DOCSLIB.ORG

Logical Form and the Limits of Thought

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Logical Form and the Limits of Thought Logical Form and the Limits of Thought by Manish Oza A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto c Copyright 2020 by Manish Oza Abstract Logical Form and the Limits of Thought Manish Oza Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2020 What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that thinkers have general abilities to respond to support and tension among their thoughts. And these abilities are constituted by following logical rules. So thinkers have to follow logical rules. But there isn’t just one correct logic for thinking. I show that my view is consistent with logical pluralism: there are a range of correct logics, any one of which a thinker might follow. A logic for thinking does, however, have to contain certain minimal principles: Modus Ponens and Non-Contradiction, and perhaps others. We follow logical rules by exercising logical capacities, which display a distinctive first-person/third-person asymmetry: a subject can find the instances of a rule compelling without seeing them as instances of a rule. As a result, there are two limits on illogical thinking. First, thinkers have to tend to find instances of logical rules compelling. Second, thinkers can’t think in obviously illogical ways. So thinking has to be logical – but not perfectly so. ii When we try to think, but fail, we produce nonsense. But our failures to think are often subjectively indistinguishable from thinking. To explain how this occurs, I offer an account of nonsense. To be under the illusion that some nonsense makes sense is to enter a pretence that the nonsense is meaningful. Our use of nonsense within the pretence relies on the role of logical form in understanding. Finally, while the normativity of logic doesn’t fall directly out of logical consti- tutivism, it’s possible to build an attractive account of logical normativity which has logical constitutivism as an integral part. I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing, and that this is the source of logical normativity. iii Acknowledgements I have a lot of people to thank. As supervisor, Gurpreet Rattan was a model of open-mindedness and a font of new ideas. I couldn’t have written this without his support, unstinting enthusiasm and wise advice. Thanks also to Philip Kremer, for teaching me logic; to Nick Stang, for guiding me through Kant and Hegel; and to both, for years of tough questions. In 2018, I had the chance to work with Florian Steinberger and Corine Besson in London; their hospitality showed me what it means to belong to an intellectual community. Special thanks go to Edward Kanterian for a few words in the margin of a tutorial essay on Husserl, in Oxford around 2009. I didn’t know it at the time, but that was the seed of a dissertation! I wouldn’t have survived graduate school without Lisa Doerksen and John Bunke. Weekly conversations with them in the Green Beanery shaped how I think about everything. I’m grateful to John for reading the Introduction and chapter 4 on short notice, and to Moritz Bodner for reading chapter 2. I’d also particularly like to thank Julia Jael Smith and Jessica Wright, who’ve read and commented on nearly every chapter at some point in the last few years. I’ve learned a huge amount from friends and colleagues in Toronto and elsewhere, including, in no particular order, Emily Perry, Josh Brandt, Prach Panchakunathorn, James Gillard, Lochin Brouillard, Catherine Rioux, Atoosa Kasirzadeh, David Dyzenhaus, Arthur Ripstein, Imogen Dickie, Dominic and Tashi Alford-Duguid, G. Anthony Bruno, Rachel O’Keefe, Adam Dobkin, Nir Av-Gay, Bernie Katz, Danny Goldstick, Mark Fortney, Jessica Leech, Carlo Nicolai, Clinton Tolley, AW Moore, Damian Melamedoff, Mason Westfall, Melissa Rees, Amogh Sahu, Sophia Arbeiter, Nader Shoaibi, Zuzanna Jusińska, Antonina Jamrozik, Ngozi Okidegbe, Anne-Sophie Ouellet, Steve Coyne, Dave Suarez, Mike Blezy, Aaron Henry, Zain Raza, Hamish Russell, Rory Harder and Seyed Yarandi. I’d like to thank all the students I’ve taught at U of T for their patience and curiosity, and for teaching me how to explain things. I hope it shows. I also benefited from discussions of my work at the Ontario Quebec Hegel Organization, the American Philosophy Association, the Canadian Philosophy Association, the Wiener Forum für Analytische Philosophie, the Society for the Study of the History of Analytic Philosophy, the LEM Seminar at the Institute of Philosophy in London and the U of T Grad Forum. The work was supported by funding from SSHRC and OGS. Of course, all remaining errors are my own. Hegel wrote that to study logic is ‘to dwell and to labor in [a] realm of shadows’. Luckily, I had people to remind me to get out in the sun once in a while: my friends, my parents Amit and Sangeeta, my sister Janika, all my relatives, Maria Papachristos and her family and my dearest Richa. I can’t express how grateful I am. This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Thomas Papachristos. iv Contents 0 Introduction1 0.1 Overview . .1 0.2 Normativism and illogicality . .2 0.2.1 The problem of illogical thinking . .3 0.2.2 Back to Kant, again . .5 0.3 Logic as constitutive of thinking . .6 0.3.1 What I mean by ‘logic’ . .9 0.4 Dissertation outline . 12 I Developing logical constitutivism 15 1 Why thinking needs logic 16 1.1 Introduction . 16 1.1.1 Terminology . 16 1.1.2 Thesis and argument . 18 1.2 The holistic constraint on understanding . 19 1.2.1 Understanding requires a setting . 20 1.2.2 Deviant understanding . 25 1.3 General rational abilities . 28 1.3.1 Two unsuccessful explanations of holism . 29 1.3.2 A better explanation . 31 1.4 The expressive role of logic . 33 1.4.1 The conditional and negation . 34 1.4.2 Response to Brandom . 39 1.5 Quinean reprise . 41 1.6 Conclusion . 46 2 Disagreement and pluralism 47 2.1 Introduction . 47 2.2 Monism and Disagreement . 51 2.2.1 Type A disagreement: conflicting beliefs about logic . 52 2.2.2 Type B disagreement: using conflicting logics . 56 2.3 Pluralism and Disagreement . 58 2.3.1 Domain variance . 58 2.3.2 The minimal kit . 62 2.3.3 Recap . 66 2.4 Which logics contain MP and LNC? . 67 v 3 Logical capacities 78 3.1 Introduction . 78 3.2 Cognitivism . 79 3.3 The causal-explanatory role of logic . 83 3.3.1 Dogramaci’s associationism and the sensitivity condition . 83 3.3.2 The simple dispositional account . 85 3.4 The first-personal character of inference . 86 3.5 Logical capacities and tacit knowledge . 88 3.5.1 Do thinkers have logical knowledge? . 93 3.5.2 Logical capacities and separability . 94 4 On the limits of illogical thinking 99 4.1 Logic as constitutive of thinking . 99 4.2 The first limit on illogicality . 100 4.2.1 The vagueness of thinking .................... 103 4.2.2 The metaphysical reality of thinking . 105 4.3 The second limit on illogicality . 107 4.3.1 What makes a contradiction obvious? . 109 4.3.2 Reductio proofs . 111 4.4 Can we be certain someone isn’t thinking? . 111 II Consequences of constitutivism 113 5 Nonsense: a user’s guide 114 5.1 Introduction . 114 5.2 The engagement constraint . 116 5.2.1 Reasoning with nonsense . 116 5.2.2 Nonsense-attributions . 118 5.2.3 The minimalist account . 120 5.3 The austerity constraint . 124 5.3.1 Nonsense thoughts . 125 5.3.2 What’s wrong with nonsense? . 125 5.4 A pretence account of nonsense . 128 5.4.1 Pretence and make-believe . 128 5.4.2 Logical form and partial understanding . 130 5.4.3 Pretentious nonsense: the general idea . 132 5.4.4 Examples of pretentious nonsense . 133 5.4.5 Objections and replies . 136 5.5 Conclusion. Is there a transparent level of sense? . 138 vi 6 The value of thinking and the normativity of logic 140 6.1 Introduction . 140 6.2 Logical self-constitution . 144 6.2.1 The constitutivist account of practical reason . 145 6.2.2 The constitutivist account of logical normativity . 146 6.3 A problem for constitutivism and two unsuccessful responses . 148 6.3.1 The absence of value problem . 148 6.3.2 The dialectical response . 149 6.3.3 The need to think . 150 6.4 The value of thinking . 152 6.4.1 Possible views of the value of thinking . 153 6.4.2 Thinking and human flourishing . 155 6.5 Vexing issues about logical normativity . 159 6.5.1 Three questions about logical rules . 160 6.5.2 The implausible consequences of the Simple Formulation . 161 6.5.3 Bridge principles . 164 Bibliography 170 vii 0 Introduction . and for all her illegalities an enemy of misrule. Anne Carson 0.1 Overview What is the relation of logic to thinking? Why should we think logically, and what happens if we don’t? Is it even possible to think illogically? These are the questions this dissertation seeks to answer.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Logical Reasoning
    Chapter 2 Logical Reasoning All human activities are conducted following logical reasoning. Most of the time we apply logic unconsciously, but there is always some logic ingrained in the decisions we make in order to con- duct day-to-day life. Unfortunately we also do sometimes think illogically or engage in bad reasoning. Since science is based on logical thinking, one has to learn how to reason logically. The discipline of logic is the systematization of reasoning. It explicitly articulates principles of good reasoning, and system- atizes them. Equipped with this knowledge, we can distinguish between good reasoning and bad reasoning, and can develop our own reasoning capacity. Philosophers have shown that logical reasoning can be broadly divided into two categories—inductive, and deductive. Suppose you are going out of your home, and upon seeing a cloudy sky, you take an umbrella along. What was the logic behind this commonplace action? It is that, you have seen from your childhood that the sky becomes cloudy before it rains. You have seen it once, twice, thrice, and then your mind has con- structed the link “If there is dark cloud in the sky, it may rain”. This is an example of inductive logic, where we reach a general conclusion by repeated observation of particular events. The repeated occurrence of a particular truth leads you to reach a general truth. 2 Chapter 2. Logical Reasoning What do you do next? On a particular day, if you see dark cloud in the sky, you think ‘today it may rain’. You take an um- brella along.
    [Show full text]
  • Architectural Theory and Practice, and the Question of Phenomenology
    Architectural Theory and Practice, and the Question of Phenomenology (The Contribution of Tadao Ando to the Phenomenological Discourse) Von der Fakultät Architektur, Bauingenieurwesen und Stadtplanung der Brandenburgischen Technischen Universität Cottbus zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktor-Ingenieurs genehmigte Dissertation vorgelegt von Mohammadreza Shirazi aus Tabriz, Iran Gutachter: : Prof. Dr. Eduard Führ Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Karsten Harries Gutachter: Gastprofessor. Dr. Riklef Rambow Tag der Verteidigung: 02. Juni 2009 Acknowledgment My first words of gratitude go to my supervisor Prof. Führ for giving me direction and support. He fully supported me during my research, and created a welcoming and inspiring atmosphere in which I had the pleasure of writing this dissertation. I am indepted to his teachings and instructions in more ways than I can state here. I am particularly grateful to Prof. Karsten Harries. His texts taught me how to think on architecture deeply, how to challenge whatever is ‘taken for granted’ and ‘remain on the way, in search of home’. I am also grateful to other colleagues in L.S. Theorie der Architektur. I want to express my thanks to Dr. Riklef Rambow who considered my ideas and texts deeply and helped me with his advice at different stages. I am thankful for the comments and kind helps I received from Dr. Katharina Fleischmann. I also want to thank Prof. Hahn from TU Dresden and other PhD students who attended in Doktorandentag meetings and criticized my presentations. I would like to express my appreciation to the staff of Langen Foundation Museum for their kind helps during my visit of that complex, and to Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • The Function of Reason in Hume and Consequences for the Classical
    Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2004 If Reason Is Not Sovereign: The Function of Reason in Hume and Consequences for the Classical/Positivist Divide, Rational Choice Theory, Low Self-Control Theory, and the Criminal Propensity Construct Michael Jason Kissner Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IF REASON IS NOT SOVEREIGN: THE FUNCTION OF REASON IN HUME AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CLASSICAL/POSITIVIST DIVIDE, RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY, LOW SELF-CONTROL THEORY, AND THE CRIMINAL PROPENSITY CONSTRUCT By MICHAEL JASON KISSNER A Dissertation submitted to the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2004 The members of the Committee approve the Dissertation of Michael Jason Kissner defended on November 10, 2004. _______________________ Daniel Maier-Katkin Professor Directing Dissertation _______________________ Barney Twiss Outside Committee Member _______________________ Cecil Greek Committee Member Approved: __________________________ Thomas Blomberg, Dean, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................Page
    [Show full text]
  • Which Quantifiers Are Logical? a Combined Semantical and Inferential Criterion Solomon Feferman1
    Which Quantifiers are Logical? A combined semantical and inferential criterion Solomon Feferman1 Abstract. The aim of logic is to characterize the forms of reasoning that lead invariably from true sentences to true sentences, independently of the subject matter; thus its concerns combine semantical and inferential notions in an essential way. Up to now most proposed characterizations of logicality of sentence generating operations have been given either in semantical or inferential terms. This paper offers a combined semantical and inferential criterion for logicality (improving one originally proposed by Jeffery Zucker) and shows that any quantifier that is to be counted as logical according to that criterion is definable in first order logic. The aim of logic is to characterize the forms of reasoning that lead invariably from true sentences to true sentences, independently of the subject matter. The sentences involved are analyzed according to their logical (as opposed to grammatical) structure, i.e. how they are compounded from their parts by means of certain operations on propositions and predicates, of which the familiar ones are the connectives and quantifiers of first order logic. To spell this out in general, one must explain how the truth of compounds under given operations is determined by the truth of the parts, and characterize those forms of rules of inference for the given operations that insure preservation of truth. The so-called problem of “logical constants” (Gomez-Torrente 2002) is to determine all such operations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Nature of Logical Constants
    Aporia vol. 27 no. 1—2017 The Nature of Logical Constants LAUREN RICHARDSON haracterizing the distinction between the “logical” and “non-logical” expressions of a language proves a challenging task, and one Cwith significant implications for the nature and scope of logic itself. It is often claimed that logical truths are statements that are “true by virtue of form,” and, likewise, that arguments are logically valid because of their respective “forms,” not because of their contents (Sider 2).1 Take, for example, a straightforward piece of reasoning: (P1) Maria is in Berlin or she is in Vienna. (P2) Maria is not in Berlin. (C) Maria is in Vienna. If this argument is valid—which, of course, in classical logic, it is—then it is typically held to be valid because of the structure of the argument and not because of certain material facts about the world. So it seems as if we should 1 Contrast the idea of truth preservation by virtue of form with the idea of an argument that is truth- preserving by virtue of the meaning of certain terms: (P1*):Nick is a bachelor. (C*): Nick is an unmarried man. We might think that the truth of (P1*) guarantees the truth of (C*), but it is not by virtue of the form of the argument; it is by virtue of the meaning of the expressions “bachelor” and “unmarried man.” Lauren Richardson is studying philosophy at the University of Chicago and will graduate in 2018. Her philosophical interests include philosophy of language, logic, metaethics, and feminism. After graduation, Lauren intends to pursue a graduate degree in philosophy.
    [Show full text]
  • Imagination: a Philosophical Examination of The
    1 The ‘Reality Oriented’ Imagination: a Philosophical Examination of the Imagination in ‘Mentalization’ and ‘Neuropsychoanalysis’. Annie Hardy Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University College London 2017 2 I, Annie Hardy, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 3 Abstract This thesis is concerned with the conceptualization of the imagination in contemporary psychoanalytic theory, focusing in particular on its connection with knowledge. I will propose that imaginative processes form the core of psychic ‘health’ by instantiating a state of mind in which the subject is genuinely open to ‘learning from experience’. At the centre of the investigation is a psychic process that I term the ‘reality oriented’ imagination: a form of conscious mental activity that facilitates an epistemological connection with both the internal and external worlds and renders the unobservable psychological experiences of others accessible. The concept of the ’reality oriented’ imagination significantly disrupts Freud’s portrayal of the imaginative processes as a form of wish-fulfilment in which the individual’s attention is drawn away from external reality and placed under the sway of the pleasure principle. Such differing presentations of the imagination across psychoanalytic models can arguably be understood by considering several major shifts in psychoanalytic theorizing since Freud’s time. I will propose that these changes can be characterised as an ‘epistemic turn’: a general movement in psychoanalysis towards framing the internal world as strategic rather than compensatory, and a corresponding understanding of psychopathological processes as a response to failures in understanding and prediction rather than instinctual conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • Rethinking Logical Reasoning Skills from a Strategy Perspective
    Rethinking Logical Reasoning Skills from a Strategy Perspective Bradley J. Morris* Grand Valley State University and LRDC, University of Pittsburgh, USA Christian D. Schunn LRDC, University of Pittsburgh, USA Running Head: Logical Reasoning Skills _______________________________ * Correspondence to: Department of Psychology, Grand Valley State University, 2117 AuSable Hall, One Campus Drive, Allendale, MI 49401, USA. E-mail: [email protected], Fax: 1-616-331-2480. Morris & Schunn Logical Reasoning Skills 2 Rethinking Logical Reasoning Skills from a Strategy Perspective Overview The study of logical reasoning has typically proceeded as follows: Researchers (1) discover a response pattern that is either unexplained or provides evidence against an established theory, (2) create a model that explains this response pattern, then (3) expand this model to include a larger range of situations. Researchers tend to investigate a specific type of reasoning (e.g., conditional implication) using a particular variant of an experimental task (e.g., the Wason selection task). The experiments uncover a specific reasoning pattern, for example, that people tend to select options that match the terms in the premises, rather than derive valid responses (Evans, 1972). Once a reasonable explanation is provided for this, researchers typically attempt to expand it to encompass related phenomena, such as the role of ‘bias’ in other situations like weather forecasting (Evans, 1989). Eventually, this explanation may be used to account for all performance on an entire class of reasoning phenomena (e.g. deduction) regardless of task, experience, or age. We term this a unified theory. Some unified theory theorists have suggested that all logical reasoning can be characterized by a single theory, such as one that is rule-based (which involves the application of transformation rules that draw valid conclusions once fired; Rips, 1994).
    [Show full text]
  • Notices of the American Mathematical Society
    • ISSN 0002-9920 March 2003 Volume 50, Number 3 Disks That Are Double Spiral Staircases page 327 The RieITlann Hypothesis page 341 San Francisco Meeting page 423 Primitive curve painting (see page 356) Education is no longer just about classrooms and labs. With the growing diversity and complexity of educational programs, you need a software system that lets you efficiently deliver effective learning tools to literally, the world. Maple® now offers you a choice to address the reality of today's mathematics education. Maple® 8 - the standard Perfect for students in mathematics, sciences, and engineering. Maple® 8 offers all the power, flexibility, and resources your technical students need to manage even the most complex mathematical concepts. MapleNET™ -- online education ,.u A complete standards-based solution for authoring, nv3a~ _r.~ .::..,-;.-:.- delivering, and managing interactive learning modules \~.:...br *'r¥'''' S\l!t"AaITI(!\pU;; ,"", <If through browsers. Derived from the legendary Maple® .Att~~ .. <:t~~::,/, engine, MapleNefM is the only comprehensive solution "f'I!hlislJer~l!'Ct"\ :5 -~~~~~:--r---, for distance education in mathematics. Give your institution and your students cornpetitive edge. For a FREE 3D-day Maple® 8 Trial CD for Windows®, or to register for a FREE MapleNefM Online Seminar call 1/800 R67.6583 or e-mail [email protected]. ADVANCING MATHEMATICS WWW.MAPLESOFT.COM I [email protected]\I I WWW.MAPLEAPPS.COM I NORTH AMERICAN SALES 1/800 267. 6583 © 2003 Woter1oo Ma')Ir~ Inc Maple IS (J y<?glsterc() crademork of Woterloo Maple he Mar)leNet so troc1ema'k of Woter1oc' fV'lop'e Inr PII other trcde,nork$ (ye property o~ their respective ('wners Generic Polynomials Constructive Aspects of the Inverse Galois Problem Christian U.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding the Logical Constants and Dispositions
    Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication Volume 5 MEANING, UNDERSTANDING AND KNOWLEDGE Article 2 2009 Understanding the Logical Constants and Dispositions Corine Besson St Hugh's College, Oxford Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/biyclc This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Recommended Citation Besson, Corine (2009) "Understanding the Logical Constants and Dispositions," Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication: Vol. 5. https://doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.279 This Proceeding of the Symposium for Cognition, Logic and Communication is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Understanding the Logical Constants and Dispositions 2 The Baltic International Yearbook of not explore here how that explanatory connection might be accounted Cognition, Logic and Communication for. But however it is accounted for, it seems that the following min- imal constraint should be met by any account of competence with an October 2010 Volume 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge expression: pages 1-24 DOI: 10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.279 (CT) An account of speakers’ understanding of an expres- sion should be consistent with their correct performances CORINE BESSON with that expression. St Hugh’s College, Oxford This is a weak constraint, since the connection between competence and performance is much tighter. But this will suffice for the purposes UNDERSTANDING THE LOGICAL CONSTANTS AND of this paper.
    [Show full text]
  • Logical Reasoning
    updated: 11/29/11 Logical Reasoning Bradley H. Dowden Philosophy Department California State University Sacramento Sacramento, CA 95819 USA ii Preface Copyright © 2011 by Bradley H. Dowden This book Logical Reasoning by Bradley H. Dowden is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. That is, you are free to share, copy, distribute, store, and transmit all or any part of the work under the following conditions: (1) Attribution You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author, namely by citing his name, the book title, and the relevant page numbers (but not in any way that suggests that the book Logical Reasoning or its author endorse you or your use of the work). (2) Noncommercial You may not use this work for commercial purposes (for example, by inserting passages into a book that is sold to students). (3) No Derivative Works You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. An earlier version of the book was published by Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, California USA in 1993 with ISBN number 0-534-17688-7. When Wadsworth decided no longer to print the book, they returned their publishing rights to the original author, Bradley Dowden. If you would like to suggest changes to the text, the author would appreciate your writing to him at [email protected]. iii Praise Comments on the 1993 edition, published by Wadsworth Publishing Company: "There is a great deal of coherence. The chapters build on one another. The organization is sound and the author does a superior job of presenting the structure of arguments.
    [Show full text]
  • Aim-Oriented Empiricism and the ‘Father’ of the Scientific Revolution: Metaphysics and Method in the Work of Galileo
    AIM-ORIENTED EMPIRICISM AND THE ‘FATHER’ OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION: METAPHYSICS AND METHOD IN THE WORK OF GALILEO A Thesis presented by Katherine R. Crawley for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of London University College, London July 1998 ProQuest Number: 10609111 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10609111 Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS With grateful acknowledgements and thanks to Nick Maxwell, for his unfailing support, and to Rob Iliffe, particularly for his valuable help with Chapter One. In addition I would like to express my gratitude to Geoff, Vicky, and Drew for all their love and encouragement. 2 ABSTRACT This thesis is concerned with that branch of the history of science which takes as its central problem the question of scientific progress, defined as the growth of knowledge and understanding about the world. It is an area of enquiry which has been suppressed, in recent years, by the development of historical methodologies which eschew all epistemological deliberations and their established ramifications.
    [Show full text]
  • The Constituents of the Propositions of Logic Kevin C
    10 The Constituents of the Propositions of Logic Kevin C. Klement 1 Introduction Many founders of modern logic—Frege and Russell among them—bemoan- ed the tendency, still found in most textbook treatments, to define the subject matter of logic as “the laws of thought” or “the principles of inference”. Such descriptions fail to capture logic’s objective nature; they make it too dependent on human psychology or linguistic practices. It is one thing to identify what logic is not about. It is another to say what it is about. I tell my students that logic studies relationships between the truth-values of propositions that hold in virtue of their form. But even this characterization leaves me uneasy. I don’t really know what a “form” is, and even worse perhaps, I don’t really know what these “propositions” are that have these forms. If propositions are considered merely as sentences or linguistic assertions, the definition does not seem like much of an improvement over the psychological definitions. Language is a human invention, but logic is more than that, or so it seems. It is perhaps forgiveable then that at certain times Russell would not have been prepared to give a very good answer to the question “What is Logic?”, such as when he attempted, but failed, to compose a paper with that title in October 1912. Given that Russell had recently completed Principia Mathematica, a work alleging to establish the reducibility of mathematics to logic, one might think this overly generous. What does the claim that mathematics reduces to logic come to if we cannot independently speci- Published in Acquaintance, Knowledge and Logic: New Essays on Bertrand Russell’s Problems of Philosophy, edited by Donovan Wishon and Bernard Linsky.
    [Show full text]