Copyright bv FRANCIS H. THOMPSON 1970 TRUMAN AND CONGRESS: THE ISSUE OF LOYALTY, 1946-1952

by I. I FRANCIS H. THOMPSON, B.S. in Ed.a, M.Ed,

A DISSERTATION IN HISTORY

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December, I970 sol ' r3 . 1970 _^ lie), '-—' Unij j-iii ii J-1^.'

^ Pag

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ,..,... ii

CHAPTER • I. THE GENESIS OF THE TRUI-IAN LOYALTY PROGRAM 1 II. THE OPERATION OF THE LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM: ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS CRITICS 4l III. TRUl^N VERSUS THE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS: 1948 77 . IV. TRUMAN VERSUS THE EIGHTY-FIRST C0NGP.ES3: JANUARY 1, 1949-AUGUST 1, 1950 ... . 127 V. PASSAGE OF THE McCARRAN INTERNAL SECURITY ACT 173 VI. THE APPOINTMENT OF THE NIMITZ COMvIISSION. 2l4 VII. CONCLUSIONS 247 BIBLIOGRAPHY 253 APPENDIXES ...;...... 259

X

ill ACKNONLEDGMENTS

A number of people have been most helpful in the process of researching and v/riting this study. I particu­ larly V7ish to thank Dr. Timothy P. Donovan for his skill­ ful direction and the other members of my committee for their critical comments. I v/ould also like to thank my colleagues at Nestern Kentucky University for their help­ ful comments, and especially Dr. Lov/ell Harrison for his most valuable consultation throughout the preparation of the first draft. I am greatly indebted to the personnel of the Harry S. Truman Library for their unfailing assistance and en­ couragement during my tv/o visits there. Nithout their help in locating the resource m^aterlals, this study could not have been completed.

11 CHAPTER I "I have little patience v/ith people v7ho take the Bill of Rights for granted." THE GEN1ESI3 OF THE TRR4AN LOYALTY PROGRAM

On April I3, 1945? one day after assuming the duties of the Presidency, Harry S. Truman, speaking to a group of reporters, issued the following plea: If you ever pray, pray for me nov/. I don't knov/ whether you fellov/s ever had a load of hay fall on you, but v;hen they told me yesterday what had hap­ pened, I felt like the moon, the stars, and all the planets had fallen on me.-'- The feeling expressed by the President is under­ standable as fev; men have entered that high office at a more critical time in the nation's history. Indeed, tke problems v/hich faced Truman "are not likely to be over­ estimated and to overstate them v/ould be next to laipos- sible."^ One of the most perplexing of these problems, and one that v/ould haunt the Truman Adrmini strati on from begin­ ning to end, resulted from the persistent charge coavina from Congress and elsev/here that Cor^aninists had succesafully

l-Harry S. Truivian, Year of Decisions, Vol. I: M_ oirs (Garden City, Nev/ Yo'fkl Dou7bTe'dE.y"7r'Co. . 1^55)? ~ "I9T~ 2 Louis E. Eoenig, The Trun an Adm:'ni_strat^i._on_: r Principles and Practice (Nov/ Yorhl^ Nov: YoTdd I'niversit; Press7 1930X3 p. 1. infiltrated high positions in the government of the United States. The problem, which soon grev7 into a major politi­ cal issue betv\reen the Executive and Congress, was m.any sided, but involved basically the difficult question of how to protect the goverrmient from the forces of subver­ sion without running roughshod over the individual rights of citizens. This study will be concerned primarily with the attempts by Mr. Trurnan and his Administration to cope with this particular problem, v/ith special emphasis on the struggle betv/een the President and Congress over v/ho should control the loyalty-security program. Although substantial evidence indicates that the Communist Party in the United States suffered a decline in membership throughout most of the 1930's, from a peak vote of 102,991 in 1932 to 49,000 in 1944, the fear of Communism, or perhaps m.ore correctly the dislike for Communism, per- 3 sisted during the entire period. Conservative frustra­ tion over tv/elve years of liberal government under Franklin Roosevelt no doubt accounted for much of the pre-occupation with Communism., and contributed to the persistent charge that the Federal Governrrient--especially the Executive 4 Branch--v/as teeming v/ith Conmiunists and their syiTipathizers.

^Eleanor Bontecou, I^^i Jlt^4e2a^^l_Ix)yT^LtyJ-_Se^^ ^'^'iR- gram (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UnTvelsity Press, IRhoTT p. Td ^^Bert Andrews, Eashington_ Hitch Hurrt (New York: Random House, 1948), p'.'cl This rumble over Communist influence grev; to a thunderous uproar in 1938 v/ith the birth of the now famous, or infamous, whichever one might choose, House Committee on Un-American Activities under the chairmanship of the flamiboyant and headline-seeking Martin Dies. Representa­ tive Dies soon turned his Committee into a forum for at­ tacking governraent employees suspected of being Communists, and for seeking legislation to prevent the employment of such disloyal persons in the future. "They never took a step vjithout proclaiming that it was necessary to save their respective nations from. 'Bolshevism. ' It is all old stuff - fabricated in Italy, finished in Germany and now being peddled in Washington." .The activities of the Dies committee represented "red baiting" at its most articulate level. Although Dies at first was considered little short of a fool, he soon made his point, especially v/ith those v/ho could see the 7 political advantages of such raucous activity. Mr. Truman later concluded that the Dies corimittee set the precedent

^Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program, p. 8. George Seldes, Eitch Hunt: The Techniques a.nd Profits of Red Baiting jFlen York: " Modern Age Books, 1940), p. 2b0. '^Ibid., p. 274. o "which has plagued the Congress ever since." This is not to say that some of the charges made by the House Com­ mittee were completely without foundation. There is cer­ tainly ample evidence that the Communists did successfully penetrate the Federal bureaucracy to some extent during 9 the 1930's. This fact alone, hov/ever, cannot excuse such irresponsibility as that displayed by Representative Dies and other members of his coiranittee. On August 2, 1939^ Congress, responding in part to the increased anti-Communist pressure engendered by the Dies committee, passed the Hatch Act, which was designed If tflO to prevent pernicious political activity. Section 9^ of that act forbade empIo^Tnent in the Federal bureaucracy to any person belonging to a political party or any other organization which advocated the overthrov; of the United States government by force. This section represented an "explicit recognition by Congress of the necessity for bar­ ring from government employment those v/hose interests v/ere directed to the destruction of the traditional Am.erican

o Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II: Memoirs (Garden City, New York: Ddubleday & Co., 1956), p. 275. Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, Tjae Trimian Administration: A Documentary History (New York: Harper and Rov/, 1966), p. 356.' Report of The President's Tem.porary Commission on Employees Loyalty, OF 2521, Truman Papers, Trunan Library. iSSm*

,,11 way of life. The Hatch Act is most significant as mark- ihg a historic break in so far as judging fitness for govern ment employment was concerned. Heretofore, fitness for em- ployraent had been judged on the basis of qualifications and character, and any inquiry into religious or political af­ filiation v/as expressly forbidden by Civil Service Rule I, 12 adopted in l884. The 76th and 77th congresses further demonstrated their intention of rooting out any subversive elements in the government by enacting Public Lav/s 67I and 808, v/hich granted summary dismissal pov/ers to the Ear and Navy depart­ ments. The Secretaries of these respective departments v/ere given the pov/er to remove any employee in the inter­ ests of national security, other Iav;s regarding em.ploymient or dismissal not-withstanding. Congress continued to press for action in 194l by attaching riders to all appropriations bills v/hich ex­ pressly forbade payment of federal m.oney to any person be­ longing to an organization advocating the overthrov/ of the 14 United States goverrutent by force. In that sam.e year.

•^•^Ibid. •'-^Ibid. ^^Ibid. John N. Caughey, lE_01ear p.nd P-'^e_sent_ Da.ng.EjR: Crucia] State of Our Freed'cnas'" (dhieagoT 'University of Chicago"Press, l$ddj] p. I03. Congress appropriated $100,000 to finance an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of all employees alleged to be members of subversive organizations. Once the investigation was completed, the necessary reports were to be submitted, v/ithout recomjnendations, to the vari­ ous department heads for v/hatever appropriate action they might see fit to take. Many of the departm.ent heads, in turn, asked for advice from the Justice Department. In 1942, Attorney General Francis Biddle created an inter­ departmental committee of four for the purpose of offering 15 such advice. Part of the assistance rendered by the Attorney General was the distribution to all government agencies of a descriptive memorandum listing so-called subversive or­ ganizations. This list, specified for the use of various officials in the government, v/as not made available to the public consumption. A basic area of conflict betv/een the executive and legislative branches of the government was clearly discernible at this point as Attorney General Biddle insisted that activity rather than membership in the listed organizations was to be stressed; others, such as Martin Dies, felt that membership alone was sufficient 16 to warrant dismissal.

15Roger S. Abbott, "Federal Loyalty Program: Back­ ground and Problems," American Political Science Review, XLII (June, 1948), p. 4"87. I6ibid., pp. 486-487. !

7 On February 5^ 1943^ President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9300 which replaced the Attorney General's committee with an "interdepartmental Cornmlttee on Employee Investigations." This nev/ committee concerned itself v/ith permanent em.ployees only and stayed v/ithin the confines of those acts already passed by Congress. Hence, a person would be subject to removal if, (I) He belonged to an or­ ganization which advocated the overthrow of the United States governm.ent by force or, (2) He personally advocated violence as a means for effecting political change. 17' This new Interdepartmental Committee remained only an advisory body; the authority for removal of any suspected employee continued to rest with the department head. Standards varied widely through the various departments, and fev/ of those responsible displayed any real enthusiasm! for a purge From July 1, I940 to March 31. 1947, only 1,313 persons were ruled ineligible for governr:ient employment due to reasons of loyalty, a number v/hich gives ample evidence of the inactivity in this particular field. Congress remained restive and continually voiced concern over the lack of will or uniformity in the administration of the loyalty 18 program.

^'''Report of President's Temporary Ccnantssion, 0F252I. ••-^Abbott, "Federal Loyalty Program," p. 4cc). mmm^ 8 This was the general situation^ with regard to loyalty, when Harry Truman assumed the duties of the Presi­ dency in April 1945. Events had already transpired some two weeks before the death of President Roosevelt that would serve to revive the Communist issue--a problem that would cause the new President no end of misery throughout his years in the White House.

On February 28, 1945, the Security Officer for the Office of Strategic Services accidently discovered that a classified document from that office was published in the current edition of Amerasia magazine. A subsequent raid on the Nev/ York offices of the magazine turned up dozens of other supposedly classified government documents. The FBI entered the case on March II and immediately implicated Phillip Jaffe and Kate Mitchell, the editors of Amerasia. A recording, inadmissable as evidence, also implicated John Stewart Service of the Department of State. 19 On June 22, acting under orders from. President Truman, the FBI arrested those persons involved in the Amerasia inci­ dent. The Justice Department--no doubt annoyed v/ith Mr. Truman for having bypassed it in ordering the arrests-- shov/ed little inclination to push the prosecution. Jaraes M. Mclnerney, a special prosecutor for the Justice Depart­ ment, indicated that the stolen docttments contained little

l^Earl IjS.tham, *I^ie__Ccaravuni s_t Centrcu"easy '}n Eashi/ ton: From the New Deal to TiefClrtrr.' "(Nov- Yoak: /ttheiveaaa 'l9^9l'n^~"204f20B. ' ""' information of value, and none that v/ould endanger national security. Although a charge of espionage was never proven, the presence of that many government documents in the files of a magazine v/hose editors v/ere knov/n to be sj'^mpathetic toward Cornmunismi certainly suggested the possibility of . , . 20 organized espionage. The Amerasia disclosure v/as only the beginning. In February 1946, the Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, presented to Truman a report on the confessions of tv/o re­ formed Communist spies. Miss Elizabeth Bentley and Whit- taker Chambers. These confessions im.plicated, among others, Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, whom Truman had just nominated for the position of United 21 States Director of the International Monetary Fund. Truman's later conflicting statements concerning White indicates that he v/as unsure as to v/hat course of action he should take. In any case, after consultation with Attorney General Tom Clark and the Secretary of the Treasury, Fred Vinson, the President steadfastly refused 22 to v/ithdrav/ White's nomination. To the President's credit, he evidently decided that there v/as simply not sufficient

^'^Ibid. , pp. 210-216. "^Cabell Phillips, The Trvy^cnyJ^resye^rn^v^_TiHiFyfr tory of a Triuanvhant Succes¥i""oVr"(lLn York: "The ^h:eral 1.van Co., 1966JT~p:"^d9. ^^Ibid., p. 3"0.

^•k 10 proof of White's guilt to warrant an open denunciation of his nominee. Had Truman been "more prudent than brave, he could have eased White out at almost any time in the Spring or Summer of 1946 and rid himself of a possible future em­ barrassment. But he likes to think that a man was inno­ cent until proven guilty."^3 This was the first indication that Harry Truman had much more than a superficial feeling for individual rights.

Perhaps the most shocking indication of Communist intrigue resulted from the report of the Canadian Royal Commission in June of 1946 v/hich revealed the existence in Canada of a very large and well organized espionage ring. Igor Gouzenko, the member of the ring v/ho informed on his fellov/ conspirators, also indicated the existence of a similar group active in the United States. The most shocking part of the Commission's report concerned the tactics employed by the Ccmm.unists on those "in critical positions, with a 'susceptibility to Communist ideology.'"2 4 Congress reacted sharply to the report, and the search for Communists began in earnest. It seem.ed quite possible that the nation v/as on the verge of another witch hunt; the new President v/ould soon feel the pressure.

^%bid. 24 p. 22. Bontecou, The Federa 1_ Loy.s^l_ty-Security Program , II Harry Truman entered the office of President under most trying circumstances; the people knew it and so did the Congress. It is therefore not surprising that the President received a rather generous outpouring of support from the 79th Congress during his first fev^^ months in 25 office. By January 1946, hov/ever, the honeymoon was over as the press began to take note of Truman's growing troubles with the legislative branch. The President indicated his hope of improving such relations through a direct appeal to 26 the people. He v/as to find this an almost impossible task as the problems that alv/ays badger a post v/ar administra- tion--price controls, labor unrest, and a host of others-- were beginning to close in. Certainly not the least of those problems was the grov/ing concern over the menace of Communism. The House Committee on Un-American Activities con­ tinued to lead in the search for subversives. The cry that the State Department v/as honeycombed with Comrriunists, fellow travelers, and the like v^/as growing louder by the 27 day. There were those in the Congress, hov/ever, vjho

^^New York Times, July 15, 19*45. 26 Nev/sv/eek, January 7, 1946, p. 19. ^"^U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2d Sess., 1946, 92, Part 2, p. 2720.

liM d 12 voiced more concern over the growing influence and power of the House Committee--"a power so vast that it would take a committee of Holmeses and Brandelses to use that pov/er and still preserve the Constitutional liberties guaranteed every American citizen." Various figures v/ere used in Congress relating to the actual strength of the Comimunist party. In May 1946, there was talk of some 70,000 actual Communists, 500,000 fellow travelers, and 150,000 underground workers--figures that, if taken literally, were apt to cause considerable 29 uneasiness. On May 17, 1946, Representative John Rankin QO of Mississippi called for a purge of the federal payrolls.-^ Rankin's colleague from Mississippi, Representative Dan R. McGehee, v/ent a step further in June when he contended that the "... dogmas of the Communist Party are absolutely con­ trary to America, and its further activity should be out­ lawed in this country. "-^ The increased concern over possible Comraunist in­ filtration had previously led the House Committee on the

^ Ibid., p. 1724. Taken from a speech by Helen G. Douglas of California. [Feb. 27, 1946] ^U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2d Sess., 1946, 92, Part 4*, p. 5209. 3^Ibid. ^•^U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2d Sess., 1946, 92, Part II, pp. A3124-3125. 13 Civil Service to appoint a sub-committee composed of J. M. Combs, chairman, George H. Fallon, and Edv/ard R. Rees "to make such investigation as it may deem proper v/ith respect to employee loyalty and employment policies and practices 32 in the Government of the United States." The Report of this sub-committee v/as submitted to Congress on July 20, 33 1946, and to President Truman on July 25. The Committee traced the historical background of loyalty investigations since 1939, noting particularly the lack of uniformity. The Interdepartm.ental Committee created in 1943 still used personal advocacy of violent change or membership in an organization advocating violent overthrow of the govern­ ment as the standard for remioval. The Civil Service, on the other hand, used the concept of "reasonable doubt" as its guide for dismissal. In addition, it v/as noted that some departments were hesitant to act at all, regarding loyalty investigations as criminal trials, v/hile others acted on mere rumor and suspicion. The sub-committee there­ fore recomjnended that . . . a commission be established . . . and that this com­ mittee make a thorough study of existing laws and the adequacy of existing legislation . . . and to

3^Letter, Jennings Randolph to the President, July 25, 1946, OF252, Trujaan Papers, Truiaan Library. 33u.S., Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2d Sess., 1946,' 92, Part b, pp. 9^03-96o4. 14 present to the Congress ... a complete and uni­ fied program that v/ill give adequate protection to our government against individuals whose pri­ mary loyalty is to governments other than our own.^^

There v/as included in the Combs report a supplemen­ tary or minority report submitted by Edward Rees v/hich in­ dicated that he did not feel the majority report had em­ phasized the urgency required. Mr. Rees v/as highly criti­ cal of the Civil Service Commission, which he felt had been lax in dismissing questionable employees, and recom­ mended that "Congress, through the House Civil Service Com­ mittee, should take action and should do it soon. "-^-^ It is difficult to understand, in considering both the Combs and Rees reports, why the President did not take some immediate action. There was indication of consider­ able executive activity in the field, in the form of staff discussions, over two v/eeks before the Combs report was submitted. A note attached to the report also gives evi­ dence that there v/as some discussion at the time concerning the preparation of an executive order to create the comx- mission requested by the sub-committee.-3"7

3^Report, Civil Service Sub-Conmiittee, 0F252, Truman Papers, Truman Library. •^•^Supplemental Report, Civil Service Sub-Comrn.ttee, OF252, Truman Papers, Truman Library. ^Newsweek, July 8, 1946, p. 22. Note, George Elsey to Clark Clifford, attached to Civil Service Sub-Committee Report, 0E252, Truman Papers, Truman Library. 15 There is no clear reason as to why the President did not act immediately, other than sheer procrastination. In failing to do so, however, Truman missed an opportunity to take the lead in the fight against Communism., a lead those certain elements in Congress had zealously held since 1938. Later, he would regret that moment of indecision. One month after the Combs report had been submitted to the President, Time magazine noted the obvious lack of activity on the part of the executive branch v/ith regard to the loyalty question. It v/as pointed out in that v/idely read periodical that if Communists v/ere, in fact, in policy positions as stated by many members of Congress, they v/ere very apt to remain there. If the executive branch v/as silent during those days in mid-suramer 1946, certain m.embers of Congress cer­ tainly were not. One of those mem.bers. Representative Walter C. Ploeser of Missouri, speaking on "Red Fascism in America," insisted that "this year's Congressional elec­ tions must have as their basic issue the question of Com­ munism in America. . . . Their stooges in the Congress and in the executive branch of the Federal government are the most effective tools to pov/er . . . this is a year of decision.

3^Time, August 26, 1946, p. I6. ^^U.S., Congress1ona1 Record, 79th Congress, 2d Sess., 1946, 92, Part 12,^p. A4*35"9. . 16

It would be difficult to prove that Coirmunism v/as the main issue in the November elections of 1946, as Repre­ sentative Ploeser had desired, but it certainly was a major issue. Marquis Childs reported in his Washington Post column, December 2, 1946, that the Communist issue v/as in­ deed the thing that sv/ept the Republicans to victory in 4o Novemiber 1946. There was in the campaign, to be sure, the ever present and persistent charge that the Truman Ad- 4l ministration v/as "soft on Commujiism. " The Truman unpopu­ larity no doubt had a great deal to do with the Republican landslide. Senator Harley M. Kilgore, supporter and friend of the President, noted this hostility^ in his campaign for re-election in West Virginia. "Here v/as a man v/ho was actually doing an excellent job as President . . . but about the most you could do v/as to defend him in a humorous fashion by using the old Western saloon refrain: 'Don't 42 shoot our piano player. He's doing the best he can.'" The Republican sv/eep in November, 1946 v/as impres­ sive. VJhen the votes v/ere tabulated the Republicans held a 51 to 45 edge in the Senate, 246 to l88 in the House, 43 and controlled 25 governorships to 23 for the Democrats.

^Qwashington Post, December 2, 1946. ^-^Alfred Steinberg, The_J-kn Fron me^nri.: Th£ Life and Times of Harry S'^TrvrnnTljiew""^York: ' GL"P. "Put- nam's Sons," 19o2), p. 28ir. ^^Ibid. ^^3Time, November l8, 1946, n. 21. 17 Heaping' insult upon injury, Democratic Representative William Fulbright of Arkansas suggested that Truman, hav- ing been repudiated by the electorate, should appoint Ko- publican Senator Arthur Vandenburg as Secretary of State to and then resign, allowing the new Secretary of State to assume the duties of the Presidency in the absence of a Vice President.44 A rather "sharp" reply from Truman ended any speculation along that line.^^^ The President took the defeat in a rather subdued manner, pledging to continue to do, "v/ithout regard to political considerations, what seems to me to be for the welfare of all our people,"^^"^ Truman did not, hov/ever, overlook the meaning of the Republican victory, especially as it applied to the Communist-in- governnent issue. Two weeks after the election, the President finally moved to take the initiative in the fight against Communism by issuing Executive Order 9306, v/hich established the President's Tem^Dorary Commission on Ernnloyee Loyalty to "inquire into tho standards, procedures, and organizational provisions for (a) the investigation of persons who are employed by the United States Govornnent or aro applicants for such enioloynont, (b) the removal or disqualification

44Ibid. 4^Stcinboi^g, The i:an_ Eroai Mooauri , p. 239. ^^Tinc, R'ovember lo, IR-'ic, }). 21. 18 47 from employment of any disloyal or subversive person." The editor of the Washington Post, on November 27, 1946, struck a responsive chord when he voiced approval of the Temporary Commission, but noted that the timing of the appointment "affords another melancholy instance of the lateness and littleness that seem to dog every act of the Truman administration." The order obviously should have come shortly after release of the Combs report in July of . r 49 1946. As a result of the bad timing, Mr. Truman could hardly escape the charge that he was simply yielding to overvN/helming Congressional pressure rather than displaying any real desire to eliminate Communist infiltrators. Justice Thomas C. Clark, then Attorney General, con­ tends that the real impetus for the order came from the Department of Justice rather than from any overt Congres­ sional pressure. Justice Clark noted that the whole ques­ tion of how to prevent subversive elements from infiltrat­ ing the government had been in the talking stage for some time and that the Presidential order of November 25 v/as 50 simply an outgrov/th of those discussions.

^'U.S., National Archives and Records Service, Fed­ eral Register Divisioi-i, Code of Federal Regulations, 1943- 48 compilation, E^xecutive Orders, p. 589. 4R VJashington Post, November 27, 1946.

^Ointerview with Justice Thonas C. Clarh, VJashing- ton D. C, August 22, I969. 19 Justice Clark is no doubt partially right, but it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a decade of heavy political pressure, dating all the way back to the advent of the Dies Coimnittee in 1938, also played a m.ajor role in moving the President finally to take the initiative. If the President is to be faulted here, it must be because of his procrastination. His inclinations were right from the beginning.

Another factor involved in Trmnan's decision to ap- point the Temporary Commission was his apparent concern over the Congressional trend tov/ard the introduction of more and more restrictive legislation in the loyalty field. The election of a Republican Congress also increased the President's concern. As 1946 drev/ to a close, Trum.an's fears appeared to be well founded as the GOP pledged 52 greater efforts against the "Reds." There is some indication that Truman, although cer­ tainly av/are of the past revelations of subversive activity, v/as not overly fearful of the dangers of Internal Communism. In his State of the Union message in January 1947, the President made no mention of the Temporary Commission. He did note the areas of disagreement betv/een the Congress and himself, but he called for a spirit of cooperation in v;o/.kin^

"^Phillips, The Trturian Presidency, p. 36O. 52, "Washington Post, December 30, 19do.

&«n 20 together for the common good. "We shall be risking the nation's safety ... if we do not. ..." Security, Truman contended, "rests ... on civil liberties and hu­ man freedoms. . . . "-'•^ Another indication of the Presi­ dent's personal feelings regarding the problem of Communism in the United States v/as contained in a letter to Governor George H. Earle of Pennsylvania, February 28, 1947. The President stated that "People are very much wrought up about the Communist 'bugaboo' but I am of the opinion that

the country is perfectly safe so far as Communism is con- 54 cerned--we have too many sane people." Truman's seeming lack of any deep concern over the menace of internal Communism v/as not shared by others in his administration. Attorney General Tom Clark, in a memo­ randum to the Chairman of the Temporary Commission, A. Devitt Vanech, stressed the urgency of the situation and proclaimed the very "serious threat v/hich even one disloyal person constitutes to the security of the Goveriim.ent of the 55 United States." Although Truman would very soon voice the same view as that expressed by his Attorney General, it

^%ew York Times, January 7, 1947- ^Letter, President to Governor George E. Earle of Pennsylvania, February l4, 1947, OE263, Trvnaen Papers, Truman Library. ^^Memorandum, For A. Devitt Vanech from Toai Clarh, February l4, 1947, 0E252, Truman Papers, Trunan Libra'yv. 21 remains doubtful that the President ever really felt the Communists represented as serious a threat to the internal security of the United States as some would have had the nation believe. The Communist hunters in Congress, hov/ever, con­ tinued to hammer away. This fact is clearly illustrated in the Senate hearings held to determine the fitness of Truman's nominee to head the Atomic Energy Commission, David Lilienthal. Lilienthal, under constant attack for many weeks, was accused of everything from being a leftist to one v/ho knowingly harbored Communists on the government payroll. An old foe of Lilienthal from TVA days. Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee, v/ent so far as to intimate that the nominee could not be trusted because "his parents 56 were born in Czechoslovakia." In a moving defense, Lilienthal stated, "I v/ill be very glad to be lynched if in the process of that lynching this lesson about v/hat our history means is learned ... in terms of protection of the individual citizen against irresponsible charges of 'witch hunters.'"5 7 No one v/ould question the right of the Senate to probe any nominee to determine his fitness for such a vital post, but the harangue against David Lilienthal boirlered on

^Newsweek, February I7, 1947, p. 32. ^'^New York Times, February 5, I947. 22 sheer partisan irresponsibility. As the New York Times reported, "it is difficult to avoid suspicion that the battle over Mr. Lilienthal's appointment was as good as ended last week until some Republicans thought they sav/ in the slovz-motion tactics of Mr. McKellar an opportunity to make political capital at the expense of the administra- tion."

At various times during the Lilienthal hearings, charges of "ComKiunist" and "New Dealer" were used almost interchangeably. The latter added a certain credence to the contention that much of the Communist "bugaboo" that infected the Congress during that tim.e could be traced in part to a deep-seated conservative frustration after tv/elve years of liberal Democratic government.5 9 As the acrimonious hearings of the Senate Atomic Energy Commission progressed through the first months of 1947, other groups, in and out of Congress, continued to rally the nation to a defense against the red menace. The United States Chamber of Commerce, estim.ating that 400 Comm.unists held high governraent positions, dea^:anded a Con- 60 gressional investigation. Doubtless Congress needed no such prodding. As one Republican noted, the 8oth "Congress

^^Ibid., February 2, 1947. ^^Ibid., February 16, 1947. ^^Ibid., February I9, 1947. 23 opened daily with a prayer and ended with a probe." In March, the House Committee on Un-American Ac­ tivities opened hearings on a bill to outlav/ the Communist Party in the United States. William Bullitt, United States Minister to Prance at the outbreak of VJorld War II, testi­ fying before the committee, warned of an aggressive Russia, but opposed the outlawing of the party in this country. 62 William Green of the AFL, in his testimony, also voiced opposition to outlav/ing the Communist Party, contending that this v/ould be "tantamount to a declaration of volun­ tary bankruptcy of the ideas and ideals of American de- mocracy. " He also testified that outlav/ing the Comjnunist party would only serve to drive the members underground. A similar viev/ was expressed by the Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, who v/arned, hov/ever, that the goal of the 64 Communist Party "is the overthrov/ of our government." Hoover further stated that the Communist 5th column was a definite menace, that it v/as in fact better organized than the Nazi 5th column of VJorld War II, and that its members 65 should most certainly be barred from government service.

Quoted in Steinberg, The Man from Missouri, p. 2o9 62 New York Times, March 25, 1947. Ibid., March 26, 1947. 64 Ibid., March 27, 1947. ^Washington Post, March 22, 19^7. 24 At the time of Hoover's appearance before the House Com­ mittee on Un-American Activities in March of 1947, no less than six different bills designed either to limit or to destroy the Communist Party in the United States already had been introduced in the first session of the 80th Con- 66 gress. The Communist problem was, to be sure, receiving its fair share of attention. It was in the midst of this superheated atmosphere of anti-Bolshevism that the Russians began to pose more than a speculative threat in the Eastern Mediterranean area. On March 9, 1947, the New York Times reported that President Truman had determined to take a tough line against Russia's expansionist ambitions and was preparing to enlarge America's role in world affairs. The Times prediction v/as prophetic as Truman, before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, outlined a new role for America in v^/orId affairs. The Triunan Doctrine proposed aid to those nations v/ho sought assistance to maintain their independence. The opening sentence of the President's address set the tone: "The gravity of the situa tion v/hich confronts the v/orld today necessitates my ap­ pearance before a joint session of the Congress. The for­ eign policy and the national security of this country are

^^Newswoek, March 24, 194-7, p. 28. ft7 New York Times, March 9, 1947. 25 involved." Such a crisis tone "indicated that officials felt that the American people needed a jolt to arouse them fio to support so revolutionary a departure." -^ This v/as probably true, but it should have been just as obvious to administration officials that the use of such rhetoric, then and later, was bound to fan the already bright flame of anti-Communism at home. Quite unintentionally, Mr. Truman "created the basis for McCarthyism's later effective- ness. • • • The Truman Doctrine was generally v/ell received in the press and Truman was praised for his courage. Felix Belair, Jr., in an article entitled "Truman Assumes lead in Fight on Communism," declared that: Having been repudiated in the Congressional elec­ tions as leader of the party of supposed Communist sympathies, Mr. Truman v/ould nov/ lead the free peoples of the world in the fight against Com­ munist inspired totalitarianism. And in the pro­ cess ... he has stolen a lot of Republican thunder. . . . The administration is aware that a lot of 'selling' must be done in the form of public enlightenment before the Presidents anti- totalitarian policy v/ins sufficiently widespread acceptance.'^1

^^Ibid., March 13, 1947. 6Q VJilliam G. Carleton, The Revolution in Aaierican Foreign Policy: Its Global Range'~(2d ed.; New York: Ran­ dom House, I96T), p. 162. ^^Athan Theoharis, "The Rhetoric of Politics," Paper read before the meeting of the Southern Historical Associa­ tion, November I966, '^•^New York Times, March I6, 1947. 26 With the announcement of the Doctrine, Truman had taken the initiative in the struggle against Communism. But, to remain in such a position and to "sell" his program, the President evidently realized the need to do something about supposed Communist subversives at work on the home front. On March 2, the President received the report of his Temporary Commission on Em.ployee Loyalty, appointed in November 1946. The Commission, after a reviev/ of past loyalty procedures, concluded that "v/hile the Commission believes that the employment of disloyal or subversive per­ sons represents more than a speculative threat to our sys­ tem of governraent, it is unable ... to state with any 72 degree of certainty hov/ far reaching that threat is." The Commission v/arned, hov/ever, against a preoccupation with employee loyalty, apart from counter espionage which the President's Commission felt v/as equally important in protecting against subversive activity. The report concluded with the Commission's recom­ mendations to the President for unifying and improving the government's loyalty program. 73 The standard for removal was to be that "on all evidence, reasonable grounds exist for believing that the person involved is disloyal to the

7? 'Report, President's Temporary Coaraission on Fn- ployee Loyalty, 0F2521, Trtt.ian papers, Trunan Library. 73 '-^See Appendix IA. 27 74 Government of the United States." Those areas to be con­ sidered in making this judgment were: 1. Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or prepara­ tion therefore,. or knov/ingly associating with spies or saboteurs; 2. Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof; 3. Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter our constitutional form of govern­ ment; 4. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure ... of documents or information of a confidential or non public character . . . ; 5. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherv/ise acting, so as to serve the in­ terests of another government . . . ; 6. Membership in, affiliation with or s^onpathetic association with any foreign or dom.estic or­ ganization . . . designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist. ... 75 The President's Temporary Commiission felt it had struck the proper balance between safeguarding the security of the United States and protecting the right of the indi­ vidual employee. The President evidently felt likev/ise, for he adopted the report of his Commission with few im^nor- 76 tant alterations.' On March 21, 1947, Mr. Truman issued Executive Order 9835, Prescribing Procedures For the Admin­ istration of an Employees Loyalty Program in the Executive

'^^Ibid. 7^•^Ibid5 . 'Bontecou, Th e Fe d e ral Loya 11y-Sec u r i ty Eroyrr r •. p. 76. 28 77 Branch of the Government. The program, as outlined in the President's Executive Order, required at least a nom­ inal check for over tv/o million government employees with a full field investigation if evidence indicated possible disloyalty".

Executive Order 9835 was, notes Cabal Phillips, "a milestone in the life of the United States--a v/retched one that sanctioned government prying into the privacy of its citizens' minds and consciences. But it v/as an inevitable one in the context of the time. . . ."' The President was certainly aware of the possibilities of Communist infiltra­ tion and consequently sav/ the need for tightening security precautions. Truman was, however, far more concerned with Russian expansionist ambitions abroad, as he clearly re­ vealed in his announcement of the Truman Doctrine on March 12. The loyalty program simply "imparted an essential element of consistency to his Greco-Turkish Program. ,,79 It v/ould have seemed foolish and inconsistent to pledge the United States to stand against Communist expansion abroad v/hile m^aking no move to prevent possible Commiunist subversion at home. This v/as particularly true in the light of the persistent Congressional charges over the previous ten years.

''See Appendix IB. '^Phillips, The Trtraan Presidency, p. 361. "^^Business Veeti, March. 29, 19-':7, p. lOS. 29 The President, sensitive to such Congressional charges, was fearful of the kind of restrictive legisla­ tion in the field of loyalty and security being considered in Congress. At the very mxOment that Truman v/as issuing the loyalty order, the House Committee on Un-Amterican Activities was preparing to open its hearings on the pro­ posed bill to outlaw the Communist Party in the United fio States. The President, feeling that he must seize the initiative, announced Executive Order 9835. The initial reaction to the loyalty order of March 21 was somewhat mixed. The Americans For Democratic Action endorsed the aims of the program, but warned that the pro- 81 cedure did not assure a fair trial. The editors of the New Republic contended that the Loyalty Program would weaken existing safeguards and asserted that the "already existing demoralization of liberal minded government 82 workers . . . was nov/ verging on hysteria." Liberals in general were disenchanted from the beginning. Their spe­ cific charges v/iII be examined in more detail in the next chapter, but the general charge made by many, that the loyalty order constituted a direct attack on federal em­ ployees, v/as simply untenable. The question really cen­ tered not on v/hether this nation would have a loyalty p:'-o- gram but who should plan, initiate, and operate such a

8QNew York Times, March 23, 1947. ^''•Ibid., March 31, 1947. ^%ev/ Republic, March 31, 1947, p. 10. 30 program. As James Wechsler noted, "If liberals cannot face the reality of communist intrigue . . . , the Congressional cops v/ill run the show; if liberals cannot offer an affirm­ ative, clearly defined plan of democratic self defense the witch hunt may be truly upon us." ^ On the whole. Congress did not respond unfavorably to the President's program although a certain jealousy at having lost the initiative v/as evident in some of the remarks of its m.embers. Mr. Robert Rich of Pennsylvania accused the President of waking up to the fact that his administration was crav/ling v/ith "Reds" only after his de- 84 cision to stop the Communist advance overseas. Represen­ tative Everett M. Dirkson of Illinois pointed out that the Democratic administrations had always been rather soft on -^ 85 Communism and wondered at the sudden shov/ of force. Karl Mundt pronounced the Truman loy^alty program as "precisely that which the House Committee on Un-American Activities ,,86 has been advocating for at least four years.

3james Wechsler, "Hov/ To Rid the Goverm.'ient of Communists," Harper's Magazine, 195 (November, 1947), p. 490. U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Sess., 1947, 93, Part'2, p. 2540. 85 Ibid., p. 2545. New York Times, March 23, 1947. 31 Much of what Representative Mundt said v/as true, but there is considerable indication that Truman had a much deeper concern for individual liberties than did cer­ tain members, both past and present, of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. From the beginning, the Presi- Ory dent pledged that there v/ould be no witch hunt. In a letter to Philip Murray, who had expressed a certain alarm over possible violations of individual rights, Truman de­ clared that "the order v/as most carefully drawn v/ith the idea in viev/ that the Civil Rights of no one would be in- oo fringed upon. . . ."^ Justice Tom Clark indicated that Truman v/as deeply concerned v/ith individual rights, had expressed that concern on numerous occasions, and v/as, in fact, much more concerned with the possible harm that might come from the loyalty order than v/ith any good it might 89 accomplish. This concern for civil liberties v

^Ibid., May I6, 1947. ^^Letter, President to Philip Murray, April 15, 1947, 0F252K, Truman Papers, Truman Library. "intervievi with Justice Th.cnaas C. Clarlv. 32 power. Mr. Hoover also objected to giving the department heads the responsibility for discharging subversives. He contended that these same gentlemen had had this pov/er be­ fore and had been most reluctant to use it.-^ Tliree days later, March 31, 1947, in another memiorandum to the Attor­ ney General, Hoover, sounding much like a child whose feel­ ings had been hurt, objected strenuously to a statement by Harry Mitchell, President of the Civil Service Commission, v/hich supposedly questioned the right of the FBI to investi­ gate persons covered by the Hatch Act. Hoover suggested that the "Civil Service Commission be given the full, com.- plete, entire and conclusive responsibility for conducting all investigations of Government employees about v/hose „91 loyalty there is any questions whatsoever. The Civil Service had, in fact, voiced strenuous objections in the form of a v/ritten statement by Mr. Mitchell and Miss Frances Perkins, also in the Civil Service Commis­ sion, to increasing the investigative role of the Bureau. They contended that the Civil Service Commiission should be allov/ed to conclude the investigation of an applicant for employment, and that the Commission should not be required

Memorandum, J. Edgar Hoover to Devitt Vanech, March 28, 1947, loyalty folder, Vanech Papers, Truanvn Library. ^•^Ibid., March 31, 1947. 33 92 to turn over the loyalty aspects of a case to the FBI.

A penciled note from Clark Clifford, an influential member of the White House staff, revealed clearly v/here the President stood in the matter. "President feels very strongly anti-FBI and sides positively with Mitchell and Perkins--wants to be sure and hold FBI down, afraid of 93 'Gestapo.'" Mr. George Elsey, another member of the White House staff, concluded that he did not believe the 94 President's fears concerning the FBI were justified. From discussions among the various staff members, it v/as evident that most of them favored an increased role for the Federal Bureau of Investigation v/hile conceding the possible danger of over extension from such an obviously 95 independent police force. The staff recommendations, persuasively drav/n and calling for more activity on the part of the FBI, v/ere submitted to Truman in a memorandum from Clifford on May 6,

92 Summary, Mr. Mitchell's and Miss Perkin's conten­ tions regarding an increased investigative role for FBI, May 5, 1947, Internal Security folder, Elsey Papers, Trum.an Library. ^^Note, Clark M. Clifford, May 2, 1947, Inteimal Se­ curity Folder, Elsey Papers, Trum.an Library. oh , ^ Notes, George Elsey^, May 2, 1947, Internal Security Folder, Elsey Papers, Truraan Library. 95 -^ Notes, Staff discussions concerning EBi' s investi­ gative role, Elsey^'s sua/niary. May 5, 1947, Internal Security Polder, Elsey Papers, Trttnan Library. 34 1947. It was recommended that the Bureau be allowed to fingerprint all present employees. If derogatory infonna- tion was revealed, the F'^BI would conduct a full field in­ vestigation. Nev/ applicants v/ould also be checked by the Bureau against their files, and by the Civil Service against other relevant sources of information. Again, if derogatory info2?mation v/as revealed, the FBI v/ould conduct an investi­ gation. Clifford concluded: I am fully cognizant of the dangers to our civil rights which v/e face in the matter of loyalty investigations, and I share your feelings of con­ cern. It is precisely because of the dangers in­ volved that I believe that the FBI is a better agency than the Civil Service to conduct loyalty investigations for new em.ployment—the more highly trained and administrated an agencv is, the higher should be its standards. . . .96 On May 9, 1947, a revision of these recoirimendations provided that in case of new employ^ees the Civil Service would no longer be required to turn over loyalty cases to the FBI, but "may" request more information from the Bureau 97 if they desired.-^' On that same day the President submitted a request for $24,900,000 to administer the Loyalty Program through

^Memorandum, For the President from Clark Clifford, on aupropriation estimates to carry out provisions of Executivscutivee Order 9835, May 6, 1947, Internal Security folder. Elsey Papers, Truman Library. ^ Memorandtiin, For the President from Clarhv Clifford, revised estimates. May 9, 1947, Internal Security folder, Elsey Papers, Truman Librav-y. 35 June 30, 1948. Of that sum, $l6,l6o,000 would be set aside for the Civil Service Commission and $8,740,000 for the 98 FBI. Although the largest share of money was marked for the Civil Service, the figures nevertheless represented an increase for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On May 10, the Washington Post noted that the FBI v/as to be 99 given a more prominent role. Why did the President so strenuously object, as he did at first, to increasing the investigative role of the FBI? The Bureau and its chief v/ere held in the highest esteem by almost everyone, and it was obvious that many members of Congress favored a more prominent role for the 100 FBI in the investigative end of the loyalty program. Truman objected, not because he mistrusted the Bureau or its Director, but rather because there v/as an inherent danger in granting too much pov/er--and virtually unchecked pov/er in the case of the FBI--to any police force as large and as v/ell organized as the Federal Bureau of Investiga­ tion. Tlie President v/as also av/are that the FBI reports contained much unsubstantiated information that might, if

" Budget Report, on anpropriations to carry our pro­ visions of Executive Order 9635, May 9, 1947, 0F2, Truman Papers, Truman Library. ^^/ashington Post, May 10, I947. ^^^U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Sess., 1947, 93, Part 2, p. A'. T590. 36 it leaked out, severely damage an innocent person. Tru­ man's objections vjere based not on any suspicion of the FBI but on his ov/h concern for individual liberties.

Although it was hoped that the appropriations for implementing the loyalty program v/ould be approved without delay, such v/as not the case. From the beginning. Congress made knov/n its intention to control the purse. Also, as previously noted, certain members of Congress felt that the FBI should be given a greater role. Clifford, in a memorandum, to the President on May 23, noted that the spe­ cial assistant to the Attorney General, E. Devitt Vanech, had expressed some concern over the political difficulties in connection with the appropriation hearings on the Presi­ dent's budget estimates because the FBI had not been made fully responsible for all investigations. Clifford did not concur v/ith this opinion, insisted that the program v/as sound, and concluded that Vanech v/as simply "making moun- 101 tains out of molehills. The President penciled a short reply: "Clark: you have properly diagnosed the case. But J. Edgar v/ill in all probability get this backv/ard loolving Congress to give him v/hat he v/ants. Its dangerous. HST. " There v/as an additional delay in im'pletienting Enecu- tive Order 9835 due to the various attempts b^a Renresentati.ve Rees to push a bill through Congress as a suistitute for the

-'-^•^Meaaorandura, For the President from Clarh Clifford on loyalty program. May 23, 194-7, Internal Secur.Ety Eoldoj', Elsey Paners, Truur^an Library. 37 President's program. Rees insisted that the solution to the problem of loyalty "lies v/ith the Congress in providing adequate legislation under v/hich the executive branch can discharge employees, since it is clear that the executive branch is reluctant to assume this responsibility on its .,103 own^initiative." With this in mind. Representative Rees introduced, on April 10, 1947, H.R. 3023, "Providing for a 104 Federal Employees Loyalty Act of 1947." The bill was subsequently referred to the House Committee on the Post 105 Office but v/as never reported. The author did not de­ spair, however, and continued to push for a* Congressional substitute. On June 12, 1947, Congressman Rees introduced H.R. 3813, "a bill to provide for removal from and the preven­ tion of appointm.ent to, offices or positions in the execu­ tive branch of the Government of persons v/ho are found to „I06 be disloyal to the United States. This bill v/as simi­ lar to the President's Executive Order in many respects, but it placed the authority for dismissal with an independent

^U.S., Congressional Record, Both Congress, 1st Sess., 1947, 93, Part 3, p. 3305. •^^^Ibid., p. 3318. •^^^U. S ., Con-,ressixiiial ^nord, 8oth Congrcss, 1st Sess., 1947, 93, Part 14, p. '790""."* U.S., C^ongressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Sess., 1947, 93, Fart 6, p. "6922. 38 loyalty board, separate and apart from the Civil Service, which Rees charged had been lax in purging its rolls of disloyal employees.

H.R. 3813 was subsequently reported out of the House Post Office Committee and vigorously debated. Representa­ tive Adolph J. Sabath of Illinois, speaking in opposition to the bill, contended that the President's Order was v/ell conceived, had adequate provisions for protecting individ­ ual rights, and would prove adequate in seeking out dis­ loyal employees. The Rees bill, Sabath stated, represented only "a belated effort of the Republicans to get back in the groove of their Red-baiting campaign. ..." Mrs. Helen Gahagan Douglas of California charged that H.R. 3813

was simply the culmination of a fourteen year Republican 109 effort to get not Comrnunists, but New Deal Democrats. Despite the exhortations of Mr. Sabath and Mrs. Douglas, the Rees bill, v/ith several amendm.ents attached, passed the House of Representatives July 15, 1947, by the rather ^110 ^ , surprising majority of 319 to 61. It was then referred

•^^'''u.S., Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Sess., 1947, 93, Part 7, pr~o951. ^^^Ibid., p. 8949. 109^... , IbiQ. ll^Ibid., pp. 8979-8980. 39 to the Senate Committee on the Civil Service, but v/as 111 never reported out of that Committee. With the Rees bill languishing in the Senate Com­ mittee, the Congress finally, on July 31, 1947, voted the appropriations necessary for the implementation of the President's Loyalty Program. The $11,000,000 appropriated was, however, far less than the amount requested by the President. Also, the division of funds v/as substantially altered with $7,400,000 marked for the FBI and only 112 $3,000,000 for the Civil Service Commission, As the President had earlier predicted, Mr. Hoover did, in fact, "get what he wanted." The twenty-three mian Loyalty Reviev/ Board, v/ith a prominent Republican, Seth Richardson, as the Chairman, 113 was appointed by President Truman in November of 1947. Although there was general praise for those selected to serve on the board, certain misgivings could be detected on the part of many who v/arned of the inherent dangers to 114 civil liberties in such investigative procedures. In his statement to the nev/ Loyalty Board on November l4.

U.S.. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Sess., 1947, 93,'~ParinErr-p-.~&r.E; 112 Bontecou, Federal Loyalty-Security Program, p. 33 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 281. 114 . New York Times, Noveaiber 9, 19^'7. 40 Truman attempted to allay such fears by reiterating his promise to avoid anything remotely resembling a witch hunt. "The government, as the largest employer in the United lit: States, must be the model of a fair employer." " The program and its critics will be examined in the next chap­ ter.

^^^Ibid., November 15, 1947. CHAPTER II "I was very anxious that no injustice be done to any individual. ..." THE OPERATION OF THE LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM: ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS CRITICS

One of the first steps in implementing the Presi­ dent's Loyalty-Security Program involved the establishment of departmental loyalty boards, and the preparation of rules to govern loyalty procedures in those departments. The rules adopted by the Treasury Department are represen­ tative of the kind prepared throughout the various non- sensitive governmental agencies. It v/as noted at the outset that those rules would govern the possible removal of eYery civilian officer of the Treasury Department, "irrespective of tenure, or of manner, method, or nature of appointment." The nev/ly created board v/ould be composed of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, v/ho would serve as chairman, the Assistant General Counsel, and one other member to be chosen by the Secretary. The standards to be used in deterraining an employee's loyalty would be the ^2 same as those outlined in Executive Order 983!:).

-'-Rules to govern loyalty procedures in Treasury De partment, loyalty folder, Vanech Papers, Trunan Inbrary. p See Appendix IB. 41 Wif^

42 The head of each bureau v/ould be responsible for reporting any derogatory information pertaining to an em­ ployee to the Administrative Assistant who v/ould then turn such information over to the General Counsel. If the lat­ ter detennined that there v/as sufficient information to warrant charges, a statement v/ould be prepared and de­ livered to the employee by registered mail. It was speci­ fied that the statement should be in sufficient detail, and "as complete as security considerations permit," in order to allov/ the employee to prepare his defense. The accused Would be expected to reply v/ithin the time speci­ fied in the statement, but in no case less than fifteen days. It was noted that any charge left unansv/ered "shall 3 be deemed to be admitted." The employee v/ould have the right to a hearing if he so requested. The chaiiman of the loyalty board v/ould be responsible for fixing the time for such a hearing and would set the date sufficiently far in advance, again no less than fifteen days, in order to allov/ the emp)loyee time to prepare his case. If the em.ployee chose not to request a hearing, the board might, at its own discretion, choose to have one any./ay. In that case, the board could require the em.ployee to apnear and "ansner any cues tions ,4 v/hich the Board deems relevant. ' The failure to appear

^Rules to govern loyalty procedures in T.-xasury partm.ent. Loyalty Folder, Vanech Papers, Trun.an Library. 4 Ibid. 43 Upon request would, it was stated, constitute grounds for removal. The employee under suspicion would have the right to appear at the hearing, v/hich was closed to the public, with or without counsel. If the suspect requested an ap­ pointed attorney, the General Counsel, v/ho v/as responsible for presenting the charges, might appoint such a counsel at his ov/n discretion. It v/as also stated that the em­ ployee had the right to introduce v/itnesses in his ov/n de­ fense, and would be allov/ed to cross examine the board's witnesses. All testimony given at the hearing v/ould be under oath, and a v/ritten record of the proceedings v/as required. When the hearing v/as completed, the board, after deliberation, v/as to prepare v/ritten recommendations stat­ ing whether they felt that "reasonable grounds" existed for believing that the employee in question was disloyal. If the board recommended remiOval, the employee would be notified, and given seven days to file an appeal and pre­

sent a written argument in his OV.TL behalf. After the time for appeal had lapsed, the General Counsel would transmit the record to the Secretary v/ith his recominendations. If the Secretary confirmed the decision for remove], the employee v/as to be immediately suspended without nay pending an appeal before the Loyalty Reviev; Board. If the employee did not request an appeal, he nas then neravavic?atl:' ^^ 44 removed from the Federal payroll. If an appeal v/as made before the Loyalty Reviev/ Board, the Secretary would con­ sider its recommendations and subsequently direct either permanent removal or reinstatement. 5 Some 800,000 government workers, employed in areas considered sensitive, received somewhat different treat­ ment with regard to loyalty investigations. The Department of the Airoy, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Voice of America Agency treated disloyalty cases as security risks, and did not allow appeal beyond the Agency head. Other agencies designated as sensitive followed the proce­ dures outlined by the Loyalty Reviev/ Board in cases involv­ ing the question of "loyalty." An employee considered as

a security risk, however, could not appeal beyond the head 6 of his respective agency. A casual examination of the procedures involved in loyalty investigations clearly reveals an element of con­ cern for the rights of the individual. A much closer study however, reveals just as clearly a number of glaring de­ ficiencies. The closed hearing, the forced testimony, and others strongly suggested something in the nature of a seventeenth Century Star Chamber proceeding. There was an /

^Ibid. Plarold W. Chase. Securitat andJTlberty: The lh'o'Ew.n of Native Communism, 1947-55 '"(iTew "lofk:'"l:7" El"" r.orton "A Co., 1955TrPP~^r3^f'4. 45 immediate protest on the part of many in government serv­ ice whose record was in the process of being perused for evidence of disloyalty. Colston E. Warne, Professor of Economics at Amherst College and a member of the Presi­ dent's Council of Economic Advisors, refused to fill out the loyalty test questionnaire and angrily denied the right of either the Executive or Congress to set standards of loyalty. "l am indeed shocked that for the first time in American history heresy hunting has received sanction of the President of the United States."'^ Truman continued to insist that "the presence within the government of any disloyal or subversive person consti­ tuted a threat to our democratic processes." The President was, hov/ever, motivated less by a fear of potential sub­ version than by a desire to silence that vocal minority within the Congress v/hich he felt represented an even graver threat. Yet, in his quasi appeasem.ent of that minority, Truman did, certainly unwittingly, sanction the "heresy 9 hunting. "'

Nev/spaper article pertaining to Professor Colston E. V/arne's refusal to fill out loyalty questionnaire, 0F252K, Truman Papers, Trum.an Library. o statement, President Truaan on the Loyalty Program, 0F252K, Truman Papers, Truman Library. %ew York Tim.es, Noveaiber 2, 1947. US '^ Twelve years after leaving the Presidency, Harry Truman would voice a rather simplistic viev/ in reference to the loyalty question during his administration. He professed that he never could understand v/hat had caused all the clamor. After all, noted Mr. Truman, a person was either "loyal or disloyal. " ' Although he v/as given on occasion to the expression of such simple views, it would be a mistake to assume that the foregoing accurately represented the President's feelings in 1947. Certainly no such clear-cut distinction could be made betv/een loyalty and disloyalty, and Mr. Truman must have knov/n it. Loyalty, as a state of mind and emotions, could not be accurately defined, and certainly could not be measured by the stand- 11 ards outlined in the President's loyalty order. Truman did, perhaps, feel at the outset that such standai-ds v/ould adequately safeguard individual rights. It remains doubt­ ful, hov/ever, that he ever believed in the underlying prin- 12 ciples of the program. The President v/ould ha.ve been on firmer ground, v/ith relation to the loyalty program, had he taken heed of the v/ords eaiployed in his veto of the

Alan Harper, "The Free Speech issue in Post World War II Reconstruction," Paper read before the American his­ torical Association, Pacific Coast Branch, Los Angeles, California, August 27, 1964.

11 Corliss Lament, Freede'-i_Is ^^J'reejcex^lleee: Cli^ll LIbertiei be s Today (Nov/ York:' "llofiz"on"Pi^ss',''IR^naJ, p. Idh. 12 Ibid., p. 123. 47 Taft-Hartley. Bill, a bill which Truman stated, "goes so far that it would threaten fundamental democratic free­ doms . " There were some groups, including' the Sons of the American Revolution, v/ho v/holeheartedly endorsed the 14 loyalty program. For the most part, hov^/ever, it was sub­ jected from the beginning to a rather divergent and often abusive attack from both the right and the left. Republi­ can Congressman William J. Miller of Connecticut v/ent so far as to suggest that the loyalty program might v/ell be a "New Deal witch-hunt" desi/3:ne•o-* d to eliminate the forces of conservatism v/hich opposed it in order to "make secure its ,,15 totalitarian hold upon the nation. ... The American Anti-Communist Association, Inc., evidently feeling that the program did not go far enough, requested that the or­ der be amended to prevent the use of government property by 16 such subversives as Henry A. Wallace. The liberal sentiment was expressed in a radio de­ bate between Representative J. M. Combs of Texas, v/ho spoke

•^%ew York Times, June 21, 1947. ill Resolution, National Society of Sons of The Ameri­ can Revolution, 0F252K, Truman Papers, Tru'aan Library. •^^U.S., Congressional Record, 8oth Congress, 1st Sess., 1947, 93, Part 2, 2"46T. ' •'•^Memorandum To VJhite House from "N. J. H.," June 13, 1947, 0F252K, Truman Papers, Truman Library. 48 in defense of the President's loyalty program, and Arthur

Garfield Hays, National Director of the American Civil

Liberties Union, Who branded the loyalty order as "the most outrageous, undemocratic measure that could possibly 17 be conceived." Although Mr. Hays v/as somewhat over zeal­ ous in his denunciation, his feelings were not far removed from those expressed by m.any other liberal groups. A num­ ber of Yale University professors characterized the loyalty program as part of a pattern of suppression that would in- 1 fi evitably lead to another I920's witch hunt. The National Lawyers Guild viev/ed the program as follov/ing in the pat- 19 tern of the Alien and Sedition laws of 1798. Clifford

J. Durr, a member of the Federal Communications Cormnission, also assailed the loyalty program, and insisted that the evils far outv/eighed any possible good that might be a'c- 20 complished. The President, it would seem, had succeeded in alienating almost everyone.

The Administration was not v/ithout its defenders.

Justice Departm.ent officials, in a miemorandum entitled

•^^New York Times, May l4, 1947- 1 fi Letter, To the President from Yale University pro­ fessors, November 26, 1947, 0E252K, Trumion Papers, Truaran Library. 19 Letter, To the President from National Lawyers Guild, June 12, 1947, Loyalty File, Vaneoh Papers, Trunan Library. 20 New York Times, April 15, 194E. 49 "Does the President's Loyalty Order violate Civil Rights?" firmly asserted that the order did not violate the individ­ ual's rights. This assumption v/as based on the premise that the loyalty procedures v/ere in accord v/ith the re­ quirements of administrative due process, i.e. notice, hearing, opportunity for rebuttal, and the like. The Justice officials based the strength of their argument, however, on their belief in the validity of two basic prop­ ositions: (1) that no government employee had a vested right to a place on the public payroll, and (2) that em­ ployment by the government was a privilege and not a con­ stitutional right. It v/as further stated, in this connec­ tion, that "The government employee, like Caesar's wife, 21 should be above suspicion." For this particular line of reasoning administration officials drew heavily from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' affinnation in the case of McAuIiffe v. City of New Bedford Massachusetts in I892. The particular case arose v/hen McAuliffe, a New Bedford policeman, v/as dismissed from the force for soliciting money for a political camipaign. Holm.es, in his oft-repeated dictum, stated that Mr. McAuliffe "nay have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has 22 no constitutional right to be a policeman." " Hence, no

^^Statement, Does The President's Loyalty Order Vio­ late Civil Rights? I^oyalty File, Vanech Papers, Truman Library. ^^Zechariah Chafee, The Blessings of Lib^nly (Nc .: York: J. B. Lippincotte Co., 1952"7, p'l" 34." " 50 one had a vested right to be a government employee. Seth Richardson, Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, v/ent one step further when he asserted that the government could 23 legally fire an employee without any hearing whatsoever. The proposed threat to the government--the danger this nation was to be protected from--had never been clearly defined. If the main threat v/as posed only b^'- those v/ho pilfered classified documents, loyalty investigations might well have been restricted to sensitive areas. Instead, it was clear that not only deeds but certain v/ords v/ere also 24 considered dangerous. The courts had earlier sanctioned such reasoning. The United States Court of Appeals, in upholding a previous decision against Leon Josephson for refusing to testify before the House Cormilttee on Un- American Activities, went so far as to state that "Congress could and should curtail freedom of speech v/here 'there is a clear and present danger.' . . ." ^ Again, the reli­ ance on Justice HoLmes v.^ho ruled, in the case of Schenck V. United States in 1919, that the First Amendment did not protect an individual from punishment for "uttering words ,,26 that may have all the effect of force.

^^New York Times, December 31, 1947.

^^Francis Biddle, The Bear of^ Freedom (Garden 0" .,' . New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc:," 19:5'^Tr PP- 205-207. ^^New York Times, December 6, 1947. ^^nry Steele Conaiager (cd.), ^oufaents of ^-ncyayean History, Vol. II: Since I890 (8th ed.; Lev: York: nypleron- Century-Crofts, I96Uy7~p: 147. 51 The United States government, therefore, involved itself in the most difficult task of attempting to deter­ mine when and if certain v/ords represented a "clear and present danger." The Courts had continually recognized the right to free and open political discussions but had also recognized the existence of certain limits to such 27 discussions. The question, then, concerned the limits: at what point did the speaker pass from nonnal, acceptable political discussion into the realm of words dangerous to the governraent? The ansv/er often depended not so much on the words, but on the intent of the speaker. In a dissent­ ing opinion to the Supreme Court's affirmation in the case of Dennis v. United States in 1951, an affirmation based on a modified version of Holmes" "clear and present danger" decision. Justice William 0. Douglas stated: The crime then depends not on v/hat is taught but on who the teacher is. That is to make freedom of speech turn not on what is said, but on the intent v/ith v/hich it is said. Once v/e start dov/n that road v/e enter territory dangerous to the liberties of every citizen. ..." Unquestionably, an over reliance on the concept of "dangerous v/ords" can open the way to activities not con­ sistent v/ith a democratic society. Whoever wished to sun- press any debate considered to be dangerous by that

^^David Fellman, The Limits^^Jyreedcag (New Brunav.-ick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1959"), PP- 106-107. ^^Barton J. Bernstein and Alien J. Matuaow, (eds.). The Truman AdministratiojiE Ale^'£B-En/3lA^ll..Av*.l-:^~-'-'- ^^•^•'•' ^"-•^• Harper 8c Row", I966) 1 p. 393".'" 52 particular person could turn to the idea of a "clear and present danger" to justify such suppression.^^ The Na­ tional Lawyers Guild, in their report on the constitution­ ality of the loyalty program, noted the tendency to judge "intent" rather than action. The Lav/yers concluded that "The charges of deceit belong in heresy trials, not in po­ litical procedures. The test is action, not the dubious 30 ground of belief about motives." The whole basic assumption, that government employ­ ment v/as a privilege and not a right, that the em.pIoyee could be legally fired for reasons that seemed justifiable only to the government, undermined the procedural safe- guards from the beginning. The granting of a hearing to the employee amounted to an act of mercy on the part of the 31 government rather than the employee's right.-^ Such justi­ fication v/as based on specious reasoning, and represented a serious, if not intentional, disregard for the rights of 32 Federal employees. It v/as this kind of reasoning that

^%ew York Times, July I8, 1948. Article by Alex­ ander Meiklejohn advocating free speech, July I8, 1948. 30 Report, National Lawyers Guild: Analysis of Executive Order 9835, Loyalty File, Vanech Papers, Trunan Library. ^-^Biddle, Fear of Freedom, p. 212. ^^Davld M. Levitan, "The Responsibility of Aeninin- trative Officials in a Democratic Society^'' 19/1^911 Science Quarterly, Vol. LXI (December IR-'ho),"?. b'-ho. 53 led to the many and often repeated charges directed against the loyalty program.

One such charge was based on the belief that the brand of disloyalty would result in perm.anent dam.age to the employee. A Washington Post article of December 18, 1947j> recognized the need for some kind of loyalty program, but pleaded for caution, noting particularly the serious­ ness of a charge of disloyalty. The government must, the article stated, find some procedure that v/ould reconcile 33 the need for security with the rights of the individual. Por the government to maintain, as it consistently did, that the employee v/as not being punished in the legal sense of the term, and that therefore the strict principles of due process could be waived, v/as based on a faulty premise. No greater charge could be m.ade against a govern­ ment employee than to say, in effect, that this particular person had been disloyal to his or her country. In this respect, the employee v/as most certainly being punished.-^3 4 The Holines dictum that no one has the right to employment simply did not fit in this case. The New Bedford police­ man, undoubtedly hurt by his dismissal, could nevertheless find another job. The govern/nent employee disaoLSsed on a charge of disloyalty faced in all probability a i^jch more

^^ashington Post, Decenl;er I8, I94'7. ^^Biddle, Fear of Freed on, p. 215, : 54 difficult task.-^^ Even if a suspended employee v/ere reinstated, the shock of the investigation, the suspicious glances of his fellov/ employees, and the possible loss of friends and acquaintances all might serve to haunt the accused for m.any years to come. It had been hoped that this kind of situa­ tion could be avoided by conducting only secret hearings. Inevitably, hov/ever, leaks did occur, especially from the

Loyalty Reviev/ Board, to the Congress, press, and others outside the government.-3^7 It has even been suggested, and perhaps not unreasonably so, that an employee, finding himself tainted by suspicions of disloyalty'', might v/ell 38 turn to the Communists. Once cleared, the employee was not only forced to accept the contaminant that he v/as once investigated for possible disloyalty, but v/as also required to live v/ith the gnav/ing fear that his files might be re-opened at any time for reviev/. This could be considered nothing less than cruel and unusual punisliment. Mr. Truman made note of this defect in his Memioirs:

35 Chafee, Blessings of Lij^^rly, p. 94. ^Eleanor Bontecou, Th e E e de r a 1 Loy a It y - S o cur^Lt^y Program (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University rress, 1953), p. 151. ^'^Ibj-d., p. 64. ^ Ibid., p. 31. 55 Every time a cleared employee moved from one job to another, his file v/as reviewed again, so that he was forced to answer the same charges over and over again. . . . This is not in the tradition of American fair play and justice. There is no indication, hov/ever, that this situation was ever substantiallj'- alleviated. Another formidable charge made against the loyalty program involved the refusal, in a large number of cases, to allow the accused to confront his accusers. A prominent lawyer, and later Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Abe Fortas, questioned "whether it is proper for a great governmental department to publish the most damaging state­ ment which can be made about an American Citizen today, to wit, that he is disloyal to his country . . . without giv­ ing him a chance to be confronted v/ith v/itnesses against 4o him." In the same light, Fortas later charged that the loyalty board's decision not to allov/ accused em.ployees to 4l examine FBI reports v/as a violation of the Bill of Rights. In the rules of procedure for the conduct of loyalty investigations as adopted by the Treasury Departm.ent, and reviev^/ed earlier in this chapter, it v/as noted that the employee in question vrould have the right to cross examine

^^Harry S. Truman, Yea.rs__of_ Trial ina^j^Elin> ^''^1- H Memoirs (Garden City, New YoiaN: DoublecIayRh Co., IRh^), p. 281. ^^New York Times, Novem.ber 4, IR'iY. 4l ' . Ibid., Deceanber 29, 1947- 56 the board's witnesses. A discrepancy arose v/hen the FBI demanded that its confidential informants not be exposed to such cross examination. The loyalty boards were there­ fore faced with the choice of either acquiescing in the FBI's demands or giving up the investigation, as the Bureau's reports and v/itnesses more often than not constituted the heart of the board's case.4 2 In the final analysis, the loyalty boards chose to acquiesce, falling back on the as­ sumption that the government could, after all, legally dis­ miss an employee "v/ithout extending to such employee any 43 hearing whatsoever." As a result, the full burden of

proof fell on the accused against "persons v^hom he did not

know, whom he could not confront, and v/hose credibility ,i44 he could not challenge. Certain members of the Administration also voiced

concern over the problem of confidential witnesses. C.

Girard Davidson, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, in

a letter to Clark Clifford, indicated his belief that an

accused should have the right to confront those who gave

damaging testimony against him. The Assistant Secretory

further indicated his belief that the Department should be

Ibid., December 28, 1947. 43 Ibid. Cabell Phillips, ^yRG J?ritaa.n Jh;esldenc,y:_ Tne lis tory of a Triuariohant Success ion (iiew lorn: ane i.aen.: Co. 7~'r9^6YrV' "36'2. ' 57 allowed to conduct its ov/n investigation if the FBI con­ tinued to refuse to allow confrontation. He pointed out, however, that the Attorney General's directive of October 7, 1947, had expressly forbidden the departments to make such an independent investigation. In conclusion, David­ son observed that many subversives might well be retained due to the reluctance of some boards to act on hearsay 45 evidence. The continued protest against the rule of no- confrontation led in the fall of 1948 to a slight change in the procedure,. Beginning November I of that year, the FBI v/as required to furnish the names of its informants. FBI agents might also be required to appear before a loyalty board and testify to the credibility of their confidential v/itnesses. The identity of such witnesses, and the oppor­ tunity to cross examine them, continued to be denied to 46 the accused. Loyalty boards, in defense of their position, con- 47 tinually pled for the same rights as private eraployers. This presujnably meant the right not to retain the services of an incompetent employee, which was not an unreasonable request. But, as President Truman had pointed out, "The

^^Letter. To Cla:!: Clifford from 0. Girard jMvision, DecemLer 29, 1947, ix)yalty Folder, Murphy Files, Trun.an Library. ^ ^Bontecou, Federal Loyalty^ecimn.ty }yerren. np. 60-:E.. il7 '\' Nev/ York Ti.iaes, Deceraber 28, 19-';7. 58 government . . . must be the model of a fair employer."^^ To fire an employee for incompetence is one thing, but to charge him with the heinous crimie of disloyalty and then deny him anything less than due process in defending him­ self is something quite different. ° It is doubtful that a private employer could long get away v/ith such disregard for his employee's rights. 50 Perhaps the most vehement denunciation of the loyalty program related to the publication of the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations, and the accompanying charge that the Administration had thereby given open sanc­ tion to the principle of guilt by association. Of the six categories set forth in Executive Order 9835 i'or determin­ ing v/hether there v/ere "reasonable grounds" for believing a person was disloyal, the sixth, pertaining to association with a subversive organization, unfortunately became the 51 most important. The listing of organizations dated back to the pas­ sage of the Deportation and Exclusion Laws betv/een the years I917 and 1919. The provisions of those laws forbade an alien to belong to any organization advocating the over­ throv/ of the United States governavent by force. T^aelve

^^^Ibid., November 9, 1947. ^^Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Loyn 11y and Security: Ph.a> 1 C)y- ment Tests i^lJIhe^JJniated jStal^'^^ Yale bnlvaraity Press^"1*958X P - 5t^87 ' ^^Levitan, "The Responsibility of Ah. inlstratave 0.''- ficials in a Demiocratic Society," p. 5'^8. ^•^Phillios, The Truaan Vreeddency, no. Rnl-Shh. 59 such organizations v/ere listed under the direction of At­ torney General A. Mitchell Palmer, v/ho insisted that the 52 burden of proof rested v/ith.the alien. The excesses of Attorney General Palmer aroused such a loud protest that the listing of organizations fell into virtual disuse until the birth of the House Coimnittee on Un-American Activities in 1938, and the subsequent pas­ sage of the Hatch Act in 1939. Forty-seven organizations were listed by Attorney General Francis Biddle under the provisions of that act. This list remained unpublished until released in December of 1947, with a number of addi­ tions, under the Truman Loyalty Order.-^-^ The general criteria for determining subversive or­ ganizations, as developed by officials of the Justice De­ partment, included the follov/ing, 1. The actual principles . . . may be deev.ied to be hostile to the American form of government . . . ; 2. The aimis, purposes, policies and programs of such organizations promote the ideals ... of any foreign government or of any foreign politi­ cal party; 3. Such organization is more concerned viith the . success or failure of foreign political and economic experimients . . . which v/ould result in the destruction ... of the Republican form of government . . . ;

.5^Bontecou, Federal Loyalty-Security Fro:xan, nn. 159.-160. ^^Ibid., pp. 160-167. 60 4. The actual principles, methods and mode of operation . . . indicate lack of bona-fide allegiance to the government of the United States; 5. Such organization may be fairly deemed to ad­ vocate . . . political or economic changes by radical or revolutionary methods . . . ; 6. Such organization.is committed to an actual policy and program which sanctions the use of the technique of conspiracy, force . . . and other similar devices to undermine confidence in the governm.ent of the United States . . . ; 7. Such organization is committed to an actual policy . . . v/hich sanctions the use of tech­ niques enumerated . . . above to deprive any person of rights guaranteed by the Constitu-. tion, or to suppress civil liberties. . . .5^ During the process of compiling the list of organi­ zations. Attorney General Clark ventured to assure liberals that they had nothing to fear--that the screening of fed­ eral employees about to be undertaken by the government v/ould, in effect, stop the smear of all government employees The Attorney General continually vov/ed there v/ould be no witch hunt but noted that "we are going to separate the chaff from the wheat." ' In April of 1947, the Justice Department v/as con­ sidering some 300 organizations. Seven m.onths later the number had been reduced to 108. Attorney General Clark,

^^''Sec Appendix II for specific criteria for desig­ nating organizations. ^^Draft, Message from the Attorney Gencn-al, April 14, 1947, Loyalty Folder, Vanech Papers, Tru.a.an Library. 6l apparently still not completely satisfied, whittled the list down to a final eighty-nine organizations, including the forty-seven which had previously been designated by Attorney General Biddle. On releasing the list for publi­ cation in December 1947, Clark noted that membership in one of the listed organizations should be counted as only 56 one small piece of evidence.-^ "Guilt by Association^" stated the Attorney General, "has never been one of the principles of our American Independence. We must be satis- fied that reasonable grounds exist."5 7 Earlier, the Board of Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union had urged that little v/eight be given to mere membership in an organization. Activities, stated the board, should be the main criteria. The Board also voiced the hope that past mierabership in a listed organiza- 58 tion should not be regarded as evidence of disloyalty.-^ It was unfortunate that this advice was not always heeded. Before the list was ever published, there v/as gen­ eral criticism to the effect that the authority to list subversive organizations placed too m.uch power in the hands of the Attorney General--that he alone would be the one to

^^Newsweek, December 15, 1947, P- 23.

^^'M^lLlP-X-^lT^' December 5, 1947- rP -^Statement, Comments by American Civil J.lberti ea Union on Loyalty Tests for Governmeivt Ennloyeea, Anril 7. 1947, Loyalty Folder, Vanech Eaners, Tru:ian L"hrar:;. 62 59 determine who was loyal and who was not loyal. The Justice Department took note of this criticism and denied the justification for such reasoning on the grounds that the Attorney General had possessed such power for some time and had always used it "circumspectly. " It v/as also pointed out that such designations were left to the Attor­ ney General because he had the best investigative facility in the executive branch, and v/as subject to the control of the President should he attempt to use his power in any 60 arbitrary manner. . The Attorney General v/as also subjected to the charge that the eighty-nine organizations had been arbi­ trarily listed without being given an opportunity to defend themselves. The first actual test of the legality of tho list, the case of Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Conaiittee v. McGrath, came shortly after publication and resulted from the charge that this particular organization had not been given a fair hearing. Although the resulting decision v/as inconclusive, it v/as clear that the court felt the organi­ zation had not been given a chance to defend itself, and that its designation as a subversive organization had been

^%ew Republic, April l4, 19^7, p. 13. Note, To Gus Vanech from Joseph Duggan, Loyalty Folder, Vanech Papers, Truraan Library. New York Times, December 6, 1947. 63 made without the presentation of adequate evidence. Justice Clark pointed out that part of the list had been in existence since 1943, and that he had felt at the time that'it should hpve been published. Relative to the list released in Decem.ber 1947, Clark stated that the or­ ganizations had been contacted, that FBI reports had been considered, and that he had personally made the final de­ termination. In a most interesting observation, Clark firmly asserted that the organizations that appeared on the final list had, in fact, been given fair hearings. The Joint Anti-Fascist Committee case, the Justice contended, simply left a false impression that such hearings had not been conducted. He somewhat qualified his rem.arks, how­ ever, by declaring that he had personally been present at two of the hearings and "understood" that other officials in the Justice Department had conducted the others. He recalled that after one such hearing, it had been decided not to publish the organization in question. Justice Clark contended, hov/ever, that he really did not feel that any hearing was necessa2^y--that it served only as a yardstick.

Leo Pfoffer. The Liberties of an American: The Supreme Court Speaks (2d ed.; Eos'ton: The "Beacon. Press, l^&J)", p. 123. The Court found that the listing of orgaral-• zations without prior notice was unconstitutional. Plon- ever, there v/as a quite evident difference of on'nion; there v/ere five concurring opinioiis delivejnad, none of which v/ould rank as the opinion of the Court. 64 He concluded by stating that dismissal exclusively on the basis of the Attorney General's list was never intended. He seemed quite sincere in that statement and there is no reason for doubting his sincerity. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the Attor­ ney General's "Black List" did, unfortunately, become the heart of the loyalty program. Henceforth, an employee's acquaintance with the "wrong people," no m.atter how far in the past or the circumstances surrounding such acquaintances, became prima facie evidence of guilt, and guilt by associa- 64 tion became the rule rather than the exception. A. L. Pomerantz, former senior trial counsel in the Nazi industrialist cases at Nureraburg, denounced the loyalty order in general and the Attorney General's list in particu­ lar. He contended that the highest placed Nazis received a more equitable hearing than United States goverrmient em­ ployees would receive under the provisions of the Presi­ dent's loyalty order. Although the crim.inality of certain Fascist organizations v/as never doubted, it v/as neverthe­ less necessary to prove that a person had joined or remained in a particular organization "imov/ing of its nefarious ac­ tivities." A goverrmient em.ployee, Poraerantz asserted.

^Interview with Justice Thomas C. Clark, Easivington, D. C, August 22, 1969. fih Bontecou, Federal loyalty-Security Pr_ograla, p. 174. "" ' 65 could be dismissed for nothing more than having .belonged 65 to an organization designated as subversive. It would have been helpful had more time been taken in discovering the nature of the various organizations. It was quite possible that a particular organization might have been taken over by a Communist group after an em- f)6 ployee had joined, and perhaps without his knov/ledge. During the course of the investigations, a young psycholo­ gist employed by the Veterans Administration, found him.- self in considerable difficulty because he had been a mem­ ber of the American Labor Party of Nev/ York in 1938-1939, although that organization was not significantly influenced 67 by the Communists until much later. In such a case, the government was unjustified in even considering the eia- ployee's membership in that particular organization. Along the same line, it v/as not possible to state with finality that American Comiaunists had always follov/ed the dictates of the Krem.Iin leaders. It v/as not beyond the realm of reason to propose that a person might v/ell have joined or remiained in an organization knov/ing of its Communist background, but v/ithout any evil or disloyal in- 68 tent. Professor Henry Steele Cormnager presented an

^^New York Times, May 4, 1947. ^^Norman Thomas, The Test_ of Ereedoai (Nen York: W. W. Norton Co., Inc., lS4J7~PP. IdC-ly'fd 'VJalter Gellhorn, S^ecurity, Loyalty._ aed Saien_ae (Ithaca, Nov/ York: Cornell lliiVersi'i'y'EreaeV i).yd). n. : ^^New York Times, Anril 29. 19-7. 66 interesting observation in that regard. If the presence of 'subversives' in an organiza­ tion is enough to persuade us to drop our member­ ship, all the Communists need to do to destroy our society—say the Republican Party or the American Legion or the Methodist Church-"is to join it,69 Shortly after publication of the list, Mr. Seth Richardson, Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, assured government employees that they should feel free to join any organization, "liberal or conservative, v/hich is not dis- „70 loyal. Such a statement represents a gross over­ simplification of the problem and demonstrates a funda­ mental weakness of the whole loyalty program. Hov/ v/as an individual to distinguish, precisely, betv/een v/hat v/as liberal, conservative, or disloyal? It v/as impossible to make such concise, clear cut distinctions. What one in­ dividual may have seen as a liberal cause, another may have viewed as a case of flagrant disloyalty. As an ex­ ample, in the late 1920's the American Medical Association branded as Communistic an attempt to secure medical care for veterans for non-service related illnesses. 71 In spite of the criticisms, the corn-piling of organi­ zational lists continued to grow, paralleled by a grovn'ng

%enry Steele Commager, Fre_e_don, Loyalaty^. Dissent (New York: Oxford University Press,' 19:74") ,"y. lOl. "^^New York Times, Deceiaber 28, 1947.

'•^'Gellhorn, Security, LoyaIty, ^'^^RH -?i?ir}7aPn P- ^-35. 67 fear and anxiety among govermnent employees v/ho no doubt searched their own minds for past acquaintances v/hich might tend to incriminate them. The total effect produced an unhealthy trend tov/ard conformity, which all too often came to be associated v/ith loyalty. To be different, to voice conflicting opinions, indeed, to be creative, might well have marked one as suspect. The situation was com­ parable, as Professor Commager noted, to Benjamin Frank­ lin's story of the tv/o Quaker sisters. "I know not how it is, sister, but the older I get the more I find that no

one is right but me and thee, and sometimes I am troubled 72 about thee." The one lesson that should have been learned from the loyalty program v/as that total security v/as sim.ply not possible unless the government v/as v/illing to resort to the kind of police-state tactics from which this society v/as supposedly being protected. Loyalty investigations 73 could and should have been limited to sensitive areas. Instead, under the provisions of Executive Order 9835, the governmient found itself engaged in the investigation of thousands of people v;ho v/ould never see nor have any access to a classified document.

72 CoiTLmager, Freedom, Loyalty, Dissent, p. 9h. '•-^Harper, "The Free Speech Issue in Poet Ecerld Ear II Reconstruction," unpublished paper, Trun.rTi Id.hrary.

iAaai^-LiiA>! . 68 The inconspicuous ichthyologist of the Fish and Wildlife service knows many secrets . . . but they are the secrets of the speckled trout rather than the secrets of national defense . . . yet the political viev/s and the associations of all these men .• . . have been a matter of government scrutiny almost as though they v/ere entrusted v^/ith the^ju

latest development in chemical warii'are. t « • Such an all-inclusive investigation v/as ted much time, left many v/ounds, and, in the end, resulted in the exposure of 75 few real subversives. A view of some of the investiga­ tions conducted under the loyalty order demonstrates that fact rather clearly. Far too often, the decision rendered in a loyalty case depended on how the members of a particular board felt about loyalty. Socialism v/as often confused v/ith Communism, and on one occasion, an employee under investigation v/as 76 charged v/ith being "in sympathy v/ith the underprivileged."' An individual considered too liberal might also have been rendered as suspect. The author of a letter published in the Nev/ York Tim.es, July 21, 194-7, voiced concern over this matter. It sec.ms he had received a phone call from some one in the State Department requesting infon.ration on an acquaintance v/ho v/as thought to be "pretty liberal in his

7b ' 'Gellhorn, Security, Loyalty, and Scienee, p. 129. ^^Ibid., p. 171. ''^^Biddle, Fear of FreedO:i, p. 221. 69 77 thinking." In one loyalty hearing, a witness for the defense was asked if the defendant had ever expressed him- 7fi self on Russian composers. Such inane questions rarely-

exposed the subversive but did represent, over a period

of time, a tremendous waste of timie and human resources.

Doubtless much of the time of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, an organization highly trained in coun­

teracting subversive activities, v/as v/asted in compiling

page after page of material that amounted to little more

than rumor and gossip. This could be no better illustrated

than by the example of the seventy-tv/o v/itnesses inter­

viewed by the Bureau to determine if a Negro man v/as ac­

ceptable for a position as a part time postman in light of

the revelation that his v/ife, som.e fifteen years before,

had contributed money to an organization on the Attorney 79 General's list. A more serious consequence of the loyalty program

was the tendency on the part of m.any to brand those v/ho

spoke out on racial m.atters as disloyal. The growing de­

mand for civil rights no doubt contributed to such fantasy.

Abraham Flaxer, President of the United Public Workers of

America, brought this to the President's attention in a

^^^New York Times, July 21, 1947-

'^Bontecou, PMnlEiLJt9;hlniM:i§£^ ?• -•••^* ^Biddle, Fear of Freed^on, p. 241. 70 fio in a letter dated November 24, 1948. Two days later, Truman received a letter from Walter White, Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, who also noted the "increasing tendency on the part of government agencies to associate activity on inter- ,,81 racial matters v/ith disloyalty. VJalter Gellhorn, in his distinguished book. Security, Loyalty, and Science, confirmed this charge by revealing the following fantastic statement made to him one day by the chairman of a depart­ mental loyalty board. Of course, the fact that a person believes in racial equality doesn't prove that he's a Coiiimun- ist, but it certainly makes you look twice, doesn't it. You can't get av/ay from the fact that racial equality is part of the Coimnunist line.^2 There were other reported incidences of this kind of confused thinlcing. In more than one proceeding, the defendants were asked to relate their feelings in regard to interracial m.arriage. In one particular hearing, thiC employee v/as asked hov/ she felt about the mixing of v/hite 84 and Negro blood in a Red Cross blood bank. Such absurd

^^Letter, To the President from Abraham Flaxer, November 24, 1948, 0F252K, Truman Papers, Truman Library. Letter, to President from. Walter White, November 26, 1948, 0E252K, Truman Papers, Truman Library. °^Gellhorn, Security, Loyalty, and Science, p. 152. Biddle, Fear of Freedom, p. 222. fi4 Bontecou, Federyd-^^ '^9213yaZhE£91 "'^•* "^Z.X-'^'"-""1'' -• '''~' • 138. 71 questions v/ere no doubt exceptions, but they appeared too

frequently to be overlooked, and represented an unwarranted

intrusion into the personal beliefs of Federal employees.

Perhaps the most glaring example of disregard for

the rights of government em^ployees occurred in the dismis­

sal of Miss Dorothy Bailey in March of 1948. Miss Bailey,

forty-one years of age v/ith fourteen years of government

service, v/as fired from her job as a clerk in the United

States Employment Service. During the course of the pro­

ceedings, she was never allov/ed to confront the v/itnesses

who furnished the critical evidence against her. Miss

Bailey denied their charges and appealed to the Loyalty

Reviev/ Board v/hich subsequently upheld the earlier deci­

sion against her. In answer to the charge that the v/it­

nesses against Dorothy Bailey had offered little more than

gossip, Seth Richardson replied that the confidential in­

formants had been "certified to us by the FBI as experi- 1,85 enced and entirely reliable.

Miss Bailey, apparently feeling she had been denied a fair hearing, carried her appeal to the courts. On

April 30, 1951, the Suprerae Court, unable to reach a ma­ jority decision, allov/ed the judgment of the United States

Circuit Court of Appeals, vdnich had earlier upheld the

^^Quoted in Phillips, The Truaan Presidency, np 351-352. 72 86 dismissal of Miss Bailey, to stand. Mr. Justice Henry

W. Edgerton of the Circuit Court, in a dissenting opinion, had asserted that her "dismissal violates both the Consti- fi7 tution and the loyalty order. . . ." Associate Supreme

Court Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in regard to the Bailey case, stated that: She v/as on trial for her reputation, her job, her professional standing. A disloj'-alty trial is the most crucial event in the life of a civil servant. If condemned, he is branded for life as a person unworthy of trust. ... To make that condemnation without meticulous regard for the decencies of So fair trial is abhorrent to fundamental Justice. It is apparent that "meticulous regard for ... a fair trial" was absent in the hearings afforded Dorothy

Bailey. She v/as not allov/ed to confront her accusers, and had not been made completely av/are before the first hear­ ing of the basis of the charges against her. ^ The Cir­ cuit Court of Appeals frankly admitted that Miss Bailey had not been afforded a fair trial in the true sense of the word, but concluded that the interests of the govern- 90 ment must prevail. It v/ould seem, hov/ever, as Justice

Bontecou, Federal Loyalty-Security Program, p. 231. ^'''Quoted in Carey McEilliams, Witch Hunt: The Re­ vival of Heresy (Boston: Little Brown ic Co., 195^0), p.' I8. ^^Herman C. Pritchett, Ci.vil Id berties ?nd The ¥^-"---1- Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press', ISoh), p. h( ^Bontecou. Federal Loyalty-Secnrlty^JPror ra:.\, pn. 118-119. ' " • 90 ^ Ibid., p. 229. 73 Hugo Black concluded, that the interests of the govern­ ment are not served best in the kind of proceedings con­ ducted against Dorothy Bailey, but rather in a more vigor­ ous defense of individual rights as outlined in the First 91 Amendment of the United States Constitution. As of March 1, 1948, it was reported that 420,000 Federal employees had been examined under the Trtmian Loyalty Order. Of that number, 399 had v/arranted further investigation, 66 had been cleared, and 25 had resigned before the investigation was completed. Evidence of dis­ loyalty, it v/as reported, had been found in only eight 92 cases. These figures indicated rather clearly that (1) the hysteria over Coimnunist influence in government was simply v/ithout any basis in fact, and (2) there v/as really no apparent need for such a v/idespread investiga­ tion of government employees. The latter became even clearer v/ith the report issued in December 1949 v/hich in­ dicated that not one subversive had been uncovered in the 93 investigation of over tv\/o million eaRoloyees. With re­ gard to individual liberties, Thomas Clark asserted in September 1948 that the vigorous proceedings being carried on against "subversive" elea:ents did "not in the slightest

^•^Ibid., p. 221. ^^Time, March 1, 1948, p. 13. ^^McWilliams, Witch Hunt, p. ]6. 74 degree infringe upon personal liberties so precious to every true American."^^ Justice Clark doubtless hoped that this v/as the case, but a considerable body of evidence indicates that it v/as not. There v/ere infringements upon personal rights-- not intended in all cases--but infringements nevertheless. The figures did indicate fev/ actual dismissals, but those figures did not measure the serious im.pact upon the thou­ sands of individuals who suffered through investigations, were ultimately cleared, and then forced to live v/ith the idea that their files could be re-opened again repeatedly for investigation. If Attorney General Clark voiced a bit of over op­ timism in his assertion that the rights of the individual had been fully protected, those v/ho cried "v/itch-hunt" were just as mistaken. There is no reason to doubt Truman's sincerity when he voiced his desire that the individual be protected. For the most part, the loyalty program was administered with moderation. But, it had its glaring

deficiencies v/hich, in the end, made the price much too 95 high for the results achieved.

^^Speech, Tom Clark to DesMoines Trades and Labor Assembly, September 6, 1948, White House Assignnent, Spingarn Papers, Trunan Library. Q3 Henry Steele Coamiager et_jil. , Cg\l 1 Jd he;ld es Under Attack (Philadelnhia: University 'oi /'ennaylvani a Press," 19511', p. 101. 75 President Truman had been faced v/ith the difficult

task of reconciling the security needs of the .nation v/ith

the rights of the individual, in a nation which takes such

rights quite seriously. The loyalty program was an honest

and sincere attempt not only to reconcile security and in­

dividual freedom, but just as surely an attem.pt to quiet

the fears engendered by extremists, and to head off more

drastic measures being proposed by the Congress. The

loyalty program was, in that respect, considered as a neces

sary evil. Perhaps Truman should have taken heed of Presi­

dent Andrev/ Jackson's view on this m.atter when he stated,

in his veto of the Bank Bill in I832, that "There are no 06 necessary evils in governraent."'^

Before judging Truman too harshly, some distinction

should be made betv/een the vd.shes of the President and the

v/ishes of those in Congress who had been demanding action

for some tim.e. Certainly the past revelations of espion.age

activities and the very tearoer of the tiaies demanded soiae

course of action. It v/as infinitely better that the Presi­

dent, who had demonstrated more than a superficial concern

for individual rights, should take the initiative. In the

final analysis, hovjover, the Presi.dent's progra!-; depended

^Richard N. Current and Joan A. G^rraty (eds.). Words That Made American History: _Coi.qn-'cE Tinea to_ t'e 1870' s (2nd ed".';"l3oston: 'Liirtre"Brov;n" id 'Cod\ "j'S e:7j"^ "t)!'7:^ 76 far "too much for comfort upon the restraint and v;isdom of 97 individuals," and the results left much to be desired. By the fall of 1948, there was already talk among administration officials of a possible "over dosage" of internal security, and suggestions for im.proving the 98 loyalty-security program v/ere being discussed. Mr. Truman's troubles with the Congress over this question had mounted rapidly, however, as an earlier prediction that the Congress would devote considerable attention to the Communist problem in 1948 had certainly come to pass. 99 "Once the bars had been let dov/n and the Government itself accepted the principle of guilt by Association it v/as to be expected that . . . some members of the Republican op- ,,100 position v/ould invoke that principle. . . .

97Ne w YorkX Times, November 2, 1947. Taken from, an article by ArthurFSchlesinger , Jr. entitled "hliat Is Loyalty? A Difficult Question. ^^Memorandttm, for the President from Stephen Spirnarn, October 15, 1947, White House Assignment, Spingarn Papers, Truman Library. ^^Newswee];, January 5, 1948, p. 9- ^^^Biddle, Fear of Erecdon., p. 2^:9. CHAPTER III "The security program of the United States has been wickedly used by demagogues. ..." TRUlvIAN VERSUS THE! EIGHTIETH CONGRESS: 1948

Senator Alben VJ. Barkley of Kentucky, in a New York Times article published in 1948, stressed the urgent need for cooperation between the Executive and Legislative branches of government, especially in regard to all- important matters. The relationship, noted the Senator, should consist of the President and Congress--not the President versus Congress. He further maintained that a President v/ho actively sought such a friendly relationship would find it less difficult to secure passage of his legis­ lative program.

Although the Senator's viev/s v/ere v/ell conceived, it v/as evident that no such friendly relationship existed betv/een Harry Truman and the Eightieth Congress. There were numerous areas of conflict but none more spectacular than the one precipitated by the various attempts on the part of Congress to force the President to share the ad­ ministration of the Loyalty-Security program--if not to wrest outright. From the beginning, a pov/erful faction within the Congress had insisted that the Truaian prograa.

•^New York Times, Jtoie 20, 1948 77 wmm':

78 did not go far enough, that it v/as not being conducted in good faith, and that subversives were still operating v/ith 2 impunity. The leading red hunters in Congress set about to correct the situation by introducing stronger restrictive legislation and by conducting a series of long and spectacu­ lar investigations, all of v/hich resulted in serious en­ croachments on the pov/er of the Executive. A certain amount of struggle betv/een the President and Congress is a natural and not an unhealthy part of the American political system. But, on occasion the Legisla­ tive branch has exerted itself beyond those natural limits. The Eightieth Congress assuredly breached those barriers in the latter part of 1947 and throughout 1948. When such "N legislative encroachments occur, as Trum.an later noted, "it is the duty of the President to say firmly and flatly 3 'no.'" That v/as his response at the tim.e and a necessary one, although its consequences prov^ed unfortunate for the President, for the efficiency of the system, end for the nation as a v/hole. The investigative pov/er of Congress may be employed in many useful v/ays, not the least of v/hich is a check on the Executive branch. Truman v/as aware of that since his

%.S., Cong re s s i ona1 Re c o r d, 80th Congress, 2d Sess., 1948, 94, pt. 10, p:~A2530." •^Quoted in Alan Earth, GoveriWicnit by Inyce-tigat" cai (New York: The Viking Press, IRiojV p.'l^hh. 79 own committee had performed that function well during World War II by keeping a check on wartime spending. The job was accomplished without fanfare, unnecessarj'^ publicity, or purposely embarrassing the admiinistration. On the other hand, such committees as the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which operated in a near carnival atmosphere, 4 often served only to frustrate the Executive. The latter committee performed that function v/ith expertise, and none could have better testified to the fact than Harry Truman. In October 1949, the House Committee, under the Chairmanship of J. Parnell Thomas, opened its v/eII publi­ cized hearings into possible Communist influence in the film industry. Such v/ell loiov/n film producers as Jack Warner and Louis B. Mayer admitted there had been Commun­ ist activity in Hollyv/ood, but said that it had been 5 checked. Adolphe Menjou on the other hand draanatically testified that the film industry vv^as tainted throughout 6 with Comjnunists. Day after day one flLm. personality after another trooped into Washington to bare his soul before the inquis­ itorial members of the House Committee end to galleries packed v/ith fans and reporters. On October 24 the President

^Ibid., p. 61. ^New York Times, October 21, 1947. ^Ibid., October 22, 1947. 80 of the Screen Actors Guild, Ronald Reagan, testified about his dislike of Communism, but stressed the necessity for applying democratic principles in combatting it. "I hope," Reagan declared, "that v/e are never prompted by fear or resentment of Communism into compromising any of our demo- 7 eratic principles in order to fight them." As the Hollyv/ood hearings progressed, there v/as a grov/ing protest not only to the investigation itself, which was ludicrous enough, but to the methods empIo5^ed by mem­ bers of the House Committee. Eric Johnson, President of the Motion Picture Association, voiced his disapproval of the intimidating questions asked by the Committee members. "it seems to me that it is getting dangerously easy to call 8 a man a Comjiauiiist without proof or reasonable suspicion." Certain individuals in and out of Congress were quick to rush to the defense of the Committee. The National Commander of the American Legion, Jam.es F. O'Neill, stated that "those v/ho attempt to vilify the cor.nlttee . . . v/ere trying to inject a phony issue--the Bill of Rlghts--into the dispute." Speaker of the House of Representatives Joseph W. Martin, Jr., defended the Hollynood investigation as necessary and proper. Martin eraphasized the serlouaness of the Coirmiunist threat and suggested that the nation should

'"^Ilb_id_., October 24, 1947. ^Ibid., October 28, 1947. 81 H.-4.,-give« -rr^jEdga r a.i«the^ green signal-j ^n . . . ."M^9 Such a statement testified to the mind and mood of the Eightieth Republican Congress in late 1947. Before the year v/as out the President would get a foretaste of the struggle that v/as to follow with the House Committee on Un-American Activities--a struggle that v/ould consume the v/hoIe of 1948. In October Representative Claire Hoffman of Michigan, Chairman of the House Expenditures Committee, had requested and been refused certain confiden­ tial files in possession of the Civil Service Comjnission. 10 He then appealed to the President, but to no avail. Truman indicated that he had found nothing in Hoffman's request to indicate that the Civil Service Commission had not been altogether correct in classifying the various re­ ports as confidential. On that basis the President refused to interfere v/ith the Comjnission's decision not to release 11 such confidential reports.

In January and February of 1948 the House Anpropr I. a. - tions Committee conducted an investigati.on of the State Department, v/hich turned over a number of its confidential files to that Committee. The subsequent release of some

%bid., November 4, 1947. ^^Ibid., October 10, 1947- ''••^Letter, To Claire Hoffman from Truaaai, October 21, 1947, Internal Security File, Elsey Papers, Truvrn^ Eilrary. 82 of the information contained in those files infuriated the President, and served as a prelude to a final shov/dov/n on the matter of loyalty files. Within a matter of v/eeks the House Committee on Un-American Activities demanded per­ tinent confidential informiation from the Departm.ent of Com­ merce pertaining to the promainent atomic scientist and 12 Director of the Bureau of Standards, Dr. Edward U. Condon. In June of 1947 tv/o magazine articles had appeared under the by-line of J. Parnell Thomas v/hich stated that Dr. Condon v/as a man to be v-zatched. He was later the sub­ ject of an investigation bj?- the Loyalty Board of the De­ partment of Commerce and subsequently cleared of any sus- 13 picion on February l4. On March 1 Chairman Thomas, in complete disregard of the findings of the Commerce Depart­ ment Loyalty Board, singled out Condon as "one of the M14 , weakest links in our atomic security." One of the things Thomas held against Condon v/as his unsuccessful attempt to acquire a passport to Russia in 1947 for the purpose of attending an international scientific celebration in

•^^Harry S. Trum.an, Years of Trial _aiid_ Hap^: 194jo- 1952, Vol. II: Memoirs (Garden City, "irow'York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), p. 2b2. •^^.S., Cqn5ressj.ona_l_Record, 80th Congress, 2d Sess., 1948, 94, Pt. 4Vpp7~4779"^i7c;o. ^^Newswee;:, March 15, 1948, p. 25. 83 Leningrad. 15 The Editor of The Nation charged that Thomas, an advocate of military control of atomic energy, was tr\^- ing to discredit civilian control by damaging the char- 16 acter of Dr. Condon. The heart of the accusations related to Condon's acquaintances vvlth certain people regarded as subversive by the FBI. The evidence to sustain such charges v/as sup­ posedly included in a letter from J. Edgar Hoover to the Secretary of the Departm.ent of Commerce, W. Averell Harri- man, a portion of v/hich v/as m.ade public in the Congressional Record. Mr. and Mrs. Condon associated v/ith several individ­ uals connected v/ith the Polish Embassy, am.ong those . . . Ignace ZIotowski. . . . It is also knov/n that Mr. and Mrs. Condon v/ere in contact v;ith several other persons closely associated v/ith this alleged Soviet espionage agent.-'^ Hov/ever, the m.ost incriaminating part of the letter v/as still in the possession of the Coanacrce Department. The House Committee's request for that portion, and Secretary Averill Harrimian's refusal to release it, moved the President to take decisive action.

•'-^U. S ., Congres si ona 1 F^eoj^, 80th Congr e s s, 2d Sess., 1948, 94, TtT^r, pn."4779-^^780. -^^The Nation, March 13, 194S, p. 303. •'-'''u.S., Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2d Sess., 1948, 94, Pt. "471). Alio, 84 On March 13, 1948, Truman circulated a "Mem.orandum to All Officers and Employees in The Executive Branch of The Government," which directed that "all reports, records, and files relative to the loyalty of employees . . . shall be maintained in confidence." The administration v/as not without precedents as the first such issue betv/een a President and a Congressional investigative committee oc­ curred during the administration of George Washington, who refused to release reports relative to the disastrous ex- IQ pedition of General Arthur St. Clair. ^ After a careful study of all the precedents that related to the withholding of information, the administration concluded that the President and the various department heads were not bound to disclose papers cornraunicated to them, and that Congress could not compel the department heads to produce informa- 20 tion in violation of the orders of the President. Tom Clark took special note of the precedents in­ volved in withholding confidential information, and felt that the President, in the face of obvious Congressional interference, took the logical and necessary steps to halt

1 o -^"^See Appendix III. •^^Barth, G2Y:ernmerrtJ^g_l]Ed^st^ p. 31. ^^Conclusions, after study of preeedents relating to the withholding of confidential papers. Interna] Seen: ity File, Elsey Papers, Trnnena Library. 85 such interference.^-^ Alan Barth in Governiflont by Investi­ gation, after expressing a similar viev/, declared that such an executive decision "must be guided by a recognition that the executive and legislative branches belong to the same government and are supposed to function as partners." Truman was doubtless guided by such a recognition; but in view of the exorbitant demands made on the executive, it appears that certain factions in Congress were not. The reaction to the March 13 memorandum reflected a marked division of opinion. Certain members of Congress were quick to defend Trum.an for his decision to v/ithhold the Condon files. Senator Barkley, for example, stated that the President should in all cases be the final judge of v/hat v/as to be submitted to Congress in such delicate 23 and important areas as loyalty and security. Some con­ servative groups expressed a different viev/. John J. Sulli­ van of Bosv/orth, Sullivan and Company, Investmient Bankers, protested vehemently the President's decision to withhold the FBI report on Condon. On one hand v/e are told that v/e miust rearai because of the fear of an attack by Russia ... on the other hand we are told in effect that we must do

^•^Interview with Justice Thomas C. Clark, Washington, D. C, August 22, 1969. 22 Barth, G_ove.rnmie2it by Investi.yatlon, p. 39- ^^u.S., Congressional Bc£ord, 80th Cong^wss, 2d Sess., 1948, 94, Ttd"3> p. 2930. "" " • 86 nothing to v/eed out of V^ashington the many Com­ munists who are . . . doing much to sabotage the best interests of the United States.24

The large number of other letters that expressed viev/s not unlike Sullivaii's prompted Stephen Spingarn, a new member of the White House staff, to suggest that a form letter be drafted for the purpose of explaining in detail the President's ideas on the matter of v/ithholding confidential files. It was recommended that such a letter should contain three essential points: (1) "That the ad­ ministration v/as determined that no disloyal person should work for the government; (2) That the President's loyalty program was v/orking with a quiet effectiveness to eliminate any disloyal employee; (3) That the President \^/as alv/ays ready to cooperate to the fullest v/ith any "responsible"

Congressional committee, but felt that an injustice v/ould 25 be done if loyalty files were released. Spingarn's final recommendation struck at the core of the matter. It was obvious that Trttman did not feel that

24 Letter, to the President from John J. Sullivan, April 28, 1948, 0F252K, Tlruman Papers, Tr^oman Library. ^Memoranduiti, From Stephen J. Spingarn on the suhiect of a letter to explain President's views on withholding con­ fidential files. Internal Security File, Spingarn Panera, Truman Library. Stephen Spingarn joined the vRaite Rouae staff in 1948. Pie was one'of the more libera], of the a'nvfi^ members and v/as particui.arlvr active in the loyalty-seeer;'ty field. Spingai'n's background no doubt contributed tc: h:'s liberalisti. He was the son of Joel Sningarn who va a oa;e of the leaders in the formation of the NAACE in IRao. 87 those Congressional committees engaged in investigations of subversive activity were responsible committees, and he v/as therefore determined that thoy should not have ac­ cess to confidential files. Such a stand was necessary but nevertheless regrottablo, for it brought the President into direct confrontation with the Congress and negated any hope for the kind of harmony suggested earlier by Sen­ ator Barkley.

Since other presidents had taken similar positions •v/ithout such serious impairment in their relations with the Congress, it would be all too easy to charge Truman with a want of political tact in his handling of the situa­ tion. But, it should be pointed out that there vvcro fen other ti.^nes in the nation's history v/hon the political at­ mosphere vvas as highly charged as it was in tho late winter and early spring of 1948. There v/as an unreasoning fear throughout the country—fear o: the bono, of Cor;rnu.nists—a fear of the unkno'vn. There v/ere those v/ho, if not the promoters of such fear, were all too ready to take advan­ tage of it. Perhaps it would have heen politically nore feasible had the President quietly given his assent to Congressional domands, but th:at was not th.e Trunan way. As Tom Clark remarked, Truaian's decisions were never based on

'^^Eric E. Goldman, ljlc^„Cry_ciolJR a * - - /^ ^ -^ • America 1QA5'1960 (New York: Alfred A. Knonf, Iv'ea), u. . ...

tmULiSAi.. 88 27 political feasibility. There were no ulterior motives in the President's decision to v/ithhold infonnation from Congress, an altogether courageous decision in the face of the obvious repercussions. It v/as based only on Truman's belief that the release of such information to v/hat he considered irresponsible factions in Congress v/culd damage the personnel involved, v/ould undermine his ov/n loyalty program, and would therefore serve no useful purpose. In regard to Truman's integrity in such matters. General George C. Marshall stated that "there never has been a decision made under this man's administration . . . that has not 28 been made in the best interest of his country. " It v/as clear that certain members of Congress did not concur v/ith Marshall's viev/. Nev/s\'/eek reported in mid-April that the relations between the President and Congress were growing steadily worse by the day.^ Earlier in that m.onth, and three weeh.s after the Truman memorandum of March 13, the Coamittee on Un-American Activities demanded for the second time that Secretary Harrim-an release the loyalty records on Edv/ard U. Condon. Harrim.an's refusal for the seceend time led Chairraan

27 Interview with Justice Thomas C. Clark. ^Quoted in Alfred Steinberg, Tne Man Eroat -^-._:^;-_:. The Life and Tines of Harry; yy^^dirnifnnd '{I:en lord: G. R. Putnam'T'^ons, 1962;, pd'XXd] ^%ev/sweek, April 19, 1948, p. 22. 89 Thomas of the House Committee to predict that a shov/dov/n 30 between the Executive and Congress v/as imminent. Thomas' prediction materialized v/ith the introduc­ tion of House Resolution 522 which was an open attempt on the part of Congress to force the President to relax his order of March 13. On April 22, 1948 the House of Represen­ tatives passed the Resolution by the overv/helming vote of 300 to 29 and "peremptorily" ordered Truman to release the Condon file. The vote was indeed a surprise, particularly because of the large number of Democrats v/ho voted with the majority. The President v/as v/ithout doubt in serious political trouble.-^31 At a Presidential press conference the follov/ing day, and in an obviously petulant mood, Truanan said that the House had m.ade its decision and he would like to see them try to enforce it. He reminded the reporters of Thomas Jefferson's observation on John Marshall's ruling in the Aaron Burr case; "The Chief Justice has made his decision, now let him enforce it." Presidential Press Secretary Charles G. Ross later corrected the President's fauvx vras by noting that he had intended to refer to Andrew Jackson's comment on Marshall's decision in the case of I'aie Ohcro^yee 32 Nation v. Georgia.

^^New York Times, April 8, 1948. 3^Ibid., April 23, 1948. ^^Nowsweek, May 3, 1948, n. lo. 90 An editorial in the Washington Post on April 23 contended that the President had justifiable reasons for withholding the Condon letter and should have explained them in preference to his terse reference to Andrev^ Jack- 33 son. Truman no doubt came to that realization, for a message to Congress was prepared on May 4 v/hich outlined in detail the basis for his decision not to comply v/ith the Congressional demand for information pertaining to Dr. Condon. TriHnan stressed in the message his belief that the release of such information v/ould undermine the integrity of the loyalty program, prejudice the v/ork of the FBI bj'' exposing its sources of informiation, and would prove un­ duly harmful to the individuals involved. He placed great emphasis on the latter point, and insisted that it v/as "vital to the carrying out of the em.ployee loyalty program that the rights of Government employ-ees be effectively pro­ tected." After a careful evaluation of each point, and a reiteration of his desire to cooperate v/ith Congress v/hen- ever possible, the President concluded that the "foregoing considerations convince me that disclosure of the letter to which House Resolution 522 is directed v/ould be contrary to the National interest, and I must therefore declirio to

38vjashington Post, April 24, 1948. 91 transmit it."^ The President's determined stand in the face of H. Res. 522 prompted the Congress to move tov/ard more stringent action. Speaker Martin threatened legislation that would have the force and effect of lav/. Such legis­ lation v/as already pending before the House Rules Committee in the form of a Joint Resolution, H. J. Res. 342, intro­ duced by Representative Claire Hoffman, v/hich would force the Executive branch to turn over any records demanded by Congress. 35 Such legislation represented a serious threat to the separation of pov/ers and further demionstrated the angry and determined mood of the Congress. The Hoffman Bill, as it emerged from the Rules Com­ mittee, v/ould not only force the Administration to turn over any information demanded by Congress, but also con­ tained provisions for the arrest of eny mem.ber of Congress or the press v/ho might divulge such confidential informa­ tion.-^ After vigorous debate, the bill passed the House 37 of Representatives by a vote of 219 to l42.

^braft. Presidential m^essagc to Congress on with­ holding Condon file. May 4, 1943, internal Security File, Elsey Papers, Trttman Library. ^^New York Times, April 25, 1948.

3^Ibid., M^^y 6, 1948. 3'^U.S., Congres^02aal_ Recorcg, 80th Conyress, 2d Sess., 1948, 947">l.''57"p'. 5o22'.~"* 92 Editors of The Nation charged on May 22 that certain members of Congress v/anted the confidential reports for no other purpose than to continue their witch hunt, and they predicted that the Hoffman Bill would never make it through the Senate.-' The prediction proved to be correct as the bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Expenditures 39 but never reported out. -^ Although a crisis of m.ajor pro­ portions had been averted, another v/as pending. On April 8, 1948 Senator William F. Knowland of California introduced an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, S. 1004, which would have permitted the Senate to require an FBI investigation into "the character, asso­ ciations, and loyalty . . ."of each Presidential appointee 4o to the Atomic Energy Commission. The Knowland amendment 4l passed the Senate on April 12. It was immediately re­ ferred to the House v/here it was passed on May 3 in lieu 42 of H.R. 5216. Tv^/eIve days later Truman vetoed the bill because he felt it would "perrait an unvvarranted encroach- ment of the legislative upon the executive branch. ,il'3

^^The Nation, May 22, 1948, p. 563. 39u.s., Con-a:ressiona._l Record, 8oth Congress, 2d Sess., 1948, 94, Pt." 13, p. 619. ^Qlbid., Pt. 3, p. 4248. ^•^Ibid., Pt. 4, p. 4311. ^^Ibid., p. 5194. ^%bid., Pt. 5, p. 5895. «p^'

93 In the debate that followed the veto Senator Claude Pepper sided v/ith the President, and insisted that the Senate had no constitutional right to take such action in regard to Presidential appointees. Senator Robert Taft contended that v/hen the Senate asserted its pov/ers of con­ firmation it was performing an executive function. In such a case, Taft argued, the FBI as an executive agency 44 should be made available to the Senate. On May 21 the Senate voted 47 to 29 to override, falling just four votes 45 short of achieving that end. The President had prevailed once again but only by a very narrov: margin. Legislation embodied in bills such as those proposed by Hoffman, Knov/land, et_ al. represented near Congressional tyranny. The founding fathers vrere not unaware of such a possibility. Madison, in his Federalist Paper XLVIII, pointed out that "one hundred and seventy three despots v/ould surely be as oppressive as one."" When legislative bodies assert such power, as Alan Barth stated, "only the most vigorous and forceful countervailing pov/er can cori- tain them. 47 The President in his March 13 memorandum and in his veto of the Knowland Bill had asserted such

44 r . Ibid., p. 6l9'l ^l^hld., p. 6264. Quoted in Barth, Govoritacrl^ Vy_ravRsti yRt;!^^ r- 7. 47 Barth, Gove rrn:-. e '"at_by inVR' a %, ^ • ) • 9^ "countervailing pov/er." He had v^on a battle but certainly not the v/ar. Truman's trouble with the Eightieth Congress had just commenced. In addition to its many investigations Congress also vigorously advanced its legislative pov/er in the struggle with the Truman Administration. It had been evi­ dent for some time that certain congressaien, feeling that the Truman Loyalty Program v/as not being conducted v/ith sufficient vigor, were determined to force through more restrictive legislation in the loyalty-security field. On March 15, 1948, Representatives Earl Mundt and Richard Nixon, acting for the House Comi-nittee on Un-American Ac­ tivities, introduced H. R. 5852, "A Bill to Corabat Un- American Activities by Requiring the Registration of Com.- ,,48 munist Front Organizations, and For Other Purposes. In summary form, the so-called Mundt-Nixon Bill de­ clared that any one v/ho attempted to establish s totali­ tarian dictatorship in the United States would be subject to a prison tenn of up to ten years, a fine of not roix than $10,000, and suffer automatic loss of citizenahin. Communisai, by legislative definition, was found to consti­ tute a totalitarian dictatorship. The most imno:/'tant pv.to of the bill v/as contained in its provision that reauired

U.S., _Co]^g:''essiona.l_Eecc;rd5 ^dth Congre: s , r ^.1 Sess., 1948, 94ril7'"27 p". C K. 95 the Communist Party and all of its front organizations to register with the Justice Department, to list, their officers, and to account for all income and expenditures. The Communist Party, but not its front organizations, would also be required to publish a mem.bership list. Front organizations v/ould be determined by the Attorney General 49 whose decisions v/ould be subject to judicial reviev/. One of the major controversies that raged over H. R. 5852 centered on v/hether the bill v/ould or v/ould not out­ law the Communist Party in the United States. Mundt in­ sisted that it would not. He extolled the virtues of the bill and concluded that "only the Communists and their closest allies and associates--their dupes, their front organizations . . . have spoken out in opposition. . . . "-^0 Raymond Moley, in his Nev/sv/eek column, praised the Mundt- Nixon bill as an excellent attempt to deal v/ith the Com­ munist problem., and stated that it v/ent as far toward out- 51 lav/ing the party as the Coaenittee dared. Jacob Javits of New York declared that the bill, v/hether it stated so or not, v/ould outlav/ the Coaaaunist

Memorandum, To President from Clifford, Connents on Lowenthal's memorandum, "The Sedition Bills of lEdR. ' Summary of Mundt-Nixon Bill 19''8, Sedition Bills of ly'io File, Clifford Papers, Truman Library. ^^U.S., Congressional RecovE, 80th Congress, 2d Sess., 1948, 94,11. 10rV' '^^^^9^" ^\lewswee]v. May 10, 19''8, p. 88. 96 Party, a move which he opposed. Nevertheless, Javits ad­ mitted that the very nature of the bill, supposedly designed to protect the internal security of the United States, would 52 m.ake it difficult for any Congressm.an to oppose. Repre­ sentative George G. Sardowski, Democrat from Michigan, also felt the Mundt-Nixon bill v/as a not-too-cleverly concealed attempt to destroy the Coirmunist Party. "The purpose . . . is obvious--it is to frighten everybody out of every or­ ganization except the Republican Party, the Dem-ocratic 53 Party, and the Boy Scouts." In May of 1948 tv/o leading hopefuls for the Repub­ lican Presidential nomination, Harold Stassen and Thomas E. Dev/ey, debated the issue of v/hether the Mundt-Nixon bill would outlaw the Comm.unist Party. Stassen affirmed that it would and that he favored such action. Governor Dev/ey stated that he had som.e doubts about the constitutionality of the bill, but did not think that it v/ould outlaw the S4 Party; he v/ould oppose it, he said, if that were the case.^ The authors of H.R. 5852.continued to deny that their bill would outlaw any political party, but it would

^^U.S., Congresslonal _Be_c_ord_, 80th Congress, 2d Se; 1948, 94, Pt. 5, p. 5066. ^•^Ibid., p. 5878. 54 Memoranduai, for the President froa ClwLTord, Sua. mary of Stassen-Dewey debate on Mundt-Ni.xon hill, April 29, 1949, Sedition Bills of 1949 File, Clifford Eanera, Truman Library. 97 not be too difficult to conclude that it would in fact have that effect. The Communist Party--by legislative definition--v/as found to constitute a totalitarian dic­ tatorship. The bill then provided drastic penalties that could be imposed on anyone v/ho attem.pted to establish such a dictatorship. In that respect, the provisions of the Mundt-Nixon bill v/ould make it virtually impossible for 55 any party so considered to exist in the United States. Truman indicated on May 13 his disapproval of any legislation he felt v/as designed to outlav/ a political party. He expressed a persistent personal belief that "splinter" parties were harmless and should be left alone. Both Truman and his Attorney General insisted that bills such as the Mundt-Nixon v/ould serve only^ to driv^e the Com­ munists underground and thereby increase the problem of detection. The President implied that he v/ould veto H.R. 56 5852 if it passed the Congress. The Democratic National Committee, to provide for such a contingency, prepared a fact sheet defending the administration's anti-subversive program. The Co.rmittee pointed out that the Communist Party had reached its peak strength in the United States in 1932, after twelve years

^^The Nation, May 29, 1948, p. 594. ^^Article, New York Herald Tribune, May l^E 19'' Democratic National Committee "Clipping } lie, Truaan F-' brary. 98 of Republican rule. It v/as further noted that Attorney General Clark had asked for certain improvemients in exist­ ing laws on February 5, 1948, and the Congress had re­ sponded with nothing more than the politically motivated Mundt-Nixon bill. The committee concluded by stressing the effectiveness of the President's Loyalty Program and its provisions for protecting the individual. 57 The Loyalty-Security Program created by Executive Order 9835, as noted in Chapter II, v/as far from a perfect instrument, and did contain a number of serious inequities. Nevertheless, the President had consistently stressed the need for safeguarding individual liberties. That idea emerged from alm.ost his every comment on the program and ran much deeper than mere political rhetoric. The Con­ gressional debates on the subject revealed no such con­ sistency with regard to individual rights but instead con­ tinually stressed enforcement. As the final House vote on H. R. 58-52 neared in the late spring of 1948, the groups lined up for and against the bill provided a rather interesting cotRoarison. Stand­ ing in favor of thie Ihundt-Nixon bill were the United States

Chamber of Coaimerce, the American Legion, the Catholic Ear Veterans, the Veterans of Foreign Ears, and not least th

^'^Fact Sheet No. 11, Co:mauni_sm and Loyrlty, ISr-,' ' e Democratic National Coariittee Clipping Fine, Trua:an li­ brary. \..y 99 National Association of Retail Grocers. Those groups op­ posed to the bill v/ere the CIO-AFL, the Americans For 'Democratic Action, The National Association for The Ad­ vancement of Colored People, the Civil Rights Congress, the Progressive Citizens of America, and a group v/hose support Truman could well have done without,. The Commun- 58 ist Party U.S.A.- The Democratic National Committee, in its Fact Sheet number 11, charged that H. R. 5852 was po­ litically motivated. It would appear from the preceding lineup, hov/ever, that the primary contest was not so much betv/een the Republicans and Democrats as betv/een the forces on the right and those on the left. In a full scale debate on May 18, the House demon­ strated its determined mood by shouting dov/n several m.oves to modify H. R. 5852 and adopted by voice vote tv/o amend­ ments that v/ould strengthen it. One amendmient, presented by Richard Nixon, defined a particular political organiza­ tion as Communist if "it is reasonable to conclude that it is under the control of the v/orld Communistrnxveaionts di­ rectorship." The bill received unexpected eleverith hour support from. liberal Adolph Berle, Jr., vrho recoan.ien.ded a revision in the definition of Coanvunisei v/hich he fc].t cvg V/as too broad.-^^ No such revision v:as ever maee.

-^Memorandum, To the President froai Clifford, April 29, 1949, Sedition Bills of 1949 File, Clifford ihnera, Truman Library. 59Kew York Times, May 1.9, 19''n. 100 The House undertook its final debate on the 19th of May as Nixon accentuated the urgent need for the Congress to do som.ething about Communism in the United States. Mundt implored his colleagues to rem.emiber that "v/e Republi­ cans . . . promised the country to miove effectively against Communisrri. . . . " Fev7 v/ere surprised v/hen H. R. 5852 passed the House of Representatives by the cormmanding mar- o 62 gin of 319 to 5o. There was an immediate and divided reaction to the House passage of the bill. The Los Angeles Daily Nev/s reported on May 20 that "the House vote yesterday overv/helming [sic] approving the Mundt-Nixon Bill . . . is a public demonstration of lack /To of faith in a living democracy." ^ An editorial in the Cleveland Plain Dealer praised the House's action and de­ clared that the bill would hurt no one other than the Com­ munists. Anyone v\fho opposed it, the editor stated, v/as 64 follov/ing the party line. Senator Elbert D. Thom.as pointed out to his colleagues in the Upper House that there were already tv/enty-seven lav/s in the statute books that

60U.S. , Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2d Sess ., 1948, 94, Pt. 5, p." ^^145. ' 61 Ibid., p. 6l^'8. ^^Ibid., p. 6149. ^Article, Frem Los Jliaelea Jla_il.e^^ hev:^ 20, 1948, Democratic Nationalllwnliittee Cli.nnlng ^i.le, .LIU. •n Library. ^^^Article, From Cleveland RJE-in DoRier, erne ijd ly',-x I I er Democratic National Coariitt.eT C'JTRR:':!: aiJe, Tru .wai E-* V rary . 101 would effectively do what was intended by the Mundt-Nixon bill. Thomas termed the bill dangerous and most probably 65 unconstitutional. The latter charge was in all probabil­ ity the thing that eventually doomed the Mundt-Nixon bill in the Senate. Senator Alexander Wiley announced on May 25 that the Senate Judiciary Committee v/ould open public hearings on H. R. 5052 on the 27th. One of the major questions before the Senate Committee involved the constitutionality of the House bill. During the course of the hearings, two Democrats, Tom Clark and John W. Davis, and two Republi­ cans, Charles Evans Hughes, Jr. and Seth Richardson, all furnished written opinions backed by substantial evidence that the bill v/as unconstitutional. Their opinions evi­ dently prevailed as H. R. 5852 v/as never reported from the 67 Committee. In the House debate on H. R. 5852 Representative John A. Carrol of Colorado opposed the bill on the grounds that it was special interest legislation at the expense of -, 68 legislation required to meet the needs of the people.

^^U.S., Congressional B.ecord_, 80th Congress, 2d Sess., 1948, 94, Pt. II, p. A354'7. 6^U.S., Congressi.ona 1 I^orci, 80th Congress, 2d Sees., 1948, 94, Pt. 5, p7~637o. ^''^Mcmoranduaa, To the President from Clifford, su:- mary of Senate Hearings on Mundt-Nixon bill, IRaS, April 29, 1949, Sedition Bills of 1949 FH^^. Clifford Payers, Truman Library. 68u.S., Coiinressional Record, 8oth Congieaa, 2d Sesc . , 1948, 94, Pt.'5, V'^'Sa^'T' ' 102 Truman for sorae time had maintained that the best way to combat Communism was through legislation that v/ould im­ prove the quality of American life rather than by restric­ tive measures inherent in bills such as the Mundt-Nixon. The menace of Commiunism lies primarily in those areas of American life v/here the promose [sic] of democracy remains unfilfilled. ... If some of our people are living in slum housing, and nothing is gpne about it, that is an invitation to Communism. ^ Senator Taft confirmed that the foregoing were in fact Truman's viev/s when he assailed the President for one of his many attacks on the 8oth Congress. Taft declared that Truman had alv/aj'-s favored a "soft" approach to Cornmunismi, and had opposed every attempt by the Congress to stop the spread of that ideology in the United States. "The only remedy he [Truman] can think of," Taft declared, "is the 70 passage of social v/elfare lav/s. ..." Although the President had survived the acrim.onious struggles during the regular session of the Eightieth Con­ gress, the debate over the Condon file and the Mundt-Nixon bill, the v/orst v/as yet to com.e. Truman must, in retrospect, share much of the blam.e for what follov/ed. The Republicans held their convention in the early summer of 1948, nomin­ ated Thom.as E. Dewey as their presidential candidate, and

69statement, Truman on Coaanunism, Box l4, Demoer National Committee Clipping File, Truman Library. '^^New York Times, June 12, 1948. 103 adopted a platform which incorporated much of Trum^an's 71 domestic program. Truman received the Democratic nomin­ ation on July 15 and delivered a short extemporaneous ac­ ceptance speech at two o'clock in the morning. During the course of the speech the President announced that he v/as calling the Republican Congress back into special session on July 26 to afford them the opportunity to make good the 72 promises outlined in their platform. Many viev/ed such a challenge as a shrewd political move. The Republicans v/ould have to produce or in effect repudiate their ov/n platform. As it turned out, the call- ing of the special session v/as anything but a shrev/d m.ove;7 3 it was a political blunder of the first magnitude. The Republican Congress did nothing about the Republican Party platform, but instead turned the session into one continu- 74 ous investigation of Cormriunism.. It does not seeai unrea­ sonable to conclude that had the President taken more tiaie to consider the angry mood of the Congress at the end of the regular session, and v/eighed the possible reaction to a special session, he might v/ell have avoided the political pitfalls that followed. The special session of the Eightieth Congress was Trum.an's "Long Parliationt. " The

'^^NcwsR/eek, July 5, 1948, p. 21. '^^U. S. News and World Renort, July 22, 194h, y. 67. ''^3ibid.^ August 6, 1948, p. 25. '^^'Parl Latham, The Cowvuniat Cent^ov: ray in Ea ah:'nylon Froiiithe Nen Deal to EeSerthy (hev/ Yonh: Athenevn, id^d): p. 397. 104 President henceforth found himself continually on the de­ fensive as Congressional concern over Communism grew and 75 flourished. The session opened with two sets of Congressional hearings. A special Senate subcommittee, under the Chair­ manship of Homer Ferguson, Republican of Michigan, investi­ gated the operation of the government's loyalty-security program while the House Committee on Un-American Activities 76 busied itself v/ith disclosures of Cormiaunist spy activities. The latter Committee's first star witness, ex-Comraunist courier Elizabeth Bentley, had been billed as another Mata Hari. There v/as certainly no physical resemblance to the famous female spy, but Bentley's tales of intrigue were just as exciting. In her first appearance on July 30 she accused William W. Remington of having been a member of the Comm.unist spy ring in Washington. Remington had been suspended just six weeks before from his job as Chair­ man of a Departm.ent of Cormierce Ccmjaittee v/hich hn.ndled secret information from m.any different government offices. Bentley also mentioned "a m.an. arouand the Vhoite House" from v/hom she had received information. On the following day Bentley named Lauchlin Cnrri.e, v/ho had served as one of Franklin Roosevelt's advisors, as

^^Ibid., p. 399. '^'^New York Tinws, SepEe:aher 12, IR^io. 105 her White House infonnant. In subsequent testim.ony she implicated Harry Dexter VThite from whom she claimed to have received information through Gregory Silveniiaster, past employee at the Board of Economic Warfare. Both Currie and White denied the accusations in their entirety. Remington, however, admitted giving Bentley, alias Helen Johnson, cer­ tain pieces of information, but declared that it amounted to no more than he v/ould have given any member of the 77 press. The Bentley revelations led to the calling of Louis F. Budenz, an ex-Communist and Professor of Economics at Fordham University, before the Ferguson subcommittee. Budenz talked of many spy rings and estim.ated that the Party had placed thousands of its spies in governraent jobs. In answer to a question from Senator McClellan, Budenz concluded that it v/as impossible for an individual to be a memtber of the Communist Party and loyal to the United States at the same time.

^^Time, August 9, 1948. One of the best accounts of the BentLSy affair can be found in Earl latham's hoc!: previously cited in this chapter. Those named by Eliza­ beth Bentley contimally denied her accusation.r, but Inthaai contended that most of v/hat she said v/as cori'oct. Rea.ina- ton v/as later sent to prison for perjury ar.d sues ecu eahaly killed in a fight anonn sor.e "iinaates . Harry Fenter hhite died of a heart attack a few days after tastiaying befo-'e the House Co/reittee on En-Aaicrican Acti.vities in August 1948. There v/as speculation that Eni.te had died fro., an overdose of sleeping pills but this was never ce/.f iaa^e:'. '^ New York Times, August 3, 1948. lo6 ' The Budenz and Bentley revelations, certainly enough to cause dismay, fade into obscurity when compared v/ith the shocking testimony of XvTiittaker Chambers, a confessed ex-Communist spy, before the House Comm^lttee on Un-Am-erican Activities on August 3, 1948. On that day Cham'.bers accused Alger Hiss, one time boy v/onder of the New Deal, of having been an active miemiber of the Commiuxiist Party. At various times Hiss had been Secretary to the late Oliver W. Ho.lmes, an Assistant Counsel v/ith the Nye Coimjiittee, an advisor to the President at Yalta, and active in both the Dumbar- ton Oaks and San Francisco conferences. 79 • Since the Hiss case has been examined time and again, it is not v/ithin the purviev/ of this study either to re­ examine it or to pass judgment as to the guilt or innocence of Alger Hiss. But it m.ust be exam.ined, particularly the reaction to it, in the light of its effect on the Truman administration. After August 3, 1948, the terms New Deal and Com-munism became almost synonymous. The forces of con­ servatism made Alger Hiss not only the representative of sixteen years of liberal deerocratic rule, but also--and

'''^imeT: ., August lo, 1948, pp. ]8-19. Alger eventuallj' con.victed on tv/o counts of nor jui'y~-ti at he had lied when he said he had never turned raiy docv: vents over to Chardi^ers, and vlren he denied seeing Chca.hers, alias George Crosley, after Januai-y 1, ly?7. lee most in­ criminating piece of evidence was the Hiss typev:niter oai which the stolen docuaients v/ere t^y;ed. 107 perhaps more important—"the symbol and living proof of their contention that the Truman administration was soft on Communism." Trunian's reaction to the Chambers-Hiss affair unfortunately did not serve to exonerate either himself or his administration of that charge. Tv/o days after Whittaker Cham.bers made his sensa­ tional charges, Harry Truraan issued the follov/ing statement in regard to the Congressional investigations. The public hearings nov/ underv/ay are serving no use­ ful purpose. On the contrary, they are doing ir­ reparable harm to certain persons, seriously impair­ ing the morale of Federal employees, and undermin­ ing public confidence in the government.81 Had Trum.an stopped v/ith the preceding remarks he might have escaped the Congressional snare. But, at his nev/s confer­ ence on the 5th he delivered his famous, oft repeated and much publicized, charge that the Congressional investiga­ tions amiounted to nothing more than a "red herring," de­ signed to detract from, the Republican failure to act on 82 his legislative program. It was a typical Truman respon.se, but it could not have com.e at a m.ore inopportune ti.^ie nce.^ been more politically damaging. In uttering such a remark

PC) Cabell Phillips, The T^auaiarg Ereeiadency:_ Th tory of a Trium.nhant SucceFalE;h"'""(Rew'lorkr 'Tne Eaemlllaii Co., 1966), p. Jr2^ • " ' ^•^Statement by the President, August 5, 1948, O'FFdFd, Truman Papers, Trunan Library. 82 Nev; York Tim.es, August 6, 1948. 108 he made himself the perfect target for the Fergusons, the Rankins, and all the other self-styled patriots v/ho had contended for some time that Truman v/as really not inter- ested in ridding the government of Communists. "^

The "red herring" remark also did nothing to strength­ en public support for the Truman administration. It ap­ peared to demonstrate a certain lack of concern on the part of the President which alarmed a public already in a state of shock from the m.any tales of Communist intrigue that had so recently come from the various Congressional investiga­ tions . Dean Acheson related in his Memoirs that members of the Cabinet and White House staff lived in constant fear of Presidential press conferences. Truman's quick responses to reporters' questions, Acheson noted, ''nere a constant ,,85 menace. The Congressional hearings may v/ell have been a "red herring," but Truraan should have known better than to say so. Instead he should have stressed the effective­ ness of his ov/n loyalty program, and pointed to th.e fact that all of the individuals naaaed before the Co.agressional committees had been presented before a New York Giaa.nd Jury

^^steinberg. The Man From Mssourl, p. 353. Goldman, The Crucial Decide, n. II8. 81 / Dean Acheson, Preseirb ^'\_The ^Orea.ti on:_ _ Fy_ jerr^ in The State Depart.-.ent" (Fion' YorhF "77 ihE7i:ollenr E Xx. , 19^97^ P • 192. " ' *

••L^iiWi^'- 109 in 1947. A detailed chronology of the operations of that Grand Jury, as Marx Leva, Assistant Secretary of Defense noted, "would reflect credit on the administration." Justice Clark contended that the public exposures in 1948 served only to frustrate the Justice DeparLm.ent in its efforts to arrive at a sound basis for the prosecution of those previously named before the Grand Jury. In this regard, Clark confessed that someone in the Justice Depart­ ment had furnished the Congressional Committees v/ith the 87 names of those individuals involved. Although he stated that the source of the leak had never been found, Corliss Lament, in his book Freedom Is as Freedoa^. Does, stated quite firmly that it v/as none other than the FBI and its Director 00 J. Edgar Hoover. Whatever the source of inform.ation, the committees certainly knev/ v/hat v/itnesses to call. Chair­ man Ferguson was still not satisfied, hovjever, and dem.anded that the adm.inistration turn over the loyalty files on a number of people implicated by the Comaaittee's star v/it­ nesses. On July 30 Senator Ferguson penned a letter to Secretary of Commerce Charles Sav^yer requesting "all memo­ randa or documents relating in any way to the eaiployrvent

86^,:oT.iorandum, For Clifford froa. Marx leva, Augnat 4, 1948, Internal Security File, Elsey Paners, Truran Id.h-ary. ^''^Intervicw with Justice Thomas C. Clark. Corliss Larjont, Freedoai jTs as FreeCo!-: Doeyg.. ^'"^r"/: Liberties Today {hen YorhT^"'^}iotlhla^71'rlaa",'Ei.SaEy)7" u'. "Ih . 110 of VJilliam W. Remington. "°^ Three days later Undersecretary of the Treasury E. H. Foley, Jr., notified the V/hite House that Ferguson had requested both personnel and loyalty files on "7 or 8" Treasury employees. Foley v/as advised to follov/ the procedure as outlined for the Departmient of Commerce; that he was to ask for a request in writing, respectfully decline such a request, and then turn the mat­ ter over to the President.9

Foley addressed a letter on August 5 to VJilliam P. Rogers, Chief Counsel for Ferguson's Sub-Coimr.ittee. He noted that six of the individuals mentioned in the Sena­ tor's request v/ere former employees, and another v/as on involuntary leave pending abjudication of loyalty proceed­ ings. Foley concluded that the Senate Coma.ittee might freely examine any of the personnel files, but the Depart­ ment "v/ould not be in a position to m.ake available any in- ,,91 formation relating to the loyalty of an cmoloy^ee. To cover the eventuality O-f any further requests for inforiaa- tion pertaining to former ci'vployees, a letter v/as se.nt to

^9Letter, to Charles Sav/yer, from Eomer Eergueon, July 30, 1948, Internal Security File, Elsey Eaners, Ta•\ '.•••- c --^ Library. ^^Memoranduai, To Clifford from Elsey, August 2, 1948, Internal Security File, Elsey Papers, Trunan Inbrary. Ql -^ Letter, To William P. Rogers freav E. E. Foley, Jr., August 5, 1948, Internal Security File, Eja^y Fnrjra, Truman Library. Ill all department heads noting that the President's memoran­ dum of March 13 was intended to apply to all records of former employees as well as persons then em.ploy^ed in the 92 •Federal Service.-^ Ferguson, clearly displeased v/ith Truman's continued determination to v/ithhold loyalty files, threatened to in­ stitute impeachment proceedings against the President. "Presidential arrogance, " he declared, "is becom.ing in- tolerable. 1,93 Senator Clyde Hoey of North Carolina voiced approval of Truman's characterization of the spy proceed­ ings as a "red herring," and concluded that far from im­ peachment, the President should be cormnended for the effec- tiveness of his loyalty program..9^4 Hoey's viev/, hov/ever, did not reflect the prevailing sentiaient. John Rankin insisted that the Congressional investi­ gations had proven conclusively that the Truman loyalty program v/as ineffective. The real policy of the chief executive, he rem.arked, was to "tell Congress one thing and do another." Rankin further charged that by denying Congress access to loyalty files, the President v/as denyirg 95 the Amierican people access to the trutn.

92i^tter, To heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, from Donald Dawson, August 5, 19a8, 0E252ir^ Tru­ man Papers, Truman Library. ^•^New York Times, August 8, 1948. ^4bid., August 9, 1943.

95u.S., Congresaion^l Reeo-'d, 80th Ovaayaesa^, W.' V, ,, ^^t <.-l >•- 1948, 94, Pt. 81 >. 97e-3'. 112 A Washington Post editorial of August II praised Truman for his stand against the Ferguson committee. The editor i.mplied that the President was on dubious grouiids constitutionally, but felt he v/as upholding the spii.lt of 96 that document. A later and certainly contradictory edi- torial stated that Ferguson had asked for only employment records and not loyalty files. The editor felt that Truman should comply v/ith such a request.9 7 A member of the White House staff responded v/ith the foIIov/ing short note. "Ferguson did so ask for all. "-^ Two separate articles, v/hich appeared in the Wash­ ington Post during that period, clearly delineated the two points of viev/ regarding loyalty files. David Lav/rence proposed not to understand the President's reluctance to release such files. He adro.itted that public disclosure of such inforrr.ation might prove painful to certain indi­ viduals but, he concluded, "it's the only v/ay to get at QQ the truth,""" Walter Lippman offered a different view. ' It has been argued lately that though the injustiee to individuals done in this inquiry is regretable,

9^Washington Post, August 11, 1943.

^^Ibid., August 15, 194s. ^ Note, From George Elsey, internal Securi.ty Erie, Elsey Papers, Truiaan library. 99vjash:ligton Post, Augnat 4, IRae. 113 the national interest is being served so v/ell that it justifies the sacrifice of a fev/ innocent per­ sons. That argument is profoundly immoral. It is also profoundly unintellectual.100 It v/as unfortunate that the voices of those v/ho cried for more stringent action effectively drov/ned out those v/ho expressed the belief that individual rights v/ere being needlessly trampled.

One of the more harmful effects of the Congressional inquiries resulted from the House Comip.ittee's investigations into the field of atom.ic research. In earl5'- September, Truman received a letter from a number of atomic scientists who asserted that the v/hole ugly affair involving Dr. Con­ don, and the Co.mmittee's continued investigation into the scientific field, v/as so repugnant to the nation's scien- 102 tists that it would require years to undo the dam.age. On September 13 Truman attacked the House Coamittee on the basis that their continued investigations were not only driving av/ay the nation's best scientific m.lnds, but were 103 also creating an atm.osphere of oppression.

^'^'^Ibid., August 17, 1948.

Eleanor Bontecou, 'lS}^J'.^^^^_j£'yid]F^yy^i^£riIdxid_ Program. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell'University Press, 19o3), p. 103. 102 Letter, Harrison Bi-own et al. atomie scientiata, to Truman, Septcad^er 6, 1948, White iinuse Assignvent, Spingar/i Papers, Trurnm Library. •^^^New Yo)k Times, September l4, 1948. 114 An editorial in the Washington Post also criticized the committee for its smearing attacks on various scien­ tists. Although the Editor felt Truraan might have usod a better phrase than "I'ed herring," he nGvei-thoIess concluded that it v;as a justifiable characterization of the committee's activities. It was also noted that "scientists, being in­ tellectuals, are naturally suspect to the 'know nothing' mentality of members of the Committee on Un-American Activi­ ties," ^ The House Committee, apparently undeterred by such criticism, continued its search for subversives. Meanwhile, the Ferguson subcommittee report v/as released in early September. In general the co.amiittec con­ cluded that the loyalty program v/ithin the executive branch v/as not being conducted with the kind of detei-mination necessary to rid the governraent of subversive or disloyal employees. It vvas therefore recommended that Congross take some action immediately, although it was noted that the President's continued refusal to release certair pertinent information had severely limited the poner of the Congress to do so. ^ During the early dcvys of Septo.odoer there was sov.e indication that the adninistration night relax its staa.d with regard to the withholding of confidential reports.

W-^^* •! ^11 "'"V/aohington Post, Septsiaber IR, 1943.

105r'pv Vov>\- m-Jrir^-^ "^.n-nt r^--^R-^-- R 1 C'X] 115 On September I, three days before the Ferguson report v/as issued, a suggestion v/as made v/ithin the administration that perhaps the President should offer to turn over all of the data on William Remington on condition that such, information v/ould be kept in the strictest confidence. It was then suggested that in the event the comm.ittee vio­ lated such confidence, that the administration should im­ mediately "blast loose that all Ferguson v/ants ... is publicity." No action was taken on the preceding suggestion, but it v/as announced in the press on September 9 that Attorney General Clark and Senator Ferguson had planned a meeting to discuss the differences that existed betv/een the President and Congress~-a meeting that v/as seen as a major move tov/ard reconciliation on the part of the 107 administration. At the conclusion of the m.eeting, the press pre­ dicted that a com.promise v/as about to be effected and that it had been "tentatively agreed that Attorney General Clark would urge Truman to relax his order v/ith:holding the record: fron Congress." If Truman ever considered such a con>ee of action, and there is no indication one way or the other.

^^^Unsigned note, September 1, 3-943, In ternv ity File, Elsey Papers, Trt^aan Library. •^^^New York Tia.es, September 9, 1948. ••-^^Newsv/cek, September 20, 19'^8, R. 19. Il6 it was quickly put aside as the war of v/ords continued. On September 22, while on a campaign trip through California, Truman delivered his most stinging attack to that point on the Committee on Un-American Activities which he bluntly described as "more un-American than the activi­ ties it is investigating." Many of those v/ho heard the speech voiced surprise at "the vehem.ence v/ith v/hich the 109 President spoke." A fev/ days later the Justice Depart­ ment issued a statement voicing regret over the continued Congressional investigations in the espionage field, and reiterating the Department's deteimination not to attempt 110 prosecution on the basis of heresay evidence. From. that point on there v/as no further talk of any immediate reconciliation betv/een the President and Congress. As the Congressional investigations abated toward the end of August there v/ere numerous speculations as to v/hat effect they miight have on Truman and his cam.paign for the Presidency. An article in Newsweek declared that Democrats in general v/ere convinced that the ''red herring" remark and the continued refusal to release confidential files would hurt Tritman in the November election. Many top Democrats, it was noted, had urged hin to ciiange his

•^^"New York Tiiaes, September 23, 19':3.

•^•'-^Stateaient, by the Denaria.ent oi^ Juatiee, Se : I ber 29, 1948, White House Assigrme/it File, Snlrgnwn/ Ihyara, Truman Library. 117 III strategy before it v/as too late. George Elsey indicated that the spy issue constituted the "Administration's v/eak- est link. . . . ," and suggested the urgent need for strong counteraction on the part of the administration. It could no longer be hoped, Elsey said, that the spy issue v/ould backfire due to public revulsion at the tactics em.ployed by the Congressional committees. It had becomte evident "that these tactics, hov/ever reprehensible . . . , are in some ways more effective than the facilities of the Execu­ tive branch. . . . There is paydirt here, and the Republi­ cans have no intention of being diverted by appeals from 112 anguished liberals who see the Bill of Rights transgressed." It v/as to be expected that the Republicaiis v/ould uti­ lize the Comm.unist issue to the fullest in their car.paign to unseat Harry Truman. Such expectations v/ere soon realized as the GOP continued to prom.ote the idea that the Democratic administration v/as infested with Cornmtniists and their sym­ pathizers. Senator E'iley of ELsconsin su-^macd up the Repub­ lican attitude in the following stateavent. The issue of the AcLministration's coddling of Reds and Red syarpathizers in goverrmient is going to be a crucial issue in the coming political caaipaign. . . . The present administration . . . has served

^^^ewsweclr, August 30, I9^^8, p. 15. '^•'"^"Random Thoughts," August 26, 19':8, 1/vternal he- curity File, Elsey Eapers, Truman Librar 118 as a fertile breeding ground for Reds during the last sixteen years. 1^-3

Administration officials made a concentrated effort to repudiate such charges by emphasizing the positive re­ sults of the President's loyalty program. Secretary of Comm.erce Charles Sawyer, in an address before a Veterans of Foreign Wars encampment, declared that the Congressional investigations had indicated significant espionage activity during the war years, but had failed to shov/ any deficiency in the present Loyalty-Security program. Sav/yer emphasized that not one subversive had been found after the investiga- 114 tion of almost tv/o million Federal em.ployees. The President him.self conducted a hard-hitting cam.­ paign aimed at v/hat he termed reactionary Republican poli­ cies, and he accused the GOP of imped i.ng administration efforts to rid the goverrmient of disloyal ea.ployees. In so doing, he declared, the Repudolican Party had becomte the un- . 115 witting ally of the Coraaunists. Truman's best defence of his administration on the Coiamunist issue was made in an address delivered in Okla­ homa City on September 28, 1948. He opened by stressing

' •'•"^^U.S.. Corraressiona.l Record, oOth Con^ Sess., 1948, 94," Pt. 12;"p. "KXFbXd"' 114 ^, - Address, Secreta-y of Coaaae-ee Cr-^^^ August 30, 1948, v/hite Houa - o • •• - - Papers, Truaaan Library. •^•'"^New York Times, Seute.I'Or RR, ly' 3 119 a point v/hich he had emphasized on m.any previous occasions-- that the United States v/as strong enough to resist Com­ munism and v/as not endangered by Communist infiltration. The Republican Congress hov/ever, v/ould like you to believe that none of these things are true. . . . They are holding public hearings and creating scare headlines and hysteria because they v/ant you to overlook their ov/ri/^indifference to the county^'s real welfare. . . .H^ The Congressional investigations, Truman said, had uncovered nothing nevr and had done irreparable harm to those individuals involved. He chided those responsible for the hearings, and asserted that he v/ould continue to withhold confidential inform.ation from such irresponsible persons. The President praised the loyalty program vjhlch he said had already indicated that 99.7 pei" cent of Federal employees v/ere above suspicion. The prograav v/as late in- getting into operation, he said, because the Congress had failed to vote sufficient funds. Truman concluded the address by pointing out that "the test of an American's patriotism is not how anti-Coaaaunist he may be. Tho German-American Bund v/as Anti-Coaavunist. So was Adolph ,,117 Hitler."

•'• Dvaft, Presidential Message cai Coaa.:unl tional Security, Septeavber 2d, 19^^3, hhiue i.ou^ File, Spingarn Papers, Truman jlltrany. 117 Ibid. 120 The Oklahoma City address, stripped of its politi­ cal rhetoric, was a reviev/ of several points the President had stressed over and over in the past: that this countrvr was in no serious danger fron Commimiist infiltration, that the most effective v/ay to fight it v/as by im.proving the quality of American life, and that the rights of the in­ dividual ought to be protected. On these points Trum.an had been consistent throughout.

Chairman Thomas of the Coimilttee on Un-American Activities responded to the Trum.an address in a strongly worded letter of September 29. He accused the President of being remiss in his duty and of thwarting the House Committee's attempts to get at the facts. Tho.mas also challenged Truman's stateraent thiat all the infor.aation re­ vealed before the Congressional Coaaalttees had been pre­ viously knoi^m to the adaministration. He invited the Presi- 118 dent to back up such a statement v/lth facts. Had Truman

intended to reply, it v/ould have been necessary fo: ... have done so v/ith all dispatch for in a matter of v/eeks J. Parnell Thomas would be indicted for fraud and rea;oved from the scene of action. In one of the great ironies cf

all time the grand inquisitor of the EOUEO Comnittee, the man v:ho had on numerous oocasione driven v/itneaaea frantic

11R Letter, to the President, froa. R^rr.ell ' September 29, 1948, OERROB, Truann layers, Orvtian

W^r: 121 with his cutting questions, on Novem.ber 8, 1948, refused to testify before a grand jury on the grounds that such 119 testimony might tend to incriminate him. Although Thomas was removed, the commituee as v/ell as the issue of Communism in governiaent, continued to exist. Earl latham, author of The Coimmunist Controvers\^ in VJashington: From the New Deal to McCarthy, contended that it was not a very great issue in the election of 120 1948. It would be easy to overemphasize it, considering the pandora's box of charges and counter charges opened up in the special session of Congress, but neither should it, as Latham has done, be underemphasized. A Gallup Poll conducted in September indicated that eight in ten voters felt the spy hearings had unearthed valuable inform.a­ tion and disagreed v/ith those—v/hich would have included Harry Truman—v/ho charged that such hearings were nothing 121 but political in nature. " Such figures indicated a very live issue, although it would be difficult to determine just what part it played in the final outcoa.e. VJhatever the issues, few believed that Truman had any more than an infinitesimal chance to continue in the

119^.Tr^T.T Vz-N-.-V rp-?r.-.-

•^^^Richard H. Rovere. "Presi.dent Harry," Harnera Magazine, 197 (July, 1948), p. 30. •^^-U.S. Hens and World Rencnl, Rove Inn^ i'X iRaO pp. 24-25.^" ""~ ' 124 Latham, The Covamnn^at Ce^ihro 123 presumably presented to Chambers by Alger Hiss, contained various items of diplomatic* correspondence dating back to 125 1937. ^ The President, as his later conflicting statements on the subject clearly indicated, was obviously shaken by the disclosures. He first declared that all of the investi­ gative machinery of the government should at once be em­ ployed to determine exactly who was responsible for pilfer­ ing the classified documents found on the microfilm. In almost the same breath, Truman again characterized the House Committee hearings as a "red herring." Such confused think­ ing brought immediate criticism from the press v/hich felt that the President should at least be as anxious os the 126 House Committee to find out what Chambers really knev/. In private. Administration officials expressed the opinion that the Chambers doctiments am.ounted to little more than harmless correspondence that v/ould have been of no value to a foreign government. They noted, hov.'ev^er, that the "general public rarely reads the viev/s of first- rate experts. ..." It v/as a fact, they said, that na­ tions v/ere going to spy; the question v/as v/hether it couid be kept to a safe level. But anti-administration groups had attempted to show "that any success by any foreig:.

^^^Time, December 13, 1943, n. 23- •^^ Washington Post, Deec!nw:r 10, 19':3. 124 agent in spying on our government is necessarily catas- 127 trophic. ..." The report concluded with a v/ord of praise for Truman, and his feelings tov/ard the spy hu.nters in Congress.

The President seem.s to have been alm.ost the only- person who had such people and their outpoui'ings sized up right. He never gave them an inch. He might have added that not only theirQexciteifient, but themselves, v/ere led herrings.-^-^^

Other sources had openly questioned the im.portance of the Chamibers documents. The Washington Post reported that it was unable to see how the publication of such bland diplomatic correspondence could in any v/ay endanger v/orld 129 peace then or nov/.

John Rankin attempted to ansv;er such a question in

the House Comm.ittee's report on the Hiss proceedings. He

pointed out that some of the recovered documents had teen

in code v\liich, if it had been broken, vrould have underained

our entire intelligence apparatus. Ranhln then noted that

"state Department officials have testified thet publication

of some of these documents even today . . . v/ould end^n^^er 1^0 national security." ~^'" In conclusi^on, he praised the work

^^'^Article, "The so-Called Sny Bills,'' dhnuary 25, 1949, Sedition Bills of IR-R Eile, Clifford Rayara, Tan;/ Library. 128-,-, . - Ibio. ^^%shwagton Post, Deeenner 9, 1943. ^80u^S Conyveissiona^ Re-en;!, oOth Oonyreas, id Sess., 194s, 9R,"T33 l27"'pRR\EE:;3; 125 of the House Committee, and strongly suggested the need for legislation of the kind embodied in the Mundt-Nixon 131 bill. ^ There is little doubt that the discovery of the pump­ kin papers, v/hatever their value, greatly enhanced the prestige of the Conmiittee on Un-American Activities. Ca­ bell Phillips, in a New York Times article, reported that the Justice Departm.ent had been "outsmarted by the House 132 Committee." A former conservative Republican congress­ man, Hamilton Fish, v/rote a scathing letter to the Presi­ dent in v/hich he attacked him for his continued denunciation of the House Committee and its v/ork. Fish made much of Alger Hiss and his various appointive positions and con­ cluded his letter, in all capitals for emphasis, with the following demand. "LET NO GUILTY iEN OR WOMAN ESCAPE, NO 133 MATTER HOW IMPORTANT OR POEEREUL, DEAD OR ALIVE." The im.proved reputation of the committee was sone- what tarnished v/hen certain members on December 23 released testimony pertaining to Lawrence Duggan who had just daya before either fallen or leaped to his death from his office window in New York. Karl Mundt's statcriont in connection

^^•^Ibid., p. 5395. -^^^Nev/ York Tiitcs, Deeeaiber IR, 1043.

•"•^^Letter. To X'e President fran Earr'lton Eaah, December 23, 19-8, 0F320B, Trva^an Eaners, Trnnn Fidrar, # ——^ 126 with the incident, as reported by the Washington Post but denied by Mundt, did not help matters. When asked by a reporter if any further nam.es v/ould be released, the South Dakota Republican was reported to have replied, "v/e v/ili 134 give them out as they jump out of v/indows. " Both Mundt and Nixon later stated their regret over the Duggan inci­ dent and proposed a nine point code of procedure to give greater protection to v/itnesses who v/ould appear before the 135 committee in the future. As the year drev/ to a close, there v/as still the general uneasiness about the country that had characterized the American scene throughout 1948. The election had stilled the spy scare engendered by the Bentley and Chambers revela­ tions but the discovery of the stolen microfilm, and the un­ certainty that surrounded it had just as quickly revived the issue. The spy hunt, in full swing throughout December, , 136 promised to carry over to 194-9.

YlMhd-^l^ILl2J^l> December 24, 1948. Lawrence Duggan had serv^ed as chief of the latin American Division of the Department of State. Although he was accused by Whittaker" Chambers, his involvement with the^^Washington spy ring was never conflraved. On Deceavber 2d, Attorney General"Clai^k stated that there was no substantial proof that Duggan v/as ever a Cormiunist. •^^^New York Times, December 28, 1948. -^^^U.S. News and WorlcyJ\ev3Qil, Eeeenhar 24, I9''-, p. 18. CHAPTER IV "The demagogues, crackpots, and professioneil patriots had a field day pumping fear into the American people."

TRUMAN VERSUS THE EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS: JANU/J^Y 1, 1949 - AUGUST I, 1950

Trum-an opened the new year with a plea for coopera­ tion with the Eighty-First Congress .in the enactment of his Fair Deal program. The Democratic success in the elec­ tions of 1948 had no doubt buoyed the President's hopes for a more tranquil and productive 1949. Although the relations betv/een Truman and the Congress improved some- what, it was another year of frustration for the a^dminis- tration. But, in retrospect, it v/as the best year Truman v/ouid have until he left the Presidency. The Communist issue although subdued to soa^e extent when compared v/ith the struggles cf 1948 v/as still very much alive. Trum.an's old nemesis, the House Coamittee on Un-American Activities, v/as sti.ll active and a force to be reckoned v/ith as Co-a-aauilsm had becoaie its _ra.i son d' et:^;e. On January 1 the House Coaiiaittee announced that the federal service was still infested v/ith Reds and issued the call for more public vigilance and the ervaetr.ent of the iknvdt- 2 Nixon bill.

New York Tires, January 6, 1949 %bid., January 2, 1949.

127 128

Before the end of January an event of major signifi­ cance bore evil tidings for the future of the Truman ad­ ministration. On January 22, 1949, the Nationalist Chinese surrendered the city of Peking and thereby sealed the fate of China. There were no immediate repercussions but for those who had warned of Coimnunist infiltration for years, the complete collapse of Nationalist China became the cause celebre. Their argument was that the Truman admin­ istration, long too soft on Communism, had sold China dovm the river. Although the so-called China bloc v/ould not solidify until 1950, the swelling tide of fear v/as mani­ fest throughout 1949.-^

During the course of the year many states estab­ lished "little" un-American activities corm-nittees, loyalty oaths camxe into vogue, and investigations became the order of the day. Several ex-FBI agents published a tabloid entitled Red Channels, v/hich supposedly detailed the ra^ndom Communist connections of several actors, directors, and writers. In the South and elsewhere the Ku KIux Klan re- mobilized its forces to harass "the Coaraunlsts, race- mixers, and atheists." John Rankin charged in Congress

3Alfred Steinberg, The ils£f J^^'^- '^^-^nd^nlj.' !^3-e Life and Times of Harry S. Truman {lien Yorl7"~'G3'T.' lirtnali's Sons, 19b2y7np. 3bO. ^^Cabell Phillips, The Truman Rrosi.deney:_ Tiie Ri a- tory of a Triumnhavnt Succession "(rfew idaav: TiiO i.aev.'.i.i.J.a.n CF.TT"?657r'pp3"'5T?"3T3: 129 that the Communists were indeed active in promoting inte- gration of the races.-^

^•^ ^ Time article of June 27, 1949, Truman de­ nounced such witch hunting and comipared it to the time of the Alien and Sedition acts of 1798. In the same issue, the Editor observed that the various executive departments had certainly not been inactive in the anti-Communist field, especially the Justice Department which had insti­ tuted numerous proceedings against suspected Communists. Clark, the Editor said, had boasted in early June that "under President Truman more top notch Coimnunists have been convicted th8.n during our entire history." As alluded to earlier, the Truman rhetoric was often geared toward v/arning of the dangers of Coiamunisai, espe­ cially during the legislative battles in 194-7 over his proposal for United States aid to Greece. In his inau­ gural address in January 1949 the President devoted con­ siderable attention to v/hat he termed the Coraeu.nist "threat 7 to world recovery and lasting peace." Such presidential warnings v/ere for the m.ost part directed at Coitnu.nist ex­ pansion abroad. Truaaan had consistently played dov'n the

5u.S., Congressional Record, 8lst Coi}gresa, 1st Sess., 1949, 95, "Pt. l^r, p. A4OI4.

^Time, June 27, 1949, P. 13. '^New York Times, January 21, 1949.

.*-•' 130 supposed threat of internal Comiriunist subversion, a posi­ tion the red hunters were quick to challenge, particularly after the Chambers-Hiss affair. There is also indication that Tom Clark did not always share the President's lack of concern, as he had several times expressed the need for more affirmative action against possible Communist infil­ tration.

Harold Chase in his book Security and Liberty con­ tended that the Truman adm.inistration made a concentrated effort in 1948 to free itself from the persistent "soft on Comm.unism" charge. Part of that effort doubtless involved the indictment of eleven Communist leaders in late July under provisions of the 1939 Smith Act. The trial began in January 1949 under the genera.1 charge that the eleven "had conspired in 1945 to fonn the present Coatmuni st Party structure and teach and advoca-te the violent overthrov/ of „9 the United States Governmient."^ The trial fine^IIy ended in October v/ith a verdict of guilty on all counts. In his chaa^ge to the jury, pre­ siding Judge Harold Medina held that it was not necessary for the state to show the existence of a "clear and present

8Harold Chase, Securit:g_and Idherty: The RrohlR of Native Coamiunisai,_J194T--IRo5 '(Gardcir •c3'tE- dF idn Yolhv: IHTbleday and Co.", 3J:nc.,'1'955)^ ?• 27. 9Time, January 31, 1949, P. 20. 131

danger" before it took action^ that it \ias sufficient to prove that an evil thing existed.•'•^ Ten of the convicted received prison sentences of five years each and $10,000 fines. The eleventh had his prison sentence reduced to two years in recognition of his service in World War 11."*""^

The trial, with ample attention from the press, con­ tributed, no doubt, to the hysterical climate of the time, but it made no noticeable contribution toward freeing the administration from the charge that it v/as soft on Co\a- munism. Liberals condemned the proceedings from the be­ ginning. It v/as dangerous, the editors of riew Republic said, to try men only for the principles they espoused; the best v/aiy to heal Communism was by practicing democ- racy. Those v/ere the same ideas that Truman had ex- pressed on many occasions, ideas v/hich are difficult to reconcile with the prosecution of the eleven Coatara.nists under the Smith Act. There is no indicOotion that Truaran did not alto­ gether concur v/ith his Attorney General in the indictm.eiit of the Comaaiunist leaders, although the main impetus for the proceedings may v/ell have coaie froia the Justice De­ partment rather than the Vfnite Reuse. On other matters

^-Qlbid., October 24, 194-9, p. 22. ^iNew Republic, October 31, 19-9, PR- 7-3.

•^•^Ibid., February 7, 194-9, p. 6. 132 involving loyalty-security there is evidence of a consid­ erable divergence of opinion betv/een Clark and others within the administration.

In January I.949 Clark dispatched a letter to Sena­ tor Pat M- Carran, Democrat from Nevada, in v/hich he asked Congress to pass the "toughest anti-spy laws in American 13 history." -^ Among others, the Attorney General requested a law that v/ould legalize wire-tapping, and provide that "information thus obtained v/ould be admissable in evi­ dence. ..." Clark indicated that such a request had "been drafted to carry out the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee." l4 McCarran, who was never noted for his devotion to individual liber­ ties, urged caution in regard to Clark's request because it "touches upon many things v/hich heretofore v/e have re- garded as exceedingly sacred to the individual." 15 One week later a m.emorandum appeared under the authorship of Clark Clifford entitled "The So-Called Spy Bills." He stressed that such legisla^tlve proposals de­ served the prompt attention and concern of every mior.doer of the administration. "The President indicated to mx- a

^3x^ewsweek, January 24, 19-9, p. 19. -'-^U.S., Conr:ressional Record, 8lst Congreas, lat Sess., 1949, 95, Pt. 1, p. 4417""

^^Ibid.

'A 133 week ago yesterday that it is the Republicans who are avid for such hills . . . the hysteria-mongering brach [sic] of the Republican party. ..." Clifford devoted abundant space in the memorandinn to a thorough denunciation of v.lre-- tapping. It had been demonstrated time and again, he said, that the final result of such investigative procedure had been in all cases "disgraceful and disastrous." In July 1946, in a mem.orandum to Truman, Clark noted that Franklin Roosevelt had approved the use of listening devices against those suspected of subversive activities and requested permission to continue the practice. Trtmaan extended his approval at that time.1 7 The request for v/ire- tap legisIa,tion in 1949, hov/ever, appeared to have origi­ nated in the Justice Departm.ent, and v/hen viev/ed in conjunc­ tion v/ith the Clifford memorandum of January 25 suggested a definite conflict of opinion v/ithin the administration. S. 595, which incorporated the various legislative requests submitted by Clark, v/as reported fro.m the Senate 1 o Judicial Coimmittee on May 27. It v/as not debated until

l6Memorandum, "The So-Called Spy Bills," January 23, 1949, Internal Security Folder, Clifford Papers, Truaan Library. '^Memorandma, For the President frc.n Tom Clarh, July 17, 1946, National Defense Folder, Svlagarn Fax-'y^^ Tru-man Library. -'•^U.S., Congressional Rc:£ord, 8lst Corgress, 1st Sess., 1949, 951 Pt. 1, pEoOAE. 134

August 1950, at v/hich time McCarran pointed out that the wire-tap provision had been removed from the bill. A pro­ vision that would require persons trained in espionage by a foreign government to register with the Justice Depa,rt- ment, and another that would provide punishment for a.nyone found in possession of stolen government documents, v/ere retained. ^ A companion bill in the House, H.R. 4703, suffered a similar fate. "The members of the [House] Com­ mittee on the Judiciary felt that it v/ould be improvident and improper to accept the recommendations of these vari- 20 ous intelligence units concerning v/ire tapping." There was additional evidence of discord betv/een the VJhite House and the Justice Departm.ent in connection v/ith H.R. 10, the so-called Hobbs bill, v/hich was intro­ duced in January 1949 and designed "to facilitate the deportation of aliens from the United States" and "to provide for supervision and detention pending eventual deporta,tion. . . ." The administration manifested con­ cern over certain provisions in the bill nhen it emerged in the spring of 1950, especially those vdnich pertained

^9u.S., Congressional Record,- 8lst Congress, 2d

Sess., 1950, 9t>, Pt. 9, p. 1 -/ •i't .

20TKn-rl P-f. ^. "n . Olow lt • Ibid., pt. 3, p. ^ ^•^U.S., Congressional Record, 8lst Congreas, Isu Sess., 1949, 95, ft. 1, p. ix-id. 135 to the detention of aliens av/aiting deportation. On May 20, 1950, Truman learned that the Justice Department v/as pushing the Hobbs bill in spite of his ov/n previous objections to such legislation. Stephen Spingarn was detailed to speak for the President and to relay his concern to the Attorney General. Spingarn suggested that the Civil Rights section of the Justice Department ought to re-study H.R. 10 with the idea of establishing a proper balance betv/een internal security and individual rights.

Attorney General J. Hov/ard McGrath, v/ho had replaced Clark after the latter's appointment to the Supreme Court in August 1949, received Spingarn's message v/ith surprise since the Hobbs bill had been initiated by Tom Clark and with, he assumed, the President's approval. McGrath in­ dicated that he would take prompt action to correct the situation for "he knev^' the President's deep conviction of the need for protecting individual rights because the 22 President had frequently spoken to him. about it." Such evidence of a lack of coordination betv/een the various executive departments undoubtedly hurt the admin­ istration in its effort to head off even more drastic meas­ ures being proposed by the Congress. In particular, there appeared to have been a conflict of vi ev;s between Truman

^%emorandun, for the files fron Spingarn, May 20 1950, National Defense Folder, Fni.nyarn Ra.nera, Truavn Library.

1^- 136 and his Attorney General Tom Clark v/ho it seemed was de­ termined to take a much tougher line than Truman felt 23 either necessary or advisable. In early March 1949 Clark instituted proceedings against an employee of the Justice Departmient. .ludith Coplon, twenty-seven years of age and employed as a politi­ cal analyst in the foreign agents registration section, was arrested on March 4 v/ith a handbag full of notes ab­ stracted from confidential docum.ents within the department. Coplon had presumably been passing such information to her Russian amarata and United Nations employee Valentin A. 24 Gubichev. Coplon v/as indicted in federal court on tv/o counts; one for engaging in espiona.ge and the other for stealing government documents. She v/as subsequently found guilty on both counts and. received a sentence of forty months to

%aroId Ickes, in a most critical comm.ent on Clark's elevation to the Supreaie Court, suggested that Trunan might have appointed Clark in order to get hiai out of the cabinet. "Perhaps President Trutaan at long last realized that he owed it to the counti^y to get rid of this v/eahest tiember of his cabinet, and, m.istakenly thinking that he was still under political obligation to Clark, decided to 'kick hii^ upstairs.'" The hint of a possible conflict betv/een th-e VJhite House and the Justice Department during the Clark years deserves further investigation as such a conflict, if it existed, v/ould have had a serious effect on the ad­ ministration's actions in the loyalty-socuia'.ty fic:ld, ykw Republic, August 15, 1949, p. II.

^\lme, March l4, 1949, p. 28.

?ri 137 ten years on the first and one to three years on the sec­ ond, the sentences to be served concurrently. She v/as then escorted to Nev/ York to face a joint conspiracj^ trial v/ith 25 Gubichev. ^ Clark, it v/as observed in the press, had been forced to expose various undercover agents in order to v/in the Coplon trial. The presiding Judge Albert Reeves had informed the Attorney General that the govcrnm.ent, if it expected to prosecute, v/ould be required to produce the evidence. On the day preceding the arrest of Judith Coplon tv/o of the leading Communists on trial, Eugene Dennis and VJilliain Z. Foster, declared that in the event of v/ar, the Communist Party U.S.A. v/ould v/ork to defeat the "v/ar aims of American irriperialism." The next day, and the day of the Coplon arrest, Traman branded both Dennis and Foster as 27 traitors to their country. The combination of events frightened a nation alrea.dy on the verge of red hysteria and no doubt hastened the inevitable introduction of more 28 anti-subversive legislation.

^5ib_iji., July 11, 1949, p. IS. The Cople.n convic­ tion v/as "later reversed on a technlcclity.

2o-rU.oT Q . M-.'-lic.icS cnu--K-./.i ^'r^-^iv.one a. -p."i\^.i--JJ.. T-. ,-,>•.-fo,- L-'-.LT-. ^o-i W- , 2 J,^ •)i^ 0,4 Rr.. .- •on c- 00- 23. ' VJashingt on Po s t, Ma re hi 4, 19''9.

^^New Republic, March 21, 1949, RR« 7-8.

~-A 138

March 8, 194-9, might v/ell have been set aside as anti-subversive day in the Congress. No less than three major bills were introduced, all of v/hich closely resem­ bled the Mundt-Nixon bill which had expired at the end of the Eightieth Congress. In the Senate, Karl Mundt and Olin D. Johnson of South Carolina introduced S. II94, a bill "To protect the United States against certain un- 29 American and subversive activities." Senator Homer Ferguson introduced S. II96 v/hich differed on.Iy in minor details from the Mundt-Johnson bill. Both were referred 30 to Patrick McCarran's Sena^te Judicial Committee. In the House of Representatives, Richard M. Nixon introduced H.R. 3342, a companion to the Mundt bill, v/hich was referred to the House Committee on Un-American Activities. 31 On March 10 Representative Fra,ncis E. Walter, Demo­ crat of Pennsylvania, sponsored H.R. 3435, ^-n amendment to the Nationality Act of 1940, v/hich v/ould deprive native born American Communists of their citizenship and make them liable to deportation.^^ Other anti-subversive legislation

^9u.s., Congressional^ocord, 81st Congross, Ist Sess., 1949, 95, Pt. 2, v. ~19'r2r' ^^Ibld., p. 1965. ^^Ibid., p. 2034.

^^Ibid., p. 2213. 139 included H.R. 1002, introduced by Edward H. Rees of Kansas, which would require Communist front organizations to iden­ tify themselves on any matter sent through the United States mail, and H.J. Res. 9, introduced by Charles E. Bennett of Florida, v/hich re-defined treason to include: (I) affili­ ation v/ith any group that advocated the overthrow of the government by force, and (2) any collaboration v/ith a for­ eign agent for the purpose of overthrov/ing the government 33 by force.'^^ The primary bills, S. 1194, S. II96, and H.R. 3342, all closely resembled the 1948 Mundt-Nixon bill in its provisions for registration, membership lists, and finan­ cial accounting. One im.portant difference placed the pov/er for determining Conmaunist front organizations in the hands of a three man Subversive Activities Commission outside the Department of Justice. In addition, the authors con­ tended that the 194-9 version tightened the provisions that would curtail Coimnunist activities, provided for more dras­ tic penalties, and removed the statute of limitations fro^n any treasona,bIe acts in time of peat.ce. An effort was also made to remove any doubts as to the co.nstitutionallty of such legislation although "it does not appear . . . that

"^%emorandum. For the Rv-esident froa; Clifford, April 29, I9':9, Coaaaents on Fan Lowenthal's nenor/avdnn "The Sedition Bills of 1949," Internal Security Eolder, Clifford Papers, Truaian iiibrary. i4o these attempts have been successful or even substantial."-^

The administration's concern v/as evidenced in an

April 29 memorandum by Clark Clifford in v/hich he stated his viev/s on all anti-subversive legislation and his rec­ ommendations for executive counter-action. Clifford ini­ tiated the memo v/ith the follow^ing general comments.

It is one thing for a nation to take basic counter­ espionage and security measures necessary to pro­ tect its existence. . . . it is another thing to urge or tolerate heresy hunts at every stump and crossroads to smoke out and punish non-conformists of every shade and stripe of opinion different than that of the majority. I'm afraid v/e are mov­ ing increasingly in that direction. ... to oc riddle the barn door in order to hit the knothole.-^-^

He further deplored the increasing anti-subversive activity on the part of many states and the accompanying nation-v^ide tendency to associate loyalty v/ith orthodoxy.

Many had come to support the false assumption "that change ... is subversive and those v/ho urge it are either Communists or fellov/ travelers."

After a reviev/ of the various bills pending before

Congress, Clifford concluded that the administration should vigorously oppose all such legislation. He remarked, how­ ever, that it v/ould be difficult to beat something v/ith nothing. In that respect he recoamendod that the president

3^'lblcl.

35ibid. I4l consider, as an administration alternate to the Mundt- Ferguson-Nixon bills, a proposal m.ade in 1947.by Trum.an's Civil Rights Commission. Such a proposal v/ould entail both the Congress and the state legislatures to enact leg­ islation that would require the registration and the list­ ing of pertinent informa

^ Ibid. Clifford Indicated in a letter to this author that he did not play a very prenieent role in fora.n- lating administration policy in the loyalty-security field. The April 29 meaio suggested, however, th-t he certainly endeavored to play such a role but v/lthout suceer.s. 142

Such a measure did not come to pass in 1949 but the grov/- ing hysteria throughout the year doubtless laid the foun­ dation.

By early summer the anti-red crusade had taken on all the aspects of a three ring circus; it seemed everyone was trying to get in on the act. The Justice Department was busy with its prosecutions of Judith Coplon and the

Conmiunist leaders, state legislatures were enacting spy laws at a. record pace, the Hiss-Chambers perjury trial v/as very much in the nev/s, and, not least, the House Committee on Un-American Activities had extended its investigative pov/er to include the field of education. Over one hundred colleges and universities ifere ordered in June to subm.it 37 textbooks to the comiiiittee for examination.~^' The Chan­ cellor of Cornell University, Edmund E. Day, satirically suggested that if the members of the House Committee really v/anted to examine a particular college's textbooks, ,,38 "they had better take courses there. . . .' Education in general received its share of atten­ tion, v/ith emiphasis on the question of vfnether Co;eiunist

Party mem.bers should be allov/ed to teach in the nation's schools. The National Education Association concluded that they should not, but denounced the growing tendency

^"^U. S. News and VJorld Renort, June 24, 1949, V- 2--

38Time, July 4, 1949, p. 39. 143 to label as Communist anyone who voiced viev/s that dif- 39 fered from the majority.^^ Truman concluded, in answer to a reporter's question, that he "didn't feel that those who advocated overthrow of the Government should teach the nation's young people." Henry Steele Comm.ager in a New Republic article admitted that Communists might not be good teachers bu.t stated that he could see no benefit, and much harm, that might result from any attempt to purge the schools. Such an endeavor, Commager noted, v/ould only re­ veal "evidence of lack of faith in the intelligence and 4l integrity of the American people." The search contin­ ued, hov/ever, as more and more states--tv/enty-six by Octo­ ber 1949--resorted to the loyalty oath as a mea.ns of pre­ venting the employm.ent of Commiunists in the public schools 42 and colleges. The Senate also manifested concern over possible Communist influence in education, particularly with re­ gard to the granting of fellowships oy tlie Ateniic Energy Commission. The Commission Chairaian, David Lilienthal, was taken to task for av/arding such a fellowsln'.p to

^^Ibid., June 20, 1949, p. 52. ^Qwashington Post, June 10, 19':9. ^^hl, S. CoTonager, "Red-Ealtlng in the Colleges,'- New Republic, 121 (July 25, 1949), P. 12.

^^Nev/ Republic, October 10, 1949, P- 15. 144 Hans Freistadt, a University of North Carolina student and supposedly an avowed Communist. Lilienthal defended the Freistadt fellowship on the grounds that nothing of a secret nature v/as involved in the program. He soon retreated, hov/ever, and promised that henceforth a non- Communist affadavit would be required. Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney of VJyoming indicated that he would prepare a lav/ to that effect, and one that v/ould also require an 43 FBI check of all applicants for AEC fellov/ships. -^ Stephen Spingarn indicated his belief that the administration should openly oppose the O'Mahoney amend- ment because it would subject AEC fellov/s to a stricter security than that imposed on government employees. He suggested that Truman miglit voice his objections to the amendment at his next press conference. "The O'Mahoney amendm.ent is symptomatic of the increasing and almost hysterical unreason v.^hich tends to obscure and complicate 4L sane discussion of loyalty and security problems." ' In spite of administration opposition a.nd charges from the floor of the Senate that the O'Mahoney proposal v/ould destroy the fellowship program, the amendriont passed the

^8i'ime, May 30, 194-9, p. l4.

Memorandum, For Clifford fron Spingarn, July 27, 1949, Internal Security Eolder, Spingarn Eaners, Trn.a-o Library. 145 I 45 Upper House on August 2, 1949. Truman continued to compare the period to the late 1790's, but emphasized that it v/as only post-v/ar hysteria 46 and X'/ould soon pass. Although the analcgyy v/as somev/hat faulty—the 1790's hysteria v/as engendered by fear of a war rather than a result of one--the basic assumption v/as correct. The fear would pa.ss, but not until it had sapped the strength of the Truman administration, destroyed its domestic program, and done incalculable harm to a number of individuals. Had the President taken some positive action of the sort Clifford had earlier suggested, his administration might well have faired better. The con­ tinued failure to act v/ould prove fatal in the long run as Congress continued to press for action.

In July the Senate Judicary Comtn'-ttee com.bined the best and v/orst features of the Mundt, Ferguson, and John­ son bills into one major piece of anti-subversive legis- h7 lation, S. 2311. ''' The bill v/as not reported from the committee in 1949 but nevertheless posed a major thz-x-at to the President's effort to retain executive control of

^^U.S., Congressional Record, 8lst Congress, 1st Sess., 1949, 95, Tt^ '^iV' ilo33h""

V.^ashington Post, June 17, 1949- ^'^U.S., Congressional Record, 8lst Coaigress, lei Sess., 1949, 95, Pt;"^ p; US?/0.

n - % . r 146 the loyalty program. Administration response, however,

remained defensive and generally negative in character.

Truman's comments on S. 2311 v/ere essentially the

same as those he m.ade in 1948 on the Mundt-Nixon bill.

He opposed outlawing any political party, did not feel

fringe parties represented any great danger, and felt the

government had sufficient lav/s to protect itself against 48 internal subversion. Others in the administration con­ cluded that "S. 2311 is almost certainly unconstitutional

in some respects and v/ill be entirely ineffective to .. 49 achieve its purposes." -^ The Justice Department, in its

reviev/ of the bill, noted that the conviction of the

eleven Communist leaders for conspiring "to orga^nize the

Communist party as a society v/hich teaches a.nd advocates

the overthrow of the government by force," raised the

most important of the constitutional questions presented

in the Senate bill. The departm-ent could not recoim^iend

enactment of S. 231I, it v/as said, until the Court of 50 Appeals ruled on that conviction.-^

up Memorandum, For Loyalty and Sueverslve Activitiea 1 File from Spingarn, August 11, 1919, Spingarn Pan^ r J. , V. . Trum.a.n Library. 9comments, "Constitutional and Rraetieal Aspeeta of S. 2311,'' 0E2750, Truiaan E-ners, Truman Library.

^^Letter, To Pat MeOarran fron Peyton Lord, As anat- ant Attorney General, January 4, 195^, Eational Defense Polder, Spingarn Papers, Tru..nvn y.ihrary. l47 The liberal press exhibited immediate opposition to the new anti-subversive bill. An editorial in the Washington Post referred to it as "an outright sedition bill, comparable to nothing ever enacoed by the Congress of the United States since the odious Sedition act of 51 1798." The Nev/ York Times labeled it as an infringe- ment on the rights of every American citizen.E^2 The old charge could also be heard that any such legislation, in addition to establishing guilt by association and thought control, would only drive the Communists underground and 53 thereby increase the problem of detection. The sup­ porters of S. 2311 ignored such opposition and continued to push for enactment. In the face of such Congressional pressure, certain individuals in the administration suggested tov/ard the end of the year that a possible re-examination of the Federal Loyalty Program miight be in order, although it v/as felt 54 that the program in general was basically sound.-^ A November report on the progress of the program added cre­ dence to the latter sta-teraent for it was pointed out that

^-^VJashington Post, August 23, 1949.

^^New York Times, August 24, 1949- ^%ew Republi.c, Senterler 12, 1949. P. 10. ^^Letter, To Donald Dawson freai McGrath, Deec/.R-er, 1949, OF252, Truman Eapers, Truayni Library. 148 only 123 employees had been dismissed for reasons of dis­ loyalty after tv/o and one half years.^^ Among those in­ dividuals exonerated v/as Williara VJ. Remington who was cleared in February of charges made in 1948 by Elizabeth 56 Bentley.-^ VJhat strength the administration might have gained from Remington's clearance v.^as as quickly lost when he vms indicted the foIIov^ing June on a charge of perjury.^' In spite of Congressional pre-occupation v/ith the spy problem, there were v/hat som.e might regard as a fev/ positive achievements during the first session of the Eighty-First Congress; rent control v/a.s extended, the minimum v/age v/as increased to seventy-five cents an hour, ^8 and the armed services were unified.^ But, most of the Fair Deal remained unfulfilled due to the conservatives continuing to harp on the evils of big government and the v/elfare state, and there was little hope for a change in point of viev/ during the follov/ing electio.n year. It was predicted, hov/ever, that the liepublieans v/ould need more than the "big governament" issue if they hoped to make

5%ew York Times, Noveadaer II, I949. R6 -^Congressional ouartealy Service, ^Conwf^eae rd the Nation; I945-I964 (Eashinigton, D.C.: Congre a si:onajE":Ear terly Service, "I.965), p. 1701. ^^Newsweek, June I9, 1930, p. 13. ^^U. S. News and World Rano/R., October 21, 1949, p. 18. 149 substantial gains in the Congressional elections. -^ They indeed found another for 1950 v/as the year of McCarthy. A news story in January 1950 described tlie merger of sixty organizations under the sponsorship' of the Ameri­ can Legion to fight Coimnunism, and the Ku Klux JCIan's crusade against the NAACP, B'nai B'rith, and the Federal Council of Churches of Christ. The article elicited from Stephen Spj.ngamthe observation that one of the major policies- of the Trtmian administration had been to move decisively against Corrmunism in an un-hysterical v/ay. It is something else again v/hen it becom.es a cru­ sade or holy v/ar entirely devoted to the negative aspect of attacking Co.m.munism and detached from the positive aspect of building up deiaocracy so that ... it v/ill be invulnerable to the chal­ lenge of Communism.. ... In short, a success­ ful organization to fight Coaimunis}a must have a positive program for imp/oving d-eriocracy . . . otherv.lse, it is going to find that it has soite very slimy characters, indeed, am.ong its most articulate supporters.^0

Spingarn's thoughts were more prophetic than he knev/. On January 24, 1950, the ordeal of Alger Hiss ca.me to an end v/ith his conviction on a charge of perjury. At a press conference the follovlng day. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a long tirae friend of Hiss, stated firmly

^9u. s. News and IJorlcgRenort, Noveaiber I8, IRvR, p. 11. " ' 6c) Memoranduio,- For Murnhy froi.i Spingarn, dannary F 1950, Inte:rnal Security Folder, SRirnnrn Rape}nv, Frn.nn library. 150 that "I do not intend to turn my back on Alger Hiss." -^- Such words served as the catalyst that solidified the China bloc; that group of individuals v/ho would contend that the responsibility for the loss of China could be ti-aced directly to the Cojmmunist sympathizers in the Department of State, and inevitably to the whole red- infested Democratic administration. Within a matter of three weeks, the group would find a leader in the bullish and crude junior Senator from VJisconsin, Joseph R. McCarthy. Senator McCarthy launched his dubious campaign at VJheeling, VJest Virginia on the evening of February 9, 1950. In a speech before a group of Republican ladies at a Lincoln birthday dinner, McCarthy announced: I have here in my hand 57 cases of individuals who v/ould appear to be either card. ca.rrylng members or certa„inly loyal to the Communist Party, but v/ho nevertheless are still helping shape our foreign policy.62

The thirty-seven year old McCarthy had been elected to the Senate in the Republican surge in 1946. His record for 1949 did indicate consideradole activity--he introduced

-^Dean Acheson, Present at_tlie_Creatlor): My_^ Years in the State Denartment"Cirevr l'o"fRd'""dd. XF'lidrtdddX CoX, 1909), p. 300. " 62 B. J. Bernstein and A. J. Matuaov^ (eda.). The Truman Ad.:.inistration: A DcKn;vvomtaey.'^Riatoid/ (h^:v/ lErk: Harper ^C'R'OVR, T^'ob)y Tr.~4o4'.'" 151 some thirty eight bills mostly of a minor nature--but gave no hint that McCarthy had any more than a passing interest in the Communist, anti-subversive field. 6R Richard Rovere, author of a critical biography, stated that McCarthy "v/as in m.any ways the most gifted demagogue ever bred on these shores. No bolder sedition- ist ever moved am.ong us--nor any politician v/ith a surer, 64 swifter access to the dark places of the /merican mind."

Dean Acheson, on the other hand, viewed McCarthy as "es­ sentially a small-tov/n bully, v/ithout sustaining purpose, •65 who on his own would have soon petered out."

McCarthy v/as not on his ov/n for long, for he soon became the agent and spokes/nan for fundamentalist con­ servatism—the "cutting edge" as Earl Latham referred to it. It v/as Joe McCarthy v/ho would perform, as he once defined it himself, the "bare-knuckle job" on the Truman fi7 administration, aided and abetted by the conservative

^3u.s., Congressional Record, 8lst Congress, 1st Sess., 1949, 95, Pt.'Tf; ppr~E79-33o. fib 'Richard Rovers, Senator Joe McCarthy (Meridian, i960), p. 3. ^Acheson, presentat The Creation, p. 370. Earl Latham, The Coaaaunist Oorrtre)^/ersy in Eash- ington: From the Nev/ "jiec'l'to i;eCa:-t:iy (viev/ Yorn: "A'theneum, 19^697, p3 4i23i ~"~'^" ^^\].S. Cc)ngr5^sional ^Record, 8lEt Congrcsa, 2d Sess., 1950, 9^, ~Pt. 1F7T3 ARRhlE 152 /TO Taft-led Republicans. On the evening of February 20, McCarthy repeated his charges on the floor of the Senate. He utilized the power of the Sergeant-at-Anns to encourage the Senators to remain and listen as he laboriously plodded through eighty-one separate cases of v/hat McCarthy termed to be treasonable activity in the State Department. It v/as clear from the exchange betv/een the Senator from VJisconsin and others that he v/as uncertain as to just hov/ miany sus­ pects he had named at VJheeling. For convenience, no doubt, he finally settled on eighty-one. McCarthy's subsequent refusal to nam.e e.ny of those eighty-one by name drev/ heavy fire from Majority Leader Scott Lucas v/ho charged that McCarthy was casting a shadov/ on guilt on the entire State Department.6 -^9

/TO Acheson, Present at The 0^0^.1 ion, p. 363. Acheson contended that Taft, frustrated oy tlie ETOP defeat in 1943, decided to give McCarthy Republican backing and support. Taft, Acheson declared," felt .McCarthy "should keen talking and if one case doesn't work out, he shiould proceed v/i.th another." p. 364 Taft's biographer Willi am S. White re­ ferred to that tim.e of I'cCarthy as the "sad, v/orst period" in Taft's life: that he adopted "the notion that almost any way to . ." . discredit the Trunan plan v/as a.cceytab:1 r^ See VJiiliam S. White, The Taft JStory (New York: Ikrner & Brothers, 1954), pp."'"b4-Eoo.

f)0 -^U.S., Congressional Record, 8lst Congress, 2d Sess., 1950, 967~Pt: 2,'ppE'lRyhllRol. ^^^ '

153 Nine days before his speech on the Senate floor, McCarthy had v/ired the President and demanded that he order Acheson to release the State Departm.ent loj^alty files; "failure on your pe.rt v/ill label the Democratic 70 Party of being the bedfellov\/ of international Comm.unism." Truman remained silent for the moment, and it v/as soon decided that McCarthy should be given a forum to prove his charges, with the full expectation that he would soon over extend himself. On February 22, the Senate adopted S. Res. 231 which established a subcommittee of the Senate Conmiittee on Foreign Relations to "Investigate VJhether There are Employees in the State Department Disloyal to the United States." It was to be composed of Dem.ocra^ts Millard Tydings of Ma^ryland as Chairman, Theodore F. Green of Rhode Island, and Brien McMahon of Connecticut. Repub­ lican members v/ere Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and 71 Bourke Hickenlooper of lov/a. In his Memoirs Dean Ache­ son viewed the appointment of the Tydings committee as a. gross miscalculation beca.use it furn.ished McCarthy v/lth a platform and loud-speaker wltri which to broadcast his

I '''^Telegram, To President fnoai McCarthy, Eehruary t 1950, OF3371,"Truman Papers, Trunan Library.

^-"•Theodore F. Green Ea,nere, Tydi)iga Suhcon-ittce Correspondence, National Archives, LiXrcnry of Co.ar • -r '^ ^•',

f ^ 154 72 charges to the farthest hinterlands. In the course of the debate on S. Res. 231, the Republicans succeeded in attaching an amendment v/hich empowered the subcommittee to subpoena all confidential files on those individuals charged by McCarthy. Truman reacted to the im-plied threat at his press conference on February 24 v/ith the announcement that under no circum­ stances v/ould he respond to such a subpoena if one were issued. He maintained a firm "come and get it" attitude, once again reminding reporters of Andrev/ Jackson's com­ ment in reference to John Marshall's decision in the case

^^ The Cherokee Nation vs. Georgia. McCarthy decried v/hat he termed such complete Presidential arrogance.'73^ The subcommittee hearings coaraenced in early March, v/ith Tydings prom.ising "neither a witch hunt, nor a v/hite- 74 v/ash."' McCarthy was the first witness to appear and soon obtained the initiative v.l.en both Lodge and Hicken­ looper pressed the subcoaaiittee Chairman to allow the Senator to present his case. McCarthy made ample use of the opportunity, following the age-old demagogic technique of never allov/lng his adversary an opportvnaity for rebuttal

72 ^ r Acheson, Present at y'^'-^SdnddniXj-Srd^ B* 3a3

'Washington Post, February 24, 1930.

7b ' '"Time, March 6, 1950, p. 17. 155 In the initial stage the hearings centered on six rela­ tively obscure individuals. Later, McCarthy im.plicated those of more renov/n such as Philip C. Jessup, United States Ambassador-at-Large specializing in Far Eastern Affairs, John Stev/art Service, v.^ho had been cleared be­ fore a State Department Loyalty Board of charges made in 1946, and Ov/en Lattimore, Director of the VJalter Hines Page School of International Relations at John Hopkins University and at that time on a special United Nations 7S Mission to Afghanistan.'-^ Jessup and Service v/ere re­ called from their foreign service posts to ansv/er the charges, and received substantial support from both the Justice Department and the VJhite House. The most spectacular charge v/as a^gainst Lattimore v/hom McCarthy referred to as the "'top Soviet espionage .,76 agent' in the State Department. McCarthy informed the subcommittee that he v/ould rest his entire case on the Lattimore charge. I am telling you that this is the one case in vdiich I think v.-e can eaisily hawe a deteriaination by this conmlttee as to v/hether or not my charges are well founded or not. I think for the balance of the investiga~tion you should knov/ that.''^^

p. 272.

7f,I '-'-ITI - ^ T T J rr-'-l rI. ^ , , -rr .-.-•: J ^ , . 1',P , /l ' C Phillips, The Tritaan Pnesldency, pp. dhd-jRo. ''Latham, The Con?:iunist Controversy in Faa^e-irnX^py, P. 279. ^' 156 Owen Lattimore, although not a v/idely knov/n public figure, v/as recognized among scholars as an expert on Par Eastern affairs. He had served from 1934 to 194l as edi­ tor of the magazine Pacific Affairs, a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations. During VJorld VJar II he v/orked as a deputy director of war information in the pacific and served at one tim.e as a political advisor to 78 Chiang-Kai-shek.' Tydings accepted the McCarthy challenge and ordered Lattimore recalled from his foreign assignment to appear before the committee. On April 6 Tydings announced that the conmiittee, with the exception of Hickenlooper, had viev/ed a summary of the Lattimiore files in the presence of J. Edgar Hoover and found nothing to indicate that Professor Lattimore v/a.s or ever had been disloyal to the United States.'^^ Rovere observed that McCarthy sensed almost at once that he had committed a serious blunder in singling out Lattimore. It v/ould have indeed been difficult for the professor to have ever been the leading spy in the State 80 Deoartment since he had never been eaiployed there. A.t

'^ Alan Barth, Government by Investigation, (New York: The Viking Press, i^lh)J P-'983 '^9phillips, The Truanvn Presid.enoR/, p. 336.

Latham, The Coa;muiIst Oorn^onerey^Jjl^dyydilirddddan.' p. 279. 157 a press conference during the hearings. Dean Acheson re­ vealed that he had no recollection of ever having met Lattimore. McCarthy quite obviously missed the m.ark, but it did not appear to deter him in the least for he quickly pressed the attack in another direction and con­ tinued to challenge the committee to check the complete files on all those he had named.8 2 There v/as an announcement in the press on March 2 that Truman had decided to reverse his three-year stand and allov/ the Tydings subcommittee to viev/ the loyalty files. It was reported that the case of Klaus Fuchs, British scientist convicted of selling secrets to the Russians, ha.d convinced the President of the necessity of proving that there were no such individuals in the State Department. The announcement v/as prem.a.ture, for Truman had made no such decision, although he v/as giving it careful consideration. He well knev/ he could, and most certainly v/ould, be charged v/ith protecting subversives if 84 he continued to deny access to the files. He v/as also desirous of aiding the com.r:iittee but felt if an exception

^•^Time, April 10, I95O, p. I8. Op Phillips, The Truman Presidency, p. 382. On ^Article, Now York IXradjl Trid;nT.ne, March 2, 1950. Internal Security Folder, Elsey I^apc3^s7 ^'runr.n Library. 8i VJashington Post, March 6, 1950. 158 were made at that point, it would be most difficult to deny such papers to any other committee in the future. The President faced a m.ost difficult decision. On March l4 Senator Tydings asked Truman to set forth the conditions under v/hich the files might be made available to the Senate committee. Spingarn suggested that the President inform. Tydings that he had decided to open the files in order to resolve once and for all the damaging charges made against the State Department, and that he had been assured that the committee v/ould use them v/ith discretion. It was further suggested that a special room be set aside in the White House where only coimriittee members v/ould be allov/ed to examine a stmmiary of each 85 file in the presence of a presidential representative. Truman remained unconvinced, hov/ever, and the loyalty files remained closed. Truman had doubtless been impressed v/ith the Justice Department's persistent argtmient that the release of such confidential information would adversely effect the in­ vestigative procedure of the department. He v/as also not unreceptive to opinion v/hich appeared in the press such as a March 22 editorial in the W£nil'.13il:iR._.Stcar. The Edi­ tor declared that the Presi.dent's loyalty proyran did r-ot

^^Sungested message. To Tydings fi'on Rreaidant, March I5, 1950, Internal Security Foi.dor, Fpin^yaj.n lay ara, Truman Library. 159 at that time represent a serious threat to the reputa­ tions of innocent people but v/ould become so if loyalty or files v/ere released to just anyone. On the same day, March 22, Truman received an of­

ficial request from Tydings for the loyalty files on all

those individuals named by McCarthy on February 20 from

the floor of the Senate. The President replied on March

28 that he v/ould be unable to make such files available

because of the damage that might result to the FBI, to

its confidential informants, and to the individuals in­

volved. Truman indicated his earnest desire to cooperate

with the Senate committee and stated that the Richardson

Loyalty Board had been instructed to re-check each of the

cases and to submit a report v/hich v/ould be made available . 87 -^ ^^ 3 3 to the subcommittee members.

The reaction to the President's decision revealed

the marked division of opinion on the matter. Tydings,

declaring the decision to be a. v/ise one, a^nnounced that

he was required by the amendment included in the Senate

Resolution to issue a subpoena for the files, although he knev/ v/ell that the President v/ould ignore it. Horaer

^^Editorial, From the V^esliiaagtcia^Stae*, March 22, 1950, Internal Security Folder-, lils7:y }%pcrs, Tru^ian Library.

87Letter , To Tydings from Truvwn, March 2ooc. , 1930, Internal Security Folder, Spingarn Paners, Truman Librar l6o Ferguson characterized Truman's decision as a cover up, and Senator Kenneth Wherry, Nebraska Republican, called QO it "shocking and shameful." The Editor of the Mil- vjaukee Journal congratulated the President on his deter­ mined stand not to release information v/hich would have "opened up pandoras box overflowing v/ith hearsay, gossip, rumor, conjecture and outright lies. . . ." " McCarthy, as might have been expected, asserted that Truman had refused to release the information because he knev/ it 90 would substantiate the Senator's charges. There can be little doubt that Truman and the v/hole of his administration v/ere stunned by the McCarthy attack. The Junior Senator from. Wisconsin v/as having his day and there seemed to be no effective course open to oppose hira. In the Spring of 1950, Trum.an set un a special force, coav- posed of Stephen Spingarn and Max Lowenthal, charged with the task of issuing instant rebuttals to McCarthy's neverending charges.9 Democrats in general v/ere frightened out of their wits that McCarthv--on the loose with a blunderbuss--just

OO VJashington Post, March 28, 1950. 89 Article, From F-''dnn'.X:ee^jdeyjrryl, April 12, 19JO, Democratic National Coa-mittec"'Oilairing li.lc, Trunan Library. ^'^Ilddl JSdiX JiddiFo'^ April 10, lyoO. ^"'"Phillips, The Truman loodXXdd!nrn F- 33?. jH^ 161 might turn up another Alger Hiss which it vvas felt would deliver the coup de (Trace to the Democratic administra­ tion. Former Secretary of State Henry Stimson stated that Joe McCarthy was not trying to get rid of Commu­ nists but rather "hoping against hope that he will find some."-^

Columnist Drew Pearson reported that McCarthy nas rapidly draining away whatever public support Truman had left. Most people believed, Pearson stated, that where there is smoke there must be fire, and McCarthy had cer­ tainly created enough of the fo.rmer. Pearson also indi­ cated that many had come to feel that the Presidont nas simply not loading—that he had lost control of the situ- X. 93 ation,^-^ Truman did attempt to rebuke McCarthy, nho;n he privately referred to an "that o.o.b.," at every possible opportunity, especially at press condorenceo and ia vari­ ous speeches. The most notahlo of the nneee anneanawceo occurrad in elorida on March 50, lyyO, vhen Trunan aryrily

Ci•''.*" T O VI y-* . f- -^ — ^-^ - r II -^ v^ r- ^, o •^ ^ *^t'-' /^ r' . ''i "O ** n — '"^ '^. ^ i'*^ \ '• f^ ' ' f\ '• 1 '' ~i

9^TlmG, A-^nil 10, l-'-O. n. ly. o y -'•^V;ae'"ir-'tea Eoat May 3, l^yO

iiyjiiy%^ l62

Republican Party has endorsed the antics of Mr. McCarthy."^ It v/as the typical free swinging response the press had come to expect from Truman, but the rema.rks served no good pujrpose other than to allov/ the President an opportunity to vent his emotions.

A more significa.nt attempt to counter the McCarthy attack came on April 24, 1950 in the President's address before the Federal Bar Association. It v/as for the most part a reiteration of points he had mxade on numerous other occasions but should be viev/ed as a sensible, straight forward, and eloquent appeal for a return to sanity. He stressed that improvement in the quality of Aiaerican life v/as "the strongest anti-Communist v/eapon(s) in our v/hole arsenal. ..." and he closed vrlth a "call on all fair minded men and v/omicn to join in this good fight." 95 It would do the President an injustice to criticize his appeal for reason, but it m.ust ba considered as insi.g- nifleant in the face of the primeval attack then under way against the administration. There had been a mtaiber of suggestions m.ade in the past for a more positive response-- Clifford's proposal for an adaalni.stration sponsored

^Truman's Statements, Presidential Press Confer­ ence, March 30, 1950, Joe McCarthy File, Lloyd papers, Truman Libraray. 95presidential address, Federal Ear Asaoci.aLJ on, April 24, 1950, PPF200, Truaian Papers, Truman idbrary. 163 registration bill and others—but no action v/as taken. The President's response remained defensive, hardly an enviable position when faced v/ith an opponent such as Joe McCarthy. Trtiman continued to place his greatest hope for exoneration on the Tydings subcommittee which v/as still trying to reach some conclusion in the midst of an almost daily^ barrage of charges. Republican Senator VJiiliam E. Jenner of Indiana, one of the most vindictive voices raised in the Senate during those days, daily referred to the subcommittee hearings as a "v.^hitewash. "^ Bourke Hickenlooper charged that Truman v/as attempting to shift the blame to J. Edgar Hoover for the President's refusal to allov/ the co/maittee 97 to see the loyalty files.-^ Senator Tyoings pleaded only for a truce that would allov/ the subcommittee to conclude its hearings in a. less hysterical atraosphere.9 8 Such irresponsible and reckless cha-rges a.s those being throv/n about by McCarthy, Jenner, Wherry, and othiors proaipted Theodore F. Green to coaaaent that "v/e aro not so much in.- periled today by v/hat the 'noisy' and ' troublesoaLO' Coai- munists can do to us as by vliat they may induce us.

9^U.S., Congressiona] Eecord, 8lst Congreas, 2d Sess., 1950, 90, Pt. 5, p". '^cxx ~

^'^rbid., p. 5709.

9^Ibid., p. 5711. 164 through the McCarthy's to do to ourselves."99

The charges and counter-charges continued unabated and no doubt had much to do with the sudden and unexpected announcement from the V\Thite House on May 4 that the Presi­ dent had reversed his decisi.on and v/ould allov/ the sub­ committee to viev/ the files under the conditions suggested earlier by Stephen Spingarn. Tv/o days later Senator McCarthy delivered an address before a young Rexmblican group in Chicago in v^rhich he charged that the loya-Ity files about to be relea.sed had in fact been purged of all derogatory informo/tion. He continued to name Ov/en Latti­ more as the architect of the United. States policy in China^ despite all evidence to the contrary, and concluded with as vicious an attaxk upon the integrity of the Presi­ dent of the United States as any public official ever 101 uttered in public. Some weeks later, in a letter to the President, McCarthy re-stated his charge that the State Department's

99yashington Post, April 26, 1950.

^Q^New York Times, ?iay -j, 1930. •^^-^U.S., Congressional Reeord,8let Congress, 2d Sess., 1950, 9o7^t3 153'y3)3"'3Er;ho-.3027. iieCartry oyenlm :- - charged that ths president was shielding suhverai.vcs. "Mr. Truman, your telephone is ringing. A sailor o?- nanir are calIing-"Calling froav a prison so::^evdaere 1/: Chlr^ • • Mr. Truman, they are getting a busy slgnai on yovw l.i/jo. They will call back v/hen you are throuy}i witii Aeheaen, Jessup, Lattiraore, and Servi.ce." 165 files had been systematically stripped in 1946 of all

Incriminating evidence. The Department characterized such accusations as false a^nd m.alicious and stressed that the so-called "stripping" consisted of nothing more than a reorganization of persorxnel files that had. nothing v/hat- 102 soever to do v/ith information pertaining to loyalty.' A short time after Trumian's announcement. Senator Tydings requested that the President appoint a "panel of distinguished citizens" to assist the comiraittee in its consideration of the loyalty files. It v.^as suggested that Truman advise Tydings that the a-ppointment of such a panel a.t that time might tend to reflect discredit on the Richardson Loyalty Board and v/ould also interfere with the President's own plan "to set up a Presidential Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights the jurisdiction of which v/ill include but not be limited to considering the adequacy of the Government's Loyalty- Security Program. ..." It v/as further proposed that the President inform the Senator tliat the Richardson board would give priority to the McCarthy charges, woul.d pre­ pare a comiplete report of its findings, and v/ould meet . . 103 and discuss such a report v/ith the Senate Connittee.

102p^^53 Rr^iease, Denartaient of State, July 12, 1950, Internal Security Folder, Spingarn Payers, Trn vaei jyh

•^^^lleyaorandAna, To the Eresi.dent froa^ Fyi\iya.rn Murphy, May 24, 1950, 01'252a:, Truaan pay era T:-u..N m^ 166 There was ample discussion concerning the advisability of a Presidential Commission, and it v/as regrettable that nothing more cajne of it at that time. The appointment of a number of distinguished citizens to study and evalu­ ate the loyalty program might v/ell have blunted much of the Congressional attack and restored public confidence 104 in the government's security procedures. By the early summer of 1950 public confidence in the administration's loyalty program had declined to a nev/ lov/. VJhen the program v/as launched there v/ere num­ erous charges that it v/as too harsh and a threa^t to in­ dividual freedom, but the pendulumi had swtmg the other v/ay by June 1950. McCarthy's charges implied, and many had come to believe, that the loyalty boards, if not out- 105 right dishonest, v/ere too lenient and ineffectual. As the administration struggled feebly to reraove such doubt, J. Edgar Hoover, one of the more important and influen­ tial members of that adiaini strati on, in effect did m.uch to increase it. It had been evident for soaie time that certain members of tho administration were uiihapny v/ltii the FBI Director's statements on the strength of the Coaaaunist Party in the United Sta.tes, vrh'.eh it was felt only served

-^^Sjashlngton Post, Kay 27, 1930. -'-^^Ncv/ York TE/ea, June 3, 193-- l67 to "keep the pot bubbling and play directly into the hands of the self-styled super patriots of the McCarthy vari­ ety." Stephen Spingarn voiced particular displeasure with Hoover's article in a June issue of U. S. Nev/s and World Report v/hich detailed the dangers of the ComLiunist fifth column. Spingarn maintained that Trunnan had pre­ sented the true picture, that the adJTiinistration v/as winning the battle agavinst the Communists in the United States. No V'/here in Hoover's statement, Spingarn declared, "is there any suggestion that v/e are licking or even hurt­ ing the CPUSA. On the contrary, the v/hole suggestion is that they are getting more and more dangerous." It v/as obvious, Spingarn said, that the director v/as employing such "scare tactics" in order to get more money from Congress.10 '7 Tom Clark admitted that Hoover often used the Com­ munist issue for just that purpose but qui.ckly added that such tactics did not constitute anything dishonorable. Hoover's background, Clark said, had deter.ained much of

Memorandum, For Adniral Dennison fron Spingarn, June 19, 1950, Internal Security Eolder, Sv)ingarn Eapers, Truman Library.

•'"^'^Remarks, Sningarn on J. E, }ieover's artic:'e in U. S. News and Wori.d^ Report, June 25, 1930, Eational Defense Folder, Spingarn payers, T:>anaan E:'brary. 168 the Director's pre-occupation v/ith the problem of Com- munism. That was all v/ell and good but it m.ust be wondered v/hy neither Clark nor any other Attorney General in almost fifty years did not make som.e effort to check the director's statements. It v/as yet another instance of discord within the Truman administration, which at that time the President could ill afford.

The long av/aited report of the Tydings coimmittee was submitted, regrettably on a partisam basis, in m.id- July and, as expected, completely repudia.ted every charge McCarthy had made. At a tim-e v/hen American blood is again being shed to preserve our dream of freedom, v/e are con­ strained fearlessly and frankly to call the charges, and the methods eaiployed to give ther.i ostensible validity, v/hat they truly are3 a fraud and a hoa:: perpetrated on the Senate of the United States and the American people. . . .109

The report v/as presented to the Senate on July 20 v/here, after bitter debate, it v/as approved by a vote of 45 to 37. It v.^as a strictly partisan vote, v/ith all Republicans, including such liberals as Wayne M'orse of Oregon and those of the raore m:oderate variety^ such as Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, voting to si/stain ncCa.jthy.-11-0

^^8jnterview v/ith Justice Thomas 0. Cla-h, Eaahiny ton, D. C, August 22, I969.

•^•^9p5ej.nstoin and Maausow (eds.), TF_d..'d died add...'^'" iii'" istrati.on, p. 4l2. '"' '~

•^-•^.S.^ Oon rare eai ojn..l Ecagawd, 8lst Ooaiyreaa, 2' Sess., 1950, 93, It. 6h p.~TOoa:o.

H' l69 Mrs. Smiith, along v/ith six other Republican Senators, had earlier been among the fev/ in the Senate who had dared to challenge McCarthy by signing a "Declaration of Conscience" v/hich deplored the tactics employed by the Vlsconsin Sena­ tor. In an extraordinary speech on the floor of the Sen­ ate, Mrs. Smith criticized the Democratic adiainistration for not having moved effectively against Comjiiunism., and stressed the need for a Republican victory in November. "But I do not v/ant to see the Republican Party ride to political victory on the Four Horsemen of Calumny—fear, 111 ignorance, bigotry, and smear." Henry Cabot Lodge indicated that he had not signed the report because the subcommittee simply did not, in his estim.ation, have sufficient time to make a full and complete investigation. The lo^ralty files. Lodge said, were in an unfinished state but still so long and compli­ cated that he confessed a complete inability to under­ stand them. He also observed that the conmiittee members had been allowed to examine the files only in the White 112 House and v;ere not pervaltted to tadne notes. ' Earlier,

•^-''-^^oted in Acheson, Present at Tie Creati.on, P. 365. ^ - . - ~

TIP U.S., Congreasic-ni^l Eeeo-d, Slat Congress, 2 Sess., 1950, 96," Pt.'"8,""T:)vi. EO?Y3)-.LU779. 170 on April 3, Lodge had introduced S. 338 "To Provide For Establishment of a Commission to Investigate Charges of Disloyalty in the State Department." It v/as to be comi- posed of tv/elve members selected on a non-partisan basis v/ith half of that ntimber to be chosen from outside the government.11 3^ Until a. thorough investigation could be conducted by such an im.pa-rtial commission. Lodge con­ cluded that he could not state v/ith finality that all of ]l4 McCarthy's charges v/ere comipletely baseless. Lodge's objections were at least of a reasonable nature. Such could not be said for those voiced by some other Senators. The most vicious attack on the subcojmnittee's re­ port in general a.nd on Tydings in particular v/as delivered on July 21 by Senalor Jenner v/ho accused Tydings of con­ ducting a "scandalous and brazen v/hitewash." Jenner then proceeded v/ith a personal attack so vile and repugnant that he v/as at one point declared out of order. The Indiana Republican v/as allov/ed to continue and final.ly concluded his polemic by declaring that Tydings v/ould soon receive a medal from Joseph Stalin with an inscrip- ,,115 tion, "Thanks from good old Joe for a job v/ell cone.

-^-^^Theodore F. Green Paners, iJcOarth'y Loyalty- Security File, National Archives, Library of Congiw:ss

•"-•^-•'•U.S., Congressional_Eecoi-d, 8]st Conyreee, 2d Sess., 1950, "98, Pt.U; p. loy^Ei; ^^5jbid., p. 10791. 171 Such a diatribe v/as uncalled for and demonstrated the kind of "shameful and nihilistic orgy," as Acheson termed it, to v.^hich the country was being subjected at that time.

Although editorial comm.ent on the Tydings report ^1, was generally favorable, there were som.e v/ho took a less favorable viev/. The strongest denunciation came from the Chicago Daily Tribune which attacked not only tho Tydings subcojranittee but the v/hoIe Nev/ Deal--Fair Deal era. The Editor of the VJashington Times Herald viev/ed the re­ port as a typical Democratic slight of hand. "VJhat else could v/e expect? This is the party of lies." It v/as concluded that the best v/ay to spot a Comimunist v/as to single out "those v/ho support the Tydings Report."" The Milv/aukee Journal praised the committee's work but concurred v/ith Senator Lodge in the need for a non- 11 9 partisan body to study the v/hole loyalty program. --^' The Editor of Christian Science Monitor expressed a similar view.-^-^^ The St. Louis Post Dispatch reported that the

Article, Chicago Dally Tribune, July 19, 1950, Democratic National Ccann:tte"e' Clipping rile, Truman Library. -^-'-'''u.S., Congressional Eecord, 8lst Congress, 2d Sess., 1950, "95, Tt. l67'pE lolao. ^-^Article, Mila/au>ee Jourwal, July l3, 1930, Democratic hatlonadi"'CoXidlddee"'drdpFrny 111-0, Truaan Library. "^"^^Article, OhjX.FXian Sci-enee_ Meat'tog, July 19, 1950, Democratic llatiohEr"Con3itteE"Cit'n;.-': ny Eilc, Trunan Lll^ rai-y.

»; 172 committee had performed a valuable service to the nation 3 20 by "blov/ing Senator McCarthy out of the v/ater. . . ." '

A wishful thought, no doubt, but far from, correct for

Harry TrujTian v/ould be forced to bear the cross of Joe

McCarthy for the remainder of his years in office.

The Tydings report represented at best an illusory

victory for the administration, but it nevertheless offered

Truman a fleeting opportunity to make a definite move to

recapture the initialive held by the conservatives since

the special session of 1948. The admiinistration rem.ained

inactive, hov/ever, seemingly paralyzed by the McCarthy

onslaught and the other cataclysmic events of 1950. Time

was indeed running out, as the Congress pressed ever

nearer toward the pa^ssage of an all-inclusive anti-

subversive bill.*

On March 21, 1950, the Senate Judiciaiy Coiamittee

favorably reported S. 2311 by a vote of 10 to 1. The

lone dissenting vote v/as cast by William Innger VOJO said

the bill "v/ould constitute the greatest threat to Amori- , 12"' can civil liberties since the Alien and Sedition ^-'•"^-'•.".. / ..-1 ''

The Editor of the Washington Post adavitted that the bill had been cleaned un a bit in ccea-d.ttee but "stii.l entails

-'-^^Article, ^. Loui s _Pqat_ Eiawateh, JnlyjLe, 19yC', Democratic National Ccenn.ttee"'C-iElaavan; rani.e, Truei: Library.

121Ne w Republic, March 27, 1930, p. 7 173 sv/eeplng and arbitrary invasions of American liber- 122 ties. ..." The Justice Department continued to voice objections to the bill on constitutional grounds."^^-^ In the midst of the debate on the bill, the United States v/as suddenly shaken on June 25, I95O, v/hen North Korean Communist troops swept across the 38th parallel into 124 South Korea. Truman's miom.entous decision to order United States Military forces to the aid of South Korea sharply increased the demand for Congressional action on the anti-subversive legislation. The Taft-led Minority Policy Committee of the Senate met shortly after the in­ vasion and demanded passage of the Mundt-Ferguson bill.' -^ Adm.inistration offici£ils took notice of the Repub­ lican demand and concluded that "Con.gress is in a mood to pass very drastic legislation indeed in the anti-sub­ version field." It was suggested that Senator Lucas be asked to lend his support for S. 595j tke bill i.ntroduced in 1949 by Tom Clark iilnus the v/lre-tan provision^ as a substitute for the Mundt-EerE-'Son bill. It v/as also sug­ gested that a provision be attached to S. 595.? or in the formi of a separate bill, v/hicE would provide for the

^^^VJashington Post, Anril 3, 1930. -•-^^bid., March 22, 1930.

1'^^Tirae, July 3, 1930, p. la.

125T .4:':. • , 174 registration of all subversive organizations, both right and left. The proposal was similar to the one made by the President's Civil Rights Cojmnission in 1947 and al- l?c luded to earlier in the memorandum from Clark Clifford. As the Mundt-Fergu.son bill gained favor through the latter part of July, it was observed in the Washing­ ton Post that Truman faced a most difficult political hurdle. The bill v/as favored by m.ost Republicans and a rather significant number of Democrats; a Presidential veto, it was noted, v/ould be difficult to defend politi- 127 cally. /Truman stated unequivocally, hov/ever, that "he v/ould veto any legislation such as the Mundt-Nixon bill which adopted police-state tactics and unduly en­ croached [sic] on individual rights, and he v/ould do so regardless of hov/ politically unpopular it v/as . . . elec- year or no election yea.r." The President soon had the opportunity to prove tha.t he meant v/hat he said.

1 Q'"^ Memorandum, To Murpliy, Da.wson, Elsey froai Spingarn, July 20, 1950, National Defense Eolder, Spingarn Papers, Truraan Library. -'-^^^VJashington Post, August I, 1950.

Memorandum, For the files on Internal Securit: from Spingarn on conversation with Iresldent ceneevaviny possible Presidential message to Congresa on suhneet of Internal Security, July 22,^1950, Eatioral Defoa.se Folder, Spingarn Papers, Trinaaa Library. ipp"

CHAPTER V "Congress . . . chose to go along v/ith the advo­ cates of extreme mieasures."

PASSAGE OF THE McCARRAN INTERNAL SECURITY ACT

The birth of the Mundt-Nixon bill in 1948 m.arked the beginning of a major effort on the part of certain mem­ bers v/ithin the Congress, notably Richard Nixon, Karl Mundt, Homer Ferguson, and, as of 1950, Pat McCarran, to enact into lav/ a major anti-subversive bill. Several reversals did not deter the group as legislation closely resembling the original Mundt-Nixon proposal v/as introduced in each succeeding session of Congress. The administration's con­ sistent response to such Congressional activity v/as: to denounce legislation of that type as un.constitutional and a threat to individual liberty, to insist that existing lav/s v/ere sufficient to deal v;ith the problcn of subversion, and to emphasize the positive aspects of the President's loyalty-security prograea. The Congressional hearings on CerrnnXan in August and September of 19^8 did much to weaken public confidence in the loyalty program, and strong]y hinted at the need for a review of the whole procedure. Althonyh o/'.nnnyi.ated, no such reviev/ v/as undertahen at th^t tnac. The aroriny hysteria in 19^9, the MeCarthy aa/ault in early 1930. ^n-

1'/ -'.

p^" 176 finally the outbreak of the Korean VJar in June 1950 all en­ hanced the chances for enactment of a Congressional anti- subversive bill and forced the administration (at last) to take some affirmative action in August 1950. It v/as, in retrospect, an ill-fated eleventh hour attempt.

V The increased tempo of Congressional activity in July 1950 had already prompted Spingarn and others to en­ courage the passage of S. 595 and a revised form of H.R. 10 as administration alternates to S. 23II, the Jiundt, Ferguson, Johnson bill, v/hich had been grov/ing in favor throughout the month of July. On August I, Judge Learned Hand, of the United States Court of Appeals in New York, upheld the 19^9 conviction of the eleven Coaramiist leaders. The Judge ruled the Coamiunist party to be a dangerous con­ spiracy v/hich did, in its operation, represent a ''clear and present danger" to the United States. Such a judicial stamp of approval on the 19^0 Smith Act added credibility to the administration's contention that the existir;g anti- subversive laws were sufficient to deal with any possi- bilitv of internal subversion. On August 8, arred with Judge Hand's decision, Tru­ man addressed the Congress on the subject of the pending

•'-lie;-or an dun. For Mnrehy. Eawson, and Elsey fiea Spingarn, July 20,'l9yO, Eational Eefenae Eoldar, Sniw Papers, Trn a.an Library. ^Timo, August l4, 1950, p. ii.. 177 anti-subversive bills and his ov/n recommendations for meet­ ing the security needs of the nation v/ithout unnecessarily violating the rights of individual citizens. The President initiated his address by re-stating his oft repeated asser­ tion that the most effective defense against Commiunism v/as to be found in a "functioning democracy v/hich succeeds in meeting the needs of the people." He adm-itted that strong government action v/as required to protect the nation against the possibility of subversion, but insisted that such action "must not be so broad as to restrict our liberty'- unneces­ sarily, for that v/ould defeat our own ends. Unv/ise or ex­ cessive security m^easures can strike at the freedom and dignity of the individual v/hlch are the very foundations of our society--and the defense of v/hich is the vd^ole pur­ pose of our security m.easures." Truman v/arned that proposals so broad and vague as to be dangerous v/ere at that moiaent pending before the Con­ gress and should be rejected. Ali that was needed, he said, to strengthen those statutes already in existence, was additional legislation. With that in mind, the Presi­ dent recomaiended laws (l) to exteaid the statute of lirn.- tations for peacetime espi.onage heyon^^ the current three year limit, (2) to require neraona vi'^o received ;^nstrua- tion fro^a foreign governnents in the technieues o:'^ or yion- age to register under the foreign agents i.'egiai?'al. on aev.. (3) to brc^aden authority for est'Ehvi?-vinr aeeur'ty 178 regulations for the protection of m.ilitary and national defense installations, and (4) to require aliens awaiting deportation to maintain contact v/ith the Justice Depart- 3 ment at all time. An editorial in the Washington Star praised Trunin for his refusal to be swept along in the v/ave of hysteria, and admired his appeal for reason and balance in meeting 4 the nation's security needs. The Washington Post referred to Truman's "statesmanlike m.essage" in v/hich, it was said, he had "grasped the great dilemma of our societj"--the dilemmia of protecting our liberties while safeguarding our 5 security. ..." The message indicated--according to the Chicago Sun Times--that "Harry S. Truman is all-Atiorican, on the first teaai v/ith Washington, Madison, and Jefferson." Meanv/hile, Senator McCarran, having blended a nu.m- ber of Congressional bills into one, introduced on August 7 10 his all-inclusive anti-subversive bill, S. 4037. Ihe McCarran act incorporated the aiost important provisions of

-^Presidential message to Congress, August 8, lEyO, 0F263, Truaw.n Papers, Truman Library. \rt:^cle, ^iashinaann Star, dxayaat 9. 1930, Eei.oerat National Committee Ciipaln:;^'!!j;e, Truanvn Library. y[?^3iEiton. 'Fozt_, August 9^ 1930. ^Artiole, Cnica-o Svni Times, Auyuat li , Ify^E Eaao- crat ic National Co3Eitl^e3 Clfn'ei ry ElJe, Trn:aa .i.:*era''y. '''u.S., Ccn'-E^essioanl }veeo-:^d, ol-t Coeyvnn.a, -^ ". c .- e

1950, 96, pt^ 9/p3'l2 •'J . 179 such bills as S. 23II, which contained the registration and publication provisions of the Mundt, Ferguson, and Nixon proposals, S. I832, McCarran's ov/n bill authorizing the Justice Department to bar from inmnlgration, or deport, a large variety of "subversive" aliens, S. 595, the Justice sponsored bill designed to tighten existing safeguards against espionage, H.R. 10, v/hich provided for detention of aliens av/aiting deoortation, and S. 3069, a bill to es- 8 tablish a new bureau of passports and visas. To combat such legislation and to facilitate the promotion of his own proposals, Truman named Charles Murphy to serve as his liaison betv/een the White House and Capitol Hill. On August II, Stephen Spingarn, acting in Murphy's absence, informed Senate Majority Leader Scott Lucas that there v^/as to be no com.promise on the "Mundt-Nixon bill-- that as a m.atter of high principle, he [Lucas] stand on the President's recoaimendations ov^en though he v/ere going to be defeated in trying to hold that line." Spingarn also discussed the matter v/ith others on the Hill inciwd- ing Harley Kilgore and John MeCormick. Assistant Attorney General Peyton Ford expressed a certain displeasure with the President's deteirlnation not to support any legislative proposals in t^-^e loyalty-aeeu:'it;.

^Con'-resslonal Quarterly Service, Caunyiwj^a r.nd t" e Nation: 19e5-1964 (Washington^ E. C: CLrgre:shenal Quainterly Service, 1985). P- -3an5- •r'-^S;

180

field other than v/hat he proposed in his August 8 message. » f Such a stand. Ford said, appeared inconsistent v/ith the President's previous indication that he v/ould not object to the drafting of a registration bill, by the Justice De­ partment, for Senator Lucas. The Assistant Attorney'- Gen­ eral was informed that the President had no objections to the drafting of such legislation, but it should be noted, Spingarn said, "that no such bill had any administration backing or approval. . . . The President told me to hold 9 the line on this matter. " A. later memorandum to Millard Tydings included the President's proposals and re- emphasized his feeling that there was no need for any addi- 10' tional legislation. The battle lines had been drann. Spingarn's messages and hurried trips betvreen the VJhite House and Capitol Hill represented a major part cf tho administration's effort to rally its forces for the impending showdovm. It was a

%emorandimi, For the Pile on iiXernal Security from Spingarn, on the subject of action to carry out the Presi­ dent's recommendations, August 8, IroO, Sni.ngarn^ Papers, Truman Library. In reyard to the nronoaed drafting of a registration tyee biJ.lT it should be reaiembered that Snin­ garn, as late as July 20, had suggeated the same type eili, supposedly with the President's support, The Cirev't^ Court decision upholding the co.avi.ct;han £ aainst ^the ^ e varan Coamiunists no doubt played a part i.n the ciiaaaee point o:' viev/. •"^^Moaior-anduja, For Tydiry'S fron Snirgai-n. Av^yuat In 1950, Internal Security Eolder, F]d ja rn / / e.' s . x.' c .n. Library. ^I8l noble effort, but at best belated, for the situation had needed such positive action for some time. Those inter­ ested members of Congress had been planning, coordinating, and revising their program for over tv^o years; it seemed improbable that the administration, as late as August 1950, could mount an effective counter-attack. Also, the evident lack of cooperation betv/een the various executive depart­ ments and the administration's supporters in Congress did not help.

On August 17, Senators VJarren Magnuson, Scott Lucas, Francis J. M^'-ers, Harley Kilgore, Estes Kefauver, Frank Graham, Theodore F. Green, Paul Douglas, Hubert Humphrey, and Herbert Lehman sponsored S. 4o6l, a bill v/hieh incor­ porated the President's earlier recommendations for strength- II ening the existing anti-subversive lav/s. Karl Mundt and others in the Congress v/ere quick to charge that the admin­ istration bill represented an open attennt to "water down" the stronger Congressional proposals for dealing v/ith in- 12 ternal Coimnunism. It rn'Odelittl e difference, for S. •'IO61 was submitted to the Senate Judiciary Coi.aaittee v/here Chairman McCarran quietly slipped it into a pi.geonhoie fron

•^•'"U.S., Congrossi onal._ Hece)rd, 8lst Congresa, 2d Se: 1950, 96, Pt. 93~V' 120933 "" •^^Articlo, Chicago Tribune, Augu/1 I8, 1930, Eaao- cratic National Coaa3ittG^e'"Cll^wla^g File, I'runan la Inn aa . 182 13 whence it v/ould never emerge. On that same day, August 17, the Judiciary Committee, by a vote of nine to three, favorably reported S. 4037j« or "that chamber of horrors" as it v\ras referred to by admin­ istration officials. The three dissenting votes were cast by Kilgore, Graham, and the Republican "radical" VJilliam Langer. Both Kilgore and Graham had been among the co- sponsors of the President's bill; another sponsor, VJarren Magnuson, surprisingly voted v/ith the majority. He stated his opinion that all bills dealing v/ith the problem of

security should at least be given hearing before the v/hole 14 Congress. The McCarran bill ran thirty-two pages in length and appeared at the outset to represent so-aething in the nature of an ad.mlnistrative monstrosity. As indicated earlier, it was an all inclusive omnibus bill which in­ corporated provisions from, m.any other pieces of anti- subversive legislation. One of the most significant parts of the proposal provided for the creation of a five-man Subversive Activities Control Hoard vdiich would be ea;poi:erei

^Cabell Phillips, ]driayTjynarrJFd^es^dde^^^ r' - * r-. of a Triwmrlianl^ ^acce^ '^de ih:ea>iiian dr., 19o6")7'p3"375. Meraorandimi, I'or the Eile from Spi.nc;arn, on arXiee of McCarran "blockbuster" Internal Security id Mi , Av-;awt 17, 1950, National Defense Eoi.der, Sn:^nya:ri Fayera, Tnnnn Library. ppw

'• 183

to classify any group of individuals as belonging to one of two types of Comraunist organizations. 1. A Communist-action orgaiaization which was de­ fined as any group controlled by a foreign governraent or a foreign organization such as the Com.intern. 2. A Communist-front organization was defined as "any organization in the United States v/hich (A) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by a Comm-iunist-actio.n organization,. and (B) is primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to a Cormaunist-a'ction organization, a Conraunist foreign government, or the vi/orld Communist miovement. "-^5

Under such vague criteria, almost any organization, regardless of its intent, might well have been designated as subversive. Who, for exairiple, could have ever derived • a precise m.eaning for tha phrase "substantially directed ... by a Coimaunist-action organization?" There had been charges made in the past that such registration procedure would, in effect, outlav/ the Coaaan.iist Party in the Unite^^ States. The contention vras ea'on more be"J.lovable after th.e Circuit Court decision v/hich unheid the conviction of the eleven Communist leaders. Indeed, it vrould appear that the whole schoiae vras to require registration of a pa^li.euJ.rr organization and then charge it with a violation of the 16 Smith act. The adan.nistrati on continued to hole;

•^^Zecharlah Chafee, Jr., Tne Ei.esa'nya C' (J. B. Lipoincott Co., lyhh), nnV'll^llhiE 16 Phillips, Toe Tvn-an }reaidene:w y. J \ • • 184 stubbornly to its belief that there v/ere already sufficient lav/s in the anti-subversive field; the addition of the McCarran suggestions, it v/as said, v/ould only confuse mat- 17 ters. The search for supporters of that point of viev/ intensified.

J. V. Fitzgerald, in am August l8 memorandum, re­ marked v/hat a "big boost'' the President's recommendations would receive if J. Edgar Hoover spoke out v/ith a strong 18 public endorsement. Four days later Spingarn m.ade such a request of Hoover, and asserted that a statement of sup­ port by the FBI Director "might contribute notably to un­ snarling the unholy mess which has developed v/ith respect to all this internal security legislation. No such en­ dorsement v/as ever made. Hoover chose to remain silent. On August 21, Spingarn dispatched a letter to At­ torney Joseph E. Rosen, a meadoer of the Board of Governors of the National Counter Intelligenee Cores Association. Included in the letter were copies of the President's mes­ sage of August 8 and the Senate bill incorporating his

File of exi.sting laws reJ.ating to the natioiial Security, and their recent enforcanent, Auyust l8, 19yO, Internal^Securlty Eolder, Sningarn Eapers, Truvian Eihrary. I8 •Meaiorandun, For Steeiv'ao- ---;--Vn. i---r-rr- ro: E11''<'0v0? 1. Auyu.st I8, 1-950, Internal Security Eolder, Fntny- rn Fanara, Truma n Li b rary. •^%:e;noranduai, For J. Edgar Eoo-aer f-^-an Sn.'ngarn. August 22, 1950, Internal Seeur'ty Eolder, Snia.yarn latere Truiti a n Li b r a ry. 1.85. requests of that date. Spingarn indicated that a public statement of support of the President's recommendations, by the Board of Governors of the CIO, v/ould be of substan­ tial help in discrediting the ''super-patriots and headline hunters v/ho really don't care a continental about an^^thing but their ov/n personal advancem.ent. " A similar letter had been sent to Stanley M. Goodrich, a former counter intelligence agent, v/ho v/as requested, if he agreed with the President, to write letters to Senators Margaret Chase Smith, Robert Taft, Pat McCarran, and Representative

Joseph Martin expressing his support for the administration 21 bill, S. 4o6l. The increase in such correspondence evi­ denced a rather earnest attempt on th.e part of the adalnis- tration to build sorae base of support for the President's recommendations. Truman's viev/ received a moriontary boast on Augnat 21 v/hen Paul H. Jensen, a staunch Republican and foit'Or wartime counter-intelligence officeiy. th.orougnly denounced both the Mundt-Ferguson and McCarran acts during trie course of a radio interviev/. He characterized both as "anateurlsri attempts at counter-intelligence desig'ied to catch head­ lines but not soles." Jensen concluded the interview n'Xd

^^Letter, To Joaenh E. Rosen fron diXnyarn. A-yuat 21, 1950, Internal Security Eolder, Sy;*ny^.]ei Faycra, truman Library. ^-""Letter, To Stanley M, GooE-*eh fron Sn'nya-a. .--gus 18, 1950, Internal Security EoJ.der, Fr'nya)n Ivaai-a, Tixaaen Library. 186 22 an endorsem.ent of the administration bill. The President was zealously promoting his own cause. On numerous occasions he had compared the clim.ate of opinion in 1949-I950 to the period leading to the passage of the first Alien and Sedition Acts. In the summer of 1950, Truman requested that a "Study of VJitch Hunting and Hysteria in the United States" be prepared in order to illustrate the comparison. In late August, he submitted the completed work to Alben Barkley, Sam Rayburn, Scott Lucas, and John MeCormick v/ith the hope that it v/ould per- 23 haps sv/ay a ntunber of opinions. - VJith the McCarran bill continting to gain supporters, there v/as certainly no indi­ cation that it did. The administration forces, although making a good fight, v/ere evidently av/are that their cause v/as hopeless. A statement from Spingarn, taken from a letter to General Landry, is indicative. "The outlook is very gloom.y. It looks as if the President's recommendations v/ill be badly licked and we are in for a I950 version of the Alien and oZi. Sedition laws of I798."" Truman's military aide. General

Views of Paul H. Jenson on effective legislation to deal with Coamunism, August 22, 1930, Internal SecuriLy Folder, Sningarn Papers, Truraan Eihrary. ^%emorandum. For Earkley, Rayburn, Lueas, >'.-'"EeO' e -• -I r- ..' from President, August 28, 1950, internal Security Eolder. Spingarn Papers, Truman Library. ^'Memorandum, For General Landry from SpEigarn. August 24, 1950, Interna^l Security Eoldein Syinyarn P: nerr Truman Library. 187 Harry H. Vaughn, expressed precisely the same view.^^ The contest did not abate, hov/ever, as Truman continued to ?6 threaten a veto of any measure such as S. 4037. ' McCarran asserted that the President v/ould not have "the temerity" 27 to veto such a bill; ' the Nevada Democrat doubtless knevA/ better. The climate of opinion in the .late summer of 1950 seemed to demand some kind of drastic action. The old "Curmudgeon" Harold L. Ickes in a September 2 letter to Theodore F. Green commented on such times. "The moral 28 climate seems to me to be getting v/orse and v/orse."' It was, indeed, for the^hysterical fear of internal Communist activity had grov/n to the point at v/hich it seemed quite probable that the American people v/ould readily accept any measure, no matter how restrictive, so long as it struck a mighty blov/ against the hated Reds. Hundreds of letters in the President's correspondence file expressed that senti­ ment all too clearly. The following excerpt from average citizen Lee Mansfield's letter to Truanan, dated Sentei.iaer

^^Letter, To Captain Watson Mller fre-i Vaughn, August 25, 1950, Internal Security Eolder, Spingarii Paners, Truman Library. ^^The Nation, September 2, 1950, p. 202. ^'^Article, lilyjlinaton Star, Septemher 6, 1530, Eeno- cratic National Committee Cldndiddy Eile, Truaan Li\-rary. Letter, To Green froai Ickes, Septe;aixw 2, j^hO, McCarthy File, Theodore F. Green Eaners, ihticnal fa-chiv.:-^. 188

7, 1950, serves as an example. I think it should be made a national lav/ that any­ body that even thinks of Communism should be strung up by their neck until dead. ... If you are the honorable man I think you are, you will feel the same tov/ard Comjnunism as I do, or any clear think­ ing American citizen.^9

Such public demand for action v/as no doubt one of the factors that convinced a number of Truman's supporters in Congress that some drastic move on the part of the ad­ ministration v/as urgently required to stop the McCarran steamroller. That feeling led to the presentation of an extraordinary, and certainly drastic, proposal at a VJhite House m.eeting on September 6. Senators Kilgore, Douglas, Graham, Humphrey, Lehrian, Kefauver, and Anderson proposed, at the meeting, to intro­ duce an "em.ergency detention" amendr.ent v/hich "vrould pro­ vide for the interninent of persons believed like-ly to com­ mit acts of espionage or sabotage. . . . The autfnority thus conferred v/ould coa-e into effect in time of v/:"^r. . . . '' The seven Senators informed Tru:aan that such a move, to be offered as a substitute for all or part of S. ^'037, preaented the only possibility of overtaking the McCarran lead. Tru­ man "told them to go ahead and make the laove aec he would reserve judgement on their proposal uaaLil the bill reached

PO . - . 7, 1950,-"letter OE2750C., T oI'ruma Presidenn Paperst frev, Trunai loen ihn^shiera I •ercry , 189 30 hjj.^." On the same day, September 6, the Kilgore bill, S. 4130, was introduced in the United States Senate.^"^ VJhat v/ould prompt seven supposedly liberal Senators to propose such an extreme m.easure, and one that appeared on the surface to be at least as undesirable as the one they v/ere trying to offset? Those men v/ere certainly not antagonistic toward American ideals of fair play, nor was there any reason to suppose that they v^ere simply caught up in the reactionary clim.ate of the time. It v/ould not seem unreasonable to suggest, as an explanation for their action, that the Senators viev/ed their proposal as an emer­ gency measure, aim.ed specifically at hard core subversives, saboteurs and the like, and one that v/ould never be imple­ mented except in time of the most eactrome national emer­ gency. They may have also presum.ed, and perhaps correctly so, that in the eveiit of such an e.nergency, the government v/ould exercise arbitrary powers v/ith or v/ithout legislative sanction. Certainly Lincoln's assumption of extraordinary powers during the Civil Ear eneryerLcy might well have served as a precedent for such .feelings.

On the other hand it was felt that the McCarran hill, which the Kilgore group teraied a "blunderbuas, " would offer

30].iemoranduai, For Internal Security Eile fron Elaey, September 6, 1950, Internal Securit:^ rile, Elsey Eeneia, Trtmian Iii. b I'a ry. ^•"•U.S., Oonpniespi.oyial Jleerna, 8lst Congreaa, -d Seva 1950, 96, Pt. 10, p3 14229; "

jm' 190 little real security, and would undoubtedly lead to serious 32 violations of individual liberties. The basic under­ lying assumption, of course, was based on the belief that the Kilgore bill, if enacted into law, would be enforced with discretion while the McCarran bill would not. Humph­ rey, Lehman, ejt al., although their proposal was submitted in good faith, might v/ell have heeded the v/ords of one of their ov/n, Estes Kefauver, v/hen he spoke out in opposition to the McCarran bill. I think that in considering a bill of this kind v/e have got to consider the uses v/hich might be at­ tempted to be made of it by someone v/ho did not have regard for constitutional privileges and for the Bill of Rip:hts.33 •CJ'- The same words might also have been said for any bill de­ signed to incarcerate American citizens vrlthout due process of law. The strategy em.ployed by the Senatorial group in- volved the substitution of the Kilgore bill, S. ^130, for all of the McCarran bill or the substitution of th.e deten­ tion proposal, in the form of an amendment, for the regis­ tration section of S. 4037. Title I of the Kilgore bill incorporated the President's recoariendations already em­ bodied in S. 4o6l, v/hich remained in the Judiciary Co:::;ltte£

3^U.S., Congr£Ssiorw 1 Eed'oaE. 8lst Congress, 2d Seas.. 1950, 96, Pt. 10, p. 144.19. 33u.S., Congressional TXeyanX., 8lat Oongveas, 2d Se/s., 1950, 96, Pt. 10, p; 14239"3 "•" 191

Title II provided for the arrest and detention of "danger- ous" Communists during the time of an internal security emergency. The President would be empowered to call such an emergency in the event of an invasion or the threat of imminent invasion, a declaration of v/ar by the United States, an insurrection in aid of a foreign enemy, or a declaration of an internal security emergency by a concur- rent resolution of Congress.-^

Senator Paul Douglas, speaking in favor of the Kil­ gore bill, insisted that S. 4l30 addressed itself to the substance and not the shadov/ of internal subversion, while at the same time providing adequate protection for the rights of the individual. Douglas included an editorial from the V.Tashington Post v/hich certainly did not favor the Kilgore bill but found it preferable to the McCarran al­ ternative. There is no use blinking at the fact that this bill [Kilgore] contemplates the creation of concentra­ tion camps. . . '. It is legislation of a most dras­ tic character, never before enacted or even seri­ ously contemplated in the United States. . . . Nevertheless^ the proposal seems to us markedly preferable to the McCarran measure.80 Thus by September I95O m.atters had reached the point at which seemingly the only choice was. to determine tiie lesser

3^U.S., Congi'ossional Reoo2"e, 8lst Congresa, o.^ ea eQ. .' 1950, 96, Pt. 11, pd'T^^xnir """ 35 Ibid., p. 1^1^116. of tv/o evils. The debates on the McCarran and Kilgore bills pre­ sented a most interesting study in paradox as liberals and conservatives appeared to change positions dramatically; the liberals adopted the tougher line and the conservatives assumed the role of defenders of the Constitution. Humph­ rey, Lehman, and others pictured the McCar?"an bill as com­ pletely unv/orkable--"a political palliative," as Humphrey termed it--and one that would not accom.plish its stated purpose. The Kilgore proposal, Humphrey said, would allovs' the government to seize dangerous subversives immediately.- "The FBI knov/s v/here they are," and "can pick them up like 37 that" [with a snap of the fingers].-^' The McCarran-Mundt group at first viev/ed the deten­ tion camp proposal as an attempt on the part of the admiin­ istration to delude the American people into thinking that it v/as interested in doing something about Communism.^ The samic group v/ould later declare the Kilgore bill as not only unconstitutional but un-American as well, and a threat to individual liberties. A Karl Mundt stateaient adequately summarizes the conservative argument against the Kilgore proposal.

^^Ibid ., p. 1^''20. ^'^IbJ^d., p. 14487. ^^Article, v:as]iijir3on Tines Eerald, Sentaad^er 10, 1950, Democratic N3"ti6naE~CE33;i-3L.ee' CJ inning Eile, ITU -- 11 Library. 193

While I sincerely welcome the support of the Kil­ gore group in trying to do something about Com­ munism . . . let us not tear the Constitution to shreds; let us not out-Hitler Hitler; let us not out-Stalin Stalin; let us not establish Concentra­ tion camps in America. . . .39

There was more political maneuvering yet to come. On August 12, Senate Eh jority Leader Scott Lucas offered the detention camp proposal as a substitute for the registration section of the McCarran measure. Lucas admitted that there was a need for som.e anti-Red bill, in viev/ of the Korean em_ergency, but recorded his disapproval of the registration provisions in S. 4037. Homer Fergu­ son asserted that the Lucas proposal marked "the first time in the history of America that an attempt had been made in the Congress to infringe the Constitutional rights of Citi- n4l zens. The Lucas am.endment v.'as subsequently rejected by 42 a vote of 45 to 29. Lucas i.omediately, in a soa.ewhat strange move, of­ fered a second amendment, the same as the first, but this time as an addition to the McCarran bill. MeOarran argued strongly against such an addendUJ;I on the gro-nds that it would serve only to furnish the President with an excuae to

39u.S., Con£resji£nal_J^ece'rd, 8lst Congress, 2d Seas 1950, 96, Pt. IT, p. i^'Tdo; b-O Ibid., p. U'585. ^^'""-Ibid., p. 14585. ^^^Ibid., p. 1^1587. 194 43 veto the bill. The second amendment v/as also rejected but by the much slimmer margin of 37 to 35. At that point in the proceedings, Harley Ki.lgore offered his bill as a substitute for the v/hole of the McCarran bill. After a short period cf debate, v/hich ranged along the same lines as that presented during the discussions relative to the Lucas amendments, the Kilgore substitute bill, S. 4l07, v/as rejected by a vote of 50 to 45 23. .The Congress was apparently receptive to any amend­ ment that might strengthen the bill, such as the second Lucas proposal, but v/as quite adamant in its determination not to accept any substitute that v/ould v/eaken the legisla­ tion. Still FiOre surprises occurred v/hen the detention proposal was presented a fourth time. VJithin a matter of hours after the rejection of S. 4130, Senator McCarran offered a detention am.endment to his ov/n bill, an amendment which he claimed had been purged of the unconstitutional features contained in the Kilgore proposal. The McCarran amendment by not providing for sus­ pension of habeas corpus, v/as, in fact, a somcvdnat watered- i[6 down version. It carried by a voice vote.

^^Ibid., pp. 1^1587-1^593. ^^^'ibid., p. l459^i. ^^Ibid., p. Ih606. ^^^Ibid., p. I-^!623.

t IV vi 195 With the final vote on the McCarran omnibus bill nearing. Senator Herbert Lehman, one of the few presiden­ tial supporters who remained consistent throughout those strange proceedings, offered the following comiment. "I am going to vote against this tragic, this unfortunate, this ill-conceived legislation. My conscience vlIl be easier, though I realize mjy political prospects will be ,,47 more difficult. kith Lehman's v/ords unheard, the Senate overwhelmingly passed H.R. 9490, which contained the some language as the Senate bill, by a vote of 70 to 7. McCar­ ran insisted on retention of the Senate's amendmients and issued the call for a conference v/ith the House. hP The roll call vote on S. 4037 presented some rather interesting comparisons. Of the seven Senators v/ho voted against the act, only Kefauver, Leh/nan, Green, and Graham had active.ly supported the President's rec orrnenda tions. Conspicuous among the seventy who favored the bill v/ere Harley Kilgore, Paul Douglas, Scott Lucas, and Hubert 49 Humphrey, all supporters of the administration. Senator Humphrey's yea, v:hen compared to his conments the day be­ fore, was an early instance of his tendency to buckle un­ der pressure.

^"^Ibid., p. 14627. Ibid . , p. ldo.-o. 196 The Congress of the United States v/ill regret the day it ever passes S. 4037. It v/ill prove to be one of the darkest pages in American history.^0

The preceding v/as indicative of the bewildering state of affairs that attended passage of the McCarran act, and most certainly illustrated the confused and uncoordinated efforts on the part of the administration to block the bill. The right hand, it v/ould appear, was not quite sure v/hat the left hand v/as doing.

On September l4, the House of Representatives, by a vote of 324 to 8, agreed to a resolution to app.oint a conference committee to resolve the differences betv/een the House and Senate versions of the internal security act. Representative Sabath voiced a hope that the conference committee might still substitute the Kilgore bill but con­ cluded that such v/as improbable. He did call on the com­ mittee to try very hard to corae up with a bill the Presi­ dent would sign. Representatives Rankin and Rees pleaded 51 for agreement on a strong bill as quickly as possible. The House and Senate conference committee suh::iitted its report on September 20. Although the covaalttee did make a few significant changes, the bill remained generally in­ tact. It eliminated the possibility of having an "emer­ gency" declar-ed by a joint resolution of Congreas plus a

5*^T/ov^r;-peNewsvreehh ,. SeptembeSenhrmher 252'-. ; IfhOl-'^hO,, nere . 3-^-l> ^•'u.S., CoiWE'ase^onal_ Eeecn-S 8lst C rvr'--''eaa . 2c, 1950, 96, Pt. ' 11 , " pp .* VXX'd- FXox:^ d~ ippr •

197

Presidential proclamation, and a provision which placed a three-year time limit on the act; stiffer criminal penal­ ties were also imposed.^ The Senate agreed to the report CO by a roll call vote of 57-7; the House concurred by a 54 margin of 313-20.-^ In the debate on the report. Senator Spessard L. Holland of Florida viewed the final version of the bill as "the product of more than two years of the hardest kind of v/ork. . . . "^^ The passage of the Wood-McCarran Act v/as indeed the culmination of a long and persistent effort on the part of Congressional conservatives to enact a major anti-subversive lav/--an effort v/hich dated back at least to the introduction of the Mundt-Nixon bill in March 19^(8. In a last minute flurry of action, the Trur.rian adr.iinistration had attempted to head it off, but the effort v/as far too little and mnichi too late. Kilgore later concluded that the President never really had a chance.

^^Arthur Sutherland, '3^reedoai and internal Security," Harvard La.w Revievn 64 (January, Ifyi-). P- 395. This ar- ticle'contalna ona of the best contenyory evaluations of the McCarran Act--from a legal point of view. ^^U.S., Congressional Eee'ElEi^ 8lst Congress, 2d Sess., 1950, 96, Pt. 11, p. "HlhoO. '"" ^^Ibld., p. 15297. ^^Ibid., p. 15250. 198

Many Democrats who opposed McCarran's bill said they had to vote for it because they were up for re-election in the fall and would be falsely charged v/ith being pro-Comimunist. Even Scott Lucas . . . was frightened to death and said he would vote for it in order to be re-elected.56

Truman, repeatedly asserted that he would veto any legislation not in accord v/ith the Bill of Rights, and he left little doubt that he considered the McCarran Act in that catego.ry. At his press conference on the fourteenth, however, the President indicated that at that moment he could not say v/hether or not he v/ould veto the bill. Such v/as interpreted as a v/eakening of his previous position and led to a number of hurried calls to the VJhite House, most notably from the tv/enty Representatives and seven Senators v/ho had risked their uolitical lives in voting against the bill, and Senator Huaiphrey. They were informed that the President as yet had not changed his position and that he v/as v/aiting for the conference C0:miittee to comolete its work before maklna a final deten-iination.

On the sixteenth, Truman received a ten tative reooi't iroa the coamiittee; from that meaient he anna3are d to have his mind set on a veto 57

56 Quoted in Alfred Stei/nrarg, a V'O:^ O 1^ '^11 1 • The Life and Times of Harry Sj_y'^ddnX ('-''• ^•^' QF Putnam's Sons, 19^2j, p.'34l3 ^'^Memorandimi, For the Eile from S , Chrcnoi.cg of events on veto of VJood-McCarj' '-•} Internal Security Folder, Spingarn Eanana, rn an Li in^ary . 199 On the tv/entieth Truman received a letter from Lehman, Kefauver, and Murray. The three Senators voiced concern that the McCarran Act would create mora problem.s than it would solve. "V7e are convinced that you with your fine feeling for the liberties and also the securitv of our country, knov/ the dangers better than v/e." They urged the President to veto the Wood-McCarran Act and at the same time to announce the appointment of a comjnission to study the v/hole problem of internal security.-^8 other lead­ ing Democrats such as Sam Rayburn and Alben Barkley, both no doubt frightened over the political consequences of a veto, strongly urged Truman to sign the bill. The Presi­ dent replied that he could not, in good conscience, add his name to such a law.5 9 With the prospect of a Presidential veto immiinent, Spingarn prepared a memorandum on Septeraber 20 entitled "Political and moral reasons for a Presidential veto of the VJood-McCarran Anti-Subversive bill." Spingarn main­ tained that a veto v/as doubtless preferable from a long range, 1952, political view. The President would receive little credit for signing such a bill and if he did, would most assuredly be charged v/itii bowing to Congressional

^Letter, To President from Eohnan, Kefauver, and Murry, Septer:ber 20, 1950, Internal Security lolder, Snin­ garn Papers, Trom.an Library. ^%emorandum. For the Eile fron Snligarn, Chreneioay of events on veto, Septemdeer 25, 1930, .internal hecur. ty Polder, Spingarn Papers, Truaan Idtrary.

%^<: 200 pressure. In addition, a Presidential approval v/ould alienate and conceivably drive the liberals into a third party. If the veto v/as upheld, the President would be vindicated at once; if the veto was overridden, a Consti­ tutional test of the law might be accomiplished before 1952 which, it v/as felt, v/ould expose the unconstitutional fea­ tures of the act, justify the veto, and pave the v/ay for a more sensible bill. It v/as also pointed cut that Truman, in viev/ of his past statements, could hardly justify sign­ ing the bill regardless of the consequences. Spingarn also noted that "the signing of the bill would represent an action of moral appeasement on a matter of highest principle." It vaas infinitely better, he said, to take a stand when the first m.oral aggression occurred. If not, it v/ould surely prepare thiO v/ay for other such transgressions. In conclusion, Spingarn concurred vaith those v/ho had proposed that the President include in his veto m.essage an announcem.ent of his intention to appoint a commission of distinguished citizens for the pu:^pose cf reviewing the i.oyalty-secuvlty nroyraan The announcement of such a conmisslon vrould not only be extremely helpful in securing the votes reeaii-ed to uphold a^eto", but it would provide a strong basis for the reconsideration oi" this tyne oF leg'a- lation in the next session . . . and v/ould . . . - r: r- r • - >', put the initiapve into the hands O" .J . ^ ^ Cv ...... tration. . . .^^

^^Meriorandun, For the Eile fi-ea Sninyein, 'lel't'ea and moral reasons for veto," Inte/aiaj. Seeua."iy Eolde-n Sningai'i-i Faaaera, Trumao Id.irv.ryn 201

The approved conference bill reached the White

House early in the afternoon of the tv/enty-first. After rejecting three drafts of a proposed veto miessage Truman added his comments to a fourth and returned it for revi­ sion. The fifth and final draft, incorporating the Presi­ dent's suggestions, v/as discussed at a cabinet meeting the follov/ing morning. Truma.n requested that the finished copy of the message be double-spaced for easier reading.

In a cover sheet on each copy he urged the members of Con­ gress to read and consider carefully the message. Such an unprecedented move, Spingarn concluded, "v/as an indica­ tion of the deep conviction of the President on this sub­ ject. "

The veto v/as delivered to the House of Representa­ tives at 4:00 P. M. on Friday, September 22. Despite the

President's plea for consideration, the House, v/ithout de­ bate, voted 286-48 to override. However, a momentary delay in Senate action provided the ad';lnistration v/ith one last desperate opportunity to forestall passage of the

Act.

Late in the evening on the w/enty-seeond, Trunan contacted Hubert Humphrey, who confessed to a change of mind since his vote for S. 4037 on Seotenber 12, anh e-Eed the freshman Senator to lead the fight to sustain the veto

6ITU-^ ^ ID.'.a. 202 in the Senate. The hastily prepared strategy called for

a filibuster by Humphrey, Douglas, Lehman, and Langer, v/ith

the expectation that such a delay might prevent Senate ac­

tion before the scheduled adjournm.ent of Congress at mid­

night on the tv/enty-third. There v/as also a lingering hope

that a delay in the Senate vote v/ould afford time to build

up public support against the bill. The latter, however,

constituted little more than v/ishful thinking.

The Senate remiained in sessico throughout the night

as the Senators meticulously poured over each and every

point in the President's message. At 5*. 30 A. M., William

Langer, as a result of the strain from the all-night en­

counter, collapsed and v/as rushed to the hospital. Humphrey

and the others carried on tv/enty-tv/o hours, until 2:30 P. M.,

at v.^hich tim.e the President released them from any further

obligation. At 4:00 P. M., on September 23- 1950, the 62 Senate voted 57-10 to override the veto. Truman's nine-page message deserved aiore attention

than either house of Congress apparently gave it. The

following principal objections emerged from the President's

point-by-pcint critique:

I. It v/ould aid potential enemies by requirmig the publication of a cerplcte list of vital military and national defense faeii:'. 2. It would require the Eeyanh.ient od and the FHl to v;aste vital time and cjieri

^^Phillips. The Trunni laxaideaioy, u 203 In an attempt to carry out its unworkable registration provisions.

3. It would deprive the United States of the assistance of many aliens in intelligence matters.

4. It would antagonize friendly governmients. 5. It v/ould place the government of the United States in the business of thought control. 6. It would make it easier for subversive aliens to becom.e naturalized citizens. The main thrust of Truman's objections, hov/ever, v/as his contention that the bill, in actual operation, would have the opposite results of those intended; it would, in essence, aid rather than hamper subversive ac- tivity by driving the Cor.amunist partj^ underground. Tru­ man's argwaents v/ere persuasive, a fact attested to by many who opposed him. But, it v/as election timie, and many who might otherwise have voted v/ith thie President v/ould not risk their political future. Political exoediency seem- ingly took precedence over integrity on that particular day in Congress. Press opinion on the veto v/as divided. The Cin­ cinnati Tim.es Star of September 23 contained an editoria? which thoroughly denounced the President's action. The Editor concluded that Trunan had decided to oppose tlie bill

63See Appendix IV. It should be noted that Truaan objected to the detention proposal becauae it did not :ne- vide for suspension of the writ of FaXeca Corpus. Cn^that point, see Sutherland "Erecdoai anad Irtvr.ial Seeui'itvn'' pp. 395-396.

-w ^ 204 rather than admit--by signing it--that his administration 64 had been soft tov/ard the Communists. An editorial in the Washington Star admitted that the new Internal Security act contained m.any errors, but. reasoned that the administration's refusal to do anything constructive about the threat of internal Comraunism had forced the Congress to take drastic action.6 -3^ The usually hostile Chicago Tribune concluded that the veto furnished conclusive evidence that the Truman administration had be- 66 come captive of the Coimnunists. Nev7 York Times columnist Arthur Knock stated that Truman had been soundly defeated because it v/as a knov/n fact that his administration had been lax in keeping sub­ versives out of government, and because some of the most violent protests against tho bill had cone from "pinkos." ' ^ New York Times editorial writer, however, described the veto as "an act of genuine courage. ..."

6h Article, Cinciniliti Tines_Sta_r, -Septeaiber 23, 1950, Democratic National Lennlttee Clipping Eile, Trua-an Library. ^^Article, V/a^tidngton_S1-r, Septemher 24, 1930, Democratic NationaX Coa3iitteo Clipning Eile, Trunan ir.hr8i-y. ^^Article, Ch^xrago^Trilaa-e, October fO, 1950, Eeno- cratic Natioiial Coainittee t;linning Eile, Tnu-:n jdorary. ^New York Tines, Sentealer 26, 1950. ^^Ibid., September 25, :i930. 205

There was praise from other quarters. Ralph Ed­ wards, a wartime counter-espionage agent, congratulated the President for his stand against a bill v/hich, Edwards said, would prove totally inadequate in protecting the nation's security and more seriously vrould jeopardize basic 69 American rights. One of the more thoughtful and bal­ anced evaluations of the Truman veto v/as contained in an article in the October 7 issue of America, a Catholic weekly. Mr. Trttman's veto message may be open to qiiestion on a number of the points he raises. What is not open to question is the spirit that prompted the veto. ... He was stressing a firm confidence in our free institutions, in their pov/er to drav/ upon their ov/n internal resources to meet and defeat totalitarianism v/ithout yielding to the totalitarian seduction.'^^ There vv'as certainly no reason to doubt either the President's motives or his courage. Truman felt that the McCarran bill, phrased in such broad and loose teia-s, would prove more of a hindrance than a help. The veto v/as an honest expression of that feeling and represented one of the heroic acts of Tnnaan's political career. The President could have killed the McCarran act with a pocket

f,o -"Memoranduri, For Murnhy_from Sningarn, RenarFa hy Ralph Edv/ards, September 29, 19oO, OE2750a, Tramaa: Eapercy Truman Li b ra ry. ''^Slemorandum, For Record fro::i Spingarn, Artio'e Fy Father Keenan, Octoher 9, 1930, inte^rnil Seeuri.t, I'oldcnn Spingarn Papains, T.ritnan Library. 206 veto, but instead he chose to voice his objections. Such outspoken Presidential disapproval, even though it failed to achieve its purpose, was nevertheless important because it offered strength to others v/ho opposed restilctive legis- lation.

VJhat must be open to question, hov/ever, v/as the Truman leadership in the months preceding the passage of the Internal Security Act. Many suggestions had been of­ fered for combatting the Congressional trend toward such repressive legislation; a number of bills had been proposed as administration alternates, and numerous individuals in and out of government had suggested a possible Commission to review loyalty procedures. But, no substantial action was initiated on any of those proposals. Even had some alternative been proposed, there v/as no certainty that it would have altered the situation, although the likelihood is strong that it v/ould have. As Clifford had stated in April 1949, it was alv/ays difficult to beat something with nothing. In essence, the administration offered just that-' nothing--until it v/as much too late. Samuel Lubell was perhaps correct when he characterized the Tru:.^an adminis­ tration as "the draraa of a man fighting stubbornly and,

^-^•Richard P. Longaker, T/ia Evng^ideney any r ,'! "; r ual Liberties (Ithaca, New Yorkr""'Cb:aaMl] iJnlveralty 1951), p. 50. 207 72 yet, courageously to avoid decision." Truman was vindicated to an extent v.^hen the Act proved to be as unenforceable as he had predicted it v/ould be. The passage of such legislation, as again the Presi­ dent had- v/arned, encouraged m.any state and local govern­ ments to enact similar lav/s. One such lav/ in Nev/ Rochelle, New York led to the follov/ing report. Under a local 'little McCarran' lav/. Communists living in or passing through Nev/ Rochelle, N. Y. v/ere ordered to register by maldnight, Sept. 28. Midnight passed in suburban Nov/ Rochelle vjith only one registration: an elderly, civic-minded Re­ publican who thought the regulation v/as for 'com­ muters. '^^8

The attempt to enforce such a registration lav/ in the state of Maryland--the Ober Act--prompted the follov/ing headline in a Baltim.ore nev/spaper: "Ober Act Catch: Three Quakers No Communists." There v/ere other less humorous circum.stances sur­ rounding the 1950 Internal Security Act. The seeming in­ ability to fathoai the m.eaning of thie act's provisions contributed, from the first, to the persistent charge that such a law was in fact "helping the cauae it intends to

72 Samuel Lubell, Tiie Future _of American Eolitiea (2d ed.: Garden Citv, New'YorkE "EbilEEoay i. Co., lyyF), p. 24. Memoranduai for the Eile fro-i Sning'W']!, Oetoher 5, 1950, Internal Security Eoldar, Sarnigarn E^:pera, Trunan. Library. 7A ' 'Ibid. 208 75 harm." The Washington Post concluded that forming regu­ lations to fit such "cockeyed nonsense" posed a near hope- 7f\ less task for State Department officials;- the Chicago Sun Times suggested that the law should have been termed 77 "an act for the Eternal Stupidity of Pat McCarran.' There v/as also evidence of ineotitude in the en- forcement of certain provisions of the act, especially those involving iimnigration restrictions. On October 23, it v/as reported that Friedrich Gulda, an Austrian pianist, and Fedora Barbieri, an Italian mezzo-soprano, had been detained on Ellis Island due to past connections with Fascist groups. Gulda had been forced, at the age of ten. to join a Hitler youth organization; Barbieri had attended a Fascist school, as all Italian children were expected to 78 do. Such literal interpretations of the lav/--if con­ tinued--v/ould have had the effect of barring entrance to alraost anyone v/ho had ever lived under a one-party . 79 regimie.

'^^The Christian Century, October l8, 1950, p. 1219. VJashington Post, Octoher 20, 1950. '^'^Article, Chicago d>en Tinaee_.. Octoter 22, 1930, Democratic National CcEa.-.Htee'~E3naoning Ei.le, Tru, wn Id era •

78 n r, Nev/sweek, Octoher 23, 'iyXO, p. eh. '^%evr Republic, November 6, 1930, p. 7.

C£. Hx: A 209 The heart of the Internal Security Act, v/hich in­ volved its registration provisions, v/as ignored from the 80 beginning. McCarran attempted to account for such dis- obediance by insisting that the lav^ v/as not being properlv 81 administered. Zechariah Chafee, in his book The Bless­ ings of Liberty, asserted that such a charge was v/ithout foundation. Both the President and the Subversive Activi­ ties Control Board, appointed by Truman in October, per­ formed their duties in good faith. They v/ere, the author declared, simply faced v/ith an impossible task. Chafee also noted the v/aste in time and human resources. After five years of operation, not one organization had regis­ tered under the act, nor had any received a final order to 82 register. The author v/ondered at the value of such a lau'/ v/hich after five years of steady labor has produced for the protection of the United States three adm-inistrativ^e orders still under reviev/ by the courts, no final orders, no registrations, and 40.200 oan;es of testimony.83 o' The same fear and hysteria that gsYe birth to th.e McCarran Act also had a significant in:^-juence on the Eoa-eai- ber Con.a/ressional elections. Frustration and concern over

^^Ibid., November 13, 1930. Pn "Washington Post, Decemher 12, lyeO. ^^Zcchariah Chafee, Jr., Ihe JE.eaagn:;a_of Eiber; p. 132-133. 83 Ibid., p. 135. 210 Communism, In evidence for years, v/as intensified by the outbreak of the Korean war. The remarks of an elderly farm couple in Ohio just before the election demonstrated the feeling quite v/ell.

VJhy doesn't Truman get rid of those Communists in government? . . . With our boys dying in Korea, he v/on't kick out^the people who are fighting us— it makes me sick.'^^ The Republicans, unlike in 1948, conducted a hard driving camipaign, v/ith special emphasis on the time~v/orn "soft on Coimnunism" charge. Robert Taft stumped hard in his native state of Ohio, delivering one blast after an­ other at the "spy riddled" Truman administration. Joe McCarthy, the Republican "bare-knuckle" man, v/as back on the hunt as he roamed the country branding both Truja.an and Acheson as traitors to their country. McCarthy's cam­ paign of iroiuendo v/orked most effectively in Maryland against Millard Tydings, the one Deaar^cratio candidate McCarthy v/as m.ost anxious to destroy. The V/isconsin Sen­ ator's repeated charges that Tydings had "whitewashed" the Reds played a m.ost sigrlficant part in the election of a relatively obscure Maryland lav-yer named John Marsriall Butler. Butler was later chiarged, and refused his seat in the Senate for a short tiaie, for having couar;.enanoed the distribution of a doctored photograph vdiici: pictured

^^Quoted in Saiauel Luheli., 7beJdEkni^E.fv-^.i'M^.h-'lfl Politics, p. .164. W 211 85 Tydings with Communist leader Earl Browder. McCarthy also contributed to Richard Nixon's elec­ tion to the United States Senate from California., In a ruthless mudslinging campaign, Nixon, v/ith McCarthy's aid, continually charged his opponent, Helen Gahagan Douglas, with being in syiTxpathy v/ith Corm-nunist causes. It v/as par­ ticularly noted that her votes in the House had often cor­ responded v/ith those of the suspected pro-Communist Vito Marcantonio of New York. The California senatorial cam­ paign, considered one of the key races in 1950, represented everything that v/as base and contemptible in American politics and v/as rivaled for that hoiior only by the dis­ graceful campaign i/aged against Millard Tydings in Mary­ land. There v/ere other notable Democratic casualties in November I950. Frank Graham, one of the Senators who had spoken out in favor of Truman's recoomendations, vras soundly defeated in ths Senate race in North Carolina. In Illinois, Democratic M?jority Leader Scott Lucas lost his 86 bid for re-election to Everett M. Dirksen. " Lucas' vota for the McCarran Act apparently failed to overeone his past record of support for adalnistratlon policies. An

057-!!.. J1 T J— rr.\..-. r--....-.^.-, ^;^..-,--* .-^r.-.-r.-r -^-> ear'_Tcn Philid.ps, The Trnan.n _Freaj^Gene_y, nn. dd--. 8 /- ^Congressiona••La l quarterly Senviec, FXdXdidTL^yLF-iX. Nation, n. 1.1. 212

obviously disheartened and frustrated Lucas attributed his defeat to Truman's "cockiness." ' Truman had suffered a grievous defeat v/lth the formidable vote to override his veto of the McCarran Act. Without benefit of clairvoyance, the President might v/ell have seen v/hat v/as coming in November. The trend, as the 88 New York Times reported, was indisputably Republican. If Truman sensed that, he gave little indication, for he put himself far out on a limb by predicting a Dem.ocratic 89 landslide. -^ The GOP most assuredly cut it off. The Republican victory represented a definite re­ buke for the administration.-^ The Dem.ocrats retained con­ trol of the House, but only by the slim m.argin of two seats. The Republicans elected eighteen Senators to only 91 nine for the Democrats. The outcome indicated that Trum.an's rem.aining two years in office v/ould be uncomfort­ able and unproductive. Many factors contributed to such a reproach. There v/as a general overall annoyance v/lth the v/hole Fair Decl

^'^Time, Novemher 20, p. 21.

^^Ibid., p. 23. ^-Time, Noveaiber 6, 1950, p. 22. ^^Ibid., November 13, 1930, p. iE.

9-^Congressional Quarterly Service, Ooyy.jn o C' <. •: J' I Nation, p. 11.

^i>^Me^^^' 213 concept of government; there v/as also the v/ar and its ac­ companying problems. But the primary factor, if not the factor, that contributed to the President's unpopularity was the Communist in government issue. The issue, en­ livened by the Hiss affair, intensified by the McCarthy charges, and manifested in the passage of the McCarran Internal Security Act, had robbed the adm.inistration of its vitality and rendered it nearly helpless. In earlj?- 1951, Truman made his last significant attempt to regain the initiative in the loyalty-security field. The substance of that attempt v/ill be examined in the next chapter.

1^ CHAPTER VI "I had hoped that Congress would be as anxious as I am to make sure that our procedures for main­ taining the security of the government service are working effectively."

THE APP0INT?.!IE1EL' OP THE NIMITZ COin-lISSION

The story of the birth--and subsequent death--of the President's Commission on Internal Security and In­ dividual Rights is essentially one of a series of near misses. The idea for such a comimission had been thoroughly discussed; for one reason or another, som.e valid and some not valid, no action was taken on the earlier proposals. A reviev/ of the background vjould seem both appropriate and pertinent to the January, 1951 appointm:ent of the commis­ sion. The revelations of Communist spy activity v/hich de­ veloped from the House and Senate investigations in July and August of 1948 prompted an urgent meeting of various officials of the Executive branch on August 6 to discuss possible counter-action by the adalnistratlon. Those pres­ ent included Clark Clifford, Tom Clark, Peyton Ford, George Elsey, and Charles Murphy. Prcmalnent among the various possibilities discussed was a strong suggestion that the "President should refer the whole [matter] valth docuaenta,

M1 to a bi-partisan coaimisslon like the hoover Coiairsaron.

•h^Iemorandum, For Clifford f:>-eai Elsey, consensu- o" 21/-

»LiO 215 It \ms reported in a national weekly toward the end of August that a large number of important Democrats, deeply concerned over the reactions to Truman's "red her­ ring" remark of August 5, had urged the President to change his strategy. High on the list of suggestions was the ap­ pointment of a special Presidential commission to study and evaluate the various procedures for dealing with the problems of internal security. A sim.ilar suggestion was contained in a letter to the president from Sidney VJalchok, Chairman of the Americans For Democratic Action, on Septem­ ber 27, 1948. VJalchok concluded that a review of the whole problem was needed in order to place the issue of 3 anti-Coimnunism in the proper perspective. The Congressional investigations in the late summer of 1948 had placed the administration in an almost unten­ able defensive position; the appointment of a bi-partisan commission seemed to present a v/ay out. But the unexpected Democratic victory in November assuaged anxieties and, it opinion at miceting on August 6, 1948, Internal Security Pile, Elsey Papers, Truman Library. The highly regarded Hoover Comm.ission, appointed by Congress on a non-partisan basis in 1947, was given the task of evai.uating various organizational procedures v/ithin the Eaaeeutive branch of government. The Conalssion subaiitted its report, with recommiendations, in I9^i9» 2 Newsweek, August 30, 19-a8, p. 15. ^Letter, To the President from Sidney Eaichoh, Set'- tembcr 27, 19^^18, 0F252K, Tru-an Panars, Trunan Library. 216 was evidently felt, negated any real need for a Presiden­ tial commission. The President had reclaimed the initia­ tive with his astounding victory, but it v/as a trituTiph of short duration; the red hunters continued to harass the Democratic administration v/ith the charge that those of Communist sympathy had infiltrated into the high official­ dom of American government. The subdued but persistent pressure from both the right and left, led in September of 1949 to a revival of the commission idea. George Elsey discussed a proposal presented by Max Lov/enthal, one of the lesser kno^^n but more creative memibers of the VJhite House staff, v/ho had voiced concern over the operation of the loyalty program. Elsey disagreed v/ith Lov/enthal's contention that the pro­ gram represented "one of the greatest blots on the Presi­ dent's record . . . ," but did approve of the coirmissio.a proposal. If the President is to appoint such a coitmi.ssion, he should do it at a time'like the preserac, v/hen the Eetecutiv^e branch is not under fire from Con­ gress or any other source on loyalty laatters. The previous pages attest to Elsey's perceptivenees in urging unsuccessfully the apyointnenG of a Eovaenth^l tyye commission.

\:emorandum. For Clifford froa: Elsey, Sen 1949, Internal Security Eile, Elaey Eaeera, Trn anTl ' '1 ' ) 'i\~ 'r ''

^ 217 In November 1949, there v/as further discussion on the commission proposal. It was noted that Attorney Gen­ eral McGrath, although not opposed to the idea, did not feel the time was right for such a commission. McGrath, it would seem, v/as not very perceptive; Elsey was evidently disappointed. "This leaves us exactly v/here v/e have been for too long." That the staff continued to press the matter is in­ dicated by a January 12, 1950, memorandum from Charles Murphy to the President. Murphy noted that the bulk of the investigative work under the loyalty program had almost been completed, that from that point on the work load v/ould be less, and that it appeared to be an appropriate time for a reviev/ of the v/hole program. He reconmended that the proposed commission be staffed \^/ith "such persons as John Lord O'Brien [O'Brian], former Senator La Follette, . n6 Milton Eisenhov/er . . . etc. The earnest attempt on the pa.rt of the staff to take advantage of the lull in the attack on the adminis­ tration proved unsuccessful as there was no indication of any serious m.ove to appoint a Presidential coimn'ssion. The

^Memorandum, For Spingarn from Elsey, Noveaiber 8, 1949, Internal Security File, Elsey Eanera, Truvan Eihrary.

^Memorandum, •For the Preaident fron Enrahy, Ja;;r- ary 12, 1950, Internal Security Id.le, Elaey Payers, Tvn.aaai Library. 218 storm broke anew on February 22, 1950, v/hen Joe McCarthy fired his opening salvo at Wheeling, VJest Virginia. On- that same day, a pencilled note v/as circulated among the VJhite House staff. "it v/as decided by Spingarn and Elsey that v/e should not press for a commission to review the operation of the loyalty program., in viev/ of the poor cir- cumstances nov/. ..." The implications of such a missed opportunity appear enormous. .Had a commission been ap­ pointed in the fall of 1949, as Lowenthal and others had suggested, it might v/ell have diluted much of the venomous attack that v/ould com.e later. Thero v/ould, hov/ever, be other opportunities for adaainlstration counter-action.

During the course of the Tydings subcommittee in­ vestigations. Senator Lodge, one of the tv/o Republican m.embers of the coaimittee, proposed that a non-partisan board be appointed jointly by the Executive and Congress to give its full and complete attention to a study of the McCarthy charges. Lodge contended thet the Tydings group had neither the time nor the training to handle the prob­ lem effectively. Such a board v:ould be connesed of four members appointed by the President, four by the heuae, and four by the Senate; political maheun would consist of six

Republicans and six Democrats. Several Sen-tors vco.c.. f^ '.J

7...'Note. , On delavlnn an-'oint.:wnt oh Ereaieenii'l Cen- mission , February 22, 1930, lale^aval Sacu.w ty EiJ.e, F]-ay Papers, True;an Library. 219 interest in the Lodge proposal, but nothing more came of It.^

On May 22, a Washington Post editorial, entitled "The Road Back to America," proposed the establishjnent of a "Commission on National Security." The commission, bi­ partisan in make-up and staffed by outstanding citizens outside the government, v.^ould be expected to take a fresh look at the problem and submit a report to the American 9 people. Congressional reaction, though varied, v/as gen- 10 erally favorable. Indeed, the desire for some kind of commission seemed to be increasing daily and from many different sources. On May 23, Senator Tydings requested the President to appoint a panel of distinguished citizens to assist the Senate subcommittee with its evaluation of the confiden­ tial files just released. Murphy and Spingarn suggested that Truman decline such a request because, among other things, it would interfere v/ith the pending appointment of a special Presidential coamiission. Such a commission, it was stated, v/ould be sufficiently broad to cover ejny charges made against goverimient eriployees, and could, at the same time, examine all pendirig legislation in the loyalty- security field. The meaiorandun seemed to in'-"icate that

8New Yor]-: Times, April 4, 1930. ^WasI'Jashingto: n Post, Jiay 22, 1950. 10^Ibid.. , May 23, 1930. 220 11 the appointment of a Presidential commission was imminent. Still no action was taken although the idea continued to gain adherents.

During the course of a radio broadcast on June 1, Representative Helen G. Douglas expressed the urgent need for the creation of a non-partisan group of citizens to explore and examine the v/hole question of un-Am.erican ac­ tivities and civil rights. Such an examination, Mrs. Douglas felt, might do much to help quell the grov/ing and distasteful hysteria that v/as sv/eeping the country--hys­ teria which the congressv/oman felt had been nurtured to a great extent by the actions of the United States Con­ gress. The Representative from California indicated that she vrould recomm.end that the President appoint such a com.-

mission, and that it be headed jointly bj'' Herbert Hoover 12 and Eleanor Roosevelt. Meanv/hile, members of the Vfnite House staff con­ tinued to press for som.e action on the co.nmission proposal Spingarn viewed the loyalty program as a "reasonably ju­ dicious compromise in the never-ending struggle betv-een freedom and security," but reasoned that the time had coi.ie

Memoranduia, For the President from Muryhy and Spingarn, May 24, I950, 0E252E, Trunan Eaners, Tranan Library. 12 Excerpt, From radio broadcast hy }^eien Eeuglaa, June 1, 1950, internal Security Eile, Suing'v-n Eaters, Truman Library.

& 221 for a review of the whole procedure. "It is my understand- ing," he said, "that a proposal for a presidential com­ mission to examine and report on the loyalty program is 13 already receiving consideration." One of the more thoughtful and deliberate appeals for a special commission v/as contained in a June 19 memo­ randum for the President from. George Elsey. Upon further consideration, I have come firmly to the viev/ that the President should recommend to the Congress that it enact legislation to estab­ lish a Commission on Internal Security and In­ dividual Rights. . . . Som.e such step as this is necessary to offset, the serious consequences of the irresponsible attacks v/hich Republicans are making against the Governraent. . . . These attacks have very harmful effects. . . . They increase the likelihood of repressive legislation. They shake the confidence of the people in this coun­ try in their Gov'ernment. A Bi-partisan comjr.is- sion . . . seems to present the best prospects for putting an end to all this. Tho fact that the President and the Congress vjould have to agree in advance upon the establishtaent of such a com­ mission v/ouId be a great help in getting general acceptance of it. . . . Nothing less than such a conmiission as this v/ould be adeoxuate to the

Elsey's imroressive appeal, no doubt, provided much of the impetus for the calling of a Blair House meeting on June 22 to discuss the proposal. Present, in addition

Memorandum, For Dawson froai Sping-rn, June 17^ 1950, Internal Security File, Sningam Eayars, Truaan Library. ^^liemoranduai. For the President from Elsey, Juae 19, 1950, Internal Security File, Elsey Ihoera, T-naan Library. 222 to Truman and his staff, v/ere such notables as Vice Presi­ dent Alben Barkley, Speaker Sam Rayburn, House majority leader John MeCormick, Senators Millard Tydings, Brien 15 McMahon, Theodore F. Green, and Attorney General McGrath. Although the opinions for and against a proposed commission appeared evenly divided, members of the President's staff concluded that the favorable opinions predominated; the only question remaining, it v/as said, concerned v/hether the commission should be appointed by the President or by Congress. In any case, it v/as felt that Truman should 16 present the proposal in a message to Congress. During the course of the m.eeting, the President read the fourth draft of a proposed message v/hich called for the creation, by Congress, of a Hoover-style coamisslon Those present said it was a "splendid m.essage" but several, notably Rayburn, Barkley, and McGrath, did riot feel the tim.e v/as right for such a m.ove. Tiie President assured them that he v/as not, in fact, going to act on the com- 17 mission pronosai at thao tirae.

-'-^ Memo rand mi. For the Files froai Spli on proposed coamiission on Internal Security and Individual Rights, June 23, 1950, Eational Defense Eile, Sningarn Papers, Truman Library. "^Memorandum, Pros and Cons on Propoaal to est/e- lish a snecial coarrvssion, June 22, 1930, Eationa - Defense File, Spingarn Papers, Tru:,aan Library. 17 " Memorandum, For tEe Files fron. SnEigarrrr.-,,,,.,, .aa^- hi, 1950, National Defense Eile, a^pangarn rayera, rr Library. 223 Indeed, if the President had intended to make such a move, he v/ould have been hard pressed to do so. Three aays after the Blair House meeting, the Korean emergency demanded Truman»s full attention and the comanission idea was momentarily laid to rest.

Spingarn, Murphy, and Elsey, hov/ever, continued to urge the President to take some affirmative action. In a memorandum of July II, the latter group recommended that the President take advantage of the temporary lull in the Congressional attack to annou.nce the appointment of a non­ partisan coironission. "The creation of such' a commission now might v/ell be considered a statesmanlike response to the tensions and fears caused by the Korean aggression rather than to McCarthy." It v/as urgent, the staff as­ serted, that action be initiated at once to offset the in­ creased dem.and for repressive legislation engendered by the v/ar. Finally, it was recoaiaiended that another raeeting be called to discuss the proposal, wltri the evident hone that the appeal for a coa-mission could be made in conjunc- iS tion with the soon-to-be-released tydings report. " Al­ though no action v/as taken on the memorandun, the release of the Senate subco-r Ittee's report on July 20 presented the best opportunity since tiie late surner of ly':9 dor

Memorandum, For t-^e ih^e/a'.dent fron hhvaey, Eu and Spingarn, July li., 1930, Eetionad Defense Eile, S garn Papers, Tritaan Li.hnary. 224 Executive action.

Spingarn, in a most important memorandum of July 20, argued convincingly that the administration should move quickly, while McCarthy "is in eclipse. ..." In addi­ tion, Spingarn noted the growing popularity of the "Mundt- Nixon" bill and Truman's repeated assertion that he v/ould veto such legislation. It v/as felt that a veto, given the climate of opinion at that time, v/ould be politically damaging. It would be much better, Spingarn said, to pre­ vent such legislation from ever reaching the President's desk.

I hate to be in the position of the boy v/ho cried 'wolf too often but I cannot help feeling that a decision on this commission proposal is pretty pressing and should not be overlooked.19 The proposal wa._s overlooked at that time as the President, on August 8, presented his legislative proposals for strengthenEng the anti-subversive lav/s already in ex­ istence. However, a later conversation betv/een Spingarn

and Averill Harriman revealed that the coamiission ide. -<^. '•'^'Ill ^ not entirely deadn. He [Harriman] told me that he was very strong for the proposal and that he thought we v/ere going to regret not having included it in the August 8 m.essage.^0

19Memorandum, For Murphy, ])aw3on, ani Elsey frcn Spingarn, July 20, 1950, National Defense EIJO, Syinyarn Papers, Truiuan Library. Memorandum, For the Eile fi'cai Sy:n';g' ' n, [he Eate National Defense Eile, Snlnryrai Payers, 1 ru.v-an E^ba^i-y. 225 No further action was contemplated until the McCarran Act emerged from the conference commxittee in its final forra. Although suggested, the Triunan veto message contained no mention of a possible commission. Members of the Presi­ dent's staff remained undeterred, hov/ever, and continued to push the idea. On November 22, Elsey noted, in a memo to Murphy, that Clark Clifford had promised to speak v/ith the President on the subject.^-^ Clifford's arguments must have been persuasive, for Trtunan, tv/o years after the com­ mission idea was first proposed, finally moved to take some affirm.ative action.

Three days after the meeting v/ith Clifford, Trum.an penned a letter to Herbert Hoover, requesting that the ex- President chair the proposed cormarlssion. The President noted the persistent charges over the past years of Com.- munist infiltration, and expressed the feeling that a bi­ partisan Presidential commission, headed by scm.eone of Hoover's stature, would "not only restore the confidence of the people in the organization of the Government but „22 could help the foreign policy situation very much." Hoover's reply on the tv:enty-sixth of Eoveal'sr, though courteous, left little doubt that he did not approve

2L, Memorandum, For Murnhy fi'oai Elsey, Eoveni i c - : 1950, Internal Security File, Elaey Paners, Tru .n n Eihrary.

^^Letter, To Hoover fron Truaan, Novealer 2.F. ifanV ' K OF275OA, Truman Panel's, Truman Lib: any. 226 of such a commission. The ex-President doubted the ex­ istence of very many "card-carrying" Communists in goveiai- ment, and suggested "that the current lack of confidence arises from the belief that there are men in government (not Communists) v/hose attitudes are such that they have disastrously advised on policies in relation tc Communist Russia." Hoover indicated that a statement by the Presi­ dent that such men had been relieved of their positions would do more to placate public opinion than any infor.nal Presidential Comm.ission.2 3^ Truman indicated his regret over Hoover's apparent decision not to serve as chairm.an, but felt inclined to defend the commission proposal in his reply to the ex- President. Such a bi-partisan group, Truman said, vaould be staffed v/ith the most competent people available, and, far from the informal group alluded to by Hoover, would be expected to conduct a review of every phase of the loyalty-security question, including all existing laws in the field. Also, to aid them in making such an assessment all oertincnt loyalty files in the possession oi•c -n.m^ T. f.".' tive branch of governaiont v/ould be a:ade available to the members of the conalssion. The Treeddent ad litted that ' had puruoselv avoided Congressional parti ci.viation en the

23 Letter, To Truaian frcn Ecover, Fore..''--.e' 2o, T r-'.' .^. 0F2750A, Truaian Papers, Truaian 11 binary. 227 commission for fear that it v/ould become a strictly parti­ san issue. "This is not a question v/hich should be m.ade the subject of a partisan debate in the Congress, v/hich I am afraid might be likely if the establishment of such e 24 commission were referred to the Congress." Disappointed but still deteriTiined, Trum.an, on Janu­ ary 4, 1951^ dispatched a letter to Chester VJ. Nimitz, re­ questing that the retired Admiral serve as chairman of the 23 proposed commission. ^ Nimitz accepted on January 9> sp- parently undisturbed that he had been the second choice.26 " The President's Commission on Internal Security and Indi­ vidual Rights v/as officially created v/ith the issuance of 27 Executive Order 10207 on January 23, 1951. In announc­ ing the appointm.ent, Trunan released the follov/ing state­ ment . VJe Fiust continue to protect our security within the framev/ork of our historic liberties, vlthout thought of partisan advantage or political gain. To keep these great problems fro..: falling into the arena of partisanshi.p, I am appointing this commission of" distinguished citizens on a non­ partisan basis.

^^Letter, To Hoover from Truvnn, Decenber 7, 1530, OF275OA, Truman Papers, Truaian Library. ^^Letter, To Einitz fro:.: Trur-.n, January k, Idnl, 0F2750A, Trinian Paners, Trunan Eihrary. ^^Letter, To Truman finn Nimitz, January 9. 1931; OF275OA, Triuaan Eapers, Trunan Library. ^'''Executive Order 10207, January 22, 3931: 0"?7y01, Truman Papers, Truaian library. ^^Statement, Ev^ the }an:sideaai o-' aa-non-n'ny anaoXn. ment of Elaita Ceanlasion, amaiai, 31, IS a "^ , CalyOA, T . i.r U;;-.e.i.i i.t ^-^-j-o, ii._.'--.i i.:.'.'... < 228 Other members of the corroTiission included Miss Anna Lord Strauss, former President of the National League of Women Voters, Right Reverend Carl Morgan Block, Pieotestant Episcopal Bishop of California, Republican ex-Senator John Danaher of Connecticut, Harvey S. Firestone, Chairman of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, VJilliam E. Leahy, a VJashington Attorney, Russell 0. Leffingv/ell, Chairman of J. P. Morgan and Company, Charles H. Silver, Vice Presi­ dent of American VJoolen Company, and the Most Revere:o.d Emmett M. Walsh, Coadjutor Bishop of the Catholic Diocese 29 of Youngstov/n, Ohio. -^ The President's order \/as greeted as a "a step . . . that many a Demooratlc politician ,,30 heartily v/i shed he had taken long ago. . . . Although the appointments appeared to represent a broad cross section of America, there nere so.ae -.dao voiced disappointment over the selections. Ihe }'[a^shinrywni_Po^ complained that "the conaiissioji nembez's laeV Ideiitifieation in the public mind with the defense of civil liberties."

In that respect it v/as suggested that someone of the sta tur; of John lord O'Erian be appointed to serve as counael te 31 the commission. ~^~ Roy Wilkins voiced his regret that taere

^Letters, Offieially appeinting /. enh'irs of Oonrau slon, January 30, 1931; OE2750A, Truaiar Fa.\^.n:a, Tit-^--.e ^* i Library. 3'^Tiiiie, February 5, '93i.. F- 8. 3-^Washlnaton Post, isaraanry 27, 1931. 229 had been no Negro appointed to the President's Co:nmission, especially with the knowledge that "many Negroes had been persecuted" under the old loyalty program.32 Despite the criticism, Truman held high hopes for the success of the Nimitz Commission; certain members of Congress thought otherwise. The views expressed by Senator Ferguson v/ere repre­ sentative of those in Congress who had so long opposed Truman on the issues of loyalty and security. Such a com­ mission, Ferguson argued, v/as "bound to create strained relations betv/een the Executive and Congress." In particu­ lar, the Michigan Republican displayed extrem.e jealousy as he described the pov/ers given the Commiission v/hich had so recently been denied the Congress; i.e., access to confi­ dential files v/ithin the Executive Departments. In conclu­ sion, Ferguson charged that the commission was nothing more than an attempt "to cloak the subject with, confusion in the hope that nothing effective will be done about security •33 risks in Goverratent service." In the minds of some Congressmen, the President's Conmiission appeared to be in conflict vE.th the recently appointed McCarran subeoariittee vdiich had been created

Letter, To the Prearcent iron r.ay •.. J.J.-.n.:^ ary 6, 1951. 0E2750A, Trui^an Papers, trunan Jlhn:>- ^^U.S.. Conyrea.sioin;.l_ Eeeo>E, 82d Co.iyress, Sess., 1951. 97. 1-1." i7'pp3'330-oahi. W^r^

230 Specifically to keep watch on the administration in its execution of the I950 Internal Security Act. The Editors of The Nation asserted that "the President's Commission is as necessary and as pro.m.ising as the McCarran subcom- 34 mittee is useless and threatening." The Editor of Christian Science Monitor, in response to Ferguson's charge that the Nimitz group v/ould only confuse matters in the loyalty-security field, concluded that "Congress long since has proved itself unable to rise consistently above partisanship and headline hunting in dealing v/ith these same serious miatters."

In general, press opinion on the Comm.ission v/as not only favorable but voiced som.e hope that "sanity and bal­ ance" might at last be restored "in an area of our national oX thinking that has gone dangerously off its rockers."^" The Editors of the VJashington Post voiced approval but noted, in retrospect, that they had pleaded for the appointment '^'-7.7 of such a commission in May, 1950.^' The I^aayJ^ork^^lEl?. expressed the same vieo--that the Ccinaission v/as a good idea but should have come aiany months before.-^_'^ :

3^"^The Nation, February 3, 1951, p. 99- 35Article, Chilstian Sei.enoE Icnitor, January 27, 1951, Democratic Eatfi'oirll''"CEa3mtv'ea'^Cin.nn: ng Pile, Trunin Library. 3^Eew York Tirr-s, darnjo.ry 23, 1931. 3'^VJashington Post, January 25. 1931. 3^Now York Tines, January 25, 1931.

mmi 231 The Nimitz Commission was officially sworn on Febru­ ary 12. The President, in his remarks at the ceremony, stressed the urgent need to find some adequate balance be­ tween securing the nation against the threat of internal subversion while simultaneously protecting the rights of the individual. The Bill of Rights, Truman said, "is still the principal part of the Constitution of the United States so far as the individual in this country is concerned. ..." The President again promised that the"Nimitz Com- 39 mission v/ould have access to all confidential files. Those in Congress v/ho had long been denied the right to examine such, files evidently nov/ determined to deny the Commission this privilege. On February l4, Nimitz notified Truman that the Commission v/as experiencing difficulty v/ith regard to cer­ tain conflict-of-interest statutes. If no exception v/as made, he said, such statutes v/ould severely limit the pres­ ent and future services of m.embers and ea^ployees cf the Commission. In particular, the Adaiiral noted that it would be virtually impossible to secure co.nnetent legal counsel v/ho v/ould "v/ish to be precluded frc-i appearances before the Federal Courts and the Departaients and Cortalssions not only throughout the period of his service nith the Commi se^-vn

•^-^Trunan's reaiarks at svaaaring in cera:.ionies fc^ Presidential Coaaaission, February iX, 1931- ]):xoerat:"o National Coamittee Clnnaln'" Eiie, Iruaxai ii'hrary. 232 but for at least two years thereafter." Nimitz suggested the pressing need for some exemptive legislation. Representative Francis E. Walter, on February 26, introduced H.R. 2829, "a bill to exempt the members and certain employees of the President's Commission on Inter­ nal Security and Individual Rights from the operation of „^1 certain conflict-of-interest statutes. The bill passed 42 the House on March 19; it v/as referred to McCarran's Senate Judiciary Committee on March 20. 43 McCarran, -having failed to get imviediate consent on the Senate version of the excwiption bill, submitted it to a subcoimnittee composed of O'Connor of Maryland, Smith of North Carolina, and Ferguson of Michigan. John Danaher, an ex-senator from Connecticut, iaanediatcly sought and ar­ ranged a meeting vith the Senate group to discuss the mat­ ter. Danaher's report indicated that the subcorniittee members were unhappy that Truman had appointed such a com­ mission at the time various Congressional committees wore reviving their investigations in the field of loyalty and security. More especially, the suhccamlttee was upset

^^lyetter. To the President froai Eimitz, I^hruary 14, 1951. 0F2750A, Truj:an Eaners, Trunan Eihvary. ^^^U.S., Connressioiia]. Eeeord, 82d Cengiess, let Sess., 1951. 977"3l3'27"p. IXyo. Ib:i^. , p. 20O9. 43" Ibid., n. 2632. 233 because the President's Commission would be allowed to examine the loyalty files. On a question of whether the Commission would release such files to the Congress, Danaher replied in the negative. Ferguson in turn threat­ ened legislation that would force the Commission members "to be answerable to the Congress as v/ell as the President." The ex-Senator from Connecticut thereupon declared that he would resign rather than allow himself to become a "guinea pig" in a power struggle betv/een the President and Con­ gress.

Danaher reminded the Senators that Public Law 391 had provided an exemption for the Hoover Commission and that he could see no reason vJhy the same privilege could not be extended to the Nim.itz group. Ferguson replied that Congress had appointed the Hoover Commission and had every right to grant such an exem.ption to one of its ov/n 44 creatures. Such an affinnation on the part of Ferguson indicated that Senate opposition to an exemptions bill v/as based on nothing more than jealousy. As the Senate continued to proci^asti.nate ovei- the proposal, a question arose vdnich seeaied to fall v/ithin the

^^^Letter, To Nia/ltz f rw i Dannier, March 2, IfyJ . Nimitz Personal File, Eeeoi'ds of E..eaident' s Covad a ^i on on Internal Security and Individual Eights, Tiaann Idhi'avy. Danaher, as an ex-Scnator from Conneetieut, vns t:ie moat logical choice among the Coaniission iveaibena to sneak vlt'^ the Judiciary subcomrrittee. 234 purviev/ of the Commission's authority. On February 15, 1951, the new Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, Hiram Bingham, recommended the following change in the standard for dismissal of government employees. The standard for the refusal of emploinnent or the removal from em.plovmient in an executive department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that on all evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as to his loyalty to the Government of the United States. -^

It was a drastic proposal—deem.ed necessary because of the Korean emergency--that seriously violated the key principle of American law that "reasonable doubt" should v/ork in favor of the accused. Truman stressed at his nev/s conference on February I6 that the proposal would be given careful consideration by his Coramission on Internal Security 46 and Individual Eiahts. Eovaever, the continued inabilitv of the commission to function forced the Presidarl, after ^17

TT. "^ * ^ "JIT . • ' #•*< • _. '__ '^^ • ^ e tne e> terminatiori, i.ts decision aty?rsr.tly v/euj.c

hn ^-^Letter, To Earny E. Mitchell fiwn Einghaai, Feb­ ruary 15, 19ol. 0E252iE Tiuaian Payers, Trwnra ilbrary. 46 Letter, To Einitz froai Eirigham, rohruary j.u, ry Nimitz Personal Eiie, Eecorde of Preaident-a Cei.nission, Truman libraJ:'V. 47 Francis Eiddle, "Subversives in Gavarrn-ena, In ternal Seeuvity _and CiviJ_ E-'y;i.s, ed. Thaawtein SelJ.cn'" XPnllallhEdErE:' "• ihe"Efrerlean' heade: y of I^olitiea] aa.i Sociaj. Sciences, 1955)- n. ho. 235 unlike the President's. Correspondence in the Commission files strongly hinted that a majority of the members leaned heavily on the side of enforcement as opposed to judicious protection of individual rights. Excerpts from a March 20 letter from R. C. Leffingv/ell to Nimitz is a fair exam-pie. Both those v/ho are disloyal or of doubtful loyalty, and those v/ho are security risks, should be subject to suimnary removal bj'- the agency head vlthout any right of appeal, I think. ... I get the impression that Congress has been too responsive to the viev/s of the employees associations and the civil liber­ ties associations. ... I think employee tenure and civil rights generally have to be subordinated^^^o to the right of the nation to defend itself. ... Since the Nimitz Commission v/as never allov^ed to function, it is impossible to determine exactly hov/ it might have performed. On April 30, the Senate Judiciary Coamn.ittee issued its disapproval of the House exemption bill, H.R. 2829, a move v/hich, for all practical purposes, doomed the Presi­ dent's Commission. On May 12, members of the Conmission b.q submitted their resignations to the President. -^ Trumavn, still determined to v/ork for the activation of his Com­ mission, refused to accent the resignatioi.s.

^^Letter, To Eimitz from leffingwell, March 20, 1951, Nimitz Personal File, Records of President's Cerriis sion, Ti'uman Library. ^9 r- r; v^ •> • '"^ , • Congressional Onarterly Service, Conyiw/ ]^9ii-9PL„;i:.3^:3gl264 (Washington^ E, C: Cenyx^^-^''^^--- Quarterly'Se rale ef, I965 ), n. loyb. 236 On the twelfth, Truman dispatched a letter to Sen­ ator McCarran, whom he had come to detest personally, in which he pleaded for.further consideration on the exemp- tion proposal. The letter included all pertinent data on the Commission to that date, and contained, in addition, a long list of precedents for exempting other commissions from such restrictive statutes.^^ The Editor of the Wash­ ington Post asserted that "the Senate cannot permit his [Truman's] defeat on this question v/ithout crass disregard of its responsibility to the country and'to the individual citizen. "-^ The Editor doubtless misjudged' Senator McCarran.

VJhile the President was av/aiting the Senator's reply, there v/as a report of a possible effort on the part of the administration to by-pass the Senate Judiciary Committee on the matter of exem.ption. The Senate had just approved a resolution providing for the exemption from the conflict- of-interest statutes for a E^ashington attorney, Robert Murphy, to serve as the counsel for the Senate Election Committee in its probe of the 1950 Senatorial caainaign in Ohio. The strategy would have invoi.ved the attachment of the President's appointees to the Murphy resolution in the

^^Letter, To McCarran from Truma/i, May 12, 1951. 0F2750A, Truraan Papers, Truman library. ^\ashington Post, May l3, 1951.

L^TE:: 237 House of Representatives. The Senate Judiciary Committee thereby V70uld be avoided, and it was hoped that the v/hole

Senate would then re-approve the resolution v/ith m.embers 52 of the Commission attached. It v/as a desperate move at best, and nothing came of it. The Senate Judiciary Com­ mittee remained the President's only hope.

Senator McCarran, in his reply to the President on

May 26, offered no consolation. Ke indicated that O'Connor,

Smith, and Ferguson v/ere all honorable men, that they had reported the exem.ption bill v/ithout recoimnendation, and that the full Judiciary Comm.ittee had followed vsrith a 6-3 vote against a favorable report. The Chairman saw no rea­ son for any further consideration. As for the precedents,

McCarran pointed out that too many exemptions v/ould erode otherv/ise v/orthv/hile statutes. The Nevada Democrat con­ cluded by observing, for v/hatever it v/as v/orth, that "the present request for exemption from, those statutes is the first that has been m.ade to the Congress in behalf of a

Presidential Corailssion, created in the absence of any 53 prior legislative directive." " McCarran's refusal to re­ consider the exeamtion proposal represented, as the Fanh- mgoo4-, n Post had charged earlier, "a slick, cynical niece

^Sjashington Post, May 15. IS31. ^^Letter, To the President fro.a EcCa-ran, v 2 a 1951, 0F2750A, Trunan Papers, Txna :an Library. 238

of obstructionism."^^ Truman continued to hold up on the

resignations of Nimitz and the others, evidently hoping

for some kind of miracle--perhaps the only thing by the

late Spring of 1951 that could have saved his Commission.

As the Nimitz group remained inactive, Truman be­

gan to express noticeable concern over the conduct, or

misconduct, of various loyalty boards. The President's

alarm v/as increased on receipt of a mem.orandum from Francis

Biddle which outlined several abuses, especially in the ^5 Fourth Regional Board in Washington, D. C.-^^ Truman ex­ pressed his concern over the matter in a May 24 memorandum to Charles Murphy. I have been very much disturbed v/ith the action of some of these boards and I v/ant to find some v/ay to put a stop to their un-American activities.

The President indicated that he had hoped the Nimitz Com­

mission would be able to handle such m.atters but, quite

evidently dejected, he noted that "it looks noa: as if we Ti56 are not going to get any Nimitz Coann.ssion. On July l4, Truman wrote to James S. Lay, Executive

Secretary of the National Security Couneii, expressing his

continued anxiety over the actions of certain loyalty

^ H'Jashington Post, May 2, 1931. •^Memoranduai, For the Ei'osidant faen E'ddi.e, [ha Date], OF2750A, Truman Paners, Trnnan Eibiary.

^Memorandum, For Muryry f>oi Truaani, Fa • . 0F2750A, Truiaan Papers, Truaan EiVn^ar^^,

^^. 239 boards. The President requested that the National Council conduct a full and complete investigation of the manner 57 in which the program v/as being administered. We must never forget that the fundamental purpose of our Government is to protect the rights of in­ dividual citizens and one of the highest obliga­ tions of the Government is to see that those rights are protected in its ov/n operations.58

Such correspondence offers am.ple evidence of Tru­ man's deep concern for individual rights. It v/as a fact which stood out am^ong whatever mistakes or oversimplifica­ tions he made in regard to the question of loyalty and security. The President was v/oefully late in appointing his Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights, and, once it v/as appointed, he v/as unv/illing to give it up without a fight. Despite rather clear evidence that the Commission v/ould never be allov/ed to operate, Trumian continued to hold on as he struggled v/lth the miany other pressing problems of 1951] the war. Congressional investi­ gations, Joe McCarthy, and, not the least, a recalcitrant General. It had been evident since the m.assive Chinese in­ tervention in Korea in late Eoveruior, 1950, that the United

^ Harry S. Truian, Years^_ of Tri?E_a.nd Jl^rie Vol. Memoirs (Garden Citv, Eon horh: Eouhj.eeay F Co., Ifye), pp. 288-289. 58 B. J. Eernstein and A. J. Eatuao-- (eds.), the Truman Adri-'n's tra tion: ' A Documentary hd^a tory (hea- Erik: Harper h Rov/, i960"), p. 37'ad" ''

•f^ 240 Nations Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, v/as in solid- disagreement with the administration over what military policy should be follov/ed there. The administration in­ sisted on the principle of a limited conflict; MacArthur strongly advocated e.n all out effort against China. In disregard of a Presidential directive of December 6, 1950, which, in effect, ordered the U.N. Commander to restrict his statements, MacArthur continued to advocate openly his ov/n position. The breaking point came v/ith the release of MacArthur's statement of March 24 which represented— according to Acheson—"insubordination of the grossest sort to his commander in chief." If the President still had doubts, the release, on April 5, of MacArthur's March 20 letter to Representative Joseph VJ. Martin, Jr. m.ust surely have settled his mind. The letter represented nothing short of an cpen attack on administration policy in Korea, and convinced Truaaan that the Genei^al v/ould have to be relieved; orders to that ef­ fect v/ere released on April 11. In the aftermath, Acheson related, "we settled donn to endure the heavy shelling from press and Congress that the relief was bound to and RO did produce." • History may well exonerate Tru:.ian for his decision to relieve lEcArthur but the average .irierican

5^"Dea- n Acheson, Ih'esjniv^a tJlhE Caveatn3:E__^^ in The State DenarimieirG ("Ee^^" Yonh: E. d. norte i E Co., 1959). "pp3 "53i3ih3h:E 24l

citizen in 1951 did not. The triumphant return of the General, his speech before a joint session of Congress, and the long Congressional hearings that follov/ed v/ould serve to haunt the already embattled President until he left office in 1952. Meam^hile, the issue of internal Cornmunismi con­ tinued to thrive, aided to a great extent by an influen­ tial member of the administration. On March 19, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover v/arned that the Coimnunist threat M ..6o to the nation's internal security looms large. . . . The Director testified before the House Appropriations sub­ committee on April 28 that Comnunlsts in the United States posed a more dangerous threat than did the Nazi fifth column of World War II--triat the EEI v/as ready, at a mo- 61 ment's notice, to pick up some 14,000 dangerous rods. Hoover's revelations no doutnt helped inspire the Congress to revive.its investigations into Coanaunist ac­ tivity in ths nation. In late March, the House Conmlttee on Un-American Activities reopened its investigation of Hollywood. One of the first witnesses was actor lama Pa/d^s, late of the yl„j^yJXFdi-^FFdZ> ••^^ confessed to the Committee that he had drifted into a Coaannr'st cell

6o VJashington Poe^, March 19. 1931. 6l , ,^- -,...--, New York Tines, Anarl 2a, l.yl.

ijiijjf^ K : 242 organization in 1940, attended a few meetings, but even­ tually, in 1945, had left the Forty. Parks readily ad­ mitted his error in judgment but contended that it v/as un­ fair to blame him in I951 for v/hat he had done in I941 because of sympathy for the underprivileged.^^ Several Committee members and many others sympathized v/ith Parks, including John Wayne, the President of the Anti-Cor.miunist Motion Pictures Alliance. -^ But, the actor's open admis­ sion of past member.ship in the Communist Party served only to ruin an otherwise promising career. Two other film personalities, Hov/ard do Silva and Gale Sondergaard, took a more belligerent attitude but fared little bettor. ' The search for Coiamunists, and the acconnanying hysteria, continued to grov/. The prenier red hunter of then all, Jooonii P. McCarthy, had continued in the limelight v/hcn in Eocruary 1951 he characterized the Eonublicau victory in Eovcnher 1950 as a "mandate to sband as a solid nail ayainst the

. , in slov: no in on of soclalica t.:an. 'wd. V . i .^

J. .c:-.- '^. . .»«^5 J.7 i.^ f ,Tn-.^..'... 1 ^-. ,. 'nCa-^thv'e viciou- and uncalled for

tack ayainst George C. Marshall antouneeo many even ei nr

02-.r^ ^.V,.; ., ^.._ ., -J,^, ^,4. V'-. v..^U- pp I O ~1 .

^HxrXFFJldFd> Ap^il 2, Ifyl, p. 21. "^'^Tiinq, April 2, 193i , p. 9':^ n. If. 'Cc; -^y\ - r, Woov'n'• -^'•• 1 o, "1 oc'n , 243 ovm Republican colleagues v/ho, if not outright supporters, had certainly acquiesced in McCarthy's venomous tirades in the past. The attack on Marshall aroused one freshman Senator from Connecticut, Democrat V.'illian. Benton, to of­ fer a resolution on August 6 calling for the expulsion of Senator McCarthy on charges of "perjury, deceit, fraud, and lack of fitness to hold office." The resolution, al­ though prompting an investigation of negligible value, did little harm to McCarthy and eventually cost Benton his rr political life. Truman, although bruised and battered from his en­ counters v/ith McCarran, MacArthur, and McCarthy, was still on his feet in August I95I. On the fourteenth of that month, the old familiar "give 'em hell Harry" emerged in a speech before the American legion v/hen he blasted the scare m.ongers v/ho were "chipping av/ay at our basic freedc.o.s just as insidiously and far more effectively than the Con- munists have ever been able to do." Trunan pleaded for a return to "real Americanisai" and urged the logionnalres to "rise up and put a stop to this terrible bnaineae ..." and "expose the rotten motives of those people vdio are try­ ing to divide us and confuse us and tear ne ti.e Ei.ll of n67 Rights.

^^Cabell Phillins, Tee Jvnnian Frp.ai aa'--p^ tory of a Triunnhant S^ieef^aaon"{.idd Vorh: ia 1 ;C.->.... iJu Co., 19o3};' pp." 3So-'3s'3 .""" ^'^Tru,.i'^n's Pav.eri ea:n Eeyion S: aeeh, iuyual J.^ PPE 200, Tra'aaan Eanera, Tru..an Eabriny . ^w*

244 McCarthy made the following remarks in regard to the President's speech.

If only Mr. Truman realized that the disgrace and shame is not to find them [Communists] high in government but the disgrace and sham.e comes when politicians of little minds and less morals try to protect them. . . .68

The Legion speech represented a noble and fighting effort, but it was, in essence, the President's last hurrah in 1951. On October 3, Admiral Nimitz recommended to the President that the Commission, obviously dead since June, not be reactivated. Nimitz felt that the issue, "if car­ ried over into the Presidential campaign year, might ac­ tually do harm to the cause v/hich is so close to the Presi­ dent's heart, namely, protecting the rights of individuals." The Admiral also remarked that there v/as actually less need for the Commission in viev/ of the recent Supreme Court decision upholding the dismissal of Dorothy Eailey, the first governaiont employee released under the 19^^' loyalty order. Both Elsey^ and Murphy concurred v.ith the Eiaiitz recommendations and suggested that tho Pi'osident reassign employees of the Con/iission, appoint a special consultant

on internal security laatters, and wait for the report fron 69 the National Security Council.

68j^ .„^^ j^^ ..^ 27, 19^1. n. 20.

''Metioranduai, For th.e Eresident frcai idaiy, heto;..er 5, 1951, Internal Security Eile, Elaey Payena, Eiu-.n Library. 245 On October 15, Truman received a letter from Patrick M. Malin, Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, pleading "that the Nimitz Commission not be abandoned, and difficult as they are, efforts be re- • nev/ed to seek the m.eans v/hich v/ould allov/ the Commission 70 to function." The President, undoubtedly having decided that the cause v/as hopeless, abandoned the Coirjn.ission plan on October 27 with the suggestion "that Congress v\fas not

interested as he v/as in makin'sO sure that Constitutional rights were not v/eakened in the drive against treason. ,t71 • • • Since the Nimitz Commission v/as never allov/ed to function, it v/ould be impossible to determine just v/hat effect it might have had on the loyalty question. It does not seem likely that there v/ould have been a^iy rairaculous change, but, in viev/ of the unreasoning hysteria, the na­ tion needed and deserved such a study as trlght have been provided by the Ni.riitz group. The suggestion is strong that had the Conalssion been appointed at a more appro­ priate time, say in Septeiiber 1938, the fall of 19a9. or on several occasions in 1950, the outcone would have been much more satisfactory.

''^'^Letter. To the President frcn. latrich E:l^n, October 15. 1951. OnXXyOA, Trunan ihoers, Trannn Eihrary '''"Washington East, Oeto-er 28, 193i-. 246 The year 1951. which had opened on a somev^/hat hope­ ful note, ended in frustration. The Commission had ex­ pired without even being allon-ed to act, the Korean peace talks viere dragging at .?ana*un.jom, and the ever present uneasiness over internal Comniunism v^/as certainly in evi­ dence. A Gallup poll released on December 29 indicated that Truman's popularity had dropped to an all time lov/. Only 23 percent of the American people approved of the President's performance; 58 percent disapproved of that 72 perform-ance. The situation v/ould shov/ little improve­ ment in 1952.

t 2T,T _ „ ; .• .,. ,,. .L -.... p^ c ''• M^. r- '••.--•:' ' :- OO ^ hi -> 1 , t.aona.e;^,oO-i ra^--^, i^^-....^.:-^. •^••. ,'^. _.. ^-i-. CHAPTER VII "There never should have been competition on the anti-Communist issue between Congress and the ' Executive. ..." CONCLUSIONS

From the outset of his Presidency, Harry Trtunan was to find himself under an almost constant attack from a powerful hard line group v/ithin the Congress on the ques­ tion of internal (Communist) subv^ersion. The purpose of this study has been to follov/ the President's struggle with the Congress over that question, and, finally, to evaluate his performance during the course of that struggle. Trtmian's most significant response to the persistent charges of Corinunist infiltration v/as the initiation of the Loyalty Program in March 1937. The Canadian spy plot, the Amerasia disclosure, and other such evidences of past in­ trigue no doubt provided part of the iaraetus for a revamp­ ing of the goverrriient' s loyalty-security procedures. But, one of the most iiiiooi'tant reasons for Executive Order 9Sh5 was to take the Initiative frci.i Congress, end, hoye^ully. to check the trend toward aiore repressive lO; aiatron Trunan consistently maintained, both then and later, th^ the threat froai internal subversion waa :ainor--th't the overwheliaing na jority of goveranient eaylo:eea •.:cre ioyc: citizens. Certainly the statistical renoit on the cyan tion of the loyalty p>w;grari J. •: ""Ol •h '\cnn strenahi^ indioa

2^7 248 that the President was altogether correct. The report showed, after the perusal of 4,300,000 loyalty forms of new and incumbent em.ployees, that only 4l4 had been re­ moved or otherv/ise denied employment on loyalty grounds. Such figures did not indicate the existence of any wide­ spread internal Communist conspiracy. Even Tom Clark, mors prone to take a hard line than Truman, later concluded that in 1947 the danger was more imagined than real. Clark concluded, hov/ever, that the program did help restrain the Congress which, it would p seem., v^/as the primary motive. Truman promised from the first that there v/ould be no witch hunt. So far as it v/as humanly possible, the President kept such a proalse. The violations of individ­ ual rights v/ere too numerous to overlook, but v/ere the ex­ ception rather than the rule. Overall, the loyalty progzam was adriinistered v/ith moderation. There is absolutely no reason to doubt Truaian's sincere devotion to india^idual rights. His feeling for such lights energed fron his every utterance on the subject of loyalty, and ran much deeper than more political rhetoric.

Harold Chase, Se^cuy'ity^cng^ Id berty_:___lne hi ohle.n of Native Con; ami say, Jll[7nl3;yl' (ep-f'^-'i ^i^h: 'd"^ Doubl.eday" ca Co". ',"Inc 3 , 19:357. E- ^''i. ^Personal interview with dnatice lee. as 0. C 249 Certain zealous patriots in Congress, however, v/ere never content v/ith the Truman Loyalty Program, and were as determined as ever to stamp out the red menace at any cost. From the first, a number including Parnell Thomas, Karl Mundt, and Richard Nixon insisted that the President's program was a farce behind which the Communists and their sympathizers still operated virtually untouched. In re­ sponse, the House Un-American Activities Committee renewed its investigations in the fall of 1947, and the House of Representatives, in May 1948, passed the Mundt-Nixon bill. The House passage of that first all inclusive anti- subversive bill, v/hich failed to make it through the Sen­ ate, marked the beginning of a continuous effort on the part of Congress to enact such legislation into lav/. In addition, the Congressional hearings on Coarvunism in the late suiraTier of 1948, culminating in tho Bentley, Budenz, and Chambers revelations, placed the administration in a high.ly vulnerable position.

The Congress most assuredly re-claiiied the initia­ tive in the sumiuor of 1948 and held that initiative, ex­ cept for a brief period after the election of 19-'8, until Truman left the Presidency. The ensuing struggle drained the administration of its vitality and raaaien^d it all but helpless. Truaian, although he fought the good flynt, must share a major part of the blane for the final resu''t. 250 From 1948 through July 1950, there were numerous suggestions offered, by staff members and others, for some administration action to counter the grov/ing Congressional demands for more repressive legislation. In April 1949, Clark Clifford proposed the introduction of an admin:stra- tion-sponsored bill that v/ould require the registration of all organizations that existed for the purpose of in­ fluencing public opinion. It was Clifford's belief that such a lav/ would harm no one and v/ould be preferable to the more stringent and narrov/ registration bill being pushed by certain members of Congress. Spingarn proposed a similar bill in July 1950. The m.ost prevalent sugges­ tion, however, involved the appointment of a special bi­ partisan coimnission. Truman took no positive action on any of the proposals until he appointed the Nimitz Com­ mission in January 1951--four months after the passage of the McCarran Internal Security Act. There was no guarantee that some earlier action would have substantially altered the situation, but, in view of ths eventual fate of the administration, it v/ould have been worth an effort. It is often easy to second guess from the vantage point of hindsight. Truaian's problems were irany and com­ plex, and the attempt to find satisfactory solutions would have taxed the coaibined v/isdcai of Washington, defferaon, and Lincoln. But, it is difficult to understand v;hy a President v/ho had made the final decision to dron tVx' /tomic 251 bomb, to .change the course of American foreign policy v/ith his Truman Doctrine, and to relieve from command one of America's foremost military heroes, could not, until it v/as too late, make some effective move to counter an openly defiant Congress. The answer may be found in Truman's consistency. Through the entire contest he insisted that the country was in no grave danger from internal subversion, that the best way to oppose Communism was by improving the quality of American life, and that Congress had turned the prob­ lem of loyalty and security into a political issue for partisan advantage. On that basis, the President stands vindicated. It was the Congress v/ho pushed the matter-- beyond the bounds of necessity or reason--to the point of national hysteria. Truman's sin v;as one of omission. His failure throughout 1949 and most of 1950 to lead positively on the issue of loyalty brought his administration to a painful state v/ith the failure of the Edmltz Comarission in October, 1951. Dean Acheson, in coainarlng piesidents, stated that "Mr. Truiiian v/ill stand v:ith the few vdio in the midst of great difficulty managed their offices with eminent benefit to the Dublic interest.''" Indeed, there were few other

3 Dean Acheson, Present ^i^ i^^'dni. ^.-'y^-.'^'-lrn.-.l'd :^cd_ri. in the State Denartrent" '(3;em''3orhV "37 E3 loltahc; Co. , 19WJ3 p3 7293 252. presidents who exhibited more integrity than Harry Truman, or tried harder to perform the duties of the presidency in an exemplary manner. "In the last analysis," Acheson concluded, "Mr. Truman's methods reflected the basic in­ tegrity of his own character. He could have said of them what Mr. Lincoln said of his: 'I desire tc so conduct the affairs of this administration that if, at the end . . . I have lost every other friend on earth, I shall have at

least one friend left, and that friend shall be down in- 4 side of me.'" Of all the Cjualities the people demand in a president, the one of personal honesty is perhaps the most desirable.

Acheson, Present C- l' the Or ea id on, p. 7o- PW^PrT''"

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Materials From Harry S. Truman Library The Papers of Stephen J. Spingarn The Papers of George M. Elsey The Papers of Clark M. Clifford The Papers of A. Devitt Vanech The Papers of David D. Lloyd The Papers of Charles S. Murphy The Papers of J. Hov/ard McGrath Official Files President's Personal Files Charles S. Murphy Files Clark M. Clifford Files Philleo Nash Files Democratic National Committee Clipping Piles

Records of the President's Comiaission on Internal Security and Individual Rights

Material From The Litrary of Oon~yc:ss The Papers of Theodore F. Gieon

Personal I^EtlEE --1''^ Justice Thoaias C. Clark, August 22, I969, Washington, D. C

Pil'li.e Doeiaie;"^ts ^•^•^ Congressional Record. Vole. 9?-93.

253

1. 254 U.S., National Archives and Records, Service, Federal Register Division. Code of Federal Regulations; 1943-1943 CompilatiorT: ^ "

Unpublished Material Harper, Alan, "The Free Speech Issue in Post VJorld V7ar II Reconstruction." Copy of manuscript in Truman Li­ brary. Theoharis, Athan G., "The Rhetoric of Politics: Foreign' Policy, Internal Security and Domestic Politics in the Truman Era, 1945-1950." Copy of manuscript in Truman Library. Street, Kenneth VJ., "Harry S. Truman: His Role as Legis­ lative Leader, 1945-1948." Unpublished Doctoral dis­ sertation. University of Texas, I963.

Articles Abbott, Roger S. "Federal loyalty Progrsmi: Background and Problems," American Political Sc 1 ence_ Reviev/, XLII (June, 194a}, pp. -M-b5-499. Commager, Henry S. "Red Baitiry in the Colleges," Nev/ Republic, 121 (July 25. 19^9). PP. IO-I3. Levitan, David M. "The Resnonsibility of Administrative Officials in a Democratic Society," Political Science Quarterly, LXII (December, 19'-6), pp. 562-590. Rovere, Richard. "president Harry," Earners Magazine, 197 (July, 1948), pp. 27-35. Sutherland, Arthur. "Ereedomjnd Internal Securitv," Harvard Eaw Eevi.en, 64 (January, 1951)^ VF- 333-^^16. Wechsler, James. '"Hon To Rid The Coveririent of Commun-^ sts," Harpers Magazine, 195 (Eovember, 19''7). PP> Eee-ijaf.

Periot r> c

Business Week Harpers Ih-^ a..azin; Nev/sweek

.w^- m ...'ya'- 255 Nev/ Republic

The Christian Century

The Nation

Time

U. S. Nev^s and V\^orld Report

Nev/spaper s New York Times. I946-I952. Washington Post. 1946-1952.

Books Acheson, Dean. Present at The Creation: My_._Years in The State Department. New York: W. W. Norton & CoT3 I9S93 •"

Allen, Robert S., and Shannon, Williara V. The Truman Merry- Go-Round. New York: The Vanguard Press, inc.,~ lE^^Ol"

Andrews, Bert. VJashington Witch. Hunt. Random House, inc., 1948.

Barth, Alan. The Loyalty of Free iien. New Yor!:: The Viking Press, Tne, l95~l.

. Gover:naent by Investigati.on. Nov/ York: The "Vlking~"Preclf, inc., 193^5.

Beaty, John. 5!^^ ^Phil P-^n3fEll_3''-^l^^Eni£f • Dallas: Wilkinson Fu bits hi rig" Co. , 1353.

Bernstein, Earton J., and Matuaow, Allen J. (eds.) T'^e Z^''4^-l?Iln^3^^4Pi3''^l^''^^-9E*- ^ -^-'^^E'lEE^-EE EhiE3E^'E. "laE Yoi'k: Harper & Eoif, Euellshers, Ipoo.

Biddle, Francis. li^^e_?^2ar_of_ Erecy'.o^ •. Garden City, Eea/ York: DoubleMay d-'Eo. , Incl, diddd. Binkley, Vlllfred. Preaident and Co^agi'eea. hew York: Alfred A. K^.on33~^33ic".3'"^iEif3.

Bontecou, Eleanor. The_Eede>nl J oyaltty - f ecui " ty Ere yiErami Ithaca, ixv/ Yovldf "'CEiriEj 1" t; el/Eraity"" /Vds/d," lyjl

., ^ T: 256 Brov/n, Ralph S., Jr. Loyalty and Security: Employment Tests in the_United States. New Haven: Yale Univer­ sity Press, 195b.

.' ' • ' Carleton, VJilliam G. The Revolution In American Forei.gn Policy: _ Its Global Range. 2nd ed."New York: I^.ndcir) House, Inc., 19B7E ' Carr, Robert K. The House Committee on Un-Amierican Activi­ ties: 1945-1950> Ithaca, Hew York: Cornell Univer- sity Press, 1952. Caughey, John W. In Clear and Present Danger: The Crucial State of Our Freedoms. Chicago: UniVersity of 'Chicago Press, I95S3 Chafee, Zechariah, Jr. Free Speech in The United States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19^(^53 . The Blessinpis of Liberty. New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 195o. Chase, Harold VJ. Security and Liberty: The Problem of Native Comip.unism, 1947-1955. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955". Commager, Henry S., et al. Civil Liberties Under Attack. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. • Freedom, Loya1ty and Dissent. New York: Oxford University Press, 195^1. (ed.). DocuLients of Ameri.cari Ho story. VolVol.. IIi: : Sinc^__^vce 1698^ . 8'th ed. New York3 Appleton-Ce^:itury- tirofts, r9'68. Congressional Quarterly Service. C_onfEia_ss__and_ the J;a_tio_n: 19^2^196^. Washington: Congl'essio^ial Cuarterly Service, I965.

Curr -ent, Richard N., and Garraty, John A. (eds.) Wordj;. TThah t Mace da-\ej.dn;iy.nJFnptoryp Colonial Tia\p^_t^ IBYO'S'"70 ^ 2hd" cd. Eoston: little, Erov/n and Co., 19^5. Cusliman, Robert E. Civi^l ilbertles__iji_laEL_jEl^:^lE-.S"3:alE' A_^y-^^^ d^9^S^^'^dd''^JdLaiFFidi^axd:d^^^ .'tnrea : Cornell' lihiv'ersity Iresn, 195o. Douglas, William 0. An A] m-nac of J! dlmrty. Garden Oi.ty, New York: Doubleday'l-'Mo. , inc., lay-'. I,: 257 Druks, Herbert M. Harry S. Truman and The Russians: 1945- 1953. New Yorlcl Robert Speller & Sons, Inc., 190b. Fellman, David. The Limits of Freedom. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1959." Gellhorn, VJalter. Security, Loyalty and Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Pre'ss, 19503 . American Rights: The Constitution. New York: The Macmillan Co.'; 19603 Goldbloom, Maurice J. American Security and T'^reedom.. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. Goldman. Eric. The Crucial Decade and After: America, 1945-1960. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 19^6. Kirkendall, Richard S. (ed.) The Truman Period as a Re­ search Field. Columbia: "University of Missouri Press, 1957. Koenig, Louis VE (ed.) The Truman Ad:• aInistration: Its Principles and Practice. New Yor::: Nov/ York Univ'er- sity Press, 1956. Lament, Corliss. Freedom Is as Freedoai Does: Civil Liber­ ties Today. riev/ York: Horizon Press, 1956. Latham, Earlt The Communist Controversy in Washington: From The Nev/ Doar"to MeCarUvy." N'ev/ Yoida: Alhefieum, 1909. Longaker, Richard P. The Presidency and Individual Liber­ ties. Ithaca: Co3^ne33i 'University Press, 19bl. Lubell, Samuel. The^J-nXnre_jafJa:ierlejm_^ 2nd^ed. Garden City,'Lew York: h^oub^:.edc,y C: Co., lr>c., Ify2. McWilliems, Carey. 2a3JhElE.iiilEEL lddil..xxd^ddydz^idFL ::"*/" X T: Boston: Little",' Erown and Co., ISoO. Pfeffer, Leo. T]}e Ilhertlee jaf j:y American: _tEie Sinmx; Court Sneaks. •"'2i33" ed 3 " Eos ton: Tne Eeacon Ereas,

Phillips, Cabell. Tne Tranan F;!.nraiean\ayp^ _ ire hystcnygo a^Trluaiohent SuncJsEi^ni." ^ ''i^ea ForF: tne E^aaiallan Go77T^93^3i;

|. 258 Pritchett, Herman C. Civil Liberties and The Vinson Court Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 195431 Rice, Charles E. Freedowi of Association. Nev/ York: New York University Press, I962.

Rovere, Richard. Senator Joe lacCarth^m Tear York: Har- court, Brace & Wo'rrd, lific".", 1959. Seldes, George. Witch Hinat: The Techniques and Profits of Red Baiting. Hew York: Modern Age Books, 1940. Sellin, Thorsten (ed.). Intei^nal Security and Civil Rights. Pniladelphla: tlie Initfri. can Acad eaiy''3el' Poll ti cai and Social Sciences, 1955. Shannon, David A. The Decline of Aaierican Communism. Nev/ York: Harcourt, Brace and' Co.", Inc.,~ 1959. Steinberg, Alfred. The Man From Missouri: The Life and Times of Harry S. Trunin. Eei/ York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962. Sujimiers, Robert E. (ed. ). Federa 1_JE'g oraiation Control.rg Jni Peacetime. New York: "The H^ w: Vfilson Col, 1949.y !• Thomas, Nonaan. The ^yft^ jail Er^ era om. -^^'' York: W. W. Norton C: Co., Inc., lyyf-. Truman, Earry S. Memoirs. 2 vols. Garden City, Eev/ York: Doubleday S: Co., Inc., 1955. 1956. White, William S. The Taft Stoiyn New York: Harper Er. Brothers, 195''.

i^ APPENDIX

TEA The Report of the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty IB Executive Order 9835 II Criteria for Designating Organizations Under Executive Order No. 9835 III Memorandum to All Officers and Employees in the Executive Branch of the Governjiient IV Internal Security Act, 1950--Veto Message from the President of the United States

25^y ' 260 APPEI\[DIX IA

THE REPORT OP THE PRESIDENT'S TEMPORARY COMiMISSTON ON EPiPLOYEE LOYALTY'' VI. RECOMivIEFDATIONS

Based on the foregoing general and specific conclu­ sions of the Commission, the following reconmiendations are respectfully submitted:

Under Paragraph 3c of Executive Order No. 98o5, it is recommended as follov/s:

a. Each department and agency shall be responsible for prescribing and supervising its ov/n loyalty procedures, in accordance with generally applicable minimum requirements hereinafter recomimended. b. A central master card index shall be miaintain.ed in the Civil Service Coirmissicei covering all persons on v/hom. loyalty investigations have been made by any department or agency since Sentemher 1, 1939. The master file shall contain the naaie, adequate identifying infomration and an indication that a report can be found in the approariate deyarl.ent or agency. The investigative renort Xi eaah. ease shall renaln in the inveatigating agency. c. (l) At the request of the head c'' aray deyarimert or agencv an i nee a ti-a live a-encv ahal"' mah.r

"Oh2-,21, Trum-ii ianers, Inuaian E-''iraa; 261

available to such head, personally, all investiga­

tive material and information collected by the in­

vestigative agency on any employee or prospective

employee of the requesting department or agency,

or shall make such material and information avail­

able to any officer or officers designated by such

head and approved by the investigating agency.

(2) Notv/ithstanding the foregoing requirement,

hov/ever, the investigative agency may refuse to

disclose the names of confidential informants,

provided it furnishes sufficient information about

such infoimants on the basis of v.liich the request­

ing department or agency can m.ake an adequate eval­

uation of the informiation furnished by themi, and

provided it advises the requesting department or

agency in v/riting that it is essential to the pro­

tection of the informants or to the investigation

of other cases that the identity of the infon-ants

not be revealed. It is not intended that investi­

gative agencies should use this discretion to de­

cline to reveal sources of infor.ration where such.

action is not essential. d. The Attorney General shali. currently fnrnaah i.n- foraiation to tr:e Civil Service Co. aiaaion on all

organizations desi.gnated by hai:i in accordance nith

"ttr^ r»-r* eo-"^ r^r; o^-h-uy! ^ c. -r. ' ^ V, rr'-rar^araT}h •;' of 262 recommendations under Paragraph 3d of Executive Order 9806. The Civil Service Comjnission shall disseminate this information to all departments and agencies together with any other current in­ formation on related loyalty problems. It shall be the responsibility of the Loyalty Board, here­ inafter provided, upon request, to advise any de­ partment or agency on loyalty m.atters. e. The Loyalty Boards of the various departments and agencies, hereinafter provided, may be called upon by The Civil Service Commission or the Loyalty Re­ view Board for reports to indicate the number of loyalty cases on v/hich a determination has been made during a given period. f. Each department or agency shall be responsible for the loyalty investigation of any of its employees v/henever it is deeiiied ,necessary. Those depart­ ments and agencies not having investigative organi­ zations v/iII use the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Commission. g. (I) There shall be a loyalty investigation of all persons entering the employ of any department oi* agency. All investigations of persona enteriny the coaipetitive sei'vice shall ba conducted hy the Civil Sei-vice Coaivd.ssiori, except in such c"ses rs are covered bv a snecial <: '•'•nni'ant cetvai.en tiia 263 Commission and any given department or agency. The investigation of all persons entering the employ of any department or agency, other than those en­ tering the competitive service, shall be the re­ sponsibility of the employing department or agency.

(2) The investigation shall be conducted either before or after a person goes on the payroll. In the case of a persons entering the competitive service, if the investigation continues after the date he goes on the payroll and is not completed v/ithin 18 months froai that date, the condition that his employment is subject to investigation shall expire except in a case v/here the Civil Service Com­ mission has made an adjudication of disloyalty and the case continues to be active by reason of ap­ peal.

(3) A full field investigation shall be conducted of those applicants desigrated by the head of the employing deeartaient or agency, such deadyneti.on to be based on v/hat he considers to be in the best interest of national security.

(4) An inveatigatien short of a full ^F m a •• gation shall he i-de on all othai' ayp^ available uer thai ent: ^. . -. • 264 i. Federal Bureau of Investigation files; ii. Civil Service Commission files; iii. Military and naval intelligence files and .;^ the files of any other pertinent mtelli- gence or governmiental investigative agency not previously referred to; iv. House Committee on Un-American Activities files; V. Local Iav\r enforcemient files at the place

of residence or em.ployment, such as munici­ pal, county and state; vi. School and college; vii. Former employer or emiployers; viii. References; ix. Any other slarilar checks as m.ay be appro­ priate. If any of thes cg_E_eni-'-ces ]"eveal derogatory J.n- foi'mation, there snai.l thei"t be a full field investigation. h. Each department and agency to the extent that it has not already done so, or the Ci.vil Service COi.a-lssion, shall submit lists of the names of all of its ineua:- bent etiployees (and sueri other nc eeasary ia^n:.dXdylny material as the I'ederal Eaw-aa of Investlgati.Tai : ay require to the Denartment of duatiee, 'd.lc'-: atadl check such, iists t'-ai.nat its I'wcoi-ia c" ne'-seiiS 265 concerning whom there is substantial evidence of being within the purview of paragraphs (i) to (vi) of the recommendations herein made under paragraph 3d of Executive Order 9806. After such check is made each department and agency shall make, or cause to be made by the Civil Service Commission, such other investigation of its employees as the head of the department or agency shall deem advisable, as indicated by the aforesaid check, i. That the President direct the Security Advisory Board of the State-V.'ar-Navy Coordinating Coimriittee to draft uniform minimum rules applicable to the handling or transmission of all confidential docu­ ments, or other doctunents or informiation v/hich should not be publicly disclosed, and upon approval by the President, such rules shall apply to all de- partm.ents and agencies of the Executive Eranch of the Governmient. Under Paragraph 3cl of Executive Order Eo. 9S06, it is recoaimended as follov.s: a. The responsibility for acting upon investi.gative reports shall be left to the respecti.ve deparintents and agencies and not to a ce-;taal agency or cen- mittee. b. The head of each denarhiant ani a-;ency al ami. ay- point a Loyalty Eoard oi" Eea_ ds of na.t .ea 266 three members each for the purpose of hearing loyalty cases. c. There shall be established in the Civil Service Commission a Loyalty Review Board with power: i. to advise all departments and agencies on all problemis related to employee loyalty; ii. to disseminate all information pertinent thereto; iii. to coordinate the employee loyalty policies and procedures of the various departments and agencies; iv. to make any rules and regulations deemed neces­ sary to .implem.ent applicable statutes and Ex­ ecutive Orders; V. to m.ake reports and submit recoamaendations to the President from tim.e to time v.lienever such actions are deemed necessary to the maintenance of the em.ployee loyalty programi: vi. Except in cases arising in a department or

agency v/hich is authorized to remove an employee summai'ily for security reasons (as non provided for in Public la-/ Eo. 8o8 an.d under the MC^ rran Rider), the Loyalty Review lieard sEail have pov/er to reviea: casta involving suiversive or disloyal persons and to make advisoiy reec m:n,r- dations thcrean to the head of tie G;.IO:'eying departr.en.t or ayeney. Caaea vh-'eh ar/ au'ltci 267 to reviev/ may be referred to this Board for advisory recommendations either by an employ- ing agency or department or by an employee in the Executive Branch of the Government v/ho has been adjudged to be disloyal or subversive. Under Paragraph 3c oP Executive Order No. 9806, it is recommended as foIlov\^s:

a. An employee v/ho is charged with being disloyal shall • have a right to an administrative hearing before a Loyalty Board in the employing department or agency. He m.ay appear personally, accom.panied by counsel or representative of his ov/n choice, v/ith v/itnesses, and present any evidence, including affidavits, in his behalf. Each department or agency shall prescribe regulations for the conduct of these hearings. b. The employee shall have the right to reply in writ­ ing to the charges so m.ade and each agency shall serve a written notice on such employee containing: i. a statement of the charges preferred against him, the specification of such charges to be as coaiplete as seeuvity considerations permit: ii. a statement that he has a right to reply to the

charges m v/ritm; vlthin a reasonable nerioa of time, to be specified;

111. a statoiacnt as to his right of heariry, in he so desires, at vdlci) ho ]ny: ntraeinliy aaniar 268 with counsel or representative of his ov/n choice, and v/itnesses, and present evidence,

including affidavits, in his o\m behalf. c. VThen a Loyalty Board recommends removal there shall be, prior to removal, a right of appeal under pro­ visions prescribed by the head of each department or agency. d. The rights of hearing, notice and appeal shall be accorded to all employees, irrespective of tenure or manner, method or nature of appointment. Under Paragraph. 3d of Executive Order No. 9806, it is recoLtmended as follov/s: The underlying standard for either the refusal of etiploy- ment or removal from em.ployment in loyalty cases shall be that, on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for believing that the person involved is disloyal to the Gov^ernment of the United States. Individual emi- ployee activities and associations v/hich m.ay be con­ sidered in this connection include one or more of the following: i. Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or nreynrationa

therefore, or knowingly associating wit^•^• ^ or saboteurs;

11. Treason or sedition or advoeaey t>ier^:Of:

• • • 111. Advocacy of revolution or force oi' violence to r-l tcr our constitutional forai of goverriant: 269 iv. intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of documents or information of a confidential or non-public character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his employmient by the Government of the United States; V. Performing or attempting to perforin his duties or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another goverrmient in preference to the interests of the United States; vi. Membership in, affiliation v/ith or sympathetic asso­ ciation v/ith any foreigji or do.m.estic organization, association, movement, group or combination of per­ sons, designated by the Attorney General as totali­ tarian, fascist, commrunist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commiission of acts of force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights, or as one vdnich seeks to alter our form of government by unconstitu­ tional m.eans. Under Paragraph 3e of^JyiSCuEi\n^_Ordxir No. yaOo, it is recoaimended as foll.ovw>:

a. That the temporary legislation hy which thx- feere- taries of the Ear, Eavy arX Site Eayarhients c-n presently reaiove bn:y O'^inix^yee si^n'.x.rily for aear:'"- ity reasons, be i::adc permanent heeauae of the t^a^- sltive nature of the ooerati.ona o.' 270 departments, and that permanent legislation of the same character be enacted to grant similar pov/er to the Atomic Energy Commiission. b. That all of the recommendations contained in this report be effectuated by the promulgation of an Executive Order which v/ill simultaneously provide for the abrogation of Executive Order No. 9300, dated February 5, 1943. In conclusion, the Commission recommends that this report, together with anj^ Executive Order v/hich the Presi­ dent may issue, be submitted to Congress for consideration. A. Devitt Vanech Chairman John E. Peurifoy Edward H. Foley, Jr. Kenneth C. Royall John L. Sullivan Earrv B. I'litchell. 271 APPENDIX IB

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9835*

Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an Em­ ployees Loyalty Program in the Execu.tive Branch ol the Government

WHEREAS each employee of the Governiaent of the United States is endov/ed v/ith a measure of trusteeship over the democratic processes which are the heart and sinev/ of the United States; and

VJHEREAS it js of vital importance that persons em- ployed in the Federal service be of com.plete and unsv/erving loyalty to the United States; and WHEREAS, although the loyalty of by far the over­ whelming majority of all Government em.ployees is bey^ond question, the presence v/ithin the Government service of any disloyal or subversive person constitutes a threat to our democratic processes; and WrlEEEAS maximum protection must be afforded the United States against infiltration of disloyal persons into the ranks of its eaioloyees, and ceual protection from un­ founded accusations of disloyei.ty m.ust be afforded the loyal emolovees of the Goaern-ient:

U.S., Nati.onal Archives and Eeeords Servloe, ^ r'eder^- Register Division, i>:^3£_ of Jed. e;E.lJE y.En. 11:0^ 1 c Corapllation, Executi.ve Oidena, yy . 0.-7-Ori-. •5 \%0^ <

272 NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including the Civil.Service Act of 1883 (22 Stat. 403), as amended, and section 9-A of the act approved August 2, 1939 (18 U.S.C. 61 i), and as President and Chief Executive of the United States, it is hereby, in the interest of the internal management of the Government, ordered as follov/s: PART I--INTESTIGATION OF APPLICANTS 1. There shall be a loyalty investigation of every person entering the civilian emaployment of any department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Govern­ ment . a. Investigations of persons entering the competitive service shall be conducted by the Civil Service Commission, except in such cases as are covered by a special agreement betv:con the Commission and any given departm.ent or agency. b. Investigations of persons other than those entering the competitive service shall be conducted by the employing department or agency. Departaients and agencies without investigative organizations shall

utilize the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Coaaiission. 2. The investigations of perso.as entering the caplo:, of the executive branci. may be conduebed after any suen person enters upon actual e. ployment toerem, but :n anv such case the antointaie-it of ei eh niraon siia.. :e

ST fe' 273 conditioned upon a favorable determination v/ith respect to his loyalty.

a. Investigations of persons entering the competitive

service shall be conducted as expeditiously as

possible; provided, hov/ever, that if any such in­

vestigation is not completed within l8 months fre i

the date on which a person enters actual employnnent,

the condition that his employment is subject to in­

vestigation shall expire, except in a case in v.^hich

the Civil Service Commission has made an initial

adjudication of disloyalty and the case continues

to be active by reason of an appeal, and it shall

then be the responsibility of the om.ploying depart­

ment or agency to conclude such investigation and

make a final deter-.tiination concerning the loyalty

of such person.

3. An investigation shall be made cf all applicants at all

available pertinent sources of infoi^aation and shall

include reference to: a. Eederal Eureau of investigation files.

b. Civil Service Ccariissioai files.

c. Military and naval intelligence files.

• d. Ta.e files cf any other appropriate goanra.aant

investigative or intelligenee agea.ey.

e. House Cca:aii ttee on un-haieniean retivat:"cs hi les.

f. Local lan-eni: oree:ni;iL. :..LLO r .. v. . ^. •.. J C- 274

residence and emplo:^Tnent of the applicant, in­

cluding municipal, county, and State law-

enforcemient files.

g. Schools and colleges attended by applicant,

h. Former em-ployers of applicant,

i. References given by applicant.

j. Any other appropriate source.

V^enever derogatory infonnation with respect to loyalty of an applicant is revealed a full field investigation shall be conducted. A full field investigation shall also be conducted of those applicants, or of applicants for particular positions, as may be designated by the head of the employing departaient or agency, such desig­ nations to be based on the deteri.;ination by^ any such head of the best interests of national security.

PART II--IE\/ESTIGAT10E OE Ei^EEOYEES

Tho head of each deyartm.ent and aaaney in the executive bi'anch of the Government sh^ll te personally respon-^ible for an effecti.ve oroan^am to assure that di.sloval civiliai) oiiicers or eaioiovees are not retained in e d-C'^'Wen b 1

c Vy o C '->, oil 1-' -.-. •,- • C. q •'^ r) —, '; e for oi'eaerj.e:

-. f \- v: .o--altv .^' V - non nroeeea

•cnartment or a '•- <-. - - -. v^ o '''» r- r\ ".*' •• o • v;..tn tne nro-

Vrsrons o:" tnra oreer o ..^. . :^e cr~: ..:re

c* o 'J.. L' V,' _. •_! J. • ! •; "1 r-: 275 b. The head of a department or agency which does not have an investigative organization shall utilize the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Conmiission. 2. The head of each department and agency shall appoint one or more loyalty boards, each com.posed of not less than three representatives of the departm.ent or agency concerned, for the purpose of hearing loyalty cases arising v/ithin such departmient or agency and making recommendations v/ith respect to the removal of any officer or eimployee of such department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty, and he shall prescribe regulations for the conduct of the proceedings before such boards. a. An officer or employee vnio is charged v/ith being disloyal shall have a right to an administ.rative hearing before a loyalty board in the eiaploying department or agency. He may apnear before such board oersonally, aceoaioanied by counsel or repre­ sentative of his own choosing, and creaent evidence on his ov/n behalf, through witnesses or by affi.da-

vit. b. The officer or eaiployaa sh/li. he served nith a v/ritten notice of sueh he" ring in sufficiert tir:e, and shall be Frnorned therein of the r^ituiw. oh ihe

chargeC.5 s aoainat liiai in sufih.ei^nb deiai!', fO thai 276 he will be enabled to prepare his defense. The charges shall be stated as specifically and com­ pletely as, in the discretion of the employing de­ partment or agency, security considerations permit, and the officer or employee shall be informed in the notice (1) of his right to reply to such charges in writing within a specified reasonable period of time, (2) of his right to an administrative hear­ ing on such charges before a loyalty board, and (3) of his right to appear before such board per­ sonally, to be accompanied by counsel or represen­ tative of his ov/n choosing, and to present evidence on his behalf, through v/itness or by affidavit. 3 A recommendation of removal by a loyalty board shall be subject to appeal by^ the officer or employee affected, prior to his rem.oval, to the head of the employing de­ partment or agency or to such person or persons as t.ay be designated by such head, under such regulations as may be prescribed by hiai, and the decision of the de­ partment or ayeney conceined shall be subject to cp- peal to the Civil Service Cem-M.ssion's Eoixilty Eavi.en Board, hereinafter' provided for, for a.n advisory reco./-

mendation

4. The rights of hearing, notice thereof real V. 1 <^ - '- • fro^a shall be aecorded to eaery officer or e

prior to n-*.s remc>vai. on O; C 277 of tenure, or of manner, method, or nature of appoint­ ment, but the head of the employing department or agency may suspend any officer or employee at any tim:e pending a determination with respect to loyalty. 5. The loyalty boards of the various departments and agen­ cies shall furnish to the Loyalty Reviev/ Board, here­ inafter provided for, such reports as may be requested concerning the operation of the loyalty program in any such department or agency.

PART III--11ESP0NSIBILITIES OF CIVIL SEKV^ICE COMiilSSION

1. There shall be established in the Civil Service Com­ mission a Loyalty Reviev/ Board of not less than three impartial persons, the m.embers of v/hich shall be offi­ cers or em.ployees of the Corrals sion. a. The beard shall have authority to reviev/ cases in­ volving persons recomaiended for dismissal on gro^n-.ds relating to loyalty by the loyalty board of any de­ partment or agency and to make advisory recoaaaenda- tions thereon to the he-d of the emnieying detart- ment or agency. Sueh cases may be referred to t-e Board ei.ther by the eanELoying dena.rk.ent or agency, or by the officer or enyloyee coneerned.

b. The Eoard sEall nahe rad ea and regul^abiona, not

inconsistent i/i.th the provrWiOin; oi tin.a om.er

deemed necessary iaa imoi.e.ient statui^ea (-•.: -i. )• "eea ^2&a

278 orders relating to employee loyalty. c. The Loyalty Review Board shall also: i. Advise all departmerits and agencies on all problems relating to employee loyalty. ii. Disseminate information pertinent to em.ployee loyalty programs, iii. Coordinate the em-ployee loyalty policies and procedures of the several departiaonts and agencies, iv. Make reports and submit recommendations to

the Civil Service Coamiission for transmission to the President from time to time as may be necessary to the m.aintenance of the em.ployee loyalty program. 2. There shall also be established and miaintained in the Civil Service Commission a central iraster index cover­ ing all persons on v/hom loyalty investigations have been made by any denartment oi- agency since Settember 1, 1939. Such master index shall contain the mae cf c person investigated, adeauato identifying informatio- concerning each such nei'se-n, and a refeienee to cmch department and agency vdiieh has condneted a ley^alty investi.gation co-iee:aniny the yereon iaaeolvea. a. All executive departments and ageneiea are diive­ to furnish to the Civii Servi ee Co.r-'aaion ail i: foraiation v.nnro nda le for ihe eatihl;--.' ami an" 279 maintenance of the central master index.

b. The reports and other investigative material and

information developed by the investigating depart­

ment or agency shall be retained by such departmx-nt

or agency in each case.

3. The Loyalty Reviei/ Board shall currently bo furnished

by the Department of Justice the name of each foreign

or domestic organization, association, movement, group

or combination of persons v/hich the Attorney General,

after appropriate investigation and determination,

designates as totalitarian, fascist, communist or sub­

versive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating

or approving the commiission of acts of force or violence

to deny others their rights under the Constitution of

the United States, or as seeking to alter the foiri of

government of the United States by unconstitutional

means. a. The Loyalty Reviev/ Board shall disseminate such information to all departments and agencies.

pA-3-n T-tr ci-pcrr-^TVY anwannns '^F i:yyxaTTo/\aTOEh

1. At the recuestj- o^-'f » -?-v,-the. nea;-.-.' t-' or-K-^i ao-.',-.n - .-• --.-•,--._ v^--i.' ;....•-v • _'.•--,; --I •'^• ' ,-..-(•- •..• j-r.^ v.•y-o^v"'- _ . _ " of the executive oranen an rnveatigatav:. ....,.„^.. ^...... ;;rall

make available to such iiead, personally, aii i.nveetl:

tive material and information cclleetad by the inveai

gative agency concerning any cmyl^i^yea oi* yreayeet^ve 280 employee, of the requesting department or agency, or shall make such material and information available to any officer or officers designated by such head and approved by tho investigative agency.

Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, hov/ever, the investigative agency may refuse to disclose the names of confidential informiants, provided it furnishes suffi­ cient information about such informants on the basis of v^/hich the requesting department or agency can make an adequate evaluation of the inforination furnished by them, and provided it advises the requesting departm.ent or agency in v/rlting that it is essential to the pro­ tection of the informiants or to the investigation of other cases that the identity of the infoiriants not be revealed. Investigative agencies shall not use this discretion to decline to reveal sources of information v/here such action is not essential. Each department and agency of the executive branch should develop and maintain, for the collection and analysis of informati.on relating to loyalty of its eti­ ployees and prospective employees, a staff specially trained in security techil.enee, and an effective se­ curity control systeai for protecting sueh: in:"-oramlien generally and foi' nroteetiny confi denti.a 1 ao'areia cl

1 • -^^ -f* such tniotmavron narticu 1 •:•-••'! ^'• 281 PART V~-STAra)ARDS

1. The standard for the refusal of employment or the re­ moval from employment in an executive department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for be­ lief that the person involved is disloyal to the Govern­ ment of the United States. 2. Activities and associations of an applicant or employee v/hich may be considered in connection v/ith the determina­ tion of disloyalty^ may include one or m.ore of the follov/- ing; a. Sabotage, espionage, or attem.pts or preparations therefor, or knowingly associating vith spies or saboteurs; b. Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof; c. Advocacy of revolution or force or violeriee to alter the constitutional foiar of governnant of the United States; d. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any pennon, under circumstances vEneh may indicate disloyaity to the United States, of dceurienti or i.nfon. ntlen of a confidentiaj. or iion-public e'-aw.^acter ohtained

by the person '-^•Xv..v.; ,L:-•r. rXUii. v- d'ueleaui..-_-o^ _'• n ae a resu.at o his O'lployrent by the Governrent

e. Terfoian.ny or atteaiotiny i.tco ne

O -'-".^,'-••.••--* r;".. •:.r""f" 1 >" '" '',T) T-^-'vJ . ".'^ '^> ;'-f-'^">'••"' t;'e " n'..erca-. S^ST^'ST*"''

282 another government in preference to the interests of the United States, f. Membership in, affiliation v/ith or sympathetic association v/ith any foreign or dom.estic organi­ zation, association, mxovement, group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commiission of acts of force or vio­ lence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of governr.ient of the United States by unconstitutional means.

PART VI--MISCEEEAEEOUS

1. Each department and agency of the executive branch, to the extent that it has not already done so, shall sub­ mit, to the Eederal Eureau of Investigation of the Departa.ent of Justice, either directly or Xnroayn the Civil Service Coarlssion, the names (and such other necessary identifying material as the Eederal of Investigation ray reanire) of all of its inevmihent

eiaployees. a. Tiie Eederal Eureau of Inveillgation sEil.l chaak

such names against i.ta rec ores of vera ear- C'xeie Vi i.ng v/hcri there is sueatenElal evi.ccnee OJ. : : 1 a.g within the era-vie.- of y. rayraoh 2 of fo-t E wmkx 283 hereof, and shall notify each department and agency of such information. b. Upon receipt of the above-mentioned information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, each department and agency shall make, or cause to be made by the Civil Service Commission, such investi­ gation of those emploj'-ees as the head of the de- pa.rtm-ent or agency shall deem advisable. The Security Advisory Board of the State-VJar-Navy Co­ ordinating Committee shall draft rules applicable to the handling and transmission of confidential documents and other documents and information v/hich should not be publicly disclosed, and upon approval by the Presi­ dent such rules shall constitute the malnimum standards for the handling and transmr'.ssi.on of such docurients and info.rmation, and shall be applicable to all departm.ents and agencies of the executive branan. The provisions of this order shall not be applicable to Dersons sumaiarily reaioved under the provisions of section 3 of the act of Deeeaiber 17, Iphf, 56 Stat. 1153, of the act of July 5. ^936, 60 Stat, or of any other statute conferring the po-/er of. summary raaoval. The Secretary of Ear and the Secretary o:" the Eavy, ea.-' tho Secretary eX the Treasury with resy^-ai to the Cnaat Guard, ai:^e hereoy dii'ected to contlnae to e.Ve:^ae : ii maintain the hi'd-'eat stand: rds o" loyalty nlthin the 1^ 284 armed services, pursuant to the applicable statutes, the Articles of VJar, and the Articles for the Govern­ ment of the Navy. 5. This order shall be effective iimr.edlately, but ccrinli- ance with such of its provisions as require the expendi­ ture of funds shall be deferred pending the appropria­ tion of such funds. 6. Executiive Order No. 930O of February 5. 1943. is hereby revoked.

HARRY S. TRUIIIAN THE WHITE HOUSE March 21, 1947. .,• f.'

285 APPEIEiIX II

CRITERIA FOR DESIGNATING ORGANIZATIONS UNDER EXECUTB^E ORDER NO. 9835^

July 24, 1947 Douglas VJ. McGregor, Assistant to the Attorney General David N. Edelstein and Joseph C. Duggon The specific criteria to be considered in determin­ ing v/hether any foreign or domestic organization should be designated by the Attorney General as v/ithin the purviev/ of the standard defined in Paragraph 2f of Part 7 of Execu­ tive Order No. 9835 are as follov/s: 1. a "totalitarian" organization is one v/hich subscribes to the principles of, advocates the policies of, or favors or advances the m.ethods of the unitary state characterized by a highly centralized governmient under the control of a political caste v;hich allows no recognition of or repi'esentation to opposition parties or minority groups. Such a state is best exeaiplified hy that which existed in Nazi Germ;^ny or Fascist Italy; and for praetica] pnryosea, a "totalitarian ort;aniaation" is one vdiich advoeatea the replacement of the Areriean dea:oer*tie foi. ad government by the creation, eetahli.shnent end ye: - petuatlon of sue], a state in the E..:*ted Sta Las;

Vr'anec h vc Tr^^:;•n-:•" ."* -^. e '• 111:1 an 286

2. in form, the totalitarian political and economic

state may be either Fascist or Cormmunist. In

both instances it is monolithic and m.akes no pro­

vision for representative government. Hence, any

organization v/hich actually advocates the politi­

cal, economic or social philosophy of either form

may be aptly designated as "totalitarian";

3. a "fascist" organization is one v/hich advocates

the principles, policies or methods of Fascism or

Nazism as expressed through a highly centralized

state, totalitarian in form, authoritarian and

absolute in substance, and v/hich is the negation

of representative, deirocratic goverinaent in that

it brooks no opposition to the ruling party,

suoresses minoilties, deiaies civil rignts, ana

makes of the citizen a creature and chattel of

the state; 4. a "communist" organization is one v/hich advocates

the principles, pelieies and methods of the Co.a-

munist roruy [a'^.----^a e^:^iL u.-...... r L_.^~-J. .•-.- t,-.u

nomic tneorres oa -arl .•nr.^, r..'.^^..^^n ^:..^..j-b ^..:

Nicolai Eeain) aa exanasaed through a highly cer

arn.rl -: T.r. tralieed •'.^ U-: and absolute in suhatanee, an- in adXen reyreeen- tative, denoeratie gevainrieil X replaced Fy the foam of noliti.eal ongar.iaatlon h loan : s tne 287 "dictatorship of the proletariat." 5. In addition to the Commiunist Party itself, other organizations may be properly designated "com­ munist" if they

a. consistently follow the "Communist Party line" through one or more changes particu­ larly v/here such change is in accord v/ith the goverrmnental policy of Soviet Russia and opposed to that of the United States; b.' advocate revolution or the use of force, if necessary, in order to bring about political 'or economic changes; c. advocate Communist Party policies and ob­ jectives vdiile subscribing to democratic forms and principles and generally through utilization of deceptive "fronts"; d. consistently adliere to, approve and ad­ vocate Communist Party "causes" and the nolitical and econoan.e noliciea and jn;'o- grams of the govern.rent of Soviet YX.eala and its satellite nations in oyyositi.on to those of the gO'/ernaient of the Un-"ted

-/ ^.-?-' o

6. v/hile "fascist" and "ce.: .nniat'' oaaaniaati en..

?oln totartt'waLan • ?nn ca/enee, i V .'- '...•-•. .. : . o .. disarree ar^ teoinirrue ana metroao.'eyin a.-n 288 of organization, therefore, has adopted a policy of condemning the other by publicly opposing its principles and castigating it by naite-calling and opprobrious epithets. Hence, a totalitarian or­ ganization vdaich consistently castigates and con­ demns any opposition as "Fascist" may properly be designated as "Coaimunist, " and, conversely, any totalitarian organization which consistently casti­ gates and condeiiins any organization as "Comjnunist" m.ay properly be designated as "Fascist. " 7. A "Subversive" organization is one v.liich seeks to underimine confidence in, pervert or corrupt the integrity of the operations of, overth:acv;, ruin, betray, cause the dornfall of, change by revolu­ tion or force, or subordinate to a foreign pov;er the govern.,.ent of the Enited States. Advocacy of any such purposes categori;:£s an crganiaation as subversive regardless of the meana or methods adopted to effeeturte such puiyaisa. The foreyolny eriteria have dean forrulated on tha

ac^-M: •-•:-. j--: nv: T^r-,' C t'' e ' Uot: ./1 11 SO J. .,0 ^.:- J.e .-; - oO 01.'- -.'^,..;J- nev General OJ. n.-S s^niu..: L..^..^. ^. ^.:^- c..„ '^n. ^ v..^^ .. - .. ..'-- --.^

L/ V,'- k^ -^.o 'w —* »-' -•- •*' - ^ »

^ • • J ^ r -• -^

iitto: - •.' . : •. I , ^ C. •

. J X" _ - >-• « .. >.. w ^ . •-. 1 , '.-nn A ^>- : r •'-^ y -.o yr;

• r- 1 •*^ E — ^ F •''- "' " -' 1 ' r"^^ 289 APPENDIX III

MEM0RANDU14 TO ALL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN TtPE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVi:ENE!dET:*

The efficient and just administration of the Eeiployee Loyalty Program, under Executive Order No. 9835 of. March 21, 1947, requires that reports, records, and files relative to the program be preserved in strict confidence. This is necessary in the interest of our national security and v/el~ fare, to preserve the confidential character and sources of informiation furnished, and to protect Government per­ sonnel against the dissemiination of unfounded or disproved allegations. It is necessary also in older to insure the fair and just disposition of loyalty cases. For these reasons, and in accordance vith the long- established policy that reports rermered by the Eederal Bureau of Investigation and other iaiveetlgative agencies of the executive branch are to he I'ogardad as confidential, all reports, reeonde, e.nd files ralatlve to the le:,w.lty cf employees or troe^nctive employees (including renerts of such investigative ageneice), shall be maintained in con­ fidence, and shall not he trana.aitted or ("' aehose" e as reou.i-i:'ed in the effieient cor... art 01 :."

Elsey layers, jh-^teair «.- — * I T 1-, " T' "," " " 290 Any subpena [sic] or demiand or request for infoimia- tion, reports, or files of the nature described, received from sources other than those persons in the executive branch of the Government v/ho are entitled th.ereto by reason of their official duties, shall be respectfully declined, on the basis of this directive, and the subpena [sic] or demand or other request shall be referred to the Office of the President for such response as the President m.ay de­ termine to be in the public interest in the particular case. There shall be no relaxation of the provisions of this directive except with miy express authority. This directive shall be published in the Federal

Register.

HARRY TEuMAE

THE WHITE HOUSE,

March 13. 1948. 291

APPENDIX IV

INTERNAL SECURITY ACT, I95O--VETO MESSAGE

PROM THE PRESIDENT OE THE Uia'TED SlATEs"

The Speaker laid before the House the followln rr veto message from the President of the United States: To the House of Re pre sent ativ e_s:

I return herewith, UTithout my approval, H.R. 9490, the proposed "internal Security Act of I950." I am taking this action only after the most serious study and reflection and after consultation with the se­ curity and intelligence agencies of the Governrent. Tlie Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Denartment of State have all advised me that the bill nould seriouslv dar.^-'^- the security and intelligence operations for vdiULCh they are responsible. They have st:^'ongly exnressed the hope that the bill v/ould not become lean This IS ari onntou.s cili contaiir_ng many otfievent legislative pranosals vrlth only one tiln^: in ce/aron: they are all renreeented to he "antiennannist.'" Put vdian t'^e many comnli.cated ni.eeea of th^ •. a startliny result aonears.

"TT *^ r nr; r--.• ,0 cr c •• '-v> •: ~i '-'-r-n.-^-' PO -.: •'.• fn -. r -v- •-r •i-yn'^ 3 he, - >^. ij., K,;_.^. j.,;r :.r--- aorc-.

ik.: '^' 292 H.R. 9490 would not hurt the Communists. Instead, it would help them..

It has been claimxd over and over again that this is an "anticommunist" bill--a "Comjnunist'control" bill. But in actual operation the bill would have results exactly the opposite of those intended. It would actually v/eaken our existing Internal se­ curity measures and v/ould seriously hamper the Eederal Bureau of Investigation and our other security agencies. It would help the Co.mmunists in their efforts to create dissension and confusion v/ithin our borders. It v/ould help the Comaaunist propagandists through­ out the v/orld v.^ho are trying to underinlne freedoa by dis­ crediting as hypocrisy the efforts of the United States on behalf of freedoai. Specifically, some of the pri.neipal objections to th.e bill are as 1 -a 11 ow3 : It v/oulo are notentrar cnen.:.ca ay requrrrny the publication of a co:aplete li.st of vital defenae plants, labo^^atori es, aa;d other installati.ons. 2. It v;ould rcorire the Deyarta.ant of Juat:''::a and its Eederal Eureeu. of Inaw^st-igation to an ate innenee a:.eunta of tiaie and energy attei'ptiny to c.'n/ry ont it- unnoa _ t reg: strat:ion proa: ai ons . 3. It v/ould denri.'w; ra of the yrea i • me-''/- alie;as in intell-" ren-ie nattrir-.. ^i

293 4. It would antagonize friendly governments. 5. It would put the Governm.ent of the United States in the thought-control business, 6. It v/ould make it easier for sub'^eroive aliens to become naturalized as United States citizens. 7. It v/ould give Government officials vast pov/ers to harass all of our citizens in the exercise of their right of free speech. legislation v/ith these consequences is not necessary to Fleet the real dangers v/hich communism presents to our free society. Those dangers are serious and must be met. But this bill v/ould hinder us, not help us, in m.eeting them. Fortunately, v/e already have on the books strong lav/s which give us m.ost of the protection we need from the real dangers of treason, espionage, sabotage, and actions looking to the overthrow of our Governament by force and violence. Most of the provisions of this bill have no re­ lation to these real dangers. Or.e provision alene of this bill is enough to dero^i- strate how far it aiisses tha real target. Seecion 5 oould

, -. -, . '! ^ . !! - n- , re published in the Eederal Eegister'' a nrhlic catai.oyua o defense ylants, laboratoriee, an': alj. oiiier faa:'i.itUa vital to oui^ national d8:^ense--no r'^tter hca; s/e>et. J

'" /". ; . ,-N ". ' !•" ""^ cannot i-ragir.e any i:eei..a;.. .a I. r\ i : '^y li ,. .•. j.e J OY

.' ', ^ ' • "" . v/ouj.d doaire aiore. Sni.a : r~ ., r- i '' • o * 1 • -.^>;o a

i- v.. ~r 294 that this bill v/ould require the Governirient to hand them on a silver platter. There are many provisions of this bill which impel me to return it v/ithout my approval, but this one vTOuId be enough by itself. It is inconceivable to me that a majority of the Congress could expect the

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of tlie United States to approve such a flagrant violation of proper security^ safeguards.

This is only one example of m.any provisions in the

bill v/hich v/ould in actual practice work to the detrim.cnt

of our national security.

I knov/ that tiie Congress had no Intention of achiev­

ing such results v/hen it passed this bill. I know that

the vast majority of the ih::mbers of Congreas vdio voted for

the bill sincerely intended to strike a blo-j at th.e Com­ munists .

It is true that certain provisions of this bill

would improve the laws protecting ua ayainst espionage and

sabotage. But these naovislone are great]y outwaighed by

others v/hich would aci.iai.j.y imnai:. our aeeairjty.

repeou, o-i^ i^oi. _ ^.su.-i...:; -. ^...^.^ j.: ^- ...... ^ ,-

heln the Ceaaiuniste, not to ht!.rt tl^eia. I therefore moat eara..:atly reeueat th-e Cnirri:.-^- to

reconsider i.ts aeti.on. 1 a:., cam leant tnat a^a

^. r- ^ . _, ...•-! ful ana i ye I.s meat ..; • I-

this bili is conti'ar^ 295 at this critical time.

H.R. 9490 is made up of a number of different parts.

In summary, their purposes and probable effects may be de­ scribed as follows:

Sections I through 17 are designed for tv/o purposes.

First, they are intended to force Comjnunist organizations to register and to divulge certain informiation about them­ selves--informiation on their officers, their finances, and, in some cases, their membership. These provisions v/ould

in practice be ineffective, and v/ould result in obtaining no infoiTJiation about Comjnunists that the EBI and our other

security agencies do not already have. But in trying to

enforce these sections, v/e v/ould have to spend a great deal

of tim.e, effort, and money~-all to no good pti.iYoose.

Second, these provaisions are intended to impose vari-

ous penalties on Comjnunists and others covered by th.e terns of the bill. So far as Communists are concerned, all these

penalties v/hich can be practicably enforced are already in

effect under existing I'ws and oroeedures. z.o.t the lan­ guage of the bij.l is so bread and vague that it might tell

result in penalizing the legitimate activities of neople

who are not Comnunists at all, but lo--al citiaens.

Thus, the net result of there see:E.o:.s of the hii^

v/ould be: no seriota daaiage to t'^a Comiunis;. a, a.eat da.iage

to the rest of us. Only the Cnr.nriiat aiorement veuld yai-n

from sueh an outcnie. 296 Sections l8 through 21 and section 23 of this bill constitute, in large measure, the imiprovemients in our in­ ternal security lav/s v/hich I recomjiiended som.e timiO ago. Although the language of these sectiovis is in scaie respects v/eaker than is desirable, I should be glad to approve these provisions if they v/ere enacted separately, since they are improvements developed by the FBI and other Govorni-icnt security agencies to mioet certain clear deficiencies of the present lav/. But even though these improvemients are needed, other provisions of the bill v/ould veah.en our se­ curity far more than these v/ould strengthen it. We have better protection for our internal security under existing law than v/e v/ould have with the am.endaients and additions made by H. R. 9'^90. Sections 22 and 25 of this bill would make sreeping changes in our lav/s goveralrg the adaiiseion of aliens to the United States and their naturalization as citiaens.

Tne ostensible puroose of Xnese nroviaions is to prevent persons who would he da: curity from entering the countr O-' fact, present law a jaj.'e 1 a.a 6.u.iic; v c- .• ^..c'. •-> v.'v. ,_r- •»• -'-- - - « VJhat these nrovishoos would act ao vent us fro : admihoing to our coana>y, or to a many people vho eo'-'.n; a;:n-e rear eon.v:._.v.u .:.'.-..>:• tional strengah. Tne hill -ruld deprive oui- r and our inteiligenee agenei^:a o" tVie varuahl:: 297 aliens in security operations. It would require us to exclude and to deport the citizens of some friendly non- Communist countries. Furthermore, it would actually mioke it easier for subversive aliens to becomie United States citizens. Only the Coimaunist movement would gain from such actions.

Section 24 and sectioiis 26 through 30 of this bill make a number of minor changes in the naturalization lav/s. None of them is of great significance--nor are they par­ ticularly^ relevant to the problarai of internal security. These provisions, for the most part, have received little or no attention in the iGiglslative process. I believe that several of them v;ould not be approved by the Congress if they v/ere considered on their merits, rather than as parts of an omnibus bill. Section 31 of this bill tiakes it a eri.aie to attempt to influence a judge or jury by nubli.c demonstrat' on, sueh as picketir:g. Vliile the courts already have considerahle

power to punish sucfv aetiona under existing law, 1 n. •j •-_ ..'..' objection to this seetion.

Sections 100 through liv of this bill (tit^e — / are intended to give t^e Covennient porer, in tne evmL o invasion, war, or inauanweticn in the Enited Slit- a i r. si of a foreign enn-y, to aeiae and hoi.d t:rs:ri:^ '.dn:> eeadd ezrpec uO'.' oO ..-.t ux...; .SM.. C.-....OO >^-. oo^.. '-••..•_.v. -. . •:• ^ ^- ^.^ : - > — thou-h they had as y.ai ee.aiittad re crlae. it ma; le E;a 298 legislation of this type should be on the statute books. But the provisions in H.R. 9^-^90 v/ould very probably prove ineffective to achieve the objective sought, since they would not suspend the writ of habeas corpu.s, and under o-ur legal systemi to detain a man not charged v.ith a crEne v/ould raise serious constitutional questions unless the nrlt of habeas corpus v/ore suspended. Furthermore, it ma.y v/eII be that other persons than those covered by these provisions v/ould be more important to detain in the event of emergency. This v/hole problem, therefore, should clearly be studied more thoroughly before further legislative action along these lines is considered.

In brief, v/hen all the provisions of H.R. 9^t90 are considered together, it is evident that the great bulk of them are not directed toxard the i-eal and present dangers that exist from communism. Instead of striving blov/s at

-J-'. If:nr v/ould strike bloaai at our own liberties coamiuni sm, c and at our pcaition i.n the foi^efront of tnoae norkrng lor freedom in the i/ori.d. At a time v/hen our young nen c re fighting for freedoai in ]r:rea, it would be tragic te ad­ vance the ohjectivea of co/riunisa: in th:'s country, ae t-^; bill v/ould do.

Eecauae I feci so sia/onghy that that ? e^d :.J a '-"V I':-

v/ould he a terrible aiistahe, 1 vrrr". lo e._aeaiss a.o.n

3. t b 1 < v.. r>C^ _ '- •- - -• i^' •'. •" 17. a.ri seetion;"

and 25. 299 Most of the first 17 sections of H.R. 9^190 are con­ cerned with requiring regiistration and annual reports, by "What the bill calls Conmiunist-action organizations and Communist-front organizations, of names of officers, sources and uses of funds, and, in the case of Communist-action or­ ganizations, names of members. The idea of requiring Comjnunist organizations to di­ vulge information about them.selves is a simple and attrac­ tive one. But it is about as practical as requiring thieves to register v/ith the sheriff. Obvious 15/-, no such orgaaniza- tion as the Comimunist Party is likely to register volun­ tarily. Under the provisions of the bill, if an organization v/hich the Axttorney General believes should register does not do so, he must request a five-man Subversive Activities Control Board to order the organization to register. The Attorney General v/ould have to produce proof that the or­ ganization in question nas in faet a Communist-action or a Cormiunist-front organization. To do this he would have to offer evidence relati.ng to eaery aeneet of the organia: tion's activites. The organizatlcr. could present oepoein evidence. Erolcnged hearings reuld he reauired te ajlor both sides to present proof an:'' te crea ^-exaniae cya.osing

v/itnesses. To estiaiate the duraticn, of aue; / prcea-.. ing the Corra.:nist Party, we read ealy reoaji. that oa . 300 narrower issues the trial of the 11 Cormmunist leaders under the Smith Act consum.ed 9 months. In a hearing under this bill, the difficulties of proof v/ould be much greater and would take a much, longer timxe. The bill lists a num.ber of criteria for the Board to consider in deciding whether or not an organization is a Communist-action or Coamiunist-front organization. Many of these deal v/ith the attitudes or states of mind of the organization's leaders. It is frequently difficult in legal proceedings to establish v/hether or not a man has coimnitted an overt act, such as theft or perjury. But under this bill, the Attorney General would have to attempt the .im­ mensely more difficult task of producing concrete legal evidence that m.en have particular ideas or opinions. Tiii.s r would inevitably require the disclosure of m.any of the lEI's confidential sources of information and thus vrould damage our national security. If, eventually, the Attorney General should overeone these difficulties and get a favcrahle decision fror. thr Board, the Hoard's decision could be anneaEad to t>ie courts. The courts would revien any cuestiona of law i.nvolved, ani whether the Eoard's findings of faet were snyyerted by the prependeranee of the eaidenes.

All these precee^irga neadad raayadn:e graat ^idf^-.rl i rn

much tixie. It is alao^l ce/lain ttant from F X: h yeara would elaose betv/een t'^e Atto-ney Senara''E; rev s...oa 301 before the Board with a case, and the final disposition of the matter by the courts. And when all this time and effort had been spent, it is still most likely tiiat no organization v/ould actual.ly register.

The simple fact is that iXien the courts at long last found that a particular organization v:as required to regis­ ter, all the leaders of the organization v/ould have to do to frustrate the lav/ v/ould be to dissolve the organization and establish a nev/ one v/ith. a different nam.e and a nev: roster of nominal officers. The Coamiunist Party has done this again and again in countries throughout the v/orld. And nothing could be done about i.t except to begin ai.l over again the long dreary process of i.n\-ea tigatlvo, ad.ninistra- tive, and judicial proeeediin^a to reeuire registration. • Thus the net result of tne ]n:glatration provision of this bill would prohably be en endleee chasing of one

organi.ze,tion after another, v.lt{i tne Coir.iuu .•_ . . O '... 1..' ..- ^ to frustrate thvO law enEoi-ee-nent a^,enear:

-e-ir^-i v'^cviVa r r.'^''i '-;r"n^' a.enreaea. .:. ^ c;r:e..e -•-^.-J.:. _CO..JJ..^ ..U

wastin•i-g j the energiea of the Eeea.n/tent o:

destrovina the sou--'-^ux.ea- o^^"a^ an..WvVr-::-i:. " an of iv-a EEI. To in- nose these fru 1S 3 h .;rd e la i-' va'iu

from i ts vital -.^^-.-.•' a- ,• dtt^e fort to tre very Cer'tuniats want th:

control.

ife&a. 302 Unfortunately, these provisions are not m.erely in­ effective and unworkable. They represent a clear and pres­ ent danger to our institutions. Insofar as the bill v.-ould require registratio.n by the Communist Party itself, it does not endanger our tradi­ tional liberties. Hov/ever, the application of the registra­ tion requirements to so-called Commiunist-front organizations can be the greatest danger to freedoai of speech, press, and assembly, since the Alien and Sedition Lav/s of 1798. Tills danger arises out of the criteria or standards to be applied in determ.ining v/hether an organization is a Coia- munist-front organization.

There would be no serious prohlem if the bill re­ quired proof that en organization was controlled and fin'nee by the Communist Party before it could be classified as a Communist-front organization, however, recognizing the dif­ ficulty of proving those matters, the bili. \^ould permit such a determination to be based solei.y unen the exterd; ta v/hich the positrons taken or advar.ee 1 by it frcn ti.ne a a time on matters of policy do not deviate fron those of tre Coatuunist aiovemant. Th^s orovision eouEi eaaily hi ur-ed to elcsaify a a a Cortrunist-front orgeniaation any oayar.izatior vdiieh ^a advoeati.ng a sinyhe yoiicy oi' oijcctii-e vd

ing urged by the Cc.rairX.st rtnty ca:' hy • Ca-rn- governient. In j-Co, ..-.-• • • •.. ^ - -••• ——-- ' 303 the bill defines "organization" to include "a group of persons pennanently or temporarily associated together for joint action on any subject or subjects." Thus.-, an organi­ zation which advocates lov\T-cost housing for sincere hum.ani" tarian reasons might be classified as a Commiunist-front organization because the Commiunists regularly^ exploit slum conditions as one of their fifth-column techniques.

It is not enough to say that tliis probably v/ould not be done. The mere fact that it could be done shov/s clearly how the bill v/ould open a Pandora's box of oppo:atirrlties for official condemnation of organizations and individuals for perfectly honest opinions vdnicii happen to be stated also by Communists. The basic error of these sections is that they move in the direction of suppressing opinion and bei.lef. This would be a very dangerous course to take, not bocause we have any sympathy for Coamiunist opinions, but because any

gover.mvental stifling of the free expresalon of o, ' ,' ;; n. i. .'. ,t>

a Ic-n'a step tonand totalita:>r_ar. - -- - •

There is no aiore fundaa.enta.. ax.o. or a-,ner .can i

dom than the familiar staterent: In a free country, we

puniSii men. for the eriaies they ee.aiht, iut rover for ti

opinions they have. Aaia t.ie r-^as^'i. L.:-.L -. Q?- sc;.- a^ " ' r-

to ireeoci rs it..;b, a-.-, . ;-:=r --•^,.---^; •---• 1'.' 1 ^_,. . ..,j.'.,., .I.~, - O'lT', > •"-,•'I"~".'"I"•'•.=^'^';";•";'•• "i •; 1' t-:ie are." CJ 1.'-1

r • / • frecoo... Ol.' exnrc.rs.Lvn: .;.^ yj...-.^. .-n - ^••-' the

lijEU'. : 304 majority because it protects criticism, and criticism, leads to progress.

VJe can and we will prevent espionage, sabotage, or other actions endangering our national security. But wc would betray our finest traditions if we attempted, as this bill v/ould attem.pt, to curb the simple expression of opinion This we should never do, no matter how distasteful the opi­ nion may be to the vast majority of our people. The course proposed by this bill would delight the Co.miiunists, for it would make a mockery of the Bill of Rights and of our claiias to stand for freedom, in the n^orld.

And v/hat kind of effect v/ould these provisions have on the nonnal expression of political viens? Obviously, if this lav/ v/ere on the statute books, the part of prudence would be to avoid saying anything that rE-ght be construed by som-cone as not deviating sufficienti.y from the curieeiit Communist nrooayanda line. And since no one could be sure

•,•!-.£- 1 v..-1 > in advance vaiax views were save to express, toe :.:ie-n.i.a. tendency would be to cxyress no vrewa on eorrj-one:n^ria l subjects. Tne result could only ae to reduce the vigor and strength of our political life--ar outcare th-^ t the Caa muni sts v/oul-n.d a narnrl)^o-.^-ni-'y v/iv^^ " ^n:,-;,-;. h-vt tint free men ahou"d abhvu'. VJe need not feai- tre e T - . - w to fear their sunn/•eea" on. 305 Our position in the vanguard cf freedom rests largely^ on our demonstration that the free expression of opinion, coupled with government by popular consent, leads to na­ tional strength and hioinan advaneem.ent. Let us not, in cov/ering and foolish fear, throv/ av/ay the ideals v/hich are the fundamental basis of our free society.

Not only are the registration provisions of this bill unv/orkable and dangerous, they are also grossly mmis- leading in that all but one of the objectives v/hich are claimed for them are alreadv- being accom.plished by other and superior methods—and the one objective v/hich is not now being accomplished would not in fact be accomplished under this bill either.

It is claimed that the bill would provide informa­ tion about the Coaimunist Party aiad its members. Tne fact is, the EEI already possesses very eo^iplete sou'^oes of in­ formation concerning the Coitaunrst movei.ient in this co-ntry.

If the EEI must disclose its sources of infoniation in public hearings to reeuire regiatreti r.i undar this biil, its present sources ot rn_ •..-.-:-..-..:...-.., c-.:. .•..o - ....x....^ ^o acquire new information, v/ill be largely destroyed.

It is claimed that th:-a hili. I'ould deny ineone-tax exerintion to Ccnuniat evg/.-i:" actions. Tae ffcn :^ tret, tre Bureau of Inter.wE. Eeaenue c rr:..aoy ce..:..-. ..:.c.....:-..... e...... p- tion to suei! organia-tlona . 306 It is. claimed that this bill v/ould deny passports to Communists. The fact is that the Government can and does deny passports to Communists under existing law.

It is claimed that this bill would prohibit the em­ ployment of Communists by the Federal Government. The fact is that the employment cf Communists by the Eederal Govern­ ment is already prohibited and, at least in the executive branch, there is an effective program to see that they are not employed.

It is claimed that tirls bill would prohibit the em­ ployment of Coifimunists in defense plants. The fact is that it v/ould be years before this bill would have any effect of this nature--if it ever \;Ould. Fortunately, this objec­ tive is already being substantially achiev^jd under the

present procedures of th- -."v:' ; 1!..: •• C/i. . C i i u ..J — XJ" v» J. v.- i 1.... v.. , C".. .. ^ J. J- K/L i'^ Congress would enact one of the pro..-i si ons I have recom- mended--which it did not include in this bill--the situa­ tion v/ould be entirely tak^n care of, proa.ptly and effec­ tively.

It is also c eu--ana tnra ae tut one nev/ o.g

--> X • tive of the registration proaaisio-a L,: ' bill--that it would reeuire Coianinist o: .:• ci 0 .1 to 1-hel all the'- publicationa an.l tc'.dlo and teivviaion '

•^ •>-. r -ay-r- • "-• Or- - •. - v. i - -'• C-M'^V-.;-' H'-I'-. '^P O '.

..,.-. 1 menu, even ii. corati autra^ '.. 'v V\. a an..' nei."".!!- ently cvadrd, simply by t:ie cc 307 organizations to distribute Communist information. Section 4 (a) of the bill, like its registration provisions, would be iiieffective, v/ould be subject to dan­ gerous abuse, and v/ould seek to accomplish an objective which is already better accomplished under existing lav/.

This provisioti v/ouId make unlav^ful any agreement to perform any act which v/ould substantially contribute to the establishment v/ithin the United States of a foreign- controlled dictatorship. Of course, this provision v/ould be unconstitutional if it infringed upon the fundamental right of the American people to establish for themselves by constitutional mi.ethods any form of governtient they choose To avoid this, it is provided that this section shall not apply to the proposal of a constitutional amendment. If this language limits the prohibition of trie section to the use of unlawful methods, then it adds nothing to the S-ilth A^t nv^r^o-r Tjh^ch "• T Co^muni st leaders haa-e been convicted, and would be more difficult to enforce. Thus, it would ac­ complish nothing. Moi-eover, the bill docs not even pur­ port to define the phrase, unicyae in a criminal stature, "substantially contri hute.'' A phraaa eo vague raises a serious constitutional queation. Sections 22 and 23 of fade hill are dir.i,cred ti ani i-\.r f .^.•^'-.•na•• p (••! 1 f^--•-•: ^^r^s ei" li'V shou"^.'." i-e c nrltLo:: to cur country, a-nd who should he yenrittei ta hreo.ie a in'red States citizen. I beli-ve thcn-e ie y-neral /gran.en J V- 308 the answers to those questions should be: V/e should adm.it to our country, within the available quotas, anyone v/ith a legitimate purpose who v.'ould not endanger our security, and we should admit to citizenship any immigrant v/lio v;ill be a loyal and constructive member of the commiunity. Those are essentially the standards set by existing lav/. Under pres­ ent law, we do not admit to our country knov.n Covrnunists, because we believe they v/ork to overthrov/ our Govermnent, and we do not admit Comimunists to citizenship, because v/e believe they are not loyal to the United States. The changes v/hich would be made in the present law by sections 22 and 25 v/ould not reinforce those sensible standards. Instead, they v/ould add a number of nev/ ston- dards, which, for no good and sufficient reason, would in­ terfere v/ith our relations v/ith oEner countries and seriously damage our national security. Section 22 would, for examnle, exclude from our country anyone v/ho advocates any form of totalitarian on one-party govearraent. We, of course, believe eratic svstem of coaipeting political parties, offerin:

choice of candidates ana polrcrea. rut a nu .?r

tries i/ith which we tiUintai^i l rD.enaiy re.-atrone a'nre a L aa

ferent form of goveritrent. Until now, no one h-s sugyeated that n- :]-auE don cultural and eoancncial :.ej ati.C:- • rith a eeuntr^ m because it has a form of yovennmant dlffcravF:. f:^....: our 309 Yet section 22 would require that. As one instance it is clear that under the definitions of the bill the present Government of Spain, among others, v/ould be classified as '"totalitarian." As a result, the Attorney General would be required to exclude from the United States all Spanish- businessmen, students, a.nd other nonofficial travelers v/ho support the present Governm.ent of their country. I cannot understand how the sponsors of this bill can think that such an action v/ould contribute to our national security.

Moreover, the provisions of section 22 of this bill would strike a serious blov/ to our national security by taking away from the Government the pov/er to grant asylum in this country to foreign diplomats v/ho repudiate Co];i- m.unist imperialism and v/i.sVi to escape its .ix:pris6ls. It must be obvious to anyone that it is in our nati.onal in­ terest to persuade people to renounce coar.iunisti, and to encourage their defection froai Ccnrunist forces. Mrny of these people are extrenely valuahre to our intelligence operations. Yet under this bill the Governrent i/ould loco

r the limited authority it nor has to offer ^syluir in our countiy as the great ineentivx for such defection. In addition, the proalsions of section 22 v:oa.ld sharply limit the authority of the Gaveriraent to ad'tit foreign eap-iomatrc rep^'eseiatat: ves anii tnarr iin.iltf;a en official business. Ender eiaiatiny law, we already lave the autho:ilty to send out of the c-nandnn-^ r - .. n."aaen i: 310 diplomatic privileges by v/orking against the interests of the United States. But under this bill a ndiole series of unnecessary restrictions v/ould be placed on the admission" of diplomatic personnel. This is not only ungencro-'.s, for a country v/hich eagerly sought and proudly holds the honor of being the seat of the United Eatlonc, it is also very unwise, because it makes our country appear to be fearful of foreigners, when in fact we are vjorhing as hard as we knov/ hov/ to build mutual confidence and f ri end J.y relations among the nations of the v/orld. Section 22 is so contrary to our national interests that it would actually put the Government into the business of thought control by requiring the deportation of any *"> ] ". r- -'"t who distributes or publishes, or vEio is affiliated with an organization v/hich distributes or piihlishes, any written or printed matter advocating (or merely expressing belief in) the economic and governnental doetrlnes of any form of tota11ta riani sm. This provision dots not reeuire an evil intent or puroose on tin vision in the Sailth Act. Tnus, me • Cl n I -

be i-eeuired to denor^ orei'atiny or cc^.^nec L :... ..- .. . 'j;

Ci r\ .'•• I- n ' a vreli--etojrv.ee cuo'•...••>,:^y:<^. \.. I L Dovitics mitten bv eu-cnortere ed the i^raaant yoreririena

of Syair, oi^ luyoslavia or a.^y one of a nn:i u. o. ^ .•.-«far

C'"-"!":-t'•"• ea. >,^r\.^r.i-^ ^-y --r.-ina -•'..•::- a'-.-- aa-r-i /'ier.a rnei"'x.e 311 for citizenship. There should be no room in our laws for such hysterical provisions. The next logical step v/ould be to "burn the books." This illustrates the fundamental error of these im­ migration and naturalization provisions. It is easy to see that they are hasty and ill-considered. But far more sig­ nificant- -and far more dangerous--is their apparent under­ lying purpose. Instead of trying to encourage the free movement of people, subject only to the real requirements of national security, these provisions attempt to bar move­ ment to anyone vvho is, or once v/as, associated vjith ideas v/e dislike, and in the process, they would succeed in bar­ ring many people v/iioai it v:ould be to our advantage to admilt. Such an action v/ould be a serious blov/ to our v/ork for world peace. Vie uphold--or have uph:eld till noai, at any rate~~the concey)t of freedoai on an international scale. That is the root concept of our efforts to bilng unity among the free nations and peace in the v/orld. The Communists, on the othar hrnd, attempt to bre-/k donn in ever-- nosaible w.ry the free irlerchange of neraons V -L and ideas. It wij 1 be to their advantage, and not curt, i.

we establish for ourselves an iE.ron ,,.-,vn> curtai^. •-.--•-0-? -rn. " cr. ' ^^ ' -v-' who cin neln us m tne i aynt aor freei..;.m. Another previa ion of the hii.l xEreh nonld yrea. f n v/oahen our national security ir. aeet^ea- ly, nhieh i-ould nake suhverai.ve aj.iena ci.^adlE.e for ra tural" ration aa acn 312 as they withdraw from organizations required to register under this bill, v/hereas under existing law they must wait for a period of 10 years after such v/ithdrav/al before be­ coming eligible for citizenship. This proposal is clearly contrary to the national interest, and clearly gives to the Communists an advantage they do not have under existing lav/

I have discussed the provisions of this bill at som.e length in order to explain v/hy I am. convinced that it v/ould be harmful to our security and damaging to the individual rights of our people if it v/ere enacted. Earlier this month, v/e launched a great Crusade for Freedom designed, in the v/ords of General Eisenhov/er, to fight the big lie with the big truth.. I can thlnh of no better v/8.y to make a miocliery of that cirisade and of the deep American belief in human freedoai and dignity vliich underlie it than to put the provisions of H. R. 9^^90 on our statute books. I do not undertake lightly th- reanonsibility of differing vith the majority in both Houses of Congreaa who have voted ior tnrs orrl. ;.e o.re c.j -.n^- -.^-^..•^^^ ^ ^.c .>._. wish to safeguard end preserve our constitutional liberti':-:; against internal and exteaarn. eacnies. Ent J. ca , J. this legislation, wh:

O'. oese would aetraiiv interfei'e rith err lihe'l. heir the Cd ...unleta against 313 This is a time v/hen v/e miust marshal all our resources and all the moral strength of our free system in self- defense again;.* the threat of CoiTmiunlst aggression. We will fail in this^ and we will destroy all that we seek to pre­ serve, if we sacrifice the liberties of our citizens in a misguided attemipt to achieve national security.

There is no reason v/hy v/e should fail. Our country has been through dangerous times before, v/ithout losing our liberties to external attack or internal hysteria. Each. of us, in Government and out, has a share in guarding our liberties. Each of us miu.st search his ov/n conscience to find v/hether he is doing all that can be done to preserve and strengthen thoi.i. No considerations of expediency can justify the en­ actment of such a bill as this, a bill vdnich v/ould so greatly v/eaken our liberties and give aid and comfort to those who would destroy us. I have, therefore, no alterna­ tive but to return this bill without r:.y apy:-oval, and I earnestly request the Congress to reconsider i.ts action.

THE WEIlE EOEfE, Sentember 22, IfhO.