Iranian Military Capability Using Open-Source Non-Classified Information

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Iranian Military Capability Using Open-Source Non-Classified Information 23mm AAA sites around the reactor complex perimitar with the northern side disecting the overall site. There are four Skyguard 35mm AAA systems each with two Oerlikon GDF 35mm cannons and multiple single 35mm and 23mm sites forming aIranian haphazard outer ring. Military Capability 2011 4. Naval Forces Open Source Intelligence Project Independent and objective analysis of current Iranian military capability using open-source non-classified information. Assessments and views expressed represent those of the authors and are not affiliated with any special interest group or political agenda. Version 1.0 Jan 2011 2 About the Project The Open Source Intelligence Project 2011 is an attempt to draw together the most salient bits of currently available Open Source material to piece together a broad and largely complete analysis of Iranian military capability. Open Source refers to unclassified, public sources. The co-authors and reviewers come from a wide range of backgrounds, including in some cases extensive military intelligence experiences and/or relevant specialist knowledge. However, their primary connection is an appreciation and active participation in the Open Source intelligence scene. All those involved have contributed on an amateur/civilian basis. Some have requested to remain anonymous, for various reasons, which we must respect. The project was started in April 2010 and took months of writing, research, drafts and revisions to make it into the form you are reading. We have attempted to provide a single text that will be easy to navigate and digest. However, it is the work of multiple people and this may be apparent in different writing styles and minor formatting differences. We apologize for this, but believe it is inevitable in this type of undertaking. We hope that you find the document interesting and informative – we are hopeful that there is some information and analysis which although open source in nature, is fresh and stimulating to even a highly informed reader. Co-Authors (This Section, no order) · ‘TLAM Strike’ (pseudonym) · Anonymous (1) Main Reviewer/Contributor (This Section) · Anonymous (2) · Anonymous (3) Additional Reviewing Pool (No order) · Sean O’Connor · Anonymous (4) · Galan Wright 3 4. Naval Forces 4.1 Overview History: Iran's navy has though out its history been considered the most minor of its military branches, although it has existed since 500 BC. During the Achaemenid Empire (650-330 BC), the Iranian Navy was very powerful. Its operation to invade Greece under Xerxes easily ranks with the Spanish Armada or Operation Overlord (the “D-Day” invasion) in terms of size, scope and preparation. Its defeat at Salamis by the Athenian navy under Themistocles is one of the critical moments in the Current Iranian Navy formation of western culture, although most only know of this battle is from images of storm tossed Jack ships in the movie “300” about the battle of Thermopylae. The modern Iranian Navy has been plagued by a history of poor organization and limited mission scope until the mid 20th century. Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi the Iranian Navy began a modernization campaign drawing equipment from the western powers that resulted in the creation of the top navy in the Region. In 1970 Iran acquired the WWII vintage British warship HMS Sluys a modified Battle class destroyer, this ship was recommissioned as the Artemiz. Despite her age this vessel was the most powerful ship operated by any nation in the region, she joined the four PF-103 class vessels already operated by Iran since the early 1960s. The next year the first Saam class Frigate (latter renamed Alvand class) joined the Iranian Navy, these were the first high quality vessels to be operated by the Iranians. As built they carried five Italian Sea Killer Anti-Shipping Missiles (ASMs), a British Seacat Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system and a Squid Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) mortar. As the standards of the time went, these were all advanced weapons. The Saams could easily dominate the Gulf or Sea of Oman and operate well in to the Indian Ocean with its Refueling At Sea capability. During this time, the United States also begin providing naval weapons to Iran. Two 1950's vintage Tang class submarine were sold to Iran- USS Trout and USS Wahoo, two more were to follow including USS Tang. Crews for the IINS Kousseh and IINS Nahang, as they were to be named, were trained at the US Navy Submarine School at New London, Connecticut. While at the end of their useful lives, these vessels t would still have provided substantial operational training experience for the Iranians. These submarines never left the U.S. Their crews who were led by royalists, abandoned them when the Shah fell. The U.S. also provided even older Gearing and Allen M. Sumner class destroyers at this time and several Vietnam-era inshore patrol boats. By the late 1970's, the Iranians received a large group of La Combattante-class missile boats armed with the U.S. Harpoon anti-ship missile. Entrusting such a weapon to Iran clearly showed how much the US valued Iran at this time. Four modified Spruance-class destroyers were laid down in U.S. shipyards for Iran, but never delivered. These vessels, which were later called the Kidd-class were to be fitted with the latest weapons systems and were optimized for operations in the Gulf. These were to serve as escorts for a light aircraft carrier equipped with U.S.-manufactured AV-8B Harrier VTOL attack aircraft. German Type 209 submarines were also to be purchased. The only part of this ocean-going strike force that actually made it into Iranian service was the British built replenishment vessel Kharg. When the Shah fell and the current Islamic Republic was created, western support for Iran decreased . The majority of warship transfers were halted; those that were actually transferred were either unarmed auxiliaries or patrol boats with 4 missile systems removed. Iran’s new leaders distrusted the existing military leadership. Arrests and executions of Iranian naval officers suspected of harboring loyalties to the Shah resulted in massive disruptions to the navy's command structure. Moreover, the creation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN, more formally known as the Navy of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution took over part of the naval mission of the Iranian navy, creating a schism in Iran’s naval operational efforts. With the IRGCN’s loyalties perceived as being higher than the regular navy, the Iranian government has continued to favor it over the navy in funding and new equipment. Sensing weakness in Iran, neighboring Iraq invaded, starting an eight- year war that had dramatic consequences for the world. From the start, the Iranian navy was engaged in sporadic fighting, mostly shelling Iraqi forces as they advanced. On November 28, 1980 Iran launched Operation Morvarid. Iranian ships (two missile boats and six amphibious transport vessels) attacked two Iraqi oil rigs that were being used as observation posts, destroying them. These ships went on to blockade Iraqi Current Iranian Naval Ensign. It is the same as their ports. The Iraqi navy responded by dispatching five Osa missile boats and four P-4 national flag torpedo boats. In the resulting skirmish, one Iranian missile boat was sunk, while two Iraqi Osas were sunk and two MiG-23s shot down by missile and gun fire. Iranian air force jets arrived on-scene and destroyed the remaining Iraqi vessels. In the air, the battle was just as one sided, one Iranian Phantom being damaged and another downed, while one helicopter, one MiG-21 and four MiG-23s being downed by F-4 and F-14s. Eighty percent of the Iraqi navy was lost on that day, November 28th, which as a result, is celebrated as Navy Day in Iran. The next phase of the Iran-Iraq war forced the west to directly intervene in the region. In an attempt to disrupt the flow of currency to Iraq, Iranian air and sea forces began to conduct attacks on merchant ships departing Iraq and Kuwait. This operation became known in the west as “The Tanker War” and by the end in 1987, 546 ships had been damaged or sunk and over 320 sailors killed missing or wounded. Iranian forces utilized a variety of methods against the merchant vessels in the region. Naval weapons used during this time ranged from high-tech anti-ship missiles to low-tech mines. Mines proved to be the most effective of all: the U.S. forces in the Gulf which had begun escorting convoys from Kuwait as part of Operation Ernest Will had few countermeasures. U.S. forces spotted the Japanese-built landing ship Iran Ajr was laying mines in the Gulf; U.S. helicopters strafed the ship causing the crew to abandon her. U.S. Naval Special Warfare (SEALs) forces boarded her the next day securing evidence of the mining operation, capturing her crew and then scuttling the ship. Following several clashes between U.S. forces and Iranian Boghammars and Boston Whalers the conflict reached a climax, when USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a mine in the Gulf. U.S. forces retaliated with Operation Praying Mantis. The first target were the two Iranian oil platforms Saan and Siri, which were both destroyed. The Iranian Navy began dispatching ships from Bandar Abbas, but these ships left one at a time, leaving themselves vunerable to being easily intercepted and picked off by U.S. forces. First the missile boat Joshan exchanged fire with a U.S. Task Force and was sunk. Second, the frigate Sahan was sunk after it fired on a U.S.
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