Littoral Rights Under the Takings Doctrine: the Clash Between the IUS Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment the Very Idea of Judicial Takings
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University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2011 Littoral Rights under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash between the IUS Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment The Very Idea of Judicial Takings Richard A. Epstein Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard A. Epstein, "Littoral Rights under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash between the IUS Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment The Very Idea of Judicial Takings," 6 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy 37 (2011). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LITTORAL RIGHTS UNDER THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE: THE CLASH BETWEEN THE IUS NATURALE AND STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT RICHARD A. EPSTEIN* The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection' bristles with conceptual difficulties and practical ambiguities that cannot be easily avoided or easily answered. The major conceptual issue in Stop the Beach Renourishment is whether the Supreme Court should recognize "judicial takings" under the Takings Clause, which reads: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.2 The text for recognizing judicial takings is that the Takings Clause does not differentiate between various branches of government and thus covers the actions of the judiciary as well as those of the legislative and executive branches. Opponents of this doctrine often deride it as a constitutional oxymoron. By definition, state courts cannot take the very property rights that their former decisions have established. Given that this tension exists within any unitary judicial system, the doctrine of judicial takings can, in practice, only arise in a federalist system. At * Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; the Peter and Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago. This paper was prepared for a conference on Stop the Beach Renourishment to be held at Duke University School of Law on February 4, 2011, and to be published in the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy. My thanks to Brett Davenport and Christopher Tan, NYU Law School Class of 2012, for their usual expert research assistance. 1. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 3. For a defense of this view, see Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of ludicial Takings, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 91,94-96 (2011). HeinOnline -- 6 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol'y 37 2011 38 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 6:1 the state level, there is no reason to expect that any state court will strike down the common-law rights that it has just announced. Even if a court disagreed with its past decisions, the more modest way to approach the problem is to overturn the prior law as part of the evolution of common-law rights.4 Similarly, in the highly restrictive domain of federal common law,' the Supreme Court cannot be expected to invalidate its judicial decisions under the Takings Clause. The problem, therefore, can only arise in practice as it did in Stop the Beach Renourishment-in a federal system, when a federal court invalidates the decision of the state supreme court, which is therefore rendered less than supreme in the articulation of its own doctrine. To many, this kind of interaction represents the antithesis to the divided system of rights under our federalist system. Notwithstanding these powerful objections, there is a sensible, albeit restricted, place for the doctrine of judicial takings under federal constitutional law. That approach makes little sense when property rights in a positivist tradition are thought to be manifestations of state power. It has far more attraction, however, within the natural law system, in which judges are rightly seen as custodians of a customary system of property rights that were created by common practice long before there were any courts to enforce the rules in question. Those conditions hold, as I shall show, in connection with water law where the so-called ius naturale7 was regarded by all courts as the traditional lodestone by which these questions were measured." Under that view, it is wrong to think of water law as if it were "judge-made" law when, historically, it was derived from a system of decentralized customary law whose basic norms had been firmly entrenched long before the appearance of a centralized judicial system. It is therefore appropriate to hold courts responsible for keeping to the main contours of water law in making their judicial decisions. Stop the Beach Renourishment thus offered a much needed way to 4. For stress on this theme, see Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack on State Court Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 107, 107-08(2011). 5. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (holding that "[t]he rights and duties of the United States ... are governed by federal rather than local law"). 6. See Dogan & Young, supra note 4, at 108-10. 7. See infra Part III. 8. Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land and Water, LINCOLN INSTITUTE (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1719688 [hereinafter Epstein, Playing by Different Rules]. HeinOnline -- 6 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol'y 38 2011 2011] LITTORAL RIGHTS UNDER THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE 39 address the actions of state courts whose decisions have strayed too far-and for no good reason-from these customary standards. Ironically, the difficulties in Stop the Beach Renourishment did not lie with the particulars of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act (Preservation Act),' which represents a surprisingly sensible environmental scheme. Instead, the target of judicial wrath should have been Florida's earlier case law that twisted every known principle of water law by treating man-made diversions from a lake or a river as though they were "avulsions," or major natural events that alter the flow of water without any human intervention." Put simply, the polar opposites in any system of tortious responsibility for individual action are acts of God and deliberate creations of harm by an individual. In a remarkable tour-de-force, Justice Scalia's analysis of Florida's statutory scheme failed to distinguish between these two kinds of acts. The weakness in his decision, consequently, did not relate to his general analysis of judicial takings, but to his uncritical treatment of the Florida case of Martin v. Buschn (which authorized the uncompensated diversion) as the legitimate starting point for the analysis, instead of treating that decision as the proper object of wrath in any judicial takings analysis. Once the law of littoral rights is correctly sorted out, the Preservation Act should be regarded, presumptively, as a taking of littoral rights. But these takings may not require any explicit cash compensation because the key provisions of the Preservation Act may provide full in-kind compensation in three separate forms: the protection of the beach on the landward side of the wall, the creation of the view easement, and the creation of the access easement, which together could easily exceed the value of any possible accretions on the seaward side of the wall. In order to make out this case, I shall proceed as follows. In Part I, I shall outline the general features of Florida's water law both before and after passage of the Preservation Act. In Part II, I shall put the rules of property law in context, dealing in turn with land, water, and the beach that lies between them as a matter of both common and customary law. In Part III, I shall examine the role of the ius naturale (the natural law) in the origin and formation of property law, under both the common and Roman law systems. In that section, I shall outline the historical distinction between alluvion, or gradual changes, 9. 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61-246, amended by, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011-161.45 (2007). 10. For discussion, see infra Part IV.B. 11. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927). HeinOnline -- 6 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol'y 39 2011 40 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 6:1 and avulsion, or radical changes, and explain the strong efficiency characteristics of the classical rules as they apply to property owners of both riparian and littoral interests. In part IV, I turn to the question of judicial takings and defend that doctrine in order to explore how the basic rules were misapplied in connection with the Florida statutory scheme. In part V, I turn to the larger question of when the doctrine of judicial takings should be applied in other cases and conclude that its application should be limited to those circumstances in which the decided cases make a radical break from well-established common-law patterns that systematically work for the advantage of the state or some identifiable private faction. A short conclusion speculates on the reasons for the abject breakdown of private law conceptions of property rights in the Supreme Court. I. THE SHAPE OF FLORIDA LAW Traditionally, Florida law distinguishes between riparian rights, which govern those who own land adjacent to a river, and littoral rights, which govern those who own land bordering a lake or an ocean.