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UN Support to Local Mediation in Libya

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UN Support to Local Mediation in Libya JUNE 2018 From the Ground Up: UN Support to Local Mediation in Libya JOSÉ S. VERICAT AND MOSADEK HOBRARA Cover Photo: A placard of a rifle with ABOUT THE AUTHORS Libya’s flag crossed over it symbolizing a rejection of the use of weapons is JOSÉ S. VERICAT is Country Representative for the Carter displayed during a protest demanding Center for Israel and Palestine and a Non-Resident Advisor disarmament in Tripoli, Libya, at the International Peace Institute. December 2011. Iason Athanasiadis/UNSMIL. MOSADEK HOBRARA is a Researcher at and Co-founder of the Vision Center for Conflict Resolution. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent those of the authors and not necessarily those of the International Peace Institute. IPI ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS welcomes consideration of a wide This project is funded by ifa (Institut fu r range of perspectives in the pursuit of Auslandsbeziehungen) with resources p̈ rovided by the a well-informed debate on critical German Federal Foreign Office. policies and issues in international affairs. IPI Publications Adam Lupel, Vice President Albert Trithart, Editor Madeline Brennan, Associate Editor Suggested Citation: José S. Vericat and Mosadek Hobrara, “From the Ground Up: UN Support to Local Mediation in Libya,” New York: International Peace Institute, June 2018. © by International Peace Institute, 2018 All Rights Reserved www.ipinst.org CONTENTS Abbreviations . iii Executive Summary . 1 Introduction . 2 The Fall of the Qaddafi Regime and the Breakdown of Libya . 3 ELECTIONS BEFORE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM GROWING FRAGMENTATION Local Mediation in Libya . 5 UN Support to Local Mediation . 7 A GRADUALLY EVOLVING ROLE ENGAGING WITH ARMED GROUPS RECONCILING COMMUNITIES Conclusion and Lessons Learned . 18 NAVIGATING A FRAGMENTED LANDSCAPE MAINTAINING ACCESS FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY INTERVENING THROUGH LOCAL MEDIATORS LEVERAGING SOFT POWER TAKING A COORDINATED, LONG-TERM APPROACH EXPANDING BEYOND TRADITIONAL POLITICAL ACTORS LINKING THE LOCAL AND NATIONAL LEVELS ENSURING SOVEREIGNTY AND LOCAL OWNERSHIP iii Abbreviations BRSC Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council DAG Dialogue Advisory Group DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration GNA Government of National Accord GNC General National Congress IDP Internally displaced person LNA Libyan National Army LPA Libyan Political Agreement NTC National Transitional Council UNSMIL UN Support Mission in Libya 1 Executive Summary • Leveraging soft power: UNSMIL can compen - sate for its lack of resources by leveraging the Libya’s overarching statelessness, and the violence international legitimacy it bestows upon and lawlessness that result, permeate the country mediation processes. which is plagued by local-level conflicts. However, • Taking a coordinated, long-term approach: local mediation efforts have flourished over the last There is a need for more coordination within few years. As a senior UN official noted, “Local UNSMIL as well as between the mission and local mediation is the best thing that has happened in mediators. The international community also Libya since the revolution.” 1 needs to follow through on mediation efforts to Historically, Libyan society is equipped with ensure agreements are implemented. traditional mechanisms for conflict mediation. • Linking the local and national levels: While local There has also been much entrepreneurship in the mediation efforts may have had a positive effect field of conflict mediation in Libya, including by at the national level by containing and de- new actors such as shura councils, heads of escalating conflict, they have generally just municipal governments, and civil society activists. managed conflict without solving it. Beyond these local actors, the UN has become • Ensuring sovereignty and local ownership: increasingly involved in local mediation efforts, Ultimately, UNSMIL’s level of involvement in which are also inextricably tied to broader local mediation has been determined by caution processes of transitional justice and reconciliation against violating Libya’s sovereignty. at the national level. While the initial focus of the • Intervening through local mediators: Because of UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was on Libya’s complex social structures and internal supporting elections and a national political dynamics, as well as many Libyans’ mistrust of agreement, local mediation has become more foreign actors, the UN generally needs to central to its work over time. intervene through local mediators. While UNSMIL has sometimes focused on • Expanding beyond traditional political actors: mediating short-term solutions to local-level While UNSMIL’s national-level efforts have conflicts, such as through cease-fire agreements, it focused on political actors, local mediation offers has also launched more comprehensive reconcilia - an opportunity to engage with armed groups that tion processes in the search for long-term solutions could otherwise act as spoilers to long-term to intercommunal conflicts. In some cases the UN peace agreements. At all levels, the absence of has directly negotiated with armed groups, but it youth and women from mediation efforts raises has more often supported local mediators. The UN questions about the legitimacy of the agreements has engaged in local mediation primarily in the reached. west of the country, from mediating between a terrorist group and the army in Benghazi to • Navigating a fragmented landscape: In a engaging militias to restore stability in Tripoli. country without clear authorities and fraught with internal divisions, it is difficult for external Almost all of these efforts have involved attempts actors like the UN to know who different actors to resolve disagreements between revolutionaries represent. and former regime loyalists, though the shifting alliances of different groups and the complex • Maintaining access from outside the country: history of their interaction make it difficult to Being headquartered outside Libya has been reduce the roots of the conflict to such a simple UNSMIL’s greatest challenge, as most mediation binary. efforts require in-person negotiations. The mission therefore needs a larger presence on the The challenges UNSMIL has faced in supporting ground. local mediation efforts in Libya offer a number of lessons: 1 Interview with UNSMIL official, Tunis, November 17, 2017. 2 José S. Vericat and Mosadek Hobrara Introduction That “local reconciliation efforts must continue and be intensified” is one of the six points of the Of the three countries in the Middle East that have UN Action Plan for Libya unveiled by UN descended into civil war since 2011—the conflicts Secretary-General António Guterres in September that grew out of the Arab uprisings—Libya has so 2017. 6 The focus of this report is therefore on the far escaped the worst. While Libya has been UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and its through a civil war and continues to witness support to internal efforts in Libya to solve local serious violence, it has not suffered the free fall of conflicts or its mediation of such disputes. 7 This Syria, where hundreds of thousands have died, and report also contributes to the debate over how a Yemen, which is experiencing the worst humani - third party external to the conflict can support local tarian crisis in the world today. 2 actors trying to solve their own conflicts or can 8 One explanation for Libya’s resilience is that the even engage directly in those conflicts. numerous local mediation efforts taking place all In examining the challenges facing the UN as an over the country are acting as a brake on its actor in Libya, two apparently contradictory downward spiral. 3 “The situation in Libya is deteri - realities emerge: while many Libyans are wary of orating, but it could be even worse,” said a senior foreign intervention due to their colonial past and UN official. “Local mediation is the best thing that decades of anti-imperialist rhetoric, they are also has happened in Libya since the revolution.” 4 One welcoming of the UN and expect it to help them. Libyan mediator also commented, “Despite the When considering external efforts to resolve ongoing fighting, local mediation had quite an internal conflicts, respect for national sovereignty impact on the overall conflict. Local initiatives help becomes a particularly important consideration. create a more sustainable and conducive environ - Finding the balance between intervention and ment for de-escalation.” 5 respect for national sovereignty is in many ways the This report examines these local mediation central dilemma confronting the UN and others processes to explore the significance of their engaged in Libya today. This paper proposes ways impact. Are these processes able to provide lasting this dilemma could be managed. solutions to local-level conflicts? Can local This report also describes and analyzes how mediation efforts do more than manage conflict Libyans themselves are able to address and resolve without a functional state to guarantee the local conflicts, or at least contain their escalation. implementation of the agreement reached and put Historically, Libyan society is equipped with in place a broader transitional justice process that traditional mechanisms for conflict mediation. addresses the root causes of these conflicts? Moreover, there has been much entrepreneurship Without providing definitive answers, these are in the field of conflict mediation since the some of the broader questions this report raises. revolution in 2011. This includes
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