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Reconciliation After 2014 Coup in Thailand

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Reconciliation After 2014 Coup in Thailand Asia-Pacific Social Science Review 15 (2) 2015, pp. 108-132 Reconciliation as Free-Floating Signification: Reconciliation after 2014 Coup in Thailand Siwach Sripokangkul College of Local Administration, Khon Kaen University, Thailand [email protected] The word reconciliation has become common throughout Thai society since the aftermath of the massacres of Red Shirt protesters in the heart of Bangkok in the months April and May 2010, which killed around a hundred people and injured 2,000 more. The word came into use by the government since the massacres, and has become an even more regular part of government discourse since the military’s successful May 22, 2014 coup d’état against Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. The need for reconciliation stems from the incidents of national unrest created by protesters demanding Shinawatra’s resignation and the dissolution of her government between October 2013 and May 2014. In part, the military used the need for reconciliation and unity as justification for launching the coup d’état. Ever since, the military government has stated that it is creating genuine and sustainable reconciliation as well as encouraging harmony. However, the so-called reconciliation process carried out by the military government is riddled with problems. Many of the military government’s actions instead took the country back to a state in which true reconciliation in Thai society is impossible. Reconciliation as defined and deployed by the military government is inconsistent with academic definitions of reconciliation derived in the field of peace studies, due to the free-floating signification of the term. In the hands of the military government, the term reconciliation is self-paradoxical, and takes on any meaning politically beneficial to the military government. When examined more closely, it is clear that reconciliation as implemented by the military government consists of 1) creating a surveillance kingdom, 2) obliterating political opposition and threatening and hunting of people with opposing views, 3) dismantling the history of the Red Shirt movement, and 4) organizing entertainment to “return happiness” to the Thai people as a form of distraction. These so-called reconciliation activities are incompatible with the established principles of reconciliation. Above all, these forms of so-called reconciliation actually lead to the suffering of Thai advocates of democracy, and to an even more uncomfortable cultural state in Thailand, where true reconciliation is rendered even more difficult due to the suppression of honest political discourse. Keywords: reconciliation, free-floating signification, human rights violation, military government, Thailand Copyright © 2015 by De La Salle University RECONCILIATION AFTER 2014 COUP IN THAILAND SRIPOKANGKUL, S. 109 The word reconciliation is fairly new in Thai out the military’s reconciliation agenda at society. While in the past the government has provincial, district, and sub-district levels. After suppressed political protesters, it was not until more than a year of military rule, PM Chan-ocha the aftermath of the deadliest political violence has continued to emphasize his government’s in modern Thai history that reconciliation role in reconciliation, saying in mid-June 2015, entered the political parlance and attempts at “I have already said that in my current role is post-conflict management. The deadly violence bringing about reconciliation” (“Transcript: that precipitated the discussions of reconciliation Prayuth Chan-ocha,” 2015, par. 54). In August occurred during protests by the Red Shirts, 2015, he said again that Thailand is in a period the largest pro-democracy group in Thailand, of reconciliation (Gray, 2015). against the government of PM Abhisit Vejjajiva Despite the newness of the term, the concept (2008–2011) in April and May of 2010. The of reconciliation in Thailand is incredibly suppression and subsequent crackdown against complex, stemming from political machinations the protesters resulted in the deaths of 94 people beginning in 2010 which are beyond the scope of and caused numerous injuries which later brought this paper. This article considers reconciliation as the death toll to 99 (Khaosod Editors, 2010). conceived and implemented by the contemporary In the aftermath of the violent suppression, the government of PM Chan-ocha in the context of Vejjajiva government established the Truth for important academic fundamentals and accepted Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to find ways concepts of true reconciliation. This article to bring about reconciliation in Thai society. discusses the immediate chain of events that led The succeeding government, that of Yingluck to the May 22, 2014 coup d’état, and dissects Shinawatra (2011-2014), made reconciliation the practices and activities established by the an “urgent policy” by drafting additional Chan-ocha government under the banner of legislation (Sripokangkul, 2012). Even the reconciliation. military government led by self-appointed PM Prayuth Chan-ocha, the general who launched the successful May 2014 coup against Shinawatra, THE 2014 COUP D’ ÉTAT IN THAILAND continues to stress that Thailand is in a period of reconstruction and reconciliation (“Prayuth The May 22 coup d’état was a political Chan-ocha asks all Thais to reconcile and not continuation of many incidents that preceded resist the government,” 2014). it, which have shown that the Yellow Shirts—a The Chan-ocha military government has political faction made up mostly of conservative claimed since the beginning that its aim is to elites—and the middle classes in Bangkok create reconciliation in the nation. For three and southern Thailand refuse to recognize months after the military takeover, General Chan- democratically elected governments that arise ocha said, “I will focus on reconciliation with a by majority vote. The Yellow Shirts and the new cabinet and constitution drafting committee Democrat Party with which they traditionally put in place,” and he justified his intention to align do not respect rural voters who make up keep the military government in place for over most of the voting population. The Yellow Shirts a year by saying “enough time has been wasted and Democrat Party have both accused rural on conflict” (“Thailand Elections not for a Year,” voters of being irrational in their voting behavior 2014, par. 6). Beginning in June 2014, the and of selling their votes. In addition, the military government established Reconciliation Yellow Shirts regard the majority of rural voters Centers for Reform in all 77 provinces to carry as lackeys or unquestioning supporters of the 110 ASIA-PACIFIC SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 15 NO. 2 former populist PM Thaksin Shinawatra (2001- in forming a coalition government (“Thailand’s 2006), the older brother of Yingluck Shinawatra New Prime Minister Faces,” 2008). who was himself deposed in a military coup. After Vejjajiva became PM, many citizens Thaksin Shinawatra has been accused of playing felt betrayed because the government they had “money politics” and was unpopular among the elected was destroyed. Therefore, they took to elites who saw his populist appeals as threats the streets under the banner of the United Front to their traditional political power, secured by for Democracy against Dictatorship, colloquially bonds with the military, courts, and independent known as the Red Shirts. Unlike the outcome of judicial entities. the Yellow Shirt protests that had overturned a The coup against Thaksin is instructive in democratically elected government, the Red Shirt revealing these alliances. Following the coup demonstrations were violently suppressed by that deposed him, the military government the military in 2009 and 2010. The suppression that had installed itself redesigned the rules of of protesters was especially harsh during the politics through the 2007 constitution, putting crackdowns in April and May 2010 when 99 Red more power into the hands of the judiciary and Shirts were killed: 82 were killed by bullets, 32 other independent political organizations, rather of whom were shot in the head. The violence left than with the elected parliament (Marshall & thousands more injured and many permanently Gurr, 2014). When the military transferred disabled. The government spent more than three power back to a civilian democracy by holding billion baht ($100 million US) to control and elections in 2007, results showed that the disperse the Red Shirts by mobilizing 67,000 majority of Thai people still supported the soldiers. More than 700 million baht ($23.3 pro-Thaksin party, People Power Party. The million US) was spent on 25,000 police officers. Yellow Shirts were incensed that the deposed The total number of bullets used by officials was PM still apparently wielded so much power, 117,932 (People’s Information Center, 2012). and consequently, Yellow Shirt protesters Within one year after these incidents, the seized the Government House and both Don Vejjajiva government dissolved the parliament and Muang and Suvarnabhumi International called for new elections. Yingluck Shinawatra, Airports to demand the resignation of the Thaksin’s younger sister, became PM in the 2011 elected government. Further, General Anupong general elections. The Pheu Thai Party (“For Paochinda, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai People,” a pro-Thaksin party organized from Thai Army, used state television channels to the remnants of the People Power Party that had broadcast messages demanding the resignation been
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