DOCSLIB.ORG

Week 47 (19Th November 2012 – 25Th November 2012)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Week 47 (19Th November 2012 – 25Th November 2012) Week 47 (19th November 2012 – 25th November 2012) ASEAN Newspapers Issues pertaining to Thailand ‐ politics Number of article(s): 11 Keywords/criteria used for search: Thailand, Thai Search Engine: www.google.com Online newspapers included in search: Borneo Bulletin (Brunei) Brunei Times (Brunei) Phnom Penh Post (Cambodia) Jakarta Post (Indonesia) Jakarta Globe (Indonesia) Vientiane Times (Laos) Vietnam Net (Vietnam) Nhan Dan (Vietnam) The Star (Malaysia) The New Straits Times (Malaysia) The Strait Times (Singapore) The Philippine Inquirer (Philippines) The Japan Times (Japan) China Daily (China) The China Post (China) Headlines and Summaries BRUNEI TIMES 6 25 /N OV. / 2012 ­ TEAR GAS FIRED TO DISPERSE PROTESTERS SEEKING TO OVERTHROW THAI GOV’T (REUTERS – ALSO PUBLISHED IN THE STAR) 6 ‐ Royalist Pitak Siam group, who has attracted the support of yellow‐ shirted members of the PAD, held demonstrations last Saturday. ‐ Authorities had deployed 17,000 police at the rally site and the government invoked the Internal Security Act that allowed police to detain protesters and carry out security checks and set up roadblocks. ‐ Thailand has seen frequent bloody street protests in recent years including a rally that lasted more than two months by supporters of the present government in 2010. Those protests sparked a military crackdown that left at least 91 people dead and more than 1,700 injured. 23 /N OV. / 2012 ­ SECURITY TIGHTENED IN THAI CAPITAL FOR ANTI­GOV’T RALLY (REUTERS) 7 ‐ Thailand’s police chief stated yesterday that he would deploy approx. 17,000 officers to prevent violence at an anti‐government rally schedule for the weekend. ‐ The rally could lead to another period of unrest in Thailand, which has seen bloody street protests in recent years. ‐ Some 50,000 protesters were expected to gather near the Thai parliament in Bangkok. ‐ The Internal Security Act has been invoked in areas where the protest will take place. PM Yingluck said that in invoking the law, she had acted to protect democracy. THE BORNEO BULLETIN 8 23 /N OV. / 2012 ­ THAILAND STEPS UP SECURITY FOR BANGKOK DEMO (AFP) 8 ‐ Thai government has invoked ISA in order to cope with political rally organized by Pitak Siam, set for the weekend. The security law enables the government to prevent the use of certain routes or vehicles, impose a curfew, ban gatherings, carry out searches of buildings and censor the media. ‐ According to National Security Council chief Paradorn Pattanatabut, “Based on our intelligence, the rally will be intense with a huge turnout of protesters,". ‐ Politically turbulent Thailand has been rocked by a series of sometimes violent rival street protests in recent years, although an uneasy calm has returned after national elections in 2011. ‐ In 2010, two months of mass opposition protests by "Red Shirt" supporters of ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra sparked a deadly military crackdown that left about 90 people dead and nearly 1,900 wounded. 2 THE PHNOM PENH POST 9 25 /N OV. / 2012 ­ CAMBODIA’S GOVERNMENT SLAMS THAI MEDIA 9 ‐ A quote on ASTV online from activist Somkiet Phongphaiboon, a supporter of the “yellow‐shirt movement” that opposes the current Thai administration, said there were thousands of Cambodians who are receiving money from the Cambodian government to act as anti‐ demonstration brawlers. ‐ This sparked a response from Cambodia’s Press and Quick Reaction Unit who rejected the quote in the Thai media report. THE JAKARTA POST 10 24 /N OV. / 2012 – THAI ANTI­GOVERNMENT PROTESTERS RALLY IN BANGKOK (AP) 10 ‐ The rally was mostly peaceful in its early stages. However police fired tear gas to disperse some 50‐100 people who tried to break through a line of concrete barricades erected on a street near the protest site. ‐ Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra ordered nearly 17,000 officers to deploy and special security law to be invoked, citing concerns that the rally could turn violent. ‐ Saturday's protest was organized by a royalist group calling itself "Pitak Siam" ‐ or "Protect Thailand." Led by retired army Gen. Boonlert Kaewprasit, the group accuses Yingluck's administration of corruption, ignoring insults to the revered monarchy and being a puppet of Thaksin. ‐ Analysts said they did not view the protest as an immediate threat to Yingluck's government, but were watching it closely. THE STRAIT TIMES 12 25 /N OV. / 2012 – THAI PM FACES NO CONFIDENCE MOTION AMID POLITICIAL PROTESTS (AFP – ALSO PUBLISHED IN THE BRUNEI TIMES AND THE INQUIRER) 12 ‐ The motions, which also targets three other government ministers, appeared to have little chance of being passed by a legislature dominated by Yingluck's Puea Thai party and its coalition partners. ‐ Criticizing the Prime Minister, Democrat Party opposition MP, Jurin Laksanavisit, said "The prime minister has failed to govern this country as promised. She allows corruption," and added "She also allows outside people to influence her and control her administration," in a thinly veiled reference to the PM’s brother, ousted former premier Thaksin Shinawatra. THE NEW STRAITS TIMES 12 22 /N OV. / 2012 ­ THAI GOVT IMPOSES ISA FOR NOV 24 RALLY IN BANGKOK 12 ‐ According to PM’s Office Minister, Warathep Rattanakorn, the ISA would cover Pranakorn, Dusit an d Pomprabsattrupai districts which are close to the Royal Plaza, venue for the rally. ‐ At a previous rally on 28th Oct., organizer Pitak Siam, led by Gen Boonlert Kaewprasit, claimed 20,000 protesters attended that rally but police estimated the figure close to 7,000 only, still more than the government's initial projection. 3 THE STAR 13 25 /N OV. / 2012 – SUMMITS MORE THAN JUST PHOTO OPPORTUNITIES 13 ‐ According to the article, the Thai PM remains very photogenic, maybe too photogenic. Recent summit in Phnom Penh has proved that summits are not about photo‐ops alone. According to the article, they are about substance, policies, the future of the region. To this, Thailand’s recent contribution to the summit held in Phnom Penh was not discernible. ‐ Furthermore, PM Yingluck is criticized for turning international conferences and summits into a session of reading English text and fails to be able to articulate her points in English. The Pheu Thai Party has previously stated that it is not necessary for the Thai leader to speak English because it is the quality of leadership and the substance that counts. However, the previous summits and conferences has not showed any of these qualities. ‐ As leader of Thailand, her role is to ensure that the country can benefit from bilateral or multilateral talks. However her articulations and comments at international conferences and summits have for the most part been throwaway ones. Unfortunately, according to this particularly article, the most memorable quote turned out to be her wish to bring “a woman’s touch to addressing” the South China Sea disputes.” ‐ The article ends by stating that a leader does not always have to be serious. However the PM has been too “playful” for too long. She has to get serious now, or Thailand should get the right person to fill the void. THE JAPAN TIMES 14 21 /N OV. / 2012 ­ NO END IN SIGHT TO THAILAND'S POST­THAKSIN CRISIS 14 ‐ According to Pavin Chachavalpongpun, the recent cabinet reshuffle (for the third time in a year) showed more Thaksinites than the previous reshuffles, signifying a growing confidence on the part of Thaksin who is believed to be the real mover behind the current government. ‐ In the past year, the government has been effective in implementing its electoral promises while lifting the nation’s economy. This has given way to the possibility of the Yingluck administration to be able to serve its full term, thus infuriating its opponents. ‐ To weaken the government, opponents have launched the tactics of street protests to discredit Yingluck while calling for military intervention. ‐ The relationship between the government and the military has been uneasy one. Under pressure by its supporters to bring to justice those responsible for deaths of red shirts during the clashes in 2010, the government first sought to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court yet has shelved it to avoid confrontation with the military. ‐ The military has also been silent on the recent antigovernment demonstrations. According to Pavin, the shrewd position of the army is understandable. While the Yingluck government still poses a threat to the military and the political position of the monarchy, staging another coup would be too devastating. ‐ In the end, Pavin speculates if the military has assumed two roles. One is to cooperate with the government on key issues, ranging from reconciliation, amnesty and even the improvement of Thai‐Cambodian 4 relations. The other is to discreetly endorse the moves by the antigovernment forces in undermining the Yingluck regime. CHINA DAILY 16 24 /N OV. / 2012 ­ THAI ANTI­GOVT PROTESTS CLASH WITH POLICE 16 ‐ In the recent antigovernment demonstration organized by Pitak Siam, Opposition Democrat Party on Saturday condemned the government for having police fire tear gas at anti‐government demonstrators. ‐ More than 100 anti‐government protesters have been detained for interrogation after the clash with police Saturday morning, authority said. ‐ About 500 anti‐government protesters clashed with police Saturday morning, cut barbed wires and drive truck to hit barricade and riot police, causing the injuries to 10 people, including police and protesters. 22 /N OV. / 2012 – CHINA, THAILAND SIGN RICE DEAL 17 ‐ A rice deal signed during Premier Wen Jiabao's official visit to Thailand took immediate effect, as the Chinese private sector bought 260,000 tons of rice worth about 7 billion baht ($228 million) from Thailand. ‐ The memorandum was not a government‐to‐government contract on rice purchasing as widely understood, but an intergovernmental instrument to boost the rice trade, a senior official said.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Asean and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict
    WAGING PEACE: ASEAN AND THE THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER CONFLICT Asia Report N°215 – 6 December 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE ORIGINS OF A SMALL WAR .............................................................................. 2 A. OWNERSHIP AND RESENTMENT OVER PREAH VIHEAR .................................................................. 2 B. WORLD HERITAGE LISTING FOR PREAH VIHEAR .......................................................................... 3 III. VIOLENCE AND TENSIONS ON THE BORDER ...................................................... 5 A. FROM DIPLOMATIC TO ARMED CONFLICT .................................................................................... 5 B. FRUSTRATING NEGOTIATIONS; STALLED PROGRESS .................................................................... 7 IV. THE ROLE OF THAI POLITICAL VOLATILITY .................................................... 9 A. THE WORLD HERITAGE LISTING, LEGAL BATTLES AND DOMESTIC POLITICS .............................. 9 B. POLITICAL TURMOIL AND TURNOVER ........................................................................................ 11 C. CAMBODIA INTERVENES: THAKSIN AS ADVISER ........................................................................ 12 V. ASEAN’S PASSIVITY IN A “BILATERAL” DISPUTE ..........................................
    [Show full text]
  • And “Threatening and Hunting”: Reconciliation Process of 2014 Post-Coup Government in Thailand
    Asian Social Science; Vol. 11, No. 15; 2015 ISSN 1911-2017 E-ISSN 1911-2025 Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education “Forgetting,” “Returning to Ironic Happiness,” and “Threatening and Hunting”: Reconciliation Process of 2014 Post-Coup Government in Thailand Siwach Sripokangkul1 1 College of Local Administration, Khon Kaen University, Thailand Correspondence: Siwach Sripokangkul, College of Local Administration, Khon Kaen University, Thailand. E-mail: [email protected] Received: February 10, 2015 Accepted: March 6, 2015 Online Published: May 15, 2015 doi:10.5539/ass.v11n15p302 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ass.v11n15p302 Abstract The coup d’état on May 22, 2014, has again broken the bonds within Thai society. Although many Thai people desire to resist the coup, they are forced into silence under martial law, which is in effect all over the kingdom. However, after the coup the military government declared that Thailand is working toward genuine and sustainable reconciliation. In this article, the author questions how the military government’s reconciliation works and examines its effects on Thai society. The author argues that the military government’s reconciliation is composed of three main processes working simultaneously. These are 1) Forgetting, 2) Returning to Ironic Happiness, and 3) Threatening and Hunting. Reconciliation scholars might be surprised by what is being called “reconciliation” in Thailand. Certainly, reconciliation undertaken in this way has no positive effect on Thailand’s present or future and cannot
    [Show full text]
  • Singapore | 26 Sep 2013
    ISSN 2335-6677 #53 2013 RESEARCHERS AT SINGAPORE’S INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES SHARE THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT EVENTS Singapore | 26 Sep 2013 Can the ICJ ruling end the dispute between Thailand and Cambodia? By Puangthong Pawakapan* (Guest Writer) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • Cambodia has petitioned the ICJ to interpret its 1962 ruling on Preah Vihear, and decide whether it includes the territory surrounding the temple. The original ICJ ruling awarded the temple itself to Cambodia, but did not dictate ownership of the surrounding 4.6 square kilometers area around the temple which is claimed by both countries. • Although the ruling was reached in 1962, the conflict over Preah Vihear has continued to be politicized, specifically in the context of Thailand’s domestic politics. To undermine the Thaksin-backed government of Samak Sundaravej, a mass movement in Thailand led by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) exploited the Preah Vihear issue to achieve their purpose in 2008. • PAD has claimed that Cambodia’s nomination of the temple for UNESCO World Heritage listing, with support from the Samak government, would result in Thailand’s loss of the right to reclaim the temple in the future and her sovereignty over the disputed area surrounding the temple. * Puangthong Pawakapan is Associate Professor at the International Relations Department at Chulalongkorn University. She is author of the recent ISEAS publica- tion, State and Uncivil Society in Thailand at the Temple of Preah Vihear (2013). • It has been difficult for successive Thai governments to settle the dispute with Cambodia in a bilateral manner as a result of media bias and PAD propaganda.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 3 Theory and Literature Review
    CHAPTER 3 THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW ASEAN, a regional block and Thailand one of the member countries of the same is the primary focus in this study. As such it has been divided into three broad parts. The first part, will deal with an overview of the whole concept of Regionalism; the second part will deal with ASEAN as an emerging regional block and in the third there will be a general overview of the endurance of Thailand through the ages. Part 1 1.1. The concept of Regionalism and Regional Trade Blocks The concept of Regionalism has come from the basic idea of forming Regional groups in order to promote economic integration among them and it can be dated back to 1960s. In general, Regions in international politics has been described as “a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence, and could be differentiated according to the level and scope exchange, formal organizations and political interdependence”. (Joseph S Nye1968, p. 149) However, there are certain ambiguities regarding the definition of Regions, because, the issue of areas which constitute a region is something controversial. Although many regions are denoted by obvious geographic or cultural boundaries and there is some amount of arbitrariness present. For instance, the Asia – Pacific region is a classical example. Some observers consider it as one region, while for some others it consists of two different regions, yet for a third group, it is an amalgamation of more than three regions. For the formation of a region “the major criteria remain geographical contiguity, interaction, and a subjective perception of belonging to a distinctive community and having a collective regional identity”.
    [Show full text]
  • Reconciliation After 2014 Coup in Thailand
    Asia-Pacific Social Science Review 15 (2) 2015, pp. 108-132 Reconciliation as Free-Floating Signification: Reconciliation after 2014 Coup in Thailand Siwach Sripokangkul College of Local Administration, Khon Kaen University, Thailand [email protected] The word reconciliation has become common throughout Thai society since the aftermath of the massacres of Red Shirt protesters in the heart of Bangkok in the months April and May 2010, which killed around a hundred people and injured 2,000 more. The word came into use by the government since the massacres, and has become an even more regular part of government discourse since the military’s successful May 22, 2014 coup d’état against Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. The need for reconciliation stems from the incidents of national unrest created by protesters demanding Shinawatra’s resignation and the dissolution of her government between October 2013 and May 2014. In part, the military used the need for reconciliation and unity as justification for launching the coup d’état. Ever since, the military government has stated that it is creating genuine and sustainable reconciliation as well as encouraging harmony. However, the so-called reconciliation process carried out by the military government is riddled with problems. Many of the military government’s actions instead took the country back to a state in which true reconciliation in Thai society is impossible. Reconciliation as defined and deployed by the military government is inconsistent with academic definitions of reconciliation derived in the field of peace studies, due to the free-floating signification of the term. In the hands of the military government, the term reconciliation is self-paradoxical, and takes on any meaning politically beneficial to the military government.
    [Show full text]