Justifying Interreligious Pluralism*

Avi Sagi

Religious Exclusivism: A Critical Analysis

Historical religions cover a broad spectrum of beliefs about the world and about God that are represented in symbols, myths, and practices. In this spectrum, each religion presents a unique world picture, incompatible with the others. Every religion, at least in its traditional garb, is exclusive— it claims to be the only true religion, presenting the most accurate picture of God and of reality. My main thesis here is that religious exclusivism is a hard position to defend, and that a pluralistic thesis that advocates the inner value of different religions is logically preferable. The motivation for religious exclusivism is clear. First, through this approach, believers convey their absolute commitment to their religion and their faith. For many, exclusivism conveys acceptance of their religion’s sole and absolute authority, interpreted to mean that all other religions have no share in the truth. Exclusivism, then, reflects the believers’ religious pathos. Second, exclusivism appears as “coherent and rational, “and believ- ers who fail to endorse it appear to express doubts about the validity of their faith.1 This claim relies on two assumptions: (1) my faith is valid and (2) my faith is incompatible with all others. Hence other faiths are invalid.2 The second assumption is the crucial one for this argument, for without it the conclusion would be redundant and believers could sustain the validity of their own faith without necessarily negating the validity of others. The incompatibility of the various religions relates to two constitutive aspects: their factual and metaphysical beliefs about the world and about God and their system of practical obligations. This crucial assumption, then, com- pels the conclusion that not all religions can be true, implying the dismissal of interreligious pluralism as a valid possibility.

* this article was first published in Jewish Theology and World Religions, edited by Alon Goshen-Gottstein and Eugene Korn and published by the Littman Library of Jewish Civi- lization (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2012). Reprinted with permission. 1 raimundo Panikkar, “Religious Pluralism: The Metaphysical Challenge,” in Religious Pluralism, ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 102. 2 Ibid. 124 Justifying Interreligious Pluralism

Third, every religion offers a way to salvation attainable only through God’s true revelation. Salvation as the purpose of religion, then, compels religious exclusivism.3 These justifications of religious exclusivism suggest that it conveys the beliefs of the faithful more successfully, in addition to possessing a sound theoretical foundation. An exclusivist approach might seem unappealing because it ostensibly denies the supporters of “untrue” religions the right to their faith, but this is not necessarily so. People may believe their religion is true and valid without denying others the right to uphold mistaken beliefs. A person can be both exclusivist and tolerant. Indeed, tolerance first emerged within an exclusivist world view, and John Locke’s Four Letters of Toleration clearly illustrates a combination of exclusivism and toleration of other religions. Sociologically, exclusivism has often led to coercion, but we should not draw conclusions about exclusivist versions of religion from history and sociology. If exclusivism is to be rejected, the argument affirming the rights of others to sustain their faith cannot be the decisive consideration. Opponents of religious exclusivism raise a series of objections. First, the theological one: the loving God cares for the salvation of all human beings. The exclusivist conclusion, arguing that only followers of the true religion will be redeemed, is incompatible with God’s universal goodness.4 The second is a moral argument: people leading worthy lives can hardly be doomed simply because they belong to another religion.5 The geograph- ical-historical argument is a third objection: membership in a particular religion is usually a matter of random historical and geographical circum- stances rather than choice, the product of birthplace, education, environ- ment. To assume that something as crucial as human redemption might possibly depend on such fortuitous events is highly disconcerting. Even if these objections are valid, however, they do not necessarily sub- stantiate interreligious pluralism, and two other conclusions are possible. The first is the endorsement of religious inclusivism, an approach claiming

3 see Michael Peterson et. al., Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Phi- losophy of Religion (New York: Oxford University, 1991), 222; Avishai Margalit, “The Ring: On Religious Pluralism,” in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. David Heyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 147–157. 4 see Joseph Runzo, “God, Commitment, and Other Faiths: Pluralism vs. Relativism,” Faith and Philosophy 4 (1988), 347; John Hick, God Has Many Names (Philadelphia: West- minster, 1982), 17; Keith Ward, “Truth and the Diversity of Religions,” Religious Studies 26 (1990), 1. 5 Peterson et al., Reason and Religious Belief, 223; Ward, “Truth and the Diversity of Religions,” 1.