Pacific Cruise Industry: Security Risk Context Statement
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Pacific Cruise Industry: Security Risk Context Statement JANUARY 2008 SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE This document was compiled by the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, in cooperation with the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Regional Maritime Programme, with funding provided through the AusAID Pacific Governance Support Programme. © Copyright Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), 2008 All rights for commercial / for profit reproduction or translation, in any form, reserved. Permission to reproduce the document and/or translate in whole, in any form, whether for commercial / for profit or non-profit purposes, must be requested in writing. Original SPC artwork may not be altered or separately published without permission. i SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Purpose 1 3. Executive Summary 1 4. Operating environment 2 International Cruise Industry 2 Pacific Cruise Industry 3 Standard Cruise Liners 1500 + 5 Development of Super/Mega Liners 5 Boutique Cruise Shipping 6 Booze cruises 7 Fly/ Cruise 7 Ports 7 Exotic Locations and on-shore excursions 7 Cruise Industry Support Services 8 Crew 8 World Cruises 10 5. International Preventive Security Regime 11 International Legislation 11 Essential Requirements 11 ISPS Implementation in the Pacific 12 Bilateral and multilateral engagement in the Pacific 12 6. Risk Management Context 12 Strategic Security Environment 12 Security Threats in the Global Maritime Environment 14 Pacific Security Environment 15 Security Threats to the Pacific Cruise Industry 16 Improvised Explosive Devices 16 Stand-off attacks 17 Biological or chemical attacks 17 Hijack 17 Landside 18 Criminal threats 18 7. Mitigation of Security Vulnerabilities 19 Physical Security 19 Access controls 19 Screening 21 Development of new port infrastructure 22 Human Security 22 Trusted insiders 22 Security culture 24 Coordination and information sharing 24 Security Planning 26 8. Conclusion 27 Appendix A – General Risks for Consideration 28 Appendix B – Resolution of Suspicious Activity 29 Appendix C – Security Incidents Exploiting Security Vulnerabilities 30 Appendix D – Useful information links 32 Appendix E – Authors’ biodata 34 ii SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE 1. Introduction At the invitation of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community’s (SPC) Regional Maritime Programme (RMP), the Australian aid agency, AusAID, funded the Australian Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government’s Office Of Transport Security (OTS) to assist in the development of a report on the security risk context of the international cruise industry as it relates to the Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs). RMP and OTS have worked jointly to bring together a report that reflects the generic strategic threats and potential preventative security vulnerabilities and discusses a variety of security related issues facing the cruise industry in the Pacific. 2. Purpose The purpose of this Security Risk Context Statement is to provide a statement of the current security environment and potential drivers of security risk related to the Pacific cruise industry. The document highlights strategic threats and vulnerabilities to ship and port security from politically motivated violence and criminal activity. This Risk Context Statement is intended to supplement threat and risk assessment information available to PICTs governments and the cruise industry from other sources. This document does not replace the need for cruise industry participants to consider their individual circumstances and identify and contextualise their own risks and vulnerabilities consistent with security risk assessment processes, such as the Australian and New Zealand 4360:2004 Risk Management Standard and the Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand Hand Book 167:2006 (see http://www.standards.org.au). Operators should consider the information in this document when determining the risk context of their own individual circumstances, identifying local operational, physical, seasonal and environmental factors that contribute to security vulnerabilities. This document draws upon a variety of open source material to provide a common understanding of the security risk context of the growing Pacific cruise industry. The document highlights potential security threats and vulnerabilities relevant to the cruise shipping environment and should be protected accordingly. It is classified SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE and its distribution should be limited to those with security policy and planning responsibilities. 3. Executive Summary The security of cruise operations in the Pacific is influenced by risks emerging from the international security environment. These risks are the result of transnational terrorism, cross-border crime and the inherent vulnerabilities of the maritime environment and transportation industry. Terrorist groups, including Al-Qa’ida, Jama’ah Islamiah, and their associates, have demonstrated the intent and capacity to mount mass-casualty attacks on transport and tourist infrastructure around the world. These groups, and those associated with them, are committed and knowledgeable, and they are capable of planning, preparing and successfully undertaking attacks with a high probability of success. Although not targeted by Al-Qa’ida to date, the cruise industry offers an attractive target to Islamic extremist terrorists due to its concentration of affluent western tourists and its potential to attract media coverage. The threat of terrorist attack is unpredictable and likely to be indiscriminate in form. This reality has created a security environment with a constant heightened state of alert and the probability that 1 SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE there will be no prior warning of attack. Whilst regional intelligence and police organisations are working together to prevent terrorist activity, and may uncover evidence of an impending attack, it is not prudent to assume they will be able to identify and resolve all possible threats. The global experiences of recent years – including the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, the 7 and 21 July 2005 attacks in London, the 11 March 2004 attacks in Madrid, and the October 2002 and 2005 attacks in Bali – reinforce this reality. In a situation where there is no absolute certainty of threat information, and consequently no guarantee of warning of terrorist attack, identified vulnerabilities in cruise ships and port infrastructure are important elements in situating the security risk context. Vulnerabilities potentially amplify terrorist capabilities and increase the likelihood of a threat occurring. The strategic security advice contained in this document is aimed at assisting in the development of a prioritised listing of generic risk events and vulnerabilities for cruise operations in the Pacific. Risk mitigation approaches can then be developed to focus on the identified priority security issues. Cruise ship vulnerabilities could also be exploited by criminals to facilitate smuggling operations, including of drugs, people, and arms. Organised crime is becoming increasing transnational in nature and criminal activities often highlight security weaknesses. Mitigation strategies to address the industry’s security vulnerabilities will not only reduce the risk of a terrorist attack, but will also limit the ability of criminals to capitalise on cruise liner and port vulnerabilities in pursuit of their activities. Appropriate, targeted and substantive preventative security arrangements must be based on a clear understanding of security risk drivers, including a shared understanding of threats and vulnerabilities. Failure to understand the significance of addressing vulnerabilities in developing mitigation strategies necessarily increases the security risks faced. Likewise complacency – through assuming that there is no threat; that it will happen somewhere else; or assuming “adequate” preparation is sufficient – can result in poorly developed security plans, poor allocation of security resources and increased security vulnerabilities. Creating a sustainable and proactive security culture within the cruise industry is a critical defensive element in our current security environment. Sustainable physical security measures coupled with staff awareness raising processes can create an active security environment hostile to terrorist and criminal activity. The most powerful means we have of preventing a traumatic terrorist attack or systemic criminal exploitation are carefully targeted, focussed and balanced risk and vulnerability mitigation action plans. 4. Operating environment International Cruise Industry Cruise shipping is a fast growing industry. According to the Cruise Line Industry Association (CLIA) the industry is worth USD23 billion a year, with predicted growth in cruise passengers of 15 percent per year. At present about 80% of the international market is dominated by passengers from North America. The major cruise destinations are the Caribbean, Europe and Alaska. It appears, however, that there is currently an expansion and globalisation of the North American cruise experience1. There is now a high percentage of first time cruisers. Cruise companies are actively looking for more and varied 1 Dowling, R. 2006. Cruise Ship Tourism, CABI Publishing, Cambridge, USA. 2 SECURITY-IN-CONFIDENCE destinations for passengers. These are usually destinations that can be reached within two or three sailing days for