Changing the Narrative: the Role of Communications in Transitional

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Changing the Narrative The Role of Communications in Transitional Justice i

Transitional justice is in a slump. While it still ex- of the transitional justice institutions’ communi- cites academics and think tanks, it is no longer cations strategy must be more in the nature of the trail-blazing idea that forced leading human community building, in the literal and normative rights, rule of law and peacebuilding theorists sense of the term. Such work implies identify- and practitioners to stretch their minds and de- ing and if necessary forging coalitions of the velop new responses to the legacies and moral groups and individuals who are most invested dilemmas of mass abuse. in a larger nation building and value transformation process. This constituency can include Among the least commented causes of the victims’ families, survivors, civil society and slump is the fact that, for most of the last 20 youth groups, ethnic and religious leaders, and years, transitional justice institutions have tried all those in the media, academia and politics to tell too much of the storyline of the legacy of who have a broadly shared vision as to why the mass abuse on their own, disconnected from a legacy of past abuse must be faced and never larger national conversation and societal narra- repeated. tive that seek to re-imagine a different future in the aftermath of conflict or authoritarian rule. The idea that simply flooding the public with Some of the most powerful voices shaping such technical information on the transitional justice narratives – media, public intellectuals and mechanism’s mandate, procedures and activities artists – have been treated as just one more is sufficient to forge such a constituency – or type of ‘stakeholder’, rather than as distinctive create reservoirs of popular support – is sheer protagonists in creating the possibility of trans- fantasy. Transitional justice’s impact is not held formative results. back by a lack of technical information, but by a failure to focus on the higher goal of delegiti- This essay argues that communications and nar- mising the dehumanising narratives that impede rative must occupy a much more central part of a better future and helping to replace them the vision of transitional justice, as in the early with convincing and inclusive ones. The work years of the field. In some cases, the oppor- must be understood creatively, inasmuch as any tunity is ample, because a clear and inclusive transitional justice institution has the opportuni- nation-building project is underway. Then, it is ty to complement its more legalistic tasks with critical for transitional justice institutions to latch the kind of non-legalistic forums and initiatives their work onto the project, so that a critical (such as when Sierra Leone’s truth commission mass of citizens may internalise that work as an convened a National Vision project) that produce organic aspect of the broader process of reshap- the national conversation that is needed in the ing the society’s values and identity. aftermath of atrocity. But the work must also be understood politically, inasmuch as it often If transitional justice is not part of such a na- involves hard conversations and disputes over tion-building project – because it never existed truth, lies and narrative with the political leaders or was abandoned – narrative becomes even and journalists who see transitional justice as a more important. In these cases, the primary goal threat rather than an opportunity. As this essay argues, the process of humanising transitional justice bodies can catalyse critical those who have been systematically dehuman- discussions that may lead to two possibly sig- ised can only happen in the arena in which the nificant outcomes: greater public understanding dehumanisation took place: the public discourse of and interest in the role of the media, and shaped by the media and politics. One look at government consideration of possible reforms to current conflicts and crises – from Syria, to Sri the media sector that help advance peace and Lanka, Burundi and Nicaragua – shows how the the public interest. role of television, radio, online and print media (and their social media amplifiers) remains de- Ultimately, communication strategies in transi- cisive in laying the ground for hatred and mass tional justice cannot be limited to outreach ses- abuse. It is the media-shaped public discourse sions, media training, infographics and ‘human where the ‘other’ is reduced to a problem that impact’ stories. To achieve any transformation, needs to be removed and where those prepared the effort must be tied to a more multifaceted to commit the worst crimes are transformed into process and narrative and engage the most patriots. powerful voices that shape societal discourse. Above all, the transformative power of transi- For this reason, the communications strategy of tional justice requires the courage of imagining a transitional justice project must work on two a different society, which cannot happen without fronts at once. First, the media’s role in driving active engagement with the media and similarly past abuse must be the subject of vigorous influential producers of public opinion. Other- public debate – and when criminal conduct is wise, it will not be possible to prevent the tran- alleged, of investigation. Without this, a reversal sitional justice effort from becoming isolated, its of the dehumanisation that made past atrocities narrative delegitimised and undermined, and its possible is not realistic. Secondly, a deliberate transformative potential deactivated. The goals outreach strategy should be undertaken to help of transitional justice can only be achieved by a broad spectrum of journalists understand the promoting consensus around its larger objec- larger purpose behind the transitional justice tives: nation building, tolerance and non-recur- institute for integrated transitions effort, and why their views and involvement are rence of abuse. 2 important. By taking this combined approach,

ifit Breaking with the narratives of the past

The concept of transitional justice emerged in to imagine a different set of values from those Latin America in the 1980s and early 1990s, with that enabled industrial slaughter of Jews, the notable cases that included Argentina, Chile and ‘dirty wars’ of Latin America, the oppression of El Salvador. In comparative terms, it was a pe- African Americans and South African apartheid. riod marked by high political realism. The legal, If transitional justice ignores these higher aims moral and practical dilemmas so endemic to and narratives – and persists in the judicial po- transitions were not downplayed or dismissed by litical correctness so characteristic today – it has the principal actors, but rather acknowledged as no chance of being transformative. It will remain starting conditions for anything good to happen. mired in practical but ultimately technocratic The early experiments were also marked by high discussions about criminal sentencing standards, ideals and ambitions. The transitional justice truth commission documentation practices, policies were understood to have transformative collective reparation deﬁnitions and so on. Its potential, capable of shaping the public nar- impact will merely be legal, rather than also rative for a new political culture and collective being social and political. memory capable of replacing the ones premised on dehumanisation and exclusion. To have this larger impact, two things must happen. First, the court, truth commission, The ‘never again’ slogan used after the Holo- reparation unit or vetting body must understand caust and later embraced in Brazil and Argenti- its place and voice in the larger social and na; Martin Luther King’s ‘I have a dream’ speech; political process of delegitimising discriminato- Mandela’s ‘it is impossible until it is done’ ry politics, setting the historical record straight and ‘rainbow nation’ messages: all these were and exposing profound social and institutional framings of such new narratives, daring society failings. Secondly, the transitional justice body

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE must insert itself into the process of construct- But even when the local context is more pola- ing an alternative, inclusive narrative to replace rised or adverse – as in the case of the former the internalised, violence-producing one. That is Yugoslavia, discussed below – transitional justice because dislodging entrenched views of one’s cannot bypass the arduous task of seeking to enemies can only happen if there is an attractive shift the narrative. If it does, the effect of its substitute for the old identity and narrative. institutions will be limited to those who directly testify or participate; the reserves of political It is in this context that the role of communica- will to see transitional justice policies through tions in catalysing the transformative effect of a and achieve their originally intended impact transitional justice process needs to be exam- will dwindle; and the institutions’ legacy will be ined. In South Africa – the best known example short-lived under the onslaught of reactionary – the Truth and Reconciliation Commission un- politics and revisionism. The philosophy of ‘our derstood its work as part of a much larger social work speaks for itself’ – which has permeated process. Its constituency – spanning victims’ too many war crime tribunals, truth commis- groups, civil society, supportive politicians, me- sions, vetting bodies and reparations pro- dia, trade unions, academia, artists and religious grammes – is a non-starter for any transitional ﬁgures – ampliﬁed the content and messaging justice that is meant to be transformative. Bad emanating from the proceedings. It owned the starting conditions might make the work harder, process and the emerging new narrative, with all but do not preclude strategies capable of chang- its imperfections. ing the national narrative.

The illusion of existing outside the narrative

In 1996, Bosnia and Herzegovina was emerging of peace.”ii It was a momentous development from a brutal, fratricidal war that saw extermi- internationally, but it meant immeasurably more nation and genocide employed in pursuit of to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There political goals. As its people struggled to come was nothing that hundreds of thousands who 3 to terms with the impact of atrocity and re- were victimised wanted or needed to hear more gain some meaning for their lives, the issue of than that somebody – anybody – would deliver narrative was everything. A set of dehumanising justice. narratives had laid the ground for atrocities un- seen in Europe since World War II. Slobodan Mi- The existence of this court, and the messaging loševic´ and Franjo Tud-man skilfully reached back emanating from and around it, elevated the into history for myths of suffering and glory in prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators the struggle against Ottoman invaders to replace into the central mission of post-conflict Bosnia. the foundational myth of ‘brotherhood and unity’ The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former that held together Tito’s Yugoslavia. As Ratko Yugoslavia (ICTY) became an integral part of the Mladic´ set out to annihilate 8,000 Bosniak men Dayton peace agreement that ended the war and boys in Srebrenica, he called the deed an in 1995, acting as the principal mechanism for act of revenge for what Turks did to Serbs more dealing with the legacy of massive crimes com- than 400 years earlier. mitted in the name of ethnically pure dreams of grandeur. For years, the Tribunal, as everyone in When the war finally ended, it was obvious that the former Yugoslavia called it, obliterated any Bosnians needed a new narrative which would notion of alternative, locally-owned initiatives to define the context in which they were seeking arrive at truth or justice. truth and justice. Yet, it was the international community that ended up defining most of their However, the Hague-based Tribunal’s mission choices. In 1993, with the war still raging and was rejected by a critical mass of political some of the worst crimes, including the Sre- actors in the former Yugoslavia, especially Serb brenica genocide, yet to be committed, the first and Croat leaders. Its framing of justice as the international war crimes court since Nuremberg foundation for reconciliation lacked the authen- and Tokyo was established to “put an end to tic rooting of a locally-owned political project; grave breaches of international humanitarian instead, wartime narratives continued to shape law, bring to justice perpetrators of such crimes political and inter-ethnic relations. This resulted and contribute to restoration and maintenance in a societal cognitive dissonance: while the

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE Tribunal delivered on its mission of gathering ing wartime myths, fostering acknowledgement evidence of crimes and prosecuting perpetrators, of victims’ suffering and factually refuting the the facts impartially established in its court- dehumanising propaganda that had enabled the rooms had little impact on how ethnic groups atrocities and continued to justify and normalise saw the recent past. them after the war.

This happened for two main reasons. First, the The contradiction between the Tribunal’s prom- Dayton agreement kept Bosnia’s wartime leaders ises and its actions was best illustrated by the in positions of power, without any correspond- reaction the judges had to the second ICTY ing mechanisms or ambitions to delegitimise president, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, who insist- the political projects that produced the mass ed on creating an outreach ofﬁce to bring the atrocities. Consequently, there was no common accounts and the narrative from the courtrooms vision for the country’s future. On the contrary, closer to local communities. Most of her col- most political leaders from the three dominant leagues viewed the proposal as an ‘emotional’ groups – Bosniak, Serb and Croat – sought ways reaction to the fact that Serbs continued to deny of achieving wartime goals by political means. documented crimes. Although Kirk McDonald ultimately prevailed, resulting in the 1999 creation The integrationist narrative was largely owned of an outreach ofﬁce tasked with communicating by ordinary Bosniaks, the group which had in the languages of the region, this came six the overwhelming percentage of victims. They years into the ICTY’s work and was neither part embraced the Tribunal as a vehicle for delegit- of its regular budget nor central to its strategy. imising the Serb and Croat anti-integrationist It was not until a decade later, after all inves- projects, because the truth emerging from the tigations were completed and the institution courtrooms demonstrated how systematic crimes started focusing on its legacy, that there was a were used to achieve political and economic semblance of proper engagement by the Tribu- goals. This gave birth to the mantra, embraced nal’s leadership in conducting local outreach and by most Bosniak political leaders, that The building a regional constituency to shift the false institute for integrated transitions Hague’s justice would help correct the sectarian narratives about past atrocities. 4 status quo created by the war and by Dayton. At the same time, this made it easy for Serb and By then, however, the narratives about the court,

ifit Croat politicians to identify the ICTY with Bos- its legacy and most of the investigated crimes niak political strategy and to claim – persuasive- had been cemented by Balkan political elites, ly and persistently with their electorates – that it the media, religious leaders and education was biased against them. systems under their control. These were carbon copies of wartime myths, dominated by dehu- The second reason for the failure to achieve manisation of their enemies, glorification of war meaningful transformation lies in the Tribu- criminals and sanctification of their imagined nal’s own engine room: the judges’ chambers. victimhood. The facts established by the Tribunal Although a court of this kind is not ordinarily were seldom accepted in Serbian and Croatian understood to have a mandate to do more than public discourse, and there was no other tran- investigate and prosecute, the ICTY leadership sitional justice body that could compensate for rhetorically embraced the transformative man- the lost opportunity. date given to it by the UN Security Council – constantly repeating its message about deliver- That made it all the more absurd that the Tri- ing justice to the victims, ending impunity and bunal never altered its messaging, especially to contributing to reconciliation. Yet, it was never victims and the public in the region. Instead of prepared to go beyond purely judicial work managing expectations or making a deliberate and ensure that the narrative emerging from effort to shape the broader political and media the courtrooms became the basis for organised context in which its reputation and outputs public debate in Bosnia and the region on how would be evaluated, the Tribunal continued for to ensure that using atrocities as a political tool years to claim publicly, including in reports to would be forever delegitimised. The Tribunal the UN General Assembly and Security Council, leadership failed, until it was too late, to make that its work would bring justice to the victims, an effort at galvanising a broad constituency in end impunity, contribute to reconciliation and the countries of the former Yugoslavia that could even provide a historical record to make revi- build a new foundational narrative firmly reject- sionism impossible. A more honest message only

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE came in the last years of its existence; but by None of this is to suggest that the Tribunal’s then not many were interested to listen, espe- task was easily achievable. The exigencies of cially as the period was marked by internal scan- due process that the ICTY had to respect; the dals and several judgments which contradicted indifference of many of the Tribunal’s political its previous jurisprudence. The ICTY’s legitimacy masters; the vicious propaganda in the region: started being questioned even among its sup- these and other factors limited its ability to shift porters in civil society and victims’ groups. the narrative. But the Tribunal’s leaders utterly failed to accept that in order to deliver on its The paradox is evident. The Tribunal delivered proclaimed mission – expressed in lofty terms on on its legal mandate: it investigated and prose- the first page of every report to the UN General cuted some of the worst perpetrators, including Assembly – they needed a high-priority strategy political and military leaders and heads of state; focused on 1) frontally addressing media-promot- it established, beyond reasonable doubt, a sea ed denial and revisionism as one of the main of facts about numerous international crimes; threats to the court’s impact, and 2) expert staff and it amassed a huge and invaluable deposi- dedicated to supporting and mobilising a broad tory of evidence supporting those facts. Yet, it constituency, beyond a small group of hardcore failed to deliver on the transformative potential supporters in civil society, that could separate it kept marketing to the people of the former myths and facts and help advance a cultural and Yugoslavia and its UN overseers. It did not pro- narrative shift toward recognition of the ‘other’. vide a sense of justice for the vast majority of Instead, the judges treated such ideas as falling victims; it did not end the culture of impunity; it outside the Tribunal’s mandate. This misunder- did not hold back the tide of revisionism; and it standing, and the excuses it spawned, soon did not succeed in contributing to reconciliation. became the norm with many other international The ICTY’s legacy shrank, ending up relevant post-conflict accountability mechanisms. only to those who were prosecuted, the handful of victims who testified and a specialised legion of international lawyers and academics.

5 Constituency building as an insurance policy

The leaders of transitional justice bodies must intellectuals, youths, religious leaders, artists work with the context they have, not the one and others. they want. The ICTY operated in circumstances where there was no unified political narrative For the members of a constitutional reform framing the reasons why a process of reckoning commission, such a participatory, dialogue-ori- with the abuses of the past and their dehuman- ented approach would be self-evident. Yet, the ising myths was necessary. It thus needed to common reflex of transitional justice bodies engage in some proactive way in the process of that find themselves operating in unexpectedly building one. reversed political circumstances is to think that the indifference or opposition to their work is in- But what happens when there is such a unified surmountable, or somehow due to lack of infor- narrative at the outset of a transitional justice mation. “If only the public were better informed process, but the political will and public interest, about the great work we do and were able to perhaps thin to begin with, evaporates mid-way see it for themselves, they would embrace and through? The answer is similar: the leaders of support our mission”, one will often hear. This is the court, truth commission, reparation agency nonsense. The problem is never lack of aware- or vetting body must interpret their mandate ness or technical information, but of social con- expansively and make things like public engage- sensus or internalised public understanding of ment, media relations and constituency building why the process is necessary in the first place: central elements of their mission, staffing and a challenge the transitional justice institutions budgeting. They should focus such efforts on must accept and own. those who can play an outsized role in shift- ing social values and shaping a new narrative, Sri Lanka is an illustrative, albeit unconvention- including victims’ groups, but also journalists, al, example. In 2015, the coalition government

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE led by President Maithripala Sirisena (UPFA) and dent Rajapaksa, now in opposition, was a far Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe (UNP) came better communicator and would use the issue to power after unseating Mahinda Rajapaksa, to punish the government in the court of public a Sinhalese nationalist whose government was opinion. He would argue that war heroes should credited with defeating the Liberation Tigers of not be put on trial, and that the Sri Lankan Tamil Elam (LTTE) insurgency that lasted some people, not the UN, should tackle the issues of 30 years. The last stage of the war in 2009 was the past. marked by widespread killings and enforced dis- appearances of Tamil civilians and combatants The government was neither able nor willing to alike. In the six years that followed, the govern- respond with a compelling narrative explaining ment faced allegations of torture and disappear- why and how transitional justice, including trials, ances of Tamils as well as Sinhalese political was integral to the broad new direction the opponents and journalists. country required. In the face of the opposition’s more effective communications capacity, the The 2015 election victory came on the back of disillusionment of the civil society coalition that a popular movement that united former polit- formed the core of those who carried the consul- ical rivals, civil society groups, activists and tation process increased. The primary constituen- progressives of different stripes in a call for cy of that process was being lost. good governance, constitutional reform, an end to corruption, and national reconciliation. This Some in the government who were still commit- narrative was clearly captured in the Vision 2025 ted to transitional justice identified communi- document issued by the Prime Minister’s office: cations as one of the problems. The specialised “People in the north, south, west, and centre institution in charge of coordinating future tran- came together [in 2015] to vote for: a change in sitional justice mechanisms (SCRM) increased its Sri Lanka’s political culture against the politics of capacity to deliver on a communications strategy ethnic and religious division and extremism on to explain and promote the mandates of the all sides; against impunity; for a strong democ- envisaged transitional justice institutions. In institute for integrated transitions racy; for the rule of law and good governance; parallel, there were bodies with complementary 6 for reconciliation and sustainable peace; equal- messages on reconciliation, including the Office ity; upholding promoting and protecting human of National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR), led

ifit rights of all and the pluralistic nature of our by former President Chandrika Kumaratunga. society; and for inclusive and equitable growth However, all such efforts were futile without and development of the country.”iii clear political ownership or a strong constituency outside the government, especially in the face of Sri Lanka’s new government co-sponsored a the opposition’s inflammatory narrative in main- resolution at the UN Human Rights Council stream and social media. No amount of jour- which set out a laundry list of transitional justice nalist training, memorial exhibits and student plans. The commitments included to establish a workshops could alone overcome the solidifi- body to ascertain the fate of missing persons, cation of an anti-transitional justice narrative in an office for reparations, a truth commission the majority Sinhalese population. and an accountability mechanism to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes. The gov- Worse was yet to come. Immediately before and ernment then created a national Consultation during the constitutional crisis of October 2018, Task Force (CTF), led by prominent civil society President Sirisena’s rhetoric started embracing, figures, to gather the views of victims and the rather than rejecting, the opposition’s attack public on the priorities and desired outcomes of on the transitional justice process. The push the promised transitional justice mechanisms. for transitional justice thus became politically The consultation process also served, indirectly, orphaned. Technical information and targeted as a vehicle that helped galvanise a constituency reconciliation initiatives delivered by the likes behind these promises. of SCRM and ONUR had negligible impact, while the original constituency for the process But when the Task Force’s comprehensive recom- gathered around the CTF consultation process mendations landed on the government’s desk, remained on the sidelines, with some strong in- they received a cool reception, principally due to dividual voices but without a popular movement the recommendation to establish a hybrid war that could mitigate the loss of political will. The crimes court. The issue was that former Presi- communal violence of 2018 and the terrorist at-

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE tacks in which more than 200 people were killed mary constituency of revolutionary youth, victims by IS terrorists in April 2019 pushed transitional and human rights groups. justice even further off the radar. Notwithstand- ing the existence of an Office on Missing Per- Only the TDC’s public hearings helped miti- sons and an Office for Reparations, the focus gate some of this mess. With a strong team has since shifted to preparation for a future time of communications specialists to advise them, when a broader constituency and narrative can and drawing lessons from South Africa’s TRC, be rebuilt around why transitional justice is in Bensedrine and other commissioners recognised the best interest of all Sri Lankans. the value of live victim testimony in conveying the substance of the body’s deeper cause to Tunisia’s transitional justice story has several the public. A comprehensive communications parallels to Sri Lanka. In the immediate after- plan was put in place, in which every detail was math of the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ that deposed considered – from the choice of venue (a former Zine al-Abiddine Ben Ali’s dictatorship in 2011, holiday retreat of Ben Ali’s wife), to victim-cen- transitional justice was an early priority and led tred procedures (including special seating to the creation of a national consultation pro- arrangements) and a sophisticated online and cess in 2012, followed by the adoption of a com- media strategy that saw all Tunisian and regional prehensive Transitional Justice Law in 2013. The media present. The blanket coverage of testimo- latter established a Truth and Dignity Commis- nies of political prisoners, with their accounts sion (TDC) to investigate and document, among of torture in Ben Ali’s prisons and poignant other things, the abuses and corruption of the stories of love and loss, catalysed a catharsis in dictatorship. The TDC was given broad powers, the country which could be felt in real time by including to refer cases for prosecution and the hundreds of thousands following online TV recommend reparations. After a fairly transparent streams and social media coverage. process of nominations, the TDC commissioners were appointed; Sihem Bensedrine, an ex-jour- Although the hearings came late in the commis- nalist and staunch human rights activist, became sion’s mandate and took place only in Tunis, chair of the commission. they made it possible to re-galvanise victims’ groups and human rights organisations and pro- 7 Regrettably, the TDC was relatively slow in vide the TDC with reserves of broader popular getting off the ground, so the excitement of its support to withstand the political attacks during main constituency – victims and the revolution’s the hearings. Youth movements mobilised, for supporters – waned. Internal problems started example, to confront a government bill that to emerge, culminating in public conflict with the would have amnestied the abuses and corrup- chair, firing of her deputy and the resignations tion documented by the TDC. However, once of three other commissioners. The TDC’s commu- the hearings were completed, things went back nication effort was almost entirely consumed by to the old patterns of attack and defence, with attempts to limit the damage to its public image, Bensendrine in the eye of the storm. In 2018, compounded by hostile media coverage. The un- she was shouted out of the parliament when she derpinning narrative connecting the commission was due to report on the TDC’s last stages of to the key motives for the revolution – the fight work. for the dignity of all Tunisians and dismantling of a corrupt regime – started to dissolve amidst The commission’s 2000-page final report, detail- the media noise. ing abuses from 1955 to 2013, was released in March 2019. The prime minister accepted it but To make matters worse, in 2014, Nidaa Tounes, a branded the TDC’s work a ‘failure’ and never ac- new party made up of some of Ben Ali’s for- tively promoted it. In her final press conference, mer cadres, came to power. The attacks on the presenting the report, Bensendrine called on civil TDC, a regular feature in the media owned by society, victims’ groups and human rights organ- interests close to Ben Ali’s circles, intensified. isations to ‘take over from the TDC and continue Eventually, the new president, Beji Caid Essebsi, the work’ on implementing its recommendations. and his party succeeded in limiting the TDC’s It was the right message, but would have had powers. Even more importantly, they turned far more resonance had it formed the direction much of public opinion further against it – a task of the TDC’s communications and public engage- made easier by the confrontational responses of ment strategy from the start. Bensedrine, which alienated the TDC from its pri-

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE Media’s pivotal but neglected impact

If an inclusive shift in public narrative is the tically with a legacy of mass atrocity. Untamed, necessary goal of any transitional justice proj- their voices will drown out those of other ect that aims to be transformative, it is obvi- journalists, intellectuals and artists who have the ous that it is vital to engage the media. In the power – alone, or ideally in combination with former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia and just transitional justice institutions – to transform about everywhere, journalists shape discussion a divisive war of extreme narratives about the and opinion like few others. At their best, they past into a productive dialogue leading toward can be impartial fact-finders who vindicate the historical clarification and reasonable forms of public’s right to know and transmit stories that accountability and victim reparation. inform understanding of complex and controver- sial issues; at their worst, they can be forces of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis- hate and disorder, promoting deliberate false- sion (TRC) is a telling example of what is possi- hoods that lead to mass violence or underwrite ble when the transitional justice role and impact repression. of the media, in both its reformed and unre- formed parts, are understood and recognised. Media that align with political forces prepared It remains the best known truth commission, to use dehumanisation and incitement in their helped by being a tile in a greater mosaic of the treatment of the ‘other’ – seen notoriously in project led by Nelson Mandela to forge a new places like Nazi Germany, former Yugoslavia South African identity and replace the founda- and Rwanda, but likewise in Syria, Yemen and tional myths of apartheid with an inclusive nar- dozens of other conflicts – soften the ground for rative where race mattered less than citizenship. those who may follow with barrel bombs and Though such political conditions cannot easily electrical rods, indiscriminate shelling, ethnic be replicated, what is transferable is how the cleansing and systematic torture. Such media TRC set out to engage the broader public in a institute for integrated transitions normalise criminal policies and conduct, often painful but dynamic national conversation, with 8 mounted as a struggle against some ancient or media at the heart of its approach.

purportedly inhuman enemy. In the process, they

ifit reduce the targeted group to vermin, trans- Alex Boraine, the TRC’s late vice-chair, wrote: forming those prepared to commit war crimes “Unlike many other truth commissions, this against the defenceless into national heroes and one was centre stage, and the media coverage, martyrs. particularly radio, enabled the poor, the illiterate, and people living in rural areas to participate in Having abandoned what communications scholar its work so that it was truly a national experi- Cristopher Bennett calls a ‘duty of social respon- ence rather than restricted to a small handful sibility’ owed to democracy, such media won’t of selected commissioners.”iv Its backbone normally change spots when the conﬂict or dic- was a weekly digest called TRC Special Report, tatorship ends. Often still aligned with political which ran for two years on the main national forces fundamentally opposed to accountability TV channel (SABC), previously a vital arm of the or acknowledgment of the criminal deeds and apartheid regime. It employed some of the best policies they fomented, these journalists can- storytellers in South African journalism to tell the not be depended upon to champion an honest ‘stories behind the stories’ of the TRC and was reckoning of the facts and underlying causes of broadcast in prime time. past abuse, or to be humanising and civilising voices in the public sphere. They must be struc- In his account of media in the TRC’s work, John turally reformed or journalistically called out if a Allen, press secretary of its chair, Archbish- transitional justice process is to stand a chance op Desmond Tutu, says that broadcast media of achieving even some of its transformative coverage of the public hearings on human rights potential. violations was a direct contrast with how dissemination of similar information failed during Example after example – from Peru to Kenya, apartheid. In times before the information bom- Nepal and Poland – shows how powerful unre- bardment driven by social media, it was tele- formed media can be in diluting, delaying and vision and radio that gave South Africans rich ultimately derailing the effort to reckon authen- access to those who testiﬁed. As Catherine Cole

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE writes, “broadcast media provided a personalisa- by the ICTY and local courts, the media there tion and particularisation of the stories the com- continues targeting Bosniaks with virulent propa- mission called forth - stories that in aggregate ganda, denying crimes they suffered and cele- could otherwise be mind-numbing in magnitude, brating the most notorious war criminals. The scale and sheer brutality. Both the hearings and coverage essentially parrots the political views their promulgation via broadcast coverage made of the ruling elite in the RS and Serbia, which individuals the central site of the commission’s have fully rehabilitated the politics of Radovan communication ….”v Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb who led a campaign of systematic extermination of non-Serbs on the The transformative effect of the coverage was Bosnian territory envisaged for the future Serb also described by Archbishop Tutu, writing in state. a South African newspaper eight months after public hearings began: Though Karadzic was ultimately brought to justice, his legacy of promoting fear and hatred is One of our most substantial achievements … well described in the ICTY judgment against him: has been to bring events known until now only to the immediately affected communities Radovan Karadzic was at the forefront of – and sometimes to the small readership of developing and promoting the ideology and alternative newspapers – into the centre of policies of the SDS and creating the parallel national life. Millions of South Africans have governmental, military, police and political heard the truth about the apartheid years for structures that were used to establish and the first time, some through daily newspapers maintain authority over Bosnian Serb-claimed but many more through television and, espe- territory and further the objective of [re- cially, radio .… Black South Africans, of course, moving non-Serbs through commission of knew what was happening in their own local crimes]. Karadzic was a central figure in the communities, but they often did not know dissemination of propaganda against Bosnian the detail of what was happening to others Muslims and Bosnian Croats, which identified across the country. White South Africans, kept them as the historical enemies of the Serbs in ignorance by the SABC and some of their and insisted that co-existence was impossible. 9 printed media, cannot now say they do not He played on this historical narrative, and his know what happened.vi rhetoric was used to engender fear and hatred of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and The continued interest in South Africa’s TRC re- had the effect of exacerbating ethnic divisions minds us how engagement by public and private and tensions in BiH.vii media in transitional justice processes is one of the most important, yet comparatively neglected, Karadzic’s ugly narratives nevertheless contin- issues. This is surprising, because the promise of ue to permeate political and public discourse, transitional justice lies precisely in the possibility decisively shaped by the Serbian and RS media. for a critical mass of people to reconsider their Despite modest attempts at media reform, the past and reimagine their future; to move from a same agents of dehumanisation, masked as time in which violence and victimisation of the journalists, are in business today. They serve ‘other’ is normal, to one in which sympathy and different masters but the same ideology. Victims rights awareness undergird the relationships of some of the worst atrocities, including Sre- across communities and between citizens and brenica, the Markale market massacre, the Tuzla state. For that to occur, there is no substitute Kapija massacre and others, are mocked by Serb for the central role of journalists of the widest politicians whose voices are amplified through variety in transmitting facts and reporting the public television, radio and other media in the stories that, for the first or the umpteenth time, RS and Serbia. The effects on reconciliation are get a nation talking about itself in ways that foreseeably corrosive, devastating the capacity open rather than close down serious debate. of victims to forgive.

The contrast with Bosnia and Herzegovina is For any chance of transformation of this frozen striking. Despite overwhelming evidence of conﬂict into a stable, lasting peace, the shift massive crimes committed against non-Serbs in from denial to acknowledgment must happen in Republika Srpska (RS, the Serb-dominated entity the Serbian and RS media. Objective news and within Bosnia and Herzegovina) and established drama programmes need to be produced to hu-

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE manise non-Serb victims again and demonstrate one. It can likewise lead to a direct dialogue that empathy for the other is not betrayal of with journalistic associations and media groups Serbdom, as Karadzic’s ideology teaches and the about their role in the transitional justice pro- ICTY’s judgements failed to unteach. cess, helping them understand why dealing with the past is important for victims and society, but The contrasting cases of South Africa and Bosnia also how their active role can help ensure that and Herzegovina highlight that media coverage the complex and diverse truths of the past are can be a friend or foe of transitional justice; but exposed in a way that is honest and productive in either, the media’s voice and inﬂuence will be for all. determinative. It is thus confounding to see that in the communication strategies of most transi- To change something as entrenched as the val- tional justice bodies, the media are almost en- ues, culture or narrative of a society, the insti- tirely relieved of their responsibility – positive or tutions associated with transitional justice must negative – as a key driver of social beliefs and take the press far more seriously, knowing that behaviour. Their deliberate role in incitement, it will never be the website or Facebook page dehumanisation and normalisation of repres- of a tribunal, truth commission or reparations sion is rarely examined with a view to achieving agency that creates an environment favouring lasting reform. Even the journalists who were transformation and peaceful coexistence; nor victims rather than promoters of violence receive will it be the courageous testimonies of victims comparatively little attention from tribunals and and perpetrators. The determining factor will truth commissions, despite having often fought be what the media presents and encourages bravely to uncover truths about past crimes, us to believe; what it forces us to reconsider; risking their lives and livelihoods in the effort. and what it puts on the national agenda. The voices and stories of all involved will be known Although it is not the role or place of transi- and internalised by a great many, rather than an tional justice bodies to reform the media, early honourable few, only if media is at the strategic in their mandate they can and should catalyse centre of transitional justice, as both a subject institute for integrated transitions public debate on its past actions and future of interest and an interlocutor of the highest 10 possibilities and needs. This can help expand importance. That applies to courts as much as space for the emergence of a freer press (and other transitional justice bodies, even if the stra-

ifit the laws and regulatory reforms that may be tegic considerations are not identical. required) and reduce space for a propagandistic

Moving forward

This essay has argued that transitional justice cline. However, both views should be deeply cannot contribute to changing a divided society’s questioned. The most frequently cited cases of dominant narrative and self-understanding in effective transitional justice remain those from the midst of a transition unless its institutional the first 20 years (Argentina, Chile, South Africa, leaders view themselves as politically-engaged, Sierra Leone, etc.), not the last fifteen, in no communication-intensive actors rather than legal small measure because their transitional justice technocrats who operate outside of or remain institutions had a broader understanding about above the political sphere. Twenty years ago, the centrality of media and communications in the point was so obvious that it did not bear dealing with the past and helping generate an mention; today it requires reiteration. environment conducive to participatory debate and inclusive values for the future. Perhaps some consider political journalism less relevant today than in the past, due to To get things back on track, communications the weakening of traditional media (radio, TV, must be understood as existing in the mandate print) and the rise of non-traditional digital and of war crimes courts, truth commissions and social media. It could also be that, because of the like, not as an auxiliary activity ‘supporting the progressive codification and mainstream- the core mandate.’ The leaders of these bod- ing of international standards, some consider ies must be attuned to larger social goals and the last fifteen years of transitional justice as needs, hiring and promoting an influential team a qualitative improvement, rather than de- of specialists to ensure that communications and

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE constituency building priorities are considered Beyond this, the capacity of transitional justice in the design and implementation of work plans institutions to change the narrative in a divided at every stage and every level of operation. This society depends on more mundane choices and includes writers and artists who can use material values. For example, to build and sustain the from the investigations, daily work and public trust of the media and mobilise key constitu- events to develop and publicise stories that ex- encies, courts and commissions should com- press what statistics cannot and that mesh intui- municate openly and professionally about the tively with any new narrative under construction. effects of political attacks, budget restrictions, obstruction or other outside influences. Also, in Building upon that, discussions about the role the realm of training, the focus should be inward and impact of print, radio, television and social not outward: staff need to learn how to relate to media must be included in the design stage and deal with the media, more than the reverse. of the transitional justice process, taking into As to managing victims’ and society’s expecta- consideration their decisive role in shaping tions, transitional justice leaders must carefully public opinion. Models of engagement limited distinguish between the concrete deliverables to information sessions and media training on that their body is producing (e.g. a report, transitional justice are wholly inadequate. There reparations package, or criminal sentence) and must be sustained, substantive engagement and the values it is promoting (e.g. truth, justice, discussion with and through journalist associa- accountability, solidarity). Prosecuting some tions (or a tailored platform) to regularly canvass perpetrators does not equal delivering justice or the issues of the moment. Special reporting ending impunity. projects can also be undertaken to improve the scope and quality of coverage. In the end, the ‘our work speaks for itself’ philosophy must be abandoned by those shaping Above all, transitional bodies must proactively the communications strategies of transitional insert themselves in the contest of creating dis- justice bodies. The approach negates – and course, rather than just managing or responding wastes – the social roles and responsibilities of to others. This implies harnessing the capacity the bodies’ leaders in fostering the creation of of a wide variety of influential opinion makers; new, inclusive societal narrative. It also wastes 11 creating and effectively disseminating original the scope, in friendly and hostile contexts alike, stories and interviews; and initiating online and for building productive relations with influential public debates. Having visibility only when re- news and social media; organising and gal- sponding to spoilers’ attacks and disinformation vanising constituencies with a deep stake in the feeds the negative information loop and is what process of forging a new national narrative; and such actors seek. Through proactive engage- helping as many as possible become genuine ment, with a purpose-built, broad-based transi- owners of the messages emanating from the tional justice constituency, courts and commis- relevant court, truth commission, or reparation sions do not need to do most of the responding agency. To change the narrative, transitional to political attacks but can rely on their external justice bodies first need to change their mindset. supporters.

This implies the need for transitional justice leaders to understand their institutional ‘place’ in the process of enabling a cultural and narrative shift. This understanding must guide the communications strategy, both in terms of engagement with their primary constituencies and support networks, as well as in the creation and dissemination of relevant content.

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE Endnotes

i IFIT thanks Refik Hodzic and the many experts who con- v Catherine M. Cole, “Reverberations of Testimony: South tributed ideas and valuable insights to this paper. African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Art and ii UN SC Resolution 827: http://www.icty.org/x/file/ Media,”, in Clara Ramírez-Barat, ed.,Transitional Justice, Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_827_1993_en.pdf Culture, and Society: Beyond Outreach (Social Science Research Council, 2014). iii “Vision 2025: A Country Enriched” (Introduction): http:// www.pmoffice.gov.lk/download/press/D00000000061_ vi Cited in John Allen, “Media relations and the South Afri- EN.pdf can TRC” (unpublished paper), p.3. iv Cited in Catherine M. Cole, Performing South Africa’s Truth vii ICTY Trial Judgement Summary in the case of Radovan Commission: Stages of Transition (Indiana University Karadzic, p.4: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/ Press, 2009), p.5. en/160324_judgement_summary.pdf institute for integrated transitions

ifit

Founded in 2012, IFIT is an independent, international, non-governmental organisation offering comprehensive analysis and technical advice to national actors involved in negotiations and transitions in fragile and conﬂict-affected societies. IFIT has supported negotiations and transitions in countries including Colombia, El Salvador, Gambia, Libya, Nigeria, Syria, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE