TOWARDS AN AMERICANIZATION OF FRENCH METROPOLITAN AREAS ?

Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot Directeur de Recherche au CNRS CERVL-CNRS/ IEP de Bordeaux Domaine universitaire 11, allée Ausone 33607 Pessac Cedex/ France e-mail : [email protected]

Paper presented at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, February 2004, and at the International Metropolitan Observatory Meeting, 9-10 January 2004, Bordeaux, Pôle Universitaire de Bordeaux.

The author expresses his gratitude to the LASMAS-IdL and to Alexandre Kych for having allowed him to use 1999 census data in application of the data exchange agreement between CNRS and INSEE, as well as to Monique Perronnet-Menault (TEMIBER-CNRS, Bordeaux) for her invaluable help in producing maps of French urban areas.

I. Metropolization and urban sprawl in French metropolitan areas

There are two main official measures of urbanization defined by the French census, INSEE (Julien 2000):

1. the urban unit (unité urbaine) fits the agglomeration concept. It includes two categories : a. the urban agglomeration : a group of communes whose population is at least 2.000 inhabitants + a continuity of the built environment, i.e. there are no gaps (agricultural land, forest) of more than 200 meters (a criterion also used in Switzerland) b. the isolated city : the same definition applied to a sole commune

France had 1.995 urban units at the last census conducted in 1999.

2. officially introduced in 1996 in order to measure in a better way the so-called periurbanization phenomenon (urban sprawl towards distant suburbs), the metropolitan area (aire urbaine) includes : a. an urban pole (pôle urbain) = an urban unit with at least 5.000 jobs b. an exurban ring (couronne périurbaine), composed of rural communes or urban units in which at least 40% of the active members work in the urban center or in a secondary center that is already attached to the urban center by means of this criterion

The metropolitan area (see Appendix 1) was selected as our main unit of analysis in order to encompass the core city or cities, suburbs, and exurbs, the latter being often not contiguous to other communes. As in other countries like Sweden, the metropolitan area is defined according to municipal economic and employment interactions rather than by continuity of the built environment.

According to the last census conducted in 1999, there are 354 urban areas containing 77% of the population (45 million), compared with 73% in 1990. In 1999, 3.8 additional million inhabitants have been counted in metropolitan areas. This increase results from two changes : there was a population growth of 1.5 million inhabitants within the metropolitan

2 areas’ limits of 1990, and in addition 2.3 million inhabitants came from the territorial extension of the metropolitan areas between 1990 and 1999.

Although the category of metropolitan area was just introduced with the last national census in 1999, it is possible to reconstruct metropolitan areas from 1968 onwards through retropolation methods, based in particular on analyses conducted by Julien (2003). It then appears that the number of metropolitan areas has remained relatively stable : 319 in 1968, 347 in 1975, 359 in 1982, 361 in 1990, and 354 in 1999. At a general level, Figure 1 shows that urban sprawl affected urban poles or agglomerations as they are traditionally defined ; their number of communes increased from 48% in thirty years (from 2.098 to 3.100). But the most important increase was registered among the more distant suburbs, the so called periurban communes, whose number increased by 651% during the same period (from 1.440 to 10.808). While the city is usually defined by contiguity of construction, a periurban area is constituted by an outer belt in form of a mixed space inhabited both by urban workers and by farmers. A periurban area is therefore a rural space as most of its land is devoted to agricultural productive activities; but it is also an urban space because the majority of its employed population works in a city and daily migrates in this direction (on the development of periurbans communes: Cavailhès et al. 2002, Péguy 2000).

3 Figure 1. Measuring urban sprawl in all French urban areas: evolution of the number of communes in urban poles and urban belts from 1968 to 1999

1968

1999

1975 10808

2098 1440 3764 3100 2398

2793 2601

5710

7892 1990 1982

Source : data from Julien (2003) N communes in urban poles N communes in urban belts

Table 1. The population of the 42 French metropolitan areas over 200.000 inhabitants (1999)

METROPOLITAN AREA Population PARIS 11.173.886 LYON 1.647.722 MARSEILLE-AIX-EN-PRO. 1.516.086 LILLE 1.142.887 TOULOUSE 964.914 NICE 933.551 BORDEAUX 925.429 NANTES 711.241 STRASBOURG 611.971 TOULON 564.740 DOUAI-LENS 552.635 RENNES 521.183 ROUEN 518.340 GRENOBLE 514.586 MONTPELLIER 459.946 METZ 429.544 NANCY 410.405 CLERMONT-FERRAND 409.533 VALENCIENNES 399.581 TOURS 376.131 CAEN 370.752 ORLEANS 355.770 ANGERS 332.737 DIJON 326.886 SAINT-ETIENNE 321.953 BREST 303.528 LE HAVRE 296.795 LE MANS 293.094 REIMS 291.701 AVIGNON 290.524 AMIENS 270.809 MULHOUSE 270.752 BETHUNE 268.435 DUNKERQUE 265.906 PERPIGNAN 249.041 LIMOGES 247.881 BESANCON 222.388 NIMES 221.380 PAU 216.868 BAYONNE 214.039 ANNEMASSE 212.451 POITIERS 209.250 MEDIAN 363.261 source : INSEE

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Most employed people work in the dense agglomeration, but they increasingly live in distant suburbs or exurbs that tend to be more densely populated than before. This trend reflects the declining dynamism of part of the older suburbs : unable to offer new jobs to replace traditional jobs (farmers, craftsmen), older suburbs have become economically more dependent on close poles, leading to a growing mobility of their population.

Forty-two metropolitan areas have a population greater than 200.000 inhabitants. These biggest metropolitan areas are represented in Table 1 and Appendix 2. Maps of the metropolitan areas of Paris and Bordeaux are in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4.

The 1999 census revealed two general evolutions : a stronger polarization around large metropoles and a continuing urban sprawl (Hoffmann-Martinot 2000). Half of the demographic growth between 1990 and 1999 was concentrated in just 11 metropolitan areas, while a same proportion was concentrated by 19 at the beginning of the 1980s.

The largest part of demographic growth is due to a few big cities like Paris, Lyon and Toulouse. However the growth rate in the Paris region has decreased (+ 0,32 % per year) and today ranks below the national average level. But other metropolitan areas registered a very strong dynamism as their population grew at least two times more rapidly than in the rest of the country : Montpellier in particular (+ 1,88 % yearly), but also Toulouse, Rennes, and Nantes. On the whole, the most rapid growth is located in the South-East and in the Val de Loire area.

While the Paris metropolitan area covered only 22% of the Ile-de-France region in 1968, it forms today a vast area of 14.518 km² (Appendix 3). Twenty-one percent of its territory is now spreading out beyond the Ile-de-France limits to the North-West. It entirely covers seven out of eight Ile-de-France départements (Essonne, Hauts-de-Seine, Paris, Seine- Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne, Val-d’Oise, Yvelines), 79% of the territory of the Seine-et-Marne département, and covers part of six départements belonging to other regions. Ninety-nine percent of the Ile-de-France population lives in the Paris metropolitan area.

Today the Paris metropolitan area includes 1.584 communes (Appendix 3), of which about 400 are located out of the the Ile-de-France region. In 1999 its territory covered 429

6 more communes than in 1990. In Ile de France it extended into the two départements that were so far not totally encompassed, Essonne and Seine-et-Marne. In 1999, only 89 communes in Ile-de-France out of 1.281, all located in the South-East part of Seine-et-Marne, are not included in the Paris metropolitan area. This eastwards expansion has now added to the periurban belt of Paris communes in three neighboring départements, 23 communes in the département of Aisne, 3 in Marne, and 10 in Loiret. But it is in the Northern and Western parts of the region, in the départements of Oise, Eure and Eure-et-Loir that the attraction of the Paris agglomeration and its belt is most visible. Between 1990 and 1999, 135 new communes from these three départements have been included into the Paris metropolitan area: 52 communes in Oise, 45 in Eure, and 38 in Eure-et-Loir.

Urban sprawl has developed strongly not only in the Paris metropolitan area but also in other large metropolitan areas. From 90 communes in 1968, the Toulouse metroplitan area covered 152 en 1975, 195 in 1982, 255 in 1990, and 342 in 1999. It includes today the largest part of the département Haute-Garonne (308 of its 588 communes, see Appendix 2) and portions of the départements Ariège (6 communes), Aude (2 communes), Gers (7 communes), Tarn (14 communes), and Tarn-et-Garonne (5 communes).

A similar global extensive trend is to be observed in the other metropolitan areas with a population of over 200.000 inhabitants : between the last two census periods (1990 and 1999), the number of communes has noticeably increased in the metropolitan areas of Besançon (from 186 to 234), Bordeaux (149 to 191), Clermont-Ferrand (99 to 147), Limoges (53 to 78), Pau (91 to 142), Poitiers (56 to 83), Rouen (142 to 189), Strasbourg (128 to 182).

This evolution highlights the obsolescence of the territorial map set up about two centuries ago. Départements are in charge of promoting intermunicipal cooperation and solidarity policies within their respective territorial limits, in particular in the areas of public transportation, social assistance and education. Yet the current configuration of metropolitan areas as new real work and consumption spaces does not correspond any longer to the traditional département framework - not only do Paris and Toulouse metropolitan areas cover several départements, but also the metropolitan area of Lyon that spreads over the départements of Ain, Isère, Loire and Rhône - , or regional limits - metropolitan areas of

7 Avignon, Paris or Reims -, or even national frontiers - the Swiss-French metropolitan area of Genève-Annemasse1-.

A similar diagnosis of institutional obsolescence or misadaptation can be applied to inter- or supramunicipal bodies existing in conurbations: due to a fast-increasing urban sprawl, their competences are limited to an ever shrinking part of the territory they control. A good example is the Communauté Urbaine de Bordeaux (CUB) that was set up in 1968 for the 27 communes of the agglomeration of Bordeaux : since that time the metropolitan area of Bordeaux has kept on extending so that its territory constitutes today only a rather small part of the whole metropolitan area.

II. A high and variable level of geopolitical fragmentation

The French territory is highly fragmented : its number of communes is by far the highest among European countries with 36.565 (on the European continent : overseas communes are not included) according to the last 1999 census. This number approximately equates to the quantity of municipalities (19.429) and townships (16.504) in the US (U.S. Census Bureau 2002). Most of French communes have few inhabitants : 76% have less than 1.000 inhabitants where one French out of six lives. In 3.011 communes, the population is less than 500 inhabitants, and there are even communes with no population, in particular, in the département of Meuse, the six martyr-communes that « died for France » following terrible fights in the area of Verdun during the First World War (Beaumont-en-Verdunois, Bezonvaux, Cumières-le-Mort-Homme, Fleury-devant-Douaumont, Haumont-près- Samogneux, and Louvement-Côte-du-Poivre).

This very high level of territorial fragmentation has several explanations. One was brilliantly presented in 1924 by Hintze (1962) at the Academy of Prussia. According to Hintze, the making of European states between the Middle-Age and the XIXth century followed two distinct paths influenced by the type of feudal systems they experienced. In countries where a feudal system was absent, weak or late emerging, or where it was not characterized by an hereditary transmission of possessions (leading to a fragmentation of goods and possessions) - England, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Bohemia,

1 In our present analysis, only the French part of this binational region will be considered.

8 Southern Italy, and Castile - former large rural territories were maintained and gave birth to supra-municipal territorial bodies (höhere Kommunalverbände like the English counties, the Polish voïvods or the Hungarian comitats), replacing in large part the basic local units, municipalities. But in the countries of the former Carolingian Empire - France, Germany West of the Elb, Northern and Central Italy, Aragon - an opposite trend occured between the Xth and the XIIth centuries : the feudal logic of hereditary succession created a crushing, or a « pulverization » (Hintze, op. cit. : 227) of traditional vast territorial entities (counties, provinces) and a full redistricting into small authorities conducted by lords and kings institutions.

While from the XIXth century onwards several waves of territorial consolidation contributed to a substantial reduction of communes in Germany – the last big reform in the 1960s and 1970s divided by three their numbers in Western Germany (from 25.000 to 8.500) followed several similar experiences carried out from the 1880s – limits of communes have hardly changed in France in the last centuries, revealing a sharp cleavage between French cities and German ones and more generally North-European cities that gradually merged with many of their suburbs (Hoffmann-Martinot 2002). Even a country traditionally and firmly preserving very small communes like Switzerland during the 1990s has pursued an amalgation policy, at least in eleven of its cantons (Kübler and Ladner 2003, Ladner and Steiner 2003).

The vast majority of French citizens live today in metropolitan areas, half of them in areas over 200.000 inhabitants and more than one sixth (11.173.886) in the Paris metropolitan area. The general territorial fragmentation is also reflected at the level of the various individual metropolitan areas (Table 2).

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Table 2. The geopolitical fragmentation of the 42 French metropolitan areas with over 200.000 inhabitants (1999)

Central city population/ Number of Metropolitan Geopolitical Total Number of communes/ Central city area pop. fragmentation METROPOLITAN AREA population communes 100.000 inhab. population (in %) index* AMIENS 270 809 210 78 135449 50 16 ANGERS 332 737 89 27 151322 45 6 AVIGNON 290 524 44 15 85937 30 5 BAYONNE 214 039 40 19 40113 19 10 BESANCON 222 388 234 105 117691 53 20 BETHUNE 268 435 73 27 27781 10 26 BORDEAUX 925 429 191 21 215374 23 9 BREST 303 528 51 17 149649 49 3 CAEN 370 752 240 65 114007 31 21 CLERMONT-FERRAND 409 533 147 36 137154 33 11 DIJON 326 886 214 65 150138 46 14 DOUAI-LENS 552 635 105 19 42812 8 25 DUNKERQUE 265 906 56 21 70834 27 8 ANNEMASSE 212 451 111 52 27238 13 41 GRENOBLE 514 586 119 23 153426 30 8 LE HAVRE 296 795 72 24 190924 64 4 LE MANS 293 094 90 31 146064 50 6 LILLE 1 142 887 131 11 184647 16 7 LIMOGES 247 881 78 31 133924 54 6 LYON 1 647 722 296 18 445274 27 7 MARSEILLE-AIX-EN-PROV. 1 516 086 82 5 797491 53 1 METZ 429 544 237 55 123704 29 19 MONTPELLIER 459 946 93 20 225511 49 4 MULHOUSE 270 752 62 23 110141 41 6 NANCY 410 405 225 55 103552 25 22 NANTES 711 241 82 12 270343 38 3 NICE 933 551 117 13 343123 37 3 NIMES 221 380 46 21 133406 60 3 ORLEANS 355 770 90 25 113089 32 8 PARIS 11 173 886 1 584 14 2125851 19 7 PAU 216 868 142 65 78800 36 18 PERPIGNAN 249 041 61 24 105096 42 6 POITIERS 209 250 83 40 83507 40 10 REIMS 291 701 175 60 187181 64 9 RENNES 521 183 140 27 206194 40 7 ROUEN 518 340 189 36 106560 21 18 SAINT-ETIENNE 321 953 41 13 180438 56 2 STRASBOURG 611 971 182 30 263941 43 7 TOULON 564 740 39 7 160712 28 2 TOULOUSE 964 914 342 35 390301 40 9 TOURS 376 131 80 21 132677 35 6 VALENCIENNES 399 581 102 26 41251 10 25 MEDIAN 363 261 104 25 136302 37 8 N = 6785 source : INSEE * Index of Zeigler and Brunn (1980) Bold characters = highest value; italics characters = lowest value

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Data from Table 2 indicate that the number of communes is not proportional to population. The Paris metropolitan area (see Appendix 3) is by far bigger than other areas in demographic terms as well as in the number of municipal units : 1.584. But two metropolitan areas having a similar demographic size may register different territorial fragmentation levels : with a population of about 950.00 inhabitants each, Toulouse (342 communes) appears from this point of view three times more fragmented than Nice (117). In the same way, with a smaller population of approximately 220.000 inhabitants, the metropolitan area of Besançon (234 communes) has five times more units than the area of Nîmes (46).

To control for demographic size, this measure was standardized by computing the number of communes per 100.000 inhabitants for each metropolitan area. If the obtained values are compared with those of the largest US metropolitan areas, it appears that fragmentation is higher in French metropoles whose median value is 25, well above the highest US values like for Pittsburgh (17.7 including municipalities, townships and counties) (see Altschuler et al. 1999, Orfield 2002). Using this indicator allows us to put in a comparative perspective the Paris case – with a value of 14, it ranks among the relatively less fragmented metropolitan areas, like the two largest following French metropolitan areas, Lyon (18) and Marseille-Aix-en-Provence (5). At the other extreme Besançon reaches a very high score of 105. Some communes may have a tiny population, for instance Lemenil-Mitry, the smallest component of the metropolitan area of Nancy : there are only two inhabitants, the mayor Henri de Mitry who has been constantly reelected since 1977 - he belongs to an old aristocratic family and owns the two main local properties, Le Ménil and Le Mitry - and his wife… 30 other communes in this metropolitan area - 13% of the total number of 225 municipalities - have no more than 100 inhabitants. These very small units are 18% in the metropolitan area of Besançon. Half of the 6.785 communes in our 42 metropolitan areas have less than 826 inhabitants and three quarters have less than 2.499 inhabitants.

In order to take into consideration the variation of the population concentration or dispersion level within each metropolitan area and therefore to assess not only the territorial but also the demographic fragmentation, we used a second indicator measuring the proportion of the central city population in relation to the population of its suburban belt (see Table 2 and Figure 2).

11 Figure 2. The geopolitical fragmentation of the 42 French metropolitan areas over 200.000 inhabitants

10 0

Douai 90 Valenciennes Béthune Annemasse

Lille Paris Bayonne 80 Rouen Bordeaux Nancy Dunkerque Lyon Toulon Grenoble Metz 70 Avignon Caen Orléans Clermont-Ferrand Tours Nice Pau Nantes Rennes 60 Poitiers Mulhouse Toulouse Perpignan Strasbourg Angers Dijon Brest Montpellier 50 Le Mans Amiens Marseille-Aix Besançon Limoges Saint-Etienne Suburb population / metropolitan population area (in %)

40 Nîmes

Le Havre Reims

30 0 20406080100120 Number of communes/ 100.000 inhabitants

In 34 of the 42 metropolitan areas, the suburban population is greater than the cities’ population. The demographic weight of the central city is likely to be reduced when it coexists with other communes having a similar or substantial population. That is the case of the metropolitan area of Douai-Lens where the central city (Douai) population (42.812 inhabitants) concentrates only 8% of the population area due to the existence of a network of neighboring municipalities with a comparable demographic size like Lens (36 .192 inhabitants), Liévin (33.463 inhabitants), Hénin-Beaumont (25.204 inhabitants), and ten other communes with more than 10.000 inhabitants. A same configuration is found in the metropolitan areas of Béthune (10% of the total population in the central city), Valenciennes (10%), Annemasse (13%), or Lille (16%). On the other hand, the city of Le Havre (190.924 inhabitants) makes up two thirds of its metropolitan area population, where the largest demographic sizes following Le Havre are in Montivilliers (16.553 inhabitants) and then Gonfreville-L’Orcher (9.939 inhabitants). A similar macrocephaly is also found in Reims, a city with 187.181 inhabitants, i.e. 64% of its metropolitan area population, followed by the commune of Tinqueux with only 10.079 inhabitants.

Using these two indicators – the number of communes/ 100.000 inhabitants and the ratio of the central city population to the metropolitan area population – we measured the geopolitical fragmentation of each metropolitan area by constructing the Zeigler and Brunn (1980) index. This index is computed by dividing the number of communes per 10.000 inhabitants by the percentage of the central city population over the metropolitan area population. Again our values – ranging from 1 in Marseille-Aix-en-Provence to 41 in Annemasse – are substantially higher and more dispersed than for the 25 largest US metropolitan areas. No less than 12 French areas display a value greater than the maximum score of 12 registered in the US for Pittsburgh (Orfield 2002 : 134). The use of this index leads to a reordering of metropolitan areas that had been ranked along the number of communes criterion : for instance Besançon appeared as the most territorially fragmented metropolitan area but is demographically much less fragmented as more than half of its population (53%) remains concentrated in the central city. Therefore, although its index value (20) reflects that it is on the whole more fragmented than the average metropolitan area, it remains less fragmented than Annemasse (index of 41), Béthune (26), Douai-Lens, Valenciennes (25) or Nancy (22). Second observation : the largest metropolitan areas are not more fragmented. Among those having more than 900.000 inhabitants, only the areas of

13 Bordeaux and Toulouse have a score of 9, a value slightly higher than the median value of 8. Significantly, the lowest value among all metropolitan areas is for Marseille-Aix-en-Provence with 1 – there are just 5 communes per 100.000 inhabitants, 53% living in Marseille and 9% in addition in Aix-en-Provence -, while the values for Paris, Lyon, Lille, and Nice are respectively 8, 7, 7, et 3.

III. Intermetropolitan Area Comparisons

For a long time central cities have dominated their sphere of influence, but they have more recently gradually lost part of their attraction capacity. Their populations have often declined in favor of their rapidly expanding suburbs and seem to have stabilized between the two last census in 1990 and 1999 (for more developments : Hoffmann-Martinot 2000). Their socio-economic profiles vary substantially, leading to continuing strong disparities between them. We will try to compare them using urban hardship measures that were conceived and applied by Nathan and Adams in their comparative analyses of US metropoles (1976 and 1989).

These two authors selected six measures in order to capture the urban hardship level in US large metropolitan areas : 1. Unemployment (percent of civilian labor force unemployed) 2. Dependency (persons less than eighteen or over sixty-four years as a percent of total population) 3. Education (percent of persons twenty-five years of age or more with less than twelfth-grade education) 4. Income level (per capita income) 5. Crowded housing (percent of occupied housing units with more than one person per room)2 6. Poverty (percent of families below 125 percent of low-income level)

Thanks to the support of INSEE (national census institution), LASMAS-Institut du Longitudinal, and the cooperation established between CNRS and INSEE, we collected data

2 Measuring comparatively urban crowded housing has a long tradition : at the European level it was done in particular in the 1930s by the International Labour Organization, cf. Pinol 2003 (Vol.II : 229s.). On the development of similar statistical analyses in France since the 1891 census and the long term decline of crowded housing in Paris, see Fijalkow 1998.

14 from the last national census organized in 1999 for the 6.785 communes belonging to the 42 metropolitan areas with more than 200.000 inhabitants and we constructed the first five measures, municipal data on poverty being unfortunately still unavailable in France. To measure education, we used an equivalent to the US twelfth grade level : the baccalauréat level. Income level is the median income per capita, based on the 2000 income declaration forms and published by the national tax division DGI - Direction Générale des Impôts : this precise measure of municipal wealth is for the first time easily and publicly available in France through diffusion by INSEE in 2003 of the CD-ROM Revenus fiscaux des ménages (Tax revenues of households). Année 2000. France métropolitaine par commune. To protect taxpayer confidentiality and anonymity, these data are unavailable for smaller communes (less than 50 households) : for that limitation reason, several indicators and indexes presented and discussed further in this paper could not be computed for smaller suburbs, leading to a reduction of our initial population of 6.785 communes to 6.273 communes.

For each measure, an index was computed to standardize municipal ratios calculated from data between 0 and 100, using the following formula :

X = ( Y - Ymin ) 100 Ymax - Ymin

Where : X = standardized ratio to be created Y = ratios calculated from data

Ymax = maximum value of Y

Ymin = minimum value of Y

For example, for the unemployment ratio, the maximum and minimum are : 24.69 (Perpignan) and 12.03 (Paris). Then the value 100 is given to 24.69 and 0 to 12.03. The standardized ratio of the city of Angers, with an unemployment ratio of 15.68%, is : ((15.68 - 12.03)/ (24.69 - 12.03)) 100 = 29.

As the formula is intended to be applied to ratios, it was transformed for the income measure which is expressed in Euros per capita. The modified formula for this measure is :

X = ( Y - Ymax ) 100 Ymin - Ymax

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Based on the various computed indexes, an InterCity Composite Index (ICCI) - the average of the five indexes values - was constructed for ranking our 42 cities (Table 3).

16 Table 3. Intercity Composite Indexes

Intercity Unemployment DependencyEducation Housing Income Composite CENTRAL CITY Index Index Index Index Index Index MARSEILLE 89 77 74 78 87 81 PERPIGNAN 100 100 81 23 100 81 LE HAVRE 67 80 100 63 92 80 DOUAI 81 71 78 65 93 78 TOULON 75 99 80 48 82 77 AVIGNON 73 76 78 45 100 74 NIMES 85 80 73 31 91 72 MULHOUSE 34 63 89 79 93 72 NICE 30 92 67 92 71 70 BETHUNE 68 62 82 40 92 69 AMIENS 63 42 72 72 91 68 BAYONNE 61 78 79 24 86 66 ANNEMASSE 23 50 88 84 80 65 DUNKERQUE 54 69 81 36 84 65 SAINT-ETIENNE 39 74 81 42 79 63 VALENCIENNES 57 54 67 31 85 59 LILLE 63 66 81 15 61 57 MONTPELLIER 82 22 30 39 88 52 REIMS 32 32 70 29 77 48 METZ 18 30 61 41 75 45 STRASBOURG 12 30 45 64 69 44 CAEN 45 25 52 34 62 44 PAU 39 52 55 5 64 43 BREST 31 43 63 0 74 42 ANGERS 29 39 59 10 72 42 ORLEANS 7 39 49 49 61 41 TOURS 33 34 61 14 62 41 ROUEN 44 20 48 24 64 40 LIMOGES 11 7 38 52 91 40 NANTES 45 33 43 16 61 39 BESANCON 19 28 52 23 70 39 GRENOBLE 32 23 34 39 64 38 LYON 4 38 71 6 58 35 CLERMONT- FERRAND 18 15 61 12 69 35 LE MANS 24 34 30 44 39 34 BORDEAUX 55 20 31 12 53 34 TOULOUSE 53 10 27 16 60 33 DIJON 0 21 48 22 48 28 POITIERS 24 0 43 6 65 28 PARIS 0 16 0 100 0 23 RENNES 10 5 37 9 55 23 NANCY 14 2 22 13 53 21 N=42 source : INSEE- DGI

17 An ICCI value of 0 or 100 would mean that a city scored 0 or 100 respectively on each of its composing indexes.

This classification allows us to differentiate clearly prosperous central cities from those that are confronted with important socio-economic difficulties. ICCI has a double advantage. Firstly it measures a plurality of dimensions (unemployment, dependency, education, housing, income) that may be not interdependent : a wealthy city like Paris is nevertheless affected with much more acute housing problems than other cities, while a city facing serious difficulties like Mulhouse has a relatively low unemployment rate. Secondly ICCI is an appropriate instrument for comparing cities within a country and across nations : it was conceived and applied to the US and could be used for international comparative purposes in other IMO countries where enough municipal data are available.

Scores vary substantially between the extreme values, between 21 for the most prosperous city, Nancy, and 81 for the second largest French city which faces harder problems, Marseille. It has to be noted that cities registering the highest ICCI values are located in the South-Eastern part of the country – along with Marseille, Perpignan (81), Toulon (77), Avignon (74), Nîmes (72), Nice (70) – and in the North - Le Havre (80), Douai (78), and Béthune (69).

The capital Paris belongs to the more advantaged cities as it has the lowest ratios of unemployment (12%), of less educated people (only 41% of the Parisians twenty-five years of age or more have a level of instruction inferior to the twelfth-grade), and the lowest level of low income population (the median income per capita is 13.731 €). On the opposite end, Perpignan cumulates three highest scores : unemployment ratio of 25%, dependency ratio of 42%, and a median income per capita about half that of Paris (7.559 €). Therefore it turns out that the socio-economic status of French central cities is not so homogeneously and dramatically different from US cities : according to persisting clichés, American cities would be affected by a general urban decay and crisis, while French cities would maintain themselves as very strong economic cores and main locations agregating the wealthiest social groups. Of course the still heavily dominant position of Paris and its region today over the rest of the country (Hoffmann-Martinot 2003) explains that it is most often selected by media and observers when they look at the characteristics and trends peculiar to metropolitan areas. But Paris stands out as a special case : it is undeniably a wealthy city that does not have to face

18 very severe socio-economic problems, although poverty and social difficulties are far from being absent, especially in some districts. Observing more in depth the vast spectrum of central cities brings us to acknowledge that it is more heterogeneous and diversified than the usual zooms focusing on Paris or some traditional bourgeois cities in the province like Lyon or Bordeaux tend to indicate.

In a second step we tried to compare suburban belts in a similar way, using the same indicators and indexes. For a better understanding of our methodological procedure, it is necessary to stress that, following Nathan and Adams, we considered the whole suburban territory for each metropolitan area as our unit of analysis (Table 4).

As opposed to variables of unemployment, dependency, education, and housing, median income per capita is not available in France at the level of the whole suburban area, as it is published only at the municipal level by the Direction Générale des Impôts. For each suburban belt, a substitute variable was therefore computed as follows and used in the subsequent analyses :

(∑ (municipal median income x municipal population)) / total population of all suburban communes in the metropolitan area

Table 4 shows that the variation of ISCI (InterSuburb Composite Index) is even greater than for ICCI as it ranges from 92 for the Douai suburb to 19 for the Annemasse suburb. In the same way that our data on cities allow us to correct a good deal of simplifications spread through media and also sometimes in academic writing, it appears that the reality of French suburbs measured by the ISCI index contradicts the widely assumed picture of suburbs functionally equivalent in France to central cities in the US. Focusing on a specific category of socially distressed suburbs tends to underestimate the great variety of suburban contexts and in particular the existence or even the rapid growth of relatively wealthy and prosperous suburbs. In fact two thirds of suburban spaces score less than 50 on the ISCI index, which reflects a rather low level of socio-economic difficulties.

Following the same methodological approach as Nathan et Adams (1976), we have then compared the rankings of cities (ICCI) and of their suburbs (ISCI) to measure the extent to which they converge or diverge. Identical scores – city A and suburb A both ranked at the

19 first place, city B and suburb B both ranked at the second place, and so forth – would tend to mean a relatively close status between cities and their suburban environment. Conversely a complete mismatch between both rankings would indicate a high discrepancy between core cities and their peripheries.

Table 5 presents in two columns the respective rankings of cities and their suburbs by sextiles. In Table 6 three types of relationships between cities and suburbs are differentiated. The first relationship (Type 1, Significant Disparity) includes cases where there is a difference or two sextile groups or more between the rankings of the central city and its suburbs on the two interarea indexes. The second relationship (Type 2, Both High) includes cases in which both the central city and its suburbs rank high (having worse conditions) on the two interarea indexes. The third combination (Type 3, Both Low) includes cases in which both the central city and its suburbs rank low on the two indexes.

20

Table 4. Intersuburb Hardship Indexes

Intersuburb Unemployment Dependency Education Housing Income Composite SUBURB Index Index Index Index Index Index DOUAI 94 97 100 73 98 92 VALENCIENNES 100 85 94 55 100 87 BETHUNE 82 92 100 46 87 81 DUNKERQUE 77 49 87 50 89 70 PERPIGNAN 73 90 67 20 74 65 NICE 63 100 33 83 32 62 TOULON 77 93 45 46 47 62 LILLE 65 63 59 43 58 58 AVIGNON 63 60 54 34 65 55 SAINT-ETIENNE 51 72 66 35 50 55 LYON 48 41 82 49 36 51 LE HAVRE 50 39 69 54 43 51 AMIENS 53 32 71 51 47 51 ROUEN 61 54 65 31 43 51 NIMES 66 45 48 27 63 50 METZ 48 46 68 30 50 48 BAYONNE 57 89 41 19 35 48 CAEN 53 34 59 36 50 46 ANGERS 41 62 52 16 53 45 MARSEILLE-AIX 73 20 28 60 40 44 LE MANS 43 53 43 21 52 43 TOURS 48 42 49 20 36 39 BREST 37 71 39 0 48 39 NANTES 43 44 47 17 44 39 MULHOUSE 33 40 57 49 10 38 NANCY 47 35 47 21 36 37 PARIS 50 13 15 100 8 37 BESANCON 33 43 46 19 40 36 PAU 42 57 33 7 41 36 ORLEANS 36 37 46 34 22 35 DIJON 43 30 42 26 33 35 BORDEAUX 58 16 41 17 36 34 REIMS 39 26 54 22 23 33 RENNES 30 35 38 11 40 31 LIMOGES 36 46 37 4 30 31 MONTPELLIER 59 24 0 31 33 29 POITIERS 38 19 44 6 38 29 STRASBOURG 30 10 45 42 11 28 TOULOUSE 47 24 15 13 28 25 CLERMONT-FERRAND 42 11 39 9 24 25 GRENOBLE 47 12 5 38 22 25 ANNEMASSE 34 0 19 42 0 19 source : INSEE

21 Table 5. Interarea Hardship Indexes Comparing Cities to Cities and Suburbs to Suburbs Intercity Intersuburb Central City Hardship Index Suburb Hardship Index

MARSEILLE-AIX-EN-PROV. 81 DOUAI-LENS 92 PERPIGNAN 81 VALENCIENNES 87 LE HAVRE 80 BETHUNE 81 DOUAI-LENS 78 DUNKERQUE 70 TOULON 77 PERPIGNAN 65 AVIGNON 74 NICE 62 NIMES 72 TOULON 62

MULHOUSE 72 LILLE 58 NICE 70 AVIGNON 55 BETHUNE 69 SAINT-ETIENNE 55 AMIENS 68 LYON 51 BAYONNE 66 LE HAVRE 51 ANNEMASSE 65 AMIENS 51 DUNKERQUE 65 ROUEN 51

SAINT-ETIENNE 63 NIMES 50 VALENCIENNES 59 METZ 48 LILLE 57 BAYONNE 48 MONTPELLIER 52 CAEN 46 REIMS 48 ANGERS 45 MARSEILLE-AIX-EN- METZ 45 PROV. 44 STRASBOURG 44 LE MANS 43

CAEN 44 TOURS 39 PAU 43 BREST 39 BREST 42 NANTES 39 ANGERS 42 MULHOUSE 38 ORLEANS 41 NANCY 37 TOURS 41 PARIS 37 ROUEN 40 BESANCON 36

LIMOGES 40 PAU 36 NANTES 39 ORLEANS 35 BESANCON 39 DIJON 35 GRENOBLE 38 BORDEAUX 34 LYON 35 REIMS 33 CLERMONT-FERRAND 35 RENNES 31 LE MANS 34 LIMOGES 31

BORDEAUX 34 MONTPELLIER 29 TOULOUSE 33 POITIERS 29 DIJON 28 STRASBOURG 28 POITIERS 28 TOULOUSE 25 PARIS 23 CLERMONT-FERRAND 25 RENNES 23 GRENOBLE 25 NANCY 21 ANNEMASSE 19 source : INSEE-DGI

22 Table 6. Sextile Rankings of Cities and Suburbs on the Individual Central City and Suburban Hardship Indexes [a]

Type 1 [b] Type 2 [c] Type 3 [d] Metropolitan Area City Suburb Metropolitan Area City Suburb Metropolitan Area City Suburb MARSEILLE-AIX 1 3 PERPIGNAN 1 1 CAEN 4 3 NIMES 1 3 LE HAVRE 1 2 ANGERS 4 3 MULHOUSE 2 4 DOUAI-LENS 1 1 PAU 4 5 ANNEMASSE 2 6 TOULON 1 1 BREST 4 4 MONTPELLIER 3 6 AVIGNON 1 2 NANTES 5 4 REIMS 3 5 NICE 2 1 TOURS 4 4 STRASBOURG 3 6 BETHUNE 2 1 BESANCON 5 4 LYON 5 2 AMIENS 2 2 LIMOGES 5 5 ROUEN 4 2 BAYONNE 2 3 GRENOBLE 5 6 LE MANS 5 3 DUNKERQUE 2 1 CLERMONT-FER 5 6 NANCY 6 4 SAINT-ETIENNE 3 2 ORLEANS 4 5 PARIS 6 4 VALENCIENNES 3 1 DIJON 6 5 LILLE 3 2 BORDEAUX 6 5 METZ 3 3 RENNES 6 5 POITIERS 6 6 TOULOUSE 6 6

[a] Rankings are on the basis of the sextile in which each city and suburb fell in the respective intercity and intersuburb hardship indexes. Cities and suburbs coded 1 are in the top sextile, evidencing the highest degree of social and economic hardship. [b] Type 1 cases are characterized as "Significant Disparity". There was a difference of two sextiles or more between the rankings of the central city and its suburbs on the two interarea indexes. [c] Type 2 cases are characterized as "Both High". Both the central city and its suburbs ranked in either the third or second or first quintile, implying a relatively high level of hardship for both areas. [d] Type 3 cases are characterized as "Both Middle Sextile or Below". Both the central city and its suburbs ranked relatively well on the interarea hardship indexes, each falling in either the third, fourth, fifth, or sixth quintile.

The observation of Type 1 (Significant Disparity) highlights, among 12 cases, two well contrasted kinds of configurations. In the metropolitan areas of Marseille, Nîmes, Mulhouse, Annemasse, Montpellier, Reims, and Strasbourg, the central city seems to face more difficulties than its suburb. Yet it is important to keep in mind that the suburb encompasses a sometimes large and heterogeneous variety of communes. Another quite different pattern is illustrated by the cities of Lyon, Rouen, Le Mans, Nancy and Paris where disparities are obvious in the other direction : central cities benefit from a better position within their category contrary to the less privileged status of their suburban belts.

Type 2 (Both High) essentially groups together former industrial metropolitan areas in the North and the South-East where central cities as well as their suburbs seem to be equally affected by socio-economic crisis and reconversion cycles.

In the last and Type 3 (Both Low) category are found rather wealthy metropolitan areas : cities and suburbs share a quite similar profile marked by more favorable life and work conditions than in other French areas, resulting from a dynamic tertiary sector, based on solid commercial traditions in Nantes or Bordeaux, developing new industries and technologies in Toulouse, or a strong potential for scientific and cultural innovations in Grenoble or Rennes.

IV. Intrametropolitan Area Comparisons

Using the same five indicators of unemployment, dependency, education, housing, and income, we tried to measure to what extent, for each metropolitan area, the central city faces more or fewer socio-economic problems than its suburban belt, still considered as a global unit. To this end a City-Suburb Hardship Disparity Index (CSHDI) has been constructed.

For each selected measure, an index was created that aims to standardize ratios on a 0- 100 scale following the formula :

X = ( Y - Ymin ) 100 Ymax - Ymin

Where : X = standardized ratio to be created Y = ratios of city-to-suburb unemployment (or dependency, or education, or housing) rates calculated from data

24 Ymax = maximum value of Y

Ymin = minimum value of Y

For instance, for the city-suburb ratio of unemployment, maximum and minimum values are : 2.16 and 0.85. The value 100 is given to 24.69 and 0 to 12.03. With 18.97 % of unemployment for the city and 13.14% for the suburb, the standardized ratio of the city of Bordeaux is computed as follows : [((18,97 / 13,14) - 0,85) / (2,16 - 0,85)] * 100 = (0,59 / 1,31) * 100 = 45

As it was conceived for ratios, this formula had to be adapted to the income measure expressed in Euros per capita. We then modified our formula in the following manner :

X = ( Y - Ymax ) 100 Ymin - Ymax

For each city, we added values of the 5 indicators and then divided them by 5. We got the non adjusted indicator included in Table 7. Its value for Bordeaux is obtained as follows :

(45 + 35 + 21 + 28 + 23) / 5 = 152 /5 = 30.4

In a second step, this index was adjusted to differentiate cities comparing favorably from those comparing unfavorably to their adjoining suburbs. As in Nathan and Adams’ analyses, a composite index score was computed for a hypothetical city that was identical to its suburbs for each of the five indicators.

For such an hypothetical city,

Its unemployment indicator is : ((1 - 0,85) / 1,31) * 100 = 12 Its dependency indicator is: ((1 - 0,781) / (1,077 - 0,781)) * 100 = 74 Its education indicator is: ((1 - 0,66) / (1,15 - 0,66)) * 100 = 69 Its housing indicator is : ((1 - 0,71) / (1,40 - 0,71)) * 100 = 42 Its income indicator is: ((1 - 0,80) / (1,36 - 0,80)) * 100 = 36 Its non adjusted composite index is : (12 + 74 + 69 + 42 + 36) / 5 = 233 / 5 = 47

25 Adjusting 47 to 100, is is then easy to adapt non adjusted values for calculating CSHDI adjusted scores. Metropolitan areas CSHDI values were ranked in a decreasing order (Table 7) and were accordingly represented in Figure 3. This figure is clear to read and to interpret : when a metropolitan area score is higher than 100, the situation of the central city is more difficult than its suburb, and conversely if its value is smaller than 100.

These CSHDI values do not validate the thesis that central cities in general would have more problems than their suburbs, but the reverse assumption is not confirmed either. Actually the distribution is about even between the 20 cities showing a better socio-economic condition than their suburbs, and the 22 cities registering on the contrary an unfavorable comparison.

Comparing these values with scores of the 55 SMSA’s (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) in the US (where the index included the same 5 indicators plus a poverty indicator) reveals two main differences between France (data from 1999) and the US (data from 1980) (Nathan et Adams 1989): - As opposed to French metropolitan areas, in most SMSA’s (49 out of 55), hardship conditions were more acute in cities than in suburbs - CSHDI values are higher in the US : they reach values over 200 in 24 cases - while this level is found nowhere in France – with strikingly high levels in Hartford (536), Newark (509), or Cleveland (385)

26 Table 7. City-Suburb Hardship Disparity Index

Non Adjusted Adjusted Unemployment Dependency Education Housing Income Composite Composite METROPOLITAN AREA Index Index Index Index Index Index Index ANNEMASSE 82 80 100 100 88 90 191 MULHOUSE 100 73 72 77 100 84 180 LE HAVRE 74 93 76 45 65 71 151 MARSEILLE-AIX 43 100 77 55 61 67 143 BAYONNE 53 66 73 51 64 61 130 STRASBOURG 88 50 34 69 61 60 129 AVIGNON 49 77 64 54 56 60 127 NIMES 52 90 62 43 45 58 124 REIMS 76 44 55 53 62 58 123 PERPIGNAN 50 88 58 42 47 57 121 AMIENS 62 53 47 62 60 57 121 LE MANS 92 69 73 25 19 56 119 TOULON 29 85 72 37 48 54 115 SAINT-ETIENNE 47 70 59 46 41 53 112 MONTPELLIER 63 34 45 51 69 52 111 BREST 82 36 57 46 37 51 110 NICE 19 75 66 40 46 49 105 PAU 73 53 52 38 31 49 104 LIMOGES 53 42 67 51 32 49 104 ORLEANS 55 47 38 61 42 49 103 BESANCON 82 32 41 47 38 48 102 CLERMONT-FERRAND 51 31 55 51 51 48 102 GRENOBLE 50 41 47 37 46 44 94 TOULOUSE 69 20 32 49 36 41 88 NANTES 76 37 31 37 25 41 88 ANGERS 66 35 44 27 30 40 86 METZ 35 33 38 56 37 40 84 TOURS 50 39 49 25 32 39 83 POITIERS 70 10 33 41 34 38 80 RENNES 86 9 29 33 22 36 76 CAEN 48 33 34 31 22 33 71 DUNKERQUE 18 75 47 12 11 33 69 BETHUNE 20 48 42 25 22 31 67 BORDEAUX 45 35 21 28 23 30 65 DIJON 31 29 39 29 20 30 63 DOUAI-LENS 16 54 38 22 13 29 61 ROUEN 33 18 27 23 29 26 55 LILLE 5 0 20 48 50 24 52 LYON 41 39 2 26 11 24 50 NANCY 35 5 9 20 24 19 40 PARIS 16 31 0 30 0 16 33 VALENCIENNES 0 42 30 0 3 15 32 N = 6273 source : INSEE-DGI

27 Figure 3. City Suburb Hardship Disparity Index

VALENCIENNES

PARIS NANCY

LYON

LILLE ROUEN DOUAI-LENS

DIJON

BORDEAUX BETHUNE

DUNKERQUE CAEN RENNES

POITIERS

TOURS

METZ ANGERS

NANTES

TOULOUSE GRENOBLE

CLERMONT-FERRAND BESANCON

ORLEANS LIMOGES

PAU NICE BREST

MONTPELLIER

SAINT-ETIENNE

TOULON LE MANS

AMIENS

PERPIGNAN REIMS

NIMES AVIGNON

STRASBOURG BAYONNE

MARSEILLE-AIX-EN-PROV. LE HAVRE MULHOUSE

ANNEMASSE

0 100 200

Not considering extreme groups – cities in a worse position than their suburbs like Annemasse, Mulhouse, and Le Havre, and cities more prosperous than their suburbs like Valenciennes, Paris, and Nancy – Table 7 and Figure 3 reveal that a large part of French metropolitan areas possess a CSHDI score close to 100. On the whole disparities between central cities and urban peripheries appear to be rather moderate. But using these indexes tends to erase or to discount potential existing disparities across suburbs. It is indispensable to take into consideration the often very different characteristics of suburban mosaics in order to avoid the risk of excessively generalizing and homogeneizing assessments induced by our methodological instruments. The demographic and socio-economic heterogeneity of suburbs is infortunately under-estimated and insufficiently explored in many countries. Recent works by authors like the urbanist Hayden (2003) or political scientists Dreier et al. (2001) contributed to a reevaluation of the commonly accepted and widespread representation of standardized places reserved to WASP middle classes in the US. The world of French suburbs is surely quite different but its structure may be as diverse and complex as in North America. To get a preliminary picture of this high level of heterogeneity, let us examine the distribution of our main municipal wealth indicator - the median income per capita - within our various metropolitan areas.

Figure 4 represents this distribution by metropolitan areas for the 6.273 communes whose median income per capita is published and distributed by the national tax administration Direction Générale des Impôts (DGI). The distribution is graphed by a line joining the highest and the lowest values, where quartiles as well as central cities values (full brown circles) are indicated. If we consider the Amiens metropolitan area, the lowest median income per capita is reached by the commune of Saint-Ouen with 6.675 €, the highest by Saint-Fuscien with 15.591 €, the first quartile lies at the level of 8.319 €, the median at 9.255 €, the third quartile at 10.022 €, and the central city, Amiens, at 8.118 €.

-- NEXT PAGE : Figure 4. Distribution of Municipal Median Income per Capita in € (2000)--

29 Minimum 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Maximum Central City 24000

21000

18000

15000

12000

9000

6000

3000

Many elements are worth mentioning with respect to this Figure 4. One can notice the important variation of median income distribution across metropolitan areas. Some of them appear rather homogeneous, for instance Bayonne - where values range from 7.227 € in Biarrotte to 10.943 € in Bassussarry - or Perpignan - from 6.037 € in Opoul-Perillos to 9.603 € in Cabestany – although the observed concentration level is likely to be favored by the relatively small number of communes in these metropolitan areas. Reciprocally the Paris metropolitan area is characterized by the largest and most impressive disparities among the urban communes of the « one and indivisible » French Republic : median income per capita is five times lower in Clichy-sous-Bois (4.482 €) than in Neuilly-sur-Seine (22.731 €), respectively the poorest and the wealthiest communes among all municipalities located in the 42 metropolitan areas. With 3.5 the gap is more limited though quite substantial in the metropolitan area of Toulouse between Auribail (5.338 €) and Vieille-Toulouse (18.886 €).

Second observation : the municipal median income fluctuates closely around 9.000 € in most metropolitan areas. Lower values close to 8.000 € are only found in Béthune (7.907 €), Douai-Lens (7.738 €), Dunkerque (7.850 €), Perpignan (7.636 €) and Valenciennes (7.813 €), and higher scores over 10.000 € uniquely in the areas of Annemasse (11.275 €), Grenoble (10.020 €), Mulhouse (10.939 €), Paris (10.945 €), and Strasbourg (10.586 €).

The highest municipal levels of poverty – that are located in Figure 4 below the 6.000 € line – and wealth – above 15.000 € - are displayed not in central cities but in suburbs. Socio-economic differences are huge between prosperous and distressed suburbs, as it is documented through three pairs of richest and poorest communes in their respective metropolitan areas using our five indicators of unemployment (IU : % of civilian labor force unemployed), dependency (ID : % persons less than 18 or over 64 years old in total population), education (IE : % persons 25 years or more with less than twelfth-grade education), housing (IH : % occupied housing units with more than one person per room), and income (II : median income per capita in €) :

METROPOLITAN AREA OF PARIS IU ID IE IH II Clichy-sous-Bois 24 41 80 34 4.482 Neuilly-sur-Seine 9 40 28 9 22.731

31 METROPOLITAN AREA OF LYON IU ID IE IH II Vaulx-en-Velin 23 39 82 19 5.342 Saint-Didier-au-Mont-d'or 7 38 39 6 16.404

METROPOLITAN AREA OF METZ IU ID IE IH II Woippy 23 37 82 17 5.607 Sainte-Ruffine 6 39 47 1 16.206

Are central cities wealthier or poorer than their suburbs ? It depends. The relationship between central city and suburbs does not fit any unique pattern. In fact, in 19 metropolitan areas out of 42, that is in slightly less than half the cases, the central city belongs to the poorer half of the communes in the metropolitan area. In the first quartile – the least prosperous quarter of the communes – are found no less than 10 central cities : Amiens, Avignon, Bayonne, Annemasse (the third poorest commune in its area with 8.767 €), Le Havre, Lille, Marseille, Montpellier, Mulhouse (the poorest commune in its area with 8.003 €), and Strasbourg. Nine other central cities are in the second quartile : Grenoble, Metz, Nice, Nîmes, Orléans, Perpignan, Reims, Saint-Etienne, and Toulon. Then 9 are to be found in the third quartile (Besançon, Béthune, Brest, Caen, Clermont-Ferrand, Douai, Dunkerque, Toulouse, and Valenciennes), and 14 in the fourth quartile formed the wealthiest cities (Angers, Bordeaux, Dijon, Limoges, Lyon, Le Mans, Nancy, Nantes, Paris, Pau, Poitiers, Rennes, Rouen, and Tours).

Due to its leading role in the nation, Paris appears as the richest central city with a median income of 13.731 € per capita, followed by Lyon (11.308 €), and then Dijon (10.799 €). In the Paris metropolitan area, there are 183 suburbs whose median income is even higher than in Paris, and often substantially. Neuilly is not the only oasis of wealth. There are quite a few other examples in this area of mostly higher income and wealthy suburbs, like Saint- Nom-La-Bretèche, Le Vesinet, Saint-Cloud, Sceaux, Jouy-en-Josas, or Maisons-Laffitte.

We have so far presented and discussed various types of socio-demographic data leading to the formulation of some main observations :

32 - An ever increasing expansion of metropolitan areas took place in France since the 1970s, especially visible in periurban communes more than in central cities or in their close suburbs - The French pattern of urban sprawl shares common characteristics with the US type of metropolitan areas extension. The causes and consequences of urban sprawl are also similar in the two countries. While suburbanization in the 1950s-60s was mainly steered and favored by state driven programs outwards from central cities, (grands ensembles central government policy, creation of new cities in the Paris region, ZUP – Zones à Urbaniser en Priorité), the movement that started from the 1980s does not correspond, as in the US, to a top-down policy initiated by the central bureaucracy but essentially to more private inputs and individualized strategies. However, for economic reasons and due to factors related to historical and cultural amenities, central cities remain in France more than in the US strong attractive poles that prevented a massive flight of the upper and middle classes towards the periphery (for a comparative theoretical amenities- based argument, see Brueckner et al. 1999). Therefore the French metropolitan pattern remains more monocentric. - On the whole, socio-economic disparities between central cities and their suburbs are likely to be more limited and differentiated in France than in the US, as it is reflected by binational comparisons based on Nathan and Adams’ index scores and classic wealth measures like median income per capita - Yet important variations of municipal profiles persist as well across metropolitan areas and between communes belonging to a same area. This makes it all the more necessary and urgent to deepen the exploration of the relationship between the central city and its suburbs

V. To what extent are citizens’ political attitudes determined by their commune of residence?

Our core hypothesis is the following : in France the suburbanization trend starting in the 1970s-80s shares much in common in its structure as well as in its effects on citizens’ political attitudes with the similar pattern observed in the US. Using words from Putnam (2000 : 209) :

33

« As suburbanization continued, however, the suburbs themselves fragmented into a sociological mosaic – collectively heterogeneous but individually homogeneous, as people fleeing the city sorted themselves into more and more finely distinguished « lifestyle enclaves », segregated by race, class, education, life stage, and so on ».

This evolution towards more residential segregation has been more scrutinized at the neighborhood level in big cities than between communes and in particular in relation to the faster growing municipalities during the last two decades, the periurban localities. But some recent studies confirm that economic and social polarization of the French urban space has grown at an increasing rate since the 1980s (see : Bessy 1998 ; Chenu and Tabard 1994, Rouxel 2003).

A large number of new suburban communes draw predominantly members of the new middle classes, the so-called « new periurbanites », often young parents with young children, looking for more space and rural life, but also comfortable housing, security - the Conditions de vie – Vie de quartier permanent survey conducted by INSEE reveals that the feeling of insecurity is much less pronounced in this type of commune than in older municipalities having a high proportion of collective housing units (Le Toqueux 2003) - , and not too long a distance to the noisy, compact, and stressing central city. Their motto would be : everything but « métro, boulot, dodo », a popular and realistic expression that could be translated by « subway, work, sleep », commonly associated with the frustrating life and transport conditions of traditional « old suburbanites ». Quality of life, a return to an idealized country that would not be located too far from the core city and its job opportunities through the proximity of highways and railway networks, affordable housing costs and in particular an easier access to property, lower local taxes, are among the basic factors explaining the contemporary process of periurbanization in France. Several recent studies document these strategies of residential localization in periurban communes leading to growing dissociation between residential and working places (for example in the metropolitan area of Lyon : Andan et al. 1999). The famous humorist Alphonse Allais was prophet as he proposed in the XIXth century : « Cities should be built in the country. The air is much purer there » ! Analyzing data from the INSEE housing surveys, Cavailhès and Goffette-Nagot (2003) have confirmed a law of urban economics stating that households arbitrate home-workplace transport costs and housing costs. People are ready to choose a more distant residential location from the core economic area where they work and therefore to pay more in

34 transportation costs when the land rent tends to decrease. These authors clearly demonstrate, through an analysis covering all French metropolitan areas, that the longer the distance to the central city, the greater the proportion of individual houses and the larger their size due to the decreasing land rent. Comparing four categories of communes – central cities, old suburbs, periurban communes located less than 20 km from the central city, and periurban communes located more than 20 km from the central city – this study finally shows that the 1996 households average income in all French metropolitan areas was higher in periurban communes and that the largest income increase since 1984 has been registered in the most distant periurban communes (+85%).

Historically, the virtue of a natural environment as opposed to the pernicious and dangerous big city has strongly influenced the suburbanization movement in the US. In France too such a Christian aspiration has been significant : Catholic and peasant roots of a large part of the population favored to some extent a generally distrustful attitude toward the big city, its « amorality », and a certain propensity to distance oneself and to migrate into smaller territorial units. Sauvage et al. (2002 : 56) emphasize this dimension in their analysis of the transformations of the Rennes metropolitan area :

« for a long time the world of the rural origin was perceived, represented, dreamed as the original paradise; for many rural people, the obligation to come to the city was the occasion to join new urbanites destined to settle in the «hell of grands ensembles (large scale public housing)»… »

Urban forms, housing types, and social structures of suburbs have gradually changed since they emerged and rapidly developed in the second half of the XIXth century. This can be illustrated using the example of four suburbs in the metropolitan area of Bordeaux, offering four well contrasted profiles (see Table 8). Around the central city was formed in a first period a rather highly dense suburban belt. Today these initial and often industrial suburbs keep their traditional production infrastructures while evolving towards more tertiary activities. Bordering Bordeaux the industrial and popular suburb Bègles presents such a profile. 60% of its housing units were built before 1967, 74% before 1975, often small houses for blue-collar workers and employees. Collective housing makes up 37% of all housing units. This old suburb for decades remained the only Communist stronghold in the Bordeaux agglomeration. However since the end of the 1980s it has experienced a certain form of gentrification as it nowadays draws middle classes looking for affordable individual houses

35 with gardens located close Bordeaux (only 30% of homeowners are found in Bordeaux, but 49% in Bègles). The gradual social and cultural diversification of this suburb resulting from the migration of new social groups partly explains the 1989 political transition from a traditional Communist regime to a new politics leadership centered on the ecologist mayor and journalist Noël Mamère.

Table 8. Old and New Suburbs in the Bordeaux Metropolitan Area (1999) % Population Housing % built % built % built Collective Median % Home before 1949- since Units 1949 1974 1975 Buildings Income Owners Bègles 22.538 10.317 37 37 26 37 9.332 49 Lormont 21.340 8.646 10 59 31 71 6.082 30 Le Haillan 8.134 3.142 8 29 63 19 11.240 63 Martignas/Jalle 5.581 1.848 4 15 81 2 11.109 83

source : INSEE

In the 1960s many large scale public housing projects were erected in this first suburban belt throughout French metropolitan areas. So called operational urbanism projects and Zones à Urbaniser en Priorité (ZUP) were meant to accomodate massive waves of migrants, especially from rural areas and the former colony of Algeria. The monumental size of these collective housing operations was often huge : 60% of ZUP built in France have a capacity ranging between 2000 and 5000 housing units. As Burgel (2003 : 690) rightly points out, since that time some of them have become legendary cases of distressed neighborhoods : Lyon-La Duchère (1958, 6.000 housing units), Caen-Hérouville (1962, 8.000 housing units), Nantes-Saint-Herblain (1962 , 7.500 housing units), Marseille-ZUP Nord No. 3 (1964, 25.000 housing units), or Toulouse-Le Mirail (1964, 23.000 housing units). In the Bordeaux agglomeration, Lormont belongs to this category of suburb developed in the 1960s-70s that are characterized by a Soviet-type collectivist architecture with sad and immense towers and bars of social housing : 59% of its current housing infrastructure was built within a period of only eleven years, from 1968 to 1981. More recently urbanized than Bègles, Lormont today concentrates a lot of economic and social problems : this is the commune in the metropolitan area of Bordeaux registering the lowest score of municipal wealth (6.082 € per capita of median income) and of homeowners (30%), with a particularly strong proportion of immigrants (one fifth of the population).

36 West of the Bordeaux conurbation, Le Haillan’s urbanistic and socio-demographic profile is quite different from Lormont. For a long time the commune of Le Haillan has also remained a small rural village whose main activity was truck-farming : only 8% of its housing units were built before 1949, and its development is more recent as it just started in the 1980s- 90s ; 63% of housing units have emerged since 1975. The stock of collective housing is limited (19%) in favor of individual houses. The commune mainly draws professionals and managers - many of them working in the nearby aeronautics pole - whose financial resources are sufficient to acquire spacious houses with lawns or gardens : the median income level reaches 11.240 €, about double the Lormont level, and the proportion of homeowners here is much higher (63%). The high price of land reflects a combination of positive and attractive advantages : economic dynamism, excellent transportation connections to the metropolitan core, proximity of lakes, of the Médoc area and of the Atlantic coast, tight network of commercial, cultural, and sport infrastructures.

The commune of Martignas-sur-Jalles is an even more recent suburb where 81% of housing units were built after 1975, almost all of them (98%) are individual houses, and where the percentage of homeowners is among the highest in the metropolitan area (83%). Like in Le Haillan, municipal officials count on the quality of life and a vast range of amenities to attract a young (average age : 35 years), well trained and wealthy (11.109 € of median income) population searching for natural space (with 2.639 hectares, the municipal territory is very wooded and particularly large, equivalent to 53% of the city of Bordeaux surface). The municipality actively promotes its special location and resources through its website as follows (http://www.martignas.org/):

«Located 18 kilometers West of Bordeaux, halfway between the quais of the capital of Aquitaine and the Atlantic Ocean, Martignas-sur-Jalle has all the advantages of a ville à la campagne (a city in the country). Pine smell from the Landes forest, sweetness of ocean air, calm of the Jalle river offer the inhabitants of Martignas a forest realm where life is pleasant, close to one of the big French metropoles ».

The recent development of periurban communes like Martignas confirms in France a general socio-territorial trend that is noticeable not only in the US but also in other post- industrial countries. Suburbanization increasingly does not depend on institutional constraints exerted by main public (state) or private agents (firms), but by individual strategies of migration and localization by households arbitrating their residential preferences.

37 Historically, as Thisse et al. (2003) stress, the distribution of populations and activities in cities was traditionally dominated by non economic logics. Land use rules were mainly dictated by custom, religion or political power, leading in some cases to more social diversity in neighborhoods and even buildings. In these traditional social settings, spatial proximity did not prevent however a frequently very great social distance between social groups and individuals.

When the private property and the alienation right of lands emerged, acquisition and sale of plots favored a growing specialization of localizations based on their relative profitability. In other words, the existence of land markets became a structural dimension of the urban space bringing a gradual differentiation of work, residence, and leisure places.

As early as 1826 the basic principle explaining the formation of land price –land rent – and how activities organize within the urban space along variations of this price was formulated by von Thünen in his study of the agricultural rent. This principle can be applied to urban spaces : everything happens as if implicitly households compare all potential localizations and assess for each of them the highest amount or bid they would accept to pay for their residence. A household bid for a specific localization depends on several factors like the housing and neighborhood quality, close facilities and available transportation systems. Distance to the main economic and employment center is also an essential criterion, even though improved and more rapid transportation infrastructures reduced its importance.

Housing is a fundamental good and its consumption is likely to increase with higher income. Wealthier households would be expected to reside at a greater distance from the central city to consume larger spaces. According to this line of reasoning poorer households would live in or nearer the central city using smaller lots, while richer households would reside in more distant suburbs : this general trend is actually observed in many North American but also European contexts. This social stratification results from a competition for land use between users possessing different abilities to pay.

At this general analytical level, it appears that the declining cost of daily migrations together with increasing household incomes constitutes a crucial cause of contemporary metropoles’ urban sprawl, including in France.

38 Locational choices of young households – who tend to settle down when they reach the age of approximately 45– result from a process of arbitrating their available financial resources and the search for an optimal level of local amenities. In many metropolitan areas in the US, the average level of existing amenities has substantially deteriorated in central cities, which contributed to massive migrations of higher income inhabitants to often distant suburbs. Contrasting with this evolution, a large number of French central cities preserved for a long time a high level of amenities (architectural heritage, schools, cultural institutions, restaurants, entertainment,…) allowing them to maintain or to attract to their territory a higher proportion of managers and professionals (see in particular on this point the US-Germany- France comparison of Sellers 1999). Still growing disamenities emerging in French central cities - shrinking and more expensive housing capacities, considerable car traffic and parking problems, increasingly intense and frequent pollution peaks with better known dangerous effects on health, insecurity perceived by more citizens as rapidly increasing, … - lead more young households to settle at a larger distance from the centre to purchase a house in a periurban commune. The more central cities loose natural (topography related), historical (architectural and cultural heritage), and economic and socio-cultural (commercial, educational, and cultural infrastructures) amenities, the more higher economic and cultural level households tend to leave these cities for moving to suburbs.

French periurbanization is likely to share more characteristics with the « US pattern » because it seems to accentuate socio-economic segregation of municipal populations. It is clear through the examples of Le Haillan and Martignas-sur-Jalle, two suburbs among the most recent and the wealthiest in the metropolitan area of Bordeaux. Settlement motivations and individual characteristics of their inhabitants illustrate this trend toward the formation of socially privileged enclaves. These households can acquire spacious lots and houses well connected to the main employment centre of Bordeaux, and are able to pay an entry ticket that excludes de facto less favored social groups. For that reason income variation is unsurprisingly smaller in periurban communes than in the other municipalities of metropolitan areas (Caruso 2003).

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Figure 5 represents a typology of communes in French metropolitan areas with four categories based on two fundamental dimensions : social homogeneity and socio-economic

39 status. These two dimensions appear to be crucial for a better understanding of how increasing segregation trends influence varying political behaviors according to residential location. In France, central cities generally remain characterized by a relatively high level of social heterogeneity : wealth and poverty coexist within their boundaries so that neighborhoods of a same city may be socially quite diverse : let us just compare in Paris the very prosperous seventh district (median income of 21.246 € per capita in 2000) to the nineteenth (8.728 €), or, in Marseille, the eighth district (12.424 €) to the third (4.028 €). Old suburbs group suburbs that developed mainly before the 1980s. As they are socio- economically highly diverse, they cannot be classified following a unique pattern. For that reason they may be located in our four categories of communes : some are socially heterogeneous and rich like Mérignac in the metropolitan area of Bordeaux ; others are not so wealthy while experiencing some gentrification dynamics like Bègles ; one can also identify socially homogeneous old suburbs, with a predominantly poor population like Lormont, or on the contrary with a clear upper class profile like Le Bouscat. New suburbs have a more specific profile : following the structure of Le Haillan and even more of Martignas-sur-Jalle, they are socially homogeneous and strongly segregated in favor of more educated and wealthier citizens.

Socio-economic segregation in and between communes is not a new phenomenon : thirty or forty years ago, simply living in Le Bouscat or Lormont could be interpreted as a reliable indicator of belonging respectively to the upper or the lower class within the limits of the metropolitan area of Bordeaux. Since that time the main evolution has been an increasing diversification and refinement of residential segregation dynamics. It is exemplified by the emergence of new suburbs. Two major consequences on political behaviors may be expected from this segregating suburbanization: on the one hand a decline of conventional political participation, on the other hand a growing fiscal conservatism.

The more segregated are the communes and consequently the more socially homogeneous they become, the less conflictual municipal political issues are likely to evolve in the absence of sufficient disagreement, leading to a weaker political mobilization of citizens. It has been demonstrated through multivariate regression analyses applied to England and France that diminished social cleavages and reduced political conflict favor non voting in local elections (Hoffmann-Martinot, Rallings and Thrasher 1996). It is therefore to be expected that controlling for other key variables - related in particular to geographic mobility

40 and political competition structure - turnout should be higher in central cities and socially heterogeneous suburbs than in socially homogeneous suburbs. Among the latter, the hypothesis should also be formulated and tested that the overrepresentation of homeowners in the new suburbs – these citizens usually express more interest in local political issues as municipal policies (be they related to taxes, urbanism, infrastructure,…) have for them more direct effects on their properties – is likely to increase electoral participation at a higher level than in old suburbs.

Until the 1980s and the gradual implementation of the decentralization reform, local taxes were strictly controlled by state authorities, including through fixing local rates. Since that time, local taxation has been decentralized and substantially increased. It now constitutes a crucial variable in the localization decision making made by firms and households, which undoubtedly contributes to differentiating France from most of its European partners. As the fiscal expert Gilbert (1999) emphasizes, the French local fiscal system is peculiar in two ways : first local fiscal autonomy is particularly high in France due to the important liberty local authorities have in the fixation of the four direct taxes (business tax, housing tax, and the two property taxes), and secondly this autonomy is considerably enhanced by the large cross- municipal fiscal variation resulting from the very high degree of geopolitical fragmentation. In other terms, the Tiebout argument of vote with the feet appears to be significantly more relevant in France than in territorially more consolidated European nations where municipal fiscal autonomy tends to be more limited like Germany or Netherlands. The French citizen may find on the « localization market » a large range of quality/ price ratios so that he/ she may arbitrate according to his/ her preferences a great number of combinations of costs, advantages, and amenities. The more fragmented the territory of a metropolitan area, the more diverse this structure of choices is likely to be. For a similar level of costs (land and transportation) and of amenities, wealthy households planning to settle in a suburb will favor low taxation communes, often located outside agglomerations and intermunicipal structures like communautés urbaines or districts. In the metropolitan area of Bordeaux, the attraction to upper income families of the Cestas suburb - bordering the territory covered by the expensive and heavy intermunicipal administration Communauté Urbaine de Bordeaux (CUB), and consequently both geographically close and fiscally distant -, is partly due to its lighter local fiscal pressure compared with the higher tax level found in the 27 communes members of the CUB.

41 Individual fiscal strategies of this type are developing in particular in metropolitan areas where the socio-economic situation of the central city is unfavorable or deteriorating, constraining its officials to increase fiscal pressure. The ongoing decentralization policy, leading to a gradual fiscal retreat by the state especially for financing costly central or state- owned infrastructure (operas, museums, libraries,…), as well as the growing concentration of dependent social groups in central cities (older and poor people notably) have substantially increased fiscal stress for central cities. Comparatively, the local fiscal burden per inhabitant is generally much lighter in suburbs with a rather small, wealthy, and homogeneous population, benefiting in addition from business tax contributions to the municipal budget paid by some local dynamic firms. Therefore the aim to pay less taxes in a commune conducting a moderate expenditures policy greatly determines the localization behavior of households in the new suburbs. Although the relationship between social structure and ideological orientation of a municipality has to be considered and analyzed cautiously, migration of upper and middle classes to the periphery is nevertheless expected to reduce conservative electoral majorities in central cities. Twenty years ago, the more bourgeois structure of central cities facilitated their control by right wing municipal councils : that was the case in 1983 for about two thirds (27) of central cities of our 42 metropolitan areas. In 2003, conservative parties maintain their control in only half of the cities (21).

Fiscal conservatism takes various forms and political expressions according to different types of suburbs. Adopting the argument of Gainsborough (2001) applied to the US, we assume that, given their residential and lifestyle choices, new suburbanites defend conservative economic and fiscal preferences that directly influence the selection of their local leaders and the policy outputs of their municipalities. This more or less explicit and strong fiscal conservatism may combine with social liberalism for forging a New Political Culture (Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot 1998) inspiring independent and right wing politicians, but also moderate leftist leaders such as pragmatic socialists. It is clear that there is a large variety of politically organized expressions of this place-driven conservatism. New suburbanites don’t pursue self-interested motivations exclusively and are not systematically in favor of a limitation of public interventionism : they may on the contrary press for developing more municipal infrastructure, in particular in the education and cultural sectors. However, though they may defend sociotropic values by not only conserving but also improving to some extent the local status quo in favor of other citizens residing in the commune, they remain basically attached to preserving the social homogeneity of their locality.

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