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Traditional Conceptions of Intervention

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Traditional Conceptions of Intervention Notes INTRODUCTION I. The full text of the speech is appended to Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 1959-1961, Macmillan, London, 1967 pp. 360-1. 2. Transcript of Speech given by the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, to the South African National Assembly in Cape Town on Tuesday, 20 September 1994, Courtesy of the British Embassy, Pretoria. 3. Gerhard von Glahn, Law among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law, Macmillan, London, 1971, p. 163. 4. Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society, Allen and Unwin, London, 1986, pp. 225 and 232. 5. Terry L. Deibel, 'Internal affairs and international relations in the post-cold war world', The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16(3), Summer 1993, p. 23. 6. Patricia Nelson Limerick, 'Dancing with professors: The trouble with academic prose', The New York Times Book Review, 31 October 1993, pp. 3, 23-4. CHAPTER 1: TRADITIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF INTERVENTION I. Lori F. Damrosch, 'Politics across borders: Non-intervention and nonforcible influence over domestic affairs', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 83(1), January 1989, p. 3. 2. Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Ana(vsis, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 53. 3. Oran R. Young, 'Intervention and international systems', Journal of /merna­ tiona! Affairs, Vol. 22(2), 1968, p. 179. 4. James N. Rosenau, 'Intervention as a scientific concept', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13(2), 1969, p. 160. 5. Hedley Bull, 'Introduction', in Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 2. 6. William V. O'Brien, US Military Intervention: Law and Morality, Washington Papers 68, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1979, p. 15. 7. D.A. Graber, Crisis Diplomacy: A History of US Intervention Policies and Practices, Public Affairs Press, Washington DC, 1959, p. 15. 8. Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, pp. 44-55. Also see Louis Henkin, Richard C. Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit, International Law: Cases and Materials, West Pub­ lishing Co., St Paul, Minn., 1980, p. 887. 9. Hersch Lauterpacht (ed.), L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I­ Peace, Sixth edition, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1947, p. 272. Also see Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law: A Concise Introduction, Westview Press, Boulder, 1979, p. 92; Louis Henkin, Richard C. Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit, p. 887, and Lori F. Damrosch, 'Politics across borders', p. 5. 10. A.V.W. Thomas and A.J. Thomas, quoted by H.B. Jacobini, International Law: A Text, The Dorsey Press, Homewood, 1968, pp. 261-2. 257 258 Notes 11. W. Friedmann, 'Intervention and International Law 1', International Spectator, Vol. 25(1), 1971, p. 42. 12. For example, J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Interna­ tional Law of Peace, Sixth edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p. 402; K. Skubiszewski, 'Use of force by states. Collective security. Law of War and Neutrality', in Max Sorensen (ed.), Manual of Public International Law, Macmillan, London, 1968, p. 757; J.G. Starke, An Introduction to International Law, Ninth edition, Butterworths, London, 1984, p. 99; Gerhard von Glahn, p. 163; and W. Friedmann, p. 40. 13. J.-G. Castel, International Law, Butterworths, Toronto, 1976, p. 55. 14. Quoted by Louis Henkin, Richard C. Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit, p. 921. 15. See Louis B. Sohn, 'The International Court of Justice and the scope of the right of self-defense and the duty of non-intervention', in Y oram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (eds), International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 876. For a debate among eminent jurists on the merits of the ICJ's decision in this case, see The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 81(1), January 1987, pp. 77-183. 16. Text in Edmund J. Osmanczyk, The Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Relations, Taylor and Francis, New York, 1990, p. 371. 17. R.J. Vincent, Non-intervention and International Law, Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 8-10. 18. Oran R. Young, 'Intervention and international systems', p. 177. 19. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics, Har­ vester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1992, p. 159. 20. Peter A. Toma and Robert F. Gorman, International Relations: Understanding Global Issues, Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., Pacific Grove, Calif., 1991, p. 224. 21. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985, p. 342. 22. Richard Little, 'Revisiting intervention: A survey of recent developments', Review of International Studies, No. 13, 1987, pp. 50-4. 23. Hedley Bull, 'Introduction', in Bull (ed.), p. 1. 24. Max Beloff, 'Reflections on intervention', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 22(2), 1968, p. 198. 25. James N. Rosenau, 'Intervention as a scientific concept', p. 161. 26. R.J. Vincent, Non-intervention and International Law, pp. 3-13. Definitions from the following selection of authors are listed from the more restrictive to the more permissive: Jack Donnelly, 'Human rights, humanitarian intervention and American foreign policy: Law, morality and politics', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 37(2), Winter 1984, p. 311; Ellen P. Stern, 'Prologue', in Stern (ed.), The Limits of Military Intervention, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1979, p. 9; D.A. Graber, p. 2; Neil Matheson, The 'Rules of the Game' of Superpower Military Interven­ tion in the Third World 1975-1980, University Press of America, Washington DC, 1982, p. 6; Urs Schwarz, Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, NY, 1970, p. 84; Oran R. Young, 'Intervention and international systems', p. 178; Caroline Thomas, Neu• States, Sovereignty and Intervention, Gower, Aldershot, 1985, pp. 20--1; K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Sixth edition, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1992, p. 208; Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, p. 160; and Peter J. Schraeder, 'Studying US intervention in the Third World', in Schraeder (ed.), Intervention into the 1990s: US Foreign Policy in the Third World, Second edition, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1992, p. 3. Notes 259 27. Robert C. Freysinger, 'US military and economic intervention in an interna­ tional context of low-intensity conflict', Political Studies, No. 34, 1991, pp. 321- 34; James N. Rosenau, 'Intervention as a scientific concept', pp. 168-169; Oran R. Young, 'Intervention and international systems', pp. 180-2; S. Neil MacFarlane, 'Africa's decaying security system and the rise of intervention', International Security, Vol. 8(4), Spring 1984, p. 135; Olajide Aluko, 'African response to external intervention in Africa since Angola', African Affairs, Vol. 80(319), Aprill981, pp. 175-7; Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, pp. 159-60; Richard Little, 'Revisiting intervention', p. 58; John N. Moore, Law and the Indo-China War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1972, pp. 142-63; John N. Moore, 'Introduction', in Moore (ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974, pp. xi and xii; Oran R. Young, 'Systemic bases of intervention', in John N. Moore (ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, p. 114. 28. S. Neil MacFarlane, Intervention and Regional Security, Adelphi Papers 196, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1985, pp. 16-17. 29. James N. Rosenau, 'Intervention as scientific concept', pp. 168-9. 30. S. Neil MacFarlane, 'Africa's decaying security system', p. 135 and Keith Somerville, Foreign Military Intervention in Africa, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990, pp. 183-8. 31. Evan Luard, Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System, University of London Press, London, 1970, p. 140; Bertil Duner, The Bear, the Cubs and the Eagle: Soviet Bloc Interventionism in the Third World and the US Response, Gower, Aldershot, 1987; Bertil Duner, 'The many-pronged spear: External military intervention in civil wars in the 1970s', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 20(1), 1983, pp. 59-73; Alexis Heraclides, 'Secessionist minorities and ex­ ternal involvement', International Organization, Vol. 44(3), Summer 1990, pp. 341-78; Alexis Heraclides, 'Secession, self-determination and non-intervention', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 45(2), Winter 1992, pp. 399-420; John N. Moore, 'Toward an applied theory for the regulation of intervention', in Moore (ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, pp. 21-3; John N. Moore, Law and the Indo-China War, pp. 175-225; and Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, Martin Robertson, London, 1975. 32. International Law, 1922, quoted by Frederick L. Schuman, International Polit­ ics: The Western State System and the World Community, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1958, p. 117. Also see Caroline Thomas, New States, Sovereignty and Intervention, p. 48; Goronwy J. Jones, The United Nations and the Domestic Jurisdiction of States: Interpretations and Applications of the Non-Intervention Principle, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1979, pp. 1-13; and Evan Luard, Basic Texts in International Relations: The Evolution of Ideas about International Society, Macmillan, London, 1992, p. 172. 33. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley and Carl Kaysen, 'Introductory note: Emerging norms of justified intervention', in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen (eds), Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention, American Academy of Arts and Sci­ ences, Cambridge, Mass., 1993, p. 13. 34. K.J. Holsti, International Politics (1992), p. 65. Also see Werner Levi, p. 89. 35. Urs Schwarz, 'Intervention: The historical development II', in Louis G.M. Jacquet (ed.), Intervention in International Politics, Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, The Hague, 1971, p. 34, and Goronwy J.J. Jones, p. 11. 36. Louis B. Sohn in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (eds), p. 876. 37. Quoted ibid. Also see Anthony Carty, 'Intervention and the limits of inter­ national law', in Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman (eds), Political Theory, 260 Notes International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention, St Martin's Press/Mac­ millan, London, 1993, pp.
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