“A Force They Haven't Seen Before”

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“A Force They Haven't Seen Before” “A FORCE THEY HAVEN’T SEEN BEFORE” INSURGENT ISIS IN CENTRAL SYRIA GREGORY WATERS APRIL 2020 POLICY PAPER 2020-9 CONTENTS * 1 ABSTRACT * 1 METHODOLOGY * 2 INTRODUCTION * 3 DAMASCUS RECLAIMS THE BADIA * 4 ISIS “COUNTER-OFFENSIVE” PHASE: NOV. 10, 2017 TO JAN. 31, 2018 * 6 ISIS “INSURGENCY” PHASE: FEB. 1, 2018 TO PRESENT * 10 ISIS’ TARGETS * 12 LOOKING FORWARD SUMMARY Immediately after the Syrian regime and its allies captured central Syria in late 2017, ISIS began waging an effective and deadly insurgency in the area. It first targeted urban centers along the western Euphrates before shifting focus in spring 2018 to the transport lines and mountains running along the M20 from Khunayfis to Shoula. These wide-ranging operations have killeda minimum of 860 pro-regime fighters of all ranks, units, and types. This report tracks self-reported regime losses in the region, as indicated on loyalist Facebook pages, community pages, and unit pages, from Nov. 10, 2017 through March 31, 2020. While the numbers of men killed and trends over time are not exact, they are meant to provide a baseline for the deaths inflicted by the insurgency. In addition, extensive interviews were conducted with members of the National Defense Forces stationed in Palmyra and Uqayribat to support the analysis of this data. ABSTRACT through March 31, 2020. These “martyrs” are reported on loyalist Facebook pages, community pages, and unit pages. In ISIS began waging an effective and deadly general, most martyrdom posts include the insurgency in central Syria immediately after location of death — with varying degrees of the Syrian regime and its allies captured specificity — although during this period the area in late 2017. ISIS’ operations first there were an additional 160 martyrs targeted urban centers along the western reported with no location given. Euphrates before shifting focus in spring The larger limitation with this method, 2018 to the transport lines and mountains however, is the lack of reporting from running along the M20 from Khunayfis to central Syria. Many deaths go unreported, Shoula. These operations have reached as sometimes because the bodies cannot be far west as Khunayfis — just 40 miles from recovered or the men are assumed missing Damascus Governorate — as far north as — all too common a situation in the remote Rahjan, Hama — just 15 miles from Idlib mountains and empty desert that make up Governorate — and span the length of the the Badia region. Compounding this is the Euphrates from Boukamal in the south to fact that the deaths of reconciled rebels Ruseifa in the north. In the past week alone are almost wholly unreported. Martyrdom ISIS launched two simultaneous attacks reporting is a communal activity, relying in Homs, followed by a third attack in on family, friends, or community leaders to north Hama the next day. The insurgency publicize the death of a local. Rebels who has killed a minimum of 860 pro-regime have reconciled and joined the ranks of fighters, with the true number of deaths regime forces rarely receive such honors, likely being twice that. From brigadiers and if they do, news of their deaths is and ex-rebels to Republican Guard and rarely shared outside their community. This local militias, every type of unit and soldier second factor makes it particularly difficult has been targeted by these sophisticated to find out about such deaths due to the attacks. impossibility of searching every Facebook page for every Syrian community. Outside of ex-rebels, the deaths of poor and single loyalist martyrs often go unreported as METHODOLOGY there is no one in their hometowns with the means to share the news. Unlike most research on ISIS this report All this is to say that the numbers of men almost entirely ignores the group’s local killed and trends over time presented propaganda, relying instead on reporting here are not exact, but meant to provide from its opponents, the Syrian regime a baseline for the deaths inflicted by the forces. Self-reported regime losses in the insurgency. Extensive interviews were region were collected from Nov. 10, 2017 conducted with members of the National 1 Defense Forces (NDF) stationed in Palmyra concerted push to reclaim Jabal Bishri, the and Uqayribat in order to support the mountain range between Sukhnah and analysis of this data. Deir Ez Zor that had been under ISIS control since April 2019. This push coincided with an NDF advance in southeast Raqqa, INTRODUCTION “clearing” tens of kilometers of land around the town of Ruseifa. While appearing on the surface to be major More than 40 men died in the three-week successes, both of these operations made battle to capture Uqayribat from ISIS in little actual progress. Few ISIS fighters or late August, 2017. The town had been a equipment were killed or captured in either stronghold of the terrorist group, with the advance, and according to Mohammad, vast majority of its male population fighting “ISIS have partially relocated or rather in its ranks. Now it is nearly empty, still spread their best forces after the full largely in ruins, reduced once more to an takeover of Jabal Bishri. Now there are just unimportant backwater town in the years some cells in this area.” following the expulsion of ISIS. But in early 2020 Uqayribat once again became a Indeed, regime forces had to wait only one frontline town. “There is some worry that month to see the failure of their operations. ISIS will use the M45 to attack Hama, or After a lull in attacks during the second half rather we know that they are planning that,” of March, ISIS has erupted across central Mohammad, a member of the NDF recently Syria in the first 10 days of April. Attacks have deployed to Uqayribat, told the author in occurred in southwest Deir Ez Zor, on the March. “From here to Palmyra, there is very highway between Shoula and Ruseifa, and little population but ISIS activity.” on Jabal Bishri itself. Meanwhile, on April 9 ISIS conducted two simultaneous attacks This most recent deployment is just the next that carried on into April 10 — one just step in the cat and mouse game between south of Sukhnah and the second around the regime and ISIS cells. “We have this Wadi Waer, near the Iraqi border. On April info about a serious attack though, so 10, ISIS launched the attack Mohammad preparations are being made,” continued and his men had been waiting for — except Mohammad. “Often they cancel the plans if instead of striking along the now reinforced there is some show of force.” This has been M45, ISIS militants managed to move along the crux of the regime’s anti-ISIS operations: the M42, past the large town of Ithriya, and shifting forces around hoping to scare off attacked the town of Rahjan in northern any major attack. More often than not this Hama near the Idlib border. simply results in the ambush of regime patrols, but recently some “progress” has A notable development prior to this most been made. In February, Russian forces recent ISIS surge was the involvement joined Syrian Arab Army (SAA) units in a of the Russian military in “clearing” Jabal 2 “This new operation [in Jabal Bishri] appears to mark the first time Russian forces have taken an offensive role in the region since 2017, more than two years after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his own victory over ISIS.” (Photo by GEORGE OURFALIAN/AFP via Getty Images) Bishri. Prior to the Jabal Bishri operation, DAMASCUS RECLAIMS Russian military units were concentrated in Palmyra, helping ensure the town was THE BADIA protected from any potential ISIS attack, and only used their air force on the rare On May 23, 2017, the Syrian regime occasion when they directly engaged ISIS. concluded its operation in the eastern This new operation appears to mark the first Damascus countryside and launched a time Russian forces have taken an offensive major offensive against ISIS in central Syria. role in the region since 2017, more than two The aim was eventually to lift the siege years after Russian President Vladimir Putin of Deir Ez Zor, where regime forces had announced his own victory over ISIS, stating fended off ISIS attacks since July 2014. “if the terrorists raise their heads again, we On May 31, 2017 a concurrent operation will strike them with a force they haven’t was launched in east Hama in support seen before.”1 And yet, since those strong of the central Syria advances. These two words ISIS has killed over 800 loyalist offensives ended on Sept. 27 and Oct. 3, fighters in hundreds of brazen attacks and respectively, with over 1,000 reported pro- infiltrated dozens of miles behind regime regime deaths. Palmyra, Arak, Sukhna, and lines. Deir Ez Zor cities had been freed from ISIS, and the western Euphrates from Deir Ez Zor to Raqqa was under Damascus’ control. 3 But on Sept. 28, 2017, ISIS launched a ISIS “COUNTER- major counter-offensive, the first sign that territorial loss in no way meant the defeat of OFFENSIVE” PHASE: the group. While lasting only three weeks, NOV. 10, 2017 TO JAN. the al-Adnani Offensive, as ISIS named it, 31, 2018 briefly succeeded in capturing or besieging every settlement between Palmyra and Deir Ez Zor, as well as capturing the town For the first three months following of Qaryatayn, near the border of Damascus Damascus’ victory announcement, ISIS Governorate. At least 300 loyalist fighters largely focused its campaign on the string were reported killed in the offensive and of towns stretching from Boukamal to regime counter. Mayadeen. This phase of the insurgency Following this, Damascus renewed its anti- involved massive, sustained attacks on ISIS operations, seizing the large town urban centers.
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