Copyright Bv FRANCIS H. THOMPSON 1970 TRUMAN and CONGRESS: the ISSUE of LOYALTY, 1946-1952
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Copyright bv FRANCIS H. THOMPSON 1970 TRUMAN AND CONGRESS: THE ISSUE OF LOYALTY, 1946-1952 by I. I FRANCIS H. THOMPSON, B.S. in Ed.a, M.Ed, A DISSERTATION IN HISTORY Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY December, I970 sol ' r3 . 1970 _^ lie), '-—' Unij j-iii ii J-1^.' ^ Pag ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ,..,... ii CHAPTER • I. THE GENESIS OF THE TRUI-IAN LOYALTY PROGRAM 1 II. THE OPERATION OF THE LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM: ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS CRITICS 4l III. TRUl^N VERSUS THE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS: 1948 77 . IV. TRUMAN VERSUS THE EIGHTY-FIRST C0NGP.ES3: JANUARY 1, 1949-AUGUST 1, 1950 ... 127 V. PASSAGE OF THE McCARRAN INTERNAL SECURITY ACT 173 VI. THE APPOINTMENT OF THE NIMITZ COMvIISSION. 2l4 VII. CONCLUSIONS 247 BIBLIOGRAPHY 253 APPENDIXES ...;....... 259 X ill ACKNONLEDGMENTS A number of people have been most helpful in the process of researching and v/riting this study. I particu larly V7ish to thank Dr. Timothy P. Donovan for his skill ful direction and the other members of my committee for their critical comments. I v/ould also like to thank my colleagues at Nestern Kentucky University for their help ful comments, and especially Dr. Lov/ell Harrison for his most valuable consultation throughout the preparation of the first draft. I am greatly indebted to the personnel of the Harry S. Truman Library for their unfailing assistance and en couragement during my tv/o visits there. Nithout their help in locating the resource m^aterlals, this study could not have been completed. 11 CHAPTER I "I have little patience v/ith people v7ho take the Bill of Rights for granted." THE GEN1ESI3 OF THE TRR4AN LOYALTY PROGRAM On April I3, 1945? one day after assuming the duties of the Presidency, Harry S. Truman, speaking to a group of reporters, issued the following plea: If you ever pray, pray for me nov/. I don't knov/ whether you fellov/s ever had a load of hay fall on you, but v;hen they told me yesterday what had hap pened, I felt like the moon, the stars, and all the planets had fallen on me.-'- The feeling expressed by the President is under standable as fev; men have entered that high office at a more critical time in the nation's history. Indeed, tke problems v/hich faced Truman "are not likely to be over estimated and to overstate them v/ould be next to laipos- sible."^ One of the most perplexing of these problems, and one that v/ould haunt the Truman Adrmini strati on from begin ning to end, resulted from the persistent charge coavina from Congress and elsev/here that Cor^aninists had succesafully l-Harry S. Truivian, Year of Decisions, Vol. I: M_ oirs (Garden City, Nev/ Yo'fkl Dou7bTe'dE.y"7r'Co. 1^55)? ~ "I9T~ 2 Louis E. Eoenig, The Trun an Adm:'ni_strat^i._on_: r Principles and Practice (Nov/ Yorhl^ Nov: YoTdd I'niversit; Press7 1930X3 p. 1. infiltrated high positions in the government of the United States. The problem, which soon grev7 into a major politi cal issue betv\reen the Executive and Congress, was m.any sided, but involved basically the difficult question of how to protect the goverrmient from the forces of subver sion without running roughshod over the individual rights of citizens. This study will be concerned primarily with the attempts by Mr. Trurnan and his Administration to cope with this particular problem, v/ith special emphasis on the struggle betv/een the President and Congress over v/ho should control the loyalty-security program. Although substantial evidence indicates that the Communist Party in the United States suffered a decline in membership throughout most of the 1930's, from a peak vote of 102,991 in 1932 to 49,000 in 1944, the fear of Communism, or perhaps m.ore correctly the dislike for Communism, per- 3 sisted during the entire period. Conservative frustra tion over tv/elve years of liberal government under Franklin Roosevelt no doubt accounted for much of the pre-occupation with Communism., and contributed to the persistent charge that the Federal Governrrient--especially the Executive 4 Branch--v/as teeming v/ith Conmiunists and their syiTipathizers. ^Eleanor Bontecou, I^^i Jlt^4e2a^^l_Ix)yT^LtyJ-_Se^^ ^'^'iR- gram (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UnTvelsity Press, IRhoTT p. Td ^^Bert Andrews, Eashington_ Hitch Hurrt (New York: Random House, 1948), p'.'cl This rumble over Communist influence grev; to a thunderous uproar in 1938 v/ith the birth of the now famous, or infamous, whichever one might choose, House Committee on Un-American Activities under the chairmanship of the flamiboyant and headline-seeking Martin Dies. Representa tive Dies soon turned his Committee into a forum for at tacking governraent employees suspected of being Communists, and for seeking legislation to prevent the employment of such disloyal persons in the future. "They never took a step vjithout proclaiming that it was necessary to save their respective nations from. 'Bolshevism. ' It is all old stuff - fabricated in Italy, finished in Germany and now being peddled in Washington." .The activities of the Dies committee represented "red baiting" at its most articulate level. Although Dies at first was considered little short of a fool, he soon made his point, especially v/ith those v/ho could see the 7 political advantages of such raucous activity. Mr. Truman later concluded that the Dies corimittee set the precedent ^Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program, p. 8. George Seldes, Eitch Hunt: The Techniques a.nd Profits of Red Baiting jFlen York: " Modern Age Books, 1940), p. 2b0. '^Ibid., p. 274. o "which has plagued the Congress ever since." This is not to say that some of the charges made by the House Com mittee were completely without foundation. There is cer tainly ample evidence that the Communists did successfully penetrate the Federal bureaucracy to some extent during 9 the 1930's. This fact alone, hov/ever, cannot excuse such irresponsibility as that displayed by Representative Dies and other members of his coiranittee. On August 2, 1939^ Congress, responding in part to the increased anti-Communist pressure engendered by the Dies committee, passed the Hatch Act, which was designed If tflO to prevent pernicious political activity. Section 9^ of that act forbade empIo^Tnent in the Federal bureaucracy to any person belonging to a political party or any other organization which advocated the overthrov; of the United States government by force. This section represented an "explicit recognition by Congress of the necessity for bar ring from government employment those v/hose interests v/ere directed to the destruction of the traditional Am.erican o Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II: Memoirs (Garden City, New York: Ddubleday & Co., 1956), p. 275. Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, Tjae Trimian Administration: A Documentary History (New York: Harper and Rov/, 1966), p. 356.' Report of The President's Tem.porary Commission on Employees Loyalty, OF 2521, Truman Papers, Trunan Library. iSSm* ,,11 way of life. The Hatch Act is most significant as mark- ihg a historic break in so far as judging fitness for govern ment employment was concerned. Heretofore, fitness for em- ployraent had been judged on the basis of qualifications and character, and any inquiry into religious or political af filiation v/as expressly forbidden by Civil Service Rule I, 12 adopted in l884. The 76th and 77th congresses further demonstrated their intention of rooting out any subversive elements in the government by enacting Public Lav/s 67I and 808, v/hich granted summary dismissal pov/ers to the Ear and Navy depart ments. The Secretaries of these respective departments v/ere given the pov/er to remove any employee in the inter ests of national security, other Iav;s regarding em.ploymient or dismissal not-withstanding. Congress continued to press for action in 194l by attaching riders to all appropriations bills v/hich ex pressly forbade payment of federal m.oney to any person be longing to an organization advocating the overthrov/ of the 14 United States goverrutent by force. In that sam.e year. •^•^Ibid. •'-^Ibid. ^^Ibid. John N. Caughey, lE_01ear p.nd P-'^e_sent_ Da.ng.EjR: Crucia] State of Our Freed'cnas'" (dhieagoT 'University of Chicago"Press, l$ddj] p. I03. Congress appropriated $100,000 to finance an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of all employees alleged to be members of subversive organizations. Once the investigation was completed, the necessary reports were to be submitted, v/ithout recomjnendations, to the vari ous department heads for v/hatever appropriate action they might see fit to take. Many of the departm.ent heads, in turn, asked for advice from the Justice Department. In 1942, Attorney General Francis Biddle created an inter departmental committee of four for the purpose of offering 15 such advice. Part of the assistance rendered by the Attorney General was the distribution to all government agencies of a descriptive memorandum listing so-called subversive or ganizations. This list, specified for the use of various officials in the government, v/as not made available to the public consumption. A basic area of conflict betv/een the executive and legislative branches of the government was clearly discernible at this point as Attorney General Biddle insisted that activity rather than membership in the listed organizations was to be stressed; others, such as Martin Dies, felt that membership alone was sufficient 16 to warrant dismissal. 15Roger S. Abbott, "Federal Loyalty Program: Back ground and Problems," American Political Science Review, XLII (June, 1948), p.