cooperation through exchanges between the universities involved in the program ♦ to develop special competences of our master students (the creative use of research; a pragmatic approach of problem solving, the use of analitical skills in different context and situations; the use of communication, negotiation and mediation within a multi perpective approach; strengthening the project management skills, etc.)
The graduate profile is oriented on high efficiency of the student, able to participate, integrate and contribute within public administration (local, regional, European), private organizations, NGO’s, mass media. Also, opportunities for further research and PhD programmes will be encouraged within the framework provided by the Oradea University and our national and international partners.
Contact: Dr. LuminiŃa OPRONI ([email protected] )
About the authors
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Carlos E. Pacheco AMARAL , PhD, is a professor at the Department of History, Philosophy and Social Sciences within the Univeristy of Azores. He holds the position of the President of the Pedagogical Council and Director of European Studies and International Politics in the same university. His main interest is oriented on social and political philosophy and European studies. His teaching and research work is conducted within several international projects on isuues related to Europe and regional policies. D. Among his work we can notice Do Estado Soberano ao Estado das autonomias. Regionalismo, subsidiariedade e autonomia para uma nova ideia de Estado , Porto, Edições Afrontamento, 1998 (E mail: [email protected])
Thierry COME is a Professor in the University of Rheims Champagne Ardenne (Fr). He is member of the Council of this university and member of the board of the "Conseil National des Universités" for the science of management. He is the director of the master "Etudes Européennes et Internationales". He is member of the research team "Mouvements Internationaux et gouvernance" (EA 4300) in Rheims. His research interest is oriented on: public management and governance in Higher Education, mobility,identities and citizenship in Europe and management of sport. He is codirector of the serie "L'Europe des Universités", Bruylant Editor, Bruxelles. Its last publication is "L'engagement des étudiants"(codirection) Coll, Etats de Savoirs OVE. (E mail: thierry.come@univ reims.fr)
Nicolae DANDI is lecturer at „B.P.Hasdeu” State University of Cahul (Republic of Moldova), PhD candidate in Political Science. He is Director of Cahul Pro Europe Center, President of the Association for Cooperation and Democratic Communication „Dialog” of Cahul, Member of the Executive Bureau of the European Movement from Moldova and Councilor in the Cahul Municipal Council. (E mail: [email protected])
Dorin Ioan DOLGHI is a lecturer at Oradea University, Faculty of History, Geography and International relations. He has a PhD in International Relations and European Studies at “Babe Bolyai” University of Cluj Napoca with a thesis on European Commission influence on the integration process. He currently teaches European Governance, Conflict Analysis and Romanian Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in the 20 th Century. (E mail: [email protected])
Dacian DUNA is currently Lecturer with the Department of Contemporary History and International Relations, Babe Bolyai University of Cluj Napoca. He has a PhD in International Relations received in 2007 with a thesis on the “European security policy at the beginning of the 21st century”. He has also a BA in Political Science and a MA in the Management of International Relations. Dacian Duna has an important number of publications relevant to the field of International Relations, including a book and dozens of reserch papers, articles, and essays, published in Romania and abroad. His research interests include international and European security studies, IR theory, geopolitics, and conflict management. He is member of the Centre Altiero Spinelli for the Study of European Organization and of the Institute for International Studies, both academic and research facilities within the Babe Bolyai University. (E mail: [email protected])
Zoltán GÁL is a senior research fellow at the Center for Regional Studies, Transdanubian Research Institute in Pécs (Hungary) and associate professor at the University of Kaposvár, Faculty of Economics, Department of Regional Economics He has a PhD in Geography at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. His research work is oriented on financial geography, regional financial economics, financial and business services offshoring in CEE, banking history and historical geography,regional innovation, regional innovation policy, innovation management, innovation geography. He teaches Economic Geography of Globalization, 205 Economic Geography of European Union, Regional Economics and Inovation Management. (E mail: [email protected])
Zuzana IŠTVÁNFOYÁ, (1982) has worked at the Department of European Cultural Studies, Faculty of Humanities, Matej Bel University as a university teacher since 2008. She finished her M. A. studies in education of Slovak language and literature, and English language and literature in 2005. After that, she continued in PhD. studies and obtained the degree in 2008 with her thesis Consciousness of a Subject in Slovak Prose after 1989. Prose Writers of the 1960s in the Reality of the End of the 20th century and the Beginning of the 21st Century . In her work she deals with English Cultural Studies and Contemporary Slovak literature. Besides that she also co operates with non governmental organisations from Bratislava (Občan a demokracia, Aspekt) and with the Puppet theatre at the Crossroads in Banská Bystrica, and she is interested in anti discrimination and gender studies as well. (E mail: [email protected])
Sinem KOCAMAZ, is gratuated from Ege University, Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Department of International Relations, in 2002. She received her MA degree on “Political and Economic Roles of Multinational Corporations as an Actor in International Relations” at the same university. She is continuing her PhD in European Union Studies at Dokuz Eyul University and has the position of research assistant at Ege University. ([email protected])
Marius LAZĂR, is currently a PhD candidate in International Relations at the „Babe Bolyai” University of Cluj Napoca and PhD student at the Institut Français de Géopolitique in Paris. In the past years he taught courses on Islamic, Judaic and Otoman history and civilization at the „Avram Iancu” University of Cluj Napoca and at the University of Alba Iulia. He published several papers and articles regarding the political and cultural issues of Islamic space and he is conducting an extensive research on the shiite geopolitics in the modern Irak. (E mail: [email protected])
Vasile NAZARE is a professor within the Department of Human and Behavioural Sciences at the Military Marine Faculty of the “Mircea cel Bătrân” Naval Academy of ConstanŃa (Romania). His teaching and research work is dedicated to philosophy, politology, geopolitics and communication. He published more than 70 articles and studies and he is the author of eleven books.
Irina POP is a young researcher, PhD in International Relations and European Studies with a thesis on Oil and Geopolitics in Central Asia: Diachronic Analysis of the American and European Positions – Post Cold War Period (“Babe Bolyai” University of Cluj Napoca, December 2008). She had research stages in Krakow and Brussels (2007), and published articles at „Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy Sibiu and in ‚Geopolitica’ (Top Form, Bucharest). Major fields of interest are: Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States – South Caucasus Caspian Sea Central Asia, foreign policies and energy security strategies of the great powers (Russia, China, India, Japan, the United States of America and the European Union), energy supply – pipelines, projects and corporations. (E mail: [email protected])
Gilles ROUET is a Professor at University of Rheims Champagne Ardenne (Fr) and at University of Banska Bystrica (Sk) where he is scientific garant of the master programme"European Cultural Studies". He is member of the research team "Mouvements Internationaux et gouvernance" (EA 4300) in Rheims. His fields of research are: public management and governance in Higher Education, identities and citizenship in Europe. He is 206 member of editorial committee of the serie "Voisinage Européen" and codirector of the serie "L'Europe des Universités", Bruylant Editor, Bruxelles. Last publications : "Elargissement et Politique Européenne de Voisinage" (codirection), "Les Journalistes et l'Europe" (direction), Bruylant Editor, Bruxelles, 2008 and 2009 and "Du Printemps de Prague à la chute du Mur de Berlin: photographies et politiques", (codirection), Klincksieck Editor, Paris, 2009. (E mail : [email protected])
Istvan SŐLI ZAKAR is a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, is a professor at the Department of Social Assistance and Regional Development at the University of Debrecen. As a member of Hungarian Geographical Society, his research work is oriented on regional spatial planning, political geography, the socio economic aspects of Northern and Eastern Hugary, the geopolitics of frontiers and transfrontier cooperation and European regional policies. He is co director of the Institute of Euroregional Studies of the University of Oradea and a forefather of cross border cooperation between Hungary and Romania. (E mail: [email protected])
Fahrettin SUMER , PhD, following his undergraduate study in International Relations at Gazi University, Ankara, Turkey, earned his M.A. degree in Political Science from Rutgers University in New Jersey. During his doctoral training in the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina, he earned a second M.A. degree in Economics from the same university. Since his completion of his Ph.D. in 2003, he has taught international relations, comparative politics, European Union and economics classes in South Carolina and Virginia. He currently teaches international studies courses at Virginia Commonwealth University. His research interests center around the causes/implications of globalization, international political economy, international conflict, and international integration, including the European Union. (E mail: [email protected])
Eurolimes
Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies “Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence
Has published
Vol. 1/2006 Europe and its Borders: Historical Perspective Vol. 2/2006 From Smaller to Greater Europe: Border Identitary Testimonies Vol. 3/2007 Media, Intercultural Dialogue and the New Frontiers of Europe Vol. 4/2007 Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers Vol. 5/2008 Religious frontiers of Europe Vol. 6/2008 The Intercultural Dialogue and the European Frontiers Vol. 7/2009 Europe and the Neighbourhood
Will publish
Vol. 8/2009 Europe and its Economic Frontiers Vol. 9/2010 The Cultural Frontiers of Europe Vol. 10/2010 The Geopolitics of European Frontiers