Southern Historical Association

Property Rights in Slavery and the Coming of the Civil War Author(s): James L. Huston Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 65, No. 2 (May, 1999), pp. 249-286 Published by: Southern Historical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2587364 . Accessed: 05/10/2012 06:52

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Southern Historical Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Southern History.

http://www.jstor.org PropertyRights in Slaveryand the Coming of the Civil War

By JAMESL. HUSTON

CERTAIN HISTORICAL QUESTIONS NEVER SEEM TO BE SATISFACTORILY AN- swered.Such is the case withinquiries regarding the originsof the AmericanCivil War,meaning specifically what forces tore the nation apart-as opposedto whatparticular circumstances led to armedcon- flict.One set of interpretationsfocuses on ideologicalforces that pro- duced secession: antislaveryconvictions, a northernfree labor ideology,and a southernadherence to neoclassicalrepublicanism.' Anotherset deals withpolitical factors: a manipulablefederal political system,ambitious and blunderingpoliticians, northern paranoia con- cerningthe "slave power,"southern fear of a "freesoil conspiracy," northernlust for national consolidation, and-the leadingcontender- failureof thesecond party system to handleimmigration and religious diversity,which enabled a new sectionaldivision of partiesto arise.2

l Emphasison antislaveryconvictions can be locatedin David M. Potter,The Impending Crisis,1848-1861, edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher(New York, 1976), 328-55; and RichardJ. Carwardine,Evangelicals and Politicsin AntebellumAmerica (New Haven, 1993), 323. The themeof freelabor and southernrepublicanism is elaboratedby Eric Foner,Free Soil, Free Labor,Free Men: TheIdeology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (2d ed.; New York and Oxford,1995), Chap. 1. On republicanismsee Lacy K. FordJr., Origins of Southern Radi- calism:The Upcountry, 1800-1860 (New York,1988), 121-25, 138, 351-54, and 372; KennethS. Greenberg,Masters and Statesmen:The PoliticalCulture of American Slavery (Baltimore,1985), ix-x, 3-14, and 125-35; andMichael A. Morrison,Slavery and theAmerican West:The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and theComing of the Civil War (Chapel Hill, 1997),7-8. Anotherstrain of ideologicalexplanation involves the rise of southernnationalism, usually seen as an ideologycreated to defendslavery; John McCardell, The Idea of a SouthernNation: SouthernNationalists and SouthernNationalism, 1830-1860 (New York,1979), 3-4 and336-37; and Drew GilpinFaust, The Creationof ConfederateNationalism: Ideology and Identityin the Civil WarSouth (Baton Rouge, 1988), 10 and 59-61. I am indebtedto VernonVolpe, thelate Bill Cecil-Fronsman,Peter Knupfer, James Chase, and GeorgeMcJimsey for their comments on papersthat I have givenrelating to thistopic at variousmeetings of theMid-America Conference on History. 2 Lee Benson,Toward the Scientific Study of History: Selected Essays (Philadelphia,1972), 307-26; JohnH. Aldrich,Why Parties? The Originand Transformationof PoliticalParties in America(Chicago, 1995), Chap. 5; WilliamE. Gienapp,"The RepublicanParty and theSlave Power,"in RobertH. Abzug and StephenE. Maizlish,eds., New Perspectiveson Race and

MR. HUSTONis a professorof historyat OklahomaState University.

THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY VolumeLXV, No. 2, May 1999 250 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY

The progressivehistorians fashioned the most enduring economic ex- planationfor the Civil War: It was caused by the strugglebetween southernplantation masters and northernindustrialists for control of thefederal government.3 A special form of this argument holds that the slaveholdingclass was prebourgeoisand incapableof amicablerela- tionswith a dynamicnorthern bourgeois class.4 Economic historians have addedto thisexplanation the southern interest in preservingcapi- tal gainsobtained from slaveholding and the fear of loss ofproperty in slaves-argumentsinsufficiently heeded by historians.5 The developmentof the new social historyin the mid-twentieth centuryhas greatlyexpanded the interpretations about the war's ori- gins.Much of whatsocial historianswrite about the Civil Warderives directlyor indirectlyfrom modernization theory. The Northwas de- velopingindustrially and commercially,and the South remained mired in agrarianways, producing a tensionthat somehow touched off the conflict.6From that base have sprunga numberof theoriesemploying some variantof class analysis.7Social historianshave promotedas causativeagents the ideas of the South as an "honor"society that reactedviolently to northerncriticisms, the power of therace question in thwartingpeaceful solutions, the differentethnic makeup of the

Slaveryin America:Essays in Honorof Kenneth M. Stampp(Lexington, 1986), 51-78; J.Mills ThorntonIII, Politicsand Powerin a Slave Society:, 1800-1860 (BatonRouge, 1978), 204-27; andWilliam B. Hesseltine,Sections and Politics:Selected Essays, edited by Richard N. Current(Madison, 1968), 101-13. The discussionof thecollapse of thesecond party system by MichaelF. Holt is generallyconsidered to be theprime explanation for the war. See Holt,The PoliticalCrisis of the1850s (New York,1978). 3 CharlesA. Beardand MaryR. Beard,The Rise ofAmerican Civilization (New York,1927), II, 3-10, 28-31, 50-5 1, and99-115; andLouis M. Hacker,The Triumph of American Capitalism: TheDevelopment of Forces in American History to theEnd ofthe Nineteenth Century (New York, 1940), 322-24 and 339-42. 4 EugeneD. Genovese,The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of theSlave South(New York, 1965), 3-10 and 243-74; and Genovese,The Worldthe Slave- holdersMade: Two Essays in Interpretation(New York,1969), 95-102 and 118-31. 5 Gavin Wright,The Political Economyof the CottonSouth: Households,Markets, and Wealthin theNineteenth Century (New York, 1978), 129-30, and 140-57; GeraldGunderson, "The Originof the AmericanCivil War," Journalof EconomicHistory, XXXIV (December 1974), 915-950; and RogerL. Ransom,Conflict and Compromise:The PoliticalEconomy of Slavery,Emancipation, and theAmerican Civil War (Cambridge, Eng., 1989), 10-16,41-72, and 101-2. It is fairto statethat these authors have heavilyinfluenced my ideas on thesubject and thatthis article is builtupon their powerful conclusions, although I am notsure that any would findthe structure I create worthy of theirfoundations. 6 RichardD. Brown,Modernization: The Transformation ofAmerican Life, 1600-1865 (New York, 1976), 3-22 and 159-76. For a directapplication, see JamesM. McPherson,Ordeal by Fire: The Civil Warand Reconstruction(2d ed.; New York,1992), 5-25. 7 BruceLevine, Half Slave and HalfFree: TheRoots of CivilWar (New York,1992), Chaps. 2, 3, 5; MichaelP. Johnson,Toward a PatriarchalRepublic: The Secessionof (Baton Rouge, 1977), xviii-xxi;John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politicsin theAntebellum Republic.Vol. I: Commerceand Compromise,1820-1850 (Cambridge,Eng., 1995), ix-x, 149, and 157-66. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 251 sections(the "Celtic Fringe" theory), and a genderedexplanation that emphasizessouthern male protectionof hearthand home.8 Economicexplanations of the war have been rare over the past three decadesas historianshave mostoften dealt with the war's originsby emphasizingideological, social, or culturalforces.9 Certainly histori- ans have laid barethe economic differences of thesections, and many have pointedespecially to therole of propertyrights involved in the struggle.10Nonetheless, these observations have notbeen molded into a coherenteconomic analysis of how theproperty rights dilemma of the UnitedStates contributedto the ruptureof the Union between December1860 and April1861. This articleproposes an economicexplanation for the origins of the Civil War-an explanationbased on theexistence of a dual systemof propertyrights. The thesisis thatsouthern secession grew out of the irreconcilabilityoftwo regimes of property rights: one in theSouth that recognizedproperty in humansand one in theNorth that did not.As longas theUnited States was fragmentedinto small market areas these tworegimes did notconflict; but the transportation revolution stitched marketareas together,and no longercould theeffects of slaverybe confinedto the South.Northerners recognized that, by means of a nationalmarket, the effectsof the southernlabor systemcould be transmittedto theNorth, depress the wages of its freelaborers, and

8 BertramWyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behaviorin theOld South(New York, 1982), x-xii; JamesA. Rawley,Race and Politics: "BleedingKansas" and theComing of the Civil War (Philadelphia,1969), vii-x and 256-71; and StevenA. Channing,Crisis of Fear: Secessionin SouthCarolina (New York,1970), 258-69 and 289-93. For a briefsynopsis of the CelticFringe theory, see GradyMcWhiney and PerryD. Jamieson,Attack and Die: Civil War MilitaryTactics and theSouthern Heritage (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1982), 170-78. Forinterpretations using the perspectiveof gender,see StephanieMcCurry, Masters of Small Worlds:Yeoman Households,Gender Relations, and thePolitical Culture of theAntebellum South Carolina Low Country(New York,1995), viii, 208-21, and279-85; LeeAnnWhites, The Civil WarAs a Crisis in Gender:Augusta, Georgia, 1860-1890 (Athens,Ga., 1995), 17-18; and GlennaMatthews, "'LittleWomen' Who HelpedMake ThisGreat War," in GaborS. Boritt,ed., Whythe Civil War Came (New York,1996), 31-49. 9 For example,see theanthologies of KennethM. Stampp,ed., The Causes ofthe Civil War (rev.ed.; New York,1991); and Boritt,ed., Whythe Civil WarCame. 10 For example,Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics,205-6; Channing,Crisis of Fear,253; WilliamC. Davis, TheCause Lost:Myths and Realitiesof the Confederacy (Lawrence, Kans., 1996), 181-82; OlivierFrayss6, Lincoln, Land, and Labor, 1809-60, editedby Sylvia Neely (Urbana,1994), 123 and 164-66; WilliamG. Shade,Democratizing the Old Dominion: Virginiaand theSecond Party System, 1824-1861 (Charlottesville, 1996), 198 and208; Randolph B. Campbell,An Empire for Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in , 1821-1865 (Baton Rouge, 1989),97-98, 115,and 151; JamesOakes, The Ruling Race: A Historyof American Slaveholders (New York,1982), 26, 109,and 232-41; BarbaraJeanne Fields, Slavery on theMiddle Ground: Marylandduring the Nineteenth Century (New Haven, 1985), 64; McCurry,Masters of Small Worlds;Alison G. Freehling,Drift Toward Dissolution: The VirginiaSlavery Debate of 1831- 1832 (BatonRouge, 1982), 51, 52-55, 59, 94, 105, 137,and 141; and JamesOakes, Slavery and Freedom:An Interpretationof theOld South(New York,1990), 43-45, 72, and 115. 252 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY therebyupset its economy.Northerners therefore felt compelled to constrictthe effects of slavery.By thesame token,southerners, who had placedvast amounts of wealthin slaves,opposed any restrictions upontheir property rights. The firstattempt of northernersto restrict slaverywas to denyits expansion into the territories. Southerners per- ceived thatas an attackon theirproperty rights and promptlyde- mandednorthern recognition of southernrights regarding slavery- therebyexpanding property rights in slaves fromthe local to the nationalarena. Northerners perceived this demand as ideologicalag- gression,and it was thebasis of theirfears of thenationalization of slavery.Southerners were not going to allow any attackupon the propertyrights that gave themwealth and income;northerners could notallow southernersto winthe battle over property rights because it wouldcause a fundamentalrecasting of northernsociety. Viewingthe sectional conflict as a struggleover control of property rightsclarifies much that is obscureabout the war's origins.First, the dynamicof interactionbetween northern and southernadvocates is clearlyvisible. Moreover, the role of propertyrights in the struggle explainswhy both northernersand southernersbelieved they were actingdefensively in responseto theother section's aggressive behav- ior."1Second, the issue of slavery'sexpansion into the territories be- comesweightier when property is factoredinto the analysis. Third, a focuson propertyrights restores to thecontroversy the material inter- eststhat were obviously at stake.And, fourth, from this angle of vision, theuncompromisability of the situation is easilygrasped: There is no knownmechanism by whicha market(or even a nonmarket)society can reviseits definitionsof propertywithout eliciting a violentreac- tion.12

l l Republicanismcan be seen as offeringan explanationwhy both sides simultaneouslysaw each otheras theaggressor; e.g., Morrison,Slavery and theAmerican West. However, I have alwayshad troubleaccepting the differentversions of republicanismas beingso potentas to promotewildly opposing worldviews that defied common comprehension. 12 As thisessay will be an economicexplanation (actually, an explanationbased on political economy)of theorigin of theCivil War,its differencesfrom existing economic interpretations shouldbe madeexplicit. First, the subject of propertyrights and how it influencedthe sectional controversyhas beenvirtually untouched, residing only in scatteredcomments rather than fleshed out as a completeexplanation. Nearly all economictreatments pit the economicinterests of plantersagainst those of northernindustrialists for political control of Congressto obtaintheir desiredset of federal policies. This is thebasis of the works by Beard and Beard, Rise ofAmerican Civilization,I, 636-39, and II, 51-53; RichardFranklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of CentralState Authority in America,1859-1877 (New York, 1990), 10-15 and 57-67; and Genovese,Political Economy of Slavery, 4-8. A relatedinterpretation, though muddled, is given byBarrington Moore Jr., Social Originsof Dictatorship and Democracy:Lord and Peasantin the Makingof the Modem World(Boston, 1966), 136 and 141 (themuddling is on pp. 114-15, 123, and 134). This articleholds that the battle was forcontrol over the power to defineproperty, not to implementpolicies, and theclash of interestswas notbetween sectional elites but between the PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 253

Propertyrights became a crucialelement in the sectionalcontro- versybecause slavery was suchan imposingdemographic presence in southernsociety. The slaveholdingstates in 1859 had a total of 12,240,300people; 65.7 percentof thesewere white, 2.0 percentwere freeblacks, and 32.3 percent-some3,950,511 or about4 million- wereslaves. In thecotton states, the extent of slaveholdingrose dra- matically;South Carolinawas 57.2 percentslave, Mississippi55.2 percent,Alabama 45.1 percent, 43.9 percent,Georgia 43.7 percent,and Louisiana46.9 percent.13The institutionmay have been peculiar,but it was neitherinvisible nor diminutive. Moreimportant was thewealth that slavery represented, for slavery was a laborsystem in whichslave mastersowned the slaves as prop- erty,and theproperty had an evaluation.Southern spokesmen had no difficultyin remindingaudiences of the wealthrepresented by the institution:"Again," said WilliamLowndes Yancey in 1860,"Look at thevalue of thatproperty. These slaves are worth,according to Vir- giniaprices $2800,000,000-an amounteasy to pronounce,but how difficultto conceiveof to one whoknows anything about the power of multiplicationof numbers."14 Yancey'sfigure is notfar removed from plantersand the northernlower and middleclasses. Moreover,most of thesestudies find the "aggression"in theconfrontation between North and Southin thenew industrialcapitalist class; viewingthe discordfrom the vantageof propertyrights finds the Southimpinging upon the economicsystem of theNorth. The recentworks of Wright,Political Economy of the Cotton South,Gunderson, "Origin of theAmerican Civil War,"and Ransom,Conflict and Compromise, makeclear the economic interest of southernersin slavery'swealth and potential capital gains, but theycannot explain why northerners feared slavery in thefirst place. RobertFogel does so only byrelying on antislaverymoralism; Without Consent or Contract:The Rise and Fall ofAmerican Slavery(New York, 1989), 202-33 and 269, while Ransomrelies on ideologyand political processes,Conflict and Compromise,138-68. Eric Foner has delineatedthe fears northerners had forfree society by employingthe free labor ideology, and he elaboratesnorthern apprehension overeconomic confrontations between slave and freelabor, an observationthat is vitalto this essay. But his interpretationindeed sees the conflictbetween slave laborand freelabor as an ideologicalcontest for the future.Foner, "Politics, Ideology, and the Originsof theAmerican Civil War,"in GeorgeM. Fredrickson,ed., A NationDivided: Problems and Issues of theCivil Warand Reconstruction(Minneapolis, 1975), 15-34. My renditionis notideological but based on materialinterests-there is an actualconflict of material interests at stake,not merely a conflict of values.Finally, a numberof scholarssuch as McPhersonin OrdealBy Fire, Chaps. 1-3, posit someeconomic antagonism in theform of the dynamic market capitalism of theNorth versus the lackadaisicalagrarianism of theSouth. This view is rathercosmic and lacks specificsabout the mechanismsthat invoked conflict, and usuallyone is leftwith the remnants of an ideological explanation.Offered here is theinterpretation that agrarianism and industrializationwere actually irrelevantto theorigins of thewar, as neitherprocess engendered any actual material conflict- therewas no competitionbetween them for resources, markets, technology, or capital;they only mildlyclashed over inconsequential federal policies. Rather, the conflict depends on a collision of differentproperty rights regimes, and thatcircumstance requires only one condition:that the propertyrights regimes begin to mergeinto one marketarea withinone polity. 13 Figurescomputed from Joseph C. G. Kennedy,Preliminary Report on theEighth Census. 1860 (Washington,D.C., 1862), 131. 14 Speech of WilliamL. Yancey in LouisvilleDaily Courier,October 24, 1860. For other instancesof southernersrelating the dollar value of slaves,see remarksof John C. Calhounin the 254 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERN HISTORY

TABLE 1

WEALTH ESTIMATES OF THE U.S. IN 1860 BY ECONOMIC CATEGORY Estimated$ Value Category (1860 dollars) Slaves $3,000,000,000 Farms 6,638,414,221 Farm Implements 246,125,064 Investmentin Manufacturing 1,050,000,000 Investmentin Railroads 1,166,422,729 Bank Capital 227,469,077 Home Productions 27,484,144 Livestock 1,098,862,355 Total of above categories $13,452,000,000 Total Assessed Real Estate and Personal Propertyby Census $16,159,616,068 Unaccounted-forWealth $2,707,616,000 (rounded) Source: JosephC. G. Kennedy,Preliminary Report on theEighth Census, 1860 (Washington, D.C., 1862), 190, 192, 193, 195, 196,209, 230-31. the one that economists have decided upon, $3 billion.15 Relative to otherendeavors in the economy,the investment in slaves was massive. (See table; unaccounted-forwealth probably reflects urban residences, investmentsin canals, river and oceanic transportationdevices and supply facilities,and various sundryitems of personal wealth.) The comparisonof wealthin slaves to wealth (or investment)in otherareas of the economy is shocking.The table shows thatslaveholding com- prised far more national wealth than railroads and manufacturingen- terprisescombined.16

Senate,January 6, 1838,in RobertL. Meriwetheret al., eds.,The Papers ofJohn C. Calhoun(23 vols. to date;Columbia, S.C., 1959- ), XIV, 66; J.D. B. De Bow, "The Cause of theSouth," De Bow's Review,IX (July1850), contained in Paul F. Paskoffand Daniel J. Wilson, eds., The Cause of theSouth: Selections from De Bow's Review,1846-1867 (BatonRouge and London,1982), 185; Message of GovernorPettus in VicksburgWeekly Whig, November 23, 1859; and J.L. M. Curry,Civil History of theGovernment of theConfederate States with Some Personal Reminis- cences (Richmond,1901), 16. 15 RogerL. Ransomand RichardSutch, One Kindof Freedom: The EconmicConsequences ofEmancipation (Cambridge, Eng., 1977),52-53; Susan PreviantLee and PeterPassell, A New EconomicView of American History (New York,1979), 215; Gunderson,"Origin of theAmeri- can Civil War,"917; Ransom,Conflict and Compromise,70n52. Clement Eaton, not an econo- mist,suggested a possiblevalue of slaves in 1860 of $4 billion.See Eaton,The Freedom-of- ThoughtStruggle in theOld South(rev. ed.; New York,1964), 36. 16 And thetotals for manufacturing include blacksmiths, wheelwrights, carpenters, millers, andcoopers, among others, who had no connectionto therise of the factory system but had much in commonwith eighteenth-century methods of conductingbusiness. See commentsof Mc- Pherson,Ordeal By Fire, 34; Lee Soltow,Men and Wealthin theUnited States, 1850-1870 (New Haven,Conn., 1975), 13-41, 66-67, and 100-101; GavinWright, "'Economic Democracy' and the Concentrationof AgriculturalWealth in the CottonSouth," Agricultural History, XLIV (January1970), 72-85; and Fogel, WithoutConsent or Contract,82-88. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 255

The vast amountof wealthin Africansexplains why slaveholders wereinterested in thepreservation of slaveryand by itselfyields an obviouseconomic motive for the defense of the peculiar institution, but theoverall impact of slaveryon southernlife must be delineatedbe- cause slaverystitched most of the Southtogether. It did so because slaverywas productivewealth: From it floweda streamof income. Wealth(such as preciousmetals and jewels) thatdoes not produce incomemay generate class conflictsbecause wealth holders command societywithout contributing to thegeneral welfare. Income stitches a societytogether and generatessocial inertia,a conservatismin the populationat large.With a reliableincome stream, even if it is paltry in its flowto numerousindividuals, life at leastbecomes predictable. This is how modernwealth, even thoughunevenly distributed, pro- duces social stability.As long as thewealth yields an incomestream thatincludes the general population, a societybecomes less willingto attemptinstitutional upheaval for fear of disruptingthat income stream.17And in the two decades beforethe Civil War, southerners knewtheir land was prosperous,from the proclamations of suchwrit- ers as David Christywho declared"Cotton is King" to theeditor of Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Thomas Prentice Kettell, to fire- breathingradical John A. Quitman,who as governorof toldthe legislature in his 1850 annualmessage that slavery was the interestupon which "are founded the prosperity, the happiness, and the veryexistence of thepeople of fourteenStates of thisUnion." 18 Income fromslavery aided in financingindustry, transportation, government,and variousurban and legal services.As long as cotton was king,it produceda percapita income comparable to thenational averageand a growthrate thataugured a rosy future.Southerners understoodthat slavery caused the economic prosperity of their region, and thatknowledge created an economicbond amongall classes of whites.Other means of wealth creation were theoretically possible, but practiceand customled southernersto value slaveholdingas thebest meansto prosperitybecause they understood its operation.19

17 Admittedly,this is hypothesison mypart. It is forthis reason, I believe,that revolutions mostoften occur under conditions of waror extraordinarilysustained high unemployment. Wars disruptthe normal income stream of a societyso completelythat it induces panic-stricken groups to seek a new meansto obtainincome. 18 David Christy,Cotton is King: or, Slaveryin theLight of PoliticalEconomy (3d ed.), in E. N. Elliott,ed., Cottonis King,and Pro-slaveryArguments ... (Augusta,Ga., 1860), 19-267; ThomasPrentice Kettell, Southern Wealth and NorthernProfits (New York, 1860); Quitman messagein JacksonMississippian, November [22], 1850; and RobertRoyal Russel,Economic Aspectsof SouthernSectionalism, 1840-1861 (Urbana,Ill., 1923), 11. 19 RobertWilliam Fogel andStanley L. Engerman,Time on theCross (2 vols.;Boston, 1974), I, table4, p. 248; Fogel, WithoutConsent or Contract,table 1, p. 85 and table2, p. 88. See also 256 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERN HISTORY

The income streamfrom the wealthin slaveryalso promoteda distinctivesocial value: the virtueof freewhite labor. For decades historianshave been entrancedwith the proslaveryargument, espe- ciallyits patriarchal tone; but southerners insisted that patriarchy was onlyfor slaves-whites lived in freedomand relative political equality. Those conditionsfor whites led to propertyaccumulation via industri- ousness,thrift, intelligence, and self-discipline.A full-blownsocial mobilityethic pervaded the whiteSouth. Many southernpublicists arguedthat social mobilitywas a factof life,that no "aristocracy" existed,and that wealthy southerners had earned their positions "by the sweat of theirbrow[s]," a phraseused incessantlyby northernfree laboradvocates.20 Nor did southernersfail to glorifylabor in almost thesame terms as did northerners.In 1854 NorthCarolinian Kenneth Rayneraddressed an agriculturalsociety and said thatin thisnew age "laboris the sourceof all wealthand prosperity,the meansof indi- vidualcomfort and luxury";the purpose of agriculturalsocieties was "to enlargethe field of operationfor labor to secure to labor the rewardsof its toil, to stimulateit to still greaterexertions . . . [and] it is evidentthat the[ir] effect must be to dignify,honor and elevate labor."21 Northernersdid not recognize the free labor argument of southerners becausea definitionalchasm separated the effects of the two economic

Ransom,Conflict and Compromise,figure 3.2, p. 49. Slaveryenabled taxation on nonslavehold- ers to be nearlynonexistent. See J.Mills ThorntonHII, "Fiscal Policy and theFailure of Radical Reconstructionin the Lower South,"in J. MorganKousser and JamesM. McPherson,eds., Region,Race, and Reconstruction:Essays in Honor of C. Vann Woodward(New York and Oxford,1982), 349-94. The substantialproperty-owning nonslaveholding portion of southern societyindirectly obtained benefits from slavery, even thoughthey tended to be lodged in semi-commercialagriculture. See Ford, Originsof SouthernRadicalism, 44-95; and JohnC. Inscoe,Mountain Masters, Slavery, and theSectional Crisis in WesternNorth Carolina (Knox- ville,1989), 36-57 and 72-85. A workthat stresses the negative impact of slaveryon nonslave- holdersis Bill Cecil-Fronsman,Common Whites: Class and Culturein AntebellumNorth Carolina(Lexington, 1992), 24-27 and 131. 20 Sam[ue]l M. Wolfe,Helper's ImpendingCrisis Dissected (Philadelphia,1860), 57-60; D[aniel]R. Hundley,Social Relationsin Our SouthernStates (New York,1860), 69 and 77; and speechof JeffersonDavis, May 26, 1851, in DunbarRowland, ed., JeffersonDavis: Constitu- tionalist:His Letters,Papers and Speeches(10 vols.; Jackson,Miss., 1923), II, 73-74. James Oakes stressesthe workethic and enterprisingattitude of small slaveholdersin RulingRace, 52-59, 127, 130-49 and 227. See also JamesL. Huston,The and theComing of the Civil War (Baton Rouge, 1987), Chap. 4. This pointhas also been recentlystressed by ChristopherMorris, Becoming Southern: The Evolutionof a Wayof Life,Warren County and Vicksburg,Mississippi, 1770-1860 (New York,1995), 17-18; BradleyG. Bond,Political Culture in theNineteenth-Century South: Mississippi, 1830-1900 (Baton Rouge and London, 1995), 2-9, 47, and 79; and Shade,Democratizing the Old Dominion,5-6, 48-49, 109, and 182-84. 21 KennethRayner address in RaleighWeekly Register, October 25, 1854. Southernnewspa- persoften reprinted northern stories glorifying mechanics, labor, and advancements; e.g., Natchez MississippiFree Trader,May 28, 1851; Tuscaloosa IndependentMonitor, August 10, 1847; Yazoo Democrat,October 11, 1854; and FayettevilleObserver quoted by Columbus(Ga.) En- quirer,November 25, 1856. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 257 systems.Northern free labor ideology stipulated that by hard work and intelligentactivity a personcould accumulate property, acquire a com- petence,and rise as farin societyas his (neverher) abilities could take him.The keyto independencewas earningproperty. In theSouth, the meansof social mobilityvia propertyacquisition-the "fruits of la- bor"-was accumulatingslaves.22 Northerners simply did notrecog- nize social mobilityby accumulationof propertyin slaves,but the social impactwas the same. Justas northernersdemanded to keep intacttheir means of social mobilitythrough accumulation of inert matter,so southernersdemanded to keep intacttheir means of social mobilitythrough accumulation of slaves. Thus wealth,income, and a hostof social values in the southern stateshinged on slaveholding,and thelegal existenceof slaveholding dependedon a set of laws thatdefined certain people as propertyand allowed othersto own those people. Propertyrights in slaves was absolutelycrucial to the existenceof the peculiarinstitution. Two specialconditions, however, governed these property rights, and these conditionsmade slaveholders vigilant and truculent: First, the nature of theproperty in questionmade it highlyprecarious and demandedthe constantapplication of coercionto makethe system function. Second, propertyrights could existonly via authorityor sanctionof govern- ment-no sanction,no propertyrights, no slavery.23 Slaverywas notlike other forms of property ownership because the propertyitself had volition.Other forms of propertycould be agreed uponas personalproperty by simplesocial consensus,without the use of government.When consensus breaks down, laws orjudicial rulings are requiredto resolvethe conflicts;and in conflictsover property, ownersdo thefighting. The propertyitself does notbecome a partici- pantin thefray because most property is inert.Slaves, however, pos- sessedvolition and could actively contest the directions and commands of theslaveholder. It shouldnot be forgottenthat one ofthe synonyms of slaverywas "involuntaryservitude," and, in orderto obtaininvol- untarylabor froma sentientperson with the capacitiesof volition,

22 For an example,see J.D. B. De Bow, et al., The Interestin Slaveryof the Southern Non-Slaveholder...(1860) inRobert W. Johannsen,ed., Democracy on Trial(New York,1966), 52. I am relyingheavily upon the economic interpretation of investment North and Southgiven by GavinWright, Old South,New South:Revolutions in theSouthern Economy Since theCivil War(New York, 1986), Chap. 2. 23 Severalrecent studies have stressed the crucial role of propertyand thelaws of propertyin theslaveholding states: McCurry, Masters of Small Worlds, 7-10, 13, 16-17,35, 92, 95, and 114; Bond,Political Culture in theNineteenth-Century South, 96; andJoseph P. Reidy,From Slavery toAgrarian Capitalism in theCotton Plantation South: Central Georgia, 1800-1880 (Chapel Hill and London,1992), 45-47 and 87-88. 258 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY physicalforce or thethreat of it mustbe applied.Remove the force or thethreat of it and thesentient being will exerciseher/his volition and refuseto yieldinvoluntary labor. The volitionof the slaves made them a mostunstable form of property.24 Southernersunderstood the connections among ownership of slaves, politicalcontrol, and propertyrights. During the first year of theCivil War,Joshua F. Speed wrotefrom Louisville to Secretaryof theTrea- surySalmon P. Chase askingfor suppressionof emancipationdis- courseamong federal officials because of its impacton borderstate unionists:"Slave propertyis unlikeany other-It is theonly property in the worldthat has locomotionwith mind to controlit-All men knowthis-and hincethe jealousy of anypeople where it existswith any outsideinterference with it." In a discussionon theuse of slave mechanics-unrelatedto the sectionalcrisis-a Georgiaeditor noted that"Slaves arehuman beings, and as such,are endowedwith volition and reason-This factmakes the tenureof propertyin slaves more delicateand precariousthan that of any otherspecies of property."25 Slaveholdersrequired the law to supportabsolutely their claims to propertyin humansif slaverywas to functionat all. The needfor constant resort to forceor threat of it led to thedemand by slaveholdersto controlthe state. Property rights cannot exist with- out statepower. Only a coercivesocial organizationcan definethe "rulesof thegame"-in thiscase, propertyrights-and enforce them. Controlof thestate is controlof thedefinition of propertyrights and thelegal meansof propertyacquisition.26 Slaveholdershad two governmentalentities to guardagainst. First was stategovernment, which wrote the basic rules of slaveholding. The

24 The observationsmade explicit in thisanalysis have been presentin nearlyevery study of slavery;for example, Stampp's chapter titles from Chaps. 3 to 5 are: "A TroublesomeProperty," "To Make Them Standin Fear," and "ChattelsPersonal," Kenneth M. Stampp,The Peculiar Institution:Slavery in theAnte-Bellum South (New York, 1956). See also ThomasD. Morris, SouthernSlavery and theLaw, 1619-1860 (ChapelHill, 1996), 1-3; McCurry,Masters of Small Worlds,116-17; Reidy,From Slaveryto AgrarianCapitalism, 6; Eugene D. Genovese,Roll, Jordan,Roll: The Worldthe Slaves Made (New York, 1974), 35-49; and MaryTurner, "Intro- duction"to MaryTurner, ed., From ChattelSlaves to Wage Slaves: The Dynamicsof Labour Bargainingin theAmericas (London, 1995), 2 and 9. 25 JoshuaF. Speed to SalmonP. Chase,September 2, 1861,in John Niven, James P. McClure, and Leigh Johnsen,eds., The SalmonP. Chase Papers, Vol. III (Kent,Ohio, 1996), 93; and Macon GeorgiaJournal and Messenger,October 24, 1849. 26 Amongeconomists a considerableliterature has grownup over the past threedecades concerningproperty rights and the state. Most of this analysis is couchedin excessivelaissez-faire terms.For the propertyrights paradigm, consult Douglass C. North,Structure and Changein EconomicHistory (New York,1981), 4-11, 17, 29, 61-67, and Chap. 3 generally;Douglass C. North,Institutions, Institutional Change, and EconomicPerformance (Cambridge, Eng., and New York,1990), 3-9; YoramBarzel, Economic Analysis of PropertyRights (Cambridge, Eng., and New York, 1989), 1-9; and ArmenAlchian and HaroldDemsetz, "The PropertyRights Para- digm,"Journal of Economic History, XXXIII (March1973), 16-24. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 259 law of slaveholdingcaused numerousdifficulties since the human qualityof slaverymeant that slaves could not be treatedlike other formsof property. This law ofproperty was inconsistentbecause it had to treatslaves as both propertyand people, notjust as property.27 Howeverinconsistent the law mayhave beento legal purists,it none- thelesspossessed a singularvirtue from the slaveholders'point of view: thelaw of slaverywas writtenby therepresentatives of a slave- holdingsociety. Thus a societywith an interestin thepreservation of theinstitution and its incomeflow manipulated the laws so thatthey recognizedslaves as bothhuman and property, but the central fact was thatindividuals interested in maintainingslaves as propertywrote the .28 As theslaveholders' second area of concern, the federal government of theUnited States was anothermatter. There, governmental power was sharedby peoplefrom societies representing different regimes of propertyrights, between slave statesand freestates. Property rights weredefined and enforced by government, and the nature of the federal Union gave powerin the nationalCongress to individualswho had absolutelyno materialinterest in slavery.Here lay thedanger to the longevityof slaveholding.That danger had two distinctforms. The firstwas thatfederal policy could injure the economic health of slaveryand possiblybuild up a northerninterest inimical to slavery. Thus, southernerswarily watched federal initiatives over the tariff, westernland disposition,expenditures for internal improvements, the federalbudget, and financialsystems. The politicalliterature of ante- bellumsoutherners is replete with denunciations of federalcentraliza- tionof politicalpower, the claim being that enhanced federal power was beingused to impoverishthe South.29 But the danger from federal

27 See especiallythe treatmentin Mark V. Tushnet,The AmericanLaw of Slavery,1810- 1860: Considerationsof Humanityand Interest(Princeton, 1981); and also Morris,Southern Slaveryand the Law, 11-13, 425-31, and generallyChaps. 3, 7, 8; and Stampp,Peculiar Institution,Chap. 5. 28 This is thecentral conclusion of Morris, Southern Slavery and theLaw, 11-13,61-73, and 425. Withinthe southernstates, slaveholders faced various threats from nonslaveholders who werethe majority and potentially could deny slaveholders their property rights, but there were few actualconflicts between the two groupsprior to the Civil War. For battlesbetween nonslave- holdersand slaveholderssee ChiltonWilliamson, American Suffrage: From Property to Democ- racy,1760-1860 (Princeton,1960), 231-34; CharlesS. Sydnor,The Developmentof Southern Sectionalism,1819-1849 (Baton Rouge, 1948), 288-90; ClementEaton, A Historyof the Old South(2d ed.; New York, 1966), 293-98; Marc W. Kruman,Parties and Politics in North Carolina,1836-1865 (BatonRouge, 1983), 58-59, 98-99, and 190-96; and RalphA. Wooster, The People in Power: Courthouseand Statehousein theLower South, 1850-1860 (Knoxville, 1969),9-25, 33-40, and 105-13. 29 Forexample, D. H. London,"Enfranchisement ofSouthern Commerce," De Bow's Review, XXVIII (March1860), 315; JamesHamilton, A Speechon Operationof the Tariff on theInterests ofthe South ... (Charleston,1828), 13-16; JohnForsyth, "The Northand theSouth," De Bow's 260 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY policy,despite fire-eating hyperbole, had its limitations.In theNorth weremany interests, and it was likelythat any strong initiative in the federalarena would injuresome of them.Southerners could always relyon makingpolitical alliances with disaffected northerners. This was essentiallywhat happenedin the formationof the Democratic party.Moreover, the South did notspeak with one voice on economic issues.The Whigparty differed from the Democrats on theimpact of federalpolicy on slavery,and in theBorder South large numbers gave strikingsupport to a strongfederal government on economicmatters.30 Federalpolicy, in short,was notinvariably calculable as to its effects on slavery. Butthe second power of thefederal government represented a size- able politicaldanger. The federalgovernment was underno obligation to recognizeproperty rights in slaves at the federallevel and had certainpowers reserved to itselfthat could affectsuch rights: foreign diplomacy,control of interstatetrade, rulings by thefederal judiciary, and governanceof newlyacquired territories. In noneof theseactivi- tiesdoes theConstitution require the federal government to recognize propertyrights in slaves.Federal authorities could damage slave own- ingby adoptinga positionhostile to theenforcement of thoseproperty rights.The economicreturns from possession of propertydepend on how securethose rights are; andif the central government indicated an insecurity,the slave regimewould suffera devaluation.As Albert GallatinBrown of Mississippi said in theU.S. Senate,if property rights in slavesin theterritories are not observed, then "our $2,000,000,000" in slavesmay be destroyedas well as "thevalue of thesoil on which theywork; you destroythe value of all our machinery;our stock becomesworthless; commerce is brokenup; our citiesdwindle and perish;and yet,sir, this great interest-the greatest individual interest underthe Government-gets no protectionfrom the Federal head."'31 Because slave propertywas so volatileand requiredso muchgovern- mentalassurance, slaveholders could not let pass anychallenge to the absolutesupremacy of propertyrights in slaves.Massachusetts textile

Review,XVII (October1854), 365-75; J.F. H. Claiborne,Life and Correspondenceof John A. Quitman(2 vols.;New York,1860), II, 189; andWilliam W. Freehling,Prelude to CivilWar: The NullificationControversy in SouthCarolina, 1816-1836 (New York, 1965), ix-x, 192-96,and 255-59. 30 WilliamJ. Cooper Jr., Liberty and Slavery:Southern Politics to 1860 (New York,1983), 202-5; ArthurCharles Cole, The WhigParty in theSouth (Washington, D.C., 1913),90-96, 98, and 102-3; JonathanAtkins, Parties, Politics, and theSectional Conflict in ,1832- 1861 (Knoxville,1997), 68-71 and 96-106; and ThomasBrown, Politics and Statesmanship: Essays on theAmerican Whig Party (New York, 1985), 170-87. 31 Speechof Albert Gallatin Brown, Congressional Globe, 36 Cong.,1 Sess., 1003 (March6, 1860). PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 261 magnateand congressional representative Nathan Appleton sensed this fearduring the Nullification battle. South Carolinians, he said, were notreally worried about the tariff; rather, their actions arose from the "fearand apprehension of the South that the General Government may one day interferewith the right of propertyin slaves.This is thebond whichunites the South in a solid phalanx.... X32 On thispoint the political vulnerability of the slaveholdingSouth was greatest.On policyquestions, southerners could expectto obtain allies; but,on the subjectof enforcingproperty rights in slaves,the Southhad no northernallies because northernersdid notown slaves and had no directinterest in seeingproperty rights in slavesenforced. This sectionaldifference made a minorityposition in thefederal gov- ernmentcatastrophic.33 The worstpossible scenario could be actedout fromthe perspective of a slaveholder:nonslaveholders controlling the governmentcould deny enforcement of propertyrights in slavesin the nationalsphere of governance.In the addresspromulgated by the NashvilleConvention in 1850, the membersdeclared, "There is but one condition,in whichone people can be underthe dominionof anotherpeople; and thatis whentheir interests are entirelyidentical. Thenthe dominant cannot oppress the subject people without oppress- ing themselves."34 Fromthe moment of rebellion in 1776to theact of disunion in 1861, southernslaveholders were hypersensitive about the sanctity of prop- ertyrights. The bruntof their forceful argument was clear:Northerners had agreedthat control of property rights in slaveswas nota subjectof federaldebate. At theSecond ContinentalCongress, shortly after the Declarationof Independencewas adopted,Thomas Lynch Jr. of South Carolinalaid downthe centralcondition of union:"If it is debated, whethertheir slaves are theirproperty, there is an end of theconfed- eration."35That idea persistedwhen the argument over slavery'sex-

32 Speechof NathanAppleton, Congressional Debates, 22 Cong.,2 sess., 1206 (January22, 1833). 33 And thisexplains why the South so fearedbecoming the minority section and whythey opposedthe increase of newfree states without counterbalancing new slave states.For example of thefear of beinga minoritysee Carl N. Degler,The OtherSouth: Southern Dissenters in the NineteenthCentury (New York, 1974), 119. 34 Taken fromHuntsville (Ala.) SouthernRecorder, June 26, 1850. See also Milledgeville (Ga.) Federal Union,October 31, 1854. 35 Quote of Lynch,July 30, 1776, in WorthingtonChauncey Ford, ed., Journalsof the ContinentalCongress, 1774-1789 (34 vols.; Washington,D.C., 1904-1937),VI, 1080; remarks of PatrickHenry, June 12, 1788, in JonathanElliot, ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventionson theAdoption of the Federal Constitution(5 vols.; 1836;rpt., Philadelphia, 1861), III, 314, 327, and 328; of CharlesC. Pinckney,January 17, 1788,ibid., IV, 283, 285, and 286; and of GeorgeMason, June 11, 1788,ibid., III, 269-70. 262 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY pansioninto the territorieserupted. In 1848 a NorthCarolina editor viewed the Constitutionas nothingother than a contractregarding slaverybetween the two sections:"The Constitutionis a compact betweenthe slave and non-slaveStates. Slavery is recognizedin it, throughout,in some formor other."36 The issue of propertyrights was also thecore of southernconstitu- tionaldoctrines. Most of theexpostulations proclaiming southern lib- erty,southern rights, and constitutionalrights can be reducedto a few elementarypropositions: liberty, in the Anglo-Americantradition, meantthe freedom to accumulateproperty and to disposeof it as the possessorsaw fit;the purpose of governmentwas to protectproperty; theconstitutional agreement of 1787-1789secured property in slaves to thosestates that had the institutionand lodgedall powerover its continuationand regulationin the states.37In 1849 a reportof the SouthernState Convention at Jackson,Mississippi, made explicitthe connectionbetween property rights in slavesand the doctrine of states' rights.Congress had "no powerover the subject of slavery,within the States,or in theterritories," the report stated; the Constitution recog- nized slaveryas property,and Congresshad no power "over such property;the right of propertypreceded the constitution-it is coeval withthe history of man; it exists by a paramountlaw ofnature; it is the subjectof controlby Statesovereignty only." One readsthe historical recordcorrectly in sectionaldebates when one crossesout the phrase "states'rights" and replacesit with"state sovereignty over property rightsin slaves."38

36 Greensborough(N.C.) Patriot,July 15, 1848; see remarksof JamesC. Dobbin,Cong. Globe,29 Cong.,2 Sess., 384 (February11, 1847); DonaldL. Robinson,Slavery in theStructure ofAmerican Politics, 1765-1820 (New York,1971), 49-50 and 59-63; and David BrionDavis, The Problemof Slaveryin theAge ofRevolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca,1975), 148-52. 37 A considerableliterature exists proclaiming the importance of local libertyto southerners. See Cooper,Liberty and Slavery,14, 178-79,257, and267; andEric H. Walther,The Fire-Eaters (BatonRouge, 1992),298-99. The revolutionarytradition, however, stressed the equivalence of propertyand liberty.See ChristopherGadsden, "To thePlanters, mechanics, and Freeholdersof theProvince of SouthCarolina ... [1769],"in RichardWalsh, ed., The Writingsof Christopher Gadsden,1746-1805 (Columbia,S.C., 1966), 77. For therelation of propertyto libertyin the Revolutionsee GordonS. Wood, "Preface,"in Ellen FrankelPaul and HowardDickman, eds., Liberty,Property, and the Foundationsof theAmerican Constitution (Albany, N.Y., 1989), xii-xiv; Michael G. Kammen,"'The Rightsand Property,and the Propertyin Rights':The ProblematicNature of 'Property'in thePolitical Thought of theFounders and theEarly Repub- lic," ibid.,4-6; and JamesW. Ely Jr.,The Guardianof EveryOther right: A Constitutional Historyof Property Rights (New York, 1992), 28-30. 38 VicksburgWeekly Whig, October 9, 1849. On states'rights see JesseT. Carpenter,The SouthAs a ConsciousMinority (New York,1930), 34-41 and 127-70;and Robert V. Remini,The Legacyof Andrew Jackson: Essays on Democracy,Indian Removal, and Slavery(Baton Rouge, 1988), 83-107. Republicanismas an interpretativesynthesis has tendedof late to elevatestates' rightsas a legitimatedoctrine of local control,which is nowseen (evidently) as a bulwarkagainst capitalistcentralizers. See Ford,Origins of Southern Radicalism, 351-56; RichardE. Ellis, The PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 263

Severalinteresting arguments spun off the southerninsistence for protectionof propertyrights in slaves by stateauthority. From the beginningof theUnion, southerners fretted that the principle of ma- jorityvoting in thefederal Congress might permit an invasionof the slaveholders'property rights.39 Antebellum claims forthe rightsof minorities,John C. Calhoun'sposition, was in everypart of itsbeing a claimfor property rights. Its existenceis tiedto theold fearof the propertiedminority that the unpropertied majority may deprive them of theirpossessions. Indeed, this apprehensionhad a distinctliterary form:a jeremiadabout the "agrarianism" that had seizedthe North and wouldeventually endanger all propertyrights.40 The economicstrength of slaveryin southernpolitical calculation has to be weighedagainst the social factthat southern slavery was racialslavery. Virtually all southerndefenses of slaveryinvoked racial doctrines:Africans were an inferiorrace, Africans could labor in tropi- cal climateswhereas whites could not,and slaverywas a meansof adjustingrace relations between a superiorand an inferiorrace. All of theseracially based argumentswere well calculatedto rallynonslave- holdersto thedefense of slavery,and throughout the antebellum South theywere translatedinto the doctrinethat white equality depended uponblack slavery.41 Thereare no groundson whichto disputeeither the power of the racialappeals made in thewhite South or theimportance of racism, Northand South,in blockingpeaceful resolutions of intersectional crisesand in destroyingpotential means of obtainingjustice for op- pressedAfrican Americans. But the racial aspectof slaverydid not cause secession.If oppositionto slaveryhad involvedonly antagonism

Unionat Risk:Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights, and theNullification Crisis (New York, 1987), 3-4 and 152-53. For a trenchantcriticism of states'rights see WilliamW. Freehling, "Nullification,Minority Rights and Blackmail," in Fredrickson, ed., Nation Divided, 5-13; Shade, Democratizingthe Old Dominion,158-60, 225-32, and 253; and Davis, Cause Lost, 182. 39 Remarksof PatrickHenry in VirginiaRatifying Convention, 1788, in Elliot,ed., Debates in theSeveral State Conventions, III, 590; remarksof George Mason, ibid., 269-70; and remarks of RawlinsLowndes in SouthCarolina Ratifying Convention, 1788, ibid., IV, 272-74. 40 Forexample, Calhoun's draft of the South Carolina "Exposition," in Meriwether etal., eds., Papers ofJohn C. Calhoun,X, 492-98. See also JohnNiven, John C. Calhounand thePrice of Union:A Biography(Baton Rouge and London, 1988), 329-34. Forexamples of southern charges of northernagrarianism see A. P. Upshur,"Domestic Slavery," Southern Literary Messenger, V (October1839), 679 and 684-85; H., "Greeleyon Reforms,"ibid.,XVII (May 1851), 269; [William]Garnett, "The Southand theUnion," De Bow's Review,XIX (July1855), 38-39; and Claiborne,Life and Correspondenceof John A. Quitman,I, 17-18. 41 This is, in essence,the so-calledherrenvolk thesis of whiteracial solidarityin the ante- bellumSouth. The basic worksfor this interpretation are Channing,Crisis of Fear, 258-69 and 289-93; Thornton,Politics and Power in a Slave Society,204-38; and GeorgeM. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the WhiteMind: The Debate on Afro-AmericanCharacter and Destiny, 1817-1914 (New York, 1971), 61-64. 264 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY towardracial oppression, then the northern attack would have barely existed.The Northwas not a raciallyegalitarian section seeking to establishequitable race relations in theslaveholding South. Northern- erswould have letsoutherners take care of slaveryin theirown way if race relationsalone had been at stake.Only the abolitionistswere motivatedto alterwhite racial attitudes.42 Considerslavery, however, entirely in an economiclight. During its 1831-1832session the legislature debated the future of slav- ery,and in his reviewof theselegislative exchanges over the peculiar institution,Thomas R. Dew analyzedslavery and its future.Though Dew's analysisis oftenconsidered one of thefirst formal proslavery documents,it is in realityone of thefirst detailed explanations of why peacefulemancipation was impossible.Dew's assessmentdid appeal to racialdoctrines, but the heart of theessay was a simpleeconomic exposition.What was thewealth of Virginia?He estimatedthat Vir- ginianshad about$206 millionin housesand land and $100 millionin slaves.How couldVirginia emancipate its slaves and recompense their ownerswhen the value of theslaves was one-thirdof thevalue of the entirestate? What taxation level did sucha schemecall for?Dew went straightto thecenter of the problem, and it wholly rested with property rights.Civilization, as so commonlyasserted in thenineteenth century, requiredthe existence of privateproperty; and therule of civilization was thatno personshould be deprivedof his propertywithout due processof law. Partialcompensation was unjustand thereforeruled out-it was "subversiveof the rightsof propertyand the orderand tranquillityof society . . . ." Propertyholders would revoltif emanci- pationwithout compensation were attempted; thus, slavery could not be legallyended without impoverishing the state. The wealthaspect of slaverydominated the question of emancipation.The racialquestion, as crucialas it mayhave been in social relationsand moralprinciples, was inconsequentialwith regard to theinstitution's fate. Dew's argu- mentis powerfulon simpleeconomic grounds; requires no othercon- siderationsto defeata peaceful,legal demiseof slavery;and rests only on theassumption that slaveholders would resist anything less thanfull compensation,which is nota weak assumption.43

42 On northernracism see Eugene H. Berwanger,The FrontierAgainst Slavery: Western Anti-negroPrejudice and theSlavery Extension Controversy (Urbana, 1971). On egalitarianism amongthe abolitionists see JamesBrewer Stewart, Holy Warriors:The Abolitonists and Ameri- can Slavery(New York,1976), 44-49 and 124-46; andStanley Harrold, The Abolitionists and the South,1831-1861 (Knoxville,1995), 4-5, 21-23, and 48-50. 43 ThomasRoderick Dew, "Abolitionof Negro Slavery,"in Drew GilpinFaust, ed., The Ideologyof Slavery: Proslavery Thought in theAntebellum South, 1830-1860 (BatonRouge and London,1981), 23-77 (especiallypp. 23-30; quotationon p. 27). The same idea of theimprac- PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 265

The dilemmathat property rights in slavesposed for southerners can be explicitlystated. Property rights dictate an investmentpath, and if the propertyinvolved will yield a good returnto the owner,then continuousinvestment will result.Over theyears, the time and effort to buildup thestore of propertyproduces a strongattachment to the propertyand, perhaps, a senseof purposeand achievement.The com- poundingfeature of wealth acquisition will operate fiercely over a long periodof time.By thetime of theAmerican Revolution, let alone by 1860, southernersknew that the investmentprocess had inseparably fusedtheir society with slaveholding. Thus spoke George Mason at the VirginiaRatifying Convention of 1788:"It is farfrom being a desirable property;but it will involveus in greatdifficulties and infelicityto be now deprivedof them.There ought to be a clause in theConstitution to secureus thatproperty, which we have acquiredunder our former laws,and the loss of whichwould bring ruin on a greatmany people." It was thiswealth aspect, its compounding growth via investment,that led SouthCarolina economist Thomas Cooper to proclaimin 1827, "[W]e shall,before long, be compelledto calculatethe value of our Union ..."44 The behaviorand attitudesof northernerstoward slavery and its expansionpresent more analytical difficulty than do thoseof south- erners.When the value of slavery-and how thatvalue hingedon controlof property rights-is understood, southern behavior and argu- mentsare eminentlyrational. The essence of the dilemmawith the northernposition is, first,the timing of the decision to combatslavery's expansion.45The secondpart of the dilemma is whatled northernersto see aggressionin southernbehavior. The onus of aggressionhas usu- allyfallen on northernantislavery advocates because they attacked the peculiarinstitution; the South seemed merely to defendthe institution fromnorthern assaults.46 The northernviewpoint, however, can be

ticalityof emancipationbecause of the economicworth of slaves was reiteratedin 1860 by GovernorJoseph E. Brownof Georgia.See WilliamW. Freehlingand CraigM. Simpson,eds., SecessionDebated: Georgia's Showdownin 1860 (New York and Oxford,1992), 149-50. See also Oakes,Slavery and Freedom,176. 44 Remarksof George Mason in Elliot, ed., Debates in theSeveral State Conventions, III, 270; Dumas Malone, The Public Life of ThomasCooper, 1783-1839 (New Haven, 1926; reissued Columbia,S.C., 1961), 308 (Cooperquotation); and Sydnor,Development of Southern Section- alism,189. 45 Whypolitical antislavery emerged in the 1840s and 1850s and notearlier has longbeen MichaelF. Holt's criticismof otherexplanations for the Civil War.See Holt,Political Crisis of the1850s, 2-3. 46 The chargewas widespreadduring the controversy. See, forexample, the reporton a Democraticmeeting in Lexington,Mississippi, in NatchezMississippi Free Trader, October30, 1850. 266 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERN HISTORY

examinedfrom the standpoint of how propertyrights in slaves could influencenorthern society. When that is done,the reasons for northern claimsof slave poweraggression become more comprehensible. The growthof thenorthern economy had a differentrhythm from thatof the southern economy because further investment in slaveswas illegalin theNorth. Investment was forcedinto other areas-buildings, farms,transportation devices, and machinery.Wealth in the North followedthe line of inertobjects and animalsand therebypresented a differentvisage than did wealthin theSouth.47 Expectationsabout property holding governed northerners' social vision.At the time of the Revolution, it was hopedthat northern society wouldbe composedprimarily of landholdingsmall farmers served by a modestcommercial sector. The republicanismof the earlynation demandedthat citizens be propertyholders so as to producean inde- pendent-minded,virtuous population. By thethird decade of thenine- teenthcentury, the original republican dream had to be amended;the Northhad grownat such a ratethat farmers were no longera vast majorityof the citizenry, and urban dwellers and wage earners made up a significantportion of the population.The social vision mutated slightlyto becomethe "free labor ideology." In thefree labor scheme of the good society,the ultimategoal was still economicindepen- dency-in farming,the professions, or shopkeeping.But beforethis "competency"could be obtained,many, if notmost, men would have to go througha periodof dependency,or wage earning,until enough knowledgeand savingswere accumulated to permitthe jump to own- ership.This, of course,is thedictum of social mobilitymade possible by industry,thrift, and intelligence.By the 1850s the set of ideas aroundfree labor became invested in theRepublican party, although mostof the separateparts of theideology existed at thetime of the Revolutionand could be foundin all politicalparties afterward.48 A crucialassumption of the freelabor ideologyand indeed the wholeemphasis on social mobilitywas thewage. Economicindepen- dencythrough social mobilitycould be obtainedonly if wages were high,or, in nineteenth-centuryterminology, ifthe laborer received the

47 The reasoningemployed here is directlytaken from the discussions in Wright,Political Economyof theCotton South, 129-30; and Wright,Old South,New South,11 and 17-34. 48 This view of thefree labor ideology is almostwholly derived from Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor,Free Men,Chap. 1. Thistransition in thoughtfrom republicanism to freelabor is currently a hotbedof controversy;for some of the literatureon it, see ChristopherClark, "The Conse- quences of the MarketRevolution in the AmericanNorth," in MelvynStokes and Stephen Conway,eds., TheMarket Revolution in America:Social, Political,and ReligiousExpressions, 1800-1880 (Charlottesville,Va., 1996), 23-42; JohnAshworth, "Free Labor, Wage Labor,and theSlave Power:Republicanism and theRepublican Party in the 1850s,"ibid., 128-46. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 267 fullfruits of his labor.If wageswere low, there could be no savingand no eventualmove to self-employmentand propertyownership. There- fore,the free labor experiment in theNorth, the entire experiment in self-governmentand republicanism, required ample remuneration to all who labored.49 The politicalbattles of the Jeffersonianand Jacksonianperiods madeit plainhow thelaborer was to claimthe full fruits of his (never herfor the early part of thecentury) labor. There was to be no par- tiality,no advantagegiven to a few,and as mucheconomic equality as legislationcould generate, recognizing that "natural" conditions might favorsome over others. This was theegalitarianism of theage, arising fromthe anti-aristocraticimpulse of theAmerican Revolution. Aris- tocraticlaws in theform of specialprivilege, partial legislation, entail, primogeniture,and monopolies distorted the distribution of wealthand permittedthe few to absorbthe fruits of labor of the many. When those imperfectionsattributable to aristocracywere removed,all laborers receivedthe full fruits of theirlabor, which was sufficientnot only for a comfortablesubsistence but also forsaving. In short,the enemies of equitableremuneration-that is, fair wages-were aristocratic laws; and no aristocraticlaw was moredestructive than monopoly.50 To northerners,slaveholding partook of monopoly.What was slav- ery?It was a particularkind of laborsystem, the economic function of whichwas to supplylabor that was controlled,directed, and rewarded at thediscretion of theslaveholder, who was stigmatizedas an aristo- crat.Slaveholders thus became monopolists of laborin a pureJackso- niansense: slaveholders, the monopolists, dictated the rewards of labor to thelaborer. The abolitionistAmos A. Phelpsdeprecated slavery for a hostof reasons,but "to instancea singlething-the monopoly of laboris in otherhands." This was theanalysis of Andrew Johnson after theCivil War and whyhe feltslavery had to be uprooted:"it was a greatmonopoly, enabling those who controlledand ownedit to con- stitutean aristocracy,enabling the few to derivegreat profits and rule themany with an ironrod, as it were.''51

49 A Friendof DomesticIndustry [Caleb Cushing],Summary of thePractical Principles of PoliticalEconomy; with Observations on Smith'sWealth of Nations and Say's PoliticalEconomy (Cambridge,Mass., 1826),43-44; and JamesL. Huston,"A PoliticalResponse to Industrialism: The RepublicanEmbrace of ProtectionistLabor Doctrines," Journal of American History, LXX (June1983), 35-57. 50 JamesL. Huston,Securing the Fruits of Labor: TheAmerican Concept of WealthDistri- bution,1765-1900 (BatonRouge, 1998), Chaps. 1-3. 51 Amos A. Phelps,Lectures on Slaveryand Its Remedy(Boston, 1834), 87; David Warren Bowen,Andrew Johnson and the Negro (Knoxville,1989), 4. See also FrederickDouglass, "Freedomin theWest Indies: An AddressDelivered in Poughkeepsie,New York,"in JohnW. Blassingame,ed., The FrederickDouglass Papers (5 vols. to date;New Haven,1979- ), Ser. I, 268 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY

The impactof thismonopoly upon wages-or, in termsthat few in themid-nineteenth century used, upon the labor market-was to depress them.52Contemporaries believed that slavery depressed wages because slaveholdersheld a monopoly,which grew out of propertyrights; his propertyrights in thelaborer (the slave) permittedthe slaveholderto usurpthe fruits of labor. Northernersunderstood this and had no doubtsabout the depressing effectof slaveryupon labor's reward.If freeworkers were brought togetherwith slave laborersin the same occupation,the wage rate wouldbe governedby theremuneration of slaves. And because the slave masterdesired to pay theslave as littleas possible,wages fell. Thisis preciselythe reasoning employed in 1860 by RichardOglesby, who laterbecame governor of Illinois: I came myselffrom a slave State.Poor whitegirls washed there all day overa hotand steamingtub, and undera blazingsun, for ten cents a day. [Criesof "That'sa fact;I saw suchthings."] And why was this?Simply because a negro wench,equally strong,could be hiredfor thatprice. In KentuckyI was a laboringman. I hiredout forsix dollarsa month.Why couldn't I get more? Because a negroman, of of [sic] equal physicalstrength, could be hiredfor $75 peryear. He couldbe fedon coarserfood than I, and wouldbe submissive.... Do you wantsuch an institutionin yourterritories?53

Vol. III, 219. The idea thatslaveholders were monopolists who stole the fruits of the slaves' labor was plasteredthroughout abolitionist and antislaverywritings. The same analysiswas made by Jacksonianeconomists: [George Bancroft], "Slavery in Rome,"North American Review, XXXIX (October1834), 417-30; W. 0. Blake, comp., The Historyof Slaveryand the Slave Trade, Ancientand Modern... (Columbus,Ohio, 1858), 58-60; and TheodoreSedgwick, Public and PrivateEconomy (3 vols.; New York, 1836), I, 254-56. See the commentof HeatherCox Richardson,The GreatestNation of theEarth: Republican Economic Policies duringthe Civil War (Cambridge,Mass., 1997), 210. 52 This conclusion,which virtually all northernersand a numberof southernersreached, has beenclouded in thetwentieth century by cliometrians. In theresearch of Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman,slaves were paid close to (90 pecentof) thevalue oftheir marginal product, which in thelanguage of microeconomicsmeans that they were adequately compensated. That, however, is an improperapproach. The assumptionbehind the value of marginalproduct is thatpeople are freeto choosetheir employment and to determinehow they spend and invest their money. Slaves, by definition,could notchoose. The appropriatestandard to gauge oppressionin thiscase is to ask ifthe slaveholders had no optionbut to hirefree laborers, what wage wouldthe slaveholders have to offerto enticefree (white) workers to workin thecotton fields in thesame mannerand underthe same conditionsas did Africanslaves? The differencebetween that wage and the remunerationobtained by actual slaves thenbecomes a truegauge of economicoppression. Slaverylogically has to be a wage depressor,otherwise free labor is an equivalentsubstitute. If individualschose to enslavepeople, it wouldmean that they were willing to pay a higherwage forslaves thanfor free labor, and no one will arguethat proposition. Fogel, WithoutConsent or Contract,76-79; Fogel andEngerman, Time on theCross, I, 5-6 and 152-57,II, 119-25.See the criticismby Paul A. David and PeterTemin, "Capitalist Masters, Bourgeois Slaves," in Paul A. David, HerbertG. Gutman,Richard Sutch, Peter Temin, and Gavin Wright,Reckoning with Slavery:A CriticalStudy in the QuantitativeHistory of American Negro Slavery (New York, 1976), 35-37. The appropriatealternative method is givenby PeterA. Coclanis,The Shadow of a Dream: EconomicLife and Death in theSouth Carolina Low Country,1670-1920 (New York, 1989), 109-10. 53Speechof Oglesbyin ChicagoPress and Tribune,August 1, 1860. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 269

Certainlynortherners expressed a hostof worriesabout the ramifi- cationsof slaveholdingin theUnited States. Among them were politi- cal fears about the power of slaveholders,via the three-fifths compromise,in the nationallegislature. National policy on tariffs, banking,and internal improvements seemed bent to thepropagation of slavery'sinterest, and fear developed that slaveholders might drive the countryto war in orderto obtainmore territory for slavery. Further- more,slavery seemed hostile to civil liberties.54The keyword in the sectionaldebate, however, was competition.From the seventeenth cen- turyto 1860,the record frequently speaks about northern dread of the "competitionbetween free labor and slave labor." And the phrase indicatesan economicfear and an economicargument: competition betweenfree and slave labor drives down the wages of free labor to the level of pauperism.55 One does nothave to go farinto the antislaveryliterature to find explicitexpressions that the presence of slaveryinevitably depressed wages. GeorgeM. Weston,a formerDemocratic editor from Maine, madea lucideconomic analysis of theresults of mixingfree and slave labor in one area and gave his thesisin the title:Southern Slavery ReducesNorthern Wages. The purposeof slaverywas the"reduction of the laborerto the minimumof physicalsubsistence ... .56 The loweringof thewages of freelabor was madeclear in anotherclassic of theantebellum period, Frederick Law Olmsted'sThe CottonKing- dom.Free whitescould not live in competitionwith slave laborbe- cause "theholder of slave-labourcontrols the local marketfor labour, and the cost of slave-labourfixes the cost of everythingwhich is producedby slave-labour."57Frederick Douglass made clear theim- pact of slaveryupon freeworkers. "[T]he whitelaboring man was robbedby theslave systemof thejust resultsof his labor,"Douglass insisted,"because he was flunginto competition with a class of labor- ers who workedwithout wages."58 In 1843 theKentucky abolitionist CassiusClay also probedthe economic core: "It [slavery]is an evil to

5 See Gienapp,"Republican Party and the Slave Power,"51-78; Eaton,Freedom-of-Thought Strugglein the Old South;Russel B. Nye, FetteredFreedom: Civil Libertiesand theSlavery Controversy,1830-1860 (2d ed.; Urbana,1972). 55 See Lebanon(Pa.) Courier,April 7, 1854; SpringfieldDaily IllinoisState Journal, Sep- tember29, 1857; speechof CortlandtParker in NewarkDaily Advertiser,September 1, 1860; Evansville(Ind.) Daily Journal,August 24, 1860. 56 GeorgeM. Weston,Southern Slavery Reduces Northern Wages (Washington, D.C., 1856), 5. 57 FrederickLaw Olmsted,The CottonKingdom: A Traveller'sObservations on Cottonand Slaveryin theAmerican Slave States.. ., editedby Arthur M. Schlesinger(New York,1953), 90. 58 FrederickDouglass, Life and Timesof Frederick Douglass (rev.ed., 1892; rpt.,New York, 1962), 180 270 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY thefree laborer, by forcing him by the laws ofcompetition, supply and demand,to workfor the wages of theslave-food and shelter."59And proofof the tumult that could arise from competition between free and slave laborcame fromno less a sourcethan John C. Calhoun.Before he commencedetching out the constitutionalsubtleties of minority rights,states' rights, and theconcurrent majority, Calhoun knew the eruptionthat would occur if ever slaves competed directly with north- erners:"Can we conceivea moredangerous political condition, than for freeand slave labourto come into competition[?]"he queried PostmasterGeneral John McLean in 1828; "[D]o you think,that the freelaborers, the voters of theNorth, would permit bread to be taken out the mouthsof theirwives and children,by the slaves of the South?"60 For the republican/democraticsociety of the Northto continue, wages simplyhad to be substantial.Democratic government with a mass of impoverishedvoters was an absurdity.Under conditions of anti-aristocracyand antimonopoly,laborers did receive,in theview of the northernleadership, the fullfruits of theirlabors. Slavery by its wage-depressingabilities endangered the whole experimentin self- government.This line of reasoningcame out in Daniel Webster's famousMarch 7, 1850, Senate speech whenhe pleaded forHenry Clay's compromisemeasures. Near his conclusion,he reactedto a chargeby SenatorHenry S. Footeof Mississippi that northern workers werepermanently impoverished. Webster claimed that five-sixths of the propertyof the Northwas in the handsof laboringpeople who "cultivatetheir farms, . . . educatetheir children, . . . providethe means of independence"-thestuff of which republics were made. But if they werenot freeholders, these men earn wages; "these wages accumulate, are turnedinto capital, into new freeholds;and small capitalistsare created.",6'That processhad to be preserved,and Websterput his fingerprecisely on thereason why high wages werean indispensable conditionfor self-government to work. No highwages, no accumula- tions,and no freeholders;no freeholders,no self-government. Concernabout the impact of slaveryupon free white workers has a longhistory. Why did concernover it riseto a boilingpoint in thelate

59 HoraceGreeley, ed., The Writingsof CassiusM. Clay,including Speeches and Addresses (1848; rpt.,New York,1969), 205 60 JohnC. Calhounto JohnMcLean, August4, 1828, in Meriwetheret al., eds., Papers of JohnC. Calhoun,X, 407. BernardMandel made this same pointabout the impact of slaveryin 1955. See Mandel,Labor Free and Slave: Workingmenand theAnti-Slavery Movement in the UnitedStates (New York, 1955), 30-31. 61 Webster'sspeech in Cong. Globe,31 Cong., 1 Sess., 482 (March7, 1850). PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 271

1840s and especiallyin the 1850s? Certainlyone answeris thatthe territorialacquisition from the Mexican-AmericanWar sparkedthe debateover whether slavery would expand into that region or not.But also fuelingnorthern fears was an understandingthat the economic structureof Americanlife had changed:the transportation revolution portendeda muchcloser relationship between free labor Northand slave laborSouth than had existedbefore 1850. Slaveryhad always beenprofitable in theproduction of the great southern staple crops, and in thissphere southerners via oceanictransportation participated in a commercialmarket that encompassed the world. But outsideof those staples,slavery affected only local labormarkets-such as carpenters, constructioncrews, blacksmiths, or otherlocal endeavors.Free work- erscould escape the negative effects of slaverysimply by moving. The transportationrevolution augured the end of the local marketand local prices.Steamboats, canals, and railroadscreated a rudimentaryna- tionalmarket that connected the East Coastto theMississippi River by 1854; thetestament to thatdevelopment was thecompletion of four vitalrailroad lines-the New YorkCentral, the New Yorkand Erie, the Pennsylvania,and theBaltimore and Ohio. The transportationrevolu- tionremolded the economy of theUnited States by breakingdown the pricebarriers that separated local economies.Because transportation was widelyavailable and the cost of shipmentso greatlyreduced, individualsfrom a localityat a greatdistance from another locality could competein the distantlocality's market. The applicationof this economic change to the sectional controversy overslavery seems obvious. The effectsof slaveryon thelabor market couldno longerbe confinedto smallgeographical areas in theSouth. Slaverycould potentially affect the national labor market by permitting theemployment of southern slaves in thesame occupations as northern workers.Products made by slavelabor then competed against products madeby freelabor-and thecost advantage would be to thesouthern produceron thebasis of thewages paid to slaves. Northernerswere beginningto reactto new marketrealities. The firstand most obvious place a competitionbetween free labor and slave laborwould take place wouldbe in theterritories. So theadvocates of freelabor felt the pressure to stopslavery's expansion into those areas. Yet northernershad to confrontthe existence of slaveryin theSouth. Northernerswere going to be forcedto fightfor their social systemin theirown states,not simply in theterritories. The long-termimpact of thetransportation revolution was to let slavery'seconomic effects, if notslavery itself, expand out of theSouth and intothe North. Understandinghow thetransportation revolution affected the sec- 272 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY tionalcontroversy begins to clarifythe reasoning behind the belief of northernersthat they were the victimsof southernaggression. In its nationaleffects, the marketrevolution was not goingto changeone featureof southerneconomic, social, or politicallife; all theeconomic practicesand customs of the North were already present in theSouth- propertyrights, legal system,free white labor, a generallaissez faire creed,and small government.The reversewas not true.The market revolutionwould allow slaveryto affectnorthern economic practices andcustoms. Perhaps slavery would not have planted itself north of the Mason-Dixonline, but over time the effect of slavery on productprices wouldgo northward.A federalUnion under a nationalmarket system meantthat the North was goingto have to adaptto theinfluence of slave labor in the labor markets.The transportationrevolution was mergingthe two property rights regimes, and this recognition disturbed theNorth.62 The ironiceffect of the transportation revolution-uniting the coun- tryeconomically so thatits inhabitantscould see clearlyhow they endangeredeach other-was notunremarked.63 Indeed, it formedthe coreexplanation in one ofthe decade's most famous speeches, William HenrySeward's 1858 "IrrepressibleConflict" oration. Historians have endlesslyquoted the phrase and used it to showrising irrational sec- tionalism.But noticethe reasoning that lay behindSeward's belief in theirrepressibility of the conflict: Hitherto,the two systemshave existedin differentstates, but side by side withinthe American Union. This has happenedbecause the Union is a confed- erationof states.But in anotheraspect the United States constitute only one nation.Increase of population,which is fillingthe statesout to theirvery borders,together with a new and extendednet-work of railroadsand other avenues,and an internalcommerce which daily becomes more intimate,is rapidlybringing the states into a higherand moreperfect social unityor con- solidation.Thus, these antagonistic systems are continuallycoming into closer contact,and collisionresults. Shall I tellyou whatthis collision means? . . . It is an irrepressibleconflict betweenopposing and enduring forces, and it means that the United States must and will,sooner or later,become either entirely a slaveholdingnation, or en- tirelya free-labornation.64

62 This,of course,is theopposite of theusual interpretation,which has thecapitalist North seekingto enterand controlsouthern resources. See Beard and Beard,Rise ofAmerican Civili- zation,I, 632-39 and II, 1-54; and Bensel,Yankee Leviathan, 10-12 and 416-17. 63 For example,William Goodell, Slavery and Anti-Slavery:A Historyof the Great Struggle in BothHemispheres; With a Viewof theSlavery Question in theUnited States (1852; rpt.,New York, 1968), 390; L.C.B., "The Countryin 1950, or the Conservatismof Slavery,"Southern LiteraryMessenger, XXII (June1856), 426. Otherhistorians have picked up theramifications of the broadeningof marketsdue to transportationfacilities: Reidy, From Slaveryto Agrarian Capitalism,86; Morris,Becoming Southern, 179. 64 Seward,"The IrrepressibleConflict," in GeorgeE. Baker,ed., The Worksof WilliamH. Seward,Vol. IV (Boston,1884), 292. For severaldecades now historianshave focusedon the PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 273

Seward'sanalysis was entirelycommercial, not industrial. The devel- opmentof commercial improvements brought the sections together and exposedthe antagonismsbetween free and slave labor whenforced intoa singlemarket area. The nationcould house all kindsof diversity, butnot in therules governing property rights, especially when differing rulesdramatically altered the labor markets of otherareas. Northernfree labor advocates incessantly paraded the superiority of freelabor over slave labor, but in directeconomic competition between freelabor and slave labor mostantislavery proponents believed that slave laborwould win. George Weston realized this. He admitted,"It is certainlytrue that wealth is morerapidly augmented under free, than underslave systems,and that,in a largesense, free labor is cheaper thanslave labor [due to productivity]."Yet in directcompetition the bettersystem would not win. "But althoughexhausting and impover- ishingin all its resultsand all its influences,it [slavery]is irresistibly and unmistakablycheaper, when applied to the ruderprocesses of agriculture,than free labor, which it overpowers and reduces to itsown level."65Slave laborwas goingto win,in otherwords, because in a competitivesystem the low-price producer emerges triumphant. And thereason for this astonishing and illogical result was thedifference in definitionsof property rights. Slave masterswere given property rights overAfrican laborers, and by thislegal device controlledwages; no one had a propertyright to thelaborer in a freelabor system but the laborerhimself (or, eventually,herself). Free labor producedbetter social and economicresults-a middlingsociety, prosperity, and growth-onlybecause wages were high. Slavery,via competition, draggeddown wages forfree laborers as well as forslaves and thus destroyedthe incentive to be productive.Hence, a slave laborsystem triumphedover a freelabor system because of thedifferent ways that propertyrights were assigned. Southernerswere miffed by suchlong-winded jeremiads concerning the competitionof freeand slave labor. Slave labor,according to developmentof thefactory system (industrialization) and theconsequences for sectional bitter- ness thatit entailed.But theimportant economic process generating sectionalism was expanded commercialintercourse via thetransportation revolution. Earlier historians sometimes picked up on thatfact: Edward Everett Hale, WilliamH. Seward(Philadelphia, 1910), 24, 33, 57, 81, and 89-90; and AlbertBushnell Hart, Slavery and Abolition,1831-1841 (New York,1906), 92. 65 Weston,Southern Slavery Reduces Northern Wages, 5. It mustbe mentionedthat Weston had a somewhatdifferent opinion two yearslater when he decided,evidently, that intelligence was thekey factor in economic development and so freelabor would win over slave labor because slavelabor was stupidlabor. See GeorgeM. Weston,The Progress of Slavery in theUnited States (Washington,D.C., 1858), 5-8. Antebellumnorthern Democrats evidently believed that slavery was so confinedby geography that free labor would triumph in the territories; for example, speech of Caleb Cushingin BostonPost, October 28, 1857. 274 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY southerners,was the fateof Africans,not whites.Most southerners insistedthat work was honorablein theSouth, and thatthe region had a dual systemof laborthat kept free labor and slave labor separate. Slaves workedat agriculturalstaples of thetropics; whites did other work;and slave labordid notdegrade free labor.66 An actualcompetition between southern slave labor and northern freelabor in theyears from 1840 to 1860was, to be generous,rare. The economicargument of antislavery northerners was correctin theorybut of dubiousvalue giventhe existing conditions. Although it mightbe conjecturedthat either northerners were operating under other motiva- tionsor theywere simply hypersensitive, there are nonetheless a num- berof reasonsfor affirming that the northern economic analysis had a strongmeasure of rationality to it.First, the initial contest would be in theterritories, where free and slavelabor would compete for resources and thepotential for direct competition in all sortsof occupations- blacksmithing,carpentry, and thelike-would exist.Second, the free stateshad a substantialpopulation that had migratedfrom the slave states.Those people carried with them resentment of slavecompetition withfree labor and did not want slavery to expand.67Third, the fear of freelabor toward slave laborwas notof recent vintage. The Southhad a long historyof mechaniccomplaints against slave laborgoing into the trades.68And so did the colonialNorth. There was an artisanal complaintin Boston againstslave competitionas earlyas 1661. In 1737 LieutenantGovernor George Clarke of New York notedthat artificerswere upset with "the pernicious custom of breeding slaves to trades,whereby the honest and industrioustradesmen are reducedto

66 For two contemporaryexamples see speechof JohnC. Calhounon theOregon bill, June 27, 1848,in RichardK. Crall6,ed., The Worksof John C. Calhoun(6 vols.; New York,1856), IV, 505; and speechof JamesA. Seddonin Cong. Globe,29 Cong.,2 Sess., Appendix,87-88 (January7, 1847). See also Huston,Panic of 1857, pp. 93-94. 67 Nicole Etcheson,The Emerging Midwest: Upland Southerners and thePolitical Culture of theOld Northwest,1787-1861 (Bloomington, Ind., 1996), 5, 67-70, and99. A numberof studies now at least notethe fearof competitionbetween free labor and slave labor.See Richardson, GreatestNation of theEarth, 23 and 210; Paul Bourkeand Donald DeBats, WashingtonCounty [Oregon]:Politics and Communityin AntebellumAmerica (Baltimore, 1995), 67; and RobertJ. Cook,Baptism of Fire: TheRepublican Party in Iowa, 1838-1878 (Ames,Iowa., 1994),31-32. 68 See RonaldT. Takaki,A ProslaveryCrusade: TheAgitation to Reopenthe African Slave Trade (New York,1971), 44-49; LawrenceT. McDonnell,"Work, Culture, and Societyin the Slave South,"in Ted Ownby,ed., Blackand WhiteCultural Interaction in theAntebellum South (Jackson,Miss., 1993), 126-28 and 138-39,although McDonnell evidently sees freewhites and urbanblacks becoming more alike in theiressential work routines; Claudia Dale Goldin,Urban Slaveryin theAmerican South, 1820-1860: A QuantitativeHistory (Chicago, 1976), xiv, 4-5, and 28-31; FredSiegel, "Artisans and Immigrantsin thePolitics of Late AntebellumGeorgia," Civil WarHistory, XXVII (September1981), 221-30; and Cecil-Fronsman,Common Whites, 24-27, 80, and 88-89. For a differentview see Wright,Old South,New South,27-28. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 275 povertyfor want of employ."69Given this record, it wouldhave been strangeindeed if the potentialexpansion of slavery,either into the territoriesor intothe North via marketinclusion, had nottouched off fearsof competitionwith slave labor. Therewas also a componentto northernfears that focused on the future.As manufacturingincreased in the North,more individuals foundtheir fates attached to wage labor.What would stopthe South frommanufacturing by usingslave labor?Eventually the profits from agriculturalstaples would drop, as thereign of King Cottonprobably wouldnot have lastedmuch beyond 1870. As theprofit rate dropped, it is likelythat slaveholders would have soughtnew uses fortheir depreciatedproperty; and thelikely direction was manufacturing,an areathat already employed about 200,000 slaves. The enormousprofits in cottonduring the 1850s precluded such a massivemove, but south- ernerswere already thinking along these lines. Congressman Thomas H. Baylyof Virginia believed it possible: "The operativein thefactory is littlemore than an animatedpart of themachinery. Slaves are fully equal to it."70 Andthe idea thatslaves and freelaborers could be keptin separate sphereshad a significantobstacle to overcome.In Macon,Georgia, in 1849 a minorrow emergedover the use of slaves as printers,and a newspapereditor indicated that it was indeedimpolitic to turnslaves into"master workmen," in thewords of thefree printers. The reason forthis editorial was an addressby "Bibb," previouslygiven to the Mechanic'sSociety, in whichhe had indicatedthat laws to interfere withhow slave mastersused theirslaves was a violationof therights of property-aform of governmentaltyranny.7' Evidently nothing cameof this incident, but it does pointup theshortcomings of arguing thatlabor could be dividedinto separate spheres. In orderto maintain the division,slaveholders would have to accept conditionson their propertyownership; and thoseconditions meant that if returnsfrom slaveryin one arenaof activitydropped, the slaveholder would refrain fromtrying to reallocatethe slave to a moreprofitable endeavor. The inabilityto reallocatean assetdepreciates its value, because the prop- ertyholder cannot dispose of propertyto maximizeits benefit. Would

69 ArthurZilversmit, The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in theNorth (Chicago, 1967), 46 and 47 (quotation).See also EdgarJ. McManus, A Historyof Negro Slavery in New York(Syracuse, 1966), 183. 70 Speech of ThomasHenry Bayly in Cong. Globe,29 Cong.,2 sess.,Appendix, 349 (Feb- ruary11, 1847). See also remarksof WilliamLowndes Yancey in Huntsville(Ala.) Southern Advocate,May 27, 1848. Thereis in theliterature a longdebate about the feasibility of manu- facturingby slaves,and it is fullof inconsistencies;the topic should be reopened. 71 Macon GeorgiaJournal and Messenger,October 10, 24, 1849. 276 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY slaveholdershave everagreed to suchrestriction? It appears unlikely: Not even civil war in supportof slaverystopped and JamesHenry Hammond from insisting upon their property rights ab- solutism.72 Finally,there is one furtherreason for believing that northerners took seriouslythe argument that slave labormight begin to compete withfree labor. The whole bruntof JacksonianDemocracy was di- rectedtoward removing governmental obstacles to achievementand success for all whitemales. Northernersconceived of such public policies in termsof proscribingspecial privilegesand governmental favoritism.In theeconomic realm, slavery as a formof propertygave slaveholdersa special privilege,an unfairadvantage, because it per- mittedthe employment of low-valuedlabor by residentsof onlyone section.It is whollyrational that northerners would seek to eliminatea competitionthat gave all theadvantages in thelabor market to south- erners. Thenorthern dread of competition with slave labor stands on itsown as a pureeconomic argument that does notrequire reference to any- thingelse in thesociopolitical environment. Politics, racism, internal tensionsin the Northwithout doubt had theirrole in creatingthe hostilitythat would lead southernersto view secessionfavorably. But theeconomic condition by itselfwas sufficientto generatea massive sectionalproblem. The creationof a nationalmarket opened the door fordirect competition between free and slave labor,and northerners' fearof thatpotential was eminentlyjustified. Southern institutions, or theeffect of those institutions, were about to escapethe confines of the Mason-Dixonline and endanger northern society. This contingency fed the northernnotion of an aggressiveSouth. And northernersunder- stoodwhere the imbalance lay. Property rights in peoplewas an unfair institutionthat disordered the labor markets and deprivedlaborers- laborin a generalas well as in a specificsense-of thefruits of their labor. Propertyrights influenced Senator John A. Dix, a free soil Democratfrom New York,in his analysisof theterritorial question: "The propertyof the freelaborer is in himself-in his powersof exertion,his capacityfor endurance, in thelabor of his hands.To him theseare of as muchvalue as theproperty which the master has in his slaves."73The two regimesof propertyrights were colliding.For

72 WilliamY. Thompson,Robert Toombs of Georgia(Baton Rouge, 1966), 186; and Drew GilpinFaust, James Henry Hammond and theOld South:A Designfor Mastery (Baton Rouge, 1982), 373-74. 73 Speechof John A. Dix, March1, 1847,in Cong.Globe, 29th Cong., 2d sess.,543. It is true thatDemocratic politicians appealed to northernworkers on thebasis of maintainingslavery in theSouth so thathordes of emancipated blacks did notoverrun northern labor markets. However, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 277 northerners,the only way to rectifythe economic imbalance between themwas to end propertyrights in people. Propertyrights were at thecore of thedebate over slavery's expan- sioninto the territories after 1846. Whennortherners announced their intentionto curb slavery'sgeographical growth, southerners reacted violentlyand perceivedat thenational level of governmenta disposi- tionto ignoreor evenviolate southern rights in slavery.That challenge couldnot be evaded,for federal disregard of propertyrights in slaves economicallydamaged the institutionby raisingquestions about its stability,thereby lowering its value. Southernersresponded by de- mandingan expansionin theobligations of governmentalauthority to propertyrights: all levels of governmentwould have to protectprop- ertyrights in slaves.That change in southerners'expectations caused massesof northernersto believe that a Slave Powerexisted, was bent on thenationalization of slavery,and was aggressivelyinvading the North.The escalationof southernexpectation and the northernre- sponseto it led to thecircumstance in which-at thesame timethat southernleaders claimed to be only defendingthemselves- northernersinsisted that southerners were relentlessly attacking their freelabor society. Priorto 1840 thelegal protectionof slaverythat southerners sought and obtainedwas whollya statematter in whichthe federal govern- menthad no powerto interfere.The operativephrase was thatslavery was a "municipal"institution. This attitudewas expressedat theCon- stitutionalConvention, where southern delegates worked to obtaincon- gressionalrepresentation based on the numberof slaves, economic securityfor the institution,and a ban on federalintrusion on state controlover slavery.The southernfear was primarilythat the new centralgovernment could invade the domain of the states, or, in Pierce Butler'swords, "The securitythe Southn.States want is thattheir negroesmay not be takenfrom them which some gentlemen within or withoutdoors, have a verygood mindto do."74The logical way to avoid federalintervention in slaveryaffairs was by emphasizingwhat became knownas states'rights. One of the earliestproslavery con- thatappeal does notvitiate the argumentthat slave laborcompetition would drive down wage rates.On theuse of racismto attractworking-class voters, see Nye,Fettered Freedom, 254-57; andWilliston H. Lofton,"Abolition and Labor," Journal of Negro History, XXXIII (July,1848), 254-69. 74 Paul Finkelman,Slavery and the Founders:Race and Libertyin the Age of Jefferson (Armonk,N.Y., and London,1996), 1-33 (quotationon p. 17); and WilliamM. Wiecek,"The Witchat the Christening:Slavery and the Constitution'sOrigins," in LeonardW. Levy and DennisJ. Mahoney, eds., The Framingand Ratificationof theConstitution (New York,1987), 178-84. 278 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY gressmen,South Carolina's William Loughton Smith, said in 1796that northernerscould not meddle in slaverybecause "[i]t was altogethera municipalregulation ...."75 The idea thatslavery was beyondthe reachof thefederal government's direct meddling due to theConsti- tutionalagreement that slavery was a stateor municipalinstitution gained widespreadacceptance.76 Free Soilers and Republicansac- ceptedit, but it was theachilles heel of southernersin theterritorial dispute. The limitationsof themunicipal-institution defense of slaverybe- came apparentunder the duress of theabolitionist attack. Representa- tiveJoshua Reed Giddingsof Ohio, in a replyto JohnC. Calhoun's 1837 proslaveryresolutions, argued that if stateshad totalsupremacy on mattersrelating to slavery,then slavery had no jurisdictionoutside ofthe state and thus the federal government in itsnational policies was not beholdento live by the rule of propertyin people.77Denying slaveryany existence outside of muncipalregulation then became the centerof debateover the Wilmot Proviso. The battleover property rights in slaves was joined whenRepre- sentativeDavid Wilmotof Pennsylvaniaproposed in August1846 to prohibitslavery in theterritories acquired by theUnited States at the end of theMexican War.78 Northerners offered a constitutionaljusti- ficationfor the prohibition that was irrefutableas it was builton the southerners'own constitutionaldefense of slavery.The essentialanti- extensionargument was thatslavery did notexist in Mexico because the Mexican governmenthad abolishedthe institutionin 1822 and, therefore,the land that the United States was obtainingwas "free"soil in thesense that slavery had no footholdthere.79 The onlyway slavery

75 Remarkof WilliamSmith, Annals of Congress,4 Cong., 2 Sess., 1731 (December29, 1796). 76 See PierceButler, Judah P. Benjamin(Philadelphia, 1906), 42; CharlesH. Bohner,John PendletonKennedy: Gentleman from Baltimore (Baltimore, 1961), 170; RichardMalcolm Johnstonand William Hand Browne, Life of Alexander H. Stephens(Philadelphia, 1878), 185-86; Sydnor,Development of SouthernSectionalism, 244-48; and Howard Jonesand Donald A. Rakestraw,Prologue to ManifestDestiny: Anglo-American Relations in the1840s (Wilmington, Del., 1997), 89-93. On southernprotection of slaveryas a local institutionand associatedlegal doctrinessee WilliamM. Wiecek,The Sources of AntislaveryConstitutionalism in America, 1760-1848 (Ithaca,N.Y., 1977), Chaps. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7. 77 Sydnor,Development of Southern Sectionalism, 244-48; PeterB. Knupfer,The UnionAs It Is: ConstitutionalUnionism and SectionalCompromise, 1787-1861 (ChapelHill, 1991), 147- 51; and Wiecek,Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism, 179-89, 196, and 214-15. 78 The propertyaspect of the congressional debate is notprominent in the secondary literature. See ChaplainW. Morrison,Democratic Politics and Sectionalism:The WilmotProviso Contro- versy(Chapel Hill, 1967), 17-35; WilliamR. Brock,Parties and PoliticalConscience: American Dilemmas,1840-1850 (Millwood, N.Y., 1979), 180-83; andJoel H. Silbey,The Shrine of Party: CongressionalVoting Behavior, 1841-1852 (Pittsburgh,1967), 90-91. 79 Speechof HannibalHamlin, Cong. Globe,29 Cong.,2 sess., 195 (January16, 1847); and speechof MartinGrover of New York,ibid., 29 Cong.,2 sess., 137-38 (January7, 1847). PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 279

could be establishedwas by "positivelaw" or "municipallaw." The federalgovernment could not meddlein municipallaw, but,on the otherhand, where municipal government-state government-did not exist,then slavery could notbe established.Hence, slaveholders were imposingslavery on an area wheremunicipal government had banned it.80The rule of municipalcontrol of institutionsprotected slavery fromfederal intervention where it was established,but the same de- fensemeant the federal government was notcontrolled in itsdecisions aboutslavery where municipal government had notestablished it. And theterritories were beyond the grasp of municipalcontrol.81 Southernersimmediately reacted to northernadvocacy of theWil- mot Provisowith the convictionthat their property rights were in jeopardy.They insisted that the territories were common property to all thestates and thatthe federal government could notdiscriminate be- tweendifferent types of property. It is truethat between 1847 and 1851 southernersparaded a hostof concernsabout the territories-fear of beinghemmed in, thepotential of enoughnew freestates to pass an abolitionamendment, the need for new lands for slavery agriculture- but theirconstant concern was thattheir property rights were being questionedby northerners.They were appalledat the discussionof propertyrights in slaves."If anyof theserights can be invaded,"said Alabama's FranklinW. Bowdon aboutconstitutional protections for slavery,"there is no securityfor the remainder." Virginia's James A. Seddonargued that the Wilmot prohibition meant that southern prop- ertyrights "are to be frownedon and condemned."In late 1850,when the unionistmovement appeared in Georgia,Alabama, Mississippi, andLouisiana to vindicatethe ,a commonplank of thelocal meetingswas, first,to remindall of thebenefits of union but,second, to warnthatht should Congress at any timeexhibit its intentionsto warupon our property" or constitutionalrights, then "we standready to vindicatethose rights in theUnion so longas possible, and out of theUnion, when we are leftno otheralternative."82 North Carolinaeditor William W. Holdenbelieved that the proposals to stop

80 Speech of HenryC. Murphy,February 24, 1849, in Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix,169 (February24, 1849); JohnNiles of Connecticut, ibid., 30 Cong.,1 Sess., 811 (June 2, 1848); SamuelLahm of Ohio, ibid.,30 Cong.,2 Sess., Appendix,108 (February17, 1849). 81 The antislaveryconstitutional doctrines are coveredin Wiecek,Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism,189-94 and 210-21. See also Morrison,Slavery and theAmerican West, 54 and 77. 82 Bowdon speech,January 26, 1847, in Cong. Globe, 29 Cong, 2 Sess., Appendix,155 (January26, 1847); speechof Seddon,in ibid.,29 Cong.,2 Sess.,Appendix, 86, 87 (January7, 1847).Macon GeorgiaJournal and Messenger,October 16 and 30, andNovember 13, 1850. See also VicksburgWeekly Whig, October 9, 1849; and Brock,Parties and Political Conscience, 237-47. 280 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY slavery'sexpansion, end theslave trade,and abolishslavery in Wash- ington,D.C., "would renderour propertyin slaves comparativelyval- ueless, and all these measures togetherwould force abolition upon us as a matterof necessity."83 JohnC. Calhounin February1847 laid out thebasic southernde- fenseof slavery'sexpansion into the territories. His proposalsreflected a changein southernideas abouthow theConstitution protected slav- ery.He assertedthat territories were property belonging to all thestates of theUnion and that citizens of everystate had theright to removeto theterritories with their property. If peoplefrom the slave stateswere notpermitted to takeslaves into the territories, then the slave states did notenjoy the equality of rightsguaranteed by theConstitution and a majoritywas usingits power to deprivethe minority of itsliberty and property.Finally, a prohibitionagainst slavery in theterritories was a denialof the principle of self-governmentin the territories. The impact of his statementsled almostto an insistencefor national definition of propertyrights in slavesbecause municipal protection was no longera sufficientdefense.84 In connectionwith New Mexico's petitionto have a territorialgovernment and no slavery,Calhoun summarizedhis stand:"Our right to go therewith our property is unquestionable,and guarantied[sic] and supportedby theConstitution. The Territorybe- longs to us-to the UnitedStates." This positionbecame prominent amongsoutherners generally: the federal government had no rightto discriminateagainst property in slaves in theterritories.85 Indeed,southern legal thoughtunder the duress of thedebates after 1846 addeda noveltwist to thedefense of slavery.Some southerners arguedthat slavery was a naturalright, not a municipallaw, and thereforerequired legal recognitionand protectionby all levels of government.This reversalbecame apparent in 1848 whenAlexander HamiltonStephens in theHouse ofRepresentatives agreed with north- ernersthat legally slavery was onlya creatureof local law andthat the Constitutionwas forbiddenfrom carrying local laws intothe territories. Stephensthen argued in favorof legislatingslavery into the territories in orderto overcomethe Mexican prohibition of theinstitution. The

83 RaleighNorth Carolina Standard, June 20, 1849. 84 Calhoun's speech,Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 453-55 (February19, 1847). See Wiecek,Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism inAmerica, 282; Niven,John C. Calhounand thePrice of Union,318; and Brock,Parties and PoliticalConscience, 237-39. 85 Calhounremark, Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., 33 (December 19, 1848). See also Addressof the SouthernDelegation in Congress(Richmond, Va., [1849]), 8-12; resolutions presentedby ArthurP. Bagby,Cong. Globe,30 Cong.,1 Sess., 241 (January25, 1848); resolu- tionsadopted by theVirginia legislature presented by RobertM. T. Hunter,ibid., 30 Cong.,2 Sess., 440 (February5, 1849). PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 281 editorof the Woodville, Mississippi, Republican immediately saw that themunicipal defense of slaverywas flimsy;it made "thetenure by whichwe holdour slaves . .. ofno greaterstrength than a merestatute of limitations."Slavery, therefore, required a strongerdefense, and the editorfound it by affirmingthat slavery was based on naturallaw and was a "naturalright." As a naturalright, all thestates in theUnion had to agreeto its protection.Senator of Mississippialso carriedthe idea to theselengths. He wantedacceptance of therule that "theslave is property,which its ownermay carry with him into any partof theUnion ..... "In thedebates over the Compromise of 1850, he assertedthat slavery was like propertyin anythingelse, "it comes froman authorityabove law; it precedesall law. The law onlyrecog- nizesit."86 However,the southern position on theright to takeslavery into the territorieswas weak,and a numberof Whigpoliticians knew it. The problemwas thatsoutherners did notwish to give up thedoctrine of municipallaw, and,furthermore, they saw thatgranting Congress the powerto makea nationallaw permittingslavery in theterritories was an admissionthat Congress could also prohibitslavery.87 The editorof theRaleigh Weekly Register brought out exactly the dilemma that the Southfound itself in. The municipaldefense of slaverycould notbe sacrificed:"Under the local municipallaw, the Constitutionfound slavery,there left it, and there, and there alone, every true friend of the Southought to wishit to remain.""[T]hen we deny"all attemptsto say thatthe Constitution yields a "nationalsanction to slavery,or recog- nizes it as a nationalinstitution .... "88 The reasonwas clear: the Constitutionwould neverhave been formedif northernershad been toldthey had to accepta nationallaw thatdefined slaves as property. At the same time,of course,many politicians in the Southwere de- claringthat the Constitution would not have been ratified if property in

86 ThomasE. Schott,Alexander H. Stephensof Georgia:A Biography(Baton Rouge and London,1988), 86-89; and Woodville(Miss.) Republican,October 3, 1848. For furtherdiscus- sionsee Athens(Ga.) SouthernBanner, August 24, 1848.Remark of JeffersonDavis on Oregon bill,Cong. Globe, 30 Cong.,1 Sess., 927 (July12, 1848); and speechof Davis on HenryClay's resolutions,February 25, 1850,ibid., 31 Cong.,1 Sess., 420 (February25, 1850). On Davis and hisproperty defense of southern rights see ClementEaton, Jefferson Davis (New York,1977), 74 and 103.A differentversion is in Paul D. Escott,"Jefferson Davis andSlavery in theTerritories," Journalof Mississippi History, XXXIX (May 1977),97-116. 87 Thiswas theargument that both Robert Toombs and Alexander H. Stephenswrestled with, finallydetermining that the Congresshad to pass a positivelaw enablingslavery to enterthe territories.See speechof Stephensin Macon GeorgiaJournal and Messenger,September 11, 1850; speech of RobertToombs, ibid.,October 16, 1850; and letterof M. J. Wellborn,in Columbus(Ga.) Enquirer,July 8, 1851. 88 RaleighWeekly Register, July 11, 1849. 282 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY

slaves had notbeen recognized.The impassewas beingreached. The onlycomplaint that southerners could reasonably make about discrimi- nationagainst slave propertyin theterritories was thatit was unfair, notthat it was unconstitutional.However, people who believe that their propertyaccumulations are endangeredare notlikely to surrenderto constitutionalsubtleties. Northernersrecognized the changes streaming from the debate over slaverybetween 1846 and 1851. Popularsovereignty Democrats out- spokenlyopposed allowing slavery to move beyondmunicipal regu- lation,and CharlesLanphier-a confidantof StephenA. Douglas and the editorof the SpringfieldIllinois State Register-embodied such sentiments.For anti-extensionists,the new southerndoctrine of pro- tectionof slaverywas appalling.Slavery was being presentedas thoughit were above the Constitutionin its sanctity,and manyob- serversrecognized that the argument led inexorablyto a nationallaw protectingproperty rights in slaves,that is, thenationalization of slav- ery.It is in thissense that one has to understandthe reiterated phrase of anti-extensionists,"freedom national, slavery sectional."89 The propertybasis of theargument and its tendencieswere picked up by HoraceGreeley or one of his assistanteditors on theNew York Trib- une. Calhounwanted to place propertyrights in slaves on such a pedestalthat no legislaturecould ever interfere with them. A writerfor the Tribunedeclared that had gottenit righta decade earlier:"what the law declaresto be propertyis property."Whether Calhounwanted it otherwisewas immaterialbecause "as a practical matter,the Law determines,and mustdetermine what is Propertyand whatis not."And whatwas thetendency of Calhoun'seffort to make slave propertyso invincible?The Northhad acceptedthe rightsof statesto makeAfricans slaves and to give thema legal definitionas property."Mr. Calhoun's slaves are his property in SouthCarolina; but would they be in Wisconsin ... ?"90 To abandon one doctrine of propertyrights-that only municipalities could establish property rights in slaves-infavor of a Constitutionalguarantee of slave property meant thepotential expansion of slaverythroughout the nation, to theterri- toriesand ultimatelyto thefree states. Indeed,for northerners the debate over slavery's expansion induced

89 SpringfieldIllinois State Register,December 8, 1849, in whichLanphier editorialized: "Slaveryis a domesticinstitution, a municipal matter, over whichthe individualstates have exclusivecontrol. The generalgovernment cannot touch it without violating the constitution . . . "; Wiecek,Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism, 219 (quotation)and 282; andspeech of Joshua Giddings,in Cong. Globe,30 Cong.,2 Sess., Appendix,125 (February17, 1849). 90New York Tribune,February 22, 1847. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 283 a widespreaddiscussion of propertyrights in general.Northern con- servativesgenerally agreed with southerners that slaves constituted propertyand thatthe constitutional agreement required northerners to acquiescein thedoctrine.91 Abolitionists propagated the doctrines that 9 MAN CANNOT BE PROPERTY and thatrulers violated natural law when theyclassified people as property.92One themethe abolitionistsex- hortedthat actually did transfer to the ideology of the Republican party was thatproperty in manis immoral.Even the moderate John Sherman announced,"The radicaldifference between both wings of the Democ- racyand the Republican party, is whetherslaves are common property, likehorses and othercattle, or whetherthey are so by local law." And for a numberof people, slaveryraised the Jacksonianquestion of whetherhuman rights should take precedence over property rights.93 Two issues-first,the sanctityof propertyrights in slaves and, second,what authority had controlover those rights-made the terri- torialissue crucial.For decades historianshave triedto determine whetherslavery's expansion into the territories was an issueof material importanceto theSouth or not,and theconclusion is moot.94Never-

91 Forexample, An AmericanGentleman [Calvin Colton], A Voicefrom America to England (London,1839), 134; JamesBuchanan speech in Congress,1838, in JohnBassett Moore, ed., The Worksof James Buchanan (12 vols.; Philadelphia,1908-1911), III, 345; Knupfer,The Unionas It Is, 91; andCommodore Stockton, Letter of Commodore Stockton on theSlavery Question (New York,1850), 9-10. 92 Quotefrom Henry B. Stanton,Remarks of Henry B. Stanton,in theRepresentatives' Hall, on the23d and 24thof February, 1837 ... on theSubject of Slavery (5th ed.; Boston,1837), 21; see Amos A. Phelps,Lectures on Slaveryand Its Remedy(Boston, 1834), 115-18; JamesRed- path,The Roving Editor (New York,1859), v; and [TheodoreWeld?], The Bible Against Slavery ... (1864; rpt.,Detroit, 1970), 17. 93 Speechof JohnSherman in NewarkDaily Advertiser,September 14, 1860. For otherssee [JamesRussell Lowell], "The Election in November,"Atlantic Monthly, VI (October1860), 496; CharlesF. Adams,An OrationDelivered Before the Municipal Authorities of the Cityof Fall River,July 4, 1860 (Fall River,Mass., 1860), 6-7; AbrahamLincoln to HenryL. Pierceand others,April 6, 1859, in Roy P. Basler,Marion Dolores Pratt,and Lloyd A. Dunlap,eds., The CollectedWorks of AbrahamLincoln (9 vols.; New Brunswick,N.J., 1953-55), III, 375; and Authorof 'ArchyMoore' [RichardHildreth], Despotism in America ... (Boston,1840), 55. The debateover the nature of property in the1840s and 1850sis fascinating,but its intricacies cannot be introducedhere. 94 For example,Alfred H. Conradand JohnR. Meyer,"The Economicsof Slaveryin the AntebellumSouth," in HughG. J.Aitken, ed., Did SlaveryPay? Readingsin theEconomics of BlackSlavery in theUnited States (Boston, 1971), 138-39 and 174-75; and RogerRansom and RichardSutch, "Capitalists Wihout Capital: The Burdenof Slaveryand theImpact of Emanci- pation,"Agricultural History, LXII (Summer1988), 138. Otherinterpretations have invoked honor(Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethicsand Behaviorin the Old South [New York,1982]); an obliqueattempt to endslavery by bottling up itspopulation (William L. Barney, TheRoad to Secession:A NewPerspective on theOld South[New York,1972], xiv and 65-72); as a symbolicissue of the South's standing in theUnion (Escott, "Jefferson Davis and Slaveryin theTerritories," 115; and RobertE. May, The SouthernDream of a CaribbeanEmpire, 1854- 1861 [BatonRouge, 1973], 230); the southernneed forsocial mobilityso thatyoung yeomen farmerswould not turn against slavery (William L. Barney,The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama andMississippi in 1860 [Princeton,1974], 4-28, 38); anda fearof being surrounded by free states 284 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY theless,what concerned southerners was theirproperty rights in slaves and the federalgovernment's potential control over thoserights. To defendsuch rights, southerners demanded that the national government recognizein all its dealingsthe sanctityof propertyin slaves. For southernersthis was defensive;they were defending property rights- which,according to mostcommentators at thetime, was theprimary dutyof government-andseeking no expansionof rights,only recog- nitionof them. The importanceof property rights at thisjuncture also explainswhy thesouthern Whig party weakened and thesouthern Democratic party flourishedin theDeep South.Southern Whigs did not recover from the nationaldebate of 1848 through1852. The reasonwas clear:northern Whigshad an antislaverycontingent that could notbe controlledby southerners.95More to thepoint, southerners disagreed on manyis- sues-national policies,constitutional interpretations, territorial ex- pansion,and even how best to counterthe antislaverythrust of the North.But they agreed on thesanctity of property rights in slaves;that was fundamentaland consensual,beyond the touchof partisanship. Given the natureof the 1848-1852 debate,the questionwas which partycould best protectproperty rights in slaves-theparty with a nationalorientation or the partythat had always insistedon states' rightsand statecontrol of slavery.On theissue of states'rights, south- ernerscould use it to fortifyslavery and still gathersupport from northernerswith an animusto centralization.It was immaterialto practicalpolicy whether northern Democrats were antislavery or not, becausethe states' rights doctrine of theparty stopped their intrusion intoslavery-related affairs. Southern Whigs had no suchshelter. In the nationalarena the partywas saddledwith an antislaverywing that could damage slaveryvia nationallaws. Its inabilityto assurethe protectionof slaverysealed thefate of the southernWhig party and gave thesouthern Democratic party its hegemonyin the 1850s. Northernersalso calculatedexactly what the new legal dogmare- quired,and theydetermined that the requirement was thenationaliza- tionof slaveryvia thedoctrine of propertyrights. They reckoned that

(ErnestMcPherson Lander Jr., Reluctant Imperialists: Calhoun, the South Carolinians, and the MexicanWar [BatonRouge, 1980], 152, 166.) 95 On southernelections and thesouthern realignment of 1848-1852see WilliamJ. Cooper Jr.,The South and thePolitics of Slavery, 1828-1856 (BatonRouge, 1978), 270-77 and 304-43; Brock,Parties and PoliticalConscience, 184-97 and 318-26; and Bond,Political Culture in the Nineteenth-CenturySouth, 104-7. On theCompromise of 1850 see HolmanHamilton, Prologue to Conflict:The Crisisand Compromiseof 1850 (New York,1964), 11, 22, 54, 64, and 72-73; andMark J. Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico, and theCompromise of 1850: BoundaryDispute and SectionalCrisis (Kent, Ohio, 1996), 86-87, 140-42, 147,and 162-63. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SLAVERYAND CIVIL WAR 285 ultimatelyall northernstates would have to recognizeproperty rights in the same fashionas did the southernstates and thatnortherners wouldhave to obeythe laws of propertyrights in slavesregardless of theirmunicipal laws. The subjectof propertyrights was prominent in all the major sectionalconfrontations of the 1850s: the Fugitive Slave Law, theCompromise of 1850,popular sovereignty debates, the Kansas-NebraskaAct, , the Dred Scott decision, the LecomptonConstitution, and the territorialslave code. Southern politicianscontinually pushed for a recognitionof propertyrights in slaves, and northernerssaw such pressureas an aggressionby the "slave power"designed to nationalizeslavery. After the Dred Scott decisionnortherners believed the nationalization was close at hand.96 AbrahamLincoln's electionto thepresidency in November1860 sparkedthe fire-eaters in theSouth to severstate ties with the Union. Not everysoutherner was a fire-eater,however. The borderstates of NorthCarolina, Missouri, Tennessee, , Virginia, Maryland, Delaware,and Kentucky did not immediately accompany the departing statesof theDeep South.On thesecession question southerners were dividedinto camps of immediatists,conditional unionists, and uncon- dititonalunionists. Many southernerssaw no pertinentreason for se- cessionif the Lincoln administration obeyed the law; theyalso saw that the Republicansdid not controlCongress. Without an overtact of aggression-suchas coercionof a state-secessioncould notbe jus- tified.97It is worthnoting, however, that secession did followthe path of thevalue of slaves.Slavery was mostvaluable in thelower South and less in the border.Though the situationwas vexed as to who aggressedupon whom in 1861 (the firingon Fort Sumterversus Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteersto suppressthe rebellion),all southernerswere agreed upon one idea: propertyin slaves was invio- lable. Secessionistsleft little doubt that the sanctity of propertyrights in slaves was thereason for their drastic action. In the SouthCarolina "Declarationof Causes" forsecession, the propertyrights rationale

96 On thesesubjects, see Don E. Fehrenbacher,Sectional Crisis and SouthernConstitution- alism (Baton Rouge, 1995); Stegmaier,Texas, New Mexico, and the Compromiseof 1850; StanleyW. Campbell,The Slave Catchers:Enforcement of theFugitive Slave Law, 1850-1860 (ChapelHill, 1970); RobertW. Johannsen,Stephen A. Douglas (New York,1973), 396-415; Don E. Fehrenbacher,The Dred ScottCase: ItsSignificance in American Law and Politics(New York, 1978),esp. 190-91; AbrahamLincoln at Galesburg,October 7, 1858,in RobertW. Johannsen, ed., The Lincoln-DouglasDebates (New York, 1965), 230-31; HarryV. Jaffa,Crisis of the House Divided: An Interpretationof the Issues in the Lincoln-DougalsDebates (New York, 1959),283-89; and generally,Potter, The ImpendingCrisis; and McPherson,Ordeal By Fire. 97 These detailsmay be foundin Daniel W. Crofts,Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionistsin theSecession Crisis (Chapel Hill, 1989), Chaps. 5, 11, 12. 286 THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERNHISTORY leaps fromthe paragraphs. The Constitutionhad been a compactthat recognized"[t]he right of propertyin slaves" by representation,tax- paying,fugitive slave laws,and protecting for twenty years the impor- tationof new slaves. "We affirmthat these ends for which this Governmentwas institutedhave been defeated,"and in particularthe nonslaveholdingstates "have assumedthe right of decidingupon the proprietyof our domesticinstitutions; and have deniedthe rightsof propertyestablished in fifteenof the States and recognizedby the Constitution.... "98 In New York,the transplanted South Carolinian RichardLathers told a New York crowdin 1861 thatto bringthe southernstates back intothe Union,the North must decide affirma- tively"whether there can be such a thingas a claim forproperty in slaves.... The southnever will come back untilthat principle is settled."99 Giventhe smorgasbord of explanationsfor the Civil War,it might be askedwhy this explanation should be givenmore credence than any other.The answeris thatthe property rights dilemma by itself, cloaked behindthe rhetoric of states'rights, was capable of producingseces- sion;the collision was alreadyinstitutionally inplace andrequired little promptingfrom social, ideological,or politicalinfluences. And as questionsof authority-municipalor federal-overproperty escalated in the 1840s,both northerners and southernersbelieved that their so- cietieswere endangered, and thoseperceptions reached paranoid pro- portionsby the 1 850s. The existenceof two systems of property-both of whichproduced income from massive amounts of investmentand one of whichintruded with damaging effects upon the other-is suf- ficientto generatemassive conflict. One additionalaspect of human behavior,however, must be invokedin orderto obtainthe final result, civilwar: In orderto preserveaccumulated property, or evento extend thebounds of propertyownership, some people will killother people.

98 "Declarationof Causes WhichInduced the Secession of SouthCarolina," in FrankMoore, ed., TheRebellion Record: A Diaryof American Events ... (1 1 vols.; New York,1861-1865), I, 3-4. 99Pine StreetMeeting (n.p., 1861), 17, in RichardLathers Papers (ManuscriptDivision, Libraryof Congress,Washington, D.C.).