BarryKosmin Old Questions and New Issues for Organized in the

1Introduction

Americansecularism is afeature of American exceptionalism.¹ It is unique in its origins as well as its composition. Ihavesuggested thatAmerican history since 1776 has produced alternations between eras of Christian religious ‘awakenings’ and periods of ‘secular’ or non-religious dominance and so, in effect,acontin- uous ‘culture war’ over the nature and purpose of the American nation (Kosmin 2014a). Recentlynationalsocial trends seem to suggest the country is enteringa new secular phase (Kosmin 2013). The ARIS 2008 findingsshowed that half of U.Shouseholds did not currentlybelong to areligious congregation and on the averageSunday73% of Americans did not go to Church. While 27%ofAmer- icans did not anticipateareligious funeral, 30 %ofAmericans did not believein apersonal biblical style (Kosmin et al 2009). And more recent surveys have confirmed these data and trends so we maybeatanimportant tipping point in U.S. history.The evidence demonstrates that the Zeitgeist,ifnot the Force, is with the secular and secularizing Nonesand this developmentmakes the analysis and studyofsecularism per se of major relevance for American social science. Religious conservatism, -based initiatives, -related terrorism, the New Atheist texts,and increasing use of digital and ‘social’ media have ener- gized and emboldened secularist advocates,networks,and organizations at both local and national levels. Accelerated growth in membership has been re- ported in recent years by nationwide organizations with clear secularist agendas includingthe Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF), (CFI), (AA),AmericanHumanist Association (AHA), (SSA)and the Military Association of Atheists and Freethinkers (MAFF). On the intentional side, public advertising campaigns and events have been mounted in major cities. This new secularist surge of has been framed, in part,asanidentity politics issue and movement in the United States. Some present themselvesasmembers of amarginalized and maligned minority

 The termssecular,secularist/secularism, secularize,and secularization here are used in the sense discussed in the Introductiontothis volume; referringrespectively to non-religious,ideol- ogythat endorses non-religion, activities or process of reducingthe influence of religion, and the outcome of that process.

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(not unlike gays and lesbians) whose rights have been curtailed or denied (Cra- gunetal. 2012). Such efforts maybehaving an effect.References to atheists (or nonbelievers), even in the American ‘publicsquare’,havebecome noticeably more frequent and prominent – such as, for example, President Barack Obama’s inclusion of nonbelievers in his first inaugural address (Grossman 2009) and ref- erences to ‘agnostic and atheist brothers and sisters’ by speakers at anti-capital- ist rallies(Landsberg2011). Nevertheless,until quiterecentlysociologicalworkonsecularizationvirtually ignoredactiveororganized formsofatheism andthe myriad of othersecularist constructs or thosethatshare criticismorrejection of religious ideas, behavior, or institutions, such as , secularhumanism, skepticism,positivism, andphilosophical materialismornaturalism (Pasquale2007; 2010). ColinCamp- bell noted ‘[t]hefactthatirreligious movementsact as agents of secularization hasstrangely enough been overlooked by sociologists in theircontributionto thecontinuingsecularization debate […]one hastosearchhardtofindexamples of sociologists referringtomaterialabout in this context’ (1971: 7).As Beckfordsummarizedthe matter:

[T]hey have tended to overlook, omit or deliberately ignore the significanceofboth organ- ized and diffuse attacks on religion. It is as if the progress of secularization could be ade- quatelyaccounted for in terms of the effect of abstract culturalforces, such as class struggle or functionaldifferentiation, without consideration of the agents and agencies that actively campaigned for secularism and secular societies.Given that awide rangeofcampaigns, movements and voluntary associationspromoted secularism, rationalism, and hu- manism in Britain and elsewhere, it is important to consider their direct and indirect con- tributionstosecularization and to interpretations of secularization. (2003:36)

It could be argued that in the U.S. the paucity of scholarlyattention to organized secularism until recentlywas justified because it reflected the societal reality of the lack of institutionalization and divisions that has bedeviled free thinkers and secularistsinthe U.S. for more than acentury. Onlyasmall percentageofthe millions who could be identified as Seculars belong to explicitlysecularist groups.Infact,secularism could be described as aclassic leaderless movement in America (Cragun&Fazzino, this volume). Despiteacceleratinggrowth in re- cent years, numbers of atheist and secularist group affiliates have always been, and remain, extremelysmall—not onlywith respect to the populations of the societies in which they emerge,but with respect to thosepeople who rea- sonablymay be characterized as substantiallyorthoroughly nonreligious (Budd 1977;Campbell 1971). Historicallyevenduringperiods of substantiallydeclining religiosity such as the 1930s and 1960s, secularist organizations failed to capital- ize on their opportunitywith even remotelyproportionate growth rates (Demer-

Brought to you by | Sacred Heart University Authenticated Download Date | 1/11/18 4:22 PM Old Questions and New Issues forOrganized Secularism in the United States 303 ath and Thiessen 1966;Warren 1943). As SteveBruce (2002) and John Shook (this volume) have suggested, the natural restingstate of secularitytends to be pas- sive indifference to religion, , rather than active atheism or irreligion. Secularist organizations (like the American Humanist Association, Council for Secular , Freedom From Religion Foundation and American Athe- ists) have been advocating secularization in the United States for decades, par- ticularlyaswatchdogsregardinginfringement of constitutional church-state sep- aration. While their activities has triggered skirmishes with religious advocates along the way, incremental increases in the population of Nonesseem more at- tributable to cultural, political, or demographic factors than to organized inten- tional activity.Asurge of religious abandonment in the 1960s and 70s, for exam- ple, was largely attributable to developmental adolescent apostasy in the Baby Boom generation (Putnam and Campbell 2010). Some Baby Boomers returned to organized religion but manydid not,giving waytoincreasing proportions of ‘Nones’ in succeeding cohorts as future generations werenot raised in areli- gion. Hout and Fischer concluded that ‘changeinthe religious preferences of be- lievers in the 1990s contributed more to the increase in no religious preference than disbelief did’ (2002: 178). Much like organized religion, secularism is adiverse and pluralist tradition producing competingvisions and organizations. Or,alternatively and negatively, it can be pictured as aweak worldview movement rent by lack of consensus on definitions and goals from its inception (Rectenwald, Mastiaux, this volume). Secularism has had asectarian quality since its beginningsbecause of the man- ner in which diversityofphilosophicalapproach to “human consciousness” as demonstratedinthe Shook’selaborate taxonomy(this volume) weretranslated into calls for social and political action with regard to religion. This uncertainty has produced avariety of binaries thatcan be described as “soft” and “hard” secularism (Kosmin2007). On one sideisthe “substitutionist” or “accommada- tionist” tradition of Holyoake, Huxley and Dewey,and before them the “soft” thinkers of the Enlightenment,such as John Locke, Adam Smith, and Thomas Jefferson, whose view of humanity led them to doubt that secularization would be sweeping,thorough and total. The SundayAssembly(see chapters by Smith and Frost in this volume) maybeseen as acontemporary illustration of this tradition. On the “hard” side standsthe “eliminationist” and “confronta- tionist” tradition of “out Atheists” likeBradlaugh, Marxist-Leninists and nowa- days the New Atheists (Campbell 1971,54). The Atheist Alliance and the Ameri- can Atheists (see chapters by Mastiaux, and Fazzino&Cragun in this volume) are contemporary examples of this second type. Disagreements over strategyand style reflect these longstanding and deep ideological divisionsamong secularists (Richter and Langston this volume). In

Brought to you by | Sacred Heart University Authenticated Download Date | 1/11/18 4:22 PM 304 BarryKosmin the contemporary U.S. the degree to which active atheism, particularlyasadvo- cated by the , mayhavecontrary effects – promptingreligious back- lash, promotion, and reactionary adherence – cannot be discounted (Bullivant 2010;Kosmin 2014b). This hostility to atheism as aresult of its radical image, of course, is longstandingand consistent with the teachings of John Lockein ALetter Concerning Toleration (1689). As in the past,this negative reaction prompts debate and disagreementamong secularistsofvaryingstripes (e.g., Baggini 2007;Kurtz 2010;Uhl 2011). ‘Moderates’ often advocatingapositive free standing secularism complain that acerbic or absolutist ‘shock and awetac- tics. ..polarize identities’ and push otherwise moderate religious allies ‘into the arms of the extremists’ (Baggini 2007:42, 44). In the U.S. onlyatinypercentageoffreethinkers have ever been affiliated with secular organizations whereas around 60%ofthe religious population cur- rentlybelongstoacongregation (Kosmin and Keysar 2009). The low rates of af- filiation, mobilization and participation is even more problematic in the current circumstances of arapid increase in the potential constituencyfor organized sec- ularism. This deficiencyisafamiliar theme in secularist gatheringswherethe “faithful faithless” lament the failureofnon-theist organizations to realize their full political and cultural potential– their inability to penetrate and mobi- lize theirnatural market.Secularist organizations todayasinthe past do indeed face asocial marketingproblem as the preceding chapters directlyand indirectly evidence. Organized secularism in the U.S. has failed to affiliate even afraction of the morethan 10 million strongcoreconstituencyofself-identifying non-be- lievers – the “hard secularists” (Kosmin 2007), those willing to self-identifyas atheists and agnostics.Usingwider theological or (un) criteria as by set out in Shook’s “polysecularism” this targetgroup could be even alargerand more sizeable demographic amounting to one in four Americans accordingto the findingsofrecent national surveys.Secularist organizations have no real need to proselytize since they alreadyhavea50 million strongpotential constit- uency of Nones. Organic economic and societalforces have created this social momentumtowardsmasssecularity.Thusthe present challengefor secularist or- ganizations is not to produce growth but buildingthe self-awareness and the mobilization of this population. The result of this lack of mobilization and struc- tural weakness is most evident in the political arena where identifying Nones are almostnon-existent and so the most under-represented population in the coun- try in terms of political office holders.

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2Recruitmentand OrganizationalChallenges

The religiosity of the United States, compared with other developedsocieties, can be attributed to a ‘supply-side’ proliferation of religious products in acom- parativelyfree market.Secularism seems to have asimilar trajectory (Kosmin and Keysar 2006). We can explain the sectarian syndrome of proliferating small secular groups,byapplying an economic market model to secular choices that parallels the religious marketplace. When free of monopolistic or govern- mental control, religious products naturallyproliferate to satisfy multiple needs and varyingtastes.The demographic profile of secularist activists is heavy with educators and intellectuals. This means secular organizations spend lot of time and energy on mission statements and discussion of principles often without reachingconsensus.But manymore non-activist secularists re- main unaffiliated. There is an obvious need to explain the paradoxofrapidlygrowingnumbers of Nonesalongside onlyaslight uptick in secular organization affiliates and so the weakness of organized secularism. The most significant cause is thatmost Nones are Apatheistsasindifferent and uninterested in secularism as they are in religion (see Langston, Shook this volume). Individuallythey have undergone asecularization of consciousness in that they have lost anysense of sin, concern for dayofjudgement,afterlife, heavenand hell and manytraditionalsocial ta- boos. Yetparadoxicallythe rise of “individuation and personalization” (Hoesly this volume) has inhibited affiliation with overtlysecularist organizations. Pre- sumably, one constraint for most Nones is that manyoftheir immediate family and friends are believers. In fact,inU.S. society most discrimination and hostil- ity against non-believers arises from familyand friends rather than strangers in institutional settings(Cragun et al. 2011). The lack of consensus over nomenclature and boundaries highlighted in this volume reflects the tensions among secular people over secular identities. Aty- pologybased on “state of individual consciousness” produces abinary model of hard and soft secularisms (Kosmin 2007). This bifurcation of secular perspectives on philosophyand religion comprises onlyone dimension of this typology. The second dimension is basedonthe distinction between individuals and institu- tions. Herethe individual aspect primarilypertains to states of consciousness while the institutional aspect relates to social structures and their cultural sys- tems.Inreality,these are not closed cells but ranges stretched between the po- larities of the dimensions. Arangeofintermediate positions can and does exist between soft-soft and hard-hardsecularism. In addition, the boundarybetween the individual and the institutions is not firm in real life. There is interplaythat

Brought to you by | Sacred Heart University Authenticated Download Date | 1/11/18 4:22 PM 306 Barry Kosmin involves social expectations and constraints originating from institutions on the one hand and extreme subjective mental states thatare individuallybasedon the other.Given the intellectualism of secularists the outcome of all this is a predilection for sectarianism (Fazzino &Cragun, this volume). The pioneering research on affiliation and membershippatterns among sec- ularistsbyFrank Pasquale (2007) highlighted this trend towardssectarianism. Nones tend to be individualists and skeptical of the value of organizations. They werenever the typeswho joined the Elks, Rotarians and Masons, the tradi- tional fraternal membership organizations, which are on the decline in the con- temporary world of bowlingalone.The character of the secular impulse itself tends to militate against institutional participation specificallyonthe basis of metaphysical world views. Pasquale goes as far as to suggest that manynon-be- lievers are “conflicted” about their own individual preferences and motives(Pas- quale 2010:2). Another factor that militates against affiliating most Nones is their individual psychological profile. They tend to be rather analytic and criti- cal. They have difficulty endorsing standard statements of opinion. They would rather dissect and discuss than offer straight positions. Most dislike labels and labeling. Whereas atheists tend to be confident in their identity and hold strident opinions, by wayofcontrastthe more numerous agnostics,humanists, and ‘softer secularists”,hold to more moderate and qualified opinions. Their openness to alternativesand unwillingness to commit to asingle viewpoint makes them particularlyhard to organize. Thus secularism unsurprisingly has no official hierarchyorleadership. The obvious contrast to this semi-anarchic sit- uation among free thinkers is the authoritarianpersonality types found in fun- damentalist religious groups (Ellison and Sherkat 1993), composed of individuals who are anxious to submit to an authority and to follow acharismatic and often disciplinarian leader. The notion thatsecularizationislinked to apreference for autonomyfinds support elsewhereaswell. Langston’sresearch (this volume) tends to discredit ideological barriers and point out the psychological disposition and structural weaknesses and fractures thatcharacterize secular organizations. Similarly, Bruce (2002) views the process of secularization as an individual process. While it can be characterized as affecting large collectivities, the decision to be secular is not adecision that is made at the group level. ForBruce, this de- cision is reachedonanindividual level. Each single individual makes up his or her own mind, however affected they maybebyothers, and therefore they all experience secularization as affirming their individual autonomy. The rela- tionship of leaders to led is difficult because Nones tend to be suspicious of cha- risma and authority.Heightened individualism creates amentality (if not the pol- itics) wherebyamajority is more libertarianthancommunitarian in organizational

Brought to you by | Sacred Heart University Authenticated Download Date | 1/11/18 4:22 PM Old Questions and New Issues forOrganized Secularism in the United States 307 outlook.For example, Mastiaux(this volume)showedthere is alarge pool of sec- ular sympathizers butthere is alackofsecular missionaries. Obviously, the small size of secularist organizations means alack of resour- ces and professionals (clergy). This in turn weakens recruitment efforts so there is little outreach activity.Another indicator of institutional weakness is apaucity of donors, particularlylarge givers, to subsidize outreach. This deficiencymeans secular organizations have to rely on self-recruitment largely (Mastiaux, Schultz, Smith, Frost,this volume) and on social media. As aresultthereislittle face to face engagement.DeTocqueville sawvoluntary organization as astrength and uniqueness of American society.Yet most types of membership organizations e.g. trades unions, fraternalorganizations such as Elks, Masons etc. are in de- cline and suffer from the bowlingalone syndrome that weakens manyvoluntary organizations today(Putnam,2000). Still, this is aparticular problem for acon- temporary movement that lacks inherited infrastructureand plant. Added to thoseproblems is the fact thatmost voluntary organizations are hit by burn out and turnover.Thisisafeature even of the student organizations SSA and CFI on collegecampuses. They operate in friendlymarkets with aconstitu- ency unburdenedbyfamilyand job responsibilities but they face adifficult mi- gratory structure namely afast turnover of volunteer leadership (McGraw 2016). Todayorganized secularism faces achallengeinhow to decide how to use to best advantagethe groundswell of popular sentiment and opinion and the or- ganic, secular trends in society and economy. We have to realize that member- ship organizations are hard to maintain and resource in today’ssociety if you are not offering tangibles,power or salvation to your followers;ifthe goal is to fight for their hearts and minds but not their souls. Rational choice theorists (Stark 1999;Stark and Bainbridge 1985) arguethat human beingspervasively de- pend upon the supernatural ‘compensators’ offered by salvational religion for unfulfilledworldlyexpectations and rewards. If true, that reality requires secu- larists to learn new ways and techniques to acquirepeople’sloyalty. The role of the Internet in creatingnetworks of seculars into new organiza- tional formsisaparamount concern for secular organizations. But how does that translate into changingpeople’ssense of belongingoridentification, which is necessary to grow amovement?The emergence of digital technologies (internet, social media) – another structural (or infrastructural) factor – is likelyplaying a role, particularlyamong the young (Addington, this volume). Ayoungdemo- graphic is not hidebound by tradition so they are earlyadopters of technology. Atheists are arare population, ageographicallydispersed minority in manylo- cations. Younger cohorts,inparticular, who wereweanedonthe Webare consid- ered ideal for creating ‘imagined communities’ and virtual movements through blogs, Internet-organized ‘meet-ups’, ‘tweets’ and ‘open posts’ (Cimino and

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Smith 2011;Smith and Cimino 2012). These new media are enablingatheistic messages to reach largeraudiences, no matter how remote or culturallyinsulat- ed. How far this trend can overcomethe face-to-face deficiencies onlytime will tell. Another methodology which has been adopted by organized secularism re- centlyispublic signaling –stickers,flags, tee-shirts, advertising posters on buses and on the highwaysand Reason Rallies. In 2014 several secularist organizations joined togethertocreateanew “OpenlySecular” initiative (Openlysecular.org). The outrageand grievancepeddling described by Mastiaux (this volume) as “moral Shock” is best seen in the FFRF strategyofseeking legal fights in middle America,suing local governments, schoolboards and police departments over and religious symbols infringingthe separation of church and state. As we have noted, Nones tend to be individualists,not joiners. Most Nones also tend towards being political independents but that is not entirelytrue of secular activists. The profile of the leaders and members of secular organizations is an important factor in the imageand appeal. Activist secularists and the lead- ership are overwhelminglymale, white, well educated, older,and affluent (Key- sar,2007). The social majority of secular activists in terms of race, education, age and income, regardless of wherethey live,has all the characteristics consistent with political conservatism and country club membership, or so one would think. The reality is otherwise. Forexample, 64 %ofthe readers of the Council for ’sofFree Inquiry self-identified in 2015 as Liberals or Pro- gressives(TomFlynn 2016). AA and AHAmembers tend to be even more likelyto be social and political progressives(Fazzino &Cragun, this volume). This overlap between political liberalism and public secularitycan be expected to deepen under the Trump administration. Nevertheless,gender differences and minorityrepresentationare important differentiators that help explain the profile of identification groups and organi- zations. Mentend to be more militantthanwomen and thatfactor is said to in- hibit female recruitment.This has led to calls for more diversity by gender and race. So CFI has sponsored threeWomen in Secularism Conferences and AHA and CFI have established sub-groups for African-Americans. There is some recog- nition among secular activists of generational issues and an emphasis on recruit- ing Millenials. Indeedthe student generation is very sympathetic to secularism but few seem to have the time or inclination to be activists, the interest to pur- chase secularist publications, or the resources to be donors (Kosmin 2014c). As regardsHispanics and Asians,secular organizations are myopic. Re- search such as the Institute for the StudyofSecularism in Society and Culture’s (ISSSC) reportonLatinos, has been ignored by secular organizations (Navarro et al). This failureepitomizes the short-sightedness problem of secularist organiza-

Brought to you by | Sacred Heart University Authenticated Download Date | 1/11/18 4:22 PM Old Questions and New Issues forOrganized Secularism in the United States 309 tions and their obliviousness to important facts and opportunities. The findings show thatdespite the stereotype of Latinosbeing anaturallyreligious commun- ity there is anew and expanding constituencyofNones among collegeeducated and English-speaking Latinos. These people are totallyinvisibletothe media, scholars and unfortunately to most secular organizations. The explanation is that they fail to fit the common stereotypeofthe religious Latino. That prejudice is explicable for the media that loves stereotypes and values exoticism and pho- togenic Catholic processions but secular organizations lose whenthey ignoreso- cial reality.The samedeficiencyreappearsintheirfailuretooutreach to Asian- Americans who ISSSC research has repeatedlyidentified as the most secularized population group in the country.Inshort,the leadership profile and member- ship ranksoforganized secularism appear unlikelytobetransformed in the near future.

3Congregation and Community Models

The membership of religious congregations in the U.S. has ademographic profile very different from that of the secular organizations – older whitemales – as de- scribed above. The churches tend to disproportionallyattract rural dwellers,Af- rican-Americans, older women and youngfamilies (Kosmin and Keysar 2006; Manning 2015). The secular SundayAssemblies’ constituencydescribed by Smith and Frost (this volume) appears different again, having adistinct social background and psychological profile mainlycomposed of urban young singles, the proverbial Yuppies.Yetthese “seekers” of groupness and community are very much aminority of the secular Nones (Schutz, Smith, this volume). This popula- tion’sneed for the support of others is often derided by the majority of the acti- vist seculars, with their more individualisticand autonomous personalitiespar- ticularlyby“out Atheists” with grievances against religion or escapingwhat they see as personal trauma causedbyreligion. As we have noted expressive individu- alism is more common thancollectivism among Nones. Nevertheless the Sunday Assemblymovement has attracted attentionfrom the media. It is regarded as a strategythatmight overcome the problems and constraints of organized secular- ism with recruitment described above. Apparentlythe new technology and media workwell for SundayAssemblies as they do for Evangelicals. These move- ments are not as burdened by complicated and clergy-focused rituals as are Catholic and Orthodox Christianity,Judaism and Hinduism (Addington, this vol- ume). Historicallythe American population has been socialized to see the Protes- tant congregational model as normative.The cultural hegemonyoforganized re-

Brought to you by | Sacred Heart University Authenticated Download Date | 1/11/18 4:22 PM 310 Barry Kosmin ligion and Christianitymeans thatNon-Christian traditions, Jews, Buddhist, Muslims and Hindus have adopted this congregational structure in America. The SundayAssembly’sparticularorganizational structure is the layled Protes- tant denominationwith aliberalmodel of standardized services and notions of voluntary work towardsthe “common good”.The medium is the message.The SundayAssemblyhas adopted afamiliar Protestant Christian format and style geared to its constituencyofyoungRecovering Protestants meeting in adecon- secrated church on aSundaymorning. Of course an organizational model of secularized congregations parallel to organized religion has been tried before by Ethical Culture, Humanistic Judaism and the Unitarians but it did not taken off as amass movement.One reason is that Secular Humanism and atheism have found it difficult to easilyreproduce the familyand generational nexus of ties that religion offers. If the SundayAs- semblyistosucceed it will need to provide the social provision typical of reli- gious congregations such as welfareand charity workand earlychildhood edu- cation (Manning 2015). Secular ceremonies and life cycle rituals are obvious next steps.The Assemblies’ predicament is whether to follow the Humanistic Judaism and Ethical Culture model and label themselvesasareligion with clergy,thus gainingthe attendant tax and legal advantages, or to utilizethe Universal Life Church fiction (Hoesly this volume). Yetmanysecularists value radical purity and the sectarian and fissiparous tendencies that plague secularism have al- readyaffected the Assemblymovement with the rise of the “splitters” of Godless Revival (Smith; Fazzino and Cragun, this volume) It is worth placing the SundayAssemblyinthecomparative context of the earlier efforts at secular congregationalism because it provides insights into the particulardilemmasorganized secularism faces.Ethical Culture(American Ethical Union) was founded by Felix Adler in City in 1877.Adler was adeconverted rabbi and son of aReform Rabbi. Very much a “progressive” he organized Sundaymeetingsinanattempt to offer amore universalistic, ethnicity free inclusive organization. Ethical Cultureoffered life cycle rituals. Itsmotto was “deed not creed” and it was geared to urban social action sponsoringakinder- garten, school and housing and philanthropic projects (Radest 1969). Humanis- tic Judaism, the “SaturdayAssembly”–aJudaism without God- was foundedin in 1963byRabbi Sherwin Wine (Rowens 2004). It has 30 congregations and 10,000 members in the U.S. Compared to Ethical Culture and the SundayAs- semblyits services offers more ritualistic ceremoniesthat reflect the heritageof the audience, includingcensored traditional Hebrew texts.Itissocially progres- sive,welcomes “intermarried” couples and operates gender equality (Chalom 2010).

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The secular congregations maybeviewed as close to Comte’svision of reli- gions of humanity. And their placement on the soft sideofsecularism makes them open to joining ecumenical religious coalitions and civic alliances with lib- eral religious traditions and so fitting into the civiclife of mainstream America. The public’sdemandfor life cycle rituals and particularlystate recognized mar- riageceremonies encouraged Humanistic Judaism and Ethical Culturetoclaim official status as and recruit clergy as state recognized marriageoffi- cers.That strategyprovides tax privileges (e.g. clergy parsonagetax relief) and legal autonomyfor the congregation (the same fiction described by Hoesly for the ULF). The exploitation of unique U.S. constitutional provisions particular- ly freedom from financial supervision (e.g. exemption from the the need to sub- mit IRS Form 990 that applies to other non-profit organizations) favors organized religion and disadvantages organized secularism unless it compromises. Onere- sponse is to establish secular celebrant training program and severalsecularist organizations have begun campaigns for state recognition (e.g. 2016). Alongsidethat,they can fight for alevel playing field and true equality e.g. the FFRF claim for parsonagetax relief (FreethoughtToday, Vol33No5June/ July 2016). Burial and death rituals are less subject to state intervention than marriage licensingbut consumerism and market forces are more at play. The ARIS 2008 finding,which discovered that 27%ofAmericans do not expecttohaveareli- gious funeral, was asurprise. But it was noted by funeraldirectors and that in- dustry has responded to market forces such as the rising demandfor cremation (ThePittsburgh Post-Gazette, 8.21.2015) Structural forces such as the existenceof an established industry makes it difficult for secular organizations to exploit the rising preference for non-religious interment.Asecular community can offer support and consolation in bereavement but this remains afamily arena and most families stillhaveareligious majority that sees secular “toolkits” as having an emotional deficit (MacMurray,this volume) compared with traditionalreli- gious burial and mourning rituals.

4Appropriationofthe CivicSquare

One of the weaknesses of organized secularism is its lack of imagination and op- portunism in claiming territory and furtheringits cause using the existing agen- cies thatadvancethe common good in society.Organized secularism’smyopia is probablydue to its fractured nature and poor leadership. In fact,awider notion of secularism with more extravagant claims is possibleand this could make it more recognizedand mainstream in society.For example, secularists have not

Brought to you by | Sacred Heart University Authenticated Download Date | 1/11/18 4:22 PM 312 Barry Kosmin focused recentlyonthe role of the public school as amass secularizing and sec- ular organization. The philosopher John Dewey sawthis opportunitytouse the Americanpublic school to promote ademocratic secular education based on freedom, equality, social cohesion and commitment to Human Rights as against the separatism and religious segregation of faith schools (Dewey 1916). Campbell concluded that ‘[t]he irreligious movementsofthe nineteenth and twentieth centuries assistedinthe secularization of society in the sense that they promoted and accelerated the disengagement of various social institutions and activities from the legitimation and control of religion’ (1971:121–122).Most so- ciologists who studied these phenomena characterized them as loose-knit or ideologically ‘diffuse’ (Budd 1967), organizationally ‘precarious’ (Demerath and Thiessen 1966), frequentlyshort-lived, and of negligible significanceoverall. Campbell attributed these judgmentstoatendency to approach these phenom- ena with religious (read: Christian) organizations in mind. This, he argued, is in- appropriate.Itobscuresthe distinctive social forms and activities through which such constructs have playedsecularizing roles.These tend to be task-specific, ed- ucational, political, or associational (rather than communal). As such they have more in common with labor unions, political movements, or advocacy groups than with churchcongregations or communities.Campaigns against religious blasphemylaws, challenges to science,ormoral legislation and for church- state separation or rights to privacyand alternative lifestyles have undoubtedly had some secularizing(and liberalizing or individualizing) effects. An obviousarena for enhancing secularization has been sports and recrea- tion. In 1934 religion, i.e. the churches,lost the struggle against Sundayprofes- sional baseball (Bevis 2003). The growinginfluenceofmajor sports corporations in the transformation of Sundayisbest expressed in the history of the National Football League’sSuper Bowl. It has been playedonSundaysince 1967and it is now widelyrecognized as anational secular holiday(MacCambridge 2004). The Olympic Movement,with its ethos and hymn, can alsobeenvisaged as part of the international secular realm. Sports competewith religious activities in time use and under Title IX it emancipates women to the detrimentofconserva- tive religions. Whether the emphasis is on science, politics or anyother area of life, it seems thatsecularists support efforts, public or private, thatjustify their belief systems and advance society in the direction they believeitshould go,which is almostwithout exceptioninthe wayofprogress.Inthis view,old and outdated ways of thinking,often entrenched in religion, are just anchors that hold society back from that progress.Secularists’ relationship to the arts and culture is akey area of potential strength—and one that challenges the German sociologist Max Weber’sdictum that the process of secularization in the West was part of the dis-

Brought to you by | Sacred Heart University Authenticated Download Date | 1/11/18 4:22 PM Old Questions and New Issues forOrganized Secularism in the UnitedStates 313 enchantment of the world, aprocess whereby magic and mystery werebanished from the mainstream of our culture (Weber 1905). Such criticism of modernity and the associated triumph of science and rationalism, maintains that asecular society and culturehas no place for the spiritual, the sublime or the romantic. Yetavisit to anyofthe nation’smuseums and art galleries dispels this conclu- sion. These public institutions are secular shrines and places of deep meaningin contemporaryculture. Americans view museums, art galleries and public libra- ries as places of aweand reverencecharacterized by silence and decorum. The secularizinginfluenceofscience and natural history museums is obvious, other- wise therewould be no need for arival Bible-oriented Creation Museum in Ken- tucky. Most public museums’ mission statements reflect the heritageofRenais- sance-style humanism and the Enlightenment,the essentialharbingers of secu- larism. Museums do an excellent job of conveying secular values by stating their hopes to inspire people of all backgrounds by imbuing them with agreater ap- preciation for human achievement and diversity.The nation’sculturalinstitu- tions espousepluralistic values and court broad audiences implicitly offering visitors,from every background achance to connect with one another through dialogue and shared experienceswith the arts. The impulsetouniversalize goes hand in hand with the tendencytosecularize. One can seemuseums as temples of asort: temples of cultureand memory.Older museums are notable for their classical i.e. pre-Christian architecture. The contemporary museum is often heavy on glass,suggesting the absence of boundaries, again avery secular concept. Similarly earlypublicexpressions of the secular with aclear aim and pur- pose, bothpersonal and civic, werethe higher educational institutions, inspired by the Enlightenment.Again visually,they tended to looked back to classical pre-Christian Greek models symbolized in architecture e.g. Doric columns. The prime example is Jefferson’sUniversity of Virginia 1818, an “academicalvillage” and “temple of knowledge” inspired by his passion for Palladianarchitecture and Greek philosophers. Likewise the utilitarian philosopher JeremyBentham was the “spiritual founder” of the entirelysecular UniversityCollegeLondon (1826) the “godless college” thatended the hitherto Anglican religious monopoly of university education in England. UCL unsurprisingly was the first to admit stu- dents regardless of their religion and the first to admit women on equal terms with men. Unfortunately, the inability of secularists and secular organizations to assert themselvesasthe guardians of highculture and of the heritageofcivic cultural institutions alsohas linkagestotheirpaucity of languageand failuretocreatea uniquelysecular vocabulary:

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When an atheist feels “awe” when consideringthe majesty of nature, at present they have just one term to describe that – a “spiritual” experience. And that term is owned by the re- ligious. Humanists need new terminology (e.g., a “human” experience)todescribe phe- nomena likethis that aresecular in orientation else they will cede this ground to the reli- gious.(Cragun &Kosmin 2011).

5FutureProspects

Openingupanew field like the studyofsecularism, which lacks acommon ter- minologyand toolsofanalysis,isalearning process. Analyzingthe relationship of secular identity to boundaries and group membership is achallengedue to this lack of conceptual clarity.Nevertheless, we have to studysecularism not as the mirror imageofreligion nor using atheological paradigm. As the contri- butions to this volume suggest,secularism requires anew conceptual armory so it can be understood as an intellectual and social forceinits own right. On apractical level, organized secularism tries to keep up and remain rele- vant to asociety and culture thatisconstantlyevolving.Yet alongside new is- sues, oldquestions return and this volume highlights the challenges secular or- ganizations face workingout their values and policies on awhole rangeof issues. Organized secularism, reflectingthe rangeofagendas of polysecularism (Shook, this volume), should have an advantage going forward because of its ability to rationallyanswer society’sgrowingbio-medical, environmental and climate changechallenges and the ethical issues created by accelerating scien- tific and technological advances. Also on the individual level, despite their dif- ferences of style and approach (Fazzino &Cragun, this volume) secularist organ- izations do have afirm consensus about personal issues such as gender, abortion, and dignity in death. Thisagreement or common purpose provides a firm basis for alliances among secularist organizations and has the potential to make them morerelevant and influential in the future. Their growingcoher- ence could be accelerated if organized secularism could overcome its main struc- tural weaknesses,lack of resourcesdue to poor recruitment and fund-raising (Fazzino &Cragun, this volume). Heresecularism stands in markedcontrast to the highlymobilized and remarkablywell-funded (often by tithing) Religious Right.This weakness can be viewed as the secular free rider problem. HereI should declare an interest not onlyasthe founding director of the first and still onlyexisting academic research institute on secularism onlybut alsoasa memberofthe Board of Directors of the Center for Inquiry.Organized secularism cannot flourish without adequate resources.Aswith anystart-up the solution is an injection of substantial funds. Somehow,progressive populations such as the

Brought to you by | Sacred Heart University Authenticated Download Date | 1/11/18 4:22 PM Old Questions and New Issues forOrganized Secularism in the UnitedStates 315 young,wealthy, socially progressive tech elite of places like Silicon Valley need to be persuaded that their social, economic, political and personal career inter- ests lie with support for the secular cause.

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