Reception of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture in Europe

2

Vytautas Magnus University 2012 UDK 008(520:4) Re-15

Editor in-Chief / Redaktorė Kyoko Koma, Vytauto Didžiojo Universitetas (Vytautas Magnus University)

Editors board (alphabetic order) / Redkolegija: Jean-Michel Butel, Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations) (France) SangGum Li, ⿖㌆╖䞯ᾦ (Pusan National University) (South Korea) Sepp Linhart, Universität Wien (University of Vienna)(Austria) Takashi Kitamura, ᄢ㒋ᄢቇ(Osaka University )(Japan) Aurelijus Zykas, Vytauto Didžiojo Universitetas (Vytautas Magnus University) (Lithuania)

Publication coordinator / leidinio sudarytoja koordinatorė Ieva Kudirkaitė, Vytauto Didžiojo Universitetas (Vytautas Magnus University)

Sponsor / Rėmėjas

ISBN 978-9955-12-797-0 © Vytautauto Didžiojo universitetas, 2012 © Vytautas Magnus University, 2012 pu{yvk|j{pvu Z

CONTENT

Introduction / 5

Jeong-Im Hyun Korean Pop Fans in France: Fascinated by Strangeness or Familiarity? / 13

Kyoko Koma Acculturation of Kawaii fashion in France through comparative analysis of questionnaires (France, South Korea, Taiwan) and interviews (France) / 31

SangGum Li High and Pop Culture in the Age of Cultural Pluralism / 53

Sepp Linhart The popular image of Japan in Nazi Germany (1933-1945) / 71

Noriko Onohara Costume and Trauma Reception of Japanese Fashion in Britain through Five Exhibitions in London / 97

Aurelijus Zykas The Development of Japan’s Public Diplomacy and Country Branding within the Worldwide Development of the Country’s Image Policy / 127

About Authors / 149

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Introduction

This book is the result of an international and interdisciplinary collective research project called Comparative study of Reception of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture in Europe, supported by the Suntory Foundation subsidy program 2011-2012, following the 2010-2011 program organised by Centre for Asian studies at Vytautas Magnus University. It has been a long time since Japanese and Korean popular cultures were popular on the world stage. This research focuses on the reception of Japanese and Korean Culture in Europe, which could be considered as one of the most influential factors in constructing the image of these two Asian countries. Our research background is as follows: In the 1990s, when Asian Popular Culture (Lent 1994, Westview), or Global Goes Local (Craig and King 2002, University of Hawaii), was published, Studies of Asian popular culture tended to focus on the localisation of globalised (that is, American) culture in each Asian country. However, in the 21st century, in the domain of the studies of Asian popular culture, we find the terms “Japanisation”, “Japanese transnationalism” (Iwabuchi 2002, Duke University), and “Koreanisation” (Aaron Han Joon Magnan-Park). Under existing circumstances we have not yet found many books on the reception of Japanese and Korean popular culture in Europe, although books on Japanese and Korean popular culture have already been published in Europe. Last year we published Reception of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture in Europe, the result of the first stage of our research (2010-2011), ] pu{yvk|j{pvu

including, Reception of Korean Popular Culture in Poland (S. Choi), Takarazuka’s Overseas Performance in Europe and Asia (T. Kitamura), Reception of Kawaii Culture in France and in Lithuania (K. Koma), The Reception of Korean Popular Culture in Germany (S. Li), Popularity of Japanese and Korean cinematography in European countries (M. Šiaučiūnas), The contemporary culture of South Korea in the Mass Media of Lithuania (J. Seo), The discourses of Popular Culture in 21th Century Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy Agendas (A. Zykas). In previous years we researched a particular country as a kind of separate case study: we tended to research how Japanese and Korean popular cultures are accepted not only in western European countries such as Germany and France, but also in eastern European countries such as Poland and Lithuania. This year, with a change of some researchers, we complete our research with theoretical elements on popular cultural studies, a comparative analysis of the reception of Japanese and Korean popular culture in selected European countries, and Japanese public diplomacy history. Sepp Linhart discusses, in The Popular Image of Japan in Nazi Germany (1933-1945), the popular cultures of Japan during the 1930s that are different from today, such as films, manga, anime, popular literature, J-Pop, popular aesthetics, fashion, electronic games, characters, cult figures, karaoke, cuisine, sports, etc. He analyses the bestsellers about Japan published during the Nazi period in Germany, when Japanese popular culture was known by a few films, a little bit of popular literature, ‘genuine’ Japanese sports, the Takarazuka girls opera, and Japanese postcards and stamps. By studying the bestsellers about Japan in Nazi Germany, a country with a totalitarian political regime, one can see, 1. what knowledge about Japan was tolerated, and 2. which Japanese values were propagated to the German masses. He concludes that analysis proves, as could be assumed, that the ‘samurai image of Japan’ was the most influential image during the Nazi period in Germany. In particular, with SangGum Li’s paper published in the pu{yvk|j{pvu ^

previous journal, this contribution permit us to give us a clue to compare perception of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture in German-speaking countries. In this journal’s theoretical element, SangGum Li approaches popular culture, which ‘opposes’ high culture. He discusses, in High and Pop Culture in the Age of Cultural Pluralism, the aesthetic point of view that distinguishes between the ‘high class’ and ‘low class’, which change with history, though the concept of high culture in its production and consumption presupposes superior mental ability and negates the cultural ability of the mass in the modern period. Arguing that, as such, the concept of popular culture can’t be a static notion and focusing on the traditional hierarchy of visual and verbal expression, ‘high level’ and ‘the public’ in cultural pluralism, the culture industry, the commercialisation of culture in a multicultural society, etc., he aims at a concise definition, i.e. about the criteria and boundaries between popular and high culture based on visual and verbal expression within the human senses. Jeong-Im Hyun analyses, in her article Korean Pop Fans in France: Fascinated by Strangeness or Familiarity?, how French youth discovers K-Pop, and why they become K-Pop fanatics. To examine her hypothesis, which is that most K-Pop fans are usually previously exposed to Asian culture, especially to Japanese culture, she explores what makes these fans give up Japanese cultural influence and adopt Korean pop culture through face-to-face and e-mail interviews, of which the majority of interviewees were students at INALCO (Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales) in the Korean language department and French K-Pop fan club members. Kyoko Koma, following on from last year, analyses and clarifies in her paper Acculturation of Kawaii Fashion in France Through Comparative Analysis of Questionnaires (France, Lithuania, South Korea, Taiwan) and Interviews (France) characteristic tendencies of adaptation of kawaii culture in France based on her previous research concerning kawaii in France _ pu{yvk|j{pvu

and in Lithuania. She practices empirical research on what the motivation is for wearers to adopt kawaii fashion, listening to the voices of some of those responsible for kawaii boutiques and cafés and wearers of kawaii in Paris. Noriko Onohara contributes her paper, titled Costume and Trauma: Reception of Japanese Fashion in Britain Through Five Exhibitions in London, which examines how Japanese fashion has been accepted in Britain, from traditional national costume elements like the Kimono to contemporary international fashion designers. She discusses the image of Japan produced in the Western world at recent exhibitions in London using the key themes of ‘tradition’, ‘trauma’, ‘technology’ and ‘trend’, expressing her thoughts on how the Japanese image is described through Japanese fashion and costume, how Japanese art has influenced modern Western art and fashion, and on the Kimono as street fashion by introducing an English performer based in London with a fascination for Japanese culture and fashion. When comparing the results of J. Hyun and K. Koma’s analyses of the receptions of Japanese and Korean popular culture in France, we found some characteristics of each reception in another place, that is, France. The studies of N. Onohara and K. Koma also permit clarification of some points relating to how Japanese fashion, the same cultural artefact, is accepted in both London and Paris. Aurelijus Zykas contributes his paper The Development of Japan’s Public Diplomacy and Country Branding within the Worldwide Development of the Country’s Image Policy. A.Zykas reviews the development of Japan’s public diplomacy and country branding practices, comparing them to those of Western countries. Analysing three different periods (pre-Cold War, Cold War and post-Cold War), he argues that, during its development starting at the beginning of the 20th century, Japanese public diplomacy always used the ‘Western’ model in the sense of the application of theories and practices relating to the country’s image policy. He concludes by asking what does the transformation through each period mark pu{yvk|j{pvu `

in detail. His discussion permits us to discover the background framework of actual Japanese cultural popular diplomacy by way of popular culture.

***

Throughout our two-year project, carried out by 11 European, Japanese and Korean researchers, we found clues to help grasp the actual situation surrounding the reception of Japanese and Korean popular culture in Europe. According to our research, the popularity of Korean popular culture, which is unassailable in Asian countries, is still developing (Choi 2011; Li 2011). We found Hallyu fan clubs in several European countries, and in particular K-Pop or Korean film has become the focus of some European public attention (Choi 2011; Li 2011; Seo 2011; Hyun 2012). Seo Jinseok is also a key person in promoting the diffusion of Korean popular culture in Lithuania. Apart from the Internet as a device for diffusing popular culture it is very important to have a key person to stimulate the diffusion of Asian popular culture in Europe, such as initiating Japan expo in France. In France, which is one of the countries that consumes most Japanese popular culture in the World, this culture has been the start for some French fans to enter the world of K-Pop, as J. Hyun discussed (2012). It would be possible that on influencing each other, Japanese and Korean popular culture will form more fans in Europe. What is more, as S. Linhart (2012) and T. Kitamura’s discussions (2011) showed, it is evident that the Japanese popular cultural ‘boom’ in Europe already started with the opening of Japan to foreign countries in the pre-World War II period. This boom occurred not only from the ‘bottom’ but also from the ‘top’. Japanese popular literature as a device to propagate to the Nazi XW pu{yvk|j{pvu

German masses (Linhart 2012), Japanese popular literature as a device to propagate to the Nazi German masses (Linhart 2012) and Takarazuka used as a public diplomacy tool (Kitamura 2011) could be considered ‘top-down’ diffused cultural artefacts. Today, as most of the authors in our research project team mention, diffusion of the Internet permits European young people to easily access Asian cultural artefacts, which is considered ‘bottom-up’ diffusion. However, such ‘bottom-up’ cultural artefacts tend also to be used as tools of public diplomacy. We find a detailed description of the situation in A. Zykas’s discussion (2011, 2012). We would like also to say that even if Japanese popular culture is diffused and its artefacts are often considered as culturally odourless, this culture wears immaturity-kawaii features, a persistent stereotypical image of Japan even now (Koma 2011, 2012). What’s more, N. Onohara also discusses stereotypical images, such as ‘tradition’, ‘trauma’, ‘technology’ and ‘trend’ through the reception of Japanese fashion in London (Onohara 2012). Based on this first research step covering the reception of Japanese and Korean popular culture in Europe, we hope to continue to develop our research in future, as S. Li mentions (2012), we will need to do more work because, “discussion on the identity of culture is important as long as we acknowledge the diversity of cultures in the context of historical changes”. We hope also to contribute to the domain of Asian popular cultural studies, which is starting to become noticed. For this project, in the first year we organised our midterm research seminar at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (South Korea), helped by Associate Professor Sung Eun Choi on January 2011, and in the second year, we have been welcome by the Research project “Japanese Populations : Contemporary Evolutions and Perspectives”, at the Centre for Japanese Studies at INALCO (Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales/National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations) in France in December 2011, thanks to kind help of INALCO associate professor pu{yvk|j{pvu XX

Jean-Michel Butel. He participated also as debater in our seminar, with another debater Mr. Adrien Carbonnet, INALCO researcher. They helped us develop our problematic and discussion. We are thankful for their kind collaboration. We are very thankful to the Suntory Foundation for its great support in realising our research.

Editor Kyoko Koma

Korean Pop Fans in France: Fascinated by Strangeness or Familiarity?

qŒ–•ŽTp”Go œ• Sogang University, South Korea

Keywords: K-Pop, Internet, Fashion, Cultural diplomacy, Asian Popular culture

INTRODUCTION Korean pop (K-Pop) mania in France and throughout Europe, is a new cultural phenomenon that developed during the past decade. Although certainly not widespread among the general public, the French K-Pop mania has created a lot of buzz, especially during a 2011 K-Pop concert in Paris and it continues to spread mostly via Internet. One of the most influential national newspapers, Le Monde, recently reported about this phenomenon under the title ‘La pop coréenne, arme de la diplomatie culturelle’1 (`Korean Pop, weapon of cultural diplomacy’). Traditionally, France has been open to many talented foreign artists who proclaimed a ‘new genre’, whether in a classical or popular field; the country even has encouraged these artists to settle there. The French people know that this kind of openness has made their culture much richer than any other country’s and they are proud of it. However, they do not accept all new genres or new artists at any price. In their acceptance process, critics’ ‘approval’ has been fundamental, still is X[ qlvunTptGo€|u

the case. Mainly in the classical arts, the specialists who belong to ‘art academy institutions’ play the role of judge. They judge according to established criteria in deciding whether to accept or reject certain artists or a ‘new genre’. That’s why in general the diffusion process of classical art is quite vertical: from top down2. In contrast, this process happens more democratically for popular arts: the public has more right to decide whether to accept or reject individual popular arts. Sometimes journalists play the role of judge but it is not a systematic process. To discover the mechanism of why and how the public accepts or appreciates certain popular arts is difficult because it could be a matter of personal taste. Of course, personal taste can vary according to person in theory. Nevertheless we observe a strange phenomenon in this democratic society3: the convergence of personal tastes, namely ‘tendency’ (‘tendance’ in French) or ‘in fashion’ (‘à la mode’). This is an appealing irony of the democratization of our everyday life: People have a right to be different but they can choose to be like others. This phenomenon seems amplified, especially in this information age because the diffusion of tendency is more spontaneous and more rapid than before while many people who share the same taste seem eager to express their own ‘ personal taste on the Net. French young people are no exception to this democratization of taste in popular culture. The telling proof is the growth of K-Pop mania, regardless of harsh criticism of K-Pop by journalists4.

RESEARCH SUBJECT This study examines how French young people discovered K-Pop, and why K-Pop became a mania. Here is my hypothesis: Most K-Pop fans were exposed previously to Asian culture, especially Japanese popular culture such as manga, animation, J-Pop etc. Then, thanks to the Internet, these fans discovered K-Pop and got hooked. At this rvylhuGwvwGmhuzGpuGmyhujlaGmhzjpuh{lkGi€Gz{yhunlulzzGvyGmhtpsphyp{€f X\

juncture, this research could explore more what makes these fans give up Japanese popular culture and adopt Korean pop culture.

METHOD This research is based on face-to-face and e-mail interviews with twenty-eight respondents aged thirteen to twenty-eight in France in March 2012. The survey instrument used an open-ended answer system that permits the author to detect more detailed and deep factors. One disadvantage of this type of questionnaire is that it is difficult to receive many responds. Initially the author collected more than eighty e-mail addresses from students of the Korean language department of INALCO (Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales) in Paris who are interested in K-Pop; only thirteen completed the questionnaire. The other interviewees (15) are K-Pop fans who one way or another connected with INALCO interviewees through K-Pop.

RESULTS The following tables detail the results of interviews. The tables are separated according to the respondents’ age to see how differently they perceive, analyze, and like K-Pop. Because people are considered adults and start higher education at age eighteen, that age is used as the dividing line. Therefore there are two series of tables: Tables 1, 2, and 3 (thirteen to seventeen) and Tables 4, 5, and 6 (eighteen to twenty-eight). The tables are organized under three titles. 1. How they arrived at K-Pop? 2. Co-relationship with music preference 3. K-Pop like J-Pop? X] qlvunTptGo€|u

Table 1: How they arrived at K-Pop? (Age 13-17)

No Age How did you get Lis- What do you like in Is K-Pop in fash- to know K-Pop? tening K-Pop? ion in France? time? 1131. Big fan of J-Pop All day 1. Music style permits Don’t know 2. Found K-Pop , to escape from the through J-Pop site ordinary 3. YouTube 2. Glamorous style : clothes, dance, clip 2 14 1. Friend showed 1h 1.Rhythms Yes a K-Pop clip, then 2. Lyrics became interested 3. Clips in K-Pop. 3151. Interested in 6-7h 1. The artists work hard Not really. Just a Asia, first in Japan to satisfy their fans. debut 2. By J-Pop music 2. Different concepts TV channel, knew of clips K-Pop 3. Artists remain hum- 3. Searched In- ble: different from ternet American or other Eu- ropean artists. 4 15 1. By Korean 1-2h 1. Lyrics Yes. The proof is drama 2. Dances the concert in 2. By YouTube 3. Voice Paris 5 15 1. YouTube by ac- 3-4h 1. All: Lyrics, dances, Yes. But “I don’t cident voices like this ephem- 2. The artists work hard eral phenomenon to satisfy their fans because it can 3. Different from usual hurt the artists music and real fans” 6151. Interested in All day 1. Music, dance, lyrics Yes. But I prefer Japan 2. Artists work hard; real K-Pop fans to 2. Listen J-Pop on devote themselves to a large public. the Internet arrive at perfection. 3. Arrived at K-Pop rvylhuGwvwGmhuzGpuGmyhujlaGmhzjpuh{lkGi€Gz{yhunlulzzGvyGmhtpsphyp{€f X^

No Age How did you get Lis- What do you like in Is K-Pop in fash- to know K-Pop? tening K-Pop? ion in France? time? 7 15 1. Listen to ani- Every 1. Clip No. Just certain mation’s Original free 2. Easy to repeat music people are really Sound Track time 3. Choreography interested in K- 2. On the net find 4. Beautiful language Pop. K-Pop by accident 5. Artists care about Journalists are their fans hostile to K-Pop 8 15 1. Friend told All day 1. Music, dance, lyrics Yes about K-Pop 2. Various clips 3. Artists work hard; devote themselves to arrive at perfection. 9161. Manga, anima- 2-4h 1. Different style of “If ‘fashion’ means tion music temporary, I think 2. Listen J-music 2. Elaborate clips K-Pop is not fash- 3. On the Net, 3. Beautiful lyrics (not ionable in France. found many K-Pop vulgar like some West- On the contrary, clips ern songs) K-Pop and Korean 4. Melodious Korean culture will last” language 10 16 1. By Japan expo 5h 1. Artists care about No but it will be 2. Searched on the their fans Net 2. The artists work hard in every clip 11 17 Friend who listens 8h All : music, clip, lyric, Yes. to J-Pop showed dance K-Pop clip 12 17 1. Japanese Manga 8h 1. Voice It will be Black Butler fan 2. Dance 2. Read Sky blog 3. Arrived at K-Pop group, 13 17 1. By searching All day 1. Music style permits Not really for a J-Pop on the Net me to escape from the large public but it ordinary will be 2. Elaborate clips 3. Beautiful Lyrics X_ qlvunTptGo€|u

As shown in Table 1, these respondents arrived at K-Pop more or less the same way. First, most (10/13) were already interested in Asia, especially Japanese culture, thanks to the manga and Japanese animation they watched when they were children. Second, they know how to use the Internet, searched Japanese music or clips on the Net, eventually arrived at K-Pop and got hooked’ Figure 1: Influencing factors to become K-Pop fans shows the simplified process of how and why they became fans.

Figure 1: Influencing factors to become K-Pop fans (13-17)

Table 2: Listening Music genre (Age from 13-17)

No Age What kinds of music Does K-Pop have sim- Is K-Pop different do you listen to? ilarities with those from other coun- types of music? tries’? 1 13 J-Pop, K-Pop copies a lot No. K-Pop is very much American music American music like American music, but different from J-Pop 2 14 Metal (Night wish, No. Totally different Yes. K-Pop is different Within Temptation...) genre They concentrate more Electro rock (The on image than mes- Birthday Massacre ) sage rvylhuGwvwGmhuzGpuGmyhujlaGmhzjpuh{lkGi€Gz{yhunlulzzGvyGmhtpsphyp{€f X`

No Age What kinds of music Does K-Pop have sim- Is K-Pop different do you listen to? ilarities with those from other coun- types of music? tries’? 3 15 All kinds of music: a No. K-Pop has some- Yes. different majority Asian music. thing really different French, American, UK, German music also 4 15 J-Pop, T-Pop, Ameri- No Yes can 5 15 French No Yes. Very different 6 15 Bollywood film music, No with Bollywood Yes. Very different from American, UK music Yes with Ameri- French, for example can, UK 7 15 Hip hop, R&B, rock, No. Not at all Yes. K-Pop artists are soul more talented to be able to sing a differ- ent style. They remain humble compared to Western artists 8 15 Only K-Pop Yes. The message is different 9 16 J-Pop, Taiwanese Not really but some Yes. Even though K- music American music (elec- Pop is influenced by tro, R&B) American music but it is different, esp. visual aspects 10 16 American hip hop, Not really. Except cer- Yes. K-Pop artists are French Pop. tain rhythm more simple and mod- est than Westerners, work hard as well 11 17 J-Rock, electro No. Not at all. That’s Yes why l love it! 12 17 Only K-Pop Yes. Artists are more trained than those from other countries 13 17 Rock, J-Pop No. Not really. Yes. K-Pop is interested more in image YW qlvunTptGo€|u

Knowing that K-Pop fans are mostly guided by Japanese popular culture, the second question is whether there is any co-relationship between lovers of specific other music genres and K-Pop fans. Not surprisingly, as shown in Table 2: Listening Music genre (Age 13-17), most listen to Japanese and American music; they found many similarities with K-Pop. Then, what made them to stay with or move into K-Pop? To find out, the study asked whether “K-Pop is different from other countries”. Just one person said no; most of them responded that K-Pop is different. This was a contradictory response: they found many similarities with the music they already listened to but also said K-Pop is very different from other countries’. They listed the factors of why they like K-Pop: clips, lyrics, styles, choreography, etc. It is true that the way K-Pop presents these elements are different or could be considered well-performed in the public eye, compared to how other musicians perform. However, if they are saying, those are the main reasons why they like K-Pop, then why do they consider K-Pop different from other countries’? Because we can find similar clips, lyrics, styles and choreography in other place, the fans acknowledged that K-Pop is not quite different. One interesting finding is that they consider K-Pop different because of the artists’ attitude. Table 1 shows that only three respondents aged thirteen to seventeen, mentioned that reason, while Table 4 shows twelve respondents aged eighteen to twenty-eight mentioned artists’ attitudes as the distinguishing factor. Their K-Pop listening time per day (5h average) shows how deeply passionate they are about this music. Asked ‘What do you like in K-Pop?’, they all spoke about clips, music, dance, glamorous style, etc. Among the most interesting remarks are those about the attitude of artists. Respondents like K-Pop because they see how the artists work hard and remain humble. Most of them replied that K-Pop is in fashion in France (6: yes /3: will be) and three people gave a negative answer. rvylhuGwvwGmhuzGpuGmyhujlaGmhzjpuh{lkGi€Gz{yhunlulzzGvyGmhtpsphyp{€f YX

Table 3: K-Pop and J-Pop (Age from 13-17)

No Age Listen Like Why J-Pop? J-Pop? 1 13 Yes Yes Since very young interested in Japan and J-Pop was one of them 2 14 Yes Yes The same reason why I like K-Pop; different music, style, etc. 3 15 Yes Yes Can’t describe why I grew up with 4 15 Yes Yes Different from K-Pop, 5 15 Yes Yes The same reason why I like K-Pop; different music, style etc. ‘Different is better’ 6 15 Yes Yes Different from K-Pop 715No No 815No No 9 16 Yes Yes Since very young interested in Japan and J-Pop was one of them 10 16 No No 11 17 Yes Yes It’s cute, symbol of Japan 12 17 Yes Yes Different style music from Western 13 17 Yes Yes Different style music from Western

As we could already predict what these results show: many K-Pop fans would listen to J-Pop. Table 3 confirms this prediction: just three respondents answered that they do not listen to or like J-Pop. Those who like J-Pop gave the same reason for why they like K-Pop: J-Pop is different from Western music, it permits them to avoid the ordinary. Table 4 shows how the older group arrived at K-Pop. The one major difference from Table 1 is that more of them mentioned J-Pop (6/15) than the younger group in reply to the question, “How do you get to know K-Pop?” The age difference explains this factor: they had been nourished by Japanese popular culture from childhood through their teens to adulthood and got used to J-Pop. Most of K-Pop has a Japanese version, and that’s how they arrived at K-Pop. Somehow J-Pop listeners recognized it is cooler and different from the usual YY qlvunTptGo€|u

J-Pop. In the beginning, most did not even realize the song they listened to was K-Pop.

Table 4: How they arrived at K-Pop? (Age 18-28)

No Age How did you Lis- What do you like in K- Is K-Pop in fash- get to know tening Pop? ion in France? K-Pop? time? 14 18 1. By J-Pop on 4-10h 1. Rock sound Yes. At the mo- the Net, TBSK’s 2. Attractive and unusual ment. (TVXQ) song in music mix with American Japanese music 3. Visual factors: hand- some, glamorous 4. Choreography creates an image of solidarity, friendship 15 18 1. Korean TV All day All: music, clips, dance, No. Most people channel Ar- lyrics ignore K-Pop irang 16 19 1. Always 7h 1. Harmony of language Yes. interested in in the lyrics: English and Asia, especially Korean. Japan. 2. Artists behave humbly 2. Friend 3. Strict training showed won- 4. Solidarity der girls’ clip.

17 19 1. A friend let 3h 1. Clips No. Only a minor- her listen to 2. Music ity listen to K-Pop. K-Pop 3. Artists remain humble, French journalists 2. On the In- very different from Amer- criticize K-Pop a lot ternet icans and French 18 19 1. Listen oc- 3h 1. Music, clips No. Minority listen casionally to 2. Artists’ personality to K-Pop. French J-Pop 4. Hard-working attitude journalists criticize 2. Arrived 5. Soft Korean language K-Pop a lot at K-Pop by sonority YouTube rvylhuGwvwGmhuzGpuGmyhujlaGmhzjpuh{lkGi€Gz{yhunlulzzGvyGmhtpsphyp{€f YZ

No Age How did you Lis- What do you like in K- Is K-Pop in fash- get to know tening Pop? ion in France? K-Pop? time? 19 19 1. Listen oc- 3h 1. Music No. Because casionally to 2. Clip French journalists J-Pop 3 Artists’ personality criticize it a lot. 2. Arrived 4. Hard-working attitude at K-Pop by 5. Soft Korean language YouTube sonority 20 20 1. Thanks to 4h 1. Music and dances are No. Because J-Pop. easy to remember French journalists 2. By K-FM, in 2. Artists behave humbly criticize it a lot. 2011. behaves 21 21 1. Thanks to Every 1. Music, voice Yes and no. Yes J-Pop. free 2. Performance on stage. because some 2. By K-FM, in time people really like 2011. K-Pop. No because the big media are reluctant to speak about K-Pop 22 21 1. By Korean Every 1. Super voice Not really. Some drama free 2. Multi-talented artists really like it, but 2 By YouTube time who dance and act others have preju- 3. Hard work dice against K-Pop 23 22 1. ‘Got tired 1-6h 1. Music It depends. Some of American 2. Visual factors: physical really like it, but and French aspects, fashion, etc others have preju- music: they 3. choreography dice against K-Pop. did not make 4. Korean language French journalists me dream any 5. Artists remain humble, criticize it a lot. more’. work hard 2. Searched 6. They deliver certain music on ‘Asian’ values: respect YouTube, ar- for elderly people, hard rived at K-Pop. work, always ready to improve, etc. Y[ qlvunTptGo€|u

No Age How did you Lis- What do you like in K- Is K-Pop in fash- get to know tening Pop? ion in France? K-Pop? time? 24 22 1. Bollywood 2h + 1.Catchy, pulsating music It’s a phenomenon film site 2. Lyrics than a fashion. 2. Found K-Pop by accident 25 23 1. Japanese 3-4h 1. Lyrics are not vulgar No. Minority drama fan 2. Performance on the groups who are 2. Found Ko- stage (hard-working) interested in Asian rean drama 3. Challenges various culture listen to 3. Arrived at other music styles K-Pop K-Pop 26 24 1. Interested in 6-7h 1. Their American music No. Minority Japanese cul- style is not ‘too strange’: groups who are ture, music easy to access. interested in Asian 2. Via a friend, 2. Their own Korean style culture listen to listened to brings the change K-Pop K-Pop in Japa- 3. Artists work hard, re- nese main humble 3. Through the Japanese mu- sic blog, found more K-Pop 27 25 1. Watching 1-2h 1. Catchy, pulsating music No, just a debut.; it Bollywood 2. Fashion style will be in 2-3 years films on the 3. Physical look Net, found by accident 28 28 1. Listened to 2-4h 1. Catchy, pulsating No, just a debut; it J-Pop melody will be in 2-3 years 2. Found K-Pop 2. Preserve Korean char- in Japanese acter 3. Abandoned 3. Professional attitude J-Pop, became K-Pop fan

The answers to ‘What do you like in K-Pop?’ are more specific and different from those of the younger group. Most liked K-Pop artists’ rvylhuGwvwGmhuzGpuGmyhujlaGmhzjpuh{lkGi€Gz{yhunlulzzGvyGmhtpsphyp{€f Y\

attitude: the humbleness (7/15), hard work (5/15), and respect for elders. K-Pop fans appreciate these attitudes that they rarely find among Western artists. As for K-Pop music itself, many mentioned a more sophisticated factor: Korean language sonority (6/15) and harmony with English. Listening time was about the same for both groups, around 5 hours per day. For the question of whether K-Pop is in fashion,, the majority said no (11/15).

Figure 2: Influencing factors to become K-Pop fans (18-28)shows the simplified process of how and why they became K-Pop fans.

Figure 2: Influencing factors to become K-Pop fans (17-28) The music genres that the older group listens to are similar to those of the younger group, such as J-Pop, R&B, rock, and American music. As Table 5 shows, they felt that K-Pop is different, not because of the music genre but because of the attitude of K-Pop artists (7/15): humbler, harder-working, and nearer the fans than Western artists. This factor is one of reason why they like K-Pop as well. Asked whether ‘K-Pop is different from other countries’?’just three mentioned this factor; on the other hand, seven chose this factor in Table 5. One respondent even described this humble and hard-working attitude as transmitting ‘Asian’ values that the respondent admires. This kind of Y] qlvunTptGo€|u

value-oriented interpretation about popular culture is quite atypical among post-modern and young consumers of popular culture. Rather, they have been considered as instant, superficial pleasure-seekers. As for the music itself, they responded that American influence is predominant in K-Pop.

Table 5: Listening Music genre (Age from 18-28)

No Age What kinds Does K-Pop have sim- Is K-Pop is different from of music do ilarities with those other countries’? you listen to? types of music? 14 18 Rock Yes. With Rock Yes 15 18 Japanese Yes. K-Pop is influence Artists’ attitudes are different: music, OST of by too much American more humble, modest and films, TV series music near their fans 16 19 R&B, Pop, Yes. Because it is mu- The only difference is the art- Pop-rock sic! ists : more trained than other in countries 17 19 Hard rock, No. Not really Artists’ attitudes are different: pop more united 18 19 French varie- No. Not at all Artists are more talented, ties, rock, clas- humbler than Western ones sical 19 19 American mu- No. Not at all Artists are more talented sic, piano humbler than Western ones 20 20 French varie- Not really Artists are more talented ties, Classics, Irish music, Rock, Pacific island music 21 21 French, Japa- No Yes nese, Chinese and UK music 22 21 American R&B Yes. Rhythm Yes. Artists are more perfec- tionist: music, dance etc 23 22 OST, Ameri- A little bit. Not really but K-Pop artists can, R&B, search more for perfection (95%: K-Pop) rvylhuGwvwGmhuzGpuGmyhujlaGmhzjpuh{lkGi€Gz{yhunlulzzGvyGmhtpsphyp{€f Y^

No Age What kinds Does K-Pop have sim- Is K-Pop is different from of music do ilarities with those other countries’? you listen to? types of music? 24 22 Only K-Pop Yes 25 23 R&B, rock, Yes. Lyrics, singing No. Everything is ‘prepared’, pop, blues, style ‘controlled’ rap 26 24 Classical, Not really. No. Influenced by America metal, French and Japan variety, J-Pop 27 25 French variety, No Yes reggae 28 28 American R&B Yes. Some melodies Yes. Esp. attitudes of artists; humble, near their fans

Table 6: K-Pop and J-Pop (Age from 18-28)

No Age Already lis- Like J-Pop? Why? tened to J-Pop? 14 18 Yes Not really Not very diversified like K-Pop 15 18 Yes Yes Its originality 16 19 Yes Yes It’s different from Western 17 19 Yes, J-Rock Yes It’s different from Western 18 19 No 19 19 Yes Yes It’s cute 20 20 No 21 21 Yes Yes It has a different universe 22 21 Yes Yes It’s different from Western 23 22 Yes No Language, not melodious 24 22 No No Doesn’t like style, language 25 23 Yes Yes Dynamic, funny, refreshing clips 26 24 Yes Yes Diversified music, less influ- enced by American music 27 25 Yes Yes Different look 28 28 Yes Yes Different musical universe Y_ qlvunTptGo€|u

Tables 6 and 3 show the same characteristics: just three older respondents answered that they don’t like J-Pop. The reason they like K-Pop is its difference from Western music.

CONCLUSION In France, Korean popular culture—especially cinema—is not considered strange. . For more than fifteen years, Korean films have had a many fans and received good critical reviews: The Cannes Film Festival has recognized Korean cinema artists’ talents several times. However, people at large are not aware of and do not choose to see Korean films. In a sense, the general public’s recognition of films reflects the classical art approval process. The Film Academy and professional critics filter `a good’ film from ‘bad’ ones and the public more or less adopt the critics’ recommendations and assessments. However, the K-Pop phenomenon in France is totally different. It is more democratic: the K-Pop acceptance process is not top-down, but bottom-up. K-Pop fans did not need journalists or ‘specialists’ to get to know the K-Pop. This democratic approach to K-Pop answers the question posed by the title of this article: ‘Korean Pop Fans in France: Fascinated by Strangeness or Familiarity?’ They are fascinated by both. On one hand, fans are already familiar with Asian culture and music, especially Japanese, and on the other hand they are fascinated by ‘strangeness’, or at least the perceived ‘better performance’ that K-Pop brings.

REFERENCES

Blanc-Gras, J. 2011. La France bilingue en Pop coréenne. Le monde. Vol. 2. May. Dayez-Burgeon, P. 2011. Les Coréens. Paris: Taillandier. Herpin, N. 2001. Sociologie de la consommation. Paris: La découvert. Kelly Fu Su Yin and Kai Khiun Liew. 2005. Hallyu in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitan- ism or the Consumption of Chineseness? Korea Journal. Winter edition. rvylhuGwvwGmhuzGpuGmyhujlaGmhzjpuh{lkGi€Gz{yhunlulzzGvyGmhtpsphyp{€f Y`

Kurt H. Wolf (ed. Transl.). 1950. The sociology of Simmel. Illinois: The Free Press. Lindvall, H. 2011. Behind the music: What is K-Pop and why are the Swedish getting involved? The Guardian. April 20. Mesmer, P. 2011. La vague pop coréenne gagne l’Europe. Le monde. June,10. Mesmer, P. 2011. Nationalisme et télévision au Japon. Le monde. September, 3. McCurry, J. 2011. Girls’ Generation lead K-Pop invasion of Japan. The Guardian. Sep- tember, 30. Pedeler, E. 2010. Les sociologies de la musique de Max Weber et Georg Simmel: une théorie relationnelle des pratiques musiciennes. L’Année sociologique. 2010/2, Vol. 60 : 305-330. Tocqueville, A. (de). 1991. Democracy in America, Norwalk. Connecticut: The Easton Press. Video: Le monde Internet version, 11, May, 2012: http://www.lemonde.fr/culture/ video/2012/05/11/video-la-pop-coreenne-arme-de-la-diplomatie-culturel- le_1700236_3246.html

NOTES 1 May 11th 2012 Le Monde made a short video as an article, composed with an interview of specialist of South Korea, one of K-Pop mania and a part of clip of K-Pop. This video shows how young French people, especially teenagers, love K-Pop and how well Korean entertainment business people have managed to ‘conquer’ the worldwide popular music market. 2 Of course, this process is not the only way; the opposite movement could also happen. 3 Democratic here means not just the political system but the way of living in modern society. 4 Traditionally in France, journalists did not welcome the concept of ‘boys’ bands’.

ABSTRACT Korean pop (K-pop) mania in France and throughout Europe, according to newspaper articles, is a ‘new’ culture phenomenon of the last decade. Although certainly not wide spread among the general public, the French K-Pop mania has created a lot of buzz, and it continues to spread mostly via SNS. My research examine how did the French young people discover K-pop, and why did they become K-pop the mania? Here is my hypothesis: Most of K-Pop fans are usually exposed to the ZW qlvunTptGo€|u

Asian culture before, especially to the Japanese culture. Then, thanks to the Internet, these fans discover K-Pop and get “hooked.” At this juncture, I would like to explore more what makes these fans give up Japanese cultural influence and adopt Korean pop culture. I have realized face-to-face and e-mail interviews to find out the reasons. Majority interviewees were INALCO (Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales) students in Korean language department and French K-Pop fan club members. According to the research result the answer for the question posed by the title of this article: ‘Korean Pop Fans in France: Fascinated by Strangeness or Familiarity?’ is this: they are fascinated by both. On one hand, K-Pop fans are already familiar with Asian culture and music, especially Japanese, and on the other hand they are fascinated by ‘strangeness’, or at least the perceived ‘better performance’ that K-Pop brings. Acculturation of Kawaii fashion in France through comparative analysis of questionnaires (France, South Korea, Taiwan) and interviews (France)

r –’–Gr–”ˆ Vytautas Magnus University

Key Words: kawaii, acculturation, comparative surveys in Taiwan and south Korea, interviews in France

INTRODUCTION Last year, I examined how the term kawaii, one of the key words of Japanese popular culture, diffused into foreign countries, adding a new semiotic value to images of Japan in France1 and Lithuania,2 in comparison with the ߆ࠊ޿޿ (kawaii) of Japan, through a comparative analysis using interviews and questionnaires, for example the questionnaire answered by students from France’s Institute national des langues et civilisations orientales (INALCO) thanks to its Associate Professor Jean-Michel Butel and students living in Kaunas and Vilnius, in Lithuania (Koma 2011). Certainly, it is said in several books that kawaii is a famous term around the world3. However, as I saw in the results of the questionnaires answered by some Lithuanian Japanese culture devotees and some Lithuanian and foreign students who were not interested in Japan, the term kawaii cannot be said to have been disseminated as much in Lithuania as the image of the geisha and samurai (Koma 2011). ZY r€vrvGrvth

In fact, I found that among my respondents living/staying in Vilnius, nobody knew the name of Hello Kitty or her Japanese origin, while French students chose Hello Kitty as the most ‘kawaii’ thing, despite the fact that the Lithuanians already knew the image of Hello Kitty from products such as sweets or stationery sold in some Lithuanian supermarkets (Koma 2011: 62-64). This shows us that, in a country such as Lithuania, kawaii could be considered odourless culture, unlike in France, which has a long tradition of accepting Japanese culture, from Japonism to the Cool Japan culture, although this is only among certain people who like Japanese culture. Comparing foreign countries’ acculturation with respect to the dissemination of Japanese popular culture around world could be the key to examining the process of its globalisation. As a second step, I would like to advance my research to better understand the characteristics of the perception of kawaii fashion in France through comparative analysis, such as: the same questionnaire to be answered in France and in Lithuania, which will then be answered in Taiwan and Korea; interviews of people wearing kawaii fashion in France; interviews of people in charge of kawaii boutiques and cafes in France. This research will aim to make clear why kawaii fashion is accepted in France.

1. QUESTIONNAIRE ANSWERED BY TAIWANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS According to my hypothesis (Koma 2011), the acculturation of kawaii could be considered exoticism/orientalism for the French, which is consciously or unconsciously a heritage of the Japonism-orientalism- exoticism from the end of the 19th century in France. But how should we consider the acculturation of kawaii in East Asian countries? It is true that kawaii in Europe does not correspond exactly to kawaii in Japan. But in Asia? Kawaii would be considered a persistent Japanese stereotype in France, but what is the situation in Asia? hjj|s{|yh{pvuGvmGrh~hppGmhzopvuGpuGmyhujlG{oyv|noGjvtwhyh{p}lGhuhs€zpzG ZZ vmGx|lz{pvuuhpylzGOmyhujlSGzv|{oGrvylhSG{hp~huPGhukGpu{ly}pl~zGOmyhujlP

Thanks to the kind help of Assistant Professor Ai Katsurada of Providence University, Taiwan, and her Taiwanese students, I was able to conduct a questionnaire survey on kawaii from October to December 2011 with 45 students, comprised of 35 women and 10 men who attended her lecture on Japanese language (hereafter this questionnaire will be called the Providence survey). The students were between 19 and 23 years old. In addition, for the Korean case, Professor Ro Sunsook of Pusan National University (South Korea) and her students, introduced by her colleague Professor Sang Gum Li, kindly helped me conduct the same questionnaire on kawaii that I had conducted in France, Lithuania and Taiwan with her students in February and March 2012; the 63 students comprised 39 women and 24 men, all students of the Professor Ro’s Japanese language course. The students were between 19 and 23 years old including a few students from 25 to 29 and some in their 30s and 40s. (Hereafter, the questionnaire survey will be called the Pusan survey.) Both sets of students answered in Japanese but I will translate into English. If I could present the result already, firstly, kawaii seen through these surveys does not correspond to the French kawaii from the INALCO survey. We will see it in detail.

1.1 WILL KAWAII BE ACCEPTED IN TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA AS IT IS IN FRANCE? Firstly, to examine the difference between the recognition of kawaii in France, Taiwan and South Korea, as a first step in the three surveys we asked the students two questions: (1) What does kawaii signify? (2) What does kawaii bring to your mind? The results are as follows.

(1) WHAT DOES KAWAII SIGNIFY?

KAWAII IN TAIWAN: THE PROVIDENCE SURVEY Concerning the Providence Survey, although all the students did not answer this question, we found 8 answers from female students and 5 answers from male students as follows: Z[ r€vrvGrvth

Female students Male student 1 นᗲޔ (cute) 㧡 ⸅ࠅߚߊߥࠆ(something to want to touch) 3 2 ᗲࠄߒ޿ޔᗲߔߴ߈㧟(lovely, ߁ࠇߒ޿㧔I feel happy when I see it㧕 lovable) 㧝, cute 1 3 No answer No answer

KAWAII IN KOREA: THE PUSAN SURVEY For the Pusan survey, 30 answers from female students and 13 answers from male students were collected as follows:

Female student answers Male student answers 1 ߺࠆߣ᳇ᜬߜ߇ࠃߊߥࠆ(some- ዊߐ޿ (small) 2 thing to agreeable to look at) 7 2 ዊߐߊߡᒙ޿߽ߩޔੱ (some- 㝯ജ⊛ (attractive) 1, ᅢ߈ߥੱ (the thing, somebody small or weak) 6 person I love) 1, ⷗ࠆߣ߶ߞߣߔࠆ (I feel relaxed when I see it) 1,ᗲࠄߒ޿ (adorable) 1,ఝߒ޿(kind) 1,㝯ജ ⊛ (seductive) 1,ᗲߒ޿ (amiable) 1, ᣂ㞲ߥ(fresh)1, ቞ࠅߚߊߥࠆ(some- thing I want to protect) 1, ⸅ࠅߚߊߥ ࠆ (something I want to touch or hug) 1, ߁ࠇߒ޿㧔I feel happy when I see it㧕㧝 3 นᗲޔ(cute) 5 No answer 4 ߈ࠇ޿ (beautiful) 4 5 ᗲࠄߒ޿ޔᗲߔߴ߈㧟(lovely, lovable) 6 ሶଏࠄߒ޿ (children)㧝, ᳇ߦ౉ ࠄࠇࠃ߁ߣߔࠆߎߣ(pretend to be pleased by another person) 1 ⸅ࠅߚߊߥࠆ (something I want to touch or hug) 1, ⷫߒߺࠍᗵߓ ࠆ (feel warm affection) 1,ਣ޿ (round) 8 No answer hjj|s{|yh{pvuGvmGrh~hppGmhzopvuGpuGmyhujlG{oyv|noGjvtwhyh{p}lGhuhs€zpzG Z\ vmGx|lz{pvuuhpylzGOmyhujlSGzv|{oGrvylhSG{hp~huPGhukGpu{ly}pl~zGOmyhujlP

The answers from the two surveys are generally similar to the French ones. But in these two surveys, I could not find any answer concerning Japanese Popular culture, including Kawaii Fashion, such as rose (pink), perverse (perverse, which is a term describing the artwork of Japanese artist Takashi Murakami), cool, moe4, as the French students mentioned (Koma 2011: 55), which were the minority’s answer. And answers concerning a warm feeling - which is far from Japanese contemporary popular culture - such as “something I want to touch”, “I feel warm affection”, “I Feel relaxed when I see it”, “I feel happy when I see it” could be found only in these two surveys. What’s more, answers such as “Pretend to be pleased by another person” from the Pusan survey can be considered to share Japanese burikko behaviour (“a woman pretending to be cute” (women’s behaviour Kojien 6th edition)), which was popular in Japan in the 1980s.

(2) WHAT DOES THE TERM KAWAII BRING TO YOUR MIND?

THE TAIWANESE CASE: THE PROVIDENCE SURVEY 95 characters, people, or items are listed by the Providence survey’s female students, and 15 by male students, in answer to this question. The 10 most frequent answers given by the students, broken down by gender, are as follows:

Female students: 1. Young Japanese actresses (24 answers) and actors (1 answer): female actresses (24 answers) such as Aoi Miyazaki (born in 1988, 3 answers), Nozomi Sasaki (born in 1988, 3 answers), Mana Ashida (born in 2004, 3 answers), Keiko Kitagawa (born in 1986, 2 answers), Yuriko Yositaka (1 answer, born in 1988); male idols: (1 answer, Teppei Koguchi born in 1986) 2. Animals (15 answers): cat (6 answers), dog (7 answers), rabbit (1 answers), octopus (1 answer) 3. Children, babies (14 answers) Z] r€vrvGrvth

4. Fashion (9 answers) 5. Dolls (5 answers) 6. Taiwanese idols (4 answers) such as Cyndi Wang born in 1982 7. Hello Kitty (4 answers) 8. Korean idols (3 answers) 9. Pink (3 answers) 10. Flowers (2 answers); people’s facial expression; such as a smile (2 answers); Relakuma (2 answers).

Male students: 1. Animals (8 answers) 2. Children (2 answers) 3. Something small and beautiful (1answer); women (1 answer); Lolita (1 answer); Japanese and Korean Fashion (1 answer); Cake (1 answer).

THE KOREAN CASE: THE PUSAN SURVEY 103 answers on characters, people, or items are listed by female students and 84 by male students in answer to this question. The 10 most frequent answers were as follows:

Female students 1. Children, babies (31 answers), including sister, cousin, niece 2. Animals (21 answers): dog (9 answers), cat (4 answers), pet (3 answers), rabbit (2 answers), bird (2 answers) 3. Young Japanese actresses or idols (17 answers) such as Aoi Miyazaki (born in 1988, 1 answer), Keiko Kitagawa (born in 1986, 1 answer); Yuriko Yositaka (born in 1988, 1 answer) hjj|s{|yh{pvuGvmGrh~hppGmhzopvuGpuGmyhujlG{oyv|noGjvtwhyh{p}lGhuhs€zpzG Z^ vmGx|lz{pvuuhpylzGOmyhujlSGzv|{oGrvylhSG{hp~huPGhukGpu{ly}pl~zGOmyhujlP

4. Young Korean actresses or idols (8 answers) 5. Something small (8 answers) 6. Girls (8 answers) 7. Accessories (4 answers) 8. Hello Kitty (3 answers) 9. Young Japanese women (3 answers) 10. Pink (1 answer), Rirakuma (1 answer), Doraemon (1 answer), something round (1 answer), beautiful (1 answer), laughter (1 answer), soft toys (1 answer), ribbon (1 answer), yellow (1 answer), my boyfriend (1 answer), something soft (1 answer).

Male students 1. Animals (44 answers): dog (11 answers), rabbit (11 answers), cat (9 answers), chick (9 answers), pet (4 answers) 2. Children, babies (16 answers), including sister, brother 3. Young Japanese actresses or idols (3 answers) 4. Young Korean actresses or idols (9 answers) 5. Young women (3 answers) 6. Girlfriends (4 answers) 7. Hello Kitty (1 answer), Pikachu, Manga (1 answer).

Concerning the answers given by the female students, in comparison with French students’ answer from the INALCO survey5, it is evident that kawaii does not relate exactly to Japanese Pop singers such as Morning Musume, AKB48, Ayumi Hamasaki, Johneys rather than Japanese actresses who perform in Japanese TV dramas, who are similar to Taiwanese idols such as Cyndi Wang, who are similar to the image of the respondents. It is remarkable that Hello kitty is not listed (139 answers, the most Z_ r€vrvGrvth

popular selected answer as a kawaii item in the INALCO survey; 4 answers in the Providence survey; 4 answers in the Pusan survey) and the answer “fashion, like children’s dress with lace or colourful fashion, Lolita, or cosplay”, which 84 students in the INALCO survey chose as kawaii (the second most popular answer in the INALCO survey), are not indicated at all, although I found only one person who talked about Lolita fashion as kawaii in the Providence survey (only one of 49 students said Lolita was kawaii, although 30 of 257 French students indicated they thought so). In the Providence survey, fashion is also given as something evoked by the word kawaii. However, this does not relate to kawaii fashion, such as Harajuku or Lolita fashion (we will more of these later). It is true that animals, children and babies are chosen in the three surveys, but they are ranked highly only in the Providence and Pusan surveys. The common points of answers in the Providence and Pusan surveys are that the 3 most common answers are the same: Japanese actresses or idols of the same age group as the respondents, especially in Taiwan, are in 1st place. And in these two surveys, women of the same age group as the students, such as Japanese, Taiwanese and Korean actresses and young women or girlfriends are often mentioned. This differing results between the INALCO survey and the two East Asian surveys, in particular the Providence survey, can be explained by the students’ information source on kawaii: in answer to the question from which source do you get information on kawaii, respondents to the Providence survey do not answer only Taiwanese TV and Internet sites, but also Taiwanese magazines that license Japanese fashion magazines,6 such as VIVI, the target of which is women aged in their twenties, Japanese women’s fashion magazines aimed at women from teenage years to around their twenties (such as Scawaii, Nonno, With), Japanese idol magazines (such as Junon for female students, SCawaii for male students), the Internet for Japanese idols, Japanese TV programs such as Music Station for Japanese idol singers, Taiga (roman fleuve in English), dramas (NHK, Japan Broadcasting corporation) with stories based on Japanese hjj|s{|yh{pvuGvmGrh~hppGmhzopvuGpuGmyhujlG{oyv|noGjvtwhyh{p}lGhuhs€zpzG Z` vmGx|lz{pvuuhpylzGOmyhujlSGzv|{oGrvylhSG{hp~huPGhukGpu{ly}pl~zGOmyhujlP

history, variety shows and Internet sites for female and male students. What’s more, Tokyo Kawaii TV, an NHK TV program presenting kawaii culture, is popular in foreign countries and has been so especially since 2008, when the Japanese government started to diffuse Cool Japan to the world as public diplomacy (Koma 2011: 53, 68). Apart from 19 respondents everyone knew this program, including 4 female and 3 male Taiwanese respondents, although no respondent from the INALCO survey knew the program. It is true that in the Pusan Survey respondents merely gave answers to this question, while our Korean respondents mentioned Japanese actresses as kawaii in person, such as Miyazaki Aoi, Keiko Kitagawa, Yuriko Yoshitake7; for those of Taiwanese respondents who gave the same answers, it would be possible that their information sources are similar. As Japanese popular culture started to be diffused in Taiwan in 1987 after the lifting of martial law, and in particular after 1994 when Japanese TV began to be diffused, and in South Korea with 4 steps between 1998 and 2004 (even if we consider the negative historical sentiment here relating to Japan) it could be said that Japanese popular culture has been accepted by respondents to our two Asian surveys, who share cultural similarities. In contrast, this is not the case in the INALCO survey. Its respondents’ information sources on kawaii culture were not Japanese TV drama or Japanese fashion magazines, but rather French cable TV stations such as NOLIFE, diffusing mainly Japanese popular culture programs produced in France for a French audience, and some fashion magazines or Internet sites in French or English. If I present some conclusion on the three surveys, differences between France and East Asian countries produced by historical and geographical factors do not permit the homogenisation of the meaning of kawaii culture. This tendency might also reflect the answers respondents to the three surveys gave to the question: who are the most kawaii woman for you? In the INALCO, Providence and Pusan questionnaires, I asked students who was the most kawaii among 7 photographs of woman that were published specifically as kawaii woman, such as the thirties [W r€vrvGrvth

Japanese actress Yoshino Kimura published in The New Definition of Kawaii in the Japanese style magazine Anan (April 19 2006); the forties Japanese actress Kyoko Koizumi published in an article titled The Secret of Cuteness in NUMERO TOKYO 2006; kawaii style realised by a French model Princess Pudding, often considered cyber kawaii impregnated by manga published in Le dictionnaire du look (2010); actress Kirstin Dunst, who played a Japanese manga character in the film Akihabara Majokko Princess produced by Japanese artists Takashi Murakami and Mac G; Morning Musume, one of the most popular Japanese idol group in France; a European fashion model wearing kawaii style, considered as preppy style and published in Glamour, April 2010; and a model aged in her twenties published in a Japanese fashion magazine aimed at students and workers in the same age group, Cancam. In the INALCO survey, it is Kirstin Dunst who is chosen as the most kawaii girl both by female and male students, although in the Taiwanese Providence survey, the Cancam model (20 answers), Yoshino Kimura (7 answers) or Morning Musume (5 answers) are selected as the most kawaii woman by the female students, and Morning Musume (5 answers) or the Cancam model (4 answers) are chosen by the male students. Kirstin Dunst, disguised as a manga character such as Salor Moon, a character from Japanese TV anime diffused not only in France but also in several other foreign countries, was hardly chosen by the female (1 answer) and male (0 answers) students. In the Pusan questionnaire, the results are very similar to the Providence survey in that the Cancam model is the most selected by female (25) and male (15) students as the most kawaii women, while Kirstin Dunst is not selected at all as the most Kawaii women, who wear colourful and infantile clothes with pink coloured hair, evoking manga-style woman. In the Providence survey, Professor Katsurada asked 200 students to fill in this questionnaire, although finally 60 students answered. She felt that most of the students did not think that the women in the seven published photos were kawaii for them. What is more, she also mentioned that the term kawaii is too vague for her students to understand. hjj|s{|yh{pvuGvmGrh~hppGmhzopvuGpuGmyhujlG{oyv|noGjvtwhyh{p}lGhuhs€zpzG [X vmGx|lz{pvuuhpylzGOmyhujlSGzv|{oGrvylhSG{hp~huPGhukGpu{ly}pl~zGOmyhujlP

It could be said that this ambiguity could be caused by cute culture such as Taiwan’s. Tzu-I Chuang indicated in her paper concerning The Power of Cuteness: Female Infantilisation in Urban Taiwan, that “since the 1980s there has been a growing obsession among Taiwanese women with aesthetics of cuteness. Everywhere on the streets one sees fashionably dressed women talking on brightly colored cell phones with fluffy stuffed-animals dangling from the bottom” (Chuang 2005: 21). She even remarks that “the cuteness craze began to spark public discussion in the summer of 1999, when McDonalds in Taiwan started offering stuffed dolls of Hello Kitty at reduced price for their customers” (ibid.). She does not mention that the cute culture is influenced by the Japanese equivalent, but explains that the “Chinese word ke’ai, usually translated as cute or cuteness, literally means ‘lovable’ or ‘adorable’”. In general understanding, ke’ai is embodied in a person, animal or small object that arouses feelings of pity; tenderness; and a desire to take care of it” (ibid). She explains “cuteness or infantilized femininity may be considered positive by women and strategically employed by many as a useful tool in social dealing”. This tendency is very similar to burikko, the Japanese women’s behaviour mentioned above, in particular during the 1980s. The author remarks that the “situation around women in Japan and Taiwan are similar” (Chuang 2005: 27), but she does not remark, as I mentioned, that Taiwanese cuteness is influenced by Japanese. It could be said that the various meanings of the term kawaii, which does not always correspond either to Japanese popular cultural character or Japanese origin culture in the Providence survey risks leading the student to confusion, so that that the women presented in photos as kawaii do not correspond to kawaii as considered by the Providence survey’s respondents. That is, kawaii in Taiwan and Korean is used to qualify not only children, babies or dogs (something to be loved), but also women of the same age group as the respondents, or their ideal girlfriends. In the Providence and Pusan surveys, kawaii is not always considered Hello Kitty or as Harajuku extravagant colourful fashion, that is, [Y r€vrvGrvth

something immature, strange and out of step, such as the result of the INALCO survey, but simply as something lovable, something you want to touch, or are sentimentally attracted to - small or weak things or people.

I.2 CAN KAWAII BE CONSIDERED ODOURLESS CULTURE IN FRANCE, OR IS IT A REPRODUCTION OF EXOTICISM? We will look at this second question through another Providence questionnaire survey question: “Is kawaii very Japanese or not/Is Kawaii exotic?” I received 23 female student answers, of which 18 answered no, 3 yes and 2 I do not know. In contrast, in the INALCO questionnaire 158 female students answered yes, 6 students no, and 3 students answered that kawaii is not really a Japanese phenomenon. The most frequent reason found for Taiwanese female students’ no answers is that “kawaii does not concern Japan” and “we could find Kawaii everywhere and in Taiwan”. In the Pusan survey, I got 38 female answers, of which 32 answers were no and 6 yes. The reasons for the yes answers are: “kawaii exists everywhere” and “the Kawaii notion is similar to one of South Korea”. Only one similar reason as to why kawaii is exotic to the INALCO questionnaire could be found: “kawaii is proper to Japan”. 29 male students answered no and 5 male students answered yes. The reasons for the yes answers are: “kawaii exists everywhere” and “Koreans also like Kawaii”, though I received one answer that “kawaii evokes Japan in my mind”. In sum, most of respondents answer yeses in the two Asian surveys because kawaii items or people can be found everywhere in their countries, although only one student answered that “kawaii evokes Japan in my mind”. This result is similar to the answers to the above-mentioned questions, that is, kawaii in France is considered to designate contemporary Japanese popular culture, or Harajuku colourful fashion, and something simply immature and exotic, while kawaii in Taiwan and South Korea concerns contemporary Japanese hjj|s{|yh{pvuGvmGrh~hppGmhzopvuGpuGmyhujlG{oyv|noGjvtwhyh{p}lGhuhs€zpzG [Z vmGx|lz{pvuuhpylzGOmyhujlSGzv|{oGrvylhSG{hp~huPGhukGpu{ly}pl~zGOmyhujlP

popular culture less and their own culture more as something lovable and familiar. It is true that the respondents to the three surveys have studied Japanese language and culture, and the word kawaii is a Japanese adjective that they would learn in the early period of their studies. However, the meanings that the respondents to the three surveys give to kawaii is not the same. Questions relating to this issue are reflected in the answers to the question of whether female students had already tried kawaii fashion or not. In the Providence survey, 17 female students out of 34 had not yet tried Kawaii style, while 13 female students had. Some female students who had already tried kawaii fashion mention this, although they did not mention whether it was in manga character style or Harajuku colourful style, as per Le dictionnaire du look definition of kawaii fashion, but mention that they wear “flower printed skirts” “frilled skirts”, etc., which do not correspond exactly to the French tendency. In the INALCO survey, French students answered why they would not like it because a respondent feels that “the Kawaii style would not fit because of ethnicity and height”, “Kawaii style is sometimes considered a device that erases one’s own identity or makes one too childlike” and “Kawaii is out of step; too stupid, not for us”. In the Providence and Pusan surveys, I could not find such an answer, while “it is not my style” and “I am no longer the age when I could wear kawaii style”. It is true that in the three surveys the respondents have a tendency to consider kawaii style as for the younger generation, but characterising kawaii as “out of step”, “too stupid, not for us” and the limitations of height and ethnicity were found only in the INALCO survey. That is, though kawaii fashion is considered strange and far from France (here ethnicity and height may imply physical characteristics opposite to those of Japanese people) in the INALCO survey, while in the two Asian surveys this is not the case. This tendency is confirmed by the 19 positive and 1 negative out of 37 answers from the Taiwanese females students on the question “if you are called ‘kawaii’, are you happy?” They are happy, because “kawaii is a word of praise for them”. The reason why a respondent might not be happy to be ‘appreciated’ as kawaii is because she does not like the lie. As I mentioned above, [[ r€vrvGrvth

this answer is reflected in analysis in the paper on kawaii culture in Taiwan (Chuang 2005), for example some Taiwanese woman pretend to be cute to get what they want (status, human relations) (reference brikko, woman pretending to be cute), which was popular in Japan in the 1980s. What’s more, in the Pusan survey, although 6 out of 39 female students answered that “they are not glad to be called kawaii” because “I’m different from kawaii woman, I prefer to be called kirei (beautiful)” and “I am passed the age of kawaii” (students in their forties), 31 out of 39 female students answered that “they are glad to be called kawaii”, because “they can give a good impression to their interlocutor”, or “they look younger”. Here, kawaii is not considered to have a negative connotation, ‘childish’, but is viewed positively, ‘younger’. So in the Providence and Pusan surveys, kawaii could be said to be considered not strange as with the INALCO survey, but to be similar to the Japanese results.

2. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: FRENCH SPECIALTY OF RECEPTION FOR KAWAII FASHION - WHY DO FRENCH GIRLS FOLLOW THE KAWAII LOOK? As we saw, kawaii as recognised in the INALCO survey (France) rather such as manga, Harajuku street fashion does not always correspond to the kawaii recognised in the Providence and Pusan surveys (Taiwan and South Korea). In the latter two surveys, kawaii does not link with Japanese contemporary pop culture (Cool Japan), so it is possible to think that the way of adaptation of kawaii culture would be proper to France. Off course, we will need to do research for the future on the adaptation of kawaii culture in other European countries. Thus, in contrast to the other two surveys’ results, in France where kawaii fashion tends to be considered as Harajuku fashion, what is the motivation for wearers to adopt kawaii fashion? We will listen to the voice of some of those responsible for kawaii boutiques and cafés and wearers of kawaii in France. hjj|s{|yh{pvuGvmGrh~hppGmhzopvuGpuGmyhujlG{oyv|noGjvtwhyh{p}lGhuhs€zpzG [\ vmGx|lz{pvuuhpylzGOmyhujlSGzv|{oGrvylhSG{hp~huPGhukGpu{ly}pl~zGOmyhujlP

THE VOICES SURROUNDING KAWAII

VOICE OF SHOPS OR CAFES ON KAWAII Firstly we will listen to voices of people in charge of boutiques and cafe following the kawaii concept in Paris. Near the Bastille area of the 11th arrondissement, to which the young generation go often, there is a street of ‘contemporary Japanese popular culture’, where there are shops such as manga character shops, Harajuku fashion style or gothic Lolita fashion shops, and so on. At this location, I asked the manager of the Harajuku fashion shop Boddywood about the concept or purpose of this shop. Boddywood opened in 2005 and does not deal with exactly Gothic Lolita fashion, but rather Harajuku casual Fashion style, which is considered Kawaii fashion, similar to MilK. The Person in charge of this shop collects clothes, in particular from Japan, not because they are kawaii, but because they are “decalé” (out of step, far from the social norm in France). Furthermore, the people in charge of the Kawaii Café”, which has just opened in December 2011, explain that “In France, the eyes of others existed everywhere not only in the public space, but also in the private space. What you do or wear at the weekend can be known by your colleagues. Although Japan has places such as Harajuku in which you can wear whatever you want, even out of social norms. it is quite difficult to wear any style out of French social norms such as kawaii style in the French public space. It is also quite difficult even to go with this style to the place in which all kawaii style wearers or cosplayers congregate such as Japan Expo, because you cannot avoid others seeing you on the way. That’s why we needed to create the secure space against intrusion.” From the comments of these people in charge of kawaii shops and cafés, it could be indicated that even those who work in the domain of kawaii fashion think that it is a Japanese (or specifically Harajuku) style far from the French social norm; exotic, that is, a style far from us, the French people, which is quite difficult to be wear in the street. So how do French wearers of kawaii fashion consider their style and [] r€vrvGrvth

why do they wear it? I interviewed some French girls/women wearing kawaii style in the street in the 11th arrondissement.

FRENCH KAWAII GIRL ADMITTED BY FRENCH SOCIETY I interviewed a Parisian teenage girl who came to search for kawaii fashion with her aunt on a Saturday afternoon in December 2011; they came to the above-mentioned Boddywood, and also to Black Sugar fashion shops, which deal with Gothic Lolita style. Initially attracted by Japanese manga such as The Melancholy of Haruhi, this girl of fourteen years old became interested in kawaii fashion inspired by Harajuku fashion. Saying that “my niece wants to buy good quality clothes, even if expensive; she buys little but good quality clothes of this style”; “my niece’s fashion style is appreciated by her professor at her college”. The aunt is proud of her niece’s fashion style even appreciated by her professor and supports her by coming to the street of Japanese popular culture with her to select clothes. When I asked her aunt if she is also interested in wearing kawaii style, she said that “this style is not for my age”. It is true that on Saturday afternoons, a few teenage girls and their chaperones, mothers or aunts, can often be found. That is, it could be said that French society accepts kawaii fashion worn by teenagers who look a little like dressed up dolls. In France, in particular for children, I find many books on fancy dress8. This fancy dress chosen by girls tends to be princess dresses and cute dresses. Considered as the last period of childhood, could it be said that during the first teenage years girls could freely wear kawaii style, even when their chaperones admitted that they look like dolls?

FRENCH KAWAI WOMAN BETWEEN TWO TYPES OF EYES I interviewed two French-speaking women who are members of the “Rainbow Team” Internet forum for wearers of Decola and FRUiTS9, considered Harajuku style kawaii by its members. I met one of these member by chance in the boulevard de la hjj|s{|yh{pvuGvmGrh~hppGmhzopvuGpuGmyhujlG{oyv|noGjvtwhyh{p}lGhuhs€zpzG [^ vmGx|lz{pvuuhpylzGOmyhujlSGzv|{oGrvylhSG{hp~huPGhukGpu{ly}pl~zGOmyhujlP

République in the 11th arrondissement. When this 24-year-old woman, working in a pharmacy as a pharmacist’s assistant, became interested in Japanese manga she visited Japan Expo in 2005 and found kawaii style similar to Victorian style and started to be interested in kawaii fashion, in collecting information on this fashion from English- or French-speaking websites and buying second hand clothes. She prefers Decola and FRUiTS that she can coordinate freely, to Lolita, because following Lolita style involves many rules. She wears Kawaii style because “she plays a beautiful and cute Kawaii doll”, and “she likes colourful style”. Furthermore, she even receives two contradictory reactions to her appearance in public, that is, a positive reaction regarding her as “kawaii”, and negative reactions regarding her as “shameful” or saying “it’s for children”; despite this she continue to wear Kawaii style because she wants to attract men’s attention, although she feels good about this: “I am not a prostitute”. I posted a question on the forum of this Rainbow Team: why do you wear kawaii fashion? Some participants answered that they wear kawaii fashion everywhere in their daily lives, even if they received negative looks from others as a first response. And they says: “I could not imagine that I am without this style”. Not because “this style is very Japanese” even if “they thought before to be Japanese girls”, and not because “they want to attract the opposite sex”, but because “this style suits me”, “it permits me to escape to childhood, which was the most beautiful souvenir for them” and “This style permits me to be stronger”. That is, even they, wearers of kawaii style, recognise the fact that kawaii fashion comes from Japan. They appropriate this style, considered far from French social standards, in order to protect themselves. The answer that I don’t adopt kawaii style because it comes from Japan affirms the fact that as a personal style wearers appropriate the otherness of this style, considered one coming from a far place. Kawaii fashion formed as exotic otherness far from France is appropriated, in the terms of Rogers Chartier, as one’s own cultural device constructing one’s own identity in order to be ‘strong’ and to be oneself. [_ r€vrvGrvth

As Malcolm Barnard (2002) classified the function of fashion and clothes as having material functions (protection, modesty and concealment, immodesty and attraction) and cultural functions (communication, individualistic expression, social worth or status, definition of social roles, economic worth or status, political symbols, magico-religious conditions, social rituals, recreation) (Bernard 2002: 49-71), fashion has several function. Simmel indicates in his essay Fashion that fashion depends upon the conflict between adaptation to society and individual departure from its demands (Simmel 1971: 295). If this indication could be applied to the reception of kawaii fashion in our work, could not it be said that the wearers of which the life has not yet occupied by social role in the society, kawaii’s wearers could have more opportunities to be able to present their own identity, depending on the marginal fashion far from social standard? The origin of information for Kawaii fashion is principally the Internet, a medium accessible for everybody. Even if wearers of kawaii do not understand Japanese, they try to imitate the style presented in photographs. The fashion for Japonism popular around the beginning of the 20th century in France was limited to being worn by the elite class, whereas kawaii style can be worn by everybody. Thus kawaii fashion is exotic as an “equal otherness” as C. Sabre indicated (Sabre 2012: 80). I would like to quote the comment of Makoto Ono (1990). In the era of standardisation, disguise does not have the self to whom the wearers can return after they take off the disguise. That is, everyday is a carnival, the self exists only in disguise. Even if people change their disguise, they could not any more put of their disguises or “its stories”. Reflecting on this quotation, let’s try to think about kawaii fashion in France. For the wearers of kawaii who always wear the style and say that they cannot imagine life without it the self can only be found in this style. Would it be considered that the wearer dare to appropriate as their own culture kawaii fashion, considered exotic from another hjj|s{|yh{pvuGvmGrh~hppGmhzopvuGpuGmyhujlG{oyv|noGjvtwhyh{p}lGhuhs€zpzG [` vmGx|lz{pvuuhpylzGOmyhujlSGzv|{oGrvylhSG{hp~huPGhukGpu{ly}pl~zGOmyhujlP

society in order to construct their identity and to protect themselves from society’s norms? Do those who wear kawaii style in their daily lives not think to take off this style?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to express my gratitude to Assistant Professor Dr. Ai Katsurada of Providence University (Taiwan), and her Taiwanese students, Mr. Ignas Sakalauskas of Vytautas Magnus University having introduced her to me, Professor Ro Sunsook of Pusan National University (South Korea) and her students who helped me to conduct a questionnaire survey on kawaii, Professor SangGum Li having introduced his colleague Prof. Sunsook Ro, Dr. Toshiya Matsunaga of Tunghai University(Taiwan), Ms. Justina.Razumaite of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania/doctoral candidate of Vytautas Magnus University who also helped me for my questionnaire survey on Taiwan. I would like to also express my sincere gratitude to Suntory Foundation who has supported our project.

REFERENCES Beillevaire, P., “L’autre de l’autre” Contribution à l’histoire des représentations de la femme japonaise, IN Mots N.41 Parler du Japon: 56-98. Bernard M., 2002, Fashion as communication second edition,London :Routledge. Botz-Bornstein,T. , 2011, The Cool-Kawaii », Maryland :Lexington Books. Chuang T.I, “The power of Cuteness: Female infantilisation in Urban Taiwan” In Stan- ford Journal of East Asian Affairs 5:2, 21-28. De Margerie, G.2009. Dictionnaire du Look, Paris: Robert Laffont Iwabuchi K., 2006, Postcolonial desire for Asia, IN Popular Culture, Globalization and Japan (ed. Allen, M and Sakamoto. R.), London :Routledge, 15-35. Koga,R. 2009, « Kawaii » no teikoku (the empire of « kawaii »), Tokyo :Seidosha Koma, K. 2010. La representation de la femme japonaise dans Madame Chrysanthè- me de Pierre Loti, IN Literatūra 2010 52 (4),Vilnius: Vilnius University, 20-28. Koma,K.,2011, “Kawaii in Europe seen through a questionnaire survey in France and \W r€vrvGrvth

Lithuania” In Reception of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture(ed.Koma.K), Kau- nas: Vytautas Magnus University(supported by Suntory Foundation) Loti, P. 1990, Madame Chrysanthème, Paris, GF Flammarion. Napier, S. J. 2007. From Impressionism to Anime: Japan as Fantasy and Fan Cult in the Mind of the West, New York, Palgrave Macmillan. Moura, J-M. 1992. Lire l’exotisme, Paris, Dunot. Pons P. and Souyri, P. F. 2000, Le Japon des Japonais, Paris, Seuil. Sabre.C.,2011,Neojaponism and Pop Culture New Japanese Exotism in France, In the Development of Japan in the West-Comparative Analysis(ed.K.Koma), Regioninės studijos(6) Sakurai, T. 2009. Sekai kawaii kakumei (Global kawaii Revolution), Kyoto : PHP. Veillon, C., 2008, L’Art contemporain japonais : une quête d’identité, de 1990 à nos jours, Paris, L’Harmattan. http://www.nhk.or.jp/tamago /program/20071113tokyokawai.html (examined on May 29, 2011). ዊ㊁੫,1990ޟⵝ޿ߩᢥൻੱ㘃ቇޠޡࠕࡦ࠺࡟ࠢࡠࠬޢ45ภ㧘18-20㗁 (Ono.M.1990, cultural anthlopology on dress, anderekuros, 45, 18-20 ) ዊ㊁੫ޟࡐࡇࡘ࡜࡯ࠞ࡞࠴ࡖ࡯ߣᵹ↪ޠ(Ono.M.Popular culture and appropria- tion) (http://www2.ttcn.ne.jp/oda.makoto/popular.html(consulted on May 9th 2012))

NOTES 1 Thanks to the kind help of Associate Professor Jean-Michel Butel of the Institut national des langues et cultures orientales (INALCO), we were able to conduct a questionnaire survey on kawaii on January 28th 2011, with the 247 students who attended his lecture on Japanese culture (hereafter, the questionnaire survey will be called the INALCO survey). The 247 students included 158 women and 89 men. About 90% of the students were between 17 and 22 years old. A little less than 10% of them were aged from the late twenties to sixties (Koma 2011). 2 We conducted the same questionnaire as at INALCO in Lithuania with 26 members of the Hashi Club at Vytautas Magnus University for devotees of Japanese culture (the age range was from 16 to 23 years) on February 18 2011, and with 19 Lithuanian and 10 foreign young persons who are living/staying in Vilnius (age range from 19 to 20 years) who were not especially interested in Japan on March 2nd, 2011(Koma2011). 3 It is said that girls around the world have started to support “Harajuku Fashion” as kawaii (Sakurai 2009) 4 Moe is a Japanese slang word meaning “a rarefied one-side attachment for things hjj|s{|yh{pvuGvmGrh~hppGmhzopvuGpuGmyhujlG{oyv|noGjvtwhyh{p}lGhuhs€zpzG \X vmGx|lz{pvuuhpylzGOmyhujlSGzv|{oGrvylhSG{hp~huPGhukGpu{ly}pl~zGOmyhujlP

and persons such as certain fictional characters (in anime, manga, and the like) and their related embodiments” (Daijisen, Shogakukan). 5 As I already analysed, in the INALCO survey, 1391 items were mentioned, of which the 10 most frequent answers were as follows: 1. Hello Kitty (139 answers); 2. Fashion (84 answers): fashion associated with Japan, manga, clothes with lace or colourful fashion clothes for babies or children (30 answers), Lolita (30 answers), cosplay (13 answers), accessories (10 answers); 3. Animals (61 answers): animals (25 answers), cat (20 answers), dog (2 answers), rabbit (14 answers); 4. Small/ little things or people (59 answers: little animals, little girls, pink, small things, etc.); 5. Rose colour (55 answers); 6. Pikachu (50 answers); 7. A stuffed animal (45 answers); 8. Children, babies (42 answers); 9. J-Pop idols (41 answers): J-Pop idols (18 answers), Morning Musume (14 answers), Ayumi Hamasaki (6 answers), J-Pop (7 answers), AKB48 (2 answers), Johneys (2 answers), Arashi (2 answers); 10. Young Japanese girls (16 answers) (Koma 2011: 57). 6 According to the Japanese advertising agency Hakuhodo’s Global HABIT survey 2010, Taipei (52.1%) and Hongkong (50.3%) are influenced most strongly by Japanese cosmetics and fashion in Asia (www.hakuhodo.co.jp), although Bangkok (23.2%) and Shanghai (22.0%) are influenced by the South Korean equivalent. 7 It is true that in Korea Japanese TV programs have not yet been diffused on a conventional broadcast TV, but since 2006 there is a cable channel called Channel J dealing with Japanese TV programs ( http://news.infoseek.co.jp/article/ yonhapnews_90669, checked on May 22th 2012). 8 I found books on disguise for children in Amazon.fr (consulted on May 27th 2012). 9 According to the Rainbowteam forum, the FRUiTS, inspired by the Japanese fashion journal FRUiTS published since 1997 by Shozo Aoki, presenting Harajuku street Fashion, is the basis for Decoras. The FRUiTS is more ‘softs’ and is a style that does not have precise regulations. The Decoras is more charged, more related to accessories and so on (http://rainbow-team.forum-actif.net /t1173-faq-de-la- rainbow-team, consulted on May 22nd 2012).

ABSTRACT Since the 1990s, the term kawaii (cute in Japanese) has been used in France and in another countries to designate Japanese popular culture, such as manga or the fashion of Harajuku Street (Koga 2006), as a childish culture (Koma 2011). In contrast, the usage of this term in Japan does not always include childishness, as expressed by Otona kawaii (adult cute) published in certain Japanese feminine journals. It is true certain discussions take place \Y r€vrvGrvth

on odourless aspect of Japanese popular culture (Allison 2002, Shiraishi 2000, Iwabuchi 2006) or the proposal is made that Japanese soft power rests more on a national rather than cultural identity (Botz-Bornsteins 2011 XV). However in France, adjectives concerning infantilism, such as petit (small in French) mièvre (vapid) or mignard (cute, pejorative meaning) derived from the adjective mignon (cute) were already used to designate Japan by P. Loti, who introduced the Japanese mousmé to France at the end of the 19th century. Would this coincidence not be able to lead us to consider kawaii style as an ethnic and exotic attraction, succeeding consciously or unconsciously the first Japonism of France? If kawaii style has started to diffuse into the world, the phenomenon is varied from country to country, in particular in France, which is the origin of Japonism in the 19th century. In this paper, I will try to make clear the situation of the acculturation of kawaii style proper to France through a comparative analysis of questionnaires on this style carried out in France, Lithuania, Taiwan and South Korea, and through interviews realised in public space (boutiques, cafés) with young followers of this fashion in France. High and Pop Culture in the Age of Cultural Pluralism

zˆ•Žnœ”Gs Pusan National University, South Korea

Keywords: visual expression, high culture, mass (popular) culture, cultural pluralism, culture industry

VISUAL EXPRESSION AND VERBAL EXPRESSION From the perspective of creators and acceptors of literature and art, it is, after all, based on humane senses. Due to the limitation of the genre, literature and art, however, took a form of relying mainly on visual and hearing senses among the five senses. Literary form and the realization of artistic aesthetics, of course, imply complicate communication process, but the key is the fact that they all appeal to human senses. That is, the degree they rely on can differ to some extent between visual sense and hearing sense, they can overlap each other to some extent, and sometimes they can be complementary or exclusive each other. But in the end, the production and acceptance all come down consistently to one converged perspective. From the perspective of western literature and art tradition, it can be said that ‘visual expression’ was considered inferior to ‘verbal expression’ and so treated badly. In other words, verbal expression was used for high culture and art, while low (mass) culture and art appealed to visual sensation. Of course there is literature that is ‘written expression’, but in the paper, the description is limited to plays \[ zhunn|tGsp

and movies, considering their relation with art. First in the case of play, which is considered as high culture, it focuses on the ‘ears’. Plays are voice-based art genre and considered to have artistic superiority. On the other hand, movies which are ‘eye’-oriented are considered to have mass culture orientation as sub-culture. Underlying such perception is Western traditional view in which logic and rationality are regarded highly. And it should be noted that spoken language basically implies linearity. Linearity was believed to lead our perception in the order of ‘cause-and-effect’ relationship. And it was the order of reason itself other than anything else. So that’s why Hegel insisted that the Alphabets, which were spoken language, were one of the most intellectual products itself ever developed. Such cultural phono-centrism that emphasizes language is closely connected with logo-centrism. Logo-centrism is epistemology which is about self reflection. This was inferred from the notion that a language has self-reflection mechanism built in itself. So that an art genre that uses a language as its medium, and in general, focuses on the revelation of its fundamental meaning, while reflecting and self-examining itself. And plays are no exception. On the other hand, movies that emphasize mosaic recognition and are expressed in images are a sense–oriented genre. Movies make us use our senses rather self-reflection, and lay stress on emotional decision rather than rational decision. So they put feeling before meaning. And such difference is very evident from the way we enjoy plays and movies. Basically, the accepting of rational high culture requires active efforts from the part of the acceptor, while the acceptance of emotional mass culture is passive. Audience themselves need to make meanings out a play that is developing before their very eyes for much part of the play. Finding out about the play requires inference from characters’ mentality that is being conveyed through their dialogues, and from the events that are taking place in reality outside the play. A good understanding of a play, therefore, requires a good level of interpretation and making meanings out of the play. opnoGhukGwvwGj|s{|ylGpuG{olGhnlGvmGj|s{|yhsGws|yhspzt \\

On the other hand, movie audience is passive, compared to play audience. Almost all the necessary information is presented in detail through the juxtaposition of the close-ups and editing. Movies are, therefore, a medium that has a very high level of visual saturation. Since movie screen itself is full of detailed information, there is almost no separate need to add meanings to the movie. Visual perception does not require deliberate training either. As such, art genre that uses verbal medium for its expression, these days in general, exhibits attributes of high class art, while art genre of mass media exhibits the attributes of popular art. There is, of course, no clear line between them, it is only relative. Visual art can be a high level art with highly poetic attributes, and there can be a complete mass culture among verbal arts at the same time. But the major trend is apparent by the attributes of media. In multicultural society therefore, it deems necessary to have a new look at such phenomena of high culture and mass culture from somewhat different perspective of cultural pluralism or multiculturalism. It also seems inevitable that developing such discussion requires some theoretical diagnosis. Hence general definition of culture, aesthetic backgrounds, and culture industry are the basis for the discussion in the paper. And this makes an important point in searching for new understanding on cultural relativism or cultural pluralism. That is, the purpose of the paper is to seek for general understanding on ‘mass culture’ in the “Comparative Studies of Acceptation of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture in Europe” which is the theme of the project. I also want you to know in advance that the paper too severs as a complementary to the premises for the discussion of ‘mass culture’ as known in the introduction of the topic “The Reception of Korean Popular Culture in Germany” (Li et. al 2011: 71-102) that was published in my previous project “Reception of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture in Europe (2010–2011)”.

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‘MASS’ AND ‘CULTURE’ IN MASS CULTURE There are many reasons that the conceptual understanding of ‘mass culture’ shouldn’t be static. First, in understanding of ‘mass’ and ‘culture’, the two have contradictory and yet have indispensable relationship each other. For example, the ‘mass’ itself has connotation of separation and difference by its meaning of ‘popular’. Raymond Williams noted that linguistic definition inevitably involves such difficulties. And we can know it from the fact that he understood in social and historical context the changes around times of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution in England. (Williams 1985:192-197) He also said that “culture is language that describes particular way of life”. (Jo 1999:212) That is, from the utilization perspective, culture can be seen in the way of works and the acts of realization of what produced by intellectual activities, especially artistic activity. Here, the area of culture that belongs to the intellectual activities of human beings includes music, painting, literature, play and movies. But from the perspective of the activity of art production, culture is as broad as to mean anthropological phenomena developing a close connection with human life. So there is no need to mention anew the fact that ‘culture’ does not have single connotation in it either. Secondary attempting to mention about culture can only result in added confusion and unnecessary misunderstanding. So that, current meaning of culture is used in the paper, rather than be stuck in the realm various connotations inferred in the course of historical changes.1 Doing so enables us to secure flexibility and practicality in the use of terminology, setting us free from conceptual constraints at the same time. Paradoxically, it is, however, necessary to understand, at least, some prerequisites for understanding of current ‘mass culture’ of today. And another supporting example would be that the word ‘mass (common)’ has another meaning like in ‘mass (massive)’ production. In other words, the term ‘common or massive’ in ‘mass culture’ has negative connotation, independence lacking, irrational or inferior group of people. But it is its positive or at least neutral connotation opnoGhukGwvwGj|s{|ylGpuG{olGhnlGvmGj|s{|yhsGws|yhspzt \^

of the term ‘popular’ that makes the wording ‘popular culture’ be used widely these days. That is, the terminology emphasizes not only the production process but also the consumption aspect of culture. (Li et al. 2011:72) Such popular culture is also within the frame of production, distribution and consumption through various layers of people. Such phenomenon called ‘popular culture’ connotes culture that is generated by the mass (or massive) medium in mass society. Therefore, the commercialization of mass culture, cultural democratization or the institutionalization of culture will be addressed in the next chapter in the same vein. But first of all, the aesthetic meaning that we can enjoy through the taste of mass or popular culture from elitist perspective needs reinterpretation. From high culture perspective, it is because the phase of mutual subordination, confrontation and acceptance need to be brought into light. In such extension, entertainment and consumption, cultural relativism and cultural pluralism in the era of globalization which belong to the cultural industry become new issue. And this essentially resulted in dominant ideology issue of mass culture in culture industry in which ‘technische Rationalität (rationality of technology)’ became and ‘Rationalität der Herrschaft (rationality of governance)’ (Horkheimer & Adorno 2001:128-129) of the culture industry should be understood differently. Even though aesthetic base and dominant ideology can’t be excluded, in the discussion of mass culture of course, it needs to be kept at its minimum.

‘HIGH LEVEL’ AND ‘THE PUBLIC’ IN CULTURAL PLURALISM The concept and power of ‘high culture’ in culturalism such as cultural pluralism appeared to diminish dramatically in USA through the 50s, an era of debate on mass culture. However, mass culture that was regarded as a premature, dangerous social phenomenon was recognized in the end, yet in different focus. (Jo 1999:237) Herbert Gans, who represented cultural pluralism, supported mass culture saying that “it can’t be just commercial manipulation” because it \_ zhunn|tGsp

reflected the aesthetics and desire of public. On the hand, Williams, who represented culturalism, showed mass culture as an expression of values shared by a group of people or community as a way of ‘life style’. To delve into a bit further, cultural pluralism such as Gans acknowledged its aesthetic base by defining mass culture as taste culture which had the same connotation as high culture. On the other hand, his opinion that “every person has right to have his own culture whether it is high culture or mass culture” (quoted in Kang 1998: 9)2 can be seen to cause significant change to the status of mass culture by advocating ‘cultural democracy’. And it can be seen as ‘cultural politicization’ that goes beyond the scope of aesthetic decision whether it is mass or high culture. In this context, the influence of mass culture does not stay within the scope of culture, but is reverberating through social, political and ethical areas these days. It became reality that mass culture has significant impact in the 21st digital age. Looking at the changed status of mass culture through the past century, it is highly dubious to segregate culture into high and low cultures. As mentioned before, the development continued throughout 19 century since the industrial revolution. The mass production system under capitalism massively produced the working ‘mass’, so such culture space was consequently formed with such dramatic urbanization. Therefore, it can be said that mass culturalism was formed in the process of sociological, theoretic reaction to such cultural phenomena. But mass culturalism did not go always smooth. The period of 1860– 1950 was for mass culturalism during which there was no vitalization into a particular way of life for certain people, times, group of people or mankind in general, following the manifestation of nationalism. Even it included the process of mental development of human being, ‘high culture’, an art that celebrated aesthetic excellence, was yet able to maintain its superior status. And such time of transition can be called a period of oppression by high culture. Then it was the emergence of culturalism after 1960s that contributed to the decline of such opnoGhukGwvwGj|s{|ylGpuG{olGhnlGvmGj|s{|yhsGws|yhspzt \`

era. Since then, high culture got together with mass culture in the end, consequently allowing positive connotation for mass culture.3 To summarize, it can be said that the dominant system of ‘high culture’ that served as a conceptual framework to deny mass culture, became to acknowledge mass culture in the last decade at last. To understand various terms and conceptual differences that existed between high and mass culture before dealing with cultural populism from comprehensive point of view. This was because the true nature of cultural populism includes opposing, relative and subjectional concepts all. And this was directly or indirectly connected with what already mentioned about the conceptual variation of mass and culture. First, the concept of mass culture that was opposed with the concept of ‘high culture’ included ‘liked by a lot of people’, ‘lowbrow’, ‘deliberately made for popularity’. And these expressions were to deny or belittle the cultural ability and potential of the ‘public’. This is irony that the time when high culture was constantly suffering from consciousness of crisis coincided with time when mass culture was denied of the use of the term ‘culture’ and disparaged as ‘the state of anarchy’ or ‘mass civilization’. Creations by certain people of a few only and appreciated by certain privileged class of people only were regarded highly, but the term ‘culture’ was denied for the product and consumption by the public and for the public. So it can be summarized as a cross road of cultural pessimism and optimism. And the cultural relativism can be identified from the fact that true culture was ironically in crisis in 1950s in USA when mass culture was the subject of discussion despite all the preconception and bias about mass culture. Such cultural relativism requires explanations about two heterogeneous cultures produced by the same contemporary culture. In cultural pessimism and the sense of crisis about high culture in Europe, ‘minority culture’ and ‘mass culture’ appeared opposing each other. ‘Avant-garde’, which was regarded as high culture unlike in the early 20th century, was understood as ‘genuine’, ‘formal’, ‘superior’, ‘true’ etc., opposed to sub-culture which was expressed as ‘rear-garde’, ]W zhunn|tGsp

‘ersatz’, ‘popular’, ‘of the mass’, ‘official’, ‘rudimentary’ etc., which were subjectional concepts. But the real importance is not such opposing concepts but the consumer of culture. And bias against mass culture can be indentified from the fact that still people are segregating culture into ‘highbrow culture’, ‘middlebrow culture’, and ‘lowbrow culture’. And such division is based on such connotations as ‘superior’, ‘refined’, ‘sophisticated’, ‘common’, ‘mediocre’ and ‘brutal’. (Kang 1998: 151)4 It also shows the limitation of culture that is destined to lose, stuck between ‘high class’ and ‘the mass’. Therefore, the classification of the taste ‘taste culture’ by Gans into high culture and mass culture does have sound grounds.

COMMERCIALIZATION OF CULTURE AND ART Here is another conceptual barrier between high culture mentioned about and high art to be mentioned about yet. In conclusion, the difference is going to be implied rather than revealed as difference in ‘art’ or ‘culture’ in the course of context. For example, telling basic differences between the ‘art’ and ‘culture’ through the ‘commercialization of art’ or the ‘commercialization of culture’ may only add to confusion about the point of the paper. To put it simple, it is tried to avoid the terminological confusion from the point that past traditional art was elite orientated. That is, dichotomic definition of art and culture from the aspect of creation (production) and procession (consumption) deems reasonable. Since art works were exclusively possessed by privileged a few elites and aristocrats, the artists needed a lot of training to learn to inherit art form that had been passed down. Of course, art that was expressed through such art form not only was unable to reach general public but also had a limitation in itself in the way that it was appreciated by the few only. But with the dissolution of such category as high culture, art expanded to the areas of everyday life. Above all, art tried to connect with various mass media as the productivity of art came into contact opnoGhukGwvwGj|s{|ylGpuG{olGhnlGvmGj|s{|yhsGws|yhspzt ]X

with the cultural industry and enlarged reproduction structure. Their examples include electronic music that uses computers, visual art and installation art that use digital technology, and even the adaptation of readymade objet. Therefore, art was not unique individual creativity of artist only anymore, but the various acceptances and interpretations of the appreciator became more important. In conclusion, it is to say that the closeness of the production of art changed to openness to acceptances and interpretations. It can be said that now it is time of ‘art popularization in which art and culture can be appreciated in our daily life rather than something that is difficult for the public to understand. That is, we try to look into Theodor W. Adorno’s criticism about ‘everyday esthetic’ from the perspective of the commercialization of art. Even though it, of course, entails looking into the line of criticism5 in the context of commodity analysis by Karl Marx6, ‘Verdinglichung’ by Georg Lukács, and ‘Identitätsprinzip’7 by Adorno, the explanation in the paper is limited to the area of commercialization of art and culture industry. But it has direct connection with the idea, De-Centering, of Adorno. Adorno understood ‘reification’ in connection with identity thinking, that is, artworks retrogresses into ancient fetishism to become a thing. He understood that ‘Entkunst’ was due to ‘Kulturindustrie’ from the fact art lost artistic value in post-capitalism society. (Adorno 1972:32) And it was because commodities that were produced by culture industry could never reach the autonomy of art due to its fetish nature. And this necessitates looking into the reality of culture industry that makes commodities out of culture by dissolving or replacing art in real sense as thought by Adorno.

CULTURE INDUSTRY AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF CONTROL In culture industry ‘Technology’ has most important role or connection above all, and it is because technology enables standardization ]Y zhunn|tGsp

and mass production through which prerequisites of the mass distribution of culture commodities among the public are solved. And it was Adorno and Horkheimer who made this idea known. They paid special attention to the fact that those who were engaged in culture industry tried to maximize the utilization of technology. It was because they thought that technology was nothing but knowledge and power and it had attribute to self-produce itself, reproduce, and to maintain itself. Technology, essentially, was seen as a form of thought or rationality. As mentioned in the beginning part of the paper, Adorno and Horkheimer went further to question such ‘technological rationality’ and the origin of such technological thinking. That is, it meant the process of overcoming nature’s dominance over mankind for the first time, and then the process of the relativization of nature and the establishment of dominance over nature in the course of civilization. And the logic behind it was that the ‘rationality of technology’ became ‘rationality of governance’ as a natural consequence of the process. (Noh 2002:230) That is, the rationality of technology of mankind that was an important tool in overcoming nature’s dominance over human beings became powerful either in dominating other people as well as themselves instead. So it indicates the paradox that the rationality that was made by human beings themselves fell into irrationality. With tremendous technological development since early days’ cultural industry, the culture industry changed so much that digital technology, for example, even turns imaginary world into reality, more than just copying the reality. In the case of movies which are one of the representatives of mass culture, more and more computer graphics are used than actually shooting movies these days. In the example of pop music, digital technology made more popular those entertainers who take advantage of images and dances, collective rhythm or flash gestures more than those day entertainers of classic music or songs. So it can’t be overstated that such reproduction technology and imaging technology which made revolutionary development play major roles in leading culture industry. opnoGhukGwvwGj|s{|ylGpuG{olGhnlGvmGj|s{|yhsGws|yhspzt ]Z

On the other hand, if technology and form can enhance the usefulness of commercialization, it is consumers that we should bear in mind in the end. Even though it may sound trite, it means that it can result in a situation in which culture becomes subjected to the industry in the frame of production and consumption. If it is about stimulating and controlling the appetites of mass consumers or even getting them to have training behind the scene, suitable container would be ‘amusement’ or ‘entertainment’. Such ‘things for enjoyment’ can take a form of commodity in a sophisticated and clever way. And such perspective raises a need to acknowledge culture industry as a compulsory frame that indiscriminately standardizes whether it is art or culture. At last, the commercialization of culture industry changed unique commercial value of art work. Adorno considered artwork as a commodity. But even though art is a commodity, it is different from the notion that culture industry is about just commodities. And the fundamental difference is that even though art is essentially tied to the prerequisite of commodity economy, the focus is on the freedom of art as a denial of social finality. On the other hand, culture industry can be seen to have completely replaced use value for exchange value by assigning commodity values only as something that can be exchangeable. If the use value of art work is reverted only to exchange value of the market, the unique qualitative value of art or culture breaks away from the abstractive protection network. Culture industry is sometimes cheaply offered to the public through the commercialization of art works. But the fact is that such cheap purchase and enjoyment obliterated special class of people that used to possess culture before exclusively, and enabled the public to have new approach to art are. As matter of fact, it firmly removed the qualitative contents and discarded the sound relationship that once existed between the acceptor and art. It, in turn, only increased the fetish nature of art. (Noh 2002:237-238) And this symbolizes the rationality of domination brought about by the rationality of ][ zhunn|tGsp

technology, that is, the harmful effect of the commercialization of culture industry.

CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY Conceptual, theatrical discussion about culture went through dramatic change through the discussion of culturalism such as cultural pluralism to culture industry and commercialization. And this was, of course, an indication of self conflicting harmful consequences of cultural ideology. That is, it raised questions again whether the rationality of technology and culture was something that human culture should aim at, culture was for what and for whom, but in reality, main stream was formed with various responses to culture rather than such ideology. That is, it can be summarized into cultural relativism and era of multi-culturalism. The motto, ‘universal ethic of globalization, humanization of humanity, cultural relativism and universalism, multi-identity of globalization era’ of “The 1st World Humanities Forum” which took place during 24th- 26th November 2011 in Busan was a good reflection of it. Of them, ‘Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism’ by prof. Takami Kuwayama of Hokkaido University attracted a lot of attention in the fact that it raised previous level of discussion on culture into multiculturalism. (Kuwayama 2011: 74-85) Culture and civilization can be seen a product of mutual contact among other societies and life styles, more actively, crossbreeding and hybridism. From such perspective, the historical evolution of culture has takes a long time in the name of globalization and it was one major drivers of human civilization from the beginning. Commercial activities and trading around the world was a major way of delivering certain commodities across certain boards. Such as, commercial relationships developed, influencing each other’s culture. Hanseatic League of 13-17th century in Europe and its modern adaptation ‘FTA’ can also be understood in the same way as it exerted opnoGhukGwvwGj|s{|ylGpuG{olGhnlGvmGj|s{|yhsGws|yhspzt ]\

important influence on cultural fact beyond its commercial exchange between cities and countries. The ramifications of the discussion of cultural relativism in 20th century were large because of its theatrical soundness. But now cultural relativism is in the center stage of social, cultural anthropology. And there would be almost no anthropologists who would deny that relative thinking about foreign culture has done an important role in this discipline historically. From the anthropological perspective, the biggest contribution of cultural relativism has been the change of the perception that a culture should be understood from the perspective of culture itself what culture that may be. And the factor can be applied to the understanding and acceptance of high culture and mass culture. In anthology, mankind was perceived to evolve through three stages, ‘barbarous - uncivilized - civilized’, as such; cultural relativism emerged from extensive belief in the superiority of Caucasian race and such intellectual climate. And those anthropologists who had such assertion include Hebert Spencer, Lewis H. Morgan, Edward Tylor.8 Even though Tylor was well known for his cultural relativism, he was an evolutionist in the fact that he insisted with no hesitation that civilized people were, overall, wiser and happier than those who were not. But such cultural relativism brought about argument about multiculturalism, which resulted in the politicization of culture. From overall perspective, it can be said that multiculturalism was political ideology from the beginning that served to keep a people together from being divided by uniting various races, languages, cultures, and religions. In the context, multiculturalism is, in part, still a way of political unification as it did so in the past. Multi-culture society is, therefore, a society in which a main group of people is in the center, rather than a society in which various races with different cultures co-exist together as one nation. In other words, the relative concept of culture emphasizes differences among different groups of people, removing differences within the group at the same time. ]] zhunn|tGsp

That is, the homogeneity and differences of culture can exist in and out of a group at the same time. According to Kuwayama, culture was regarded as ‘consumable’ in the sense that the components of culture can be recognized by many people beyond the race and country. For example, sport ‘Judo’ is no more regarded as exclusively belongs to Japan who invented the sport. ‘K-Pop’, one component of ‘䞲⮮(Korean Wave; Hallyu)’ which represents mass culture of these days, is in a process of interacting with different cultures in various places in the world. And this can be understood as an attribute of cultural relativism and cultural pluralism. In the era of globalization in which international exchanges take place in many parts of our life, outstanding characteristics of culture of cultural relativism is the fact that the consumption of culture is taking place regardless racial background of the consumer.

BOARD AND CRITERIA OF MASS CULTURE So far, conceptual definition, aesthetical argument and relation with culture industry that were developed in the name of ‘culture’ up to cultural pluralism were broadly looked into. In conclusion, the criteria or basis on which the subject ‘high culture’ and ‘mass culture’ can be defined are the key point. As mentioned in the beginning, the framework of art and culture that are maintained up to now has understandable answer itself in the fact that it relies on the five senses of human beings. That is, we deliberately ignore or neglect boundary between high and mass that originated from difference between visual expression and verbal expression. Of course, the diagnosis is limited to such truth of the appearance and distribution of the production and acceptance of culture, capitalism and culture industry. But, the dichotomy of high and mass can only generate numerous issues, not being able to be future-oriented culture. From the perspective of expression medium and function, vision and hearing are indirect and passive. They have limitation in the sense opnoGhukGwvwGj|s{|ylGpuG{olGhnlGvmGj|s{|yhsGws|yhspzt ]^

that they cannot reach direct sense of touch in the acceptance or communication of culture. In other words, they will remain as perception issues that hang between the reality and imaginary world. Even though three dimensional world or even four dimensional world are made possible in part, with ground breaking development of technology, the boundary that brings about such ‘cyber reality’ or ‘real cyber’ is existing reality. That is, the differentiation of the five senses of human beings is understood as such perceptional difference in the fact that the five senses of human beings are working in reality. With that, the paper concludes with mentioning the understanding of the attributes of plays and movies as criterion that separates high culture and mass cultures, which is the most apparent line between visual expression and verbal expression. A play has very verbal identity despite its visual attributes. And it is because most of messages are delivered by the lines of actors filled with information in a play. Even inner psychology of characters often appears as a form of aside. Delivery of dialogue is also the center of the performance of actors. Visual performances of actors have limitations in delivering their messages. Because it is difficult to see facial expressions or delicate movements in detail for those audiences who are in a distance from the stage, unlike in a movie that can deliver its message with even small change in facial expression by close-ups. In that sense, a play is like a movie with the camera fixed at a long shot. And it is why the visual performance of actors tends to exaggerate in a play. The message should be delivered with specific movements of their body rather than facial expressions and their movements should be deliberately enlarged. We sometimes see that play actors seem to exaggerate their performances in a movie or TV drama and it is because the play actors who are accustomed to play situation are not get used to the different situation of visual media. On the other hand, visual expression is more essential than dialogue in a movie. Dialogues should be expressed by visual expression in a movie. Flexible movements of cameras can catch or create messages in various ways that cannot possible with verbal expressions. If the role ]_ zhunn|tGsp

of verbal language is conspicuous with too much use of narrations, it tends to deteriorate the completeness of movie. Such basic differences in media are important conditions for the cinematization of a play as an essence for the change. Play is a genre that realizes the mental values of language. It is comparable to an art form of literature in which letters are the basis since the development of printing. Literature lost a lot of advantages of phonocentrism as it became an art of letters-dependant; on the other hand, plays have been able to maintain the literary values as contemporary re-representation style that was addressed in the poetics by Aristotle. It should be remembered that the cadence of literature changed to inner rhythm with the beauty of reading hidden beneath deep-rooted structure. From phonocentrism perspective, plays can be said to keep the media characteristic that deals with the essence of language better than literature does. Today, it is hard to make sense of dichotomy that separates culture to high culture and low culture. It has also become difficult to draw a line between art and literature in the era of so-called cultural pluralism and multicultural society. The maximization of such expressions that overcome the boundary of genres is disguised as ideology in the mane of culture, with new potential open. Whether it is culture industry or commercialization, is it an era of losing the originality of culture itself with the decoration of culture? Whether it is conceptual definition or real trend, discussion on the identity of culture is important as long as we acknowledge the diversity of cultures in the context of historical changes, after all, the separation between high and mass is secondary.

REFERENCES Arnold, M. 1994. Culture and Anarchy. Yale University Press. Adorno, Th. W. 1972. Ästhetische Theorie, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 7. Suhrkamp. Horkheimer, M. & Adorno, Th. W. 2001. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Fischer Verlag. opnoGhukGwvwGj|s{|ylGpuG{olGhnlGvmGj|s{|yhsGws|yhspzt ]`

Jo, J. 1999. Mass/Popular Culture and Kitsch. Journal of Contemporary Art Studies, Vol. 2. Kang, H. D. (Trans.). 1998. Mass culture and high culture. Nanam Publisher. Kang, H. D. (Ed.). 1998. Modern society and Mass culture. Nanam Publisher. Kuwayama, T. 2011. Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism.‚Paper pre- sented at ‘The 1st World Humanities Forum’], 24th-26th November. Busan, South Korea. Li, S. G. 2011. The Reception of Korean Popular Culture in Germany. In T. Kitamura / K. Koma / S. G. Li (Ed.), Reception of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture in Europe. Vytautas Magnus University. Marx, K. 1988. Das Kapital, Bd. 1, MEW 23, Berlin. Noh, S. S. 2002. Aesthetics in daily life and Adorno. In Korean Philosophical Association (Ed.), Philosophy. Williams, R. 1985. Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society. Revised ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

NOTES 1 But it is not to deny that ‘culture’ has become to be used as an important concept in such system of thought which are very different among them that can’t co- exist, as said by Williams. 2 Original text from: Herbert J. Gans. Mass culture and high culture. 3 The argument of USA mass culture that can be summarized into the intersection of cultural pessimism and optimism means an era where new thought about culture began to have new life while past thought about culture still maintains its status. Especially, it didn’t stay in avant-garde movements in early 20th century in Europe, but contributed to the rise of Yes Art, Pop Art which was developed around New York as a new form avant-garde movement. 4 Original text from: Edward Shils. Mass Society and culture. 5 As far as Adorno is concerned, the ‘commercialization of art’ should start from the Lukács’s issue based on Marx’s theory. Because Lukács derived the concept of ‘Verdinglichung (reification)’ from Marx’s ‘commodity analysis’ and ‘Warenfetischismus (goods fanaticism)’, while Adorno differentiated from Lukács by explaining Lukács’s issues as principle of identification. 6 The main point in the ‘commodity analysis’ by Marx is that commodities have ‘Gebrauchswert (utility value)’ and ‘Tauschwert (exchange value)’. That is, even though originally has ‘Gebrauchswert’ to satisfy human needs, the Gebrauchswert of commodity acquires Tauschwert as well that can be exchanged with Gebrauchswert of another commodity. 7 According to him, the incomparable should be made comparable and the non- ^W zhunn|tGsp

identical should be made identical for the social exchange. Therefore, such identity was seen as a root form of ideology. 8 One of representative writings can be ‘primitive culture’ by Edward Tylor. Even he showed similar opinion to Lewis H. Morgan, the key point is religious revolution. He ranked religions with animism (spirit religion) at the bottom, and polytheism in the middle and monotheism at the top. So saw the Christianity as the most developed religion in the world.

ABSTRACT Nowadays popular culture must be major trend of culture which people have for the first and most time in their lives. Nevertheless, some hesitate somehow to denote as ‘culture’ texts like music concerts, TV dramas, films etc. That is, aesthetic point of view that distinguishes between the ‘high class’ and ‘low class’ changes with the history. However, the concept of high culture in its production and consumption presupposes superior mental ability or negate cultural ability of the mass in the modern period. In other words, the popular culture emphasizes consumption aspect of culture in addition to the aspect of the production process and widely be used these days. As such, concept of popular culture can’t be static notion. Accordingly, culture must have three premises and that were conceptual definition, aesthetic background and culture industry. In other words, there are understanding of technological rationality and the rationality of governance in culture industry. Therefore, my paper will be focused on the visual and verbal expression, first as introduction. And in the body mass culture, ‘high level’ and ‘the public’ in cultural pluralism, culture industry, commercialization of culture in multicultural society etc. will be mainly recognized. These descriptions aim to define in short, i.e. about the board and criteria between popular and high culture based on the visual and verbal expression among human senses. The popular image of Japan in Nazi Germany (1933-1945)

zŒ——Gs•ˆ™› University of Vienna

Keywords: popular image of Japan, German bestsellers on Japan, Nazi Germany, samurai image, heroic Japan, Albrecht Fürst von Urach, Wilhelm von Scholz

INTRODUCTION My object of analysis within the research project “Comparative Studies of the Acceptation of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture in Europe”? is the historical study of bestsellers about Japan during the Nazi period in Germany. In my opinion these bestsellers reflect the acceptation of popular Japanese culture of that period in Germany best. First it has to be stressed, though, that the contents of popular culture in Japan and in Germany today are quite different from their respective contents during the 1930ies. There is a lot of Japanese popular culture which has been influencing popular culture in foreign countries, today as well as in the past. Today we use to think of films, manga, anime, popular literature, J-Pop, popular aesthetics, fashion, electronic games, characters, cult figures, karaoke, Japanese cuisine, martial arts, etc., but in the 1930ies Japanese popular culture that was received in Europe were films, popular literature, martial arts, the Takarazuka girls opera, postcards, etc. I would like to give a few examples for the acceptance of Japanese ^Y zlwwGspuohy{

popular culture in Germany during the 1930ies. In 1936 Arnold Fanck, known at that time for his excellent mountain films, produced a Japanese-German film Die Tochter des Samurai (The Daughter of the Samurai), a movie which bore almost the same title as Etsuko Inagaki Sugimoto’s autobiographical novel, which had been originally published in the US in 1923 and was translated into German and appeared in 1935 as Tochter der Samurai (Sugimoto 1935). The movie was financed by the Japanese Ministry of Education, and was thus clearly intended for propaganda purposes among a German audience to explain the validity of traditional Japanese values in present times. All the Japanese in the movie were Japanese professional actors. Thus it can be said that Die Tochter des Samurai was a Japanese movie especially made for Germans (Hansen 1997). As concerns popular literature of the time, Hino Ashihei’s Weizen und Soldaten (Wheat and Soldiers) appeared in 1940 in German translation of Hino’s trilogy about soldiers’ life, Mugi to heitai, Tsuchi to heitai and Hana to heitai (Wheat and Soldiers, Earth and Soldiers, and Flowers and Soldiers) (Hino 1940). These books sold in Japan more than 3 million copies and are thus representative of Japanese mass literature of the late thirties. Even in Germany it arrived at a publication figure of 38.000 copies by 1943, which is quite high for a novel translated from Japanese. Martial arts can be mentioned as another field in which there existed much influence from Japan. Already in 1906 the first school for Dschiu Dschitsu (jūjitsu) was opened in Berlin. Kanō Jigorō, the inventor of modern judo, visited Germany and Austria in 1933 with several pupils to teach his way in Berlin, Munich, and Vienna, and in 1934 the first European Judo Championship took place in Dresden. A host of introductory books on judo and jūjitsu from the first half of the 20th century give proof of the high interest in and popularity of judo in Germany even before World War II. As for popular music, The Takarazuka Women’s Revue Theatre made its first tour to foreign countries in 1938, when it visited Germany, Italy, Poland, and Lithuania which was followed by another one {olGwvw|shyGpthnlGvmGqhwhuGpuGuhpGnlythu€GOX`ZZTX`[\P ^Z

to the USA a year later. These tours can also be included into the cultural propaganda activities of the Japanese state rather than being interpreted as a tour which followed the demand of European fans of the Takarazuka Theatre, who at that time were certainly very limited in number. Another field, often neglected, in which Japanese popular culture had some influence on Germany, is stamp and postcard collecting. There existed many private ties between Japanese and German collectors. The visual representation of Japanese or German phenomena on postcards and stamps without doubts left a lot of impressions about the respective country on both sides. Taken together, all these realms seem to have been very limited in their power to influence the German masses as to their impressions of Japan. In an age without TV and internet the image of Japan in Germany was largely formed by political events like the capture of Tsingtao by the Japanese in 1914, by music about Japan, pictures of Japan like postcards or journal and newspaper illustrations, and fictional and non-fictional literature about Japan. Of this literature, bestsellers about Japan seem to be especially revealing as regards the formation of a popular image of Japan in Germany.

THE ROLE OF BESTSELLERS By studying the bestsellers about Japan in Nazi Germany, a country with a totalitarian political regime since 1933, one can see which knowledge about Japan was tolerated by the Nazi regime, and which Japanese values were propagated or promoted by it to the German masses. Since the book market at that time was not free, but heavily influenced by censorship and economic measures – e.g. the distribution of paper to publishing companies which published books seen as desirable by the regime while paper was being held back from other companies – the publication figures of books can be interpreted as heavily manipulated. ^[ zlwwGspuohy{

Bestsellers about Japan can be seen to reflect Japanese popular culture, popular images and popular values, because their contents were embraced by the German masses, and what was easiest to transfer from Japan to Germany was Japanese mass culture. It is unlikely that Japanese high or elite culture could have become mass culture in Germany or even could have influenced it. With this in mind I began to investigate the books on Japan published in Germany between 1933 and 1945 which had a mass circulation. It is difficult to call them bestsellers, because it is by no means clear, whether all those publications were really sold or whether they were distributed free of charge. But even if they were given away freely, we at least can assume that this was done so with the intention of influencing people. If books are sold in great quantity, we can equally assume that they are read, since people pay for them. In order to find out which books were widely read, I first used the bibliography by Hadamitzky and Kocks (1993) which lists every book on Japan published in Germany between 1921 and 1950. I made a list of all the books published between 1933 and 1945. In a second step I searched for every book in the internet search system for antiquarian books, www.eurobuch.com, through which I could find out how many editions of a book were published and how high the highest circulation figure was. There were several books of which the first edition was already published a long time before the Nazis seized power, but which were still allowed to be published afterwards. Although it would be interesting to find out why these books were still published after 1933, I would like to limit myself here to books the first edition of which was published after 1933 or shortly before 1933. Thus I arrived at the following list of books of which at least 20.000 copies were produced. Of course, this list can contain omissions. {olGwvw|shyGpthnlGvmGqhwhuGpuGuhpGnlythu€GOX`ZZTX`[\P ^\

Table 1: German Bestsellers on Japan Published Between 1930 and 1945

Author Title (Year of Publication of the Highest Circula- First Edition; English Title) tion (Year) Urach, Albrecht Fürst v. Das Geheimnis japanischer Kraft 800.000 (1944) (1942; The Secret of Japanese Power) Scholz, Wilhelm v. Die Pflicht (1932; The Duty) 278.000 (1943) Corazza, Heinz Die Samurai (1944; The Samurai) 100.000 (1944) Brosius, Hans Fernost formt seine Gestalt (1936; 74.000 (1942) The Far East Molds Its Shape) Thiess, Frank Tsushima (1936) 70.000 (1943) Sugimoto, E. Inagaki Tochter der Samurai (1935; A 56.000 (1942) Daughter of the Samurai) Lissner, Ivar Japanischer Bilderbogen (1939; A 50.000 (1941) Sheet of Japanese Pictures) Zischka, Anton Japan in der Welt (1936; Japan in 42.000 (1938) the World) Italiaander, Rolf Banzai (1939) 40.000 (1943) Sieburg, Friedrich Die stählerne Blume (1939; The Iron 39.000 (1939) Flower) Hino Ashihei Weizen und Soldaten (1940; Wheat 38.000 (1942) and Soldiers) Baelz, Erwin v. Ein deutscher Arzt in Japan (1931; A 20.000 (1943) German Physician in Japan) Rottauscher, Anna v. Ihr gelben Chrysanthemen! (1939; 20.000 (1940) You Yellow Chrysanthemums!)

Let us first take a look on the genres to which these books belong. Fictional literature is represented by The Duty, Tsushima, Banzai, and Wheat and Soldiers, while You Yellow Chrysanthemums! is a collection of translated haiku poetry. The remaining eight books belong to the category of non-fiction. ^] zlwwGspuohy{

FICTIONAL WORKS Among the fictional works the high number of copies of Scholz’s short novel, first published at Paul List in Leipzig, is especially remarkable. From the title Die Pflicht. Eine Novelle (The Duty. A Short Novel) one does not at once know that it has to do with Japan, but the first edition was published in Japanese binding, a small booklet made up of 44 pages. It seems that after two editions with only 8.000 copies together someone got aware of the political potentials of this short story. Thus from the third edition onwards the Japanese binding was replaced by a normal European book binding, and the number of pages increased to 58. Until 1942 thus 150.000 copies had been printed, and in 1943 another 128.000 copies were added, so that almost 300.000 copies appeared. This final edition was a Feldpostausgabe, an edition which was especially made to be sent to soldiers on the front or to be sold by shops accompanying the fighting soldiers. It seems that the leadership of the Wehrmacht, when the war turned more and more unfavorable for Germany, relied heavily on the power of the written word. The novel was also remade into a radio play, probably to find an even wider audience. The author Wilhelm von Scholz (1874-1969) was the son of a Prussian minister of finance. He grew up in Berlin and Konstanz, was chairperson of the Prussian Academy of Arts until he returned to Konstanz in 1928. After that there is a great white spot in his biography, which only mentions that in 1944 he became honorary doctor of the University of Heidelberg. As a poet, a novelist and a dramatist he created numerous works with romanticist and mystic-pantheist features. After 1945 he continued his literary career and became president of the German Association of Dramatists and Composers (1949-51). In old age he got numerous distinctions. In 1959 The Duty was even published once again in Scholz’s collection of short stories Das Inwendige (Inner Things). Although the short biographical materials which I researched about Scholz do not report of dark brown spots on the author’s clean slate, Scholz continued to publish during the Third Reich as if nothing had {olGwvw|shyGpthnlGvmGqhwhuGpuGuhpGnlythu€GOX`ZZTX`[\P ^^

changed. There are many indications that he was a staunch Nazi: in October 1933, he pledged allegiance to Adolf Hitler, he was one out of hundred writers who cooperated to produce a festschrift on the occasion of Hitler’s 50th birthday in 1939, in the same year he retracted his previous “philo-Semitic works”, and in 1944, Scholz authored verse glorifying the Führer for an anthology of poetry. He was selected by Hitler for the list of most important literats of the Third Reich, and given a grant of 30.000 Reichsmark by the Führer himself. Scholz’s short story The Duty was written one year before the Nazis seized power, but it was clearly instrumentalized by them. The novel is said to be based on a true story and gives the author the possibility to glorify the “unlimited patriotism of the Japanese, which in Europe could only be seen if a war would break out”. The plot is simple: A newly developed Japanese airship that was used as a reconnaissance airship against the American navy in the vicinity of Japan crushed because of a heavy tempest near an American squadron. The Americans were able to save the airship and its crew, and thus had the opportunity to get a lot of information about the airship. When the airship had been repaired and was ready to fly back to Japan, two American experts asked whether they could fly to Japan on board of the airship. Their goal was of course a closer espionage of the airship. The Japanese agreed and they promised to send the two Americans back to their ships with a military airplane. The Japanese pilot who was to return the two Americans to their ships on the next day, escorted by a imperial prince, let his airplane crush into the sea before the eyes of the waiting Americans, in order that the Americans could not get the reports of their spies. This happened without an order having been given, but it was the only possible honorable solution of the problem how one could prevent the Americans from getting important military information about the new airship. The commander of the airship, “who had been promoted for his clever leadership in a time of danger, choose death for himself”. ^_ zlwwGspuohy{

From this short synopsis the success of this novel in a very pathetic language cannot be explained. Its success only makes sense, if we assume that a system behind the novel tries to steer the values of its members into a similar direction: absolute disregard of self-interest as compared to common goals, messhi hōkō, and the attempt to stabilize these values by means of a wide distribution of a literature that stresses such values. Absolute loyalty, the acquittal of one’s duties, and unlimited self- abandonment are the most important values in this novel which should serve as a paragon for the German soldiers. This tendency can also be seen in the works of other authors, and is especially clear in the numerous versions of Chūshingura, The Treasury of Loyalty, a drama by Chikamatsu Monzaemon about the revenge of their Lord by 47 rōnin, who after their successful deed all committed ritual suicide (seppuku, in the West known as harakiri). The first version in German was made by an Austrian physician, F. A. Junker von Langegg, under the title Midzuho-gusa. Segenbringende Reisähren. Nationalroman und Schilderungen aus Japan. Band 1: Vasallentreue (Chiushingura). This might have been the first translation of Chūshingura in the West. During the Nazi rule the following versions appeared: 1. Noishiki Toshie: Harakiri. Die 47 Ronin. Berlin: Schönfeld, 1938, 143 p. 2. Arthur Ernst Grix: Tschikara. Die Rache der 47 Samurai. Nach einem japanischen Heldenepos. Berlin: Die Heimbücherei, 1941, 303 p. 3. Hanns Maria Lux: Die Verschwörung der 47 Samurai. Eine japanische Heldengeschichte. With an afterword. Leipzig: Reclam 1942, 80 p. (=Reclams Universal-Bibliothek 7507) 4. Mirko Jelusich: Samurai. Schauspiel in fünf Aufzügen. Wien: Speidel 1943, 122 p. 5. Takeda Izumo: Die siebenundvierzig Ronin. Ein altjapanisches Heldenspiel. Remade for the German stage by Eduard Reinacher. Berlin: Widukind Verlag 1943, 115 p. {olGwvw|shyGpthnlGvmGqhwhuGpuGuhpGnlythu€GOX`ZZTX`[\P ^`

This means that within five years, between 1938 and 1943, at least three narrated and two drama versions of the same story appeared.1 The message seems clear: German soldiers should take the Japanese samurai and their behavior as a model for their own deeds. Like the 47 rōnin had sacrificed themselves for their Lord 250 years ago, German soldiers should not hesitate to sacrifice themselves for their Fuehrer Hitler. But in none of the versions there is mention made of the fact that Lord Asano had had 250 vassals, and not only 47. Those 200 who were not willing to follow their former Lord into death but preferred to stay alive, not less than 80 % of his vassals, are never treated. Most of the writers who competed to rewrite Chūshingura were pronounced Nazis, like Hanns Maria Lux (1900-1967), a German nationalist from the Saar district, who after 1933 became Landesleiter of the Reichsschrifttumskammer Gau Moselland (Head of the Chamber of Writers in Moselland District), or Mirko Jelusich (1886-1969), a writer and theatre critic in Vienna, one of the key figures of Nazi cultural policies there (Austria-Forum n. d.). A book with similar intent as The Duty is Rolf Italiaander’s Banzai, a collection of thirty stories of Japanese heroes on 120 pages only. Rolf Italiaander (1913-1991), a man of Dutch-German origins, in the recent German Biographical Encyclopedia is called an ethnologist, translator and writer. According to the same source he seems to have been dismissed for political reasons from Leipzig University in 1934, and had to live underground in the Netherlands and Italy during World War II. Astoundingly, in spite of this massive antifascist background, he collected with the help of the young japanologist Gerhard Mehnert (1914-1983)2, after the war active in East Germany, stories of Japanese military heroes from the famous Atsumori in 1184 to the unknown Tazawa in 1938 in China and published them under the title Banzai at the publisher “Die Wehrmacht” in Berlin. It was included into the series Kleine Wehrmacht-Bücherei with a foreword by the Japanese ambassador to Germany Baron Lieutenant-General Hiroshi Oshima, and probably sold cheaply to soldiers in order to heighten their fighting spirit. Since Italiaander was not a famous author like Scholz, his little book did not sell more than 40.000 copies in 1943. _W zlwwGspuohy{

Italiaander went on writing quite well selling books after the war, and he demonstrated his loyalty to Japan when publishing several propaganda books for two new religions, the Sōka Gakkai and the Risshō Kōseikai (Italiaander 1964, 1973, 1978, 1982, and Italiaander (Ed.) 1973). You Yellow Chrysanthemums! is untypical, since it is not addressed to soldiers, but rather to a general readership with traditional interest in Japan, Japanese lyrics. The translator was a female sinologist who worked as librarian in the Austrian National library for a long period. Therefore we do not need to analyze it further, but just keep in mind that not all Germans during the Nazi reign became soldiers instilled with Nazi spirit. The case of Frank Thiess (1890-1977), the author of Tsushima, is complicated. Born into a German family in Latvia, Frank Thiess had great success with his novels in the Weimar Republic (Kloeden 1996). Especially his tetralogy Jugend (Youth, 1924-1931) in which he tried to grasp the Weimar times by way of biographies of pupils and students was a remarkable opus. At the same time this brought him the reputation to be a reactionary, because he compares the unlawful urban society with idyllic country life. In spite of this, two of his novels were burnt by the Nazis in 1933. Thiess did not emigrate, but tried to continue his life as a successful writer. In Tsushima, he tried to write everything according to the facts, as the Neue Sachlichkeit (new objectivity) demanded, but at the same time he tried to contrast the characters of the two protagonists, Russian admiral Rojestwenski and Japanese admiral Tōgō. In this novel, Tōgō has the will to win, while Rojestwenski is characterized by his will to die. Thiess’ novel was translated into 16 different languages and was again published after the Second World War in many editions. One part of the novel was selected by Ernest Hemingway for his war-anthology Men at War. The best stories of all time (New York 1942), in which Thiess is the only German author represented. The problematic nature of Thiess’ novel stems from the fact that it seems to fit so well into the political development, so that Thiess after {olGwvw|shyGpthnlGvmGqhwhuGpuGuhpGnlythu€GOX`ZZTX`[\P _X

1945 was even accused of having been a Nazi war-writer. But we should not forget that the novel was politically opportune only after the termination of the Hitler-Stalin-Pact and the start of Hitler’s campaign against Russia in June 1941. This is reflected in the circulation figures. From 1936 to 1938 there were four editions with 28.000 copies all together, in 1940 there appeared another edition with 10.000 copies, but of the 6th edition in 1941 21.000 copies were printed, and 1942 and 1943 two more editions appeared, of which I do not know the number of copies. We can estimate that at least 70.000, but probably more than 80.000 copies were printed, so that as many Germans as possible would be informed about the defeat of the Russians against the Japanese, now the allies of the Germans. Consequently, in Austria Tsushima in 1946 was forbidden by the Russian occupation army, so that nobody would make comparisons between the Czarist army of 1905 and the Red Army of 1945. Paradoxically, 40 years earlier, in 1905, the Russian socialists, communists and anarchists had acclaimed Japan’s victory over Czarist Russia. Seen today, it is difficult to find Nazi ideology in Thiess’ novel which was nevertheless instrumentalised by the Nazis. The last literary work is the already mentioned translation of Hino Asishei’s trilogy about Japanese soldiers in the War against China. Hino himself called this work ‘documentation literature’ (kiroku bungaku), and even if read today it gives one the feeling of marching together with the common soldiers. It is remarkably free of nationalistic jargon, but of course it is not an objective documentation of what happened in China: Hino was not allowed to report about any Japanese losses or misbehavior, und thus it is a Japanese success story from the beginning to the end. Since the Japanese original had become a bestseller with more than 3 million copies sold, the Nazis probably thought it safe to publish its translation, thus also trying to please the Japanese ally. I cannot imagine that Hino’s novels had a great influence on the German people. _Y zlwwGspuohy{

NON-FICTIONAL WORKS: TRAVEL DESCRIPTIONS AND (QUASI-) BIOGRAPHICAL WORKS Of the remaining eight bestsellers, four can be said to belong to the category of travel descriptions (Brosius, Lissner, Zischka, Sieburg) and two are biographical works (Sugimoto, Bälz). Of the travel records, two are from 1936 and two from 1939, or in other words two from the time when Japan still was not on war with China, and two from later. The two books from 1939 were written by rather famous German writers. Friedrich Sieburg (1893-1964) was a journalist, literary critic and writer who had a likening for authoritarian regimes. He was hired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a propagandist and worked as such in the German embassies in Brussels and Paris. There he became a member of the Nazi party in September 1941. The book’s title is of course a metaphor for the aesthetic Japan dominated by the military. The cherry blossom, in Sieburg’s words, got a steel coat in the form of a tank, but in spite of this the cherry blossom is still alive. The other rather famous figure is Ivar Lissner (1909-1967), a journalist with a Latvian entrepreneur as father and a German-Jewish mother, whose wife died in a German concentration camp on the accusation of owning a bank account in Switzerland. Later his sister was also murdered in a concentration camp. Lissner was very heavily influenced by geopolitics, and he travelled as much as possible to be able to publish books about foreign countries. His first book about France, the US and Great Britain was criticized as being too pacifistic, his second book about the US, in which he praised American style democracy, sold 130.000 copies. The third book Menschen und Mächte am Pazifik included a long treatment of his experiences in Japan which were also sold separately as Japanischer Bilderbogen in 1939. Since Lissner did not feel safe in Germany he went to Harbin in Manchukuo as correspondent of the Nazi newspaper Der Völkische Beobachter. Similar as the famous Richard Sorge he also seems to have worked as double agent. When he had to go to Tokyo in 1943 he was arrested by the Japanese police and tortured almost to death, only to come under suspicion of the liberating US army. Only in the fifties he was cleared {olGwvw|shyGpthnlGvmGqhwhuGpuGuhpGnlythu€GOX`ZZTX`[\P _Z

of all guilt by the Americans and could spend his remaining years as a best-selling author of books on history, culture and geography, among which So habt ihr gelebt (1955) became a world-wide best- selling book. One wonders how a man like Lissner with his bourgeois Jewish background and his pronounced admiration of democracy could publish during the Nazi period, and even sell books into the ten thousands. His booklet on Japan is vividly written and lacks the usual Nazi ideology, but it seems that it was welcome because there were not enough books on Japan at that time. Hans Brosius’ (1891-?) book is based on a six month long journey through the Far East, and only a third of it is directly related to Japan, but on the whole Japan is present in all the regions through which the author travelled. The author’s sympathies are clearly with Japan. The same can be said about Zischka’s Japan in der Welt. The Austrian Anton Zischka (1904-1997) was such an internationally successful journalist, first in Vienna and then in Paris and Mallorca, that he made use of his own airplane for his coverage of affairs. From 1940 onwards he was a member of the Nazi party NSDAP, and he tried to work for Nazi Germany from Spain. After the war he tried to position himself as a peace-loving, apolitical author who admired technocracy. Since Sieburg’s, Zischka’s and Brosius’ books got a thorough treatment elsewhere (Kim 2000 and Kim 2001), I will not treat them here any longer. The two biographical works on my list of bestsellers are about a Japanese woman of samurai descent, who went to the USA in the late 19th century and about the German physician Erwin Bälz who worked in Japan during the Meiji Period. Etsuko Inagaki Sugimoto (1873-1950) in her book initially published in 1923 described her own fate as a samurai daughter. The international success of this book that was translated into several languages made her a writer of many similar books which tried to introduce Japan to the West. The word ‘samurai’ in the title might have been responsible for the fact that the translation appeared in 1935 after the Nazis had seized power. _[ zlwwGspuohy{

That Erwin Bälz (1849-1913), the German medical doctor who went to Japan at the beginning of the Meiji period from 1876 to 1905, became a figure symbolic of the German-Japanese rapprochement in the thirties is no wonder. His son Toku, who edited his father’s diaries which sold with considerable success in the thirties, seems to have been very active in this process, and Italiaander dedicates his mentioned book Banzai to the two Bälzes. Even though Toku Bälz seems to have been an active Nazi, the book of and about his father Erwin is rather a historical source on Meiji Japan than a piece of Nazi ideology.

NON-FICTIONAL WORKS: DESCRIPTIONS AND ANALYSES OF JAPAN AND JAPANESE PHENOMENA Finally I would like to say a few words about the remaining two non-fictional works, which also have the highest publication figures. Heinz Corazza’s brochure Die Samurai. Ritter des Reiches in Ehre und Treue (The Samurai. Knights of the Empire in Honor and Loyalty) (1937), published by the Zentralverlag of the NSDAP with a foreword by Heinrich Himmler, is a reprint of articles which had appeared in the newspaper of the SS, Das Schwarze Korps. As Himmler mentions in his foreword explicitly, this booklet was to be read by members of the SS as learners. The “laws of honor” or values of the samurai, as we would say today, were obviously something which was worth to be copied by his SS-men. This explains why in the course of seven years at least 100.000 copies of this booklet were printed and distributed3. The author about whom I know nothing except that he also wrote a book about the samurai sword (Corazza 1935), tries to convince his readers of the important role of the samurai in Japanese history until 1933 by giving several famous examples of self-abandonment. By and again he stresses that individual lives are worthless when the realization of higher ideals is at stake. In conclusion he states that “written law, which shows not much difference to Western law” is {olGwvw|shyGpthnlGvmGqhwhuGpuGuhpGnlythu€GOX`ZZTX`[\P _\

only suitable for peace times, but “in stormy times the only rules /for the Japanese/ are the eternal virtues”. The most important work on my list is – because of its wide distribution – Das Geheimnis japanischer Kraft (1942; The Secret of Japanese Power) by Fürst Albrecht von Urach (1903-1969), a member of an old aristocratic family from Würtemberg in Southwestern Germany. He did not finish his academic education, but from 1932 onwards he was working as a foreign correspondent on the Balkan Peninsula and in the Far East, in 1934 he became a member of the NSDAP, and from 1938 he was working in the Press Section (Presseabteilung) of the Foreign Office. There he became the person in charge of East Asia in 1939 and of Italy in 1940. While he was working as foreign correspondent in Rome until the end of April 1939, from May 2 of the same year he became auxiliary academic assistant (wissenschaftlicher Hilfsarbeiter) in the Foreign Office. As such he published two monographs on Japan, Ostasien. Kampf um das kommende Großreich (Eastasia. The War for the Great Empire to Come) in 1940, a report on the war between Japan and China, and Das Geheimnis japanischer Kraft in 1942, as well as a number of journal articles, mainly for the propaganda journal Berlin Rom Tokio. From his writings it becomes clear that Urach was a devoted Nazi. In a collection of speeches published by the German Institute for the Study of Foreign Countries (Deutsches Institut für Auslandswissenschaften) he among other things urges Japan to make a solution of the Jewish question within its territory, mainly in Shanghai (Urach 1943: 209), solution in the Nazi jargon meaning of course expulsion or extinction. Berlin Rom Tokio was a monthly journal for the sole purpose of celebrating the three axis powers Germany, Italy and Japan, published under the patronage of Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. Called “Monthly journal for the deepening of the cultural relations of the peoples of the world political triangle”, the journal’s appearance as such was extraordinary: Its size of 265 x 365mm was impressive as was the cover in solid grey-blue on which the names of the three capitals were printed in 57 millimeters height _] zlwwGspuohy{

in white, underlayed by the symbols of the three nations in gold. To impress the readers the journal, which started in May 1939 with about 60 pages and was sold for 1 Reichsmark but gradually slimmed down to only 30 pages for 1,5 Reichsmark, was richly illustrated with black and white photographs and color prints of works of arts. Fürst Albrecht von Urach wrote e.g. in volume 2, number 10 (1940) a contribution on “War Power Japan”, which he concluded with a summary, that Japan’s military is spiritually superior to any possible enemy in the Far East, because the Japanese army excels in spiritual education. The “often superhuman achievements of the Japanese soldier as regards heroism and perseverance” give proof of the success of this education. The heroic Japanese spirit within the Japanese army has two sources: the spirit of the samurai, and the holy belief in the tennō, which make her the spiritual bearer of the national people’s renovation and of the purification of the Japanese people’s body from damaging foreign influences. The readership of Berlin Rom Tokio as a quasi-official journal was probably rather limited, and therefore its influence should not be overestimated. But Das Geheimnis japanischer Kraft is different. This was published by the Central Publishing Company of the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, and within two years it reached the enormous figure of 800.000 copies. Sold cheaply for 1 Reichsmark, this brochure promised “to explain fully and easily understandably the Japanese people of heroes, which until now had to remain a riddle”, as an advertisment on the back cover of Die Samurai by Heinz Corazza tells us. To continue: “It contributes highly to create an understanding of the numerous and often startling correspondences which exist between our national socialist world view and the deep spiritual world view of our ally Japan, and which as invisible spiritual, but war-decisive factors in our common fight for a new world order give us the certainty of victory.” {olGwvw|shyGpthnlGvmGqhwhuGpuGuhpGnlythu€GOX`ZZTX`[\P _^

Perhaps the text of this advertisement gives a clue for the proliferation of this publication. When the German Blitzkrieg did not bring about the desired results, the German leadership had to resort to all possible means to win a war which was to last long. The instilment of samurai spirit can be seen as one of the means to motivate the German soldiers to the fullest. Although I have not yet found an indication for this, I guess that the high publication figure results from the free distribution of this brochure to German soldiers. Otherwise the figure of 800.000 copies, be they even so cheap as 1 Reichsmark each, can hardly be explained. In order to achieve this samurai mentality within the heads of the German soldiers, the German soldiers had to understand it, of course4. How does Urach proceed to explain the secret of Japan‘s power in this slim volume? In order not to bore his readers, he keeps the text rather short. Out of 124 pages only 83 consist of text, while 37 pages are devoted to photographs and 4 to maps. Another feature of the publication which underlines the author‘s or editor‘s intention to have it read for educational purposes is that important words or sentences are space-typed, so that the essence of this booklet can easily be memorized. Urach takes a very conventional approach. In a 3-pages introduction he defines the ‚Japanese wonder‘ as Japan‘s becoming a world power in such a short span of time as 80 years only. Probably knowing that redundancy is fruitful for memorizing, Urach mentions those „80 years“ 5 times in this introduction. He then goes on to give a crash course in Japanese history, stressing that the national consciousness of the Japanese started 2600 years ago when Jimmu Tenno became the first ruler over Japan. Equally important in his view of Japanese history is the fact that Japan was never conquered by foreign powers, that it wiped out Christianity, and that it decided to seclude itself from the world. By doing so it avoided mental/spiritual foreign infiltration (geistige Überfremdung) (Urach 1942:15). This most beloved phrase of all rightist until today is of course space-typed. After a few words of appreciation for the Tokugawa regime, he praises the samurai. For __ zlwwGspuohy{

him they constitute a knighthood which lives up to the highest ethical standard and which is at the same time economically modest to the extreme, a knighthood incomparable to that of any other country in the world. The history lesson continues in the chapter „The transition to modern times“. In an aggressive act of imperialism, the US, followed by Russia, England and France, waked up Japan from her Sleeping Beauty‘s dream. Very clever leaders around the young tennō created a centralized political system, and successfully modernized the country by making use of Western civilization as a tool only, while at the same time always trying to avoid foreign infiltration, one of the most frequently used phrases. Japan succeeded in the magnificent unification of its own nature with adopted foreign things (Urach 1942:29). The result is that the spirit of the samurai is alive in spite of all adopted western civilization. In Japan we find the perfect synthesis between modern civilization and very old Japanese cultural tradition. „Japan, if we are to understand it correctly, is the most modern military with aircraft carriers and armored divisions, behind which stands the more than thousand years’ old spirit of the samurai. It is an ancient straw mat and an ultra-modern assembly shop, it is a huge textile factory and rice plantation like the ancestors did, it is kimono and American business suit, all at the same time.“ (Urach 1942:32) His spiritual power stems from the elemental force of his own nature (aus der Urkraft seiner eigenen Wesensart) and from the several thousand years old cultural assets. The industrialization of Japan was successful, because Japan avoided several faults which the Western countries had committed. In contrast to England, Japan did not sacrifice its peasants during the industrialization, and therefore the peasants could act as an inexhaustible resource of manpower. For the author a people like the Japanese with a very high birth rate is a people with a high will to live, and for such a people territorial expansion is only natural as is the Japanese idea of an economic self-sufficient region. Since the {olGwvw|shyGpthnlGvmGqhwhuGpuGuhpGnlythu€GOX`ZZTX`[\P _`

goals are the same for the capitalist and the workers, Japan was lucky in never experiencing class struggle. The last part of the history lesson is devoted to the Japanese military expansion and the creation of a huge empire in the Far East. With great admiration for Japanese expansion Urach divides Japan‘s rise to a world power into three stages. Stage one, national defense against the Western plans to overrun Japan, was followed by a fight for equal rights as a world power, whereas presently, in 1942, Japan in stage three was fighting for leadership in East Asia. Under Japan‘s strong leadership, Urach explains, the peoples of East Asia, one third of the world population, enter a period of orderly and peaceful conditions and of an unexpected rise. „They are no longer objects of colonial exploitation by powers foreign to this area, but partners in a co-prosperity sphere with enormous economic wealth.“ (Urach 1942:65) „How the Japanese is living“ tries to describe the national character traits of the Japanese, of course enumerating almost only positive character features. Shintō religiosity in every sphere of life, untiring eagerness to learn, toughness, a lively mind, vital creativity, orderliness, often to the extent of bureaucratic or pedantic order, punctuality, cleanliness, frugality, are only some of the many positive character traits of the Japanese mentioned. But above all, their way of thinking is always collectivity oriented, and their will of order and of subordination and of the state in the social order of the family state is only logical. They are „the most national feeling, the most passionate national people of the world“ (das am nationalsten fühlende, nationalleidenschaftlichste Volk der Welt), and this nationalism finds its foundation in Shintō religion and ancestor worship. Of course Urach knows that it is important to implant these values into the young Japanese, and he finds words of praise for the Japanese people‘s education and especially for morale education. Japanese youth learn that the Japanese people is a chosen one, they learn that Japanese spirit stands high above Western materialism, they learn the spirit of sacrification, contempt for material profit and the spirit `W zlwwGspuohy{

of dying a heroic death. Death is without fright for the Japanese, since they are only one link in a chain consisting of all ancestors and all descendants. With some words about the plight of the Japanese peasants and the Japanese in Manchukuo, who exhibit quite different character traits - they are men of bold conceptions and of stupendous energies -, he concludes this chapter. The final part of the small booklet is devoted to the model Japanese, which the German soldiers were supposed to imitate, the Japanese soldier. It seems to be the most important chapter, easily to be seen from the fact that it is the longest one. Although Japan‘s new military created in the Meiji period was a people‘s army, no longer restricted to the samurai or warrior class, in the military the spirit of the samurai is still alive in its purest form. Giving various examples of the samurai spirit, Urach in 37 lines uses the words (samurai) spirit (Geist des Samurai) nine times (Urach 1942:94-95), so that he can‘t fail to impress his readers. After a description of the army and the navy, he stresses that America and England in Pearl Harbor and on the shores of the Malacca peninsula could do nothing against „the raging vehemence of the Japanese heroes, who did not care for their lives, who only cared for the annihilation of their enemies, for the greatness of their native country and their tennō.“ With great respect he speaks of the ceremonies of honoring the war dead and of the tennō cult. Finally he mentions that the military has the important social obligation to act as educator of the people, and as such is the „strongest socializing force in Japan.“ (Urach 1942:111). This military could often only prevail against a tremendous superior strength, because it always put more importance on the strength of the spirit over material power. Japanese soldiers have left behind their homes and families and do not expect to return to them, which gives them their enormous spiritual power. Of course it is not their foremost goal to die in the battle, but to annihilate their enemies. Urach concludes that national-socialist Germany and the peoples of the axis powers have the highest understanding for Japan, „our ally in East Asia“, because they are fighting for similar goals. Equally, the {olGwvw|shyGpthnlGvmGqhwhuGpuGuhpGnlythu€GOX`ZZTX`[\P `X

Germans can best grasp the spiritual driving force behind Japan‘s story-like rise, because the national socialists like the Japanese put spirit over matter. Altogether, Urach‘s book, written in excellent Nazi German, represents a kind of official view of Japan, its history and its cultural values, and can be seen as an attempt to make use of the superhuman traits ascribed to the Japanese, as exhibited in their samurai spirit.

CONCLUSION The enormous importance attributed to spiritual power had various sources. Japan and Germany were materially so inferior to the United States that they had no other means than to rely on their spiritual strength. To openly publicize time and again that spiritual strength could level out or even surpass the advantages of material superiority was the only means to prevent the German soldiers from falling into desperation. That Japan resorted to this method, too, is well known. But whereas the Japanese relied on their own spiritual tradition, this again soon having become a tradition of the superiority of Japanese spirit over Western science or materialism, namely that of wakon yōsai or Nihon no dōtoku, Seiyō no gakugei, the Germans did not trust their own tradition and even tried to make use of the samurai spirit as a model for their own soldiers. It should be noted here, that probably due to various evocations of Japanese writers and scholars from the beginnings of the 20th century until the 1930s, the importance ascribed to the Japanese spirit must have been fairly well-known among well-educated Germans and the Nazi elite. One could even go as far as to say, that perhaps in Germany with its tradition of idealism the image of a spiritual Japan could be more easily created than anywhere else. Japanese authors like Kanokogi Kazunobu (Der Geist Japans/The Spirit of Japan, Leipzig 1930), Fujisawa Chikao (Japan als geistig-kulturelle Wirklichkeit/Japan as Spiritual-Cultural Reality, Tokyo 1936), Nitobe Inazō (Bushido. Die `Y zlwwGspuohy{

Seele Japans/Bushido. The Soul of Japan, Berlin 1937), Suzuki Daisetz (Die große Befreiung/The Great Liberation, Leipzig 1939; Zen und die Kultur Japans/Zen and the Culture of Japan, Stuttgart-Berlin 1941), Kitayama Junyu (West-östliche Begegnung/ West-Eastern Meeting, Berlin 1941; Der Geist des japanischen Rittertums/The Spirit of the Japanese Knighthood, Berlin 1943; Der Shintoismus. Die Nationalreligion Japans/ Shintoism, National Religion of Japan, Berlin 1943; Heiligung des Staates und Verklärung des Menschen. Buddhismus und Japan/Sanctification of the State and Transfiguration of Man. Buddhism and Japan, Berlin 1943; Das heroische Ethos Japans/The Heroic Ethos of Japan, Berlin 1944), and Sakuma Shin (Bushido. Soldatengeist von Japan/Bushido. Soldier Spirit of Japan, Leipzig 1944), all published in the German language between 1930 and 1944 or translated into German during the same period, were instrumental in inventing the image of the spiritual, heroic Japan. German authors who contributed to this tendency in the thirties and forties were Lilly Abegg (Yamato. Der Sendungsglaube des japanischen Volkes/Yamato. The Faith of Mission of the Japanese People, Frankfurt 1936), Eugen Herrigel (Die ritterliche Kunst des Bogenschießens/The Chivalrous Art of Archery, 1936), Erwin Bälz or, better-said, his son Toku (Über die Todesverachtung der Japaner/On the Contempt of Death of the Japanese, Stuttgart 1942), and Paul Lüth (Die japanische Philosophie/Japanese Philosophy, Tübingen 1944). With such big names, Japanese and Germans alike, behind them, Nazi authors like Heinz Corazza and Albrecht Fürst von Urach could easily popularize the image of the heroic Japan which was about to change the course of the world with the help of its samurai spirit.

REFERENCES Austria-Forum (n.d.). Jelusich, M. Retrieved July 8, 2012 from http://www.austria- lexikon.at/af/AEIOU/Jelusich%2C_Mirko. Bälz, T. (Ed.). 1930. Erwin Bälz. Das Leben eines deutschen Arztes im erwachenden Japan. Tagebücher, Brief, Berichte. Stuttgart: J. Engelhorns Nachf. Berlin - Rom - Tokio. 1939-1944. Monatsschrift für die Vertiefung der kulturellen Bezie- {olGwvw|shyGpthnlGvmGqhwhuGpuGuhpGnlythu€GOX`ZZTX`[\P `Z

hungen der Völker des weltpolitischen Dreiecks. Berlin: Steininger-Verlage. Caspary, C. P. 1998. Vergeben aber nicht vergessen! Ivar Lissners Japanischer Bilderbo- gen im Kontext seines Lebens. Unpublished manuscript. Institut für Japanologie, Universität Wien. Corazza, H. 1935. Japan. Wunder des Schwertes. Foreword by Takehiko Tomoeda. Ber- lin: Klinkhardt & Biermann. Corazza, H. 1937. Die Samurai. Ritter des Reiches in Ehre und Treue. With a foreword by Heinrich Himmler. Berlin: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Franz Eher Nachf. GmbH. Donat, W. 1943. Deutschland und Japan. Eine Einführung. In Walter Donat and others (Eds.), Das Reich und Japan (pp. 5-14). Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt. Hadamitzky, Wolfgang and Marianne Kocks. 1993. Japan-Bibliografie. Verzeichnis deut- schsprachiger japanbezogener Veröffentlichungen, Reihe A: Monografien, Zeitschrif- ten, Karten. Band 2: 1921-1950. München etc.: K. G. Saur 1993 Handsur, H. 1998. Das Geheimnis japanischer Kraft von Albrecht Fürst von Urach. Un- published manuscript. Institut für Japanologie, Universität Wien. Hansen, J. 1997. Arnold Fancks Die Tochter der Samurai. Nationalsozialistische Propa- ganda und japanische Filmpolitik. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz (=Iaponia Insula 6). Herrigel, E. 1997 (11936). Zen in der Kunst des Bogenschießens. Introduction by Daisetz T. Suzuki. 37th ed. München: O.W.Barth Verlag. Italiaander, R. 1939. Banzai. Japanische Heldengeschichten aus alter und neuer Zeit. Berlin: Verlag „Die Wehrmacht“ (=Kleine Wehrmacht-Bücherei Band 8). Italiaander, R. 1964: Die neuen Männer Asiens. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag. Italiaander, R.1973. Sokagakkai. Japans neue Buddhisten. Erlangen: Verlag der Ev.- Lutherischen Mission. Italiaander, R. 1978. Harmonie mit dem Universum. Zwiegespräche zwischen Europa und Japan. Ein Buch der Lebenshilfe. Foreword by Werner Kohler. Freiburg: Aurum Verlag. Italiaander, R. 1982. Ein Mann kämpft für den Frieden. Nikkyo Niwano. Freiburg: Aurum Verlag. Italiaander, R. (Ed.). 1973. Eine Religion für den Frieden. Die Rissho Kosei-kai. Buddhisten für die Ökumene der Religionen. Foreword by Werner Kohler. Erlangen: Verlag der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Mission (=Erlanger Taschenbücher 23). Kanokogi, K. 1930. Der Geist Japans. Leipzig: Verlag der „Asia Major“ Dr. Bruno Schin- dler (=Veröffentlichungen des Japaninstituts in Berlin 3). Kim Chun-Shik. 2000. ’Großjapan’ in deutschen Reiseberichten der 1930er Jahre. OAG Notizen 4: 6-15; 5: 6-19 Kim Chun-Shik. 2001. Ostasien zwischen Angst und Bewunderung. Das populäre deut- sche Ostasienbild der 1930er und 40er Jahre in Reiseberichten aus dem japanischen Imperium. Hamburg: Lit. `[ zlwwGspuohy{

Kitayama Junyu. 1944. Heroisches Ethos. Das Heldische in Japan. Berlin: Walter de Gru- yter & Co. Kloeden, Wolfdietrich v. 1996. Thiess, Frank. In Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirch- enlexikon Vol.11 (pp. 1169-1173). Nordhausen (Bautz). Retrieved July 8, 2012 from http://www.bautz.de/bbkl/t/thiess_f.shtml Leims, T. 1990. Das deutsche Japanbild in der NS-Zeit. In Josef Kreiner und Regine Mathias (Eds.), Deutschland-Japan in der Zwischenkriegszeit (pp. 441-462). Bonn: Bouvier Verlag (=Studium Universale 12). Lewin, B. 1997. Japanologie in Berlin. Geschichte und Ausblick. Japonica Humbold- tiana. Jahrbuch der Mori-Ōgai-Gedenkstätte Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 1: 7-27. Lissner, I. 1939. Menschen und Mächte am Pazifik. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsan- stalt 1939 Lissner, I. 1941. Japanischer Bilderbogen. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt . Lüth, P. 1944. Die japanische Philosophie. Versuch einer Gesamtdarstellung unter Berück- sichtigung der Anfänge in Mythus und Religion. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Sugimoto, E. I. 1935. Eine Tochter der Samurai. Translated from English by Richard Küas. Berlin: Wolfgang Krüger Verlag. Sugimoto, E. I. No Date. Eine junge Japanerin. Published by the NS-Kulturgemeinde. Berlin and Leipzig: Herman Hillger Verlag (Hillgers Deutsche Bücherei 632). Urach, Fürst A. 1940. Kriegsmacht Japan. Berlin-Rom-Tokio 2 (10): 22-24. Urach, Fürst A. 1940. Ostasien. Kampf um das kommende Großreich. Berlin: Steininger- Verlage. Urach, Fürst Albrecht von. 1942. Das Geheimnis japanischer Kraft. Berlin: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Franz Eher Nachf. GmbH. 1942. Urach, Fürst Albrecht von 1943. Die Neuordnungsprobleme Japans und Deutsch- lands. In Walter Donat and others (Eds.). Das Reich und Japan (pp. 188-211). Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt. Walravens, H. (Ed.). 1985. Bibliographie von Japan. Begründet von O. Nachod. Bearbe- itet von Hans Praesent. Bd.7: 1938-43, Teil 1: Deutschsprachige Literatur. Hamburg: C. Bell Verlag (=Orientalische Bibliographien. Ed. by Hartmut Walravens, Vol. 3; = Han-pao tung Ya shu-chi mu-lu 32). Worm, H. 1994. Japanologie im Nationalsozialismus. In Gerhard Krebs and Bernd Martin (Eds.) Formierung und Fall der Achse Berlin-Tokyo (pp. 153-186). München: Iudicium (=Monographien aus dem Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien 8). Wüst, W. 1942. Japan und wir. Ansprache gehalten bei der Gründungs-Feier der Deutsch- Japanischen Gesellschaft in München am 30. April 1942. Berlin-Dahlem: Ahnenerbe- Stiftung Verlag. {olGwvw|shyGpthnlGvmGqhwhuGpuGuhpGnlythu€GOX`ZZTX`[\P `\

NOTES 1 Hadamitzky and Kocks (1993: 70) contains a drama called Treue (Berlin: Langen- Müller 1944) by the Nazis‘ model playwright Curt Langenbeck (1906-1953), which probably uses the same story. It is not clear whether it was ever published, since the state library in Berlin possesses only a typoscript. Perhaps the war situation prevented publication. Dr. Herbert Worm from the University of Hamburg informed me that Rolf Italiaander, the author of Banzai in my list of bestsellers, also prepared his own version of Chūshingura. In a letter from May 29, 1942, he tells the famous scholar of geopolitics, Karl Haushofer that “his ronins” were still in the Ministry of Propaganda which wanted to obtain a comment from the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. It seems that these two versions by two staunch Nazis were never published. 2 Interestingly, Bruno Lewin mentions that Mehnert, who had been studying journalism, Russian and Japanese, had been persecuted during the war years by the Nazis, and had therefore not been able to graduate from the university until 1948 (Lewin 1997: 18). 3 On occasion of the founding ceremony of the German-Japanese Society at Munich on April 30, 1942, the president (Rektor) of Munich University, at the same time SS standard leader (SS-Standartenführer), professor Walther Wüst after speaking about the samurai and bushidō mentioned this publication explicitely by saying: „It is not without deeper meaning that the Central Publishing Company of the NSDAP published a treatise on the samurai with a foreword by Heinrich Himmler, the national leader of the SS and chief of the German police,...“ (Wüst 1942: 14). 4 Worm (1994: 184) mentions that according to a secret SS-report in August 1942 the Intelligence Agency of the SS at that time was concerned about the views of the Japanese in the German population. The various reports on the brave Japanese soldiers had led to irritations, because they seemed to be contradictory to the desired view that the German soldier was the best one in the world. Since the Japanese represent themselves as „Germans squared“ this had even resulted in inferiority complexes among the Germans.

ABSTRACT In this study I try to construct the image of Japan in Germany during the period of Nazi rule from 1933 to 1945. Although one can think of various means to arrive at this goal, I tried to analyze the bestsellers about Japan published during the Nazi period in Germany. When speaking of popular culture, we have to consider that the popular `] zlwwGspuohy{

cultures of Japan today and that of Japan during the 1930ies are quite different. Japanese popular culture which influences foreign countries today consists of films, manga, anime, popular literature, J-Pop, popular aesthetics, fashion, electronic games, characters, cult figures, karaoke, cuisine, sports, etc. During the 1930ies Japanese popular culture known abroad comprises a few films, a little bit of popular literature, ‘genuine’ Japanese sports, the Takarazuka girls opera, as well as Japanese postcards and stamps. But we can also include the popular values and beliefs of the Japanese among popular culture. My hypothesis is that by studying the bestsellers about Japan in Nazi Germany, a country with a totalitarian political regime, one can see 1. which knowledge about Japan was tolerated, and 2. which Japanese values were propagated to the German masses. Bestsellers about Japan can be seen to reflect Japanese popular culture, popular images and popular values, and it is unlikely that Japanese high/elite culture became mass culture in Germany or even influenced it. Since there existed strict paper distribution restrictions during the war years, bestsellers thus can be interpreted as officially promoted books. This analysis, focusing on the works of journalist Fürst Albrecht von Urach and fiction writer Wilhelm von Scholz, proves, as could be assumed, that the ‘samurai image of Japan’, stressing duty, loyality and self-sacrifice, was the most influential image during the Nazi period in Germany. Costume and Trauma: Reception of Japanese Fashion in Britain through Five Exhibitions in London

u–™’–Gv•–ˆ™ˆ University of Hyogo

Keywords: fashion, image, kimono, trauma, tradition, technology, trend

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to appreciate Dr. Kyoko Koma to give me this opportunity to contribute to the research project, all the other researchers working on the book and the anonymous readers. My paper also would not have been achieved without the support of language correction and interesting discussion with Mr. Kevin Stone.

INTRODUCTION In my paper, I would like to think about Japanese fashion and how it has been accepted in Britain, including the Kimono, our Japanese traditional dress, and look at our national costume globally in a modern way. Also, I shall try considering Japanese fashion as art, which has been influencing the western world for a long while, as well as through more than a few recent exhibitions held in London, focusing on Japanese fashion and art. My interest in such Japanese culture and art, spotlighted at exhibitions in Britain, started in 2005. `_ uvyprvGvuvohyh

This paper, consisting of three chapters, could aim to ultimately argue that the mystic image of Japan is being produced by both uniqueness and modernity in her culture and art; discussed with the key themes of ‘tradition’, ‘trauma’, ‘technology’ and ‘trend’.

In this first chapter I shall examine some exhibitions in London that featured Japanese fashion, and consider how the Japanese image is described in presenting Japanese fashion through Japanese costume.

[FASHIONING KIMONO] The exhibition, called ‘Fashioning Kimono: Dress in early 20th century Japan’ (from the Montgomery collection), at Victoria and Albert Museum in 2005-2006 (13 Oct-2 May), was a significant project, which offered British people the opportunity to understand the knowledge of the costume from historical meanings of design and pattern, to modern technical aspects of weaving and dying, all influenced each other in an interesting fashion. Although Kimono is so to speak a uniquely Japanese national costume, Japan had to import a purple dye technique that a British dyer named Perkins invented for her kimono industry in the late nineteenth century. The purple dyes especially, had been expensive and hard to obtain, but new chemical based dyes were already created in Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It is considered that these revolutionized the world’s dye industry at that time (Assche 2005:19-20). As for the design, some of the Kimonos were found as Art Deco style, for example, its special Scottish pink art nouveau designs dynamically set off with orange and dark red. Not only color but the Japanese patterns (motifs) and curving (lines) influenced European artists in the early twentieth century. European artists who were stuck in the traditions mentioned that Japanese art style, from asymmetric inspirations to dynamic forms, had “set us free and made us bold’ (Assche 2005:31-33). jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG `` {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu

Figure 1

Today, we can understand Kimono as a fashion which was also influenced by European designs and technique, and also being an important motif for European fashion, not only as ethnic traditional images of Japan, but also playing an important role as a modern style in Western fashion. When the culture is adapted newly, we cannot avoid mutual influential phenomena occurring. These dynamics could make the culture richer; this process occurs naturally, not just in the fashion and design world. Furthermore, in this exhibition, I may state that the way they selected and exhibited was remarkably unique when I regarded their exhibits of men’s kimono and boy’s kimono. As national costume is to be designed to improve people’s morale, kimono seemed to be utilized and worn in such a way. Illustrating here a piece of under-kimono (‘juban’) in the Meiji period, you can find an obvious reference to the war between Japan and Russia in 1905-06, through the images of Yokohama port and two men in Japanese military uniform. XWW uvyprvGvuvohyh

Figure 2

Juban is a mostly made of cotton, easily washable and worn directly to the skin, which is physically and symbolically closer to the wearer’s body so that he can feel Japan’s military campaign more intimately and raise his nationalism unconsciously. In the example of the young boy’s kimono, the design is playful and friendly, but air force, military force, the national flag and the Mt.Fuji – Figure 3 jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XWX {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu they are all that could grow Japanese nationalist spirit for his developing mind. It is notable that the catalogue (for the exhibition) included images which demonstrated the idea of women’s liberty, aesthetics, of Japanese beauty, and the futuristic image of kimono that are stylized by younger girls today in a modern way. The look of the younger Japanese women wearing kimono reminds me easily of the western girls in kimono. When the traditional costume becomes fashionable today, it has to travel across culture boundaries as well as the oceans. It is true that kimono is still a formal national costume mainly worn only on special occasions, but younger girls wear kimono more casually and freely without the fear and anxiety that afflicts western wearers of the costume.

[FUTURE BEAUTY] Looking at one of the most recent exhibitions, entitled Future Beauty: 30 years of Japanese Fashion at Barbican Arts Centre in 2010 – 2011(15 Oct- 6 Feb), we might realize how Japanese fashion designers stand out uniquely in the world of global fashion. The Paris Collection designers such as Yohji Yamamoto, Rei Kawakubo and Issey Miyake are mainly spotlighted in the exhibition. However, they are displayed alongside rather younger independent designers like Undercover and Matoh. This type of exhibition focusing on Japanese fashion designers has presented a quite new approach to British art scene. I could suggest that Japanese avant-garde fashion designers represented by Yohji Yamamoto and Rei Kawakubo that both started their collection shows in early 1980s in Paris, tended to be introduced to Britain through French media and the French fashion business. Amongst them, Issey Miyake appears to be more accessible and admired in the British fashion scene. My research indicates that Issey’s style is XWY uvyprvGvuvohyh

commonly talked about in relation to his unique idea in connection with technology and design. One of his representative works called ‘Pleats Please’ was created in 1993 and since then it has been remarkably successful all over the world. It is a kind of an innovative design technique of pleats but based on the concept of Japanese tradition found in the way of Kimono. It looks like a simple functional compact pleated cloth but becomes variable according to those who wear it, which means the dress is totally open and free to everyone regardless of the age, ethnicity, gender, and size; it is flexibly changeable and adjustable to the wearer. His concept ‘East meets West’, adopted later for the title of his first book published in 1972, attracted respect for Japanese tradition and technology and could transcend the boundary between the West and the East. He achieved this by coming back to the original idea of ‘A Piece of Cloth’( to wrap your body) as the world standard design which also later inspired his next idea called ‘A-Poc’, which was also displayed in this exhibition.

Figure 4 jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XWZ {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu

Interestingly, he was born in Hiroshima during the war time and his first encounter with design was in his home town where there were two bridges named ‘to live’ and ‘to die’ which were located near the site of the A-bomb strike (Miyake Design Studio 2009-2012). Akiko Fukai, chief curator of Kyoto Institute of Costume that has constantly presented Japanese fashion globally as interesting exhibitions, looks back in the catalogue for this exhibition, at the history of thirty years of Japanese fashion. When Kawakubo and Yamamoto Figure 5 debuted in Paris in 1981, following after Kenzo Takada, Hanae Mori and Miyake, who already appeared on the international fashion scene in the 1970s, their clothes were shocking to the western fashion world. With their dark colours, shabbiness, asymmetry and dragging oversized style, this was far from the proportional elegant look that had been long successful in European fashion. The dominant western fashion world could not accept them properly at first. There was an interesting comment in the catalogue on Kawakubo’s dress: ‘Her apocalyptic clothing is proceed with holes, tattered and torn, almost like clothing worn by nuclear holocaust survivors’. For Yamamoto’s dress, ‘clothes for the end of the world that look as if they have been bombed to shreds’. Both are quotes from fashion critics in XW[ uvyprvGvuvohyh

the high end French popular fashion journals, ‘Jours de Mode’ and ‘Le Figaro’ (Fukai, Vinken, Frankel & Kurino 2010:13-16). I contend that, even considering the new perspective and experimental creative value to the western fashion world that we Japanese have brought to the west, our works were considered as nothing more than what comes from the far east, and are interpreted merely as ‘The Other’ with Oriental value. A traumatic approach for the defeated nation, as highlighted by Miyake’s and Kawakubo’s concepts, enabled the western mind to access and understand the new and unusual fashion ideas from The East. Such a process may be required to be acceptable to the Western aesthetic value. My thought might sound negative and pessimistic, however I will discuss this issue a little more and positively with a dress designed by Kawakubo. This dress was initially featured as the cover image of this exhibition, shown as the front cover of the pamphlet and conspicuously, the motif of this dress is the Japanese flag ‘rising sun’ (‘Hinomaru’ in Japanese).

Figure 6 jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XW\ {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu

Significantly, an essay in 2010, by one of the most famous Japanese architects, Kenya Hara, is cited in this catalogue, displayed next to the page of the Hinomaru dress. In his essay, Hara discusses the possibility and receptiveness of the design of the Japanese flag; ‘the simple and abstract quality of a red circle on a white background is so equivocal, it can be filled with various images. Therefore, even if our flag inevitably reflects a sad history, it can still hold every possible meaning if we place our will and hope in it. The Japanese flag fulfils its function silently while embracing the contradictory notions of sadness, disgrace, hope and peace’. He even introduces a painful interpretation: the countless soldiers and the killed and the dead, who placed the flag on their foreheads, but he holds onto the hope contained within the iconic image (Fukai, Vinken, Frankel & Kurino 2010:108-109). Concluding my comment on the exhibition, I would like to consider how the modern Japanese image was projected today at this contemporary gallery. In the final part of the exhibition, I found ‘Japan’ to be a little strange and even awkward, when I saw lots of comics and Hello Kitty merchandising. It was obviously different from all the high fashion styles we had seen just before reaching the last section. What Japanese contemporary designers have done so far; is to deconstruct the static western fashion value, to develop the power of clothes into artistic form. However, introducing cool, popular Japanese culture to the exhibition was surprising to the contemporary gallery visitors. But we may think about it in rather a different view, who will be the target audience, and what is the purpose of the exhibition. Now Japan is fashion itself (Onohara 2011:325-349), Japanese fashion like Tokyo street style is leading the fashion world internationally. Weird x weird = cool, as my German friend used to say to me describing Japanese fashion. It seems to have taken a long time for fashion to be considered as art and allowed to join the high culture. But, by collaborating strategically with the trendy pop image of Japanese manga or animation, such artistic designers from the privileged high fashion world become more familiar to the western audience. We could recall those examples of Japanese pop art being exhibited at XW] uvyprvGvuvohyh

national museums around the world, and the subsequent elevated values when sold at what would be considered, high culture auction houses and galleries.

In this second chapter I am going to take fashion as art, looking at the exemplified works to show how Japanese art has influenced modern western art and fashion.

[AWARE] At another recent significant fashion exhibition in London, ‘Aware: Art Fashion Identity’ at the Royal Academy of Arts from 2010-2011(2 Dec –31 Jan), we can go though Japanese fashion and arts vividly represented by collaboration with contemporary foreign artists in the world. Interestingly, at this exhibition, Japanese traditional art was represented by a London based Turkish fashion designer, Hussein Chalayan. He introduced a new dress design inspired by the three hundred year-old Japanese ancient art of Puppet theatre called Bunraku. The project, called ‘Son of Sonzai Suru’, (Sonzai Suru means ‘exist’ in Japanese), illustrated the invisible in the visible, or vice versa, very much like the Ninja or Islamic subjects that animate the clothes as he suggested. He stated ‘Both dress codes define a territory where the individual can become invisible and anonymous’ (Coppard 2011:74-77). The project questioning the meaning of ‘identity’ was inspired by the method, in Japanese performing arts, of hiding one’s existence while functioning at the same time. This was done with live models clad in totally black clothes, being absorbed into the darkness like the ‘kuroko’ in Japanese theatre that move invisibly in support of the main actors. jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XW^ {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu

Figure 7

Also exhibited was the French artist named Marie-Ange Guillemniot. The historical photographs of war victims’ clothing had moved her creative desire during her stay in Hiroshima. Her art/fashion installation entitled ‘Kimono Memories of Hiroshima’, is inspired by the memories that a second hand Kimono could convey.

Figure 8 XW_ uvyprvGvuvohyh

Her Kimono were displayed together with a bag which could remind us Japanese instantly of some protective equipment distributed at war time. According to the catalogue of the exhibition, her works are described as follows; ‘Tradition, living (as opposed to nostalgic) memory, healing and the intensely personal are all imbued in the work of Guillemniot’.(Coppard 2011:94-101) So, it was not only Japa- nese aesthetics but also her understanding of the traumatic impact of war on the country which may have caused her to confront her European sense of reality. At the exhibition, you could watch the short film of Yoko Ono’s well known ‘Cut-piece’.

Figure 9

‘Cut piece’ is to be categorized as an art performance or art action if necessary. It was interactive, with the audience given the scissors and allowed to participate in her work by cutting her clothes wherever they liked. She was becoming almost naked and exposed in her jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XW` {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu vulnerability. The work examines the tension between our recognition of art performance and our sense of shame in front of a show such as striptease, and in this way it tested and challenged our potentially masochistic eyes. It seems that past and present, traditional and modern images of Japan have repeated themselves to establish a recognizable existence so that the country’s international image may be stronger and more authentic in the world of art. We could say that, in this exhibition, fashion is expressed as one of the art forms. However, it appears that the traumatic approach, extracting the wartime images, cannot be the ignored when Japanese fashion and art are exhibited in Britain. Then I wonder if the strength of our country’s authenticity in the fashion world could dwell mainly in the powerful economy growth after we had overcome the devastation of atomic bombing at the end of the World War II. Needless to say it may be a question of whether the image of the country as the defeated power has been manipulated by Europeans.

[YOHJI YAMAMOTO] Once again, I will introduce the exhibition at the Victoria and Albert museum. One Japanese modern designer Yohji Yamamoto was featured in the special exhibition in 2011(12 March – 10 July) Although he often states that he hates his exhibition to be held because he is still alive and active in designing clothes. However, not only Britain, but the other European countries like France and Italy were eager to exhibit his archive works in a retrospective way. Referring to the outstanding method in displaying his clothes at the gorgeous palace in Italy together with the historical masterpieces and elaborated furniture, the exhibition (installation) at the V&A was rather banal, but we were also given the pleasure to find some of his works placed naturally, slipped away like secrecy in the labyrinth of the great gallery. During the months of the exhibition, there was XXW uvyprvGvuvohyh

Figure 10

also an interesting event outside the museum showing his white silk wedding dress with huge crinoline made of bamboo in the name of ‘Yohji’s Women’ at Wapping Project.

Figure 11 jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XXX {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu

His works are also well known for the beautiful collaboration with the film directors Wim Wenders and Takeshi Kitano. On the film ‘Dolls’ (2002) directed by Kitano, Yohji designed all the costumes but the oversized kimono the main character wears was very impressive in its color and style, and played an important role in the story. Besides the theatrical costume design, he adores Japanese crafts- manship so much that he often adopts kimono motifs into his modern clothes: ancient color coordination, pattern and dyeing, and above all,

Figure 12 characteristic textiles and fabric. In the conversation with the curator in the catalogue, he confessed special regard for Japanese crafts- manship; ‘Maybe I’ll be the last designer who cares strongly about ‘Made in Japan’. If I stop, maybe young designers cannot afford to do business ‘Made in Japan’, because it costs a lot, because a Japanese man’s hand has become the most expensive in the world. So it’s my duty, not duty, it’s my desire to protect these small Japanese tradi- tional techniques’ (Salazar 2011: 73). This was the first Yohji’s exhibition in Britain. Recalling his style, I find it surprising that he had been impressed by the British punk movement XXY uvyprvGvuvohyh

and had visited Vivienne Westwood’s World’s End shop before going to Paris in 1970s. However, it is not that surprising, if we could remember the fact that he worked with some great British artists including photographer Nick Night and graphic designer Peter Savile in his early creations. ‘The British artists opened my world ten times wider’, he states in the same catalogue. ‘Every time with them, I had a surprise, because an English artist has very strong focus, so when they touch my clothing, the finishing of a magazine or catalogue is totally far from me. It begins with their creation, but in that creation I have found my new Yamamoto’ (Salazar 2011:94). A new discovery of oneself. It seems to be the happiest collaboration between the artists across the oceans. I had not found any traumatism in his design, until a Japanese anthropologist told me about it. He talked simply about Yohji’s cutting, for the anthropologist the cutting is weird, but I need to remember that international Japanese avant-garde designers including Yohji, Kawakubo and Miyake used to be called ‘Post Hiroshima’ merely in the western context for understanding unusual works from Asia. As Dorine Kondo discussed the concept of ‘Japaneseness’ in analyzing modern Japanese fashion, so the Japanese fashion phenomena tends to be interpreted as the establishment of a new sophisticated nation or the image of trans-nationality (Kondo 1997: 55-99). I found this confirmed in Yohji’s confession of his height complex and traumatisation in the interview reported in the exhibition catalogue; ‘I was born in a very bad moment in Japan. There was no food to feed babies, so my generation of people are very small. So naturally I am angry about my size, so I design big sizes’. (Salazar 2011:85) Through the exhibition, visitors could experience his special love towards the fabric and textile in his clothes. He said, ‘Fabric is everything. Often I tell my pattern makers, “Just listen to the material. What is it going to say? Just wait. Probably the material will teach you something” (Salazar 2011:14). He says that his ideal clothes are firm army styles and vintage clothing, because his primary aim in jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XXZ {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu his designing dress is to protect the human body. To support this aim, his designs should be bearable to be worn for a long time. I suggest that the significant key word for his aesthetics and creativity is ‘air’. He talks about ‘ma’ which means ‘space’ in Japanese, and it is an important factor in traditional Japanese art. He explains; “We have to find a new vocabulary. I understand why European people take my creation as very Japanese: it is probably because, if you see a creation as whole, as 100 percent, I will always try to finish before arriving at 100. This five, seven or 10 percent – in Japanese we call it ‘empty’ or ‘in-between’ or ‘uncompleted’…We need this space, so I design space…The space of expression is even more important than the visual or written.” (Salazar 2011:78) Would it not be possible to believe that he talks about ‘air’? Meaningful emptiness for the air to go through; the space between body and dress?

Figure 13 XX[ uvyprvGvuvohyh

Lastly in Yohji’s exhibition and his works, I would like to discuss the image of women in his dress and the male image in his men’s collections. He says his collection is his literature, particularly a story about women that he loves. Furthermore, he presented a challenging menswear collection for the autumn/winter in 1998, whose models were all women including actress Charlotte Rampling and Vivienne Westwood. The silhouette of menswear through the female body might be received upon your eyes dramatically and even sensually. At the same time he ‘fights with fashion history’, as he often says. I could assert that he has been questioning the convention and the ideology of gender and sexuality, inside a fashion business still mainly led by white male dominated companies and institutions (Onohara 2011:103-123). Art activity is often interpreted as a kind of recovery over the artist’s traumatic experience - as Judith Herman writes in her work ‘The first principle of recovery is the empowerment of the survivor. She must be the author and arbiter of her own recovery’ (Herman 1997[1992]:134). This idea, might be too simple, but let us confirm here the statement that Japan is the defeated country of the Great war and, since those traumatic events, has recovered as the world model of economic success. I propose that Japan’s expression through its unique art and fashion has played a large part in that recovery and success; along with the work of skilled artisans and modern technology, and by continuous industrious efforts, whilst still keeping her beautiful tradition and culture. I find that, when taken in the context of the western-centric world of high fashion, the passionate Japanese avant-garde designers have continually expressed Japan’s role as the traumatized nation in their work. Yohji shows his admiration for women and their natural strength in talking about female designers from Chanel, Vionnet and Schiappeli to Kawakubo, Westwood and Stella McCartney. He says he has been fighting with them but cannot beat them. To approach his complex jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XX\ {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu feeling, I could also refer again that his aim in designing clothes is to protect human body. Actually in his speaking of ‘human body’ he seems to focus on ‘women’s bodies’, to hide their adorable sexuality. In order to overcome his complex, he might need to write his own literature on the fashion stage, as opposed to tracing western fashion history. He could make his unique writing understood to the western fashion world with the use of variable female characters and his oft-quoted sadness, romanticism, craziness and madness. It is not only because of his traumatic experience, but also for the sake of female vulnerability, as he describes himself ‘I am a designer like an ancient shell found in the mud, who loves woman’ (Salazar 2011:82-85).

In this third chapter, I would like to think about Kimono again as well as Tokyo street fashion by introducing Miss Akimbo, an English gay male performer based in London with a fascination with oriental culture, especially Japanese.

[A NIGHT OF CONSTRAINT] His alter ego Miss Akimbo explores modern and traditional imagery surrounding oriental figures such as Geishas and concubines through a combination of costume and performance art. He is also inspired by Kabuki, a Japanese traditional play where all characters are actors/ men. Most of his performance is dedicated to the Geisha, female entertainer who performs Japanese traditional arts such as music and dance usually in front of the male guests at extravagant dinner and drink parties. It would be easier to see how he is through his videos, but in this paper, I will introduce his performance by illustrating some good images. The Japanese national costume Kimono is a crucial property for his theater performance. Hurricane Akimbo was a piece about Celine XX] uvyprvGvuvohyh

Dion talking from her dressing room in Ceaser’s Palace is Las Vegas about the disaster left in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Akimbo loosely wears a white wedding kimono then later changes into a red juban towards the end of the number as she is reborn in the form of the spirit of the Hurricane. He purchased kimonos from the shop called Ichigoya in Osaka, they are amazingly well made and beautifully adjust to western people, who are bigger and taller than the original Japanese wearers, to be enjoyable to wear, even for men. In the proper, traditional way of wearing kimonos, we need lots of strings and we tie them tightly around the body with a special complicated technique. But the modern Kimono are easy to wear like western dress. Belts are normally attached already to the customised

Figure 14 kimono of Ichigoya, and the strings are also fixed to the dress to be easy to form the proper style. With these modern styles there is no need to worry about the length of the sleeves, and nor adhere to the strict rules of combination between special patterns and colors. You can see most of the Ichigoya customers are living abroad who could gain access to the kimonos on line easily at its well-organized website. To adopt the gorgeous and decorative, rather oriental look, you do not have to struggle with difficulty any longer to master how to wear. Just enjoy. jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XX^ {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu

They might not be real Kimonos, but what is Kimono? If the Japanese unique traditional style is to survive in the future for a longer period, it has to become more accessible to anyone who is interested in this ancient costume and appreciative of our art and culture. For this Japanese tradition to acquire popularity, the style ought to be changeable to the wearer’s needs. In his performance of Camouflage Akimbo wears a kimono with surplus patterns with the army helmet. Camouflage is Military Akimbo and the act is called ‘We Need a War’. It was a political piece about the Iraq war. The kimono was the first kimono he made for himself. He liked the clash of images between soldier and peaceful geisha. It is an exciting fusion of manly casual street style and feminine classic kimono look.

Figure 15

Thinking about the domestic fashion situation, younger girls in Japan dress in kimono as street fashion, an easier kimono called Yukata (summer kimono made of cotton) in particular. Unsurprisingly some of them have the skills to remake it attractively, cutting its length shorter and attaching frills and ribbons to the hem. Far from the authentic Japanese tradition in the past, but we could say they XX_ uvyprvGvuvohyh

appreciate kimono culture, at least they enjoy putting the dress on, even if it is in their own style and taste. In 2010 (12 August), I organized a Japanese art performance event in London with Miss Akimbo and our mutual friend who is a Swiss anthropologist on contemporary Japan and has been learning a martial art Aikido for many years. The event is entitled ‘A Night of Constraint’, funded as a research project by the academic institution called Japanese Association for Semiotic Studies. We hoped to present Japanese contemporary art and culture in a different way from the ordinary Japanese events that had been held in Britain. The key concept of our show was ‘constraint’. Constraints are all around us: in the way we dress appropriately, in the way we behave towards others and in the way our surroundings constrain our actions. Most of those constraints we inflict upon ourselves in the name of normality and most often we are not aware that we are doing this. However, an encounter with a contrasting culture and its rituals can provide us with a new perspective on things we are already deeply familiar with. Contrary to the Western idea of a struggle between constraint and freedom, we think Japanese culture has embraced constraint as a means of development of the self. We also think our show ‘A night of constraint’ allows our guests to explore this concept in an intimate dinner party context. Through a series of performances inspired by various Japanese arts we wanted to make tangible what is normally invisible. We felt that nourishment of the body has to be complemented with nourishment of the mind and that the original musical format of a ‘soiree’ is ideally suited to present a theme with such variations. The evening, held at a dim sum restaurant’s private upper floor, progressed through a four course dinner interspersed with poetic performance, live flower arrangement, Japanese rope bondage, Butoh dance, martial arts, short films and performance art accompanied by traditional Shamisen (Japanese three-stringed instrument). At the bar, a series of sake and plum wine based drinks was served. We are not Geishas but we would prefer the Geisha spirit to entertain the jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XX` {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu customers, and the audience to be intoxicated with performance and fine food. In the show, I tried Geisha Dressing for Akimbo while he read a Maiko (the daughter stage before becoming a Geisha) poem. My challenge was to express ‘constraint’ and ‘release’ in dressing him and de-constructing the Kimono.

Figure 16

The audience might enjoy the process of dressing, but dressing him was also like undressing him in the performance. Dressing down kimono is a sort of new experiment, we are challenging the orthodoxy for this Japanese costume which is originally designed for dress-you-up. I know lots of Japanese events could astonish the XYW uvyprvGvuvohyh

western people at the perfect way of dressing up with kimono, but my performance was of a different type, and I did try expressing fashion as art with a traditional national costume motif. Not only deconstruction, reconstruction of the beauty. It also meant that I needed to wrestle with the totally customised kimono in clothing the western man, regardless of my knowledge of proper Japanese kimono dressing. I needed to try to forget what my body remembered unconsciously. Besides this performance, I was also in charge of another poetry performance, it was a flower arrangement, without any flowers but with my poem. I read my works sitting in Zazen style after making tea to create silence with tuning folks and a singing bowl. Collaborating with an English florist, Francis Rushby’s Ikebana (Japanese traditional flower arrangement), I already gave him a constraint in advance; he was to use the colours only from green to brown gradation ha(leaf)- mono and eda(branch)-mono. Also in our night of constraint, French dancer Thierry Alexandre, gave us a performance of his art. In his dance we could see the spirit of Ohno Kazuo (this legendary pioneer Butoh dancer passed away just before the show, on 1st June, 2010), in the beauty and freedom of his dark underground conceptual dance with use of the rope. His expression was very charming and strongly presented Japanese stoicism or minimalism, in his interpretation of ‘constraint’. Lastly on stage, Nawashi (means ‘rope artist’) Murakawa and his model Miyo (also appeared as a front-act Shamisen player) perormed a Kimbaku/ Shibari (‘bind tightly with rope’) show in which they observed careful respect for each other, retaining the equality between the roper and the model to be bound. Kimbaku seemed to be a solemn ceremony itself that brought the silence totally back into the venue because every audience member stopped eating and drinking to take his/ her own breath. It is true that I, a Japanese, was impressed by the way of wearing and attitude towards Kimono of a male British wearer. At least he dresses our national costume more frequently than I do. His look and his performance are weird but original with good respect for Japanese jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XYX {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu tradition. To de-construct the Geisha dressing that I tried for him is a challenge to release the constraint of the heaviness within clothes carrying long history and old tradition, and to express the existence of my country and her enduring culture and costume. I must note here that Miss Akimbo is also conscious of the cool aspect of Japan’s Harajuku style street fashion. Looking at his leg fashion, he often puts on stripe tights Gothic Lolita girls are said to be fond of, sometimes he combined them with his kimono. At his birdcage performance, he tried expressing another Japaneseness,- that of twisted cuteness/kawaii wondering who/what I am, with the birdcage covering his head, and bondage garment laced on his body.

Figure 17

The Bird cage performance is entitled ‘Le Terrible Enfant Oiseur’ which means ‘The Terrible Bird Child’ in French. The figure has a beak and XYY uvyprvGvuvohyh

a cage is worn over the head. The look was inspired by certain art works he saw in Australia. The act explores ideas about Freedom and becomes increasingly poignant when performed to the song ‘Green Finch and Linnet Bird’ from Sweeney Todd. His performance aims to reveal to us the hell of our latest capitalist society of ceaseless seduction and obsessive consumption. I would like to suggest here that western acceptance of this Japanese ethnic dress is not only historical, but to Miss Akimbo is also seen as a solution of identity crisis through dressing in it as fashion. Kabuki actors often are said to be more feminine than women, and in Miss Akimbos charming performances we may find hope.

CONCLUSION Whilst I was about to start writing this paper, I received good news from a fashion editor in Tokyo; Issey Miyake just took the prize from the Design Museum of London. The New York Times on-line reports as follows, ‘Among the extraordinary inventions and progressive ideas are the winning outfits from Mr. Miyake’s studio that seem to encompass different kinds of modernity: clothes that fold flat, opening with 3D dimensions and made from recycled polyester. Just looking at the mathematically calculated designs, creating prisms of unfolding shapes, is to realize that the Pleats Please invention from Mr. Miyake, which started nearly 25 years ago in 1988, was only the beginning of a series of futuristic ideas’ (Menkes 2012). This award celebrates the great success of one Japanese designer leading the fashion world with high technology and new trends, but it is far from the image of a traumatised nation, traditionally presented by our designers. This divergence from the traditional trend of presenting Japan as the traumatised nation was apparent by the appearance of two separate articles in English newspapers on January 23rd 2012 (McCarthy 2012: 27-28). One newspaper discussed the possibility of a re-explosion at one of jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XYZ {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu the nuclear power plants in Fukushima, evoking the trauma theme; whilst the Evening Standard introduced a Japanese pop girl singer Kyary Pamyu Pamyuin the article of ‘Trends’ by Emma McCarthy. Japan’s image makers seem to be working hard to progress our new popular appeal.

Figure 18

Anyway, Pamyu Pamyu is not an absolutely proper name used for a human, it sounds like the name for pets, or is made just to enjoy the sound or rhythm as onomatope; we Japanese have the special liking for this, one of our most characteristic usages of language (Onohara 2011:295-324). Pamyu Pamyu appeared on the media scene all of a sudden, with her wholly sweet and girly image but even more friendly and nostalgic than the Lolita girls. According to McCatrthy’s article, ‘It’s not just Japan’s latest music export, J-Pop, that is taking London’s teen scene by storm, so is it’s street fashion’. XY[ uvyprvGvuvohyh

Kyary Pamyu Pamyu is the trend itself but her public existence seems likely to be replaced very easily by an alternative idol. Fashion and music go together strategically in commercialism by aiding each other to make the image powerful accompanied with each other’s popular aspects. The journalist added that Japanese music was playing an important role at night club scenes in London at present and introduced Ayumi Hamasaki as the Empress of J-Pop with her great contribution to London based brands of Rimmel and Aquascutum. I should also note from the article that Miu Miu recently presented a fashion line that reflected the doll-like styling favored by Japanese Lolitas, at her Spring/Summer 2012 collection. French thinker Guy Debord, well known as a Situationist, revealed what the world was like after the great economic crash of 1929. Introducing his original use of the word ‘spectacle’, he states ‘In societies where modern conditions of production prevail, all of life presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation,’ (Debord 1970/1983 [1967]:I-1). Everything is presented as image in our modern capitalist society to be consumed one after another and split up with reality. Debord says ‘spectacle’ doesn’t mean ‘a collection of images’ but he warns it is a ‘social relation among, mediated by images’. We can quote the Japanese fashion designer, Yohji, again here, ‘I was not very sure that I would become a so-called fashion designer. It sounded very light…When I think about the image of a fashion designer, I have to think about trend. I have to think about what’s new, what’s next, what kind of feeling consumers want. It’s too busy for me. So, from the beginning I wanted to protect the clothing itself from fashion.’ (Salazar 2011:78). He dreams of the dress that can ‘live forever’. So he struggles on. Debord described the age of ‘spectacle’ in the following way;‘ The first phase of the domination of the economy over social life brought into the definition of all human realization the obvious degradation of being into having. The present phase of total occupation of social life by the accumulated results of the jvz{|tlGhukG{yh|thaGyljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGmhzopvuGpuGiyp{hpuG XY\ {oyv|noGmp}lGlopip{pvuzGpuGsvukvu economy, leads to a generalized sliding of having into appearing, from which all actual ‘’having’’ must draw its immediate prestige and its ultimate function….’ (Debord 1970/1983 [1967]:I-17). Could this statement also be relevant to the work of his Japanese contemporary, Yohji Yamamoto? For Yohji’s fight, is for the ‘being’ of dress. It is against fashion, the desire of ‘having’ and consumption of ‘appearing’, which seems to be a non-stop race or information war, to be the faster and the cheaper. Historically, the holes in the Japanese dress were nothing less than revolutionary to the perfection of design in the context of the western fashion world. Invisible air traverses body and dark color swirls in the broaden cloth. Dress realizes; the person exists. And we may observe that traumatized Japan today, continues to push the boundaries of contemporary trends.

REFERENCES Assche, A. V. 2005. Fashioning Kimono: Dress and Modernity in Early Twentieth Century Japan, 5 Continents. Coppard, A. (ed) 2011. Aware:Art Fashion Identity, Daimiani. Debord, G. 1970/1983 [1967]. Spectacle of the Society (English Translation), Black & Red. Fukai, A., Vinken, B., Frankel, S., Kurino, H. 2010. Future Beauty 30 Years of Japanese Fashion, Merrell. Herman, J. M. D. 1997 [1992]. Trauma and Recovery, Basic Books. Kondo, D. 1997. About Face: Performning Race in Fashion and Theater, Routledge. McCarthy, E. 2012 (23 rd, Janurary). The Evening Standard. Menkes, S. 2012. The New York Times (on line), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/ fashion/26iht-faward25.html?_r=1. Miyake Design Studio (2009-2012). Issey Miyake Official Site, http://mds.isseymiyake. com/im/en/work/. Onohara, N. 2011. Fighting Fashion, Suiseisha-Rose de vents. Salazar, L. (ed), 2011. Yohji Yamamoto, V&A publishing. XY] uvyprvGvuvohyh

ABSTRACT This paper examines how Japanese fashion has been accepted in Britain, from traditional national costume Kimono to contemporary international fashion designers. I will discuss the image of Japan being produced in the western world at recent exhibitions in London with the key themes of ‘tradition’, ‘trauma’, ‘technology’ and ‘trend’. In the first chapter I shall consider how the Japanese image is described through Japanese fashion and costume. In the second chapter I am going to take fashion as art to show how Japanese art has influenced modern western art and fashion. In the last chapter, I would like to think about Kimono again in a modern way as well as street fashion by introducing an English performer based in London with a fascination with Japanese culture and fashion. The Development of Japan’s Public Diplomacy and Country Branding within the Worldwide Development of the Country’s Image Policy

hœ™Œ“‘œšG ’ˆš Vytautas Magnus University

Keywords: public diplomacy, country branding, propaganda, Japan’s public diplomacy

THE NOTION OF THE POLICY OF A COUNTRY’S IMAGE A country’s image policy is defined as rational practice aimed at improving a country’s image through a range of techniques of public relations and marketing, managed by the country’s government. Research into these practices is usually based on different positions and has caused the emergence of different ‘schools’ analysing the phenomenon, which consolidated during the 20th and 21st centuries. Although the dividing line is not very clear, these schools may be conditionally subdivided into the following: early propaganda; public diplomacy (developed by the USA, and ‘new’ public diplomacy, which developed from it); Soviet propaganda; and finally, country branding, which emerged during the last decades of the 20th century and integrates the theoretical approaches of marketing. Currently the scholars who research this phenomenon can be grouped into two influential schools: i.e. representatives of the (new) public diplomacy, and of country branding. XY_ h|ylspq|zG€rhz

This paper aims to introduce the historical development of this phenomenon, starting from the early 20th century. In Lithuania, this research area has not been developed widely, even though there are some significant works that it is necessary to mention. The most important is the monograph Propaganda ir simbolinis mąstymas (Propaganda and symbolic thinking) by G. Mažeikis, who analyses aspects of propaganda thinking, propaganda history, and propaganda criticism. Another group of Lithuanian scholars, the research of whom is close to the topic analysed here, concentrates on research into information warfare; the studies by Maliukevičius and Martišius should be mentioned here particularly.

Soviet propaganda Early propaganda (Germany, the UK, the US, the (Cold war) public New public USSR, Japan, etc.) diplomacy diplomacy Country’s image policy (?) Country branding

Pre-war and WWII Cold War Post-Cold War period Figure 1: development of the ‘schools’ of country image policy during the XX- XXI centuries.

PRE-COLD WAR: EARLY PROPAGANDA There is no a well established opinion on what the starting point was for countries and ethnically defined communities to start applying different techniques to improve and manage their images abroad. The beginning of the modern application of such techniques is related to Nazi international propaganda of the 1920s, as for instance Roberts (2006) and Ogawa (2009) point out. However, without any doubt, countries have always used different rational management techniques {olGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmGqhwhu˅zGw|ispjGkpwsvthj€GhukGjv|u{y€GiyhukpunG XY` ~p{opuG{olG~vysk~pklGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmG{olGjv|u{y€˅zGpthnlGwvspj€ to show themselves as more attractive or more threatening since time immemorial. Bolin (2006) refers to the international affairs of the 19th century as very important tools that nations used to present themselves abroad, especially to impress other nations with unique culture and technology. Matsumura (2002), in his comprehensive analysis of the history of Japan’s public diplomacy, dates the start from the mid-19th century, giving the examples of how Japan was trying to improve its international image by participating in international exhibitions. As Melissen (2007: 3) argues, “image cultivation, propaganda and activities that we would now label as public diplomacy are nearly as old as diplomacy itself. Even in ancient times, prestige-conscious princes and their representatives never completely ignored the potential and pitfalls of public opinion in foreign lands”. The policies of a country’s image management before the Cold War were usually known as propaganda - without negative connotations - spanning back to the 1600s goodwill missions of the Catholic Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide. Officially, several government institutions using the term propaganda were established in the pre-Cold War period, the German Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda and the Otdel agitatsii i propagandy of the Russian Communist Party being among the most important and representative. At the beginning of the 20th century, propaganda was almost inseparable from the notion of public relations, which was mainly developed by a cluster of researchers in the US, notably Edward Bernays (and his Propaganda of 1928) and Walter Lipmann (and his Public Opinion of 1922) and others, who started rationally applying the theories and technologies of psychoanalysis with aim of affecting audiences (Mažeikis 2010). In addition to the American researchers and practitioners, J. Goebbels in Nazi Germany, N. Bukharin and A. Shcherbakov in the USSR can also be mentioned as important personalities in developing early propaganda practices. However, in contrast to Bernays or Lipmann, as Mažeikis (2010) argues, “the leaders of Soviet propaganda, V. Lenin, XZW h|ylspq|zG€rhz

L. Trotsky, N. Bukharin did not get acquainted with the ideas of S. Freud, and did not apply the methods of psychoanalysis to rule the masses” (Mažeikis 2010). Despite this, the interwar period ideas of S. Eisenstein or N. Bukharin laid the path for further development of the later Soviet propaganda school. It must be mentioned, however, that since the very beginning the notion of propaganda had a much wider semantic field than that of the politics of a country’s image. It was mainly understood as directed towards ‘domestic’ target audiences and mainly acted for the consolidation of the nation and help achieving results that benefited the government. Goebbels’ Reichsministerium mainly dealt with the ‘creative industries’ (cinema, radio), the development of domestic tourism and working with both the domestic and foreign mass media. In the same way, Shcherbakov’s Sovinformbureau (Совинформбюро) was mainly targeted at the Soviet people to aid successful mobilisation of their fighting spirit during the war. Only a tiny segment of all propaganda practice was aimed at external audiences in order to manage the country’s image abroad. Nazi Germany can be named the first state to begin strategically implementing this external propaganda, initiating radio broadcasts at target audiences abroad in the 1920s (Roberts 2006). Soon afterwards the USSR started using the same practices. The processes were quite natural: authoritarian regimes and an increasing sense of approaching war inspired the exploitation of information as a kind of psychological warfare, aimed at frightening the ‘enemy’ and at convincing it of a particular ideology1. This kind of understanding was not a qualitatively new phenomenon. As Roberts (2006) states, “there is a long history of such activities during hostilities, often called psychological warfare or morale operations, going back to the ancient Greek states when it was common for one country to try to break the will of the people of an enemy state during war. Homer described soldiers carving messages in stone in an attempt to persuade enemy fighters to abandon resistance”. Later, some democratic countries, like the UK and US, launched {olGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmGqhwhu˅zGw|ispjGkpwsvthj€GhukGjv|u{y€GiyhukpunG XZX ~p{opuG{olG~vysk~pklGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmG{olGjv|u{y€˅zGpthnlGwvspj€ information counter-attacks against the Nazis. This step was again naturally inspired by the strengthening psychological operations of the Nazis, raising the need to join the intensifying information warfare. Therefore, in 1932 the British Broadcasting Corporation Empire Service was established, initially mainly targeted at English speaking audiences in the British colonies, but in the late 1930s programs in Arabic, German and other languages were launched, evolving into the government supported External Services of the BBC, which played an important part in the propaganda war against Nazi Germany. Another institution, the British Council, established in 1934, still remains an important tool of managing the worldwide image of the UK. Similarly, the US State Department launched international radio broadcasting in the late 1930s, and the predecessor of the Voice of America was born in 1942, just a few months after Pearl Harbor. Both countries went even further, establishing centrally controlled institutions, like the Ministry of Information (UK, 1939-46), the Office of the Coordinator of Information (US, 1941-42), and the Office of War Information (US, 1942-45). Japan was another imperial and authoritarian nation applying propaganda practices since early times. It was the only country in Asia with institutionalised cultural diplomacy before the Second World War. Interestingly, Japan had already used a special term for external propaganda since 1917, calling it ‘propaganda diplomacy’ ( ትવᄖ੤ senden gaikō) (Matsumura 2002). Since 1930 the term was gradually supplemented by ‘culture diplomacy’ ᢥൻᄖ੤ bunka gaikō). At this time, this kind of diplomacy was mainly directed towards neighbouring regions like Korea and Taiwan (parts of the Japanese Empire), China and Southeast Asia. The main aim of this propaganda was to show the strength of Japan, to develop loyalty to Japan and the Emperor among the citizens of the Empire (the so-called⊞᳃ൻkōminka process) (Matsumura 2002), and to introduce the nationalistic Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (ᄢ᧲੝౒ᩕ ࿤ daitōa kyōei-ken) ideas that would fight against increasing anti- Japanese sentiments. Institutionally, in 1920 Japan established the Information Department (ᖱႎㇱ JĎhĎ-bu) within the Ministry of XZY h|ylspq|zG€rhz

Foreign Affairs (Matsumura 2002: 238), while from 1934 the Society for International Cultural Relations (࿖㓙ᢥൻᝄ⥝ળ Kokusai Bunka ShinkĎ-kai, or KBS) was the main institution dealing with its cultural diplomacy.

THE COLD WAR: SOVIET PROPAGANDA VS. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY Throughout history information warfare has usually been used only during wartime. However, even after World War II ended and the majority of wartime institutions relating to information control and propaganda were closed, propaganda practices continued. As Roberts (2006) argues, “when the Second World War ended, an amazing development occurred. Diplomacy was reestablished, but the government-to-people programs, previously confined to wartime, continued”. Moreover, it can be argued that the period of 1950s-1980s marked the flourishing of these programs. This can be explained by the fact that WWII gradually evolved into the more sophisticated and indirect Cold War. Although the ‘enemy’ changed, information warfare and psychological operations did not lose their importance. After the end of the Second World War, the policies of national image developed into two antithetic schools represented by two different superpowers and ideological blocs. The socialist-communist block was represented by Soviet propaganda, and the capitalist block by public diplomacy. The USSR continued the application of the terms of propaganda and agitation, sometimes combining them into agitprop (агитпроп), still without negative connotations, while in US, during and after WWII the term propaganda became more and more negative, absolutely differing from the notions proposed by early researchers in the 1920s. Therefore, as Taylor (2002: 20) argues, a set of new euphemistic terms with different semantic spectra emerged in an attempt to substitute the old term in different fields of application. Thus, spin doctoring, {olGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmGqhwhu˅zGw|ispjGkpwsvthj€GhukGjv|u{y€GiyhukpunG XZZ ~p{opuG{olG~vysk~pklGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmG{olGjv|u{y€˅zGpthnlGwvspj€ public affairs, public diplomacy, international information, information operations and perception management, among others, emerged. The last one, having the broadest meaning, almost perfectly replaces the early notion of propaganda, while the other terms highlight its different aspects. The term public diplomacy in the modern meaning was proposed in 1965 by E. Guillon (Cull 2006). During the Cold War, a clearer understanding of public diplomacy, its tools, theory and practices developed. Obviously, public diplomacy was mainly developed by American scholars and reflected American theories. One of the main research clusters in the US during the Cold War was the E. R. Murrow Centre at Tufts University. Despite the mutual hostility, a clear borderline between both schools, as well as the borderline between them and early propaganda, can hardly be distinguished. Theoretically, all three schools are based on public relations theories. Moreover, their driving forces were the same, and their aims were very similar: the notion of information (psychological) warfare was still prevailing. This caused many similarities between the two antagonistic schools during the Cold War. For instance, both schools indirectly emphasised the importance of central governmental control of practices and communication channels (cultural diplomacy events and information flows). This idea was embodied as USIA (US public diplomacy) and the Press Agency Novosti 2 (Soviet propaganda). Novosti (Агентство печати «Новости») replaced its predecessor Sovinformbureau in 1961. The Agency was targeted at foreign audiences and aimed at an “overall contribution to mutual understanding, trust and friendship among nations through the distribution of truthful information about the USSR abroad, and the introduction of the lives of foreign nations to Soviet society3”. The Agency managed its offices in 120 countries, published around 60 journals in 45 languages (4.3 mln.) and more than 200 types of books and booklets annually (Rossiiskoje... 2010). Similarly, the tools of US public diplomacy since 1953 have been concentrated in the hands of one institution, the US Information XZ[ h|ylspq|zG€rhz

Agency (USIA), which controls more than 190 Information Services (USIS) worldwide, disseminating American values and lifestyle, and creating a positive image of America (Risen 2005). Using the Voice of America radio and magazines (Encounter, Look) controlled by the CIA, USIA aims at the propagation of pro-American and pro-Western sentiments, both in USA and outside (Vyas 2008). However, there were some differences between the two schools, including the amounts of disinformation, and the cultural content (e.g. the US using more ‘popular’ culture, embodied in Hollywood cinema, while the USSR used ‘classical’ culture, such as ballet, music, theatre (Nye 2004)). Moreover, public diplomacy and Soviet propaganda emphasised different segments of activities to different target audiences. For US public diplomacy, the main target audience was foreign populations, especially those across the Iron Curtain, where the ‘better’ Western values were to be introduced and disseminated. Therefore, the classical definition of public diplomacy was “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments” (Malone 1985, cit. in Gilboa 2008: 57, emphasis by author). In addition, similar activities were certainly also directed at domestic audiences, aiming to strengthen American patriotism and construct the ‘enemy’ across the iron curtain (Taylor 2002). However, these efforts were not included in the notion of public diplomacy. According to Matsumura’s definition, these activities are covered by the notion of public affairs. In contrast, the understanding of propaganda in the Soviet Union never made a clear distinction between domestic and external propaganda. However, the main target audience for Soviet propaganda was still the domestic one, with the aim of creating a unified Soviet identity and strengthening loyalty to Soviet ideology. According to Taylor (2006), the USSR’s activities abroad were much less emphasised and in this respect were targeted more at a blockade of ‘enemy’ information flows (e.g. Voice of America, Free Europe, Radio Liberty) than the active propagation of Soviet values across the Iron Curtain. The ideas and models of the two Cold War schools were exported {olGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmGqhwhu˅zGw|ispjGkpwsvthj€GhukGjv|u{y€GiyhukpunG XZ\ ~p{opuG{olG~vysk~pklGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmG{olGjv|u{y€˅zGpthnlGwvspj€ to other countries, which started applying them in their practices. Therefore, American public diplomacy served as a model for reshaping French, British and German public diplomacy, while Soviet style propaganda was applied by the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, Cuba and other pro-Soviet countries. Notably, this ‘import’ was not a blind process and was creatively applied case by case according to every country’s local structures and specific conditions. For instance, in contrast to the way in which US public diplomacy was exploited as a tool of information warfare against the ‘enemy’, being used to threaten or show power, Western European states were mainly concerned with more moderate aims. Although they used the schemes of communication policy, cultural diplomacy and institutional models, the aims of the Western European states were mainly to deal with negative perceptions abroad (especially in the case of West Germany), or economically aimed at competition between the capitalist Western countries (Melissen 2007). During this period Japan (belonging to the capitalist block) chose to apply the American (or, strictly speaking, Western European) model. However, its development faced remarkable challenges due to the nationalistic past and infamous propaganda practices during WWII. Therefore, until the early 1970s Japan did not openly apply public diplomacy practices. The functions of the aforementioned KBS were reduced and its staff and budget sharply decreased by two thirds (Vyas 2008). This was understandable in the context of the occupation forces’ overall policy during the 1945-52 period. Even after 1953, cultural diplomacy was still not clearly emphasised or openly declared due to controversial international attitudes and critics. The symbolic date of the open introduction of the public diplomacy model in Japan was in 1972, when the Japan Foundation (࿖㓙੤ ᵹၮ㊄ Kokusai koryū kikin), was created. Before establishment, the Japanese government comprehensively researched the activities of existing cultural diplomacy institutions, such as the British Council and Alliance Française. Correspondingly, this later became a model for the establishment of other similar institutions in South Korea (the XZ] h|ylspq|zG€rhz

Korea Foundation) and the Republic of China (the Chiang Ching Kuo Foundation). Although its establishment was treated as a new step in Japan’s cultural diplomacy, its relationship with the aforementioned KBS cannot be denied (Vyas 2008). The establishment of the Japan Foundation and the restarting of national image policy was inspired by different international challenges, the Nixon scandal, diplomatic clashes with Southeast Asian and Western countries and increasing negative aspects of Japan’s image, among others (Zykas 2012). The peak of Japanese cultural diplomacy occurred in the late 1980s, coinciding with the kokusaika (࿖㓙ൻ)4 strategy, officially announced by Prime Minister Y. Nakasone in 1984. Expressing concern that Japan was still lagging behind in the field of cultural exchange in comparison with other economically developed countries, governmental efforts were concentrated on improving the situation. During the short period of 1986-1991, the budget of the Japan Foundation almost tripled, reaching 20 billion JPY annually (Hirano 2005: 62).

POST-COLD WAR 1: ‘NEW’ PUBLIC DIPLOMACY The end of the Cold War and the transformations of the international system that followed caused the end of Soviet style international propaganda (with some remarkable exceptions). On the other hand, the American public diplomacy school remained powerful worldwide, although it had to undergo important qualitative changes. Gilboa (2008) shows how the basic Cold War model of American public diplomacy evolved into several new models. There is a tendency to call post-Cold War public diplomacy a new public diplomacy (Melissen 2007) as it is a natural continuation of Cold War public diplomacy, although with some very important features distinguishing it from previous practices. The main peculiarities of the new public diplomacy are closely related to the intensification of worldwide information flows, the diminishing role of the state, the weakening notion of information warfare. The {olGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmGqhwhu˅zGw|ispjGkpwsvthj€GhukGjv|u{y€GiyhukpunG XZ^ ~p{opuG{olG~vysk~pklGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmG{olGjv|u{y€˅zGpthnlGwvspj€ new public diplomacy questions the established models of public diplomacy, including central government control, the definition of the ‘object’ (i.e. audience), diversification of the tools and activities, the relationship between ‘information’ and ‘reality’, etc., in addition to which the proponents of Cold War public diplomacy still remain influential within the scholarship. Although they understand the new trends of the international system after the Cold War, they still believe in the effectiveness of ‘soft power used in a hard way’, i.e. perception management. They make important the mobilisation of not only military forces, but also of information, using the slogan “winning foreign hearts and minds”. This notion is supported by the fact that the war (for instance, the war against terrorism) is still continuing. This is natural, as the anti-democratic ‘enemy’ also exploits the means of information warfare, strengthening them by the newest technologies. Presumably, this cluster will remain, as some ‘enemies’ will always exist, and will influence the development of this trend of public diplomacy. Starting with the 1990s, public diplomacy faced an important internal crisis in the USA. The disappearance of the main arch-enemy destroyed the legitimation for information warfare and public diplomacy within government strategy. This was, for instance, reflected by the shrinking budget and numbers of information materials. During the 1993-2002 period, the cultural diplomacy budget decreased by 30% abroad, and by 20% within the US, and many cultural centres and libraries that provided American resources were closed. Between 1995 and 2001, the number of ECA participants conducting exchange programs shrank by 50%. The most important institution of public diplomacy, the USIA was completely demoralised (Snow 2006: 394) and finally closed in 1999 (US Department of State 2005: 4-5). Later, starting with September 11, 2001, there was a remarkable rebirth of public diplomacy practices in the US, which reinitiated its importance as a research field among American scholars (Risen 2005). Similarly, the late 1990s and early 2000s marked the revival of public diplomacy in Western European countries. For instance, T. XZ_ h|ylspq|zG€rhz

Blair established the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board in the UK in 2002 (Cull 2006). This council is an attempt to unite the UK’s public diplomacy activities, comprising trade, development and education ministry representatives, tourism, cultural relations bodies, and other influential figures (Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge 2005). Another trend during this decade was very fast spread of ‘Western’ public diplomacy models to previously ‘minor’ countries (including post-Soviet countries), which had never systematically applied public or cultural diplomacy tools. In the short period between 1989 and 1992 no less than 6 countries established cultural diplomacy institutions: the Chiang Ching Kuo Foundation (ROC), the Korean Foundation (South Korea), the Estonian Institute (Estonia), the Cervantes Institute (Spain), the Camões Institute (Portugal), the Hellenic Foundation for Culture (Greece). This process is still continuing in the 21st century. The spread and diversification of public diplomacy practices also caused the diversification of public diplomacy research. US authors no longer play the leading role in theorising the phenomenon as European (and East Asian) authors contribute an important part within the scholarship. In the research of new public diplomacy, non-American authors actively participate in the generation of new theoretical frameworks, usually having an important and innovative position. Therefore, the new public diplomacy of the 21st century is theorised by both American and European (and Japanese) scholars. Some representative non-American authors are Leonard (2005), Melissen (2007), van Ham (2002, 2005), Ogawa (2009) and Kaneko (2007), among others. Some authors from the USA are Snow (2006), Taylor (2002), Cull (2006), Tuch (1990) and Martin (2007), among others. Relatively recent publications combining authors from the USA, Europe and East Asia are The Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (2009), Discussion Papers in Diplomacy (2008) and New Public Diplomacy (2007), among others. The clear intensification of public diplomacy practices and re-questioning of its theoretical frameworks relates to the increasing importance of soft power as a means of facing challenges in the {olGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmGqhwhu˅zGw|ispjGkpwsvthj€GhukGjv|u{y€GiyhukpunG XZ` ~p{opuG{olG~vysk~pklGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmG{olGjv|u{y€˅zGpthnlGwvspj€ international community. As, according to Nye, co-opting as a means of solving the problems is becoming more and more important, the importance of public diplomacy also increases. Melissen (2007: xviii) argues that public diplomacy notably moves towards the centre of foreign policy, and it is reflected in the changing (becoming positive) public attitude towards these practices. In this context, the development of Japan’s public diplomacy resembles the case of the US. 1989 saw the economic bubble bursting, leading the country to overall crisis in the areas of economy, internal politics and international relations. At this time Japan’s cultural diplomacy underwent ambivalent transitional processes. On one hand, processes started in the 1980s (for example, budget increases for cultural diplomacy) continued by inertia. On the other hand, the decade was marked by diminished government attention to cultural diplomacy, as happened in the USA. The rebirth of Japan’s cultural diplomacy began in 2001, and especially in 2003, when a clear intensification of activities and newly increasing tasks for Japan’s cultural diplomacy can be observed. In addition to the intensifying activities of the Japan Foundation and the reorganisation of the Public diplomacy department within MOFA, a gradual expansion of Agency for Cultural Affairs (ᢥൻᐡ Bunka-cho, part of MEXT) activities into the field of cultural diplomacy can be observed. Within the Agency, strategically coordinated and institutionalised cultural diplomacy was started in 2001 with the establishment of the Office for International Cultural Exchange. This ACA development made it an important competitor for the Japan Foundation and began to seriously questioned the hegemony of the latter. The increasing number of institutions and strategic documents, sometimes even contradicting each other, makes Japan’s 21st century cultural diplomacy slightly chaotic. However, it reflects the tendency that cultural diplomacy has been becoming more and more intensive, and is gradually moving from the periphery of foreign policy towards the centre. A particular inspiration for Japan is the increasing competition with China, and the PRC’s very aggressive public and X[W h|ylspq|zG€rhz

cultural diplomacy, threatening Japan’s already established position in the international community.

POST-COLD WAR 2: PLACE BRANDING The term ‘nation branding’ was first used in 1998, in an article by a young British scholar, Simon Anholt, titled “Nation-Brands of the Twenty-First Century”. The article discussed the possible strategies with which to manage the images of different nations and countries and inspired quite controversial feedback (Weiner 2006). Later, the term was developed into the wider ‘country branding’ and ‘place branding’ (Popadopoulos 2004). The new public diplomacy school was a natural continuation of Cold War public diplomacy, which in turn was the continuation of early propaganda techniques. Therefore, all three can be treated as different phases of development based on the same theoretical framework, i.e. public relations. In contrast place branding evolved from a different theoretical framework and was initiated by different aims and conditions. The main theory used by place branding researchers is marketing, and especially branding, acting in the same way as public relations acts in public diplomacy. Branding, as a separate unit within marketing studies, evolved in the 1950s (Aoki 2004: 22) and has developed into the central tenet of marketing theory. Aaker (1996) treats branding as the most creative part of marketing as it includes and integrates different strategic elements. The emergency of place branding within the branding as field of studies can be explained in two ways. Firstly, there was a tendency to apply branding to different objects, starting from the very simple and continuing to the more complete. Therefore, in its initial stage, branding was interested in branding products and services. Later, in the 1980s and 1990s, the corporate branding idea questioned whether branding could be applied to a much more complex ‘product’, i.e. the corporation. Therefore, the attention of branding shifted {olGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmGqhwhu˅zGw|ispjGkpwsvthj€GhukGjv|u{y€GiyhukpunG X[X ~p{opuG{olG~vysk~pklGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmG{olGjv|u{y€˅zGpthnlGwvspj€ from its emphasis on the external appearance, towards the internal organisation and every member of the corporation (Aoki 2004). Finally, nation branding or place branding went one step further and tried to apply branding to even more complex structures, i.e. the nation, the city, the country or the continent. This kind of branding object is the most complex, as this ‘corporation’ has millions of different members, independent institutions, and millions of different products; therefore, their ‘branding’ becomes a challenge. Another explanation of how place branding emerged in the 1990s is based on practical needs. It can be explained as the unification (or umbrella term) of separate research fields dealing with different practical tasks and aims. Papadopoulos (2004: 38-40) explains them in his article, distinguishing different research fields that were finally unified into country branding. t
Firstly, during the Cold War, Western countries started PCI (product country image) or country of origin image research. The research raised the question of how the labels of country of origin (e.g. “made in Japan”, or “made in Mexico”) of particular products affect customers’ decisions and attitudes. t
During the last decades of 20th century, TDI (tourism destination image) research developed quickly, raising questions as to why tourists visit particular countries or cities, and what should be done to attract them and to sell the tourism products. This research was mainly inspired by the fast development of global tourism and increasing international competition; t
One of the latest trends was the increasing international competition to attract foreign direct investments and a qualified working force. Different countries and companies started research on how to achieve the best results in this field. Therefore, starting in the 1960s, capitalist countries actively initiated, and in many cases governments supported, campaigns aimed at the protection of the domestic markets and the fight against imported products on the one hand, and the aggressive promotion of countries X[Y h|ylspq|zG€rhz

products and tourism on the other. This inspired new research fields looking into the branding of a country as exporter, tourism destination or attraction for investment, and also as a place to live, study or work. The growth of these research fields even accelerated after the Cold War, with the opening of new markets in post-Soviet countries, increasing number of tourists, etc. (ibid.: 41-42). Interestingly, the majority of these research fields existed almost independently, with no links to one another. They concentrated around specific academic journals or personalities, and did not notice the similarities with other fields of study. Unification under the term ‘place branding’ began only gradually in the late 1990s. The same situation is reflected in practice. Separate research clusters (public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, tourism promotion, export promotion and FDI attraction) of national image policy represent different sectors (institutions) within the government and still emphasise different aims. Institutions from different sectors usually did not recognise the similarities in their activities. Such a model is called uncoordinated (or fragmented) branding by Jaffe and Nebezahl (2006: 141) and is usually criticised (Anholt 2007: 3). As a response, the concept of the country umbrella image emerged in the late 1990s, proposing the idea that coordinated country image communication could bring economies of scale and raise the possibility of synergy (Jaffe and Nebezahl 2006: 141). The main requirements for the umbrella image are to find common stakeholder requirements, then construct a common core of values, and finally implement them (ibid: 142).

PRODUCT BRANDING ψ CORPORATE BRANDING ψ

PCI RESEARCH ψ PLACE BRANDING TDI RESEARCH ψ FDI ATTRACTION RESEARCH ψ

1950s-1980s 1990s 2000s Figure 2: Development of different research clusters within country branding {olGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmGqhwhu˅zGw|ispjGkpwsvthj€GhukGjv|u{y€GiyhukpunG X[Z ~p{opuG{olG~vysk~pklGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmG{olGjv|u{y€˅zGpthnlGwvspj€

Place branding ideas emerged and are still being developed, mainly by European (especially Western European) scholars. One of the centres of the place branding school is the United Kingdom. The British school is represented by such scholars as Anholt (2003, 2004, 2007, 2010), Olinz (2002, 2006), Dinie (2008). British place branding companies act worldwide and are usually hired to deal with the branding of different countries, especially in post-Soviet and ‘third world’ countries. Other researchers within the field of place branding in Europe are Kavaratzis (2004, 2005), Papadopoulos (2002, 2004), Szondy (2007, 2008), Gudjonsson (2005), Rainisto (2003) and others. The place branding school (excluding separate research clusters dealing with particular aspects) is less widely represented than the public diplomacy school, which already has a long tradition. This situation is reflected in the number of academic journals. For a while there was only one internationally known academic journal dealing with country branding issues: Place Branding and Public Diplomacy. The Journal of Place Management and Development was launched later. From the point of view of country branding, the case of Japan reflects the case of other Western countries. In addition to the separate institutions dealing with different sectors within country branding, such as JETRO (dealing with export promotion since the late 1950s), Japan National Tourism Organization (acting since 1964) and Japan Tourism Agency (since 2008), starting from the early 2000s there were serious attempts to unify country branding activities under one umbrella strategy, core idea or institution. In the government this school is mainly represented by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Prime Minister’s Office (㚂⋧ቭ㇗ShushĎ Kantei). The former mainly manages country branding through the activities of the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (ਛዊડᬺᐡChūshĎ KigyĎ-chĎ), which initiated the Neo-Japonesque campaigns (Kaneko 2009: 7) and Japan Brand (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency 2007). The Prime Minister’s X[[ h|ylspq|zG€rhz

Office began its activities in earnest in 2002 with a new slogan of an intellectual-property-based nation (࿾࿷┙࿖ chizai rikkoku), and the establishment of the Intellectual Property Policy Headquarters (⍮⊛ ⽷↥ᚢ⇛ᧄㇱChiteki Zaisan Senryaku Honbu) (Dinie 2008: 211-219). Japan’s country branding issues were covered by the Task Force on Content (ࠦࡦ࠹ࡦ࠷ኾ㐷⺞ᩏળKontentsu Senmon Chōsa-kai), which in 2009 prepared the Japan Brand Strategy (Kontentsu…2009). The aforementioned institutions are actively trying to develop the main idea/core identity for the branding of Japan. During the Abe Cabinet, the short-lived catchphrase of Beautiful Japan (⟤ߒ޿࿖ޔ ᣣᧄ Utsukushii kuni, Nippon) was proposed. According to T. Ogawa (2009: 264), S. Abe was the first Prime Minister to express his concern about public diplomacy in such a clear manner. Another attempt to brand Japan concentrates on the traditional culture recreated in modern contexts, and could be called Japonesque modern. It was inspired by the METI strategic document (Ministry of Economy… 2005), which still remains the main proponent of this idea. This strategy defines Japan’s core identity as the “Japanese view of nature/a spirit of harmony” (ᣣᧄੱߩ⥄ὼⷰ㧩๺ߩᔃ Nihonjin-no shizenkan – wa-no kokoro), which can be described as “feeling of coexistence with nature and the beauty of harmony” (⥄ὼߣߩ౒ሽߣ⺞๺ߩਛߦ⟤ࠍᗵ ߓ Shizen-tono kyozon-to chowa-no naka-ni bi-wo kanji) (Ministry of Economy… 2005). As Kaneko (2009: 7) concludes, these efforts were not successful and some efforts, such as for instance selecting the most symbolic Japonesque modern items, ended in 2009.

CONCLUSION

During its development, starting at the beginning of the 20th century, Japanese public diplomacy always used the ‘Western’ models in the sense of the application of theories and practices of national image policy. The three main waves of Japan’s cultural/public diplomacy correspond to three different phases. During the pre-Cold War period Japan was the only non-Western country to institutionalise early {olGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmGqhwhu˅zGw|ispjGkpwsvthj€GhukGjv|u{y€GiyhukpunG X[\ ~p{opuG{olG~vysk~pklGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmG{olGjv|u{y€˅zGpthnlGwvspj€ external propaganda practices, initially developed by Nazi Germany, the USSR, the USA and the UK. During the 1972-89 period (the second wave) Japan, as an ally of the USA, chose to apply the ‘American’ public diplomacy models applied by other so-called ‘Capitalist block’ countries. Finally, after the Cold War, the development of Japan’s national image policies underwent important transformations, faced also by other countries. These transformations, on one hand mark a shift towards the ‘new public diplomacy’ related to the intensification of worldwide information flows, the diminishing role of state, the weakening notion of information warfare, and the questioning of the established models of public diplomacy. On the other hand, Japan’s policies also tend to include country branding practices based on marketing and branding activities.

REFERENCES Aaker, D. 1996. Building Strong Brands, FreePress, New York, NY. Anholt, S. 1998. Nation-brands of the twenty-first century. Brand Management, July, 5 (6), p. 395-406. Henry Stewart Publications. Anholt, S. 2000. Another One Bites the Grass: Making Sense of International Advertis- ing. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Anholt, S. 2003. Brand New Justice: the upside of global branding. Oxford: Butter- worth-Heinemann. Anholt, S. 2004. Editor’s Foreword to the first issue. Place Branding. Vol. 1, 1, p. 4-11. Anholt, S. 2007. Competitive Identity: the new brand management for nations, cities and regions. Palgrave Macmillan. Anholt, S. 2010a. Places. Identity, Image and Reputation. Palgrave Macmillan. Anholt, S. 2010b. Nihon-wa, futatsu-no nanmon-wo kaiketsu dekiru ka? Gaikō (3). Tōkyō: Jiji tsūshin shuppan-kyoku. Aoki, Y. 2004. Burando kenkyū-no keifu: sono kako, genzai, mirai. Burando kōchiku to kōkoku senryaku. Nikkei kokoku kenkyūjo, p. 19-52. Cull, N. 2006. “Public Diplomacy” before Guillon: the evolution of a phrase. University of Southern California. http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/ newsroom/pd- blog_detail/ 060418_public_diplomacy_before_gullion_the_evolution_of_a_ phrase/ (examined on November 18, 2009). Dinie, K. 2008. Nation Branding. Concepts, Issues, Practice. Amsterdam: Butterworth- X[] h|ylspq|zG€rhz

Heinemann. Gilboa, E. 2008. Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy. The Annals of the Ameri- can Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, p. 55-77. Gudjonsson, H. 2005. Nation branding. Place Branding. Vol. 1, 3, p. 283-298. van Ham, P. 2002. Branding territory: Inside the wonderful worlds of PR and IR theory. Millennium, 31, 2, p. 249–269. van Ham, P. 2005a. Branding European Power. Place Branding. Vol. 1, 2, p. 122-126. van Ham, P. 2005b. Power, Public Diplomacy, and the Pax Americana. The New Public Diplomacy (ed. J. Melissen), p. 47-66. Hirano, Ken'ichiro. 2005. Sengo Nihon-no kokusai bunka kōryū. Tōkyō: Keisō shobō. Kaneko, Masafumi; Kitano, Mitsuru (ed.). 2007. Paburikku dipuromashi. Tōkyō: PHP. Kavaratzis, M. 2004. From City Marketing to City Branding: Towards a Theoretical Framework for developing City Brands. Place Branding, vol. 1, 1, p. 58-73. Kavaratzis, M. 2005. Place Branding: A Review of Trends and Conceptual Models, The Marketing Review, 5, 4, p. 329–342. Leodard, M; Small, A; Rose, M. 2005. British Public Diplomacy in the Age of Schisms. London: The Foreign Policy Centre. Martin, D. 2007. Rebuilding Brand America. New York: Amacom. Matsumura, M. 2002. Kokusai kōryū-shi. Kingendai Nihon-no kōhō bunka gaikō-to minkan kōryū. Tōkyō: Chijinkan. Mažeikis, G. 2010. Propaganda ir simbolinis mąstymas. Kaunas: Vytauto Didžiojo uni- versiteto leidykla. Melissen, J. 2007. The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice. The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations (ed. J.Melissen). Palgrave Macmillan, p. 3-27. Nye, J. 2004. Soft power. The means to success in world politics. New York: Public Af- fairs. Ogawa, T. 2009. Origin and Development of Japan‘s Public Diplomacy. The Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (ed. N. Snow, P.M. Taylor). New York and London: Routledge. Olins, W. 2002. Branding the nation — The historical context, Journal of Brand Man- agement. Vol. 9, No. 4/5. March, p. 241–248. Olins, W. 2006 (2003). Prekės ženklas. Vilnius: Mūsų knyga. Papadopoulos N., Heslop L. 2002. Country equity and country branding: Problems and prospects. The Journal of Brand Management, 4(5), p. 294 – 321. Papadopoulos, N. 2004. Place branding: Evolution, meaning and implications. Place Branding. Vol. 1, 1, p. 36-49. Rainisto, S. 2003. Success Factors of Place Marketing: A Study of Place Marketing Prac- tices in Northern Europe and the United States. [daktaro disertacija]. Helsinki Uni- {olGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmGqhwhu˅zGw|ispjGkpwsvthj€GhukGjv|u{y€GiyhukpunG X[^ ~p{opuG{olG~vysk~pklGkl}lsvwtlu{GvmG{olGjv|u{y€˅zGpthnlGwvspj€

versity of Technology. http://lib.tkk.fi/Diss/2003/isbn9512266849/isbn951226 6849.pdf (examined on April 13, 2009). Risen, C. 2005. Re-branding America. Marketing gurus think they can help ‘reposition’ the United States - and save American foreign policy. Boston Glob. March, 13. Roberts, W. 2006. The Evolution of Diplomacy. Mediterranean Quarterly. Summer edi- tion. Snow, N; Taylor, Ph. 2006. The Revival of the Propaganda State: US Propaganda at Home and Abroad since 9/11. International Communication Gazette, 68, p. 389- 407. Szondy, G. 2007. The role and challenges of country branding in transition countries: The Central and Eastern European experience. Place Branding and Public Diploma- cy, Vol. 3, 1, p. 8–20. Palgrave Macmillan. Szondy, G. 2008. Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences. Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. Clingendale: Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Taylor, D. 2002. Perception Management and the ‘War’ Against Terrorism. Journal of Information Warfare, 1, 3, p. 16-29. Tuch, H.N. 1990. Communicating With the World. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Weiner E. 2006. Consultants develop notion of Branding Nations. Day to Day. http:// www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5149506 (examined on 2010 01 12). Vyas, U. 2008. Japan Foundation in China: An Agent of Japan‘s Soft Power? Electronic journal of contemporary Japanese studies. http://www.japanesestudies .org.uk/ar- ticles/2008/Vyas.html (examined on October 9, 2009). Zykas, A. 2012. ‘Traditional’ and ‘Popular’ Culture Discourses within the Post-war De- velopment of Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy. Acta Orientalia Vilnensis.

DOCUMENTS Kontentsu Nihon Burando Senmon Chōsakai. 2009. Nihon Burando Senryaku. Sofuto Pawā sangyō-wo seichō-no gendō-ryoku-ni. http://www.kantei. go.jp/jp/ singi/ titeki2/houkoku/090310_nihonbland.pdf (examined on May, 27).

NOTES 1 This understanding of external propaganda was called information warfare in 1976 by Tom Rona. Recently it is substituted by a softer term of information operations (Dearth 2002: 14). 2 In 1978 it was renamed to International Communication Agency (ICA), but changed its name back in 1982. X[_ h|ylspq|zG€rhz

3 This organization changed its name to RIA Novosti since 1991 and is still acting 4 „путем широкого распространения за рубежом правдивой информации о СССР и ознакомления советской общественности с жизнью народов зарубежных стран всемерно содействовать взаимопониманию, доверию и дружбе между народами“

ABSTRACT This paper reviews the development of Japan’s public diplomacy and country branding practices, comparing them to the Western countries. Analysing three different periods (pre-Cold War, Cold War and post-Cold War), it argues that, during its development starting at the beginning of the 20th century, Japanese public diplomacy always used the ‘Western’ models in the sense of the application of theories and practices relating to the country’s image policy. During the pre-Cold War period Japan was the only non-Western country to institutionalise early external propaganda practices, initially developed by Nazi Germany, the USSR, the USA and the UK. During the 1972-89 (second wave) period, Japan, being an ally of the USA, chose to apply ‘American’ public diplomacy models, also applied by other so-called ‘Capitalist block’ countries. Finally, after the Cold War, the development of Japan’s national image policy underwent the important transformations faced also by other countries. These transformations, on one hand, mark the shift towards the ‘new public diplomacy’ related to the intensification of worldwide information flows, the diminishing role of the state, the threatening notion of the information warfare, and the questioning of established models of public diplomacy. On the other hand, they tended to include country branding practices based on marketing and branding activities. About authors

Jeong-Im HYUN She is Ph.D in Sociology of University Paris IV-Sorbonne (France), Senior Research Fellow in Center for Social Science Studies of Sogang University, in Seoul Korea. Visiting Professor in Vytautas Magnus University, 2011-2012. Her research inter- ests are: Social movements, collective actions, mass mobiliza- tion, Internet, mobilization process, democracy, tendency, sociology of music. Her representative works are :« What really matters in creating mass mobilization, classical organization or new social media? A comparative case study of the mass mobilization process in France and South Korea », in Ed. Ben- jamín Tejerina and Ignacia Perugorría, From Social to Political: New Forms of Mobilization and Democratization, Bilbao: Uni- versidad del País Vasco – Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, 2012. Mouvements étudiants en Corée du Sud : Transition vers la démocratie dans les années 80, Paris : L’Harmattan, 2005. [email protected]

Kyoko KOMA She is Ph.D of Languages and Cultures of Osaka University㧔Japan㧕,Researcher of Center for Asian Studies of Vytautas Magnus University. Her research interests are: Information and Communication, Intercultural communica- tion, Transnationalism, Globalisation Popular Cultural Studies (Fashion), identity construction, Representation of Japan in Europe(in particular in France and in Lithuania). Her repre- sentative work are Representations of the Japanese Fashion Designers in France and Japan: through the discourse analysis of French and Japanese Newspapers (1981-1992) (Vytautas Magnus University2009) Mode et stereotypes interculturels (Editions universitaires europeennes2012) [email protected] X\W yljlw{pvuGvmGqhwhulzlGhukGrvylhuGwvw|shyGj|s{|ylGpuGl|yvwl

SangGum LI He is professor of Pusan National University, South Korea. During Sept. 2011~Aug. 2012 he is now researching as a vis- iting professor at University of Tartu, Estonia. His research interests are German literature and literary criticism. He is membership of Koreanische Gesellschaft für Deutsche Sprache- und Literaturwissenschaft and was former editor of Korean Critic Review. His representative works are German Baltic and Estonian Literature (academic writing; 2011), Hidden Beauty and Sorrow in Three Baltic Countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithu- ania) (Essay; 2010), Fiction and Reality of the Freedom (literary criticism; 2006). [email protected]

Sepp LINHART He is a professor of Japanese studies at the University of Vienna.His research interest include the sociology of modern Japan, the aging of Japanese society, work and leisure, pop- ular culture (especially popular music), and visual sociology. His recent work includes (ed. With Noriko Brandl) Ukiyo-e Cari- catures (Wien: University of Vienna 2012), (ed. with Gabriele Sinigoj, Gavin Jones, Katsuiku Hirokawa): The Impact of Ageing: A Common Challenge for Europe and Asia. (Wien: LIT 2007), (ed. with Susanne Formanek) Written Texts – Visual Texts. Wood- block-printed Media in Early Modern Japan. (Amsterdam: Hotei Publishing 2005), ‘Dainty’ Japanese or Yellow Peril’? Western War Postcards 1900 -1945.Wien: LIT 2005). [email protected]

Noriko ONOHARA She is an Associate Professor at University of Hyogo, Kobe and an author of Fighting Fashion published in 2011 at Suiseisha- Rose de vents, Tokyo. She obtained Ph.D. in 2004 from Kyoto University with the dissertation entitled ‘Semiotic Studies of Fashion and Clothes’ and was an honourary research fellow at University College London (2005-2006) and a visiting research fellow at Victoria & Albert Museum (2009-2010). [email protected] hiv|{Gjvu{ypi|{vyz X\X

Aurelijus ZYKAS He is PhD of political science of Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania), research fellow at the Center for Asian Studies of Vytautas Magnus University.His research interests are: public diplomacy, nation branding, Japan’s postwar society and politics.His recent representative works are Policy of Country‘s Image: the Experience of Japan‘s 21st Century Public Diplomacy (doctoral dissertation, Vytautas Magnus University 2011); ‘Western’ Public Opinion on Japan and its Recent Development (Vytautas Magnus University 2012); The Discourses of Popular Culture in 21st Century Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy Agenda (Vytautas Magnus University 2011); [email protected] Re-15 Reception of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture in Europe. 2. – Kaunas: Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas / Vytautas Magnus University, – 2012. 152 p.

This book is the result of international and interdisciplinary collective research project called Comparative Studies on Reception of Japanese and Korean Popu- lar Culture in Europe, supported by the Suntory Foundation subsidy program 2011-2012. This research focuses on the Reception of Japanese and Korean Cul- ture in Europe, which could be considered as one of the most influential factors in constructing the image of these two Asian countries.

ISBN 978-9955-12-797-0

UDK 008(520:4)

Reception of Japanese and Korean Popular Culture in Europe 2

Chief editor Kyoko Koma Cover, graphic designer Rasa Švobaitė Approved for printing 2012 07 28

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