Information Operations in Afghanistan from 2001-2012
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University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2015-01-28 Information Operations in Afghanistan from 2001-2012 Stephenson, Mercedes Stephenson, M. (2015). Information Operations in Afghanistan from 2001-2012 (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/26526 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/2034 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Information Operations in Afghanistan from 2001-2012 by Mercedes Stephenson A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF STRATEGIC STUDIES GRADUATE PROGRAM IN MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CALGARY, ALBERTA DECEMBER, 2014 © Mercedes Stephenson 2014 Abstract Mercedes Stephenson, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary. Abstract for Master’s Thesis, Submitted 27 November 2014: Information Operations in Afghanistan from 2001-2012 This thesis describes and analyses Taliban and coalition information operations related to the Afghanistan war between the years 2001 and 2012. Academic literature is reviewed and analyzed, as well as coalition and Taliban information products. The thesis examines the nature of counterinsurgency and information operations in an evolving media environment. The messages, mediums used to deliver information products, strategy, posture, organization, and media engagement of both combatants are analyzed to evaluate their contribution to the combatants’ respective influence and political goals. This thesis finds that the Taliban had a superior understanding of the target audiences, developed messages with greater resonance, and delivered them more effectively than the coalition was able to do. It also contends that the Taliban’s strategy, organization and capacity for information operations allowed it to out maneuver the coalition on the information battleground. This thesis finds that the Taliban was able to conduct more effective and influential information operations than the coalition. ii Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. Barry Cooper who was always available to teach, guide, critique and encourage. I would also like to thank my thesis defence committee for their time and consideration, Dr. John Ferris, Dr. Joshua Goldstein and Dr. Frank Towers. The Centre for Military and Strategic Studies nurtured in me a passion for security and defence issues and I will always reflect fondly on the time spent with CMSS and the University of Calgary, both in Calgary and from Ottawa. To my editor, Helen Morris, thank you for the diligence, insights and excellent punctuation. I also would like to thank my colleagues and the leadership at CTV News and Bell Media for supporting me in pursuing this work. My bureau chief, Robert Fife encouraged me to take on this challenge and finish it. Thank you to my friend and colleague, Don Martin, who took on extra work when I was away writing. I would also like to thank Lisa Beaton, Executive Producer of News Channel and Ramneek Gill, Senior Producer, both of whom actively supported me pursuing this degree while I worked full time. Thank you to Bell Media for the support from the Bell Media Educational Assistance fund. I owe a debt of gratitude to all my colleagues at Ottawa National Bureau who patiently asked about my progress and cheered me on. To my family, I could never have finished this without your support. Mom and Dad, thanks for believing I could do this, even when I doubted myself. To my incredible fiancé Dan Mader: provider of pep talks, advocate of the oxford comma, feedback guru, and incredible friend and partner, you are my heart and my strength. Finally thank you to my late Grandma, Evelyn MacAulay, who taught me the value of education and always encouraged me. iii Dedication For all those who served Canada in Afghanistan. iv Table of Contents Abstract............................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ iii Table of Contents.................................................................................................................v List of Tables .................................................................................................................... vii List of Figures and Illustrations ....................................................................................... viii List of Symbols, Abbreviations and Nomenclature........................................................... ix Epigraph...............................................................................................................................x CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: DEFINITIONS / CONCEPTS ...............................1 1.1 Thesis Statement........................................................................................................1 1.2 Definitions and Terms ...............................................................................................1 1.3 Theoretical Underpinnings ........................................................................................7 1.4 Afghanistan From Counter-terrorism to Counterinsurgency.....................................7 1.5 Insurgency: an “Armed Political Competition”.........................................................9 1.6 People As the Centre of Gravity: “Hearts and Minds”............................................11 1.7 Information Operations: The Role of Influence ......................................................14 1.8 Battle Terrain: Understanding A Changed Information Battlefield ........................15 1.9 Evaluating Information Operations: Message Delivery and Resonance .................23 CHAPTER TWO: MESSAGING......................................................................................25 2.1 Overview..................................................................................................................25 2.2 Insurgent Themes and Messages .............................................................................26 2.3 Introduction to Taliban Themes and Messages .......................................................27 2.4 Religion and Culture: Essential Shaping Factors ....................................................28 2.5 Taliban Themes and Messages ................................................................................32 2.5.1 Legitimacy and Corruption..............................................................................32 2.5.2 Xenophobic Messaging ...................................................................................36 2.5.3 Civilian Casualties...........................................................................................40 2.5.4 Power, Presence and Coercive Credibility ......................................................49 2.5.5 Time.................................................................................................................51 2.5.6 Coalition Casualties and Intractable Violence ................................................53 2.6 Coalition Messaging ................................................................................................56 2.6.1 Lack of Religious and Cultural Understanding...............................................57 2.6.2 Coalition Themes and Messages .....................................................................62 2.6.3 Promises vs. Reality ........................................................................................69 2.6.4 Deteriorating Relationship...............................................................................70 CHAPTER THREE: GETTING THE MESSAGE OUT ..................................................73 3.1 Radio........................................................................................................................74 3.2 Key Leader Engagement..........................................................................................76 3.3 Night Letters ............................................................................................................79 3.4 Traveling Poets and Preachers.................................................................................81 3.5 Audio Cassettes........................................................................................................84 3.6 Printed publications .................................................................................................85 3.7 Spokesmen...............................................................................................................86 v 3.8 Online Communications ..........................................................................................89 3.9 DVDs .......................................................................................................................95 3.10 Coalition Message Delivery...................................................................................97 CHAPTER