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HE&SUR, Raghtvendra KAshavarao, 1936- SOCIAL MOBILIZATION, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIL VIOLENCE IN THE INDIAN STATES. The American University, Ph.D., 1975 Political Science, general

Xmrox UnlvmHy Mfterofllmi, AmiArtw.M+ohn^^io* THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

AND

CIVIL VIOLENCE IN THE INDIAN STATES

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirement* for

the Degree of Doctor of Philoeophy:

Government

Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebeur

January 1975

Accepted; Dean

Date: (ZtfV p^rvC Committee chairm.

THE iUERICAli UNIVERSITY LIBRARY TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page LIST OF TABLES...... iii

LIST OF FIGURES ...... iii

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION...... 1

II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES . . . , 13

Theories of Civil violence...... 15 The Impact of Social Mobilization ...... 3 2 The Nature of Political Development ...... 49 A Review of Findings of Empirical Studies * . 6 2 Study of Violence in India...... 76 The Context of the Indian States...... , . 8 3 Hypotheses...... 86

III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA PRESENTATION ...... 100

Operational Measures of Social Mobilization . 100 Operational Measures of Political Develop­ ment...... 102 Operational Measures of Political Hardships . 118 Operational Measures of Civil Violence. . . . 120 Derivation of the Total Measures of Social Mobilization, Political Development and Political Hardships ...... 132

IV. TEST OF HYPOTHESES -1 ...... 139

V, TEST OF HYPOTHESES-II AND FACTOR ANALYSIS . . . 162

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH...... 189

APPENDIX I...... 201

APPENDIX I I ...... 213

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 228 LIST OF TABLES

Page Levels of Social Mobilization in the Indian States...... 103

University Students as Ratio of Population in the Indian States...... 104

Levels of Political Development in the Indian States...... 119

Levels of Political Hardships in the Indian States...... 1 2 1

The Scale of Magnitude of Civil Violence . . . 128

Levels of Civil violence and Communist Voting in the Indian States...... 131

Transformed Standard Scores for Social Mobilization Indicators...... 134

Transformed Standard Scores for Political Development Indicators ...... 135

Transformed Standard Scores for Political Hardships...... 136

Matrix of Intercorrelations Among the 22 Variables ...... 146

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of the 22 Variables , ...... 185

LIST OF FIGURES

Social Mobilization and Political Develop­ ment: Correlation and Regress ion. . . . 140

Social Mobilization and Ratio of Political Development to Social Mobilization: Correlation and Regression ...... 141

Social Mobilization and Civil violence: Correlation and Regression ...... 164

Social Mobilization and Civil Violence (Low Mobilization States Only): Correlation and Regression ...... 165

Social Mobilization and Civil Violence (High Mobilization States Only): Correlation and Regression ...... 166

iii j/ T” 4- 4- 4------INDIA < V -T J A M M U J POLITICAL DIVISIONS C AMD / 1969 j KASHMIR J HjO160 10 4 HjO160 ion HO Mitt) 1-- 1-- 1 ■■ r .' > O E r a . AMO. M ( PO 100 KD 4(0 900 f ' i P i

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r- i tj-- I i-e1. A lj--^j .A \j1' ": I >. Irl I I 1 I ■ I k l-’-i i I IJI h I . f* ( iiahu I N J L k r 11 , i A LiP-l I •■ * ) I

i . .. i i j ii > n V

iv PREFACE

Both during the formulation of the dissertation

proposal and the completion of the project itself, I was

very fortunate to receive the assistance, advice and

comments from many persons in the United States and India.

The idea of the dissertation arose in the various

seminars on Comparative Politics which I took at the

School of Government and Public Administration (SGPA),

The American University (AU), Washington, D.C,, during

1967-1970. Or. (Mrs,) Coralie Bryant, the Chairman of my dissertation Committee encouraged me from the very

beginning in the pursuit of the project, it is impossible

to exaggerate her kindness, help and patience towards me which, however, did not dilute her critical review.

Or. Glynn Wood and Professor Charles Ruttenberg were

helpful with their incisive comments, suggestions and

guidance.

My years with the SGPA turned out to be enriching

and rewarding beyond my expectations. I am particularly

indebted to Dean Earl H. Delongf Dean Robert E. Cleary

and Dean A. Dee Fritschler who all encouraged and helped me pursue my doctoral career at the AU.

I shall never forget the affection and help I have

received from my classmates at the AU, Mr. and Mrs, Steven

v L. London, now of TIvorton (R.I.). Another friend in

Washington, D.C,, Hr. Sumner McKnight also goaded me In

this undertaking.

This project could not have been completed without

the cooperation of innumerable persons in India. Dr. L.

S. Bhat, Associate Professor in the Indian Statistical

Institute, New Delhi, gave me invaluable assistance and

comments. It is very difficult to thank, him adequately.

I am grateful to Hr. A. N. Sharma also of the Indian

Statistical Institute, who did the cartographic drawings

so w e l l .

I am also grateful to the Indian Council of Social

Science Research and particularly to Hr. J . P. Naik,

Member-Secretary, and Dr, Ramaahray Roy, Director, for granting me financial assistance during 1973-1974. I have insnensely benefitted from my discussions with

D r . R o y ,

vi CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Violence— both individual or criminal on the one hand, and civil, collective, social or political, on the other— is not a peculiarly modern phenomenon. Instances of murder, arson, of even regicides, tynannicides and slave uprisings can be found scattered in history. But what is really unique to the modem times is the frequent and increasing outbreaks of a kind of violence--riots, civil wars, political assassina­ tions, coups d fetat and revolution.

The role of violence in the society has engaged many astute and creative minds. Marx and Engels considered violence as the midwife of the revolution ushering in a new order. Sorel, feeling cheated by the revisionist stance of many European Parliamentary Socialists, advocated violence as a means to restore to socialism its revolutionary fervour.1

Simmel saw in violence the efforts of an organism to rid itself of pathological disturbances. To him, conflicts were the methods to 'resolve dualisms* and of 'achieving some

1Georges Sorel, Reflections on violence Trans. T. E. Hulme and J, Roth, {Glencoe, 111,: The Free Press, 1950). Proletarian Strikes, which, to Sorel, were the paws of violence, are now the accepted and legal tactics of the labour in many states.

1 2

kind of unity1 More recently, Arendt has tried to show

how inconsistent it is on the part of the black power

advocates and student militants to derive support from

Marx, etc.3 Sartre sees man recreating himself through

violence.*

These and similar speculations, however insightful and

persuasive, can never be the substitutes of scientific

inquiries into the nature and causes of violence. They can

not answer the fundamental questions like: why are some

kinds of societies more prone to violence than the others?

Under which circumstances do the people consider it worth

their while to resort to violence? Partial answers to these

questions may be found in the works of the students of

revolutions.5 But the revolutions, though dramatic, constitute

only one species in the entire genus of violence. The early writers like Brinton and Edwards ignored the other forms which

have become ubiquitous these days. According to Eckstein,

some of these writers focus mainly on the great revolutions

^Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, trans. Kurt H. Wolff and ReinBord Bendix, (Glencoe, flT*! The Free Press, 1955), p. 13.

^Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.}.

^Jean Paul Sartre quoted in Arendt, Ibid., p. 12.

^See, for example. Crane Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution, {New York: Norton, 1939); Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolutions, {Chicago: University of Chicago P r e s s , 1927}; George Pettee, The Process of Revolution (New York: Harper, 1938). 3 between 1640 and 1917, and "draw mammoth inferences from

too few cases; - * .they are neither very scientific nor very historical.”*’ Nonetheless, these early writers on violence have inspired fresh conceptualization and hypotheses on the revolutions and other manifestations of violence.?

Despite the famous dictum of Clausewitz that war is a continuation of peace by other means, and its obverse coined by an anonymous writer that peace is a continuation of war by other meansf violent phenomena have, by and large, been treated as abnormal and arbitrary. In the Princeton Seminar

(1963) Eckstein found, ", * . .the greater the author’s concern with internal war, the leBS he seems to use the social science equipment."® The political dynamics and dimensions

*>Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," in Ivo K. Feierabend Rosalind L. Feierabend and Ted Robert Gurr, {Ed.), Anger, Violence and Politics; Theories and Research (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972) pjp, 9-30, Quotation on pp. 10-11.

?See, for example, Chalmers Johnson Revolutionary Change, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1967) ; James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in Feierabend et al. (Ed.) A n g e r ...... op. cit. , pp. 67-94; James C. Davies, "The Circumstances and Causes of Revolution; A Review," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 1967) pp. 247-57; Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlor Sky "A Theory of Revolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11, No. 3 {Sept. 1967) pp. 240-200; Lawrence Stone, ^Theories of Revolution," World Politics, Vol. IB, No. 2 (Jan. L&66) pp. 159-76. The theoretical perspectives, empirical findings and methodology of these and other studies will be reviewed in chapters II and III.

®Harry Eckstein, 11 Introduction; Toward the Theoretical Study of internal War," in Harry Eckstein; (Ed.) Internal War: Problems and Approaches, {New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964) pp. 1-32. 4

of violence, according to Niebury, were slurred over by D imputing them to aberrant individuals or backward nations.

Bienen complains, "■ violence as a prism for see­

ing change has not been well exploited...... Similar views

have been expressed by ArendtH and Dhanagare.^

The reasons for this relative neglect of violence, until

it suddenly seised our minds a decade ago, have been many.

Eckstein says that the problem itself wasnot processed to

meet the theoretical needs of the social scientists.1-'3 Despite

the inheritance of both order and conflict theories of society,

the social scientists were preoccupied with the stable social

models.1'4 Against the stable model of social system, held

together by consensus and integration, and interdependence

of its elements, Dahrendorf puts forward an equally plausible

model of society in which change and conflict are ubiquitous,

®H, d . Nieburg, Political Violence: The Behavioral Process (New York: St. Martinfs Press, 1S69).

Henry Bienen, Violence and Social Change: A Review of Current Literature (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968). Bienen, however, 3oes not deal with the dynamics of social change at all.

^Arendt, On Violence, op. cit. , p. 63,

N, Dhanagare, Violence and Politics in India, Political Science in India: A Trend Report. (New Delhi; Indian Council of Social Science Research, 1971) Mimeo. pp. -12,

I'3"Introduction: Toward, , . ." op. cit.

*4John Horton, "Order and Conflict Theories of Social Problems as Competing Ideologies," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 71, No, 6 (May 1966} , pp. 701-711. 5 and tha elements can be seen as held together by constraint.15

Feldman says that violence was considered as "an incidental intrusion" in this "excessively stable and tame" picture of society.16 Violence has often been attributed to the 'riff­ raff* and psychopaths1? and, in the Indian context, to the budmashes and qoondas18 {bad characters and professional hoodlums). Host of the judicial inquiry commissions into the causes of riots in India and justifiability of the police firing adopt the same administrative-police viewpoint,19

i^Arnold s. Feldman, "Violence and Volatility: The Likelihood of Revolution," in Eckstein {Ed,} Internal W a r ...... op. cit., pp. 111-12B. Quotation on pp. 111-2.

17For comments on the 'riff-raff' theory, see Nieburg, Political Violence, op. cit., pp. 19-21; David Abrahamsen, Our Violent Society (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), p. 16i. “---

18S. K. Ghosh, Riots: Prevention and Control (Calcutta: Eastern Law douse, 1971)? B. Mullfk, Civil Disturbances (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1966). Both the authors held very high positions in the Indian Police Service. Ghosh discusses how a mob collects, the psychology of a mob, how tensions build up and why hoodlums exploit the situation.

19See, for example, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Report of the (Mr. Justice Dayal) Commission of Inquiry on the Communal Disturbances, Ranchi-Hatia (Aug. 22-29, 1967} , (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1968) \ Government of Gujarat, Report (of the Mr. Justice Jaganmohan Reddy Commission) of Inquiry into the Communal Disturbances at Ahmedabad and Other Places in Gujarat on and after 15th September 1969, (Ahmedabad: Government of Gujarat, 19"?1) . Only occasionally these Commissions refer to deeper social causes. Justice Dayal says that the Hindu-Moslem tensions in Ranchi were building up for some years because the Hindu refugees from Pakistan had been increasingly taking to fruit and vegetable vending business and plying taxis, which were for long the monopoly of the Moslems. (op . c i t . , p. 90). 6

Many social scientists and even journal late have sought to

rebut this argument*20

Many classical and modern sociologists, obsessed

with typologies, have overlooked the dislocations--sometimes

leading to violent eruptions— caused by the process of

modernization* Such ideo-typical claasifications as Maine's

societies of status and contract, Toennies1 Gemeinschaft and

Gesselschaft, Durkheim's societies of mechanical and organic

solidarity, Weber's traditional, charismatic and bureaucratic-

rational societies, or even Apter's mobilization, reconcilia­

tion, theocratic and bureaucratic t y p e s , apart from ignoring

20Myron Weiner, Politics of Scarcity; The Public Pressure and Political Response in India (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1972), p* 229. s* Krishnaswamy, "A Riot in Bombay, August 11, 1893: A Study in Hindu-Muslim Relations in Western India During the Late Nineteenth Century* (Unpublished Doctor's Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1966) Microfilm, p. 44. Ajit Bhattacharjea, Report on Ahmedabad (New Delhi: Sampradayikta Virodhi Conmittee, N.D.) pZ 10, Richard E. Rubenstein, Rebels in Eden: Mass Political Violence in the United States, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970) pp. ISft-92. “

2-*-Henry Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society anJ its Relation to Modern Ideas (London j Lardon J. Murray, 1861)1 Ferdinand Toennies, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (1887) trans. by Charles P. Loomis, Fundamental Concepts of Sociology (New York: American Book Company, 1940) ; Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (189 3) trans. by George Simpson^ (Glencoe, TTT71 The Free Press, 19 49); Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M* Henderson and Talcott Parsons, (Glencoe, iTl. : The Free Press, 1947); David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965). 7 the fusion of the ideal types in the real world, do not help us much in analyzing the causes of the agonies and travails of modernization. Their focus, as Pye remarks,

"is on the differences in types of societies and not on the dynamics of change or transition."22

It is only recently that violence is being studied in the perspective of social change. Its role as a normal method of political participation is being recognized. Almond and Powell see violence and demonstrations as one of the methods of interest articulation.2^ Payne argues that the labor groups in Peru have no other alternative hut to resort to violence to make their demands felt and heeded.2^ Easton argues that in the transitional societies the demand over­ load accompanied by the lack of 'gatekeeping' institutions has produced a "style of politics notable for its dependence on violence and mass action." He continues, "Demonstrations, riots, mass rallies and the like have become important mechanisms for expressing and communicating demands,,,25

22Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development {Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 62,

2:jGabriel A, Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr,( Comparative Polities; A Developmental Approach (Boston; Little Brown and Co,, 1966), p. 01,

2^James L. Payne, Labor and Politics in Peru (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1065),

25David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 196?), p. 122. ' 8

According to Coser, violence is not merely a protest, but

a claim to be considered * 2 6

It does not mean that violence can be considered only

as a dependent variable, in the sense that it is produced

by certain kinds of social processes under certain

circumstances. Violence can also produce major structural

changes in the society. Kornhauser says that violence can

lead to political development like extension of citizenship,

removal of arbitrary authority.27 Popper argues that

violence can help political development by disorganizing the

traditional social structures, by facilitating the emergence of political parties, etc.2®

The importance of the study of violence, especially in

the context an increasing pace of social change,29 has

suddenly burst upon us. The frequent resort to revolutions,

and coups to change the governments in the developing

^Lewis A. Coser, "Some Social Functions of Violence," in "Patterns of Violence," Armais of the Academy of Social and Political Science, Vol. 364 {March 1966) , pp. Y3-14^

2?William Kornhauser, "Rebellion and Political Davelop- ment, " in Eckstein, Internal War. ^ ~ op. cit., pp. H2-156.

28f . Popper, "Internal War as a Stimulant to Political Development," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Jan. 1971) pp. 413-423.

2®Among the many works on social change, see Wilbert E. Moore, Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 19 63) ,* Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins {Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, Inc. 1963}. Neil J. Smelser, "Processes of Social Change" in Neil J. Smelser, (Ed.), Sociology: An Introduction, (New York, John Wiley and Sons, I n c ~ IU67) pp. 674-Tiff^ 9

societies, to rioting in order to change the policies, and

the chronic insurgencies have all made us realize that

violence has deeper societal causes. Even the economically

most advanced countries are not free from the process of

social change, and one of them, the United States, has

witnessed a most violent decade in the sixties.

Unlike the physicists, the political scientists are

unable to say that new research should take place only on

the periphery of the well established and interrelated

theories. For, political science has no such centre or

periphery. Nor will such a centre or core emerge. That is

because even the low order uniformities of human behavior we have discovered are subject to change in time and place.

Perhaps, there are no uniformities in the change in

uniformities. But this does not mean that the attempts to

discover, through the behavioral approach, the uniformities

and regularities in the human behavior should be altogether

abandoned. On the contrary, they should be pursued with

continual improvements in concepts and methods. Even in the

areas like voting behavior where a lot of research haB been

invested, we need to replicate the research and incorporate

innovations. The importance, therefore, of testing theories

and speculations in the frontier area of civil violence need

not be overstressed.

It is the purpose of the dissertation to examine the

theories of violence in the context of social change, to 10

review the hypotheses end the theories that have been proposed

and tested in other contexts, to frame new hypotheses and test

them in the context of the Indian States, This study revolves

around the three major concepts of social mobilization, poli­

tical development and civil violence, with a few variables on

impoverishment and inequalities in the distribution of wealth

thrown in. Various social scientists have analyzed these

concepts in their multi-dimensional aspects and implications

with respect to single processes in a country or unit, or

across a number of countries.30 This study is not an exercise

in any one of the concepts, but an attempt to pull together

the important theorizings, speculations and findings of

research in each one of these into an organized whole and

test their relevance and validity in the Indian context.

Naturally, when there are three major fields of inquiries,

only a few aspects of each of them can be pulled together.

There is another justification for this study. The proc­

esses of social mobilization and political development have been,

generally speaking, conceptualized and explicated, and their

consequences and impact predicted, at the systemic l e v e l s . 31

3^since the meaning of the concepts and the theoretical interlocking among them will be explored and examined in the following Chapter, it is not necessary to anticipate the works here.

3*Only a few representative works may be cited here: Lucian W. Pye, Aspec :s of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. , 1966; Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics. . , , op. cit.; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970} ; Karl W. Deutsch,"Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No, 3 ^Sept. 1961) pp. 493-514"." 11

As LaPaloinbara notes, there has been a growing gulf between the omnibus theories and modela at the systemic level on the one hand, and their rigorous testing on the other. 32 It la hoped this study, involving as it does a comparison of the

States in India, will go some way in filling the gap between micro-studlea and macro-theories.

The Indian States have witnessed increasing violence on a large number of issues. There have been violent attempts at secession in Nagaland, and sub-regional separation in Andhra

Pradesh. While Tamil Nadu had the anti-Hindi riots, Maharashtra ) the anti-migrant Shiv Sena disturbances. Quite a few States have seen the periodic eruptions of Hindu-fluslim conflicts.

A sizeable portion of the disturbances in West Bengal have been connected with the leftist parties. Each of these kinds of violence can be taken up and studied in their historical perspectives in terms of the people’s response, areas affected etc.33 Or, there can be micro-studies of a single incident examining how tensions build up, which parties are involved, how a riot is sparked, etc.3* All these can be rich in detail.

This study does not go into the origin, development, and

32Joseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories and Microapplica­ tions in Comparative Politics; A Widening Chasm," Comparative Politics, Vol. t, No, I (Oct. 196B) pp. 52-79.

33See, for example, L. Natarajan, Peasant Uprising in India, 1850-1900 (Bombay, People's Publishing House, 1953),

3*Krishnaswamy, "A Riot in Bombay:* . , 11 op. cit. ; Darry D*monte, "Bhiwandi: The Anatomy of a Riot, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 22 (May 30, 1970) pp. B69-871. 12

outcome of any of the violent agitations. Batherf it seeks

to examine if the total violence in the Indian States can

be explained with reference to twenty or so variables

reflecting the theoretical framework to be developed here*

No doubt, rich details have been sacrificed for the sake of

an attempt at parsimonious theories. In this sense, this

study is in the tradition of those by Gurr and the Feierabends, 35

In Chapter III, the various theories of civil violence

have been examined* The nature of social mobilization and

political development have been discussed along with their

impact on the causes of civil violence* Many related

empirical works have been reviewed. The Chapter then presents

the hypotheses along with additional support, if any.

Chapter II reviews the strength and weaknesses of the major

attempts to derive operational measures of social mobilization,

political development and civil violence* The data on the

variables adopted are also presented. Chapter IV reports on

the test of the first three hypotheses and also analyzes the

portion of the intercorrelation matrix relevant to these*

The tests of the remaining hypotheses and results of the factor

analysis are given in Chapter V, Chapter VI gives the con­

clusions and suggestions for further research,

■^Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, Cross-National Studies in Civil Violence (Washington, D.C. : The American University, 19£9J ; Ted Gurr, "Sources of Rebellion in Western Societies** Some Quantitative Evidence." Annals of the American Academy of Political Science,11 Collective Violence,* VoTT! J91 (Sept. 1570) , pp! 12B-144 j ivo k ., and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Systemic Conditions of Political Violence: An Application of Frustration-Agr ession Theory" in Feierabend, et al. , Anger. . . , op * cit., pp. 107-188. ' CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES

The acts of both criminal and civil violence involve

injuries to persona and damage to property and, sometimes, no hard and fast line can be drawn between them. Nor is

it denied that there are deeper social malaises which produce thefts, arson, murder and similar acta of criminal violence. Still, they are two different forms of aggression.

According to Etzioni, individual or small group violence does not tend to have societal consequences unless it reaches a very high level.^ The essential difference is that involve­ ment of the people in the acts of civil violence and the

selection of targets of attack are produced by different kinds of motivations. Ruttenberg defines civil violence as

"all collective non-governmental attacks on persons or property, resulting in intentional damage to them, that occur within the boundaries of an autonomous or colonial unit.”2

lAmitai Etzioni, '’Violence,11 in Robert K, Merton and Robert Nisbet (ed.), Contemporary Social Problems (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovlch, Inc., 1971) pp. 709-742.

^Charles Ruttenberg, "Measures of Civil Violence," Chapter 4, in Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, Cross-National Studies of Civil Violence (Washington, B.C.: The American University^ 1969) ppT 30-37. Quotation on p. 30,

13 14

He addi, "For operational purposes collective refers to at least 20 people, in order to exclude most criminal acts and juvenile delinquency.*13 But it is conceivable, and it has actually happened many times, that a conspiracy against government or an attack on another ethnic etc. group, can be organized and undertaken by leas than 20 persons. Political assassinations have been committed by single individuals.

Criminal violence should be excluded by the definition of civil violence itself, and not by any operational referents.

To Gurr *'. , .political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors — including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies.It includes such events as revolutions, coups d'etat, rebellion, riots, guerrilla wars, etc. But, Gurr's label 'political violence' and the notion of ’competing political groups' seem a bit restrictive, although they include all the manifestations of such violence. Of course, attacks on the incumbents of a regime, say the police, or the regime's property, are the instances of political violence- But, one has to stretch the meaning of political regime and its incumbents to include the attacks, say, by the students on the university authorities or property. Nor do the students and the university constitute

3I b i d .

^Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1970) pp. 1-2. IS

'conptting political groups.* Grinshow's definition ia parsimonious as well as wide: '’Social violence ia assault upon an individual or his property solely or primarily because of his membership in a social category."^ (The adjectives civil, collective, mass, political, social have been employed by different scholars to designate this type of attacks on life and property,)

THEORIES OF CIVIL VIOLENCE

There is no dearth of theorizing or speculations on the causes of civil violence. Some of the theories and specula­ tions are so wide as to include all kinds of aggression, although violence--both criminal and civil, is only one form of aggression. The theory that the riff-raff, the mischievous and anti-social elements cause violence has been noted in the earlier chapter. The more serious theories can be grouped into three classes: (1) the individual oriented theories;

(2) social-psychological theories; and (3) the social structural theories.

1. The individual oriented theories:

Etzioni has briefly summed the biological explanations of violence, which suggest that violence is rooted in "man's

Allen D. Grimehaw, * Interpreting Collective Violence: An Argument for the Importance of Social Structure," in Annals of the American Academy of Politleal and Social Sciences^ "Collective Violence," Vol. 3 5 1 (September 1971) pp, 9-20. Quotation p. 12. 16

biological, animal or instinctual foundation."® He refutes

this by showing that not all share this view. According to

him some researchers have found that the intra-species

violence is less frequent among the animals. The Report

submitted to the National Commission on Violence has found,

"Neither genetic nor non-genetic abnormalities specifically

determine violent behavior."^ These abnormalities include

extra-chromosome and other forms. The authors suggest that

man may have the capacity, or ability for violence, but may

not necessarily have the instinct or drive. "This ability

is modulated by social and cultural experiences."®

Many psychoanalysts subscribe to the view that aggressive

tendencies flow from the maladjusted personality traits.

They have been ascribed to the unique personal experiences 9 of a person's very early life and traumas, especially sexual.

Abrahamsen believes, "when a man commits a violent crime,

it is inevitably on his unconscious feeling that he must show

his mother that he is not insignificant and is able to take

revenge upon her for rejecting him."-^ It has also been

^Etzioni in Merton, et al. Contemporary. . . , op. cit, , pp. 714-15, Also, Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression {New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1966).

^"Biological Explanations," in Donald J. Mulvihill and Melvin M, Tumin (ed,), Crimes of Violence, Vol, 12 , A Staff Report submitted to the^Natlonal Commission on the Cauee¥ and Prevention of Violence, (Washington , D,C. : Government Printing Office, 1969), pp* 418-432. Quotation on p. 431.

Blbid.

^Discussed in Grimshaw, "Interpreting, . , , *' op. cit.

i0David Abrahamsen, Our Violent Society (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970) p. IQ27 Original emphasis omitted. 17 suggested that human rage is due to the breakdown between the id— part of the psyche dealing with innate drive* and desires--and the Buper-ego^-part of the psyche that knows the societyrs rules.H But the Report to the National

Commission concludes that there is no scientific support to such theories. "Psychoanalysis is of little value when more and more people are getting involved in v i o l e n c e . 11 ^

If the biological and psychoanalytic theories consider violent tendencies as innate and inborn, the psychological theories in general consider them as responses triggered by stimuli. McNeilr in his detailed review of psychological theories of aggression, states that all human actions represent resolutions of a host of drives and conflicts of varying urgency. He suggests that the conflicts inherent in the choice of two most unpleasant alternatives evoke extreme forms of human behavior. 13

Around the concepts of frustration and aggression has been built a popular and largely persuasive body of psycho­ logical theories and hypotheses on violent behavior. These

11"Psychiatric and Psychoanalytic Explanations," Ch. 9 in Mulvihill and Tumin (ed.), Crimes of. . op. cit., pp. 453-466.

l^Ibid. , p. 465. For a further critique of the Psychia­ tric and Psychoanalytic approaches, see Edwin I. Megargee, "A Critical Review of Theories of Violence," Appendix 22, in Mulvihill and Tumin, Ibid., pp. 1037-1115. Bernold ChodorKoff and Seyraond Baxter, "Psychiatric and Psychoanalytic Theories of Violence," Appendix 23, Ibid. , 1117-62,

l^Elton B , McNeil. "Psychology and Aggression," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Sept. 1959) pp. 195-27 3. 18 theories and explanations, based on both speculations and clinical tests, are still to be established definitively.

But their importance stems from the following factors: they have been subjected to much testing, verifications, qualifications and corrections. Also, originating as explanations of individual criminal violence, they have provided inspiration, impetus and support to the social psychological explanations of civil violence. Dollard and his Yale associates state that aggression presupposes frustration and frustration always leads to some form of aggressive behavior.H Frustration provides the basic stimulus of anger. Aggressiveness is a function of the factors of instigation, inhibition and stimulus, Berkowitz extends the meaning of frustration to being criticized, etc.Megargee, however, feels that this dilutes the meaning of frustration.!6 It has been suggested that the threats or perceptions of frustration, its arbitrariness and suddeness are also the crucial f a c t o r s , ^ Also, disposition toward aggressiveness can be cumulative,!®

l^John Dollard, et al Frustration and Aggression (New Haven; Yale University Preset 1939) p"! T7

15Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: McGraw Hill, 19^2) p. Y6.

l^Hegargee, P'A Critical. . . * o p . c 11 .

^"Psychological Explanations. . in Mulvihill and Tumin, op. cit,, p. 435,

18lbid. 19

Etiioni^ and Magargee^O suggaat that . aggression can

be provoked alao by the Interruptions of normal psyslologlcal

activities like sleep, or by Intense heat, pain, etc. It might also be added that the sources and causes of frustration can be diffuse. Etzioni wonders why one aggressive individual may become a lawyer and another a criminal.21 Megargee reaches

the conclusion, "By and large, it is safe to suggest from the available evidence that frustration is not the only antecedent of aggression.11 22 Again, as Nieburg says, aggression may not be the only outcome of frustration; a frustrated individual may indulge in fantasies.2^ Nieburg continues, flThe social and psychological variables that constitute an external or internal block and intervene between frustration and aggression are too complex and diverse to be reduced to a simple reflex. . .

The simple frustration— aggression syndrome represents a very primitive state of the psychological art.*1^ Which targets will be attacked by the aggression-prone frustrated and under

^"Violence,” op. cit., p. 71B.

20«A Critical. . . .” op. c i t ., p. 1062.

21"Violence," o p . c i t ., p. 722.

22 Q p . c i t ., p. 1962♦

L* Nieburg, Political Violence t The Behavioral Process, (New York: St^ Martin's Press, 19^9}, p^ 41.

24Ibid., p. 41. 20 what circumstance* have also not been settled. According to Horowitz whether the frustrating agent himself is attacked {i.e. direct target) or a substitute or displaced target will be chosen will depend on the equation between the frustrated and the frustrating agent, and between the frustrated and the inhibitors.25 He continues, 11. . . (I)n actual practice, a great deal of ethnic aggression appears to be both direct and displaced.112*> He further notes that the frustration aggression literature contains "few of the findings derived from studies of crowd or mob behavior."2?

2. Social-Psychological Theories:

Despite the criticisms and modifications, as has been noted above, the fruetration-aggression theory, far from being demolished, not only continues to prevail, but also has provided the core around which explanations of group or collective violence have been built. According to Gurr, "The primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second, the politici­ zation of that discontent, and finally, its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors.

Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation

2^Donald L. Horowitz, "Direct, Displaced, and Cumulative Ethnic Aggression," Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (October 1971), p, 16,

2**Ibid. , p. 1, Original emphasis.

Ibid., p . 2. 21 is the basic instigating condition for participants in collective violence."2® He defines relative deprivation as actors1 perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. "value expecta­ tions are the goods and conditions of life to which they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping."2® Gurr describes three categories of values: welfare, power and interpersonal.30 The scope of relative deprivation depends on the number of population affected.

Its intensity is the extent of 'negative affect* associated with the perception of deprivation, Three of the many possible patterns of relative deprivation have been suggested by Gurr: decremental, aspirational and progressive which depend upon whether the value expectations and capabilities are rising, falling or static in relation to each other.32

Drawing upon a number of studies and speculations, Gurr hypothesizes: "The potential for collective violence varies

20Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men. . .o p . c i t ., pp. 12-13,

29ibid., p. 24.

3° Ibid, , p. 25-26.

3llbid., pp. 25-29,

32 ibid, , pp. 46-56. 22 strongly with the intensity and scope of relative depriva­ tion among member a of a collectivity,"^ Davies suggests, with examples, "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social develop­ ment is followed by a sharp period of reversal. . .The actual state of socio-economic development is less significant than the expectation that the past progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future.”'**

Many criticisms which the individual oriented frustration- aggression theory attracted can also be levelled against the relative deprivation theory. in the first place, the question arises if the chain of causation--from relative deprivation to frustration to potential for collective violence to actual violence--is necessarily unidimensional. Even allowing for the coercive balance and the cultural norms inhibiting or facilitating violence, the collective frustration may be siphoned off, or gets siphoned off, into other non-aggressive activities like migrations abroad and religious movements.

Secondly, Nieburg has made a few cogent criticisms of the relative deprivation explanation. {i) Violent behavior must

33Ibid ■ , p. 24.

3*James C, Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in I vo K, Feierabend etal. (ed.l Anger, Violence and Politics; Theories and Research (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.! Prentice- Hall, 1972] pp. 67-64. Quotation on p. 68. Also, see Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," World Politics, Vol, 18, No, 2 (January 1966) pp. 159-7 6, 23 be understood as adaptive, learned behavior for achieving values. (ii) Deprivation, injustice and stress are found everywhere, but only a few societies erupt into violence.

(ill) The American blacks, though accustomed for a long time to deprivation, started achieving 11 group consciousness, organization and militancy'* only when their bargaining power increased as a result of the dominant groups needing their support and labor for national unity. {iv) Amelioration of the conditions of the deprived only serves to fuel further demands and leads to the scalation of ’frontlash and back­ lash.' (v) Relative deprivation theory fails to provide answers to questions on the nature of those who lead the rioters or revolutionaries.

Nieburg*s point on the leadership question is well taken.

We do not yet know under what circumstances the deprived and discontented can be mobilized by leaders. The possible role of social mobilization in activating the stress and inequities will be discussed later. But his other objections to the relative deprivation theory are weak. The protagonists of the theory nowhere contend that the ameliorative steps towards reducing the deprivation will automatically remove or reduce the dissatisfaction. After all, the relative deprivation is rooted in perception. The more discontentment people have, the more they may want of it. As Van den Haag remarks,

■^Nieburg, Polltical. . .op. cit., pp. 41-45. 24

"Improvement a t a process l e a d * to more dissatisfaction than

static misery, for aspirations fueled by the process of

improvement pull ahead of any possible fulfillment." He

ascribes the American Negro riots partially to the promises of President Kennedy and the ’naive1 attempts of President

Johnson to implement them.As regards Nieburg's contention

that the aggressive behavior is learned and, therefore, instru­ mental, it will be argued below that social mobilization enhances the awareness of various political options available to the mobilized. As Ctzioni has remarked, the collectivities do not pick up violent patterns of behavior at random. 37

Learning might refer to anything from demonstrations to organizing a conspiracy. The discontented persons, say in

Saudi Arabia, cannot learn to precipitate a turmoil, because turmoil, as will be suggested later, can arise out of specific societal conditions.

Despite apparent weaknesses, the frustration-aggression theory, as embodied in the relative deprivation explanation, provides a fertile field for deriving, modifying and further refining of hypotheses on violent political behavior. The concept of relative deprivation is a plausible bridge between the individual oriented and sociologically oriented theories.

The capacity of the bridge is, however, not yet proved completely,

3^Ernest Van den Haag, Political Violence and Civil Disobedience (New Yorki Harper and Row, 1$72) 9fT,

3?E!tzioni, "Violence," o p . cit., p. 723. 25

3. The Social Structural Theories ;

These theories generally trace the causes of aggres­

sion and violence to the upsetting of the stable pattern of

interactions, or the structural dislocations in a society.

They are discussed here separately because, not all these

explanations can be related, simply and directly, to the

concept of relative deprivation.

According to Galtung, persons, groups or even countries,

see aggression as a possible way out of frustration, if they

are experiencing ’rank disequilibrium, ' i.e., if they are,

say, high on political power, low on income, high on education,

low on status, etc. This is an unstable configuration in

a society, as compared to the stable one in which some groups

are consistently high, and some others are consistently low,

on each of the criteria of power, education, income, etc.^8

Grimshaw’s arguments, are roughly along the same lines. He

states that the superordinate and subordinate relationships

between the groups in a society are inherently unstable.

Social violence, according to him, is likely to occur, when the 'accommodative structures' that hold these relationships

'lose their viability' through (i) the subordinate groups gaining power or realising their latent power; (iij superordinate groups losing their vitality, (iii) the developments of new

^®Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," in Feierabend, et a l ■ (ed.), Anger. . , .op. cit., pp. 85-97. 26

perspective on legitimacy; (iv) frustration; or (v) for­

feiture on the part of controlling groups of their

impartiality. 39 According to Easton, a system maintains

itself and persists by successfully performing the two

functions: (i) allocation of values, and (ii) Inducing the

members to accept these allocations. These, he calls

essential variables.40 Demand overloads, caused by the

inadequacy of the channels, or the gatekeeping institutions

like the parties, breakdown of the cultural restraints,

cleavages etc. , are likely to push the operation of the essential variables beyond the critical range, causing stress and contributing to the collapse of the system. 41 This pre­

sumably involves violent upheavals, because Easton describes

riots, etc., as having become important mechanisms for communicating demands. But the central concern of Easton is with the political consequences following the pushing of the essential variables beyond the critical range. There may well be a gradual debilitation of the essential variables, accompanied by rising violence, well below the critical range, while the system somehow manages to persist. Again, Easton is clearly inconsistent when he describes the spontaneous manifestations of discontent, like the uprisings and jacqueries

39Grirashaw, "Interpreting. , .," op. cit. , pp. IB-19,

4^David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life {Hew York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965) , p. 2 4.

41Ibid., Chs. 4,6,7,8,14 and 15. 27

as being "rare occurrences in politics,He seems to have relied too much on the stable societies to derive his famous model.

Johnson theorizes that the revolutionary potential is created by a disjunction between the political division of

labor and societal division of labor, caused by the various exogenous and endogenous circumstances,*3 According to

Dahrendorf, . ,(l)t is the task of sociology to derive conflicts from the specific social structures and not to relegate these conflicts to psychological variables

(’aggressiveness1) or to descriptive historical ones (the influx of Negroes into the United States) or to chance."*^

On the lines of Grimshaw, Dahrendorf sees the sources of conflict in the dominance relationships in a society. The organization of the latent interests of the 'subordinated quasi-groups’ into the manifest ones sparks the conflicts for change and status quo.^5 He says that his process is

facilitated by certain empirical conditions like communication among the members of the quasi-groups, freedom to form

fl^Ibid. f p. 8 9 _ Emphasis added to the words in the quotation,

43Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

Ralph Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict,1* Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2, No, 2 (June 195B) pp. 170-&3, Quotation on p , T72, Dahrendorf intends to suggest a theory that would explain the entire gamut of conflicts from opposition to civil wars to wars.

45Ibid., pp. 176-0. 28 coalitions, leadership, material means, social mobility, etc.*** Feldman argues that the processes of differentia­

tion caused by social change increase the number of social systems constituting a society, increase the discontinuity between the subsystems as the normative content of each is

’purified and decontaminated,' and heighten the importance of a subsystem. This fragmentation produces the revolutionary potential via status inconsistency.*^

If the above theories generally stress the violent impli­ cations of structural disequilibrium in society and the relative positions of various social groups, a few related theories emphasize the consequences of the disintegration of the norms and bonds that hold a society together. Accord­

ing to Durkheim anomie occurs when the moral system that has prevailed for centuries is weakened and nothing takes

its place.*® The resultant rootlessness causes suicide and violent eruptions. Extremism, radicalism and violence are

*6Ibid. , pp. 170-9.

*^Arnold S, Feldman, "Violence and Volatility: The Likelihood of Revolution," in Harry Eckstein, (ed,), Internal War. . . (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19631 pp, 111-28.

*®Emile Durkheim, Selected Writings (ed.) Anthony Giddensf (London: Cambridge University Press, T572) p. 174, See also, Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1462); Gordon Rose, "Anomie and Deviation: A Conceptual Framework for Empirical Studies," British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 17, Ho. 1 (March 1966} pp. 29-45, 29

implied in Kornhauser'a concept of m s b society, which is objectively the s tomlred society and subjectively the 49 alienated population. Etslonl also sees violence arising out of the weakening of the different kinds of bonds that tie the individuals together.^ Schwartz sees alienation and withdrawal as the first step toward the rise of revolu­ tionary attitude.51

Nieburg, whose objections to the relative deprivation theory have been discussed above, sees social structure, access, conflicting values etc. as responding to the dynamics of bargaining as well as providing the setting for bargaining.52

He considers bargaining, with its cost-risk calculations and mutual testing, as the central element in political violence,^

Of course, there is an element of bargaining when a deprived minority group hitherto quiescent, feels confident in resorting to violence. But it cannot be discerned when a majority com­ munity, like the Hindus, attacks a minority community, like the Muslins.

Gurr says that the concept of relative deprivation is sufficiently general to subsume the explanations of violence

49W illiam Kornhauser, The Politics of Maas Society, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 19601 pp. 32-33. Original emphasis.

^Etzioni, ,rViolence," op. cit. , pp. 724-6.

^David C. Schwartz, * Political Alienation: The Psychology of Revolution's First Stage" in Feierabend, et al., (ed,} , Anger. . .op. cit. , pp. 58-60,

^Nieburg, Political Violence. - .op. cit., pp. 45,59-60.

S^Ibid., p . 75. 30 in terms of dissonance, conflict and anomie.He is only partly right. An actor high on political power {like the newly enfranchised and politicized groups) but low on income, thus experiencing Galtung’s rank disequilibrium, will be aspiring for higher welfare values. Frustration and relative deprivation may erode and disturb Grimshaw's accommodative structures which contain the superordinate and subordinate relationships. Both Galtung^ and Grimshaw^ expressly accord frustration a place in their theories. Easton’s demand input overload is caused, among others, by the excessive aspirations; and the deterioration in value capabilities, leading to stress, is caused by channel failures, etc.

But Dahrendorf expressly rules out resorting to frustration as a psychological deux ex machina.58 But, one can by a priori reasoning, relate the organization of Dahrendorf*s latent interests of the ’quasi-groups' into the manifest ones to relative deprivation. Gurr, further, argues that anomie, insofar as it causes uncertainty in the minds of men as to

^*Gurr, Why Men. . . , op. cit. , pp. 37-46, especially p. 37 and p. 41 Gurr tries to show that dissonance, conflict and anomie though appearing to be alternatives to relative deprivation, are really not so,

^Galtung, "A Structural. . ." op. cit. , p. 88.

^Grimshaw, "Interpreting* . , " op. cit., p. 19*

^^Easton, A Systems. , .op. cit.

&&Dahrendorf, "Toward a. . .", op* cit., p. 172. 31

how they should act to attain their value goals, constitutes

or increases relative deprivation.59 But in another context,

he defines the loss of ideational coherence as "man's loss

of faith in, or lack of consensus about, the beliefs and norms

that govern social interaction.He suggests, ’'the greater

the intensity of relative deprivation, with respect to

welfare, power, status and communal values, the greater the

likely decline in ideational coherence."^l in other words,

relative deprivation causes, and, is, in turn, caused by

anomie or the loss of ideational coherence--which shows that

the precise relationship between them is still obscure.

Despite the profusion of studies cited by Gurr, the fact

that relative deprivation alone is at the root of conflicts

leading to violence is yet to be established. In the process

of modernization, the number of sub-systems, often having

divergent norms, increases.^2 The historical memories of

the groups, like the Hindus and Muslims, or Protestants and

Catholics, or their primordial sentiments may be stirred, and

violence may result* When the people belonging to different

Gurr, Why Men* . .op . cit., p. 43.

6 01b id., p. 134*

^ Ibid. , p. 136.

^Feldman, "violence and Volatility:. * ." op. cit. , pp. 12 0-1. Clifford G*ortz, {ed*) Old Societies and Mew States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: The Free Press, 1963}. 32

religions are mobilized for holy ware, or conflicts within

a state, it is difficult to infer relative deprivation

from these. Therefore, it is not necessary at this stage

to subsume all the notions of social structural disequilibrium

under the generic concept of relative deprivation.63

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

Perhaps, there is no developing country which has not

consciously set before itself the goal of modernization, or

is immune from the process. What the latter concept really

means has been the cause of much debate. Modernization has

wrongly been equated with westernization, with its normative

implications, because there is no one western country which

serves as a model to the developing societies.®^ Black defines

^Jenkins says that Gurr1a approach to the definition of violence leads to an anti-historical stance. It may be suggested here that an excessive reliance on the concept of relative deprivation also leads to this stance, because it distracts the attention from the historical rise and fall of various groups in a society. See Robin Jenkins, "The Study of Violence," in Robert Benewick and Trevor Smith, (ed.), Direct Action and Democratic Politics (London: George Allen andUnwin, 1972) pp^ 100-10B.

G^See, for example, Baringtone Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship: Lord and the Peasant in the Making"oT tne Modern World (London: Allen Lane, the Penguin Press7 1567). Moore discusses four routes to modernization. If one takes into account the finer variations in the patterns, there can be more models. The only justifications for equating modernization with westernization are that the developing societies are seeking to acquire the technological and other features common to most of the western countries and many of these developing societies Were under the western colonial rule. Although, in the earlier times, modernization might have meant Hellenization or Romanization, the transition from pre-industrial to industrial era has bien compared to that from pre-historic to historic times. 33 modernization aa ". . ,(T)he process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing

functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man’s knowledgei permitting control over his environment that accompanied scientific revolution.”65 Almost in the same sense, Pye describes the 'massive diffusion1 of the world culture.66 The fact that the developing societies have to operate in the world states dominated by the technologically advanced countries provides a powerful impetus to moderni­ zation. It has not only technological, but also political, economic, social and psychological dimensions. The process of modernization, therefore, cannot be viewed separately from social change, which is essentially a change from one pattern £ Q of role relationships to another. Social mobilization

6SC . e . Black, The Dynamics of Modernizationi A Study in Comparative History (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), Rustow similarly views modernization. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Moderni­ zation and Comparative Politics: Prospects for Research and Theory," Comparative Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1966) pp. 2 7-51^ To Levy, substitution of the animate energy by the inanimate is the key to the process of modernization; see, Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Societies; A Setting for International Affairs, Vols. I & II, (Princeton; Princeton "university"'Press, 19661 ,

^^Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966) , jT! HT,

G^Black, The Dynamics. , ., op. cit., pp. 9-23.

6&See Everett Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change; How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood, ill,: The Dorsey Press, 1963); Wilbert E . Mbbre, Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 19637"? Neil J. Smelaer, "Processes of Social Change" in Neil J. Smelser (ed.} Sociology: An Intro- duction (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 19671 pp. 671-720. 34

signifies a concomitant, aspect of the process of modern­ ization, seen as the latter's impact on, and undermining of, people's social, political and economic ties in the traditional society'. Deutsch defines social mobilization as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socializa­ tion and behavior * He sees it as a "recurrent cluster" among the consequences of modernization. To Deutsch the process denotes:

...... a concept which brackets together a number of more specific processes of change, such as changes in residence, of occupation, of social setting, of face to face associates, of institutions, roles, and ways of acting, of experiences and expectations, and finally of personal memories, habits and needs, including the need for new patterns of group affiliation and new images of identity.^

Although Deutsch speaks of Mthe need for new patterns of group affiliations” toward the end of the above paragraph, and has suggested, in the same article, that the earlier notions of social mobilization involving two distinct stages, viz., "(1) uprooting ox breaking away from the old settings, etc. and <2) induction into relatively stable patterns of group membership, organization and commitment," need to be

69Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Science Review Vol. 55, No. 3 (Sept. 1961) pp. 493—514, ~ ’

^Ibid, , p. 493. 35 made more specific,71 his emphasis is clearly on the process of people becoming or getting mobilised, it is not on the process of people being mobilized by the elites. What he has in his mind is essentially the traditional roles and ties becoming dissolved and the people becoming uprooted, both physically and mentally. This is even more evident from the indicators he suggests to measure social mobilization! exposure to aspects of modern life through demonstrations of machinery, consumer goods, etc., macs media, change of residence, urbanization, change from agricultural occupations, literacy, per capita income.72 He says that through the process of social mobilization "people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior. "7 3 He nowhere suggests or implies that the uprooted people are naturally and automatically inducted into the new patterns of institutionalized behavior.

This raises, and not merely in the context of this dissertation, some far reaching and important questions: whether the people can be effectively mobilized for a political action without their having experienced or undergone social mobilization, or whether there can be political mobilization without social mobilization. Nettl provides some interesting thinking on this. To him, "mobilization is essentially (1) attitudinal— a commitment to action, and (2) means of translating this commitment into action or observed behavior."7^ Mobilization

7LIbid., p. 494. 72Ibid., p. 495 .

71 Ibid., p. 494, Emphasis added,

7^J. P. Nettl, Political Mobilization: A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts f " ( L o n d o n : Faber and Faber, 19671, p. 32. 36 is conducted through the stages of having goals, elite actions, institutional or collective means, symbols and creation and change of c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . H e recognizes three forms of mass mobilization— Military, Religious and

Political. He calls the pattern of mobilization, whose direction is from the top downwards 'stalactite* mobiliza­ tion, which, he says, is usually found in the developing societies. "Stalagmite mobilization, 1 whose direction is from bottom upwards, was experienced by the continental countries. Some countries like India and Ceylon, Nettl says, have experienced both the kinds of mobilization.7®

Both Gandhi and Mao mobilized masses for political action and sizable sections of these people had experienced only marginal or no social mobilization. Even in the more recent years in India, as Kothari says, politicization has increased at a faster pace than literacy, urbanization, industrialization, etc.77 But it stands to reason that such politicization from the top downwards will be more far reach­ ing if the substantial sections of the population have experienced the Deutschian social mobilization. The impervious crust of tradition will be broken more easily and completely by the mental and physical uprooting of the population. For

7^Ibid., p. 33, 7®Ibid., pp. 261-71,

77Rajni Kothari, Democracy in India: A Comparative Perspective (Bombay: S. I.E. S. College, 1971). 37 purposes of this dissertation, the elements of social mobili­ zation will be kept strictly social and whether certain expected and theoretically justifiable consequences are following will be examined.

The winds of change are blowing in increasingly strong gusts in the developing societies causing innumerable social and political problems and crises. Nettl and Von Vorys says that the optimism that 1 industrialization will spread like a benevolent blanket* has now been discarded.78 Revolutions, riots, coups, civil wars, ethnic and class conflicts have been rife in these societies. The implications of an increasing pace of social mobilization are being recognized by the social scientists. Deutsch says, "In whatever society it occurs, social mobilization brings with it an expansion of politically relevant strata of the population. These politically relevant 75 strata are a broader group than the elite: . . . .11 Re further suggests that the growth in the size of these strata produces increasing pressures for the transformation of political practices and institutions,80 Social mobilization, by undermining the political and economic power of the tradi­ tional elites and by galvanizing new groups, produces the conditions of Galtung*s rank disequilibrium8^ and leads to

78J . P. Nettl and Karl Von Vorys, "The Politics of Development," Commentary Vol. 56 No. 1 (July 1968) pp. 52-59.

7^Deutsch, "Social Mibilization, . . - . , *' on. cit. . pp. 497-99.

80Ibid. ®*Galtung, "A Structural...... op. cit. 38 the organization of Dahrendorfrs 'latent quasi-groups.’®^

It causes Johnson’s disjunction between the social and political divisions of labor. The thrust of Huntington's thesis is that violence and instability are results of "rapid social change and rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions.

Social mobilization increases and politicizes the aspirations of the people. As Deutsch says, the process

"changes the range of human needs that impinge on the poli­ tical process."®^ Uprooted people need, in short, a wide range and large amounts of new government services and this naturally strains the resources and the capabilities of the state.®* Rapid economic growth, which, with its consequences of urbanization, growth of non-agricultural labor, mobility, etc., is the prime pace-setter of social mobilization, leads to many dislocations. Olson has catalogued such effects as

82Dahrendorf, "Toward a ...... " op. cit.

®^Johnson, Revolutionary ...... op. cit.

a a °*Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19701 p7 47

®5Deutsch, "Social mobilization. ..." op. cit., p. 498.

°*lbid., The same effect is stressed also by Easton: "Almost any significant social change dislocates at least a few members considerably, and all the members to some extent, frequently enough so as to stimulate the policizing of wants." A Systems...... op. cit. , p. 81. 39 alienation, spiralling aspirations, rise of the class of new rich with political ambitions, etc.®7

To Lerner, the process of modernisation, with accompanying urbanization, literacy, participation, is characterized by the growth of 1erapathic* personality types as compared with the constrictive personality types in the isolated traditional communities. An 'empathic’ person, possessing psychic mobility, can experience the vicarious universe, and is "equipped with the mechanisms needed to incorporate new demands upon himself that arise outside hie habitual experience."®® Although

Lerner speaks of the transitionals being unhappy in the case of Turkey, and moving towards extremism in the cases of Egypt,

Syria and Iran {which he attributes to the overproduction of such transitionals and a process of modernization, the aspects of which are 'out of phase1)®®, the probable growth of dis­ content claims little attention and emphasis in his theorizing in The Passing of the Traditional Society. But, in another place h q stresses the fact of the revolution of rising expec­ tations turning into a 'counter-revolution of rising frustrations caused by 'communication malfunctioning.1 He suggests that the ratio, between want and get, and aspiration and achievement,

®7Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Journal of Economic History, Vol. 23, No, 4 {Dec. 1963) pp. 529-552 . See also, Donald G. Ridker, "Discontent and Economic Growth," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Oct^ pp. 1-15.

®BDaniel Lerner, The Passing of the Traditional Societyi Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe; The Free Press, T95T) p T “49-53. ------——

®®Ibid., p. 162, p. 3G3, and p. 401. 40 worsens.90 "The new needs and new aspirations," Almond and

Powell argue, "confront the political system with a set of

Intense demands, for the other social systems are no longer capable of meeting the stress imposed upon them"9* Again, in the words of Huntington, who is the most eloquent spokesman of this schooli

Urbanization, literacy, education, mass media, all expose the traditional man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment, new possibilities of satisfaction. These experiences break the cognitive and attitudinal barriers of the tradi­ tional culture and promote new levels of aspira­ tions and wants. The ability of a transitional society to satisfy these new aspirations, however, increases much more slowly than the aspirations themselves. Consequently, a gap develops between aspiration and expectation, want formation and want satisfaction, or the aspiration function and the level of living function. This gap generates social frustration and dissatisfaction. In practice, the extent of the gap provides a reasonable index to political instability.92

^Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization: A Set of Considerations," in Lucian W. Pye (ed.} Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196 3) ppT 327-50. "The thousand hopes that die in Iran each year are multiplied into millions throughout the underdeveloped countries...... H (p. 324). Lerner, like many others emphasizing the role of communications, believes this disturbing trend can be checked and corrected by a new conception of communication as a crucial instrument" that can promote psychic mobility, political stability under conditions of societal equilibrium." He suggests mobilization without raising insatiable expectations. (Ibid., p. 350). In view of the complexity and multiplicity of theorigins and channels of communications, like the family, schools, mass media, peer groups, communities, face-to-face contacts, etc., one wonders how this content of communications can be ensured short of totalitarian controls.

9^Gabriel A. Almond and G, Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966} pi 210.

92Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order...... o p . cit., pp. 53-54. 41

To Huntington, violence and instability go together. Social

mobilization also creates, by destroying the old frames of

cultural and personal reference and by diluting the old

traditional bonds, a profound identity crisis among the

q -a individuals,” Many writers see these as fostering the

potential for violence.^ "Change, especially extensive,

rapid and abrupt change,11 as Feierabend, et al. argue, *’ie

an unsettling and bewildering human experience. It is likely

to create strain in the psyche of the individual and crisis

in the social order.*19^ They suggest that such collective

bewilderment may lead to violence. The role of social

mobilization in bringing the hidden cleavages to the surface

and exacerbating the group rivalries, often, erupting into

^See, for example, Lucian W, Pye, Politics, Person­ ality and Wation Building; Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962) and Aspects of...... , op. cit., pp. 89-112. Pye argues tHat the Insecurity of the psychologically uprooted people impels them to take to political action for its own sake and, there­ fore, the political cultures do not have stable psychological moorings. Ibid■, p. 106.

^Black, The Dynamics of. . , . , op. cit. , p. 31. "The relatively stable personality traits, structured by age old cultural heritage, which also change only marginally in the centuries, are suddenly upset by modernization. . . Related to these things in ways that are not entirely clear is the increase in violence that has accompanied modernization.” Ibid,, pp. 31-33.

95lvo k . Feierabend et al. "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns" in Ivo K, Feierabend et al. (ed . ) Anger...... op, cit., pp. 107-118. 42 violence, has been stressed.®® Feldman's assertion that modernisation 'purifies values of each group,' thus increas­ ing the subsystem distances, has been noted earlier.

These groups are led into conflict with one another not only over their clashing values, but aleo over the prizes that modernization offers. Moreover, under the impact of social mobilization, the smaller groups, as Kelson and Wolpe have proposed get consolidated into bigger ones, constituting broad based antagonists.58

No other aspect of social mobilization has claimed as much attention of the social scientists as the process of urbanization, perhaps because of its visible ecological impact.

Urbanization is an inexorable and irreversible process in all the developing societies. It figures in all the attempts to

9$See, for example, Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States" in Clifford Geertz, (ed,), Old Societies. , . op. cit., pp. 105-157. Aristide R. Zolberg "The Structure of Political Conflict in Africa" American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 1 (March I960) pp."70-IT7; SeTrg Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I960}; Lloyd I. and Susanne H. Rudolphs argue that the growth of caste consciousness in India is not dysfunctional to modernization. They have, rather, overdrawn their case: The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967),

^Feldman, "Violence and Volatility...... " op. cit.

9®Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Dec. 1970) pp. 11.12-1130, The authors”, drawing primarily but not exclusively on the experience of Nigeria, put forward 14 propositions on the impact of social mobilization on the growth of communal ism. On the fusion of small groups into bigger ones, see also M, N. Srinivas, Social Change in Modern India, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966). 43 measure modernization, social change, social mobilization and also in the correlates of economic development. Often stressed among the deleterious and dislocating consequences of the process of urbanization are; the eruption of the visible eyesores of slums, unemployment, rootlessness among the migrants from the tranquil countryside to the fast and turbulent city causing anomie, bewilderment and frustration, the urban mobs, the unprecedented problems of housing shortage, poor sanitation, inadequate transport— all worsened by the invariably weak-willed and inefficient municipal administra­ tion, glaring inequalities of wealth, imbalance in sex-ratios, etc.9® As Kornhauser argues, ” , , * . (I)t is not the growth of urban-industrial organization per se that induces mass

"These points are made by: Huntington, Political Order. . . ., op. cit., p. 73; W. Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin~ Inc., 1955) pp. 15^-51; Shanti Tangri, "Urbanization, Political Stability and Economic Growth," in S. P. Aiyar and R, Srinivasan (ed.) Studies in Indian Democracy (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1965) pp~ 449-469; J.C. Daruvala, led.) Tensions of Economic Development in South East Asia (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1962); Jean-Paul Marroy, "ThePolitical Economic and Social Role of Urban Agglomerations in Countries of the Third World,” Civilizations, Vol. 17, Nos. 1 & 2 (1967) pp. 166-185; Philip M. Hauser, Urbanization in Asia and the Far East (Calcutta: UNESCO, 1937); S. P. Aiyar, "The Anatomy of Maas Violence in India" in S. P, Aiyar, (ed.), The Politics of Mass violence in India (Bombay: Manaktalas, 19 67) pp. 21-33; on the demonstration effects of urban life, see Gurr, Why Men. . , op. cit., p. 97; for an exhaustive bibliography on Indian Urban demography, see Ashish Bose, urbanization in India: An Inventory of Source Materials (Bombay: Academic Books Ltd., 1970). On the problems facing municipal bodies, see P. R. Nayak "The Challenge of Urban Growth to Indian Local Government," in Roy Turner, (ed.) India's Urban Future: Selected Studies from an International Conference on Urbanization in India (Berkeley: The University of California Press, i960) pp. 361-38! 44

tendencies, but the discontinuities in the community that may be associated with urbanization and industrialization, "100

The counterpart of rapid urbanization, rapid rural depopulation

also contributes to these tendencies. Moreover, according to

Kornhauser, the mass movements arise in the earlier stages of urbanization and industrialization.101 Aiyar,102 R i d k e r and Tangri10* suggest that the urban mob affords the security of anonymity to the rioters and the opportunity costs of riot­

ing are low. Tangri further argues that tensions and hostilities are increased in the urban areas due to intergroup contact and the demonstration effect.10^

Despite all these views, how exactly urbanization and urban migration contribute to violence has not been finally settled. Huntington, who, in the earlier part of the book argues that urbanization along with literacy, etc. , serves to increase the aspirations, observes in the latter part that the slum-dwellers and the rural migrants are likely to support the government and count their blessings for having improved their

1^°Kornhauser, The Politics. . . op, cit., p. 125.

1D1Ibid., pp. 150-51.

1 0 2 Aiyar, “The Anatomy. . . .," op. cit., p. 32.

10^Ronald G. Ridker, “Discontent. ..." op. cit.

10*Tangri, "Urbanization, . , op. cit.

10^Ibid., p. 461. 45 conditions, rather than revolt or rebel. Only after a generation or two, they ahed their rural passivity and aspire for vertical mobility.106

Bulsara, reporting on the socio-economic surveys of nine Indian cities between 1956-60, finds that the migrants, on the whole, fare better economically than the residents.107

In the same vein, Joan Nelson says that the urban migrants are neither traumatized, nor fired by higher aspirations and they are not likely to be the sources of violence or radicalisms.10® Weiner finds that, in Calcutta the migrants are politically more moderate than the residents.10^

All this does not mean that the speculation that urban­ ization and violence go together is rejected. The theory that uprooted and atomized urban migrants, and the slum-dwellers

106Huntington, Political Order. . . . , op. cit. , pp. 278-03.

107Jal F. Bulsara, Problems of Rapid Urbanization in India (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1964} p. 175"."

10®Joan Nelson, "The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities," World Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (April 1970} pp. 393-412. See also, her, Migrants. Urban Poverty and Instability in Developing Nations, occasional paper no. 22 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for Inter­ national Affairs, 1969). Oberschall disputes the theory that, at least in Africa, urbanization and education, lead to rising expectations or frustrations; Anthony R, Oberschall, ’’Rising Expectations and Political Turmoil," Journal of Developmental Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Oct. 1969) ppT'5-22. 109 Myron Weiner, "Urbanization and Political Protest," Civilizations, Vol. 17, Nos. 1 * 2 (1967) pp. 44-49. Weiner, however, infers the size of the migrants in the Calcutta assembly constituencies from the imbalances in the sex ratios, which is an inadequate indicator. 46 are violent-prone has been challenged. The argument that the rapid influx of the migrant* arouse* the hostility of the older resident* is still accepted.The phenomenal growth of the Shiv Sena movement in Bombay city provides an example of such anti-migrant sentiments. m

These problems of modernization in the developing societies— politicization of the masses, participation explosion, anomie and alienation, the gap between increasing aspirations and expectations, reactivation of primordial conflicts, excessive demands on the machinery of the state with its insufficient resources--are further aggravated by the fact that all these have been unleashed simultaneously.

Binder lists these crises as those of identity, legitimacy, participation, distribution and penetration ^ In the case of most of the developed societies, these crises presented themselves in a phased manner, thus facilitating the absorp­ tion of the groups, growth of governmental and systematic capability, etc. (France, where these crises did not arise gradually, was left with a legacy of problems and used to be,

H 0 n ornhauser, Politics of. . ., op. cit., p. 147.

Hlpor an analysis of this movement see: Ram Joshi, "Shiv Senai A Movement in Search of Legitimacy," Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 11 (Nov. 1970) pp. 967-78; Mary F. Katzenstein, "Origins of Nativism: The emergence of Shiv Sena in Bombay," Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 4 (April 1973) pp. 386-99.

112Leonard Binder, "Crises of Political Development," in Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 197T1 pp. 3-72. 47 at least until recently, saddled with imnobiliam,

L e w i « m and Friwlland1^ describe how the gradual prolifera­ tion of roles and the diffusion by degrees of the ideas and tendencies of modernization in the older states helped soften the worst blows. But, the elites of the most of the modernizing states not only are avowedly committed to the goal of accelerated modernization but also tend to minimize the costs. Lewis calls this latter type "inverse moderniza­ tion* and finds no expressly emulable model for these societies.

The concern for the distribution of wealth in a society and its relationship to political power goes back to

Aristotle.The distribution crisis in the developing countries, generated by the inpact of social mobilization on the politicization of the wants, relative deprivation, poli­ tical participation and group rivalry, is very likely to be deepened by the inequalities of the distribution of

H^Almond Powell, Comparative. . op. cit. , pp. 320-321.

Upjohn W, Lewis, "The Social Limits of Politically Induced Change" in Chandler Morse; et al■, (ed.) Moderniza­ tion by Design: Social Change in Twentieth Century, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969) pp. 1-33.

H^William H. Friedland, "A Sociological Approach to Modernization," in Morae et al. , (ed.), Modernization. . * ., op. cit., pp. 34-05.

this connection see, Fred Kort, "The Qualifica­ tion of Aristotle’s Theory of Revolution," American Political Science Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 (June 19 52) p p . 406-93, 48 v«alth,l^ In moat of these countries, the egalitarian ethos has been an integral part of the ideology of nationalism.

Kuznets, in his celebrated analysis of the relationship of inequalities to economic growth, finds; {1) the distribution of income in the less developed countries is more unequal than that in the developed countries; (ii) in the underdeveloped countries the distribution of income is more unequal within the agricultural sector than within the non-agricultural sector; (iii) the inequalities in the less developed countries are similar to those that existed in the developed countries about a hundred years ago; (iv) probably, in the initial stages of economic growth, income inequalities increase.116

According to Deutsch, the assumption that increase in per capita income goes to the newly mobilized people is unfounded in the developing societies.11® In another place, he hypothesizes that political stability varies inversely with

11^For an analysis of the distribution crisis, see Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics. . . op. cit., pp. 196*199; Joseph LaPalombara, ^Distribution; Crisis of Resource Management," in Binder, et al. Crisis and...... op. cit., pp. 233*92. LaPalombara discusses the relevance of ideologies, strategies of economic planning, the psycho­ logical factors affecting the growth, to the problems of the distribution of what is usually a 'constant pie* in the developing societies. Oddly enough, the relationship of inequalities to ideology, and the impact of social mobiliza­ tion and economic development on inequalities are omitted.

116Simon Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of the Nations, VIII: Distribution of Income by Size,** Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 11, No. 2, Part II (Jan. 1963) pp. 1-80,

11®"Social Mobilization...... " op. cit., pp. 504*5, 49

the share of the top ten percent of the population in the

total national i n c o m e . ^ 0 Huntington argues that the process

of social mobilization erodes the legitimacy of the tradi­

tional inequalities and the latter become the sources of

rebellion.

THE MATURE OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Perhaps, no other concept in the post-war vocabulary

of political science has caused as much controversy as that

of political development. So frustrating have been the

attempts to pin down its meaning and to establish a consensus about it, that some political scientists are advocating that the phrase be better dropped. In a recent article, Huntington has suggested that the concept of political development has proved to be of dubious utility and should be abandoned in

favor of that of political change, which can be studied in terms of culture, structure, groups, leadership and policies,122

l^Karl h , Deutsch "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 (March 1960) pp. 34-57,

l^lpqlitical order. . pp. 57-59. "Economic develop­ ment increases economic inequality at the same time that social mobilization decreases the legitimacy of that inequality. Both aspects of modernization combine to produce political instability,"

l^Samuel p, Huntington, "The Change to Change? Modernization, Development and Politics," Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, (April 1971) pp. 283-323. "The principal function that political development has in fact performed for political scientists is neither to aggregate nor to distinguish, but rather to legitimate,* Ibid., p. 304. 50

Sometimes, the phrase has been used only to describe the politics in a country at a point of time or to give an historical account of politics, 121 To make the confusion worse, political modernization is used interchangeably with political development,12* To Coleman political moderni2ation signifies differentiation, explicitnesa of governmental structures, socialization by manifest and secondary institu­ tions, achievement against ascription, aggregation by pragmatic and bargaining parties, etc, He then goes on to describe anomie, urban overcrowding etc., as being the consequences of political modernization.1^ The use of the phrase political modernization attracts the charge that in reality pure types of tradition and modernity do not exist. Huntington poses the dilemma: if political development is an omnibus concept embracing so many conflicting notions, then, only the label is common to them; if it denotes any one aspect, then, why change the n a m e ? 1 2 ** Apter and Munshi argue that the confusion about the concept and its operational measures has reduced its

l23For examples of this, see Ibid. , p. 305.

*As an example, see Lucian W, Pye, "Introduction," in Lucian W, Pye, (ed,), Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196 3) 16, For the difficulties in using the phrase ’political modernization,’ see Huntington, "The Change to Change, , . op, cit.

i ^ e James S. Coleman, "Conclusions: The Political Systems of Developing Areas," in Gabriel A, Almond and James S. Coleman (ed,) Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960) pp. 352-576.

l-^Huntington, "The Change to Change. . . o p . cit. , p- 304. 1 77 practical utility. Aa Pye remarks, "The difficulty with tha concept of political modernization and develop­ ment is that thara are so many legitimate ways of judging 128 and evaluating a political ayatern." It la essentially a value laden phrase and has been critic1red on the ground 129 that a form of social Darwinism is implicit in it.

Coleman says that, if political development is used in the historical perspective to denote the totality of culture and structures that accompanied the social and economic modernization which first occurred in western Europe, the concept, then, becomes saddled with western ethnocentric bi„.uo

Despite all these criticisms and difficulties, the con cept of political development cannot be so easily abandoned.

What we are grappling with here, is the ability or capacity of some systems, whether in the West or in the East, to take

12 7 D. E. Apter and S. S. Munshi, "Disciplinary Contri­ butions, Political Science," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1972} Issue on Developmental Studies, pp. 44-6B. 12 8 Pye "Introduction," in Pye (ed.), Communications■ . op. cit. , pp. 3-23. Quotation on p, 16. 129 Ali A. Mazrui, "From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization: A Tradition of Analysis," World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Oct. 1960) pp. 69-83,

James S, Coleman, "The Development Syndrome: Differentiation-Equality-Capacity" in Leonard Binder, et al. Crises and. . . .op. cit., pp. 73-100; esp. 73-74. 52 in their itride, in a large measure, the problems of social change, to generate as well as absorb sustained change , to restructure the social roles—-whatever the mix of modernity and tradition might be in such roles. This capacity need not forever be taken for granted. This social change need not be taken to have reached its apogee, for, it will never.

If, after dropping political development, the political processes are analyzed, as Huntington has suggested, in terms of culture, structure, leadership, groups, etc., this may not contribute to our understanding of the totality of the problem of coherence in the face of social change* Again, we might need new concepts to integrate the theories and findings of analyses in terms of political change. For these reasons, the guest for political development and its consti­ tuent elements will continue. So will the search for appropriate operational measures.

Although Deutsch's oft-quoted article is entitled

’Social Mobilization and Political Development,1 a clear- cut reference to, or analysis of, political development is absent in it.^’1^ He only refers to the pressures of social mobilization on the ‘transformation of political institutions and practices' and the increase in governmental capacity needed to cope up with the effects. As Huntington^32 and

131"Social Mobilization. . op. cit.

1^2**The Change to Change. , . ." op. cit. 53 and Hah and Schneider133 have observed, Almond's "Introduc­ tion: Toward a Functional Approach to Politic*f n134 with its categories of socialization, interest articulation and aggregation, etc., is an exercise in comparative politics 135 and not in political development, Packenham, Hah and

Schneider33® have discerned five to six different approaches to political development* Pennock sees legitimacy, political culture, etc., as only providing external environment and internal conditions facilitating the increasing output of political goods, like welfare, liberty, justice, and he equates political development with the rise in the output of political goods.13^ Pye has shown how political development 130 has been used in ten different meanings.

Any attempt to build a viable theory of political development will have to be made only in the context of social mobilization and modernization. For, the full implications

133Chang-Do Hah and Jeanne Schneider, "A Critique of Current Studies in Political Development and Modernization,” Social Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 {April 1968) pp. 130-158.

33^Gabriel A. Almond, in Almond and Coleman (ed.) Politics o f . . .op. cit., pp. 3-64,

33^Robert A, Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of Political Development," World Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Oct. 1964) pp. 108-120. l 1C "A Critique. , . . ,11 op. cit.

33^J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems and Political Goods," World Politics, Vol, 16, no. 3 (April 1966) pp. 415-34.

33®Pye, "Aspects of. . , ," op. cit., pp. 33-34. 54

of the concept cannot be understood without a reference

to the consequences of the phenomena. Both Riggs and

Eiaenstadt^40 recognize the imperative necessity of

establishing the institutions and techniques of coordina­

tion of increaaingly differentiated social roles and

processes. To them, the level of coordination and inte­

gration will have to match the level of differentiation.

Riggs calls a society, where these two levels are matching,

a 'diffracted' oner if the level of coordination falls

below that of differentiation, the system is called

'prismatic.1 The latter type of systems according to

both Riggs and Eisenstadt, are susceptible to breakdowns.

Almond and Powell define political development as

. . .(T)he increased differentiation and specialization

of the political structures and the increased secularization

Fred W. Riggs, "Political Aspects of Developmental Change," in Art Gallaher, Jr., (ed.) Perspectives in Developmental Change (Lexington, Ky, : University of Kentucky Press, i960) pp. 130-171.

N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization'1 in S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.) Readings in Social Evolution and Development (Oxford, Eng.: Pergamon Press, Ltd, , 1970) pp.

-^^Riggs, "Political Aspects. . , op. cit. The concepts of 'diffracted1 and ‘prismatic1 constitute the themes of many of Riggs1 works. Among them are: The Ecology of Development, Comparative Administration Group Occasional Paper (Bloomington, Ind.: Comparative Adminis­ tration Group, Indiana University, 1964); "The Theory of Political Development," in James C. Charles-Worth, (ed.), Contempor ary Pol1tic al Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1957) pp. 317-~349; Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton, Mlff1in and C o . , 1964). " ' 55 of political culture," They continue, "The significance of such development is, in general, to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the performance of the political system*: to increase its capabilities.Mi*2 They argue that a transitional *ystem can meet the problems of nation building, state building participation and distri­ bution, generated by social mobilization and often cumula­ tive in their impact, by acquiring political capabilities.

They list five such capabilities: extractive, regulative, distributive, symbolic and responsive. Both Pye^* and

Coleman^^ consider political development as a syndrome consisting of 'equality, differentiation and capacity,' which interact upon one another. But it is Coleman who accords a pride of place to capacity:

Political development, in these terms, is seen as the acquisition by a politi­ cal system of a consciously sought and a qualitatively new and enhanced politi­ cal capacity as manifested in the successful institutionalization of (1} new patterns of integration and penetration regulating and containing the tensions and conflicts produced by increased differentiation, and (2) new patterns Of participation and resource distribution adequately responsive to the demands gener- ated by the imperatives of equality. The acquisition of such a performance capacity is, in turn, a decisive factor in the reso­ lution of the problems of Identity and legitimacy.

Comparative Politics. . op. cit., p. 105,

l^^Ibid. , Ch. 8. ^ ^ Aspects of. . ., op. cit., pp. 45-47,

145,'The Developmental. . .," op. cit.

l^Ibid. , pp. 74-75. Original emphasis. 56

The three elements of equality, differentiation and capacity in the development syndrome, at discussed by

Coleman, have congruent as well as conflicting relation­ ships. A fully differentiated society is essential to augment the political capacity and the latter can maintain the process of differentiation. Only when the human energies are released by equality, the capacity of a system will grow, which can, in turn, protect equality. The requirements of differentiation, role specialization, etc. can be met by equality; and only growing equality can accommodate the pressures of differentiation. But, both increasing equality and differentiation will put enormous strains on the capacity of a system.

This paradoxical relationship among the elements in the developmental syndrome can be explained by the fact that each of them has a dynamism of its own and its own degree of susceptibility to external manipulation. The rate of growth of equality and differentiation-'themselves the product of social mobilization— can be stepped up by political elite more easily than they can be controlled and directed. The same political elite cannot legislate an increase in the capabilities of a system. It is easier to build schools and factories than to ensure the growth of political parties, or a capable administrative machinery.

Hence these imbalances arise,

147Ibid., pp. BO-83. 57

Capabilities of a a y a torn do not grow in a vacuum.

It is only through the institution* such capabilities are

realized. Eisenstadt says that the breakdowns in the

process of modernization can be prevented by the appropriate

institutional mechanisms. Huntington defines institu­

tionalization as *. . ,(T)he process by which organizations

and procedures acquire value and stability," He continues,

"The level of institutionalization of any political system

can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy

and coherence." He states that a matching level of

institutionalization is necessary to cope up with the

rising levels of participation generated by social mobili­

zation and frustrations; otherwise, violence and instability will erupt. He has attributed the relatively high level

of stability in India during the earlier years of her

independence to the comparatively low levels of social mobilization and the high levels of input and output insti-

tutions--like the Congress Party and the Civil Service.^50

Those countries lacking in institutionalization have fallen

a prey to political decay. It is to the credit of

Huntington that he has demolished the assumption of uni­

linearity in the theories of political development. In

conclusion, it can be said that, whether it is raising the

Breakdowns of. . .," op. cit. , pp. 43Bff.

^ ^ Political Order. . ., op. cit - , p- 12.

15°ibid., p. 84. 56 resource* or planning developmental expenditure, regulation of the demands or structuring the political participation, or the government penetrating into the interior to eell a new policy or the system creating new opportunities, institutionalisation, having widest scope and highest support, is imperative. It is essential not only in the form of governmental organizations, but also the associa­ tions of social infra-structure ,

Very few have attempted to answer the question: why does institutionalization fail to emerge or grow? Why have some societies thrown up appropriate, if culturally relative, institutional mechanisms, while the others could not? Eisenstadt ascribes the failure of institutional mechanism to the perpetuation of the previous traditional types in the modern groups. But previous traditional types need not necessarily be dysfunctional to the growth of the modern institutions. It is one of the lacunae of Huntington's 'sophisticated1 work that the factors of political culture affecting the institutionalization do

151"The Developmental Syndrome. . . op. cit. Coleman further refines the meaning of capacity: ""it includes, in addition, the power constantly to create new and enhanced capacity to plan, implement, and manipulate new change as part of the process of achieving new goals." (p. 79). He also refers to its attributes of scope, effectiveness and rationality. But, it is very surprising to note the absence in the article of a discussion of Huntington 1s institutionalization,

1 ^"Breakdowns 0f_ pp, cit. , pp. 4-40-42.

^’*-*See, for example, Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Modernity of. . .op. ci t . David Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda TPrTnceton: Princeton University Press, 19 61). 59

not find a prominent place in it, Again, as Kothari points

out f Huntington has ignored the change from ’'one set of

universale to another, and, in moat cases, from one set of

institutions to another,"15^ Huntington, further, does not

make any distinction among the institutionalisations of the

liberal democratic variety, and the fascist or communist one.

But the most serious defect is that Huntington is satisfied

as long as the level of institutionalization of a system

matches the level of social mobilization and participation,

resulting in stability. If, in Saudi Arabia and Sweden,

the respective levels of social mobilization etc. are

matched by the appropriate levels of institutionalization,

can we say that both the political systems are equally

institutionalized? To be satisfied with a lower level of

social mobilization and a matching level of institutionali­

zation, is to ignore the fact that the benefits of social mobilization, including the realization of political parti­

cipation, have not reached the unmobilized and apathetic

sections.

Despite the fact that capacity has emerged as the

kingpin of the development syndrome, most of the foremost

theoreticians have ignored or slurred over the implications

in terms of civil violence of the denuding of capacity or

l^Rajni Kothari, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited," Government and Opposition, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Summer 1968) p p . 27 3-293. Quotation on p. 290,

155"Breakdowns, . op. cit., pp. 431-32, 60 inability to attain it. Huntington is one of the exceptions,

Eisenstadt also speaks of the "extreme oscillation of the demands between apathy and violence,1*155 Almond and Powell refer to anomic violence in the context of interest articula­ tion, but not in that of capabilities.15® Coleman, while discussing the conflicting relationships among the different elements of the development syndrome, has made only a pass­ ing reference to the 11 revolutionary potential of the dis­ affected groups."15^ Gurr has reported, in two of his own studies and one with Ruttenberg , a negative correlation between civil violence on the one hand and trade unionism— a form of infra structural institutionalization“-extractive capability and regimenic institutional support on the other. Again, in his work which draws together the theories and empirical findings of civil violence, Gurr says, "If a society has extensive resources and a demonstrated capacity to convert them into more satisfying conditions of life, and if the people have varied and reasonably effective opportunities for sharing the benefits, perceived

1 ^ Comparative politics. . , , op. cit. , pp. 81-82.

157"Developmental Syndrome. . op. c i t . , p. 95,

15BTed Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: Comparative Analysis Using New Indices,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Dec. 1968"} pp>. 1104-1124; "Sources of Rebellion in Western Societies: Some Quantita­ tive Evidence," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, "Collective Violence,” Vol. 191 (Sept. 1970} pp, 128-44; with Ruttenberg, Cross- National . . ., op. cit. 61 value capabilities are likely to be high*"159 (These perceived value capabilities are posited to be negatively correlated with violence). But in his chapter, "The

Balance of Institutional Support," he sticks to a water tight compartmentslication of the institutions into the regime oriented ones and the dissident oriented ones.1^

He then develops hypotheses on relationship between the likelihood of different forms of violence and structure of bases of regime and dissident support, organization etc. He also discusses the expressive versus instrumental functions of associational groups, but in this also the regime-dissident dichotomy creeps in. If, in Ahmedabad

Hindus kill Muslims, or in Tanjore landlords burn agricul­ tural laborers alive, or in Benares students destroy university property, who should be considered as belonging to regime institutions and who to dissident institutions?

Such examples can be multiplied. The point is, having tested earlier the hypotheses on unionization and extrac­ tive capability, and having speculated on the conversion capacity being a determinant of value capabilities, Gurr misses the opportunity of integrating these concepts into the overall growth of institutionalization.

l59Why Men. . ,, op. cit., p. 123.

l6QIbid., Ch. 9. 62

A REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Many attempts have been made to test, using quantita­ tive techniques and In a more or less rigorous Way, the validity, in time and space, of many aspects of the theoretical relationships presented above, Since the methodologies adopted in these studies have a bearing on the methodology developed in this dissertation, they will be considered in the next chapter. Only the findings have been discussed here.

Hopkins, drawing upon the data collected in A__Cross-

Polity Survey, World Handbook of Social and Political 162 Indicators, Dimensionality of the Nations Project, and the study by Cutright,^^^ wishes to compare the "results of some recent theorizing about political development."^*

He has 43 variables, like party competition, press freedom.

Ik^Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Crosa- Polity Survey (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. press, 1961). Using quantitative data, wherever possible and judgmental coding wherever necessary, the authors have ranked the countries. Many researchers have drawn upon this source, converting; rather indiscriminately, the ordinal measures into the interval scale.

Ik^Bruce Russett, et al. World Handbook of Poli­ tical and Social Indicators (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.TV Press, 1963) ,......

^■*Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review Vol. 20, No. 2 (April, 1963) pp. 253-264,

^*Raymond F. Hopkins, "Aggregate Data and the Study of Political Development," Journal of Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Feb. 1969) pp. 71-94. 63 violence, nature of executive stability, etc., measured across 85 countries. His factor analysis reveals a set of five dimensions; viz., power sharing, executive stability, domestic violence, political socialization and tertiary integration, which are generally different from the dimensions Identifiable in the important schools of thought on political development like Almond and Powell's autonomy, differentiation, and secularization; Committee on Comparative Politics' differentiation, equality and capacity; Huntington1 b institutionalization, etc. Hopkins suggests, n...... (D)iscontinuities between theory and data-based development criteria may be attributed to the concern of most data collectors for a more general com­ parison of nations rather than an explicit measure of development, " Lipset's was one of the earliest attempts to show the relationship between various indices of wealth, communications, industrialization on the one hand, and stable and unstable democracies and dictatorships, on the other. He also attempted a classification of states on the basis of legitimacy and the lack of it and the effectiveness and the lack of it. His classifications, however, do not exhaust the nature of political development♦1^6 Cutright reports a fairly strong correlation (r = .81) between political

1650pt d t . f p. 90,

l^Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: Social Bases of Politics, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, T960] pp. 3 5-38. 64

developmentf defined a * complexity and specialization of

national political institutions, and the growth of communi- 1 fi 7 cations. Neubauer, attempting to improve upon Cutrlght's

indicators, has reported a similar relationship between

democratic development and the communications indicators?

he also indicates a threshold above which democratic poll- Ira tical development materializes. DD Recognizing that there

could be a slippage from the concept of political develop­

ment to its measure, Tanter decides to adopt two of its

aspects, viz., interest articulation by associational groups

and 'minority representation,'169 Using the measures of

these, and of urbanization, economic development, social mobilization, with reference to the Latin American countries,

he attempts to find a best fitting causal linkage. This

turns out to be a complex model in which interest articula­ tion and minority representation are independently and causally related to economic development and social mobiliza­ tion, the latter also depending on economic development.

Brass finds that Huntington's thesis that social mobiliza­ tion and political participation lead to a decline of

l6^"National Political. , . ," op. cit.

1 fifi Deane E, Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No, 4 (Dec. 1967) pp. 1001-9.------1 69 Raymond Tanter, "Toward n Theory of Political Development," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 11, No. 2 (May 196T) pp^ F 4 T - T 2 , “ “ 65

institutionalization la not validated in the context of

the Indian States in 1967,i?0 He shows that the decline

of institutionalization— equated with the decline of the

Congress Party--occurred in the least modernized as well

as the most modernized states, with a correlation coefficient

of only 13* Again institutionalization— equated with the

decline in the forfeiture of election deposite— increased

with participation (r >= .66). But the thrust of Huntington's

thesis is that in the absence of matching levels of insti­

tutionalization, increasing rates of social mobilization

lead to political instability and violence* Moreover,

Brass has wrongly equated the decline of the Congress with

the decline of institutionalization, which is theoretically

unsound. The political system of a state like Tamil Nadu, where the Congress declined in 1967 and the Dravida

Munnetra Kazhagam acceded power, may be healthy. Olson

finds a very high correlation (multiple r = 83} between a combined index of political development on the one hand, and 14 indicators of socio-economic development taken

separately. Moreover, he reports a moderate interdependence among the various indicators of political development and a fairly strong interrelationship among the socio-economic

indicators. He concludes that, although economic development

^^Paul R, Brass, ''Political Participation, Institu­ tionalization and Stability in India," Government and Opposition, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 1969) pp, 23-53, 66

doci not ensure the subsequent growth of political develop­

ment f it provides the necessary foundation.171 Needier,

in hie study of political development in 20 Latin American

countries, says, *If participation la treated as the

independent variable, then if participation increases

greatly, constitutional integrity will tend to deteriorate

unless the country's economy develops at the same time,

providing a higher level of welfare to match the higher

level of participation. *1^2 Needier has ignored the fact

that mere economic development does not automatically

ensure that the benefits will be equitably distributed. In

their study of the Black African nations, Duvall and Welfling

find that high degrees of social mobilization are associated with high levels of institutionalization of parties measured

in terms of coherence and adaptability*Thus it will be

seen that there have been very few empirical studies on the

structural interrelationship among the aspects of political development, and the relationship between political development

^^Marvin E. Olsen, "Multivariate Analysis of National Political Development," American Sociological Review, Vol- 3 3 No. 5 4Oct. 196 B} pp, 699-712, 1 7 7 ‘Martin C, Needier, "Political Development and Socio­ economic Development: The Case of Latin America," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Sept- 198} pp^ 5F9-97.

17^Raymond Duvall and Mary Welfling, "Determinants of Political Institutionalization in Black Africa: A Quasi- Experimental Analysis," Comparative Political Studies, Vol, 5, No, 4 (Jan. 1973} pp. 307-410. 67 on the one hand and social mobilization and economic development gn the other* The finding* of even these few studies vary. How the methodologies of measurement vary from author to author will be seen in the next chapter.

Gurr has classified the civil violence incidents into internal war, turmoil and conspiracy.1^4 A few attempts have been made to find whether the acts of civil violence cluster along these dimensions or any other ones.

This is important because each of these kinds of violence can be related to unique socio-political conditions. Tanter finds that the acts of assassinations, strikes, guerrilla wars, riots, purges, cluster along two uncoordinated 171 dimensions of internal war and turmoil. Rummell too finds similar dimensions. The Feierabends discover that demonstrations, riots, mass arrests go together indicating

Why Men. . , , op. cit., p. 11. Internal wars cover civil wars, revolutions and large scale terrorism aimed at overthrowing the regime or dissolving the state: "participation in this kind of violence is extensive and well organized.H Turmoil denotes "relatively spontaneous and unorganized violence" and includes riots, clashes and local rebellions. Conspiraties involve assassinations, small scale terrorist activities, coups d'etat etc., in which the participation is limited,

l^Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-60," Journal of Conf1ict Resolution, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 19661 pp. 65-T3.

^^Rudolph J. Rummell, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1946-59," Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 10, NO. 1 (March 1966) pp. 65-73. 60

anomie and mass participation; revolts, coup*, etc., form

another group; they also find a third dimension of arrests

and executions.^7 Bwy, however, finds in hie study of

the Latin American Countries that the nine indicators of

political instability group themselves into no less than

seven clusters of organised violence, government crisis,

revolutions, anomic violence, strikes, riots, and demonstra- \ JO tions. Gurr develops hypotheses relating each type of

violence to specific societal conditions of bases, resources,

strength of regime and dissident institutions.He

suggests that the societies in the early stages of moderni­

zation are likely to have turmoil, because "patterns of

organizations have not yet been aligned with the distribu­

tion of changing group interests and HD {relative depriva­

tion),"160 Morrison and Stevenson find that, in the

context of Black African nations, mass violence is related

to higher levels of social differentiation, and elite

violence varies inversely with economic development due to

^^Ivo K. and Rosalind L, Feierabend, "Systemic Conditions of Political Violence; An Application of Frustration— Aggression Theory," in Feierabend, et al (ed.) Anger. , ,, op. cit., pp, 136-183,

^^Douglas P. Bwy, "Political Instability in Latin America: The Cross-Cultural Test of a Causal Model,1’ in Feierabend et al . (ed,), Anger. . ., op. cit., pp. 223-41,

l79Why Men. , op. cit., pp. 279ff.

l80Ibld., p. 200. 69

non-cumulation of inequalities, *B1 With the help of a cross lagged matrix of intercorrelations for two different periods of time I960 to 1964 and 1965 to 1969, they find that communal instability follows elite instability in point of time, thus implying the consequences of social mobilization and social differentiation.

A few attempts have been made to find if, and to what extent, the incidence of civil violence varies in practice with value expectations and value capabilities, want formations and want satisfactions, various aspects of institutionalization, etc. Allowing for the differences in conceptualization, operational definitions and measure­ ments, they can be taken to test the relationship between civil violence on the one hand and aspects of social mobilization, political development and institutionaliza­ tion, on the other. Tanter and Midlaraky^1®^ test the

Brinton-Davies^B^ hypothesis that revolutions occur when a rising trend of economic prosperity suddenly reverses itself, i.e., when the rising aspirations are suddenly

101 Donald G. Morrison and Hugh Michael Stevenson, "Political Instability in Independent Black of Africa: More Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 5, no, 3 (Sept. 1971} pp. 147-60. ------

l®^Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, “A Theory of Revolution" Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sept. 1967) pp. 264-67. They, however, operationally define revolution in terns of domestic violence and duration. 1Q1 10JCrane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (London: Jonathan Cape, 195-3) : James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory. . . ,H o p . c i t . 70 blocked, In the 17 countries they studied for the years

1955-60, they did not find any proof of the hypothesis.

In their study of 62 countries for the years 194B-65, the

Feierabends find a strong association between systemic frustration as defined by the ratio of want formation to want satisfaction, on the one hand, and political instability 1 R4 (including civil violence), on the other. They discover that most and least modern societies produce stability, while the transitional societies produce maximum instability, although this relationship is statistically not significant.

Duff and McCamant have examined the profiles of the indi­ vidual Latin American countries in terms of combined indices for social mobilization and social welfare, and have specu- l □ E lated on the violence potential of each of the countries.

Gurr and Ruttenberg do not find any significant correlation between their measures of relative deprivation and value expectations on the one hand, and strife, on the other.

But they report that the variables of value capabilities and social control are well correlated, and the latter

1 R 4 Xvo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Systemic Conditions, . , ," qjj. cit. The Feierabends strangely include newspaper circulation as an indicator of want satisfaction.

^^Ernest A, Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for Systemic Stability in Latin America," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. A (Dec._ITffB) pp. 1125-43, 71 curvilinearly, with strife.Gurr, again, reports that strife is negatively correlated with the institutionaliza­ tion and trade union membership.187

In another of his study of violence in 21 western nations, Gurr found that political and persisting depriva­ tion (i.e. economic decline, cleavages, discrimination, etc.), justifications of violence (i.e, legitimacy, past strife, etc.), and institutional balance (i.e. Gross Domestic Product, budget, voting, coercion, etc.), accounted for 71.5% of variance of all strife.^88 Nesvold, using the same data base as that of the Feierabends, finds that economic develop­ ment (measured in terms non-agricultural labor) is positively correlated with violence (r - .42), while growth of mass media, life expectancy and voting participation are negatively correlated.I®8 She too finds a curvilinear relationship between social change and violence, with stability re-emerging when the economy reaches a high mass-consumption level.

Kirkham, Levy and Crotty seek to find the association between political assassinations and seven factors of socio-economic

i88Cross-Nations 1. . . , op. cit.

Causal Model. . op. cit.

l®®"Sources of Rebellion. . .," op. cit.

l^^Betty A, Nesvole, "A Scalogram Analysis of Political Violence," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 2, no. 2 (July 1969) pp. 172-194. 72

190 significance. Using chi square test, they find significant association between political assassinations and (i) level of socio-economic develop; (11} systemic frustration; (ill) rates of soico-economic change; and (iv) homicides. But, it is interesting to note, that these authors discover that while the most modern states are stable, and the transitional states are unstable, the traditional states tend to be both stable and unstable.

In his study of 70 countries Taylor reports that per capita income, GNP growth rate, ethnic fractionalization, press freedom and the age of the constitutional system account 141 for 34% of the variance in riots. The more interesting of his findings are: (1) the press freedom and riots are curvilineary correlated, with high incidence of riots in the countries of middle levels of press freedom; <11} the probability of a coup increases with ethnic homogeneity. In another study Taylor reports weak correlation between communi­ cations and violence,The Schneiders, studying nine West

19 0 James F. ftirkham, Sheldon G. Levy and William J, Crotty, 11 Cross-National Comparative STudy of Assassination," in Kirkham, et a 1 ■ , Assassination and Political Violence: A Report to the National Commission on the Caases anJ Prevention of violence (New York; Praeger Publishers, 1970) pp. 14S-5117

^^Charles Lewis Taylor, "Political Development and Civil Disorder," Paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Convention, New York, Sept. 2-6, 1969.

192charles Lewis Taylor, "Communications Development and Political Stability," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Jan. 1969) pp. 557-562. 73

European countries and Mexico find a fair correlation between violence and (i) institutionalization {negative),

(11) ratio of social mobilisation to institutionalisation,

and (ill) the ratio of social mobilization to economic development**^ They, however, find no relationship between

social mobilization alone and violence. In his study referred to above, Bwy finds that (i) anomic violence and retributive force are curvilinearly correlated and (ii) 1 ft J organized violence and satisfaction are negatively correlated.

Sofranko and Bealer find only a small relationship between violence and the lack of congruence among political 1 4S development, economic development and education. Terrel, in his study of seventy countries discovers that social frustration is more highly correlated with internal war than 1 with turmoil? so also the cleavages. This, to Terrel, signifies a threshhold effect: at the lower levels many substitute outlets may be there for aggressive tendencies.

If the above studies involve cross-national comparisons, a couple of studies involve within-nation comparisons, and

lqi Peter R. and Anne L. Schneider, "Social Mobiliza­ tion, Political Institutions and Political Violence: A Cross- National Analysis," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (April 1971) pp. 69-90 7

"Political Instability. . op. cit.

*^Andrew J. Sofranko and Robert C, Bealer, "Moderniza­ tion Balance, Imbalance and Domestic Instability,1 Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Oct^ 19^3) PpTT5^T3T

*®^Louis M, Terrel, "Social Stress, Political Instability and Levels of Military Efforts," Journal of Conflict Resolu­ tion, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Sept. 1971) pp. 329-341. 74

involve different regional unite. Burki, treating violence as an urban phenomenon— a questionable but convenient as sumption--compares the incidence of violence measured as number arrest a per thousand urban or town population in the districts of Pakistan.Hie findings are revealing.

Violence is more negatively correlated with the indicators of modernization in the cities than in the towns. Urbaniza­

tion produces stability, because those cities growing faster

than the national average are politically less volatile.

Industrialization reduces the level of violence more in the towns than in the cities. Nakahura and Witton compare the growth of structural differentiation of the Thai Society in the 69 provinces--defined as the proliferation of professions

l r t d and occupations. They report that insurgency and degrees of structural differentiation are associated. They contend that this insurgency in the highly differentiated provinces is due to the dominance of Bangkok in the national life and denial of a proper role and expansion in national institutions to the differentiated provinces. However, there is no sub­ stantiation, statistical or otherwise, for this very insight­ ful explanation.

1 flg ^ ' S h a h i d Javed Burki, "Ayub's Fall: A Socio-economic Explanation," Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No, 3 (March 1972), pp. 201-212. l qq Joyce Nakahura and Ronald A. Witten, Development and Conflict in Thailand, Data Paper No. 30, South-East Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1971). 75

Bowen et al, and Grofman and refute, on the basis of their surveys in Cleveland (Ohio) and

Waterloo (Iowa), that violence rises unilineary and monotonously with perceived relative deprivation. Grofman and Muller particularly state that the highest potential for violence is manifested both by the individuals who are optimistic about their future and by the individuals who are pessimistic.

The role of the inequalities of wealth in relation to violence has not been examined by many despite the concern of the politicians and powerful theorizing by social scientists.

According to Russett, **Extreme inequality of land distribution leads to political instability only in those predominantly agricultural societies."201 Tanter and Midlarsky report that revolutions between 19 5 5-60 have occurred more in the countries

y rti with a high Gini index of land distribution. ^

1 aq Don R. Bowen, Elinor R. Bowen, Sheldon R, Gawiser, and Louis H. Masotti, "Deprivation, Mobility and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 11, No, 4, (March, April, i960j.

^^Bernard N. Grofman and Edward M. Muller, "The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-curve Hypothesis," American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, No. 2 (June 1973} pp. 514-540.

7 n l Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1964) pp. 442-454.

202"^ Theory of. . op. c i t. See also, Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March, 1956) pp. 21-35. 76

It ii evident that not much work has been done on empirical explication of the nature of political develop­ ment, and on the relationship among social mobilization, political development and civil violence. Excepting, perhaps, in the case of civil violence and coercive balance, not all the findings reported above pull in the same direction, and those that do are not very consistent with one another, let alone identical. Taylor rightly remarks,

"We may find the world more complicated than we expected. "^03

STUDY OF VIOLENCE IN INDIA

Although civil violence in India is increasing, it has attracted the serious attention of very few social scientists, and the field has been pre-empted mainly by the newspaper commentators. 205 attempts have been made to relate the incidents rigorously to the changing ecological factors. The analyses and explanations of violence in India, with a few exceptions, are spread over a number of books and articles— popular and learned, but mainly devoted to other themes,

^^Charles Louis Taylor, "Political Development. . op. cit., p. 10.

204por a review of what little has been done and suggestions for further research, see D. N. Dhanagare, "Violence and Politics in India." Political Science in India a Trend Report, {New Delhi: Indian Council of Social Science Research, 1971, mimeo).

205por detailed bibliography of mainly such articles, see Communal Violence in India: A Bibliography (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1970, mimeo.) 77

The legacy of the civil disobedience movement of the pre-Independence era seem to have conditioned the attitudes of the public and the government toward each other and of both of them to violent actions in a peculiarly Indian way.

Aiyar notes that the concept of public seems to be 1alien to the Indian tradition1 Weiner has noted how the govern­ ment ignores the popular demands and representations, concedes them when the people resort to violence, strengthening in the process the conviction of the people that only violence pays.2*^ According to Weiner, only a small part of violence in India is anomic and most of it is planned or organized, but he has reached this conclusion without any systematic classification of the incidents. ^0$

206S. P. Aiyar, "The Anatomy of. . os. cit.. p. 26.

2^ M y r o n Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity: The Public Pressure and Political Response in India {Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). Similar observations have been made by: David H. Bayley, "Public Protest and the Political Process in India," "Pacific Affairs, Vol 42, No. 1 (Spring 1969), pp. 5-16j David H. Bayley, "The Pedagogy of Democracy: Coercive Public Protest in India," American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Sept. 1962)^ pp. 663-672: Myron Weiner, "Struggle Against Power: Notes on Indian Political Behavior," World Politics, Vol. 9, No. 3 (April 1956) pp. 392-403. In Weiner's The Politics o f . . ., op. cit., some inconsistency appears in the arguments, He says in the beginning that government fails to respond when the demands are made thus turning the people to force (pp. 33-36); in the latter part he hypothesizes ". , ,(I)n general, Central and State Govern­ ments discourage those techniques that restrict the govern­ ments freedom of action and encourage those techniques that provide information." (pp. 201-2).

20eThe Politics of. . ., o p . c i t ., p. 204. 78

Dhanagare, drawing upon the newspaper reports, seeks to study the urban rural differences in the election violence during the 1967 general elections.2®® He finds that urban violence was higher than the rural violence in all the states except in Kerala. He also discovers that the frequency of election violence was higher in the urban areas and intensity in rural areas. Hut the Chi square test between urbanization and violence yields no significant relationship. In the other study, which has hardly any theoretical speculation at all, he merely examines the nature of the acts of violence, 210 like stone throwing, etc. As Dhanagare himself admits, his studies are more exploratory than explanatory in 211 character. Chatterjee and associates attribute, on the basis of a survey, the March 1964 riots in Rourkela, Orissa, to tensions among the Hindus, Muslims and Adivasis (Tribals) caused by the differential immigration into the steel city and to false rumor-mongering about the refugees from

Pakistan.212

n . Dhanagare, "Urban Rural Differentials in Election Violence,” Political Science Review, Vol. 7, Nos. 3 St 4 (July-Sept. and Oct.-Dec. 19^8) pp. 747-759,

2^®D. N. Dhanagare, "Violence in the Fourth General Elections," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 3, Nos, 1 S, 2 1 Annual NumberT (Jan. 1966) pp. 151-6,

N. Dhanagare, Violence and Politics in India: Political Science in India, a Trend Report (New Delhi; Indian Council of SocTaY ScTence Research, 1971) p, 16 (mimeo).

212R. B. Chatterjee, P. N. Singh and G. R. S. Rao, Riots in Rourkela: A Psychological Study (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1967}, 79

Bay ley discusses the problems and dilemmas of preventive detention being resorted to by the government in the context of increasing violent protests in India.213 He recognizes six forms of non-violent and violent protests:

(i) processions and public meetings, (ii) strikes, hartals and boycotts, (iii) hunger strikes, (iv} obstruction, (v) courting arrests, and (vi) violent riots.Drawing upon the reporting in The Times of India (Bombay) and The statesman (Calcutta) for the years 1955, 1957, 1958, he has collected the data on the number of riots, casualties' involved, number of persons arrested, and the number of police firings. This has been done only to come to the conclusions that (i) the Indian government is faced with a massive and continual threat to law and order (which is obvious), and (ii) violent disturbances are heavier in India, than in the U.S.A. or U.K. There is no systematic examination of, or speculation on the causes, except for the statement that economic motivations predominate.^5 The Research and

Political Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government

^l^David H. Bayley, "Violent Agitation and the Democratic Process in India" (Unpublished Doctor’s dissertation, Princeton University, 1961) microfilm.

2 Ibid., pp. 25-30. Bayley also classifies the violent incidents-Into the spontaneous-inadvertant, gradua 1- inadvertent and gradual-deliberate types. (pp. 47-57) .

2^Ibid. , p. 341. 80

of India, have prepared a document reviewing the incidence

of violence from 1963 to 1968,2 They aee the causes of

the riaing trend in increasing urbanisation, population explosion, rise in prices, alliance among the political

parties to organize mass confrontations, etc. But, unfortu­

nately, this paper has merged the incidences of both civil

and criminal violence.

As Dhanagare has noted, the works on agrarian relations

in India, while discussing rent, land revenue, tenancy, rural

indebtedness, have ignored the changes in the class structure

in the context of modernization.2^ Omvedt has described mobilization of the Maratha and other lower-caste peasants

under the aegis of the Satyashodhak Samaj (Society in Search of Truth) in the western India in the 1920’s, which resulted

in violent incidents against the Brahmin landlords.2^®

Natarajan has reviewed, from the Marxist perspective, the agrarian agitations in India during the second half of the

19th century.2^ Another study by the Home Ministry reviews

the peasant protests like forcible land seizure in the

31 ft ‘c^pHeview of Violence in Indian Society (New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, n ,

2^L. Natarajan, Peasant Uprisings in India 1B50-1900 (Bombay: Peoples Publishing House] 19*3). ’ ~ ei different Indian states and traces their causes.The

comparative approach relating peasant uprising in different

areas through the various strategies of mobilization to the

structural conditions has been absent in most of these

studies.

Some of the peasant uprising have been engineered by

the Communist parties in India, especially by the (Third)

Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). One such

uprising, which was protracted and assumed menacing propor­

tions, has been analyzed by Franda^l and Irani. Over­

street and Windmiller have described the communist disturbances

in Telegana in 1949-50.^^

The Hindu-Muslim communal disturbances, which are becoming increasingly virulent and intense, have also been, by and large, ignored by the social scientists. Krishnaswamy' s dissertation is an exception. His analysis of the Hindu-

Muslim riots which erupted in Bombay during August 1893, reveals that the immediate causes of music before the mosques,

the killing of cows, the impact of riots elsewhere, become

220t ^& Causes and Mature of Current Agrarian Tensions: A Summary (New Delhi": Ministry of Home Affairs, n .d , mfmeo) . See also, Andre Beteille, "Agrarian Unrest in Tanjore," The Times of India, Sept. 20, 1960. Beteille compares the different tenurial conditions in eastern and western Tanjore.

^^^Harcus F. Franda, Radical Politics in West Bengal (Cambridge, Mass.: The M,I,t ! Press, 1971) pp. 1$2-1687

222c Irani, Bengal; The Communist Challenge (Bombay: Lalwani Publishing House, 19687.

2 2 3 ^ ^ Q Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959). 02 significant only in context of general economic, political and religious unrest.22* d'Monte's case study of the

Bhiwandi (Maharashtra) riots in May 1970 traces the successive stages of mounting tension and the riots,Murphy22** and

Ram227 describe the various sources of communal tensions.

The pamphlets of the Sampradayikata Vlrodhi Committee, New

Delhi, (The Society to Fight Traditionalism) are mostly propagandist in nature and possess no scientific value,22®

As said in the earlier chapter, the various commissions of inquiry concern themselves only with fixing the responsibility of police firing and the adequacy of the police 'bundobast1

22^S. Krishnaswamy, "A Riot in Bombay, August 11, 18 93. A Study in Hindu-Muslim Relations in Western India During the Late Nineteenth Century," (Unpublished Doctor's Disserta­ tion, University of Chicago, 1966) microfilm.

22^Uarry D*Monte, "Bhiwandi: The Anatomy of a Riot," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 22 (May 30, 1970) pp. 665-671. ------

22^Gardner Murphy, In the Minds of Men: The Study of Human Behavior and Social' Tensions in India (New York: Basic Books, 1953} ,

227Pars Ram, a UNESCO Study, study of Social Tension in Aligarh 1950-51 (Ahmedabad: New Order Book Co. 1955).

22®Among their publications are: N. K, Singh, A Ta1 e of Two Villages (A Spot Study of Nonari fr Sajni Riots Tn uTp.) (n.d .) ; n"I kT Singh, Chaibasa Riots ; An on the Spot Study (1970); Research Worker^ Ahmedabad M o t s X-Rayed (107Q); A. G. Noorani, Ranchi Riots Inquiry Report X-Rayed, (n.d.); Riots in Aurangabad: An Analytical Report fHindi) (n.d.) ; Ashwini K. Roy and Suhas Chakravarty, Communal Riots in Meerut: An Analysis (Hindi) (n.d.). 83

(security arrangements),^® There have been studies of the student in discipline and unrest. The various causes mentioned are unplanned expansion of education, lack of meaningful teacher-students relations, *ruralization* of university education, discontinuities in socialization, lack of job opportunities, etc .2 ^0

THE CONTEXT OF THE INDIAN STATES :

The Indian states provide a unique opportunity to test some of the theories and speculations regarding social mobilization, political development and civil violence.

Despite the formidable powers entrusted to the Union govern-

■ T - l 1 ment, and the apparent 1 quasi-federal1JA character of the

Constitution, the operation of the political systems in the States shows that the States have, in practice,

®For a summary of the reports of some of these com­ missions, see, S, K, Ghosh, Riots; Prevention and Control (Calcutta; Eastern Law Housed 1971), The Appendix.

2 Among the many works on this, see Philip G, Altbach, (ed.) Turmoil and Transition: Hl^h Education and Student Politics in India (Bombay; Lalwani Publishing House, I960) ; Philip G, Altbach, "The Transformation of the Indian Student Movement," Asian Survey, Vol. 6 , No. 8 (Aug, 1966} pp. 448-60; Joseph E . DiBona, Change and Conflict in the Indian University (Bombay: Lalwani; Publishing House, 1973); "Students 1n Turmoil," Seminar No. 8 B (Dec. 1966); Weiner, The Politics of. . op. cit., Ch, 7; S. P. Ayvar, "Students and Politics in India" pp. 53-103, and A. B. Shah, "Student Indisciplines," pp. 104-10 both in Aivar, (ed.) Politics of. . ,, op. cit.

c . wheare, Federal Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1967, 3rd ed.) esp, 28. 84 conaiderable political and administrative freedom. ^32

Host of the nation-building powers like irrigation, power, education, cooperation, public health, agriculture, etc., are vested with the states. Appleby says that the union government has all the nstaff and no line1 functions,^34

The fact the States are nearer to the common man than the

'figuratively and physically' distant Delhi, and their importance as transmitters of forces of economic development has been stressed by many.^^ As Weiner says, ", , , (T}he instabilities and shocks associated with the economic development

2 32Among the many works dealing wholly or partially with the operation of federalism in India may be cited, M. V, Pylee, The Constitutional Government in India {Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 19GCU ; Asok Chanda, Federalism in India; A Study of Union State Relations (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1 9 6 5 S. P. Alyar and Usha Mehta (eds.) Essays in Indian Federalism {Bombay: Allied Publishers, Ltd., "!$"(» 5 fj Amal Ray, Tension Areas in India's Federal System {Calcutta; World Press, 1970). "

2 33.j>he Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, List II.

234Paul Appleby, Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey {Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1953) (T 10. Weiner says that the States tend to ignore or dilute the instructions of the Union which is heavily dependent on them for the implementation of the plans and that the States are more concerned with the distributive aspects than the creation of wealth: Myron Weiner, "India: Two Political Cultures," in Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba, (ed.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton University Preag^ 19 65) pp. 159-2 44, esp. pp. 233-34. 2 3 5 K. Venkataraman, States Finances in India; A Perspective Study for the Plan Periods (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. , I960) jpT 17. D~. iv! Gadgil, Planning and Economic Policy in India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965) pp. 237-llfl. ' 85

process are felt first at the state level, and, only there­

after, move into the national politics. "23®

Kothari has argued that the diffusion of political

power-generated by the necessity of implementing the plan

programmes at the lower levels, the vast networks of

patronage, the elections to the innumerable local bodies and

shift in the social bases of power— has crystallized at the

state and even lower levels.237 The leavening due to the

process of social mobilization has brought to the surface,

and accentuated, the cultural and political uniqueness of

the States, especially since the reorganization of the States

in 1956. As Kothari has suggested, the social structure within the States and many antecedent factors like the varia­

tions in the degrees of the penetration of the Congress movement in the pre-Independence period and of the growth efficient bureaucracies, have affected the patterns of State politics.23® The ability of the Congress to accommodate different castes and other groups within its fold, the patterns opposition— leftist, rightist, feudal, tribal--and the degrees of revivalist politics, vary from State to State.

236Hyron Weiner, "Political Development in the Indian States," in Myron Weiner, State Politics in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 6B) pp. 3-58, Quotation on p. 3.

Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1970) pp. 117-122. ” ~~

238Ibid. , pp. 122-126. 86

The States also differ in terms of the various social mobilization indicators, and these differences do not seem to be narrowing at all, despite the avowed aims of the planners. Having measured the Inter-State distances on six indicators of social and economic development in the fifties and the sixties, Rao concludes that distances have not been reduced in the course of 15 years of planning.^® Again, even a casual look at the States will show that incidence of civil violence varies from State to State. As Weiner eyas:

. . .(S)ince the Indian States function within a common political system and operate within the same constitutional structures and national constraints, we have a rare opportunity to observe developmental changes in a system controlled for governmental structures. . . There are few problems in political develop­ ment in other countries not found in some form within the Indian States, and no problems of development within the Indian States not found outside I n d i a . 240

HYPOTHESES:

This dissertation will test, using appropriate statistical techniques, the following hypotheses developed in the light of the theorizing and the empirical findings discussed in detail in the earlier sections. The arguments

K. Rao, "A Note on Measuring Economic Regions in India," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 6 , No. 17 (April 2W] 1973} pp. 793-800, See a1 so, Identification of Backward Areasj Report of the Working Group (New Delhii Planning Commission,

240"po iiticai Development in, , . o p . cit., pp. 17-18. 87

in favor of the hypotheses need not* therefore, be repeated

in the case of each hypothesis* Besides the minimal reference,

additional support, both in general and in the Indian context,

will be adduced,

HYPOTHESIS 1: As Social mobilization increases, political

development also increases, but not to the

same extent.

The processes of social mobilization and modernization,

whether forced from above or possessing their own momentum and

dynamism, or both, release the people from centuries old and con­

gealed patterns of living and thought, and generate the 'free-

floating resources' for political development, Eisenstadt argues

that this 'dismemberment of the old ties' and 'disembedding1

of the material and motivational resources present problems as well as new opportunities.^41 ^ threshold of economic development

is necessary, whether for political development or democratic

development, 24 2 Therefore, it is impossible to find a state

very low on social mobilization, but very high on political

development. Conversely, there cannot be a State very high

on social mobilization, but very low on political development.

The Huntington gap arises in the transitional societies

N, Eisenstadt, "Social Change and Development," in Eisenstadt, Readings in, , . , op. cit., pp. 3-54.

Political Man. . ., op. cit., Olsen, Multivariate Analysis^ . . , " op. cit. 86 because social mobilization does not automatically ensure a perfectly symbiotic growth of political development.

The Huntington gap can assume many forms. Since, in the transitional societies, a maximum disparity between social mobilization and political development can be expected at the higher levels of the former, two forms are expected.

First, there is the probability of a rising curve flattening at the top, i.e. at the higher stages of social mobilization, political development, instead of rising, remains constant.

Secondly, the curve gradually rises at first and then comes down, i.e. political development starts declining with the higher levels of social mobilization. A third probability can also be envisaged: as social mobilization rises, political development also rises, but not in the one to one relation­ ship ? the growth of political development may be proportional, but always less than that of social mobilization.

Any one of these forms can be expected in the case of the Indian States, It can be explored whether the capabilities and the institutionalization match the levels of social mobilization, especially in the higher states, Myrdal describes

India, like other South Asian countries, as having become a

'soft' State, with a growing dichotomy between promise and performance.^*'* It can be seen whether some states are

Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty 09

1 softer* than the others. It is possible that the levels of political development in the more modernized states like West

Bengal/ Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra, may not be coimnensurate with the atrains.

HYPOTHESES 2{aJ: The various indicators of social mobilization

are highly inter-correlated among themselves.

{b): The various indicators of political develop­

ment are highly inter-correlated among

themselves.

It might appear that these two hypotheses are redundant and hence, unnecessary. It might also be argued that both social mobilization and political development can be so operationally defined as to obtain the expected results.

Then, it would be logical opposite of 'Straw-man* hypothesis, perhaps a 1strong-man' hypothesis.

In reality this is not so. Deutsch's social mobilization indicators will be, with some adaptations, adopted) and these indicators have generally gone together in the West. But is this experience being repeated in the Indian States with its semi-planned economic development?

Lerner is pretty emphatic about the various aspects of modernization going 'hand in hand1 and the western model being repeated. He says that their mutual association suggests their having gone together because, in some historical sense they had to go together.Deutsch also stresses the aspects

34^The Passing of. . ., op. cit., p. 46 and p. 436. 90

of social mobilization recurring in clusters.Many studies have corroborated this.2***

But, in the same article Deutsch says, "The lags and discrepancies between the different indicators can reveal much of interest to the student of politics."247 in other words, he does envisage a possibility of their not going together. It has been argued that urbanization in the developing states is qualitatively different from that in the West in the comparable stages of economic development, in that the developing countries do not have a well-developed tertiary sector to support the migrants.2^® Lags and discrepancies can be expected for other reasons, too.

Urbanization may be due more to the rural push caused by the pressure of population on the land than to the urban pull caused by the expanding job opportunities. The rate of growth of literacy and college education may be more than that of per capita income. Hence, it would be interesting to see if the indicators of social mobilization resolve themselves into one or many clusters.

The essence of the above arguments applies to the questicmof the indicators of political development going

245"Social Mobilization, , ,," op. cit■, p. 493.

2^ F o r example, Olsen, "Multivariate. - . , ” op. cit.

2*7"Social mobilization. • , , 11 op. cit. , p. 295.

2*®Bert F, Hoselitz, "The Hole of Urbanization in Economic Development: Some International comparisons," in Turner (ed.) Indians Urban. . ., op. cit., pp. 157-131. 91 together, Olten ha# discovered only a moderate association among his variables of political development.2*® It has been shown above that Hopkin's actual dimensions of political development turned out to be different from those derived from the theories. ^0 The indicators^^ developed in this dissertation in terms of scope and effectivenss of government, growth of associations in the social infra-structure and cohesion of the party systems, which have been derived from the theories of Almond and Powell, the Committee on Comparative

Politics, Huntington, Eisenstadt and others, may be logically expected to hang together. Bureaucratic growth is essential for higher extractive and regulative capabilities. Distributive capabilities cannot rise without administrative and extractive capabilities. A non-fragmented party system enhances the effectiveness of government. But it is quite possible that these indicators may not go together in reality because the roles attributed to some structures in terms of the relevant indicator, may be performed by others, rt could be that, as

Huntington has complained, these indicators, may have nothing in common except the label.

^^Olsen, “Multivariate. , op. cit.

Hopkins, "Aggregata Data. , . ,11 op. c i t .

2 ^ S e e Chapter III.

252"The Change to Change. . . , “ p. 304. 92

HYPOTHESIS 3: An increase In social mobilization is

accompanied by an lncfaait in the inequalities

of the distribution of land and income.

Kuxnet's thesis that the distribution of income is more unequal in the developing countries than in the developed ones and that in the earlier stages of economic development the overall inequalities in the underdeveloped countries are likely increase, may be recalled here.^^

Myrdal further suggests that (i) th^se inequalities in South

Asia become more glaring if the post-tax incomes are taken into account; (ii) the indirect taxes, on which the under­ developed countries rely, are notoriously regressive? (iii) and the benefits of social services flow mainly to the upper income g r o u p s . ^54 Ozha and Bhatt, while disputing some of KuzMt's general comparisons between the developed and the underdeveloped countries, agree that in the earlier stages of economic development, the pattern of income distri­ bution becomes more uneven. They find that in India, between two time periods of 1953-54 and 1956-57, the ratio of concentration of income in the Urban Sector increased while

25^"Quantitative Aspects. . op. cit.

254"Asian Drama. . Vol. 1, op. cit. , p, 566-79. Also, H, F. Lydall, "The Inequality Indian incomes," The Economic Weekly, Vol. 12, Nos. 23, 24 k 25, (June I960) Special Number, pp. 873-4.

D- ozha and V. V. Bhatt, "Pattern of Income Distri­ bution in an Underdeveloped Economy" in Charan D„ Wadhwa, (ed,} , Some Problems of India1 s Economic Policy: Selected Readings on Planning, Agriculture and Foreign Trade (Bombay: Tata-McGraw Hill, l5?3) pp. 17J-1G9. — 93

that in the rural sector fell, and that the distribution is more unequal in the urban sector than in the rural one.

In a more detailed analysis, using the same data base for the same time periods, they argue that low income rural groups and high income urban groups have gained, but the high income rural groups and low income urban groups have l o s t . ^ 6 Rosen has argued that in the process of planned economic development urban entreprenuerial and rural landlord classes have become richer, while the urban middle and lower, and the rural landless classes have become poorer. ^^ Prime

Minister Indira Gandhi says that despite the impressive gains in the field of economic development, the disparities between the social classes, the States and regions have widened.

The Congress party has been conmitted to the cause of land reforms from even the pre-Independence days. But the enactment of the land reform measures by the States, increasingly socialist in purpose, have not had any impact

d . Ozha and V. V. Bhatt, "Distribution of Income in the Indian Economy: 1953-54 to 1956 to 1956-57," Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, Vol. 11, No, 9 (Sept. 1962), pp. 1346-136 3. In other words the rural inequalities have declined, while the urban ones have increased. But, for conflicting evidence on the failure of land reforms and Green Revolution, see the following paragraphs.

25?George Rosen, Democracy and Economic Change in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966) .

^®Indira Gandhi, "India and the World," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Oct. 1972) pp. 65-77. 94

on thi actual redistribution of land,25® This is mainly

due to the faulty and half-hearted implementation, and the

lack of political will at the top, especially the class

of solid, upper caste peasantry which controls the State

power bases.2®*1

This has been documented extensively in both the Government Reports and the works of the scholars. For a history of the Congress Agrarian policy, see H. D. Malaviya, Land Reforms in India {Hew Delhi: All India Congress Committee, 1954) , Gunnar Myr3al (Aslan Drama. , ♦, op. cit. , Vol. II, pp. 1301-1344) discusses how the post-Independence policies have not succeeded, or have been foiled by the conservative and anti-reformist block. The earlier Five Year Plans stressed not so much the land reforms as increased production. The increasing but futile impatience of the Union Government is betrayed in Report of the Committees of the Panel of Land Reforms (New Delhi: Planning Commission, I9$ff) ; implementation of Land' Reformst A Review by the Land Reforms Implementation Committee of the National Development Council (New Delhi: Planning Commission, 1966); Chief Ministers' Conference on Land Reforms: Summary Record, New Delhi. 26th-27th Sept. 1970 (New Delhi: Ministry of Food and Agriculture, is-?!), mlmeoF? P. s. Appu, Ceiling on Agricultural holdings (New Delhi: Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 19T1, "mimeo) t See also, Raj Krishna "Agrarian Reform in India: The Debate on Ceiling," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 7, No. 3 (April 1959) ppT 3(52- 311.------

260a statement of Myrdal is enough to sum up his eloquent criticism of the 'radicalism in promise and conservatism in practice' on the part of the ruling circles: "Democracy itself thus plays into the hands of petty plutocracy." Asian Drama:. . , Vol. 1, op. cit-, p . 293^ (Original emphasis). TTVe following investigations by the researchers reveal how the land legisla­ tion is evaded: Wolf Ladejinsky, A Study on Tenurial Conditions in Package Districts (New Delhi; Planning Commission, n .d .); K , S . Bonachalam, Land Reforms in Tamil Nadu; Evaluation and Implementation (New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing Co., r m r f V, Dandekar and G. J. Khudanpur, Working of Bombay Tenancy Act 1948: Report of Investigation (Poona: Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1957}. 95

The available evidence suggests that the impact of the Green Revolution— raiaing the agricultural production through investments of fertilizers, improved high yielding varieties of seeds, etc."has only been to exacerbate 1 existing income inequality in rural India. Frankel finds that the gains of the Green Revolution have often accrued to landowners owning more than 20 acres of land and the small landowners and the landless laborers have gained little or 262 nothing. She further suggests that the goals of raising the agricultural output and reducing disparities in rural life are often irreconcilable and that the polarization between the big landlords on the one hand and small landowners and the landless on the other, has already begun, which is

fraught with violent implications. ^63

The reasons why the processes of social mobilization and modernization widen the disparities of wealth are not

^®^Francine R. Frankel, India*s Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs (Princeton: Princeton UniversltyPress, 1971]j Lester r 7 Brown, "The Agricultural Revolution in Asia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, no. 4 (July 1968) pp. 688-698: Pranab Bardhan, "Green Revolution and Agricultural Laborers," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 29-11 (Special Number] July 1970. PratapCT. Aggarwal, The Green Revolution and Rural Labor: A Study in Ludhiana (New Delhi: Sri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources, 1973).

^®2jndla*s Green. . ., op. c i t . , p, 25.

^®^Ibid. , p. 191, "In summer of 1970, the sudden murders of several landowners (in Punjab) stunned the Akali Ministry and created a law and order crisis as local landlords also resorted to violence against Harijans" (p. 45). Again in Thanjavur "Abductions, arson, beatings and murder have become a common way of life.” (p. 117), 96

far to seek* The opportunities of new skills and new roles,

generated in the processes of modernization, are monopolized

by the few groups which have the advantage of an earlier

start and momentum. And the rewards for the different types

of new skills also vary, ^ 4 If the above relationship is

true, the testing of the Hypothesis 3 will reveal the extent

and the degree of the relationship. Moreover, while a few

inter-state comparisons of the variations in the standards 265 of living and average per capita income have been made,

the inequalities have not been measured in terms of the

concentration ratios.

HYPOTHESES 4 fa): Social mobilization varies positively with

civil violence.

(b) : Political Development varies Inversely

with civil violence.

(c): Political Hardship--defined as inequalities

of land and income distribution, population

density and growth of poverty, i.e., fall in

the standards of living due to inflation--

varies positively with civil violence.

D. Ozha, "A Configuration of Indian Poverty- Inequality and Levels of Living” in A, J, Fonseca, (ed.). Challenge of Poverty in India (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971} pp. Sfe-4?. 26 5 For such comparisons, see V. M. Dandekar and Nilakantha Rath, Poverty in India (Poona: The Indian School of Political Economy, 1971). 91

(d): Taken together, social mobilisation and

political hardship vary positively, and

political development varies inversely,

with civil violence.

(e): The tendency toward civil violence due

to higher degree of social mobilization

is checked by higher degrees of political

development.

The relationship of civil violence to social mobiliza­ tion , political development and inequalities has been discussed in depth in the preceding pages. As also has been said above, no attempts have been made to examine the degrees of these variables in the Indian States and relate them to each other, although there have been many suggestions and speculations.

As Frankel says, "Over the last few years, long-standing assumptions about the positive relationship between more rapid economic growth and promotion of democratic stability have been badly shaken by growing instances of rural violence,"^®®

The variable of inequalities of wealth has been kept separate from that of social mobilization, as it does not form a part of the latter, conceptually and organically. It is only to be expected that population density worsens the problems created by politicized inequalities. A higher

2 &feIndia's Green. . op. cit., p. 8 , 98 density of population facilitates formal or informal association of people for agitational activities* Growth of poverty, to be defined as the increase in the percentage of the people below the minimum necessary standard of living, can occur along with an increase in inequalities, or independently of them, due to inflation. Dandekar and Rath have estimated that between 1960-61 and 1967-68, "The condition of the bottom 20 percent rural poor has remained more or less stagnant. The condition of the bottom 20 percent of the urban poor has definitely deteriorated? and for another

20 percent of the urban population, it has remained more or less stagnant."267 Bardhan, in his statewise analysis of growth of rural poverty, has reached the conclusion that it has increased in 11 of the 16 States.This raises the questions: What is the State-wise variation in the growth of urban as well as rural poverty? And what are its political implications?

In addition to the above hypotheses, the following proposition will also be investigated.

267poverty in. - o p . cit., pp. 32-33. Regarding the continuous migration of the rura1 poor to the city slums, they say, "its shape today is probably no more than hideous; allowed to grow unheeded and unrelieved, it will inevitably turn u9 ly*" (Ibid.) 2 68 Pranab K. Bardhan, "On the incidence of Poverty in Rural India in the Sixties," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 8 , Nos, 4-6, (Annual Number, 1&73J pp. 345-254, 99

Proposition 1s It is possible to predict, the additional

degrees of political development the highly

mobilized but poorly developed States have

to attain in order to check civil violence.

In a purely exploratory way, the relationship between communist voting and civil violence will also be examined. CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY AND DATA PRESENTATION

OPERATIONAL MEASURES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

Social mobilization has not presented many problems regarding its operational measurements. Different writers have adopted singly, or in groups, or sometimes entirely, depending on their emphasis, Deutsch's operational measures. They arer

(i) exposure to aspects of modern life through demonstrations of machinery, consumer goods etc., (ii) mass media, (iii) change of residence, (iv) urbanization, (v) change from agricultural occupations, (vi) literacy, and {vii) per capita income.^ In the latter part of the same article, he adds (i) voter parti­ cipation, fii} population growth, and (iii) linguistic, cultural or political assimilation.2 It is difficult to see how popula­ tion growth and linguistic etc, assimilation constitute con­ ceptual parts of social mobilization. Both population growth and assimilation may not necessarily produce the physical and mental uprooting of the people. Tanter, for example, uses the degrees of assimilation of the (Latin American) Indians into

■•■Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization, and Political Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Sept. 1961) pp. 493-514,

2lbid.

100 101 the mestizo population ae an index of social mobilization in the Latin American states.3 But, instances of social mobili­ zation deepening and exacerbating the cleavages can be pointed out.* Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation popu­ lation growth and assimilation will not be considered as parts of social mobilization. Also, to keep social mobilization strictly social, voter participation will be omitted. One of the indicators of Deutsch is change of residence. It would be more precise to include mobility or transportation as an indicator.

The following indicators of social mobilization will be used, with the appropriate units of measurements for the

Indian States.^

1. Percentage of literacy.

2. Newspaper circulation per 100,000 population.

3. Number of radio sets per 100,000 population.

^Raymond Tater, "Toward a Theory of Political Development," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 11, No. 2 (May 1967) pp. 14 5-17 2.

*For many hypotheses on the exacerbation of communal ism due to social mobilization, see Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and The Politics of Communal ism: A Theoretical Perspective," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No, 4 (Dec. 1970) pp. 1112-1130.™“

5For the purposes of this study the Union Territories in India will be omitted, because, in view of the variations in their automony they are not comparable with the States. Also, the State of Nagaland will be omitted only because on most of the indicators of social mobilization and political development, the data for that State are not available. Therefore, 16 of the 17 States as existed on Dec. 31, 1969 will be taken into account. As far as was practicable the data were collected for the period 1965 through 1969, For the details, see Appendix I. 102

4. Percentage of urbanization.

5. Percentage of non-agricultural population.

6 . Kilometer* of road* as a ratio of 100 ■quare kilometers of area,

7. Number of motor vehicles per 10,000 population.

8 . Per capita income.

In addition to the above measures, a measure of university students per 100,000 population of each State will also be included. Originally, a measure of all those who had been and are being exposed to higher education was planned to be

Included as one of the indicators of social mobilization. But as the data on the distribution on high school students were not available, for any year after 1964-6 5 the measure of university students has been kept separate. No rigorous hypothesis has been formulated, but the Impact of the growth of universities on civil violence will be loosely examined.

Table 1 shows the levels of social mobilization in the

Indian States. Table II presents the levels of University education,

OPERATIONAL MEASURES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

As Huntington has said, the answers to the question:

'what is political development?' are more numerous than the questions,6 The eel-like character of the concept has rendered

^Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Moderni­ zation, Development and Politics," Comparative Politics. Vol. 3, No. 3 (April 1971) pp. 283-323. Table I: levels of Social Mobilization In the Indian States ido O *h V T3H& O > ftgS J iH , jj &, i-H a pJ u ® o a n u S u 8 o t Cu d i v a d o vi i ktk

3 I a - h i O flf H 4 o' i ■ O O O 1 n j l - i | | t H ■ l l tH o o J W t f H *J -H K U ( o M t C « 4 4 J < fa a. o . P O O ) a W H u o « h 4 O V H 0 d c *

h g 3 * M O Cfl j ± Jj 6 * o. 8 8 ) l f 4 4 u c P I * P * , w

-S

g

g o t M C (M m 0 4 n c drift - r " J - D J ■ i-H H r M C r O T H ■— 1-1 888 o p o O p p d ■ o f ■St - r 3 XI 4= P P •-H M C H p H n i H p " !O U"*! tj JZ q M 4 H Id A A H H H h « p p a a. » » » 1 b- k 4 .* a. ■ £ i o t - r i T C O ■st « M C IX ^ - F 0 0 0 4 , ^ r 5 O p m 3 p r- *5 A A | -4 H H a ri. H O . o o * D H S o p r"i a T x j f H O O a a *r4 JZ try H p H p o ■ H O m eM A kt H * * * p p ■ M C . ^ f o M C n i m n » m O o O n k -a- - n o X O H n i ^ r H - H v m o n i s r n h n * (JH O N N » n o m n n i—i oiS p t - p st H CJ 1—! U 3 A

■H t k O s M C M cn OP t-Hn* n o o o o s o . o m © p— H r 0 4 n f p f E - S O o o ] £ > • p H " p p w p a - u A A H - H H H H 4 m i ■ ■ to a> M C 'H s o M C o m o o o c M C C t o o m H O j Cm J 40 ~COo N f O

n < i-H o o 0 0 p s ■ - S n 8 3 3 l * c 3 O M C ■J m j H m o o o M C o H - p - H 3 o r- m H O M C —i i— kJ a n 2

o ■St t HN H O *S r--, n c M C n c N - C r M C - ^ r O p t i t i HO 40 o p O C O s H - i * £■•£! p - a 4 n 0 v d H H H + p ■ p * # ■ ■ n Ed I s f > * * < ^ r ■ CM H t ' O H C m ta­ in O* O H O p in O t O H ■ h H . . * a Cm l ^ H rH m * O n c a m Q O t ^ f m * r m Ot S 3 3 O p m ao o o 0 0 cn m m N p O c - f H m 3 4 H —1 H 5 n a ■ a * + a X S r < 40 o n * o 2 > £ \ •a- ■st = j M C p o H r p H O i ? n - r n c p t r * p kJ A n U H H H % + »

\D >o o cn O M - a - n m ■ o j - r 0 o o •e O m m M C n c m o m p p £ 3 A C! £ SJ H H m p p h a ► 103

For the sources, which are too nuserous to be cited here, and the explanations of the nethods of calculation*, which

in acnoe case are involved, see Appendix I. 104

Table 11; University Students ss ■ Ratio of Population in the Indian States

Mo, of university States students per 10,000 population (1) (2>

1. Andhra Pradesh 26.17 2. Assaa 34.70 Bihar 27.23

4. Gujarat 52. B5 5, Haryana 50. 48 6. Jaaau & Kashair 42,91

7. Kerala 02.97 8. Kadhya Pradesh 30.66 9. Maharashtra 47.97

10. Mysore 40.86 11. Orissa 21.34 12. Punjab 65.95

13. Rajasthan 23.01 14. Tamil Nadu 38.00 15. Uttar Pradesh 20, 35 16. West Bengal 56. 78

Data assembled from the files of the University Grants Commission. Also, see Appendix 1.

even a broad consensus on its operational measures difficult.

Pennock suggests that the concept should be equated with the production of political goods like welfare, security, the consumption of which is compulsory, and the latter can be 105 nuiurtd.^ Almond** and Almond and Powell^ suggest that different kinds of capabilities, including symbolic and responsive ones, can be measured by using aggregate and survey data. De Sweinitx puts forward the concept of

Gross Political Product, which can be broken down into the outputs of regulation, welfare, military, diplomacy, and investment.10 All these, he says, can be measured at factor costs.

The actual efforts to suggest the operational measures of political development have produced a wide variety of measures, which are reported, in brief, below:

Accent on Democratic Development,

Lipset:11 He divides the countries dichotomously into the democratic, and dictatorial and autocratic ones, and hints at the association between democracy and economic development. There are no attempts at any ordinal or nominal measurements.

7J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems and Political Goods, World Politics, Vol. IB, No. 3 (April 1966) pp. 415-34.

®Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Development: Analytical and Normative Perspectives," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Jan. 1969) pp. 447-470.

^Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics; A Development Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. , 1966) Ch. 8, '

^ K a r l Sweinit*, Jr., "On Measuring Political Development," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Jan, 1970} ppT $03-11.

^-Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man? The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N. Y . : Doubleday, 1960} p p . ” 35-18, 106

Cutright:^ Having aqua tad political development with th* complaxity of the political institutions, ha meaauraa it for tha pariod 1940-61 by assigningt 2 points for aach yaar that a parliament axists and if tha minority parties have at least 30% of tha seatsj if tha latter have lass than 30% of seats, only one point. Similar scaling if there is an elected chief executive.

Neubauer:^ Rightly complaining that Cutright's^ indices measure only democratic political development and not political development, Neubauer tries to improve upon them by using; percentage of adult population eligible to voter range of distortion between votes and seats, party competition, newspaper circulation in the capital city. His index of the range of distortion between votes and seats would mean the countries with proportional representation systems are more democratically developed than the ones with the plurality system. The index of newspaper circulation in the capital city is amazing.

Accent primarily on party institutionalization;

The Schneiders; Adaptability of institu­ tionalization is measured by the age of a country’s constitution, the average age of

^Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 1963) pp. 253-264.

^ D e a n e E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No* 4

{Dec. T967) pp. 1002-1609.

^ ^ Op . cit*

15What about Australia with its capital Canberra and Federal Republic of Germany with Bonn!

^ P e t e r R. and Anne L. Schneider, "Social Mobilization, Political Institutions and Political Violence: A Cross National Analysis," CojRpflrfttjvf Political studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (April 1971) pp. 69-90. 107

political parties, and the percentage of votes secured by the 'Surge' parties (negative adaptability}. The indicators of coherence are* percentage of cabinet posts held by the majority party, total number of different parties represented in the cabinet, number of parties in the parliament, seats of the majority party. The lack of legitimacy is measured by the votes of parties opposing the system. Money spent on social welfare by the central and local governments is suggested as index of decentralization and complexity. Gut, Huntington’s idea of complexity referred to all the manifest associations in a system, and not just the parties.*'

Duvall and Welfling:10 They measure institutionalization or the lack of it by the percentage of non-party or independent legislators, party splits and mergers, emergence of new parties, changes of names of parties and changes in the relative strength of the parties; scope of insti­ tutions is indicated by the extent of electoral participation; the adaptability by postponement or the regularity of the elections, bannings, arrests, one party being the only legal one— with appropriate negative scorings. Duvall and WeIfling resort to judgmental scaling wherever necessary. 19 Brass: In addition to inferring the decline of institutionalization in the Indian States from the decline of the Congress party (which is theoretically wrong), Brass measures the decline in institutionalization by the percentage of the votes polled by the candidates who forfeited the security deposits.

17Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), Also, extractive etc. capabilities do not figure in the measures of the Schneiders, 1 R Raymond Duvall and Mary Welfling, "Determinants of Political Institutionalization in Black Africa," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Jan. 1973) pp.

Paul R. Brass, "Political Participation, Institu­ tionalization and Stability in India,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 1969} pp. 23-?TJ, 108

Hurwitzt20 Hit proposed measures for persistence of pattern and legitimacy/ support arei inter-election change of Prime Ministers, inter-election withdrawal of parties from government, the ratio of votes won by the pro-system parties to the total valid votes. But, the measures of changes in the Prime Ministers, with­ drawal of parties from governments cannot be applied to the presidential executive systems.

Accent on different capabilities:

Deutsch:^1 One of the correlates of stability, according to Deutsch, is the share of the government sector in the national income.

Duff and McCamant:22 They suggest taxes as a percentage of the GDP as a measure of extractive capability, and expenditure on education as a measure of distributive capability.

Multiple emphases:

Olsen:23 Subjectively coding and scaling the categories and classifications given in A Croaa- Polity Survey,2' he uses the following measures for political development: (i) executive functioning measured by effectiveness of, and interest aggregation by, bureaucracy, and degree of government stability;

2^Leon Hurwitz, "An Index of Democratic Political Stability: A Methodological Note," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (April 1971) pp . 41-6fl,

^iftarl W. Deutsch, "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 (March I960) pp, 34-57. *

22Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for Systemic Stability in Latin America," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Dec” 1968) pp. 112 5-4 3.

23Marvin E. Olsen, "Multivariate Analysis of National Political Development," American Sociological Review, Vol. 33, No. 5 (Oct. 1968) pp, 699-712.

2 4Arthur S. Banks and Robert B, Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963). 109

{ID legislative functioning measured by effectiveness of, and interest aggregation by, legislature; (iii) development of the party organization measured by number of political parties, interest aggregation by political partiee, and their stability; (iv) power diversifi­ cation measured by the number of autonomous government branches, non-reetrictive recruitment of political leaders; (v) citizen in fiance measured by freedom of opposition, press; etc. * Sofranko and Bealer:^ They/measure, also by drawing upon A Cross-Polity Survey, political modernization, the freedom of the press and opposition, associational interest articulation, character of bureaucracy, etc.

Gurr, although not dealing with the problem of finding operational measurements for political development, measurements for political development, measures regime institutional support (which tends to minimize civil violence} by Gross Domestic Product, Central government budget, voting participation, government party seats, unionization, executive stability, etc.26 Similarly

^Andrew J. Sofranko and Robert C. Bealer, "Moderni­ zation Balance, Imbalance and Domestic Instability," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 22, Ho. 1 7oct. i m r ' p p . 52-72. ■“ —

^Ted Robert Gurr, "Sources of Rebellion in Western Societies: Some Quantitative Evidence," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 39l (Sept. 19fof pp. 12B-144; "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Dec. 196B) pp. 1104-112 4; with Charles Ruttenberg, Cross-National Studies of Civil Violence (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1969) , 110 caloric and protein i n U U i , hospital bads have been utilized ae measures of value or want satisfactions.2^

It Is evident that the operational measures vary

from person to person, and no one, that includes Olsen, whose indicators are wide-ranging, has been able to capture the full flavor of political development. Nor is it easy.

Olsen,2® too, has ignored the possibility of the precise measures of extractive and distributive capability in

favor of the crude classifications of a Cross Polity Survey.

All this shows that these attempts should be pursued and

improved upon. It is not contended that the operational measures of political development presented here will fill all the lacunae of measures reviewed above. But they grasp a larger part of the totality of the phenomenon of political

27Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Systemic Conditions of Political Violence: An Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory," in Ivo K. Feierabend et al ■ , (Eds.), Anger, Violence and Politicst Theories and Research (Englewood cliffs^ N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972} p p . 136-1B3 f the same measures have been adopted by Louis M. Terrell "Social Stress, Political Instability and Levels of Military Efforts,11 Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Sept. 1971) , pp. 329-346j James F, Kirkham et al. , Cross National Comparative Study of Assassination, ^ Assassination and Political Violence: A Report to the National Commission on the CauseB and Prevention of violence (New York: Praeger Publishers, HFflTJ ppT! 148-211.

2®"Multivariate. . op. cit. For example, he measures the functional effectlveness of bureaucracy by converting the already vague judgmental scaling of A Cross Polity. . ., op. cit., into interval scales. Ill development than many of the above measures. The follow­

ing are the operational measures employed in the case of

the Indian States;29

A. Scope and effectiveneaa of government, measured

b y :

1. Governmental revenue aa a percentage of

gross product.

2. Governmental employment as a percentage

of population.

3. Per capita expenditure on health and

education*

4. Percentage of appropriated funds actually

s p e n t .

B. Group complexity and strength of pluralist infra­

structure, measured by:

2 9 The original indicators developed in the disserta­ tion proposal were kindly regrouped in the above format by Prof. Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University, whose assistance and detailed comments are gratefully acknowledged. The responsibility for the conclusions drawn are the candi­ date's alone. Prof. Huntington had suggested a few measures like party activists and revenues. The dissertation proposal also intended to use the indicators of party membership and internationalization by the people of the norms and rules of democratic procedures. The data on some of the above measures could have been adopted from the Statewise Surveys of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, who generously and willingly offered them. But these data (1967 Survey) related to 13 States only and, hence, could not be utilized. This generous gesture of the Centre is gratefully appreciated. The surveys of the Indian Institute of Public Opinion, New Delhi were found to be inadequate from the point of view of this study. 113

5. Trade union membership as a percentage of

organized aector employment.

6 . Cooperative society membership as & percentage

population.

C. Strength of party system, measured byt

7. Non-fractionalization of the party system

according to the Rae formula, Pe - [ T^(

where Fe * Index of non-fractionalization

or non-fragmentation, is the share of

the votes of party 1 and so on.^®

A few words may be said in justification of these indicators. Resource mobilization or extractive capability has assumed critical importance in view of India's commitment not only to planned and accelerated economic growth but also to the creation of an egalitarian society. The income of a State government is derived from (i) its own tax and non-tax bases allocated ot it under the Constitution, (ill its share in the divisible pool of taxes as determined by the five-yearly Finance Commissions under Article 2B0 of the

30Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of the Electoral Laws {New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967) pp. 56-57, Rae's original formula, F»l-{£ t J) is actually intended to measure fractionallzation of fragmentation. But what we are interested in is itsopposite, i.e. non­ fragmentation. Hence, the substraction from the unity was dropped. 113

Constitution,^ and (iii] discretionary grants roads by

tha Union Government (especially on the recommendation of

the Planning Commission) under Article 275, (All the

resources of State will be taken into account, since they

all add to its capabilities.) The performance of the State

and Union governments in regard to raising more resources, checking the tax evasion and removing the unaccounted

<1 black 1) money, leaves much to be d e s i r e d . ^ 2

While it is true, as Lakdawala says, that the resources of the Union Government are more elastic than those of the

States, and the distance from the people makes it easier

for the Union Government to impose additional taxes without encountering organized resistance, * there is much the States could and should have don«.#^ He further states that the increases in State tax efforts are restricted to a few items like sales tax, motor vehicles tax and electricity tax, but

31For comprehensive reviews of the Union-State financial relation see, among others, D.T. Lakdawala, Union State Financial Relations in India (Bombay: Lalwani Publishing House, 1967) t F.R. Brahmananda," Aspects of Centre-State Financial Relations," in S.P. Aiyar and Usha Mehta (ed.) Essays in Indian Federalism (Bombay; Allied Publishers, 19 65) pp\ 536-256. Asok Chandaj Federalism in India; A Study of Union State Relations (London; (Jeorge Allen and Unwin, LtJ! , 19

32A noted Indian economist, V.M. Dandekar says "Government has demonstrated its inability to collect taxes such as income tax even at the present level. The failure is partly administrative but mainly political: "Have We Turned the Corner," The Illustrated Weekly of India, Vol. 94, No. 42 (Oct. 21 , 1973) pp. 6-11. '

^ Union State. . op. cit., p. 04. 114 efforts in the sectors like agricultural income tax, State excises, contributions of public enterprises have 'lagged behind.134

In no other field has the lack of political will been so conclusively demonstrated as in the case of agricultural income tax. The upper class of landed peasantry has benefited considerably from the phenomenal rise in prices of food and cash crops. State investments in irrigation, fertilizers etc.35 While agriculture contributes nearly

34Ibid. ; for a review of the tax efforts by the States, see K . Venkataraman, Twenty Years of State Taxation," Indian Journal of public Administration, Special Number, "Taxation Policy and Tax Administration in India," Vol. 18, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1972) pp. 395-413, and also his State Finances in Indiai A Perspective study for the Plan Periods (Londoni George Allen and Unwin, Ltd, I960) especially Ch. VII, He argues that while the revenues of the States have shown 'considerable buoyancy,' the taxes on agricultural income and non-agricultural land have not yielded much, (Ibid., pp. 121-131) , A similar note is struck by P.K. Bhargava, "Indian Tax Structure— A Brief Review," Indian Journal of Public Administration, Special Number, "Taxation Policy and Tax Administration in India," Vol. IB, No, 3 (July- Sept. 1972) pp. 436-442. See also, M.D. Joshi, (ed.), Mobilization of State Resources (New Delhi: Impex India, 1967),

35The topic of agricultural income tax is becoming increasingly important. For a detailed review, see The Report of (Dr. K._N_. Raj) Committee on Taxation of Agricuitural Weaith and Income (New Delhi: Ministry of Finance, 1970) , This Re portend the following articles emphasize the dismal performance of the States in this regard: "Agricultural Income Tax in India," Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, Vol. 17, No. B (Aug. 1963) pp. 10D2-1D31; NT, A, Kiian, "Re source Mobilization from Agriculture and Economic Development in India," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 12, No. i (Oct, 1963) pp. 42-54; A.M. KhusroT Taxation of Agricultural Land." A Proposal, The Economic Weekly Annual Number, Vol. 15, Nos, 4,5,6 (Feb. 1963) pp, 27*-86f Ashok Mitra, "Tax Burden for India's Agriculture" in Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J, Spengler, Administration and Economic Development in India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963) pp. 281-303. 115 half of the GNP, Its share of the total tax revenue In

India is only 20 percent.36 Ae the Raj Committee Report reveals , the direct taxes on agriculture varied from only

0.24 percent of the State Gross product in Or1sea and

Punjab (the latter, incidentally, is the throbbing heart- T7 land of the Green Revolution) to 1.34 percent in Rajasthan.

In many States the main direct taxes on agriculture comprise of the land revenue and other cesses and levies, which are 39 not at all progressive, °

It is obvious to the 'Pundits* as well as laymen,

that the main resistance to make the agricultural sectors yield more tax resources comes from the upper caste and class landed peasantry who are loath to tax their own power

bases in the States. Nor are they willing to surrender

36Mitra, "Tax Burden. , . op. cit■, p. 293.

3?0p. c i t ., pp. 6-7.

3®For the erratic nature of the incidence of land revenue, see Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission 1953-54, Vol. Ill, (Delhii Manager of Publications, 195$7. ^ few States are intending to abolish the land revenue. Mitra, Tax Burden. . ., (op. cit., p. 294) argues that Japan collected, 1B93-94, nearly 40 p.c. of taxes from agriculture, while Wilfred Halenbacum says that China Is raising 60 p.c, of its revenues from agriculture as against India's 20 p.c.: 11 India aad China : contrasts in Economic Development," American Economic Review, Vol. 59, Ho. 3 (June 1959) pp. 264-39.

3^See Myron Weiner, Politics of Scarcity: The Public Pressure and Political Response (Chicago? University of """ Chicago Press, 1965), He says, "Indeed, as urban discontent has risen, the Congress Party has felt more and more dependent upon the rural support, and less and less inclined toward pursuing taxation policies which might erode that support." P. 164. See also, Myrdal Asian Dramat An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations, Vol. 3 (New V o r k : Pantheon, i960) pp. 280-61 lie the power to tax agricultural income to the Union,*0

The indicator of per capita expenditure on health and education is a measure of a State's distributive capability, while that of governmental employment as a percentage of the total population can reveal a govern­ ment's regulative capability, not thoroughly and completely but at least approximately. Kothari's view that the political institutionalization in India has been charac­ terized by the penetration of the governmental structures into the periphery and the reaching of the social structures 4 1 to centers of power, may be recalled here. The percentage of appropriated funds actually spent constitutes an index of administrative maturity, planning, efficiency and 42 commitment.

In the transitional societies the trade unions con­ stitute relatively modern groups which cut across the ascriptive affiliations and project 'rational' interests.

Their role in socializing the rural migrants into the industrial culture, in reducing the possible anomie, and

^ T o circumvent the resistance of the States to increase the tax on agricultural income and their unwilling­ ness to transfer this to the Union, the Raj Committee has recommended an integrated agricultural wealth tax to be imposed by the Union, op. cit. , p. 16-B.

*^Hajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little, Brown and C o . , 1970) Ch^ IT

*^Quite often the 5tates are unable to spend the funds granted to them by the Center. Interview with Mr, O.P. Mathur, Joint Director, Planning Commission, New Delhi. See also Joseph LaPalombara (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) . ” 117

4 3 oven In education has been emphasized. It it also true that the unions in the developing societies are more politicized and more militant than the unions in the developed socletlee at comparable stages of economic growth.

An analysis of the data in the dissertation may throw some light on this. The cooperative societies may be regarded as one of the attempts of the rural India to institutionalize the relationships among the primary producers, consumers 44 and the governmental agencies.

The importance of political parties in the process of political development cannot be overstressed. Their role in mobilizing the people, structuring the participation, and recruiting the leaders is crucial to every modernizing society. As Huntington argues, the urge and the incentive to mobilize the masses are high in a two party system, ^

(The position in Tamil Nadu approximated this before the

1969 split in the Congress,) He further suggests that in a multiparty system the need on the part of a party to reach out to other banks of votes is severely limited.^ McDonough*s

^Asoka Mehta, "The Mediating Role of Trade Unions in Underdeveloped Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol, 6 , No. 1 (Oct, 1957) pp. 16-23} Bruce H. Millen, The Political Role of Labor in Developing Countries, (Washington, IK C . : The Brookings Institution, 1963) . 44 In this connection, see Eleanor M, Hough, The Coopera­ tive Movement in India, fifth edition, revised and enlarged by K. Madhava Dae, (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1966},

*^Political Order. . ,, o p . c i t ., pp, 445-6.

46Ibid, 118 study of the relationship between the party competition and voter turnout in the first four general elections in

India corroborates this,*7 It can also be inferred

logically that the parties In a multiparty system tend

to be leas adaptable, and lees complex than in the other

systems. Hence, it is believed here that the non-

fragmentation of the political parties is a better measure

than the age of a party*® or the generational gap among

the leaders, etc.

The levels of political development in the Indian

States are presented in Table III.

OPERATIONAL MEASURES OF POLITICAL HARDSHIPS

As indicated in Hypothesis 4, the impact of political

hardships on the incidence of civil violence will also be

tested. The measures for the Indian States are:

*^Peter McDonough, "Electoral Competition and Parti­ cipation in India, A Test of Huntington’s Hypothesis," Comparative Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Oct. 1971) pp. 77-88. Testing the voter turn out in four general elections, he finds the turn out was higher in the constituencies with biparty systems than in those with either multiparty or dominant party systems.

The DMK party is younger in Tamil Nadu but no less institutionalized. Levels of Political Development In the Indian States A» A H 4-1 * O -H O ■*4 f -3 ja u «i ■H a ■H » » J Hi O E +J Is g § l l H b t-l» p o 44 p V* « « « « o u o « O -Hw V b bb M ta■ a.-Hd e. > . Pvp p. □ V 4 1 i a □ | ft . u <-i u in * -rtu ! 4j a p a 8 Cb -H -H bi s 41 m ? p u m I (J r4 4 ■ 1-1 M M d H <-i ■O I cn r >-t

U U 4-1 a 1 at a « O H O P O a

N u"i o |V J - 1 0 o o to ■» rs O Os o £] ■rH 4 cn rH ■41 A H r rH U"> ooo so o' vj oo o t n cn p — d d d 4 » 4 » ft k 1 t 'P 03 O C cn o tv n « —1 a— n P in 4 iH ■■o 00 •H H H H * * P p O m CN m n o £ CO H i£) CO cN *— rH 9 cn ■n m 0 0 n c D 4 i ■- i

h rt« ( N O N *s ( w n 4 A 4 TV (M to ao r- H Os H r CN 8 ■H m M n u rH vf in M3 rH d 4 p ■ Q O N f H r to m n d ■ 4 d CO C O CN M C o s« O os r— N C t£> ON 4 in CN m 5 ft * p p p » ■ *

(S It N h N (M p g v i tv 3 * 3 A a rt 4) |J 4 A <-< A 4 ' QO 17N O Q t', n t ■Hf cN C S O' 00 IV © o ■—I H —41 ■CN 1— 4 4 a— m Os m rH n c S 3 3 * 4 * d CN J 4 VJ O so Os CN CN Nf rH m OS l-i. tv II Si 4S —1r-| 1 p— b ?h ■ ■ n * s NO SoCO C o □S rH m ON 4 8 m j 4 — « 4 J 4 p ■

4 0 4 Os -a- in « 9> r-lO v -n h ■ 4 O « H I l A fl II n ■ p + ■ + + * p » t4* 4 ft ■ - O 4 o N c Oi in i-H O m rH 03 rn rH a h m d a * o o 14 M C rH M C ■rH rH r-. m o O CN o CN O sON as in ro cn m n h

sc cnO o rri *0 00 Ln o r rH ■rH m CO tv i—H J2 00 O S sp Oft l-H m HrH rH rH m rH n J« 4J 4 4 P ■ * 4 ■ ■ H ft ■ d 1 119 o © o O 4 <7*. 4 IV H m N I ^3 p M3 cn IV H r n i m rH ■— IV H rH z: 4 4 H 3 R 3 ■ 4 4 n 4 1

O O A o 0 ' O 30 O d£3 r-s N CN O rH o m DCS OD HrH rH n i r- r-v bv 4> l-H r3 r4 sO P u u IB 4 4 U V h t» ft ft n n O Os C S ■rH 8 os O N C n c (V rM P-i N CN 4-1 a 4J DO 4 4 , n 3

For the sources, which are too numerous to be cited here, and the explanations of the methods of calculations pi some cases, are Involvedt see Appendix I. 120

1. Inequality of distribution of land

measured on the Lorenz curve in terms

of the Gini index**9

2. Inequality of distribution of Income

similarly measured*

3* Density of population per square kilometer.

4. Growth of poverty, i.e., increase in the

percentage of urban and rural population

below the poverty line between 1961 and 1965.

The levels of these three indicators in the Indian

States have been presented in Table IV.

OPERATIONAL MEASURES OF CIVIL VIOLENCE

All the four major attempts to collect data on civil violence— The Dimensionality of Nations Project^ of Tanter and Hummel1, the Feierabend Survey,the Gurr and Ruttenberg

Survey, ^2 an

*9The method of calculating Gini Index is discussed in Hayward R. Alker, Jr. t Mathematics and Politics (New York: The MacMillan and Co. , 1965) pp. 315-42; also, Hayward R, Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, "Indices for Comparing Inequality," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, Comparing Nations; The Use of Quantitative Data In Cross-National Research (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1966} pp. 14 9-82. See also Appendix I for the method employed here.

^"Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1950-60," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. X , No. 1 (March 1966) pp. 41-6, Rudolph J. Hummel 1, "The Dimensionality of Nations Project" in Merritt and Rokkan, Comparing Nations. . ., op. cit. , pp. 109-30.

51**SyBtemic Conditions. . op. cit.

^ Cross National. . . , op. cit. 121

Table IV

Levels of Political Hardships in tbs Indian States

Growth of poverty; Density of (Increase In popu- Land Gini Income Gini Population lation below the State (Urban and (Urban and (Persona poverty line Rural)* Rural)* per square between 1961 and Kms.) 1965)*

U> <2> " <*T <>T

1. Andhra Pradesh .796 -297 143 1.70 2, Asian .640 .227 117 6.2L 3. Bihar , 712 .269 309 44.75

A. Gujarat .706 .307 131 19,45 5. Haryana .776 .294 209 9.95 6. Js b b u A Kashmir . 538 .245 17 13.43

7, Kerala .792 .297 509 27.10 0. Madhya Pradeah .656 .311 85 5.65 9. Maharashtra . 7AA .316 151 10.99

10. Mysore .706 .291 142 21,65 11. Orissa .653 .279 129 1.2B 12. Punjab .776 . 294 268 9.78

13. Rajasthan .670 .306 71 2.32 1A. Tamil Nadu .782 .307 2S9 4.95 15. Uttar Pradesh .659 .300 281 14,36 16. West Bengal , 694 .275 473 40.59

^Weighted averages of urban and rural distribution*,

For the sources and methods of calculations, see Appendix I, of Political and Social Indicators (1970)^--have relied on newspaper reporting or news digests. The others have either drawn upon these sources or done their own content analyses of the newspapers.

^New Havens Yale University Press, 1970. 122

Ai Taylor says, "Thar* ia no on* immutable and right way to measure disturbance, or violence, or conflict, or civil disob*di*nce, , . The F*ierabends adopt a

0-7 point scale, and fix the incidents from peaceful elec- ce tione (0 point) to civil wars (7 points) on this scale.

Ruttenberg first calculates the five basic measures of

Participants, Area, Casualties, Damages and Duration, com­ bines them in various stages to derive Magnitude of Civil violence.^ He weights measures of Participations and

Casualties by the population, but not the Damages by the

GNP, and Area by total area of a country. Taylor^7 and E Q Kirkham, et al., find the weighting unnecessary and, often, it ia not practicable.

For this project, the data on civil violence in 16

Indian States, have been collected for the years 1965 through 1969 from four major English dailies. They are;

The Hindustan Times (Delhi) for the northern Indian States

^Charles Louis Taylor, "Political Development and Civil Disorder,11 paper Delivered at the American Political Science Association Convention, New York, Sept. 2-6, 1969, p . 4.

^"Systemic Conditions in. . . ,11 op. c i t .

^"Measures of Civil Violence," in Gurr and Ruttenberg, Cross National. , ., op^ cit., Ch. 4. c i "Political Development. „ op. cit., p. 7. e a James F. Kirkham, et al. , Assassination and Politi­ cal Violencet A Report to the National Commission on the~ Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1970, Ch. 3., pp. 148-211, esp, p. 155. 123 of Rajasthan, Jamrn and Kashmir, Punjab, Haryana, Uttar

Pradesh, and Bihar* The Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta)

for the eastern States of W, Bengal, Assam, and Orissa.

The Hindu (Madras) for the southern States of Tamil Nadu,

Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Mysore; and The Times of India

(Bombay) for the western States of Maharashtra and Gujarat,55

The Ruttenberg method of scaling has been adopted with

suitable modifications. For each incident, the details on

the following five Basic Measures have been collected.

b m is Number of participants reported to

have taken part in an incident. The

measures are:

P 1 - Less than 500

P 2 = 500 - 1,500

P 3 - 1,500 - 4,000

P 4 - 4,000 +

BM 2: Area covered:

al: A village, a block or two, or a locality

of a town or city; small campus, a hall;

______ft pieeting place, etc.

55The following method of sampling was used. For Jan, 1,2,3 and 4 of 1965, The Hindustan Times, The Amrita Bazar Patrika, The Hindu and The Times Ihdl'a^were reapec- tively read for the details of the incidents of civil violence in their concerned States, If any incident was noted, the preceding and following issues were also reviewed to examine the duration. This cycle was repeated for all the five years with the appropriate changes in the initial allocation of the dates to the newspapers. This method of sampling was suggested by Mr. G, N. Han gal, Engineer, All India Radio, New Delhi. His comments and help are gratefully acknowledged. 124

a2; A group of village*; 3 or more blocks

of a town or city; or a suburb or two

of a major city; a big campus,

alt Up to 9 urban areas, or up to 3 districts

or their major parts or major parts of a

metropolitan city.

*4: 10 or more urban centers? a large part

of the State.

BM 3: Casualties. This is the total number of persons

killed or injured, as a direct consequence of

civil violence, including police firings; one

killing was given four times the weight of

one injury.®®

C 0 = None or none reported

C l - 1-10 casualties

C 2 = 10-35

C 3 - 35-90

C 4 = 90+

The co category was adopted because, in many

incidents there was only damage to property,

but were no casualties.

Unfortunately, this is as much unpleasant as it is arbitrary. Dhanagare also has adopted a kind of weightage. Bee D, N. Dhanagare, "Urban-Rural Differentials in Election Violence,H Political Science Review, Vol. 7, Nos, 3 and 4 (July-Sept. and Oct,-Dec. 1966) pp. 747-759. 125

B M 4i Property Damage

do - None or not reported, or cannot even be

guessed from the context,

dl * Modest or moderate, stone throwings;

window smashing,

d2 - Large scale, damage to a few buildings,

looting.

d3 — Extensive, widespread arson, destruction

of many buildings, looting.

d4 - Massive, systematic destruction of a very

large number of transport, buildings,

shops, arson etc.

The do category was adopted because,

in many cases, there were casualties, but

no damage was reported.

BM Si Duration. The number of day or days an

incident lasted,

tl - 1 day

t 2 - 2 days

t3 ■■ 3 to 6 days

t4 = more than 6 days.

Composite Scales:

The Basic Measures of participants (BMl) and area (BM2) were combined into a scale of Pervasiveness. Following the method adopted by Ruttenberg, more weight was given to the

participants than to area according to the rule: "the rank 126 on the BKl scale determines the composite ranking except when the corresponding rank on the BM2 ecale differs from

it by at least two levels, Collapsing gives four ranks,

Pe rva a ivene s s

PI plal P2 p2a2

pla2 pla4

p 2al p3a4

pla3 p2a3

P3 P3

p3a2 p4a2

p2a4 p3a4

p4al p4a3

p3a3 p4a4

The composite scale of Intensity was formed by com­ bining casualties (BM3) and damages (BM4). Weightage was given to the rank on BM3 unless the coresponding rank on

BM4 was higher by at least two levels. Collapsing gives

five ranks.

61"Measures of. . . ”, op, cit., p. 33. Ruttenberg has separately scaled the composite measures of Pervasiveness, Intensity and Amplitude, because in the study by Gurr and Ruttenberg, each composite measure is also a dependent variable. In this study only the final Logged Total Measure of Civil Violence is treated as the dependent variable. 127

Intensity

cOdo 12 c0d3

codi cld2

cldO c0d4

cidi c 2dl

cld3 14 c2d3

c 2d 2 c3d2

cld4 c2d4

c3d(> c4d0

c3dl c4dl

c3d3

c4d2

c3d4

c4d3

c4d4

The composite scale of Amplitude was formed by combining Pervasiveness with Intensity, which has been collapsed into 4 and 5 ranks respectively. Equal weight was attached to each. Collapsing gives eight ranks,

Amplitude

Al Pill A2 P1I2

P2I1

A3 P2I2 A4 P1I4

PlI3 P4I1

P 311 P2I3

P 312 128

A5 P1I5 A 6 P2I5

F2I4 P3I4

P4I2 P4I3

P313

A 7 P3I5 A 8 P4I5

P4I4

Magnitude of Civil Violence

This scale was derived by combining Amplitude with Duration. Tha rank on the Amplitude determined the composite rank on the Magnitude Scale , except when the rank on the Duration Scale differed from it by two levels. Ties have been taken into account. This scalef which is given in Table V, runs from 1 to 80.

Table V

The Scale of Magnitude of Civil Violence

Altl * 1 A3t* * 31 A 8 t 1 - 73 A U 2 - 2 A5tl - 34.5 A7t3 - 74.5 A2tl - 3.5 A4t3 - 38.5 A8t2 - 76 Alt3 - 5 A5t2 - 42.5 A7t4 - 77.5 A2t2 - 6.5 A4t4 - 46,5 A8t3 - 79 Alt* - 8 A6tl - 50 A8t4 - 80 A3tl - 10 A5t3 - 53.5 A2t3 - 12.5 A6t2 - 57 A3t2 - 15, A5t4 - 60.5 A2t4 - 17,5 A7tl - 63,5 A4tl m 20,5 A6t3 - 66 A 3 13 - 24 A7t2 w 68. 5 A4t2 - 27,5 A6t4 - 71 129

Each incident of civil violence was scaled by using the scale of magnitude of civil violence. An example of the procedure may be given, An examination of The Amrita

Bazar Patrika for August 12, 1969 revealed, the following incident which had occurred the previous day in Dhenkanal town, Orissa State, The details of the incident are summarized as shown below;

About 4 00 people, mostly students, tried to force their entry into the collectorate demanding improvement of the college. The police were stoned. Dak. bungalow was raided. Brickbatting ensured and a car was damaged. The police resorted to lathi (baton} charge and tear gas. In all 55 injured.

The incident has been scaled thus:

BM1 (Participants}: 400-pl

BM2 (Area]; At most two localities of a

town-al

BM3 (Casualties): 55 injured-c3

BM4 (Damages): Moderate-dl

BM5 (Duration): 1 day-tl

Pervasiveness-Pl

C3-i Itensity-I3 -Amplitude~A3— dl-r -10 tl

On the magnitude scale of civil violence, this particular incident obtains 10 points.

The scores on the magnitude scale for all the individual incidents In each State for the years 196 5 through 1969 have 130 been cumulated to obtain a final score called the Total

Measure of Civil Violence, These total measures were reduced to their log base of 10 to normalize their distri­ bution. Table VI presents the Statewiee distribution of the Total Measures of Civil Violence and their log trans­ formations. The table also reveals the levels of the percentages of the two Communist parties in the General

Elections of 1967.

Since these tables are self-explanatory, only a few general comments are necessary. As the Table I on the levels of social mobilization reveals, most of the measures show a wide dispersion among the States. The States of

Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh show a consistently low rank on many of the indicators. The

States of Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal are high on most of the indicators. The States of Gujarat and Kerala are high on a few indicators and low on others. The other

States like Mysore and Haryana fall in the middle ranges.

The Table III on the levels of political development shows a different picture. Jammu and Kashmir ranks first on the indicators of total revenue as a gross produce and governmental employment; the State also ranks high on the party non-fragmentation score, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra show consistently high levels on all the indicators.

The range of the political hardship measures is shown by Table IV, The measure of inequality of distribution of Levels of Civil Violence end C o m m l B t Voting In ffl 3 1 41 to w ■ M i O +i u U U « > II H ) 1 0 ad ID 14 T* « « o 3 w O (W t4 -H • t r U K O •H 4 H 44 ■0 u u Hi H u b to O s fl 3 qj In a « • c s 3 rl lO h fri H H Hi a s 0 u V u a C

CM H rl H N r\| W tN u"i eo (Jl M fli <0 43 J3 in H ffinrCS CO lO ^ iC m o in h- O H hi

s S 5 8 -t in io ^ O in H N rN Ji n O H O rH H i - J - I J - l u - | tf>lO CM H

(N (M (M un l n m f C in n un O O toh m aii b h

m N hi hi N m 4 d A A o i a p^- m o M H N m o M H O KlHlO M N H tM A nn H -A kn ■* iotL o 14 u * * * T DP D ■ * i i d d d n B 0

9 t - f

N 4T

*Data assembled Iron the Report on the Fourth General Elections In India, 1967, Fart II Statistical, of the Election CoHlssltm. Also, see Appendix I, 132 income doe* not fhow a wide variation among the States, but the measures of inequality of distribution of land, population density, and growth of poverty do.

DERIVATION OF THE TOTAL MEASURES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL HARDSHIPS

All the indicators used here are In different units of measurement and, therefore, are not susceptible of simple addition. The technique of transformed standard 6 2 scores was used to derive the total measures. Each of the eight social mobilization indicators was converted to X-X a standard score by the formula, --- , where X is value of a variable, X is the mean, and a is the standard deviation. ^

An appropriate constant was added to eliminate minus signB, which is called linear transformation. All the transformed standard scores were cumulated to obtain the Total Measures of Social Mobilization for the states. This procedure was

®2Ranking is the other method commonly used to get around the problem of statistical non-additivity. For example, the Indian States can be ranked first, second, and so on, on each of the social mobilization indicators, and then average of the ranks obtained by a State becomes a final measure of all the indicators. But, in this procedure, the relative differences between two states are disturbed. In the procedure of standard scores, the variance in the original distribution i.e. the relative differences, is proportionately reduced. Hence, it is preferrable to ranking. For a discussion of the procedure of deriving the standard scores, see Allen L. Edwards, Statistical Methods for the Behavioral Sciences, (New York; Rinehart and Co., 1555) ------. c 1 (X-X)^ OJTo derive the standard deviation, the formula ----- — was used, where in X is the value of a State on a 0 variable, X is its mean and n ia number of States, here 16. 133 repeated to obtain the Total Measure* of Political Develop­ ment and Total Measure* of Political Hardships. They are shown in Tables VIIr VIII and IX, which reveal the ranking of the states on these three total measure*. The total measures of Civil Violence, together with log conversions have already been stated in Table VI.

As Table VI reveals, West Bengal ranks first on the

Total Measure of Civil Violence, followed by Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, while Haryana is very low. Rajasthan,

Orissa and Jammu and Kashmir are the other three States from the bottom. The Table V also reveals the varying degrees of communist voting, which as said earlier, is only tangentially related to this study.

As will be explained in detail in the Appendix I, the aggregate data {collected by the offical agencies) have been employed in regard to all the indicators, except four; inequalities of distribution of land and income, growth of poverty and civil violence. While the data on civil violence have been drawn from the newspapers, those on the inequalities and poverty are taken from the surveys of the

National Sample Survey, now an agency of the Government of India. The employment of aggregate data creates, as

Scheuch says, 'some uneasiness, 1 due to the problems of the accuracy, the comparability of the measurements and the representativeness of the aggregate data varying from Transformed Standard Scores for Social Mobilization Indicators * 3 s i H 3 3 £ U 3 3 i i 4 » “ » 3 Pd U u o 3 +J M 5 3 t/) •o vd O 3 » I -»— -=1 H 4-1 u ffl U h V > a IX o W 4 a <4 IX V u a o a g 4

/*» ■w' in X* w ,p“^ sj cn ky *W"ao p-". © cM * a p*^ p-. A w“ rH dH o CM A o Q r-K OpH (O iH 0 nCM tn sj 0s dH CMcn © CM m T} rH CO □ p Hd-HrH t o H -C h p fX p *H H H U H J£ * 1© 1© 01 M3 0D cn o CM cn O © h- o Q cn CM CM en DO 01 ^0 o 0i O p p p ■n ■fj t2 H H H 1 0 4 ■ g a 3 I m 4 * p * 01 4 O o r- no cn on OD m Hi—1fH rM H m HCM dH ■H m 4 O 'O O' p H H 4 4 3 H 4 4 * * ■ ■ n 4 m -4 m CM0 Is CMO On cn o m a Hp—4rH dH CMO o CM DO HiH ■H Os m un iH o 0s ■H p H l-f M O 4 4 p * * r . ■ * 4 A CM 01 cn r— 1-^ Ln ■H H o CM -J O 0 0 ■—1fcCi fs CM H rH 4 4 .• 4 * ■ 4 p p pi 10S 01 as 0i *n 4 n iH N I'M CM 0i cn CM cn m fs so r- CD 0 un -O 4 CM ■0 ■H No IN rH fl 4 3 h 4- * 4 4- 4 p , 0 0 rH O cm in © O CM 0 0i rH © CO 00 TJ Tcn sT irH 0i un © 0 © O O . * 3 -» w h.d*t o £ H' CM t CM m p *H H H 4 © © V 4 4 4 p ■ ■ -o V) 0 H H M 4J - 3 4-1 ts t s P 4 dH d iCl m CM CM o © o o fs.

3 e Transformed Standard Scores for Political Development ^34 4 *9 ■H J ■s *- t5 da ■rl i i <+x< I UX U U £ 3 U ^ 43O 41 ^-0 4k M S A § * lx 3 V J3fld o 3 i a □ & tl i-g i .- 4

~o W1 t (UO 4J *J O. « O Of 01 lu h o o ■ -o9 I * i

g u ■A A a 1)

O 4 ■hO d - s n c M C ■sO i ^ ^ H r o M C CM O M 3 H S3- O l N O V n c H r 0 0 o o V cn -d »o-d-in s CH -o i-H © 4) 5 3 3 p I-H m M 4 N 4 H H 4 v * 4 4 r ■ 4 4 * -44 4 4- » 0 < M C d ■ C*. cr- o H ■ 3 G o 1 m T - n n c i r H M ■H ■0 Ml« r^. o H • ■4 0 in h 4 4 4 p p p p r ■. » k o N < r-. <30 O D s o n n c n c d ■ M f n c n i 01 l-i.

O id n ('i Tl (T M C Nf kfl iC n c l i— M C M C fN H J vD 0 W 0 O *6N N ■x> O H ■ I*

r- aj O' M C n c A r-* o o o tn no ITk H M H n c i 9 O O H O r- n ® ■sO p a - r rH H 4 — « s H - 4 4 4 4 » 4 p ■ p P ■ » ■ r M C M f ' ’d >OQ *> rH n u O iM fx fl .Ch CO J T T M o e - n c H U Hr i-H rH rH i-H Jj H ■ H ■ m m —t i— 4 M *J H 4 U p p e 4 p

o o o c O O o n c O i n i n c £ O V H r r-. d ' n c rH 4 m 4 p ■ » w

' O ■i-H M H O O ? a 1 9 H O C1^ tf] ^ H r 0 0 -d ■-H H S* IH x ■ > i 9 H r n c m N O H O N 00 H"| H O H O S r— p-H M < M H r p * tx 4 « 43A - H O AO » 4 ■ ** r ■ ■ 4 ■ p p p ■ ■ o d. t % o M C ' o o w'l H r Th t o H r ■i-H n c n r i-H . h ■d- cn H r kin H r TM ■T H r ■A to« iH i-H i-H H r 4 (B ■ p o o ' O O O i 9 H r O V i— r ID M C n c n ? t M A PH cn to 4 ■ ■ p

o o - 0 4 r-i o *n M - N ( i-H cn 3 0 0 •hC > 9 o M C d - o o n i cn - r o o n i m H r •H i-H C I H 0 H - i-H i-H m n t - O 0 r-H I-H o O <7 +J A 4 U> 4 4 4 4 4 ■ ■ * * 1 ■ * v m e O rH 01 -4 o o M r - r D C - r i* n H H t3 ^ 35 ■4 4 p H - IU 4 7 -o 4 * p ■ M p k in ^ o m n < D C m o M r n u d - O H*1 cn 43 t m o A, M C N C M C m M C p-H r~+ 3 - h m 4 4 4 p ■ a ■ » d - - r o v£> n r M C M C H r f-. m Ii. ■rH 0 4 P V -d m 0 0 H r m rH o a m - o p-H H • I ■ » 1 ■ » » p p

I 0 0 m M C o cm H r 0 4 —1 i— M C 1 9 o p H H -H m ■d' m I H r H - n l O A J 4 tl > T 1 4 . ^ ■ 3 H d 4 135 cl h 4 | u trt 4J 4

n * o o N C n i D C - r D v 5 M C ' O d - m v£> H r d - m o h T3 3s? 4k S H r O O s N C O s O M C P 8 M C O o Q 5 N 4 k 4 k S Traaaforned Standard Scores for Political Hardship (h ix S a 3 a o o a 3 O O fb g ^ u st ♦13 ”3 d TS *3 t5 -i b -h -d n 3 * * tl 1 2 +J b a d o 0*3 b lb a j a *rl m

N m u? 4 - iiia M < o c M C

N 'j m o o M f m n c cn H r H o n i p-H 0 ■ n a p ■ a * cn H C 0 O i-H H r 3 M M C M f o H r o H r a a a O M < id o M f - r n Oi. | s M f A i-H H r i-H a ■ a » 0 <30 <30 D C 0 m r s I * * .co ( T l M C 0i H r r~~ M c F— C * ■ p a p a n<4

* < H C 0 - M C cn H C n ■* to 4 O r < . 0 0 1 r- o H Eri W [=> 3 o n i n n m n B ■n p-4 ssss i-H 4 b H - « d d H t i 3 « nj J a ■ a 4 ■ » p M * Q C -r--r- m n t D C M C H r 0 0 m 4-H < n r p H r t h -H 3 u u > a a * * v a e) ao o H r 8 40 m n c > 0 si m n c M C rH w> - 0 - p-H « a .H a a a a a a '! O 0 0 0 o M C H m M C M C Mo fM i 0 H r m p ■ p p

136 o r- o fM a 41 a a ^ ^ 3 p ^ II ^ p 3 ^ ft rt ^ 3& £ a « o b o « a - 3 0 O M f o O C 0 0 o o t V u b a a I ) d a o 41 b a 8 M C 8 M C h a a a 8 137 country to country.** Also, In his view, the inferences from analyses of the aggregate data are apt to involve the

'ecological fallacy*1

The aggregate data employed here have been collected either directly by the Government of India or by the State

Governments according to the specifications and requirements of the former* In regard to the range and relative accuracy of the official statistics, India ranks even with most advanced countries* The commitment to planned economic development, has led to the realization of the importance of collecting reliable and wide ranging statistical information.®^

Hence, there is a reasonable basis to believe that the accuracy of the data is high, or at least it does not vary much from State to State. There is no problem regarding the comparability of the measurements, because the units and concepts of measurements do not vary from State to State,

The problem of the representativesness of some of the measures cannot be evaded. Maharashtra and West Bengal may be high on urbanization, but the cities of Bombay and Calcutta cantribute much to this fact. If the small units like the

**Erwin K, Scheuch, "Cross-National Comparisons: Using Aggregate Data: Some Substantive and Methodological Problems," in Merritt and Rokkan (ed,) Comparing Nations. . , , op. cit., pp. 131-16B, esp, 137-48, .... .

®5For a comprehensive review of the different types of statistical information collected and published by the agencies of the Union and State governments, see M.R. Saluja, Indian Official Statistical Systems (Calcutta: Statistical Publishing Society" 1972J,------138 districts are used this skewness can be reduced, but, in that case, most of the measures of political development are rendered useless. Any attempts to correct for the preponderance of Bombay and Calcutta are likely to be arbitrary. Hence, these measures have been used as they are, with their built-in weaknesses.

The ecological fallacy means that the correlations between two variables are likely to vary with the units of measurements. This only suggests that there is a great scope in political science for continually replicating the studies or testing theories using different kinds of units, like the districts, etc. CHAPTER IV

TEST OF HYPOTHESIS-I

HYPOTHESIS li As social mobilization lncreai

development increaieflj but not to the same

extent.*

This Hypothesis tested whether, and, if ao, to whet extent, the Huntington gap occurs in the Indian context.

Three forme of the lag between social mobilization and poli­ tical development were envisaged) (1 ) the rising curve flattening at the top, i.e. political development rising at first with social mobilization and then remaining constant)

(2 ) the rising curve declining in later stages, i.e. politi­ cal development, which at first increases with social mobilization, comes down, thus contributing to a maximum gap;

(3 ) political development increasing with social mobilization, but, not in a one-to-one relationship, but in a less than one-to-one relationship.

Of these three possibilities of the lag, the last one is borne out by the facts, as revealed in Figure 1 which

^The statistical operations to test these hypotheses and obtain the matrix of intercorrelations were done on the IBM 1620 computer of the Computation Center of the Planning Commission, New Delhi, with the help of the programs the Center has developed. The generous and painstaking assistance of Mr. M.R. Rao and Mr, R.K. Pruthi of the Center is grate­ fully acknowledged.

139 PJ&IRE-T

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION and political development COP RE, AT ION AND REGRESSION I J. ) * f a J V JWeJO 7 3 A J 7 / 70^ 7 JO a & 140 Lfl

SOCtAL ffCB/LiZATI ON (SHJ TtCAi. ocvELortiCNr ra social, mobillzatiom [*%n) MOHMZATUN SOCIAL TO DEVELOPMENT POLITICAL OF RATIO AND MOBILIZATION SOCIAL O M ORLTO AD REGRESSION AND CORRELATION tCA MBLXTO (BM) MOBiLiXATtON BttClAL F gure r u ig

e 141 142 shows ths regression of the Total Measure of Political

Development on the Total Measure of Social Mobilisation. A glance at the figure shows that a rising and flattening regression line, or a rising and declining one could not be fitted to the scatter of the values and that a linear regression line is the best fitting.

The Huntington gap does occur in the third form envisaged. The linear regression line does not slope at an angle of 45 degrees. The regression coefficient is only

.377, which indicates a less than one-to-one relationship.

The actual relationship between the Total Measure of Social

Mobilization {5M) and Total Measure of Political Development

(PD) is:

Y = a + bX

PD - fl.76 + .377 (SM)

Only 32 percent of the variance of political development is explained (R^) , giving a correlation coefficient (r> of .566, which is significant at less than 5% level.

Figure 2 reveals the relationship between social mobilization and political development in a more telling way,

2 The tests of significance are applied whenever the samples are drawn. But in this study all the States in India, except Nagaland, have been considered. Hence, strictly speaking, the tests need not be employed. However, it has become a convention to employ them, even if the entire universe is considered. Anyway, they can be used to see if the correlations are of high order or not. 143

In this figure, the ratio of political development to social

mobilisation is regressed on social mobilisation. The State-

wise distribution of these ratios have been shown in Col. 10

of Table VIII. (This ratio approximates, in view of the

theoretical background, to Huntington's ratio of institu- ■S tionalization to participation)* If political development

were to increase, in a one-to-one relationship, with social

mobilization, then the line of regression of the ratio of

political development to social mobilization on social mobilization would have been horizontal to the X-axis. But,

Figure 2 reveals that the regression line actually slopes

down. The correlation (r « 70) is significant at less than

It level.

Figure 1 shows that the actual levels of political

development in Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, Tamil Nadu and

Maharashtra are higher than the expected level. in fact,

Jammu and Kashmir, which ranks as one of the low social

mobilization States, leads all the States in the levels of

political development including the States like Tamil Nadu,

Maharashtra, Punjab, and West Bengal, which are high on

social mobilization. This high level of political development

^The ratio of political development to social mobiliza­ tion adopted here is the inverse of the ratio Huntington has used. He posits that the higher the value of the ratio of political participation to political institutionalization, the higher will be the political instability. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) p. 55. 144 of Jammu and Kashmir la due to its vary high lavala of governmental revenue aa a parcantags of lta groaa product

(facilitated by heavy subsidies and grants from the Union

Government), and other development indicators. The relatively high level of political development of Assam, which too falls in the group of law mobilization States, is due to its high union membership and the relatively high non- fragmantation of political parties. Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Punjab owe their position to the more or less consistently high levels on many political development indicators. The actual levels of political development in Kerala, West Bengal and Gujarat— the States in the higher social mobilization groupa--are leas than the expected levels, because of their low values on some development indicators. Despite its being a stronghold of the Communists, Kerala Is low on unionization.

Presumably the strength of the Communists in that State is due less to its unions but more to the solid support of the ritually low castes like the Exhavaa. West Bengal's low rank on the membership of cooperative societies underlines

Weiner's observation that the Bengalis are least prone to 4 form organizations for mutual help.

In general, Figures 1 and 2 show that higher degrees of political development occur only with higher levels of

*Myron Weiner, "Urbanization and Political Protest," Civilizations, Vol. 17, Noe. 1 and 2 (1967) pp. 44-47. 145

social mobilisation, though there are a couple of exceptions

to this. The five least mobilised States of Bihar, Orissa,

Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh are also the

States very low on political development, and none of the

seven States with high levels of political development are very low on social mobilization. The Figures also reveal

that the higher degrees of social mobilization do not automatically ensure a pari passu growth of political development.

Since the Total Measure of Social Mobilization is correlated significantly, and at a fairly strong level, with the Total Measure of Political Development, it would be

interesting to compare the intercorrelations of the individual components of each. (See Table X.) The correlations of the governmental revenue as a percentage of the gross product of the State, i.e., the extractive capability, with the components of social mobilization and university education are negative in five cases, and positive in four, as revealed

in column 10, Moreover all the correlations are low, with

the exception of the one between Revenues and Per Capita

Income which too is very mild (-.308). This negative correla­

tion points out to a tentative but disturbing trend in the

Indian States: as the per capita income increases, the extractive capability of a State decreases, thus contributing

to the Huntington gap. Evidently, the richer States have not been doing their best, perhaps due to the lack of Matrix of Intercorrelation* Jteoag the 22 Variables & & H « i-i »* O u a r & 3 U M V _ »• *6 A j D j .H > tJ ■rl a 3 u u u e o H & 0 h O V a e u EH a n. S' 4

<»> o s f**.Iso n io ^ n « H o n d n $ ai o « a « n a < N > f 5 H H N -J^ IDO H ro 4 r-i in o a t t t a o J

<9 ff I ■S

19. Population Density 20. Poverty Increase e n 21. Cowuniat Votes 22. Civil Violence Welfare Variables Vehicles Per Capita Government rn m nmrnnl Eapendl- Appropriated Inc nee Revenue EeployatDt ture Funds Spent i«n in oo I -tc * *1 0 O H N O H ^ O O m f 00 10 V 4* ' N fN O • *« • v ^ n vD m irt» o * * — I O i — < o r-i r* O n cs qs ^ 1

H ^ f ^ O P O V ' O cm N n i O i—IO O c~- O r-~ o s n o> MflOcsflino * o N t r l u ( r >* J ■JtO J ' N O J H « r - c * m w « « no a o o f o 'fi o oo S 3 'if 4 CM O £ I - ci n g O I

in cv

U P h Hr-tHNNN 9 EQ I-* l i f H O 147 Party Mon- Variable 6 Cooperative Fragpenta- Land Incoae Population Poverty fi mini IT Civil tion Clnl Gini Density Increase Votes Violence N un o 3 n inin 4 4N 4 0ffi rv (M IN m H r H i t O M O O4 O c 4 r. o r-. 4 ici o> * * « m m e rn e e o o O T-+ 00 QO j nHinfl H o m n i ^ r-t h at a- m so H i n ■ * 4 r O >p|ino*P

o 4 M 4 t n g C e ^ m o H i c e h s o « n 4 in t * h * 4 ^(NflNNMnnn « o * N e N 4 i p e e t*\

4 e O O l P H N N H O O N H l P O NOOrMinocn4innHin p'flrMeoNHNOO i - i e * i - i r ' A A 4 i n f f l CN4 Q -J —» t r e n N * N n eiii«Ms^H inHcoiM'tr'rnr,(no 4MMO4(ni00vmO m onO o ineHMt m o o O H m n i ^ m j e eiriMrKrteeooiAPiPi « (M Oi ** « * * e lA 4 H H A neertefHetflirtMM e »«»ao^frrr ■ r'OOO'OrlMmj 9 * D » Oi

u "moorMffv^inma enNHNinaoDo i O 4 m — 4 O O C M O >n4 e i till v v ■* ■* * I I I II l l i i I i i iI S 4 i o in 4 m 4> doo o o n ) a i n h tn I in nj n h n J) o J) n h n nj in inmsetiO^N <^ i ^ r 0 « 4 0 p* *N .p h h I I

4 ■* * » i

n ^ n MNW« W (MKN t*i —

O' C> 4 h h

I o 6 e e efl h oj a e •

*n

148 *Slgnlfleant at leaa than .05 level, ••Significant at leas than .01 level. £&11 the correlations, except thoaenarked (£), reported in cola. 21 and 22 are those due to the curvilinear regression: - V ■ a - + b 2 * r ^^F-ceat significant at less than ,05 level. 149 political will, to mobilise the resources so sorely neadad for economic development. Of tha two indicators of mobility, that of roads correlates negatively at -.416 with the extrac- tive capability. If tha growth of tha network of roads can be interpreted as the creation of the facilities and the overheads for mobility, the states are neglecting this aspect. Mobility as measured by vehicles denotes more than just physical travelling. It signifies increasing inter­ locking of the sections of society due to social, professional, business and commercial transactions. All thea* are, to a great extent, a function of industrialization and growing societal interdependence; they also add to the governmental revenue by way of sale taxes, etc. But, the very low corre­ lation between vehicles and governmental revenues indicates that the governments have not fully tapped their resources.

Governmental employment correlates, among the social mobilization components, well with radios (.619), urbaniza­ tion (.690) and vehicles (.BOB). All the correlations are significant at less than .05 level. The correlation of governmental employment with non-agricultural labor is sizeable at .441. It is noteworthy that the correlations of governmental employment with literacy and university education are not high. All this shows that the regulative and penetrative capabilities increase as the industrial culture grows.

it is one of the speculations of the theory of social mobilization that the activated strata of the population 150 conn to expect a large number of services from the government.^

But, in column 12 of Table X we find that only university education correlates well with welfare expenditure. (.686 significant at «,0 1 ); but this is so because education forms a part of the items on which the welfare expenditure is incurred. The fact that welfare expenditure has not kept pace with the expectations that are presumed to rise with urbanisation (r - .1 0 0 ) and newspapers (r * .224), or even with vehicles (r = .410), points to the conclusion that the distributive capabilities of the Indian States are not rising rapidly or proportionately.

The indicators of social mobilization contribute little to appropriated funds actually spent (column 13). (The latter is intended as measure of administrative planning and maturity.) Only vehicles is associated with the funds spent at .410. This raises the question do the funds spent really signify administrative maturity and if they do, the latter is almost independent of the components of social mobilization.

The non-fragmentation of political parties (in column

16) is significantly correlated at <.05 level with vehicles

(.554) and fairly well with urbanization (.469), and its correlations with the other components of social mobilization are negligible. Whether a party system is fragmented or not

5Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development, ** American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Sept. 1961) pjT 493-514, 151 depend! on a number of factor*, including the ethnic, caste, linguiitic, etc. cleavages. But, the correlation in this analysis of party non-fragmentation with vehicle* and urbanisation signifies an important linkage. It ia note­ worthy that the party non-fragmentation increase*, not with the increaae* in literacy, newspaper ciculation, and radios — all of which impart and enhance communication skills and increase the political exposure of the people, b"t with urbanisation and mobility as measured by vehicle*. This could be due to the fact that urbanization and vehicles not only enhance the communication skills but also tend to dissolve some of the primordial cleavage*- By knitting together the politically like-minded aspirants and elites, and through the interdependence of the various sections, interlocking of the needs and the emergence of a common denominator of political views, they tend to reduce the number of political parties and candidate*. This is only a trend that has been discerned, and this ha* to be explored

further. Brass's findings that participation leads to a decline of forfeiture of security of deposits is partially validated.® It is noteworthy that, between 1965 and 1969, the party non-fragmentation is lower (i.e. fragmentation was higher) in Bihar, Uttar Pradeah and Orissa, than even in

West Bengal.

®It should be recollected that Brass had equated insti­ tutionalization also with the viability of the Congress Party, which is conceptually wrong. Paul a. Brass, "Political Participation, Institutionalization and Stability in India ,*1 Government and Opposition, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 1969) pp. ii-53. ------152

Many of the components of social mobilization are well correlated with both trade union membership and membership of cooperative societies— representing the group complexity and infra social organizations. Since this involves a comparison of both, these correlations will be taken up in the section on Hypothesis 2.

HYPOTHESIS 2 1 (a) The various indicators of social mobili­

zation are highly inter-correlated among

themselves.

(b) The various indicators of political

development are highly inter-correlated

among themselves.

(a) The colisnns 1 to 9 and rows 1 to 9 in Table X give the inter-correlations among the indicators of social mobi­ lization, with the indicator of university education also thrown in.

The correlation matrix reveals that there are moderate to high correlations among the indicators in the matrix.

Excluding university education and the diagonal unities, there are 2 B correlations in the triangle. 13 correlation coefficients are significant at the 5% level and B of them at the la level. (If we include education there are 36 correlation coefficients? IB of them significant at the 5% level and 11 of the latter at the 1% level) * All the coefficients are positive. Generally, this lends support to

Deutsch’s argument that these Indicators go in clusters^

^"Social Mobilization. . . ," op. ci t . , p. 493 . 153

and Lerner’s contention that thay hava always gone g together.

But, a closer look at this matrix reveals that the interlocking of these indicators is not even. The correla­ tions of mobility as measured by roads with other indicators of social mobilization are not of a high order. While literacy correlates highly with newspapers (.839) and non-agricultural labor (.809), its correlations with others are not high. The correlation of radios with literacy is only .215 and with newspapers is only slightly better with

.287. This means that two mass media, radios and newspapers, do not go very well with each other. Perhaps, the crucial factor here is the per capita income, which correlates highly with radios (6.98), but only moderately with literacy (.330) and newspapers (.350). The reason is plain: the skill of the three R’s and newspaper reading do not much depend on income. This is not a very profound or original finding, but its implications are important. The future of mass communications in the developing countries depends heavily on the propagation of literacy and encouraging (naturally the regional language) press. Urbanization is not very crucial to literacy (r = .403), but is important for newspapers (r =* *669),

Radios, urbanization, non-agricultural labor, vehicles and per capita income are, generally, highly correlated

8Daniel Lernar, The Passing of the Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New Yorkl The Free Press, 19 5b) pT 46 and p. 4 38. 154

among themselves, with tha axcaption of vehicles and per capita income, tha correlation for which ia only .317.

Thua we can diacorn two interrelated clusters, one of literacy, education and newapapers and the other containing the root— with the exception of roads. Theae clusters are not at all mutually exclusive or perfectly distinct; but their divergence can be noticed. The non-agricultural labor ia a buckle that binds these two clusters. Perhaps, it symbolizes the essence of social mobilization and modernization. This shows that the emphasis of Deutsch and Lerner on the clustering o t symbiosis of the aspects of social mobilization or modernization is not necessarily warranted.

(b) In Table X, the triangle formed between columns and rows 10 to 16 contains the matrix of intercorrelations among the seven political development indicators. The correlations are not of a high order and are, in some instances, even negative in sign. Only the correlation between governmental revenue as a percentage of the State gross product and the per capita expenditure on health and education (.563} is significant at less than 5% level, indi­ cating the higher the resources raised, the more can be spent on welfare. If the expenditure on welfare is taken as a dependent variable, only 3 3 percent of its variance is explained in terms of the extractive capabilities. In other words, the commitment to welfare expenditure varies 155 also with other factors, such as the attitudes of the elites and bureaucracy, not reflected in this study. It may also be noted that non-fragmentation of political parties correlates with extractive capability at .407, which, although not significant at the 5% level, is respectably moderate. This shows that the splintering of votes among innumerable political parties is likely to detract from the capability of the government to raise the resources.

The four indicators of the scope and effectiveness of government, viz., revenue as a percentage of the gross product, governmental employment, expenditure on welfare, and appropriated funds actually spent, are only mildly inter cor related among themselves (with the exception of revenues and Welfare expenditure) , They may pull together, but only weakly. The indicator of appropriated funds actually spent was adopted because it signified adminis­ trative efficiency, maturity and planning. It may be argued that the extractive capability depends on will, commitment, requisite ideology, the capacity to bargain for more funds with the Union government, on the one hand, and efficiency of the tax and revenue administration, on the other. In view of the low correlation (.068) between the revenues raised and the funds spent, it is possible that appropriated funds actually apent may not be reflecting administrative maturity, planning, etc. If they do, the 156

Statei are concerned more with spending the money then with

raising the resources.

The two aspects of the growth of group complexity end

social infra-structure, viz,, trade union membership and

membership of cooperative societies are almost uncorrelated

(r « ,033). This is probably due to the diverse social

circumstances contributing to the origin and growth of these

two types of associations. Trade unions come into existence

mainly on the impact of industrialization, with the purpose

of bargaining for better working conditions. While it is

not denied that there are trade unions with educated and middle

class membership, the bulk of the membership is likely to

consist of the semi-literates and lower class. On the other

hand, cooperative societies are likely to be formed by educated

persons (farmers, consumers, members of housing societies)

belonging to the middle class and desirous of availing them­

selves of governmental facilities. This difference in trade

unions and cooperative societies is brought out dramatically

by their respective correlations with some of the indicators

of social mobilization.

The upper class accents of the cooperative society membership are further emphasized by its strong correlations with inequalities of land distribution (.581) and inequalities of income distribution (,515).

Some of the indicators of political development are well correlated with a few measures of political hardships 157

Cooperative Trade Union Societies Mastership Membership

Literacy .610*

Newspapers .134 .756**

Radio* .024 . 476

Urbanization .115 .683**

Non-agrlc. Labor .065 .754**

Fat Capita Incowe .035 ,420

*S±g. at .05. **Slg. at .01. as well. Revenue as a percentage of the gross product Is

Inversely correlated with land inequality (-,579) and income inequality (-.525); in other words, it is positively correlated with equalitiee of the latter. This may be taken as the re inf ormcement of the conventional wisdom that higher the equitable distribution of wealth, the larger the tax base, hence larger the extractive capability. Against this, it can also be pointed out that, since the extractive capacity decreases as the inequalities increase, this might betray an unwillingness on the part of the power elites of the higher inequality States to tax their own power base.

Again, the density of population and the non-fragmentation of political parties are negatively correlated (-.519), The multiplicity of political parties in the densely populated states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal has doubtless contributed to this. We have seen above that non-fragmentation 158 of political partiaa i i vail correlated with vehicles. Thus we can surmise that in the absence of communications, contacts and social lnterpenetretlons-^buaineas , professional or any other— which are associated with mobility, population density

leads to multiplicity of political parties and candidates.

In short, the attempt to establish a coherent set of empirical referents of political development has not succeeded

here. The capabilities of government, the administrative penetration, party institutionalization, and the growth of groups have their own divergent dynamics.

HYPOTHESIS 3; An increase in social mobilization ia

accompanied by an Increase in the inequalities

of the distribution of land and income.

This hypothesis was tested by means of two different

regression equations? one for the inequality of distribution

of land and the other for that of distribution of income.

The first equation in which the inequality of the

distribution of land was regressed on the Total Measure of

Social Mobilization, yielded the following resulti

Y * a + bX

Land Gini =■ .60 + ,007 (SM)

More than 3 3 percent of variance (ft^) of the Land Gini

was explained in terms the variance in social mobilization,

giving a correlation coefficient of ,576 which is significant

at less than 5% level. 159

In the other equation using the Inoome Gini as the dependent variable, the result wan

Y - a + bx

income Gini - .27 + ,001 (SM).

Only 7 percent of the variance in Income Gini waa explained (R ) giving a correlation coefficient of only ,271 which ia not significant even at the 5% level.

This shows that there ia a strong aaaociation between the increase in the inequalities of the distribution of urban and rural land, on the one hand, and increase in social mobilisation on the other.

The higher association between social mobilization and Inequalities of the land distribution may be further examined in terms of the correlations of the latter with the various measures of social mobilization, given in column 17 of Table X. The land inequalities correlate highly (at *.05 level) with literacy (,5B2), newspapers (,519), non- agricultural labor {.615}, and per capita income (.514). Of these, from the point of view of economic development theory, the per capita Income and non-agricultural labor are more important. Evidently, the StateB with higher per capita

incomes like the Punjab, Haryana and Maharashtra are also the States with higher land inequalities. Rajasthan arid

Orissa have both low per capita income and low inequalities.

There are a few exceptions alsot Bihar and Andhra Pradesh are low on per capita income but high on inequalities. It is 160 vtry importvit to not* that the regression equation end the correlation coefficient do not tell us how much of the land inequality (or the income inequality in the second equation) is due to the initial conditions and how much is due to social mobilization proper.** However, the available evidence shows the trend of increasing land inequalities. In the process of the growth of non-agricultural labor, those who own marginal land, or those who cannot successfully combine their non-agricultural profession with cultivation, tend to sell their land. This applies to many of the urban migrants, too. But the land is normally sold to the already substantial landlords. This leads to the increase in inequalities, The a finding also gives credence to the view of Frankel and others that the Green Revolution is increasing the inequalities of land and income.

It is surprising that the correlation between Income

Gini and Social Mobilization is only .271, A Glance at column 3 in Table IX and the 15 inequality graphs (Appendix II)

•hows that the distribution of the Income Ginis does not

aTo analyze this, the data on both the measures at two different periods of time, separated by at least a decade, are necessary* Since the 16th round of the National Sample Survey on landholdings, one more survey has been completed, But it will be some time before the report is published.

*Francine Frenkel, Indians Green Revolution; Economic Gains and Political Coats (Princeton i Princeton University Press, 1971.}------161

■quart with the eight one commonly encounter* in the Indian cities and towns where one discovers a glaring disparity between the styles of living of the rich and the poor. One explanation could be that the National Sample Surveys of consumer expenditure are not the best substitutes for incomes.

Also, in these surveys of consumer expenditures, all persons whose expenditures are above Rs.7 5 per month are bracketed together in the top group, thus underestimating the variance within the group. Anyway, this is the best available data.

It should booted that of all the measures of social mobilisa­ tion, urbanization alone correlates well with Income Gini

t.425).

Whether these inequalities have any bearing on civil violence will be examined in the next chapter. CHAPTER V

TEST OF HYPOTHESES-II AND THE FACTOR ANALYSIS

HYPOTHESES 4(a): Social mobilization varies positively

with civil violence

Figure 3 shows the scatter diagram In which the values of the Total Measure of Social Mobilization and logged values of Total Measure of civil Violence are plotted against each other. Fitting a linear regression line (not

shown in the Figure) yielded a correlation coefficient of only .249. But fitting a second degree or curvilinear regression line (as shown in the Figure) yielded a correla­ tion coefficient of .453. The full equation is given belows

Y = a - bj^X+bjX2

Log TMCV * 3.5 - . 19(SM) + ,0Q7{SM)2,

2 Only 20.5 per cent of the variance (R ) of civil vio­

lence was explained, giving a correlation of ,453. The F

test (for 2 and 13 deqrees of freedom) shows that this

correlation is significant only at 25% level. If the Indian

States are considered as the entire universe, this correla­

tion can be considered as a moderate one. If they are

considered as a sample of 16 out of a larger universe, this

correlation is supposed to hold good 7 5 per cent of the times

162 163 such ittnpliB are drawn . Thle m d c n t e correlation shows that the causes of civil violence could be more complex than have been predicted by the researchers so far.

Figure 3 shows the tendency of civil violence to decline in the earlier stages of the increase in social mobilization, and to rise again in its later stages of increase. Figures 4 and 5 clarify this (undoubtedly) vague trend a little more.

Figure 4 gives the linear regression of the logged

Total Measure of Civil Violence on the Total Measure of

Social Mobilization in the 9 low mobilization States.*

The results are:

T - a - bX

Log TMCV - 3.3 - .075 (SM) 2 Only 16 per cent of the variance (R ) is explained g i v i n g a correlation coefficient of - .41, which is not significant at the 5% level (with 7 d.f.) but, is not negligible either.

Figure 5 shows the linear regression of the log Total

Measure of Civil Violence on the Total Measure of Social 2 Mobilization in the 7 high mobilization States.

*The mean of the Total Measure of Social Mobilization for all the 16 States is 14,03. Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan, Assam, Andhra Pradesh and Haryana fall below the mean. 2 The States are Mysore, Gujarat, Kerala, Punjab, West Bengal, Maharashtra and Timil Nadu. 164

H & 9 V *. ft * * * & I V A

U r itfl/l Q X J n^ »S* 9 (A tiJ * ii n J< ^ > o H SI > 5 * 3 £ 5| s a s |0 « " < O 3 Szi % S Q « C a ^ z> teg « rj ■*, Ul . J ^ « 3 CDO G£ *S

< L J O c/i

— -^M- -t__ u^-J— ^i_1— - L — L*/v, u i r #■ P #1 F K1

(ADMIH^NIIOIA IIM^ iO 3tJ'i»V3H 1VIOJ ‘JO* TOTAL MCASU&E Of CJVtL. VWL C W C f fT M C V ) 1 1*0 1 O M 1*0 I 40 ■ ) 10 0 0 : 1 1 r*.167 •LogfMCV 3U-07S(SM) t Qo-bX O IL OIIAIN N CIVIL MOBILIZATION AND SOCIAL VlOLCNCC J Lw Mobllijcoilon (Low only Slitn I OIL OftAtN (SH) MOBfLtZATtON SOCIAL REOItetSlOM A O N H O I T A L € K R O C IUE 4 FIGURE 7

UI II ffi

17 165 10G TOTAL MEASURE OF CIVIL VIOLENCE (TMCV) 100 2 I * 1 A * * 0 0 0 - - - 9 OIL OIIAIN N CIVIL,VIOLENCE AND MOBILIZATION SOCIAL ORLTO AD REGRESSION AND CORRELATION c (HIGH M08JLI2ATI0N STATES (ONLY) STATES M08JLI2ATI0N (HIGH OIL MOGILlZATION(SM) SOCIAL 0 FIGURE5 to H L o g fMCV - * B f l f r , 9 { S M ) tc - Qo r+ bX f* * *313 * f* m

« 1

167

The results ere;

Y - a + bX

Log THCV - -60 + .09 (SM) 2 Thirty two per cent of the variance (R ) ia explained, giving a correlation coefficient of .57, which ia not signi­ ficant at the 5% level.

In the case of the 9 low mobilization States, there is, aa Figures 3 and 4 reveal, a moderate trend of decline in civil violence associated with the increases in social mobilization, civil violence in Madhya Pradesh, Assam,

Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh have a higher degree of violence than can be explained in terms of their lvvels of social mobilization, Although a classification of violence has not been attempted here because tdiere are too many dimensions involved, a few features may be generally described. Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh seem to be high on communal (Hindu-Muslim) , student, inter-party violence. A good part of the violence in Andhxa Pradesh and

Assam during the period of study was due to sub-regional secessionist movements.

As can be seen in Figure 5, the actual level of civil violence in West Bengal is higher than the expected level.

During the period, West Bengal saw violence on a wide variety of issues, and between different kinds of groups, including the communists. In the other States in this group, a size­ able proportion--but only a proportion— was due to the

Anti-Hindi riots in Tamil Nadu, Shiv Sena riots in Maharashtra, 160

and Hindu-Hu* 11m disturbance* in Gujarat, and Marxist activities in Kerala, But civil violence incidents of other types have also occurred in these States.

The positive correlation and regression in the high mobilization States can be explained in terms of the conse­ quence a of social mobilization. He can expect all these

States to have experienced, in rough proportion to their degree of social mobilisation, the revolution of rising expectations and the counter-revolution of rising frustra­ tions, breakdown of the cohesion of the traditional order, or structural dlsequilibria etc. West Bengal, whose actual level of violence is higher than expected and which ranks behind Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra in terms of social mobilization, has had a longer exposure to modernization than any other State in India. It has experienced a heavy refugee influx and dislocation of its economy due to parti- tion; it has had a protracted period of terrorist activity.

In Tamil Nadu, where social mobilization had produced an unusual degree of sub-nationalism, the mobilized strata saw

Hindi as a threat to their value expectations. The Shiva

Sena riota of Bombay (Maharashtra) have their origins in the blocking of the aspirations of locals by immigrants. In

Galtung’s concepts, the local people in Bombay are high in respect to political power, but low in respect to economic

^Marcus Franda, The Radical Politics in West Bengal (Cambridge Mass.i MIT Press, 19701, 169 welfare.* Such instances can be multiplied.

But, the fact that the eivil violence in the 9 low mobilization States shows (although only a moderate) ten­ dency to decline as social mobilization increases is incon­ sistent with the theorizings of the Gurr Feierabend school.

The question arises: have not the increasing levels of social mobilization in these states produced any relative deprivation and the gap between want satisfaction and want formation? A speculation can be made. In these less modernized States, social mobilization and consequent social differentiation may provide a feeling of relief and an outlet to people whose lives have been constrained and oppressed in the straight jacket of the rural, tradition- bound and undifferentiated character of the society. Nelson5 and Weiner*’ have argued that migrants to the cities are not likely to be as frustrated as long-term residents.

A low caste landless laborer, from a village, with the rural hierarchy bearing down harshly upon him, may experience a degree of freedom and mobility in city, even if he lives in a slum or on a pavement. Relatively new diversions

4Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," in Ivo K, Feierabend, et al. , (fid.). Anger, Polltics and Violence: Theories and Research, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972) pp. 05-97 ,

5 Joan Nelson, "The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in the Third World Cities?", WotId Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (April 1970) p p , 393-412.

^Hyron Weiner, "Urbanization and Political Protest," Clvi11zations Vol. 17, Nos. 1 & 2 (1967) pp. 44-49. 170 art optn to him. Perhaps only after a time {Huntington7

■•ft one generation) the migrants might compare their posi­ tion* with those of the long-term residents in a city.

Urbanization, however, is only one aspect of social mobilization. In general, It can be speculated that the process of proliferation of roles and the expansion of the psychic horizon brought about by the early stages of the growth of non-agricultural labor* and the spread of the mass media tend to cause relief. Or, at least, the tensions due to the dislocation caused by social mobilization tend to be less than the relief. But, when the process of social mobilization has been underway for a fairly long time relief and exhilaration yield to higher expectations, frustrations and conflicts.

In Figure 3, the curvilinear regression line clears the trough at Haryana, whose Bcore on the Total Measure of

Social Mobilization (13.79) is only a bit smaller than the mean of 14.03. It should be noted that the actual level of civil violence is much less than the expected level. Delhi, which is a separate political and administrative entity by itself, serves as a big urban outlet for Haryana's produce.

Thus the State enjoys the advantages of a high level of urbanization without being saddled with the problems of metropolitan transport, housing congestion, etc.

7 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Hew Haven: Yale University Press, 1976V pp. 273^ 93.— 171

Host of the components of social mobilization are

also curvilinearly correlated with civil violence, thus

supporting the trend of civil violence to decline first and

rise again. Column 22 of Table X reports the higher of the

two correlations - either linear or curvilinear. The differences between the correlations due to linear and

curvilinear might be seen from the table below:

R R Correlations due to due to of civil violence linear curvilinear with______Regression Regression

1. Literacy .18 4 .253

2. University Education .014 ,014

3. Newspapers .306 .3 37

4. Radios .04 2 .123

5. urbanization .205 .336

6 . Hon-agri cultural .197 .361 labor

7. Roads .456 . 476

B. Vehicles .109 ,486

9. Per Capita Income -.0 89 .181

Although both the sets of correlations are of a low

order, with none significant, the difference between the sets

of correlations due to linear and curvilinear regression is

marked, in all cases except university education, newspapers

and roads. The differences between the two sets of correla­

tions in the case of urbanization, non-agricultural labor. 172

and vehicles are noteworthy. As has been said earlier, vehicles rather than roads represent a more powerful index

of mobility^ the former is a function of the total trans­

actions in a society. The above differences suggest a good

basis to hypothesize that the differentiation in the social

roles produced during the early phases of modernization may

reduce violence,

HYPOTHESES 4 (b) i Political development varies inversely

with civil violence

The logged Total Measure of Civil Violence was regressed

both linearly and curvilinearly on the Total Measure of

Political Development. The results for the linear regression

are:

Y = a + bx

Log TMCV * 2.36 + .01 (PD)

Only .009 per cent of the variance was explained,

with a correlation coefficient of only .010, very insignifi­

cant*

Y = a - b 1X + b2x2

Log TMCV = 1.2 3 - .017[PD) + .000 2 IPD) 2 2 The variance explained (R = .009) and the correlation

coefficient (r = .010) were the same.

Thus it can be seen that the Total Measure of civil

Violence and the Total Measure of Political Development

are uncorrelated. 173

In column 22 o f Table X, the correlations of civil violence with, each of the 7 component* of political develop­ ment have been stated from row no. 10 to row no. 16. Civil violence was regressed on each of the components using both linear and curvilinear equations, and only the higher of the two types of correlations have been shown. None of the g correlations are significant even at the 5% level, but some show moderate strength. Here also, some of the correlations of civil violence with a few components of political develop­ ment in a curvilinear regression are found to be a little higher than the simple linear correlations. The following table shows this;

ft R Correlation of Due to linear Due to curvilinear civil violence with regression regression______

1 . Govt. revenue -.272 . 479

2 . Govt, employment , 387 . 396

3. Welfare Exp. -.318 . 352

4. Appr. funds spent .118 . 339

5. Trade Unions . 501* .511

6 . Cooperatives .068 .239

7 . Party non-frag. -.158 .206 * Significant at <.05 level.

The correlation of civil violence with trade union membership in a linear regression is .501, which is signifi­ cant at <.05 levelt the correlation reported (.511) is due to curvilinear regression, which is no better. But this correlation of .511 cannot be considered significant at the 5% level, because a curvilinear equation between two varia­ bles X and Y, essentially involves three; X,X* and Y. Applying the F test, r * ,511 is not found significant at .05. 174

The above table reveal* that the curvilinear relation­

ships between civil violence and the components of political

development are somewhat better than the linear relation­

ships. rn plain language, the incidence of civil violence

shows a tendency to decline with the initial increases of

the components of political development and then to rise

along with the latter.

A similar Interpretation as in the case of civil

violence and social mobilization is possible here. The marginal utility the people derive from the increase in

scope and effectiveness of government and the growth of

cooperatives in the initial stages, is higher than the marginal utility in the later stages. A small maternity

home or a 'Pucci' (well-built) drinking water well in a backward State is likely to satisfy the people more than a huge hospital or running water in an advanced State,

The correlation of civil violence with trade union membership is higher than with any other component. This

shows that in the developing countries, trade unions do not g play the role, attributed to them by Kornhauaer and others, of "mitigating the mass tendencies." This is due to the

fact that the politicization of the labour in India through

g William Kornhauaer, The Politics of Mass Society (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, i960) pp. 150-1, Asoka Mehta, "The Mediating Role of Trade Unions in the Underdeveloped Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change Vol. 6 , (Oct, 1957) pp. Ifi-JjJ'j Bruce H. Millen, The Political Role of Labor in Developing Countries (Washington, D,C. ; The Brookings Institution, 1963)» 175 union!cation goes back to th« days of fraadon movement and

that the aspiration* of the labovi have grown quicker than

the national product,

A paradox, which is of great theoretic*! importance might be noted here. While the correlation of civil vio­

lence with the Total Measure of Political Development is almost zero, the correlations between civil violence and

some of the components of political development are not

negligible. The correlations of some of the individual com­

ponents (4 of them higher than .3 50) with civil violence are

not reflected in the correlation of the latter with the

Total Measure, because, as we have seen in the test of

HYPOTHESIS-2 (b) , the inter-correlationship among the com­ ponents of political development are low and sometimes even

negative. Either the indicators chosen here do not really

represent the essence of political development, i.e., growth

in capacity and institutionalization, or if they do, the

different aspects of political development do not have much

in common. Of course, before we are forced to accept the

latter alternative, the attempts to find better operational measures for political development must be fully exhausted. 176

HYPOTHESES 4 tc} i Political Hirdihlpi dtflntd m tn«gmlitlM

of land and inoone dlitrlbutloni population

density and growth of powrtyT-l.a, fall

In the sUndarda oC living due to infla­

tion— varlea positively with civil

violence

The linear regression between the logged Total Measure of civil violence and Political Hardship yielded the follow­ ing results:

Y * a + bX

Log TMCV - 2.21 + .156 (PH}

Thus 17.5 per cent of the variance in violence was explained giving a correlation coefficient of .419.

This correlation, though not significant at the 5% level, is respectably moderate and cannot be dismissed as totally insignificant. Normally one would expect a very high degree of association between relative deprivation as reflected in political hardship and civil violence. The moderate correlation reveals that simple relative depriva­ tion theory is not adequate to explain the occurrence of violence. All this suggests that there could be many more intervening variables between poverty, population density and inequality, on the one hand, and civil violence on the other, which could possibly play an important role in either facilitating or controlling violence. The extent of social mobilization may be one such factor and its relationship 177 with viol*nce in conjunction with political hardship is considered in Hypothesis 4{d) below. Elite discontent, mobilization by parties or cultural restraints could be some of the other factors.

The correlations of civil violence with each of the four measures of political hardship are found in the column

22 of Table 10 between the rows 17 and 20. In the case of the correlations of civil violence with population density and growth of poverty there is practically no difference between the correlations due to linear and curvilinear regressions. In the case of the correlations with inequali­ ties, there is some insignificant difference.

Although none of the correlations are significant, those of civil violence with population density (,420) and growth in poverty (.424) attract attention. Probably inequalities in the Indian context are not critical enough to be associated with violence. Obviously, the high inci­ dence of violence in the five most densely populated States of Kerala, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Tamil

Nadu has contributed to its sizeable correlation with popu­ lation density. The moderately strong association of civil violence with growth of poverty due to inflation and improper distribution of the gains of economic development, tends to support, to some extent, the theorizings of Brinton^ and

^Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution iLondont Jonathan Cape, 1953] p,^7B, 178

Davies** that upheavals are more likely to occur when

Improvements in the conditions of life are followed by sudden reversals. A comparison of the very low correlations of civil violence with land and income inequalities (.223 and .179} and the moderately respectable correlation of civil violence with growth in poverty (.424} shows that people in

India are likely to be concerned more with the erosion of their awn standards of living than with what others possess.

But any further refinements of these hypotheses can be made only with survey data.

HYPOTHESES 4 (d); Taken together, social mobilization and

political hardship vary positively, and

political development varies inversely,

with civil violence

It has been shown above that when civil violence was curvilinearly regressed on the Total Measure of Social

Mobilization, only 20.5 per cent of the variance was explained, yielding a correlation coefficient of .453. It was also seen that the correlation between the Total Measure of

Political Development with civil violence, whether in a linear or curvilinear regression, was only .0 1 .

In a multiple regression equation, political develop­ ment was introduced as the second Independent variable in addition to social mobilization, making allowances of the

**James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in Ivo K. Feierabend et al. iBd,), Anger. Violence, and Politicsi Theories and Research, (Englewood cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- rfall, 19731 PP* 47-04. 179 cur vi linearity of tha latter. Hie results weret

Y - a-bjXj + b 2X^ + b 3X 2

Log TMCV i» 3.5B - ,167 (SM> + .007 tSM) 2 - .006 (PD)

The addition of political development made practically no difference to the amount of the variance explained, which turns out to be 20.64, with a correlation coefficient of

.455. That is, only .1 per cent more variance in civil violence was explained and the correlation coefficient improved by only .02. When the F test was applied the correlation was not found significant at the .05 level.

When Political Hardship was introduced as another indepen­ dent variable in the above multiple regression equation, the results were:

Y = a-bjXj^ + b2X2 + b-jX2 + b4x3

Log TMCY - 3.04 - . 149 fSM) + .006 (SM) 2 + .002 (PD)

+ .124 (PH)

The amount of variance explained improved to 30.6 per cent and the correlation coefficient to .554 . The F-test, however, reveals that this is not significant at even the

5i level. When the Total Measure of Political Development was omitted from the equation, the results were:

Y = a - b lXl + b 2xj + b3x 2

Log TMCV - 3.06 - .149 (SM> + .066 (SM) 2 + .122 (PH) 180

The amount of variance explained was still 30.6 per cent and the correlation coefficient was still .554,

The negligible contribution made by political development to the amount of explained variance in civil violence is emphasized in another way. The occurrence of the Huntington gap was observed earlier. It was found in the test of Hypothesis-1, that the ratio of political develop­ ment to social mobilization— a form of the Huntington gap-- given in Col. 10 of Table VIII, varied negatively with social mobilization. When civil violence was correlated with this ratio, the coefficient turned out to be -.173.

Thus the ratio of political development to social mobiliza­ tion makes practically no difference to the Incidence of civil violence.

The above multiple regression equations, though not presented in the step-wise fashion, reveal that {1} the

Total Measure of Social Mobilization (taken curvilinearly) and Total Measure Political Hardship explain the maximum amount of variance in civil violence, i.e. 30.6 per cent, and (2) the Total Measure of Political Development hardly improves the amount of variance explained. By all theoretical considerations, the combination of social mobilization and Political Hardship— involving as it did the physical and mental uprooting of the people, higher aspira­ tions, disintegration of the traditional moral fabric, politicization of the inequalities and relative deprivation 181

due to deterioration in the condition® of living— should have explained a far greater amount of variance in civil violence than it actually doea. This underscores the need for further refining the theoretical framework and for the

Introduction of other variables. Probably, more people are being mobilized by the political processes themselves than by the operation of the Deutschian indicators of social mobilization.

The negligible impact of political development on civil violence, as revealed in the test of Hypothesis 4(b) or in the above multiple regression equations could be interpreted in several ways. Perhaps, because of the small coherence among the political development indicators, they may not contribute to the growth of capacity and institu­ tionalization of state political systems. The Indicators may not be really reflecting the ways in which the conflicts are composed and resolved. Or, the Huntington theory of political instability is, despite its being very sophisticated, inadequate to explain the reality. All this emphasizes the need for further research.

HYPOTHESIS 4{e): The tendency toward civil violence due to

higher degree of social mobilization is

checked by higher degrees of political

development

This hypothesis was predicated on the basis of very powerful and persuasive theory that commensurate levels of 182 political d«v«lopunt are necessary to contain and neutral­ ize the destabilising consequences of social mobilization*

But in the context of the Indian States it has been found that in the earlier stages of increased social mobilization the effects of the latter are not destabilizing at all.

Moreover, political development as defined here has no contribution to make in the reduction or increase of civil violence. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 te) is not validated by the facts.

Proposition 1: It ia possible to predict, the

additional degrees of political development the

highly mobilized but poorly developed States have to

attain in order to check civil violence

This proposition is a variant of Hypothesis 4(e), formulated under the assumption that political development is associated with the reduction in civil violence. Since this is not the case, the proposition is weakened.

As revealed in Figure 1, the seven States of Mysore,

Gujarat, Kerala, West Bengal, Punjab, Maharashtra, and Tamil

Nad are high on social mobilization. The actual levels of political development in Gujarat, Kerala and West Bengal, are much lower than the expected ones, especially so in the case of West Bengal. But the suggestion that if these

States Increase their levels of political development, their levels of civil violence may come down is not warranted by the findings. 18 3

rt can be seen from the inter cor relation matrix in

Table X that the correlation between the votes for the

Communist parties (in 1967) and civil violence is only .385.

This reinforces the common sense observation that only a

small part of the civil violence in India is due to the

Communist-led agitations. However/ it is interesting to

compare the respective correlations of many variables with

communist voting and civil violence. Literacy, university

education, newspapers, non-agricultural labor,, party non-

fragmentation, inequalities of wealth/ density of popilation

and growth poverty are better correlated with communist votes

than with civil violence. On the other hand, urbanization,

vehicles and roads, governmental revenues, governmental

employment, trade unions are better correlated with civil

violence than with communist votes. Only a theoretically weak guess may be hazarded. If both communist voting and

violence are regarded as (not very mutually exclusive)

patterns of protest behavior*,, then the urban-industrial-

governmental penetration syndrome tends to encourage civil violence more than communist voting. An explication of

thiB guess, let alone an organized hypothesis, is out of

place in this study, because there are too many intervening

variables. 1B4

FACTOR ANALYSIS

Th« varying d«gr««a of interlocking of many variables can be more fruitfully studied by means of factor analysis.

The analysis brings out the natural clusters hidden in a 12 matrix of correlations among a number of variables. The varimax Rotated Factor Hatrlx of the 22 variables used in 13 this study is presented in Table XI. Although the Rotated

Factor Hatrlx does not show any neat resolution of the variables into the factors, there are, nonetheless, certain distinct clusters.

In Factor I, literacy, university education, news­ papers, population density, and communist voting go together.

Growth in poverty is almost equally associated with this factor. This factor can be characterized as the three R's and leftist dimension. It seems that the leftist ideology is mediated through the written word and human contacts.

I y The two most important books in this connection are R. J. Runanell, Applied Factor Analysis (Evanstoni North­ western University Press, 1970) j Harry Harman, Modern Tactor Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Preset 196b).

^The factor analysis of the data was done in the Delhi University Computation Centre (IBM 360) , using the OSIRIS programme. The help of the Centre and Mr. S. M. Luthra is appreciated with thanks. In the process of preparing the data for the analysis and in analyzing the results very valuable assistance, comments and advice were received from Dr. Ramanhray Roy, Director, and Mr. Niahavan, Deputy Director, of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi-1. Grateful thanks are extended to them and also to Mr. Shankar Bose of the Centre for the Study of the Developing Societies, New Delhi. 105

TABLE XI Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of the 22 variables Factors Variable* I II III IV V VI h1

1, Literacy [.80) .31 -.29 -.06 -.08 .04 .04

2 , Univ. t, 82) .53 .12 .26 -.05 .01 1.00 Education 3. Newspapers (.51) .46 .46 .17 -.08 -.05 .73 4. Radio* .04 (.64) .01 -.02 -.06 -.04 .72 5. Urbanization .15 (.79) -.37 .24 .05 -.33 .96

6 . Non-agri. . 57 (.66) -.37 .07 -.11 -.16 ,61 Population 7. Roads .22 .22 -.16 (.65) .20 .11 .69

B . Vehicles .35 (.63) .11 .12 -.15 -.34 .60 9. P .C. Income .13 (.72) -.13 -.04 ,08 .19 .60 10. Govt. Revenue -.05 -.05 .28 .10 (-.88) -.39 1.00 11. Govt. .06 (.64) ,10 .31 -.18 -.30 .64 Employment 12. Welfare . 36 .40 ,29 -.41 (-.60) .07 1.00 Expenditure 13. Appr. Funds .25 .19 (.52) .12 -.13 .03 .40 Spent 14. Trade Union* -.04 .03 .08 (.69) .05 -.10 .49 15. Cooperatives ,19 .50 (-.75) .01 -.13 -.07 .07 16 . Party non- .01 .22 -.02 -.02 IB (-.91) ,92 frag. 17, Land Ginl .44 . 28 (-.54) .07 . 24 . 23 .68 18. Income Gini .12 .03 (-.76) .01 .20 .04 .64 19. Popu. (.94) .03 -.13 . 37 ,07 .43 1.00 Density 20. Poverty (.48) .13 .23 (.48) .05 . 16 .66 Increase 21. Communist (.91) .01 .01 .23 -.12 -.31 1.00 Votes 22. Civil .20 , 1B -.10 (-.74) -.64 .01 1.00 Violence % Total Variance 20.01 19.97 11.80 10. 72 8.98 8.10 79.66% % Common Variance 25.12 25.06 14.92 13 .45 11.28 10.17 100.00% Loadings equal to or above .48 are shown in parenthesis. 166

Factor II consiitv of radios, urbanisation, non- agricultural laboi;, vehicles, per capita income, and governmental employment. He have seen the high interlocking of the first five variables in the context of social mobilization.

The underlying phenomenon of this cluster can be seen in terns of the growing economic development, which produces, and is also facilitated by, urban growth, structural differen­ tiation of society and growing commercial transactions.

Despite the availability of cheap transistorized sets, owning a radio is still a function of one's income, and hence radios go into this cluster. Economic development and its consequenoes call forth increased governmental regulation, assistance and intervention, and hence the size of governmental employment. It is noteworthy that trade union membership does not go into this cluster, but coopera­ tive membership almost does. This factor may be called the urban-industrial syndrome.

Factor III consists of the appropriated funds actually spent, the absence of cooperatives, and the absence of inequalities of land and income distribution. Correcting

for the negative signs it s h o u l d mean the inability to spend

the appropriated funds, membership of cooperative societies,

inequalities of land and income distribution go together.

This has a very disturbing implication in view of the accession to power in the recent years of the solid rural 187 gentry. This emphasizes the domination of the mainly rural cooperatives by the wealthy landlords. Cooperative socie­ ties, through which seeds, fertilizers and loans are distri­ buted, have become the important power bases of the rural politicians. If the appropriated funds actually spent really

Indicate administrative planning, maturity and a desire to do something for the people, the fact that their absence goes hand-in-hand with the inequalities of wealth should cause concern. Also, the question arises, do the coopera­ tives flourish where the administration is slack? This factor may be described as the Kulak-bureaucratic-inef f iciency cluster.

Factor IV consists of roads, trade union membership, growth in poverty and civil violence. That politicization due to unionization and deterioration in the standard of living can be an explosive combination is revealed in this.

This cluster may be described as impoverished-violent labor_ factor,

In Factor V, correcting for the negative signs, we find governmental revenue and welfare expenditure going together. Naturally, the latter is a function of the for­ mer, This cluster may be described as extractive-distribu­ tive factor.

In Factor VI, the nonfragmentation of political parties stands alone. Its moderate correlations with urbani­ zation and vehicles seen in the correlation matrix in Table X 186 is not reflected here because of the pull of the other variables,

The facts that the Social Mobilization indicators fall

Into two different but related clusters and the political development indicators are pulled In different directions can be seen in the factor analysis also. But as far as the internal clusterings of the social mobilization and political development indicators are concerned, more reliance has to be placed on the correlation matrix, because in the factor analysis, all the 22 variables pull and repel each other in different directions. CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

There have been many approaches to the study of civil violence. Using a number of theoretical frameworks of varying degrees of rigor, case or comparative studies of

revolutions, rebellions, communist and other insurgencies,

civil wars, riots of various kinds, have been attempted mostly in recent years. In this study civil violence has

been sought to be explained in terms of very general cate*

gories. The main problem tackled in this study is: to what extent the occurrence of civil violence can be caught

and explained in the net or the sieve of the theoretical

structure framed in terms mainly of social mobilization and political development? to what extent the behavior of the

individuals and collectivities can be inferred from the

aggregate data. The theoretical framework utilized here, it

is admitted, is not foolproof. It suffers from the weak*

nesses inherent in any attempt to paint a picture in broad

strokes. The squares in the theoretical net or the holes

in the conceptual sieve may be large enough to let many big

aspects go uncaught. For example social mobilization

undoubtedly raises the expectations of the people. But the process might work differently on different individuals.

189 190

Moreover, there is always the phenomenon of mobilization from the top. Again, social mobilization causes structural dlsequillbrla in society. The assumption here has been that the structural disequilibrium in a State is more or less proportional to the degree of social mobilization.

This may or may not be the case. A society exposed to a smaller degree of social mobilization may possibly experience a greater amount of structural disequilibrium than the one exposed to a higher degree of social mobilization. Some societies may contain an ever present social and cultural glue which as quickly integrates the newly differentiated groups as they are spawned by modernization. The deferen­ tial nature of the British or the emperor worship of the

Japanese may be examples. In the same way, political institutionalization is supposed to contain the destabilizing consequences of modernization. Take, for exanple, the non­ fragmentation of political parties. The fewer the parties, the higher the non-fragmentation, measured according to the

Rae formula; hence, the higher the institutionalization, the better structured participation, etc. But if there are only two political parties, one fascist and the other commu­ nist, then the whole system is rent asunder.

Despite all these weaknesses, this approach In terms of aggregate data has its own merits. It facilitates an easy empirical testing. Moreover, when a riot is in progress, one cannot just go in and stop a rioter holding a 191 flame or knife in hia hand and Interview him. When system- wlde general!lationa are made, they have to be teeted with system-wide data. That often means aggregate data. Syste­ mic capabilities, institutionalization, and welfare expen­ diture cannot be easily inferred or measured from survey data, even if the survey is on the scale of The Civic

Culture.* Hence this modest attempt at middle level generalization.

1. It has been found that social mobilization as defined here is not a single whole. It breaks into two but related dimensions of literacy and newspapers on the one hand, and the rest of the indicators, on the other, both connected by the non-agricultural labor. It would be most rewarding to study the disjunction between the clusters of social mobilization in terms of political behavlon*

In this study the physical and mental uprooting of the people due only to literacy and other variables has been taken into account. But, Nettl, as has been noted, points out to the other possibility, i.e., ’Stalactite' or from the 2 top downwards mobilization. The latter kind of mobilization has also been occurring in India. As Kothari points out, the average voting turnout in India is 60 to 6 5 per cent,

^aabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, The civic Culture (Boston; Little, Brown and Co, 1965),

^J. P. Nettl, Political Mobilization; A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts (Londont Faber and Faber, 19(57) pp. 261-71. 192 despite the fact that levels of modernisation are much 3 lower. This shows that the people are being mobilized politically without their being fully exposed to modern!ra­ tion. This study has not revealed through what symbols and techniques the t riba la in the Naxalbari area of West Bengal or the Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh were mobilized for action. It would be moat rewarding to pursue this line as well as the fact why such mobilization from the top down­ wards has not been successful elsewhere.

2, The quest for the precise operational referents of political development, reflecting the same kind of dove­ tailing which the theories suggest, has not proved very rewarding. The seven indicators of political development seem to fly off in several directions. They seem to corro- 4 borate Huntington's complaint that the aspects of political development have nothing in common except the label and

Hopkin's5 findings that the actual dimensions are not ttur same as those implied by the major schools. The indicators do

3 Rajni Kothari, Democracy in India; A Comparative Perspective (Bombay: S . I.E.S . College-of Arts and Science, 1 9 7 1 1 7 ----- A Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Moderni­ zation, Development and Politics, " Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, (April 1971) pp. 283-323.

^Raymond F. Hopkins, "Aggregate Data and the Study of Political Development," Journal of Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Feb. 1969) pp. 71-04. 193

not 9i«n to ihotr the coherence which Olsen6 found.

Laski once said with his usual eloquence and fervorv,

"It would be of lasting benefit to political science if the whole concept of sovereignty were surrendered.” Should we make the same kind of remark about the concept of political

development?

While Huntington's suggestion that Instead of political development, political change should be studied in terms of

culture, structure, groups, leadership and policies is wel­

come, we have not yet reached such a desperate stage as to

jettison completely the concept of political development.

There have been countries like England or those in Scandi­

navia which have both generated and absorbed change more or

less smoothly. How did they manage it? Huntington defines

institutionalization as "the process by which organizations 7 and procedures acquire value and stability," Procedures do

not constitute an itemised list of codified rules. They have to be internalized by the people and have to manifest themselves in ensembles of role structures. How and why did

these role structures come to acquire value and stability

in some countries? Why are some countries finding it difficult to throw up valued and stable role structures?

6Marvin E. Olsen, "Multivariate Analysis of National Political Development," American Sociological Review, Vol. 33, NO. 5 (Oct. 1968) pp. 699-712.

^Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University P r e s s , 1^70) pi 12. 194

(It is conceded here that there can be many varieties of these.) These questions cannot be evaded. Until these are answered the quest for the 'El Dorador of an integrated and empirically validated concept of political development will go on. If a theoretically coherent syndrome of political development has not been churned out by these indicators, it could be that there could be other ways in which a political system acquires the capacity to meet the challenges of modernisation.

The effects of social mobilization in the form of g rising expectations, or Galtung's structural disequibria Q or Dahrendorf's organization of quasi - or latent groups should be expected to be reflected in the discontent of a section of the elites. The Indian political system, especially the Congress 'System', both at the level of the

Union and the States, has sought to solve the conflicts by assimilating the contenders into the power structure. As

Kothari says, this is in conformity with the Hindu genius of eclectic borrowing and agglomeration.*"0 The demands of

0 Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," in Ivo K. Feierabend, et al■ fftd,), Anger, Violence and Politics : Theories and Research (Englewood Cliflfs, fo.J, : Prentice Hall, 1972) p p . 67-84. Q Ralph Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Con­ flict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2 No. 2 (195B) pp. 170-83.

^°Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little, Brown and Co,, 1970), 195

thtt Maharashtrian, Gujarati*# the Sikh# the South Indian

group* for new states, or more recently the grievances of

the people of the Telengana region of the Andhra Pradesh

have been met by containing the dissident elites# or

bringing the straying elites into the Congress fold*'*'1 That

applies to the non-brahmin movements In Tamil Nadu and

Maharashtra* Unfortunately this process of conflict 12 resolution has not been reflected in the indicators.

Similarly# as the Rudolphs have described# caste associations

have proved to be an important linkage between society and politics.1"* These have not been, and could not be built into

the research design by using the aggregate data*

For an analysis of this unique style of resolving conflicts, see Stanley A. Kochanek# The Congress Party of Indiai The Dynamics of Che Party Democracy, (Princetom Princeton University Press, 19601. 1 2 This again raises further questions, As the vio­ lence in the Indian States varies from a very low level in Haryana to a high level In West Bengal# the state political systems must be varying in their capacity to agglomerate the dissident demands. Are the dissident demands fewer in Haryana than in West Bengal? If so, why? Moreover# are there no limits to the capacity for agglomeration?

11 Lloyd I. and Susanne H, Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: The Chicago University Press# 190?V. It is necessary to point out again that the happy picture painted by the Rudolphs is an exaggerated and overdrawn one. The Tanjore agricultural riots of 1966 were between the low caste landless workers and the landlords of the higher castes. Very recently {Jan. 1974) , organization of the untouchables in Bombay in Dalit Panthers (Organization of the oppressed) led to clashes between therm and the caste Hindus. 196

3. The imti indicators of political development nay

not have happily merged to give us one or two dimensions.

Taken separately, they represent effectiveness of government,

formation of groups and party cohesion. Even If they are

taken as measures useful by themselves and as tentative and 14 crude indicators of Institutionalization, the Huntington gap occurs; there is no one-to-one relationship in the

respective increases of social mobilization and institu­ tionalization. But this gap is not related to civil violence.

4. Although inequalities of wealth and social mobili­

zation are moderately correlated, the commonly observed

inequalities of income have not been reflected, probably because of the weakness of the consumer expenditure data of

the National Sample Survey. It is necessary to observe the growth in inequalities at two different points of time.

Only then the contribution of social mobilization to increas­

ing inequalities can be clearly established.

5. Civil violence has shown a tendency (admittedly

a moderate one) to decline in the earlier stages of social mobilization and to rise again. This findinq is a corrective

to the Gurr-Feierabend^ school and tends to confirm the

14 Huntington says that he has quietly dropped the phrase political development in Political order. . op. cit. , see "The Change to Change. . ,, op. cit. 15 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Wen Rebel tPrinceton: Prince­ ton i University Press, 1970); ivo K . and Rosalind L. Felerabend, "Systemic Conditions of Political Violence: An Application of Frustration Aggresiion Theory," in Feierabend, fit fll. (fld. ) , A n g e r . . op c i t . . p. 136-183. 197

V-curve hypothesis of Grofman and Muller ,1 6 The five year

period (1965-1969) is too short to examine whether there is

an annual decline in the low mobilization states. The

levels of social mobilization measured here are the results

of the decades old process. This finding should not be too

literally interpreted. All that can be said is this i If

and when the states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar come to

acquire the levels of social mobilization found in Haryana,

they might witness a decline in the levels of violence. But, 17 they may never acquire all the features. Their density

of population, if anything, will increase. Even this

suggestion can be confirmed only after finding the other

possible correlates of civil violence, like culture,

socialization, etc.

There is a tremendous scope to further test these

findings. More valuable Insight can be gained by using the

rates of change of social mobilization, etc., when the data

will permit it. The statewise data o f the 1951 and the

16Bernad N, Grofman and Edward N, Muller, "The Strange case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Violence. The V-curve Hypothesis,* American Political Science Review, Vol. 67 No, 2 (June 1973) pp. 514-540 ^

^Let us imagine that the following hypothesis is very well proved! the level of self-confidence among a group of high school students varies positively with social status of their parents. Then it becomes difficult to answer the question! will the low self-confidence of some students change for the better, if the social status of their parents suddenly improves? Social status changes only imperceptibly over time. 198

preceding ctniuaai have been upset and rendered useless

baoftuta of the reorganization of the States. But similar

data on the cities and towns have not been affected at all.

The levels of structural differentiation, communal fragmen­

tation, ratio between the migrants and the residents, etc.,

can be measured in time series between say 1881 and 1971 18 census and these can be related, in the Nakahara and Witton

fashion, to violent behavior. Again, the attitudes of the

urban migrants from different milieu and the residents,

their optimism, pessimism, cynicism, etc. , can be analyzed

by survey techniques.

There is a wide scope for further testing the impact

of social mobilization on the structural disequilibrium

among the different groups. As the Report of the Inquiry

Commission Into the disturbances in Ranchi (Bihar) noted in

passing, the Hindu-Muslim tensions in that city were also

due to the Hindu refugees from Pakistan moving into the

trade in fruits and vegetables which had earlier been a 19 preserve of the Muslims. Which groups, previously high on income, status and political power, have lost any or most of these, or which groups previously low on all the

18 Joyce Nakahara and Ronald A. Witton, Development and Conflict in Thailand, Data Paper No. 80, South-East Asia Program, Dept, of Asian Studies (Ithacai Cornell University Press, 1971). 19 Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Report of the (Mr. Justice Dayal) Contnlssion of Inquiry on the Con>nunal Disturbance, Ranchi—Rati fT, A u g . 22-29, 1967), (Delhi; Manager of Publications, 1968) p. 80. 199

abovt aipacti are gaining political power can be fruitfully examined, poaaibly in term of quantitative measurements, in 20 regard to many urban area* chronically affected by riots *

The same kind of inquiry can be extended to the different regions within a State. The regional grievances of the people of Telengana of Andhra Pradesh have taken very ugly turns. These sub-regional separatist trends could not be built into the model. Some time ago there were faint rumb­ lings of secessionist talk in Mysore and Gujarat. Thus the rise and fall of different regions in terms power and other values can be comparatively examined with respect to many

S t a t e s .

6 , Population density and growth in poverty are found to be well correlated with civil violence. Which sec­ tions of the people accept impoverishment and inequalities supinely, and which others rebel should be further inves­ tigated .

7. Even if the causes of 'why men rebel' are estab­ lished, we do not yet know which of the disgruntled and the frustrated rebel, which of them do not. It is said that a violent crowd provides anonymity and affords the people an opportunity to riot with impunity. This is true. But there must be many frustrated people who may not avail themselves of the protection afforded by the anonymity of a

^Bhivandl and Malegaon in Maharasthra and Meerut in Uttar Pradesh are a few of such places. 200

crowd. Even survey techniques will not be useful in thiH regard, while the people may say if they are going to participate in a riot or not, they will not disclose, generally, if they did participate in a riot or not.

This study may be considered worth its while, if it provokes further replication with refined indicators and with smaller units of analysis, and further research in the above mentioned aspects, which are but a few of the many po s s i b l e . APPENDIX I

SOURCES AND CALCULATION OF THE MEASURES OF

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND

POLITICAL HARDSHIPS

Since this study of civil violence in India deals with the period 196 5 through 1969, every effort was made to obtain the statistical data on the 8 indicators of social mobilization, 7 indicators of political development, 4 indicators of political hardship, the additional variables of university education and communist voting, pertaining to this period, in the case of the incidences of civil vio­ lence, the details were taken from the four major English dailies. The Reports of the National Sample Survey were used for the data on the distribution of land and consumer expenditure. For the remaining indicators the published and unpublished sources of official aggregate data were utilized.

In the case of a few indicators, the data in terms of appropriate percentages could be readily transferred to the relevant tables. But, pretty complicated calculations were involved in the case of most others. The division of the erstwhile Punjab State into Haryana, Punjab, and the Union

Territory of Chandigarh in 1966 created some statistical

201 202 problems.^ This problem wee partially solved by taking, wherever possible, the data from the Census of India

(Provisional) Estimates for 1971, since the year 1971 was nearer to the median year of 1967 of the study. But the adoption of the provisional 1971 Census estimates on a few

Indicators caused some discrepancies in the case of Assam, from which a few districts were detached in 1970. Demogra­ phic scholars have assured that the error is minimal, because of the small size and populations of the districts.

Even this error Is more than compensated for, because that of adopting the 1961 census figures would have been more.

Every researcher dealing with the aggregate data runs into these difficulties and makes some compromises. Through the interviews with the officials, their method of ensuring the accuracy of the data has been ascertained. The methods of calculating the measures have been explained below;

1. Literacy; The figures of the Statewise percen­ tage of literacy have been taken from the Census of India

(1971), Provisional Estimates (Delhi; Manager of Publica­ tions, 1971).

2. Newspaper Circulation; The figures represent the average circulation for the years 1965 through 1969 per

^Brass, for example, repeats the figures of the com­ posite Punjab for the bifurcated States of Punjab and Haryana. Paul R. Brass, "Political Participation, Insti­ tutionalization and Stability in India," Government and Opposition, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter, 1969) pp. 53-53. 203

1 0 0 , 0 0 0 population. The raw data ware taken from the

Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Press in India,

Part I, Report of the Registrar of the Newspapers for

India, published annually (Delhi: Manager of Publications).

The estimated mid-year populations of the States in 1967, obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat, Central Statistical

Organization, Statistical Abstracts of the Indian Union,

1969, were used. The newspaper circulation figures for

Punjab and Haryana, are based on the averages for the years

1967, 1966 and 1969 only, as said above, the erstwhile Punjab was divided in 1966.

Mr. Purohit, The Deputy Registrar, revealed that his department does not just rely on the circulation figures supplied by the newspaper offices, but undertakes surprise

checks to ascertain the veracity of the figures.

3. Radios: The figures of the broadcast receiver

licenses per 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 population, represent the averages for

the years 1965 through 1968, taken from the Ministry of

Information and Broadcasting, India, A Reference Annual, 1967,

1966, 1969 and 1970. Even for the post fiburcation years of

1967 and 1968, the Punjab and Haryana figures were merged.

They were broken for these two states separately with the

assistance of the Post Master General, Punjab-Haryana circle,

at Ambala.

4. Urbanizationt The figures of the percentage of

urbanization refer to the projections of urbanization, based 204 on the ceniUBM r for the year 19661 they have been taken from, the Registrar General of Indiat Report on the

Population ProjectIona worked out under the Guidance of the

Expert Coiwplttee under the Chairmanship of the Registrar

General, tD*lhi: Manager of Publication*, 1969), The

Report gives separate figures for Punjab and Haryana.

5* Hon-Agricultural Populationt The percentages of non-agrlcultural population were calculated from the

Regietrar General, Census of India 1971, Economic Charac­ teristics of Population (Selected Tables) Series-I India, paper 3 of 1972. For each State the number of workers in

(i) Manufacturing, processing, repairs, servicing other than in households, til) Construction, (iii) Trade and commerce,

(iv) Transport and storage, tv) Mining and quarrying, and

(vi) Other services, were cumulated and then the percentage

calculated. The above publication itself does not provide

the ready-made figures of non-agrlcultural workers. The occupational groups were drawn from The Registrar General of

India, National Industrial Classification {New Delhi: 1970).

6 . Roads; The length in kilometres of Extra Munici­ pal Surfaced and Unsurfaced Roads as a ratio of 100 square

kilometres of area of State was calculated from the

averages for the years 1965, 1966, and 1967, given in the

Statistical Abstract of India, published in 1967, 1968,

respectively- The areas in square kilometres of the States were also taken from these abstracts. The Punjab and 305

Haryana figures pertain to the year 1967 only.

The above source* also give the details regarding

♦Kuccha1 or imperfect and unsurfaced roads constructed by the Comuni ty Development and National Ex tens ton Service

Agencies. On the advice of the Transport Research Division of the Ministry of Transport, these were not considered for the lack of uniformity in reporting.

7. Motor Vehicles: The ratio of vehicles, i.e. cars, trucks, jeeps, motor cycles, autorickshaws, buses, etc., per 10,000 population was calculated from the averages for the years 196 5, 1966, 196 7, obtained from the Statistical

Abstract of India published in 1967, 1968, and 1969, respectively. The Punjab and Haryana figures relate to

1967 only.

The Statistical Abstracts also contained the statis­ tics regarding the number of bus-kilometres performed by the

State Hoad Transport Undertakings. (When a State-owned bus runs for a kilometre, it is defined as a bus-kilometre.)

After the averages and standard scores had been calculated, it was decided to drop these statistics, because of the phenomenal growth of private passenger transport in recent years, especially in the States such as Mysore, Punjab,

Haryana, etc. Perhaps, this was a more powerful index of mobility than either roads or vehicles. The attempts to obtain an idea of the scale of operations were not fruitful.

The Transport Research Division of the Ministry of Transport 206 is engaged in a Sample Survey of all public and private passenger transport,

8 . Per Capita Income; The averages of per capita income at current prices for the years 1964-65, 196 5-66,

1966-67, 1967-68, 1968-69, were calculated from the docu­ ment, Estimates of Total and Per Capita Met Domestic

Product (Mimeo. 1970) provided by the Central Statistical

Organization. The principles and concepts of national

Income, according to which these estimates are prepared by the State Governments, are closely laid down by the Central

Statistical Organization and the Planning Commission, and the twenty years of planning have introduced a fair measure of uniformity,

9, Governmental revenue as a percentage of gross product; The average actual revenue of a State from all sources for the fiscal years 1965-66, 1966-67, 1967-68, and

1968-69, were calculated from the "Finances of State

Governments," prepared by the Division of Monetary Economics of the Economic Department of the Reserve Bank of India, and published annually in the Reserve Bank of India

Bulletin, Vol. 21, No, 8 (Aug. 1967), Vol. 22, No* 5 (May

1968), Vol. 23, No. 6 (June 1969), and Vol. 24, No. 8 (Aug.

1970) . This average income was calculated as a percentage of the average state Gross Product for the years 196 5 through 1969, obtained from the Estimates of Total and Per

Capita Net Domestic Product (op. cit.). The figures of 20?

Punjab and Haryana pertain to the fiscal years 1967-6B and

1968-69 only.

10. Governmental employment as a percentage of the

Population; The average of government (civilian) employees, central, state, local and quasi-government organizations, stationed in a State was calculated from the figures given

in the Statiatical Abstracts of India (1966, 1967, 1969,

1969, 1970) . The figures themselves pertain to the years

1965, 1966, 1967, 1960, and 1969. The Punjab and Haryana

figures refer to the years 1967-68, and 1969 only. The

figures in respect of Jammu and Kashmir were not reported in

any issues of the Statistical Abstracts. The data for this

State were taken from Ministry of Labour, Employment Review,

1971-7 2 (Delhi; Manager of Publications, 1972) and pertain

to the year 1970-71. This is an unhappy compromise, but

better than dropping the State of Jammu and Kashmir for all

the indicators and from the entire analysis♦

11. Per capita expenditure on health, education and

community development; The figures were obtained from the

Reaerve Bank of India Bulletin, {op. cit.) and the averages

for the years 196 5 through 196 9 calculated. The data on

Punjab and Haryana have similar limitations as in Item 9

a b o v e .

12. Percentage of appropriated funds actually spent;

Source and limitations are the same as in Item 9. 208

13. Trade Union rowBbgrahip as a p«c«ntage of

organised a actor employment t The union membership figures

for the years 1966-67, 1967-68, are from the Labour Bureau,

Indian Labour Statistics 1970, and 1971 (Delhi, Manager of

Publications, 1970, 1971) and from The Check List of Trade

Unions (1969} of the same bureau. The gap regarding Jammu

and Kashmir was filled through the courtesy of Labour

Coranissloner, Srinagar, and Mr. Nagaraj, Asst. Director,

Directorate General of Employment and Training.

The statistics on organized sector employment for the

years 1966 through 1969 were obtained (and averaged from}

the Directorate General of Employment and Training, Employ­ ment Review 1966-67, 196B-69, and 1970-71 {Delhi, Manager

of Publications). Punjab and Haryana have their usual

limitations.

14. Cooperative membership as a percentage of population: Averages for the years 1964-65, 1965-66 and

1966-67 obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the

Indian Union, 1967, 1966, 1969 {op- cit.}.

15- Non-fragmentation of the politics) parties : The

distribution of the votes among the parties and independent

candidates in the fourth General Elections was taken from

the Report on the Fourth General Elections in India, 1967,

Part II, Statistical, of the Election Commission 1967, The

non-fragmentation scores for the States of Uttar Pradesh,

Bihar, Punjab, Haryana, and West Bengal were added to the 209

non-fragmentation scores, these States obtained as a result of the mid-term elections of 1966-69, and averages calcu­

lated. The data for 1969 elections were obtained from the

Report on the Mid-term General Elections Vol. II, Election

Commission, 1970.

16, Inequalities of Distribution of Land and Income;

The Gini indices of the inequalities of the distribution of

rural and urban land were calculated from the data on

landownership by households given in the National Sample

Survey, 16th Round, 1960-61, No. 159, Tables with Notes on

Some Aspects of Landholdings in Rural Areas (Delhi; Manager

of Publications, 1970), and 16th Round 1961-62, No. 165,

Tables with Notice on Some Aspects of Landholdings in Urban

Areas (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1970). similar land

distribution figures can be found in the Census of India,

1961, volumes on the States. But the data of the National

Sample Surveys were preferred because these, unlike the cen­

sus surveys, have been conducted by trained personnell.

Even in the statistically most advanced countries, the

data on the actual distribution of income are hard to get.

As a surrogate measure, the data on the urban and rural

consumer expenditure were used. The basic data were taken

from The National Sample Survey, 16th Round, 1963-64, No.

14 2 Tables with Notes on Consumer Expenditure (Delhi:

Manager of Publications, 1960). Unfortunately, the data on

the consumer expenditure, unlike those of the land, have not 210

been prerented In the form of groupwlte cumulative distribu­

tion. But the letter war calculated even from the form in which the data had been presented.

A brief note on the method of calculating the Gini 2 indices Is necessary. The use of the Riker formula, via.,

Gini Index - n 2 I (XA - Y 1 ) 1-1 where x^ - the percentage of households in the class i, say

1 - 2 acres, and Y^ - the percentage of land or consumer expenditure pertaining to the class i, and = the difference between the percentages of households in class 1

and class i-1. The Gini indices turned out to be abnor­ mally high, in some cases exceeding the maximum of I. (This was due to the small number of groups.) Hence, the distri­

butions of land, etc., were plotted on the millimetre graph

paper and the area, in terms of square millimetres, of the

Inequality, i.e, the area between the hypotenuse and the

curve, was divided by the area of the triangle. This yielded more precise Gini Indices. The figures of the

erstwhile Punjab have been used for Punjab and Haryana.

For each State, the Gini Indices of urban and rural

land were averaged, by using the ratio of the total rural

3Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Mathematics and Politics (New Yorki The Macmillan and Co. pp. 3G-42. 211

land to the total urban land of the State as a weight i similarly, a state's urban and rural consumer expenditures were combined by using the ratio of the total rural expendi­ ture to the urban expenditure of that State as a weight.

17. Density of Population: This was calculated by using the area and median year (1967) populations from the

Statistical Abstracts (op. cit,),

IB* Growth of Poverty; The source used is: The

National Sample Survey, 16th Round No. 138 , 1960-61 Tables with Notes on Consumer Expenditure and 19th Bound, No, 208,

1961-65. Drawing the poverty line at Rs. 15 per month In the case of rural households and at Rs, 21 in the case of urban households, Statewise percentages of population below the poverty lines were calculated. Adjusting the poverty line for the Statewise rise in rural and urban rises in the price level between 1961 and 1965, new Statewise urban and rural poverty lines were drawn and the percentages of the population below the new poverty line were calculated.

The differences between the 1961 and 196 5 percentages gave the figures of growth in poverty- In adjusting the 1961 poverty lines to the 1965 prices, the rural consumer price index numbers (1960-61 = 100) in 1965-66 and Industrial workers price index numbers (1960-61 = 100) in 1966 were used. They were taken, respectively from "Price Indices for the year 1965", Indian Labour Journal, Vol. 1 2 , No. 12

(Dec. 1971) pp. 2045-2055, and Indian Labour Statistics 196B 212

(op. cit.). In the case of industrial Worker Prices for urban areee, the different weights for sample cities have been taken into account.

The growths of urban and rural poverty were combined using the ratio of rural to urban population of each State as a weight.

19. The votes of the Communist party of India and

Communist Party (Marxist) in the elections of 1967 were taken from the Report of the General Elections (op. cit,).

20, University Education; The data for 1967-6B,

196B-69 were assembled from the files provided by the officials of the University Grants Connnisalon, New Delhi.

The invaluable assistance of all persons is gratefully acknowledged. APPENDIX II

GRAPHS OF GINI INDICES OF INEQUALITY OF

distributions OF RURAL AND URBAN LAND,

AND RURAL AND URBAN CONSUMER EXPENDITURE

213 CUHUi-ATIvS PERCENTACE OF AEEA/CONSUMER EXPENDITURE lflir to f 20 '.Q to 70 30 to 10 0

...... ______jM q OEZCRE N GN IDCSO INEQUALITY GINI INDICESOF AND CURVES tORENZ jWPifC£ff AN CNUE EXPENDIURE ■ S ■ E R ITU D N E P X E CONSUMER N *A R U CNU R XE T . . E R ITU D EXPEN ER CONSUM l A R U K RA LM ? * 1 * ? LAMQ UR0AN RURAL U J M m A H V t' P fH C fc H iifc O t O f f O t O iifc H fc C fH P t' V H A m M J U LAND NO A H S C R A O P A R H O A N ■ ■?»*, MiUbtHUk 2 33 l « 0 i i i LAND ] LAND

215

LORENZ cs ano gini tHoices or incqualTtv • A s s a m 1 'V- ':(l *r ■! r..

too RU R A L (.AMO • -*•? URBAN LAND a *A3 RURAL CONSUMER tXRtHOITURf ■ - lit URBAN CONSUMER IXRfNOITURt « -MB

* 70

SO

0 K> 10 BO 70 •0 10 KM CUMULATES KRCMTAOf Of HOUSEHOLDS 216

fijur**- LORENZ CURVES ANO GiNt I NO ICES OF tNEQUAltTV BIHAR

QtMl J/VP/£fel 100 — HURAL UNO* 70S _ _ URBAN I AND i 9 1 * ... RURAL. CONSUMER EXPENDITURE ■ -If) URBAN CONSUMER EXPENDITURE * I ) *

* 10

(t 70

//

//

> M 10 o

0 10 30 70 *0 90 CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS CUMUUTtYE PERCENTAGE OE AREA/CONSUMER EIFENDlTUPE too Q OEZ UVSAO GlNI INDICES INEOUALUV ANO OF CURVES LORENZ RA LN i 4 U i LAND URBAN RA CHLE EPNnR « *74 « EKPCNOnORE CCHSLMER URBAN UA CNLE ECEDffE 290 EJCPENDrfOftE • CON5LMER RURAL >689 • LAND RURAL 20 CUMULATIVE percentage T A R A J U G

■ : Flfuf* - 90 of HOUSEfrOtDS

* . / 9L 217 CTUMUlJxrtVE PERCENTAGE OF AREA /CONSUMER EXPEN loo GO 70 ID 0 iUHt IQ wag g a w LORENZ LORENZ RA LN -*tl t * - - LANO -51» UR*AM ■ LAND RURAL RA CNUE EPNIUE - EXPENDITURE CONSUMER URBAN UA CNUE EPNIUE■ *13* ■ EXPENDITURE CONSUMER RURAL CM CUMULATIVE RE RCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS CURVES A AD i* M H S A K AND U M JAM AND AND Flgun—- I* INDICES INEQUALITY ORGIN* so f r GO TO / . /

K 218 CUMULATIVE percentage of area /consumer expenditure too OEZ CURVES LORENZ RA > - '•« • ' - >i URBAN UA LN ■ 737 ■ LANQ RURAL UA CNUE EPNIUE* -281 * EAPtNOITURE CONSUMER RURAL RA 144 URBAN i — I U M iJl iJl M U I o HO io ------AflVf AND H tM .H -IK jU M . . M jU HUI -IK .H tM H u LA A R C K Flgur* •—

GIN ' C W I INDICES 70 f INEQUALITY Of

. j _ ___ _ i- 219 220

figure — LORENZ CURVES AND 01 Nl INDICES OF INEQUALITY MADHYA F/TA D E 5 H

'' . r u r a l l a n d - l i t ■ V. . URBAN )1 ‘*10 - RURAL CONSUMER CKREHOtTURC W l . URBAN

A *0

//

20 W * .0 SO SO 7 0 • 0 CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS 221

Fi|urt — LORENZ CURVES AND 01 Nl INDICES Of INEQUALITY MAHARASHTRA p i t * tt4Q S £ *

- KUftAl LAND* 'TH X * UHRAH * * **11 .. AURAL CON*UM£A CXftMQlTURI * • 1M> .. lift* AM

30 to 30 10 70 CUMULATIVE M RCtNTAflC Of HOUSEHOLOl CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF AREA/tONSUMEB E IP E N 100 30 50 •0

■ * 12 s d l o h e s u o h * 0100 70 il

h . ; j . V,- 224

^ I ' h . ' ' 1 'pjgy^J__ ' L 1 UWCNZ CURVES AND o(Wi INDICES W IHtcWUfTY PUNJAB AND HAIfi'ANjt

GWt tHCMCES 100

1 RURAL CONSUMER ftf’ENDtTURE* <1B0 iA ban I7B

5 60

0 10 30 60 100 OJMUtATl¥t PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF AREA/CONSUMER EXPENDITURE 100 30 M tMOICCS t a -1 OEZ UVS N GN IDCSO INEQUALITY INDICESOF GINt LORENZ CURVES ANO URBAN URBAN UA CNUE EPNIUE *214 EXPENDITURE* CONSUMER RURAL UA LN ■*« * ■ * LAND RURAL 30 UllAIE ECM R O MOlJ.FHtUOS Of ARE MR RERC CUMlJlAJIVE 3ft ■*03 N A H T S A J A R

Flgur* ~ y*-

B 0

90 100 225

rtiw* — LORENZ CURVES ANO> 01NI INDICES OR INEOUAtfTV TAMIU NA OU

0 tM tN & C C *

RURAL LANQ * UR RAM m ■ -110 ------RURAL c o n s u m e r ------URBAN "

30 I* W «0 70 CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS “ it . ^

LORENZ CURVES AND GlNI INDICES OF INEQUALITY U T TAR P R A DCSH

GtNi fNPtCCS too __ RURAL LA MO * -U*

U R B A N n * *B 27

r u r a l CONSULAR EXPENDITURE * -H I ■ «■-■■ URBAN •• n * ■!?>

S JO

S 60

* 50

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90 ibo 227 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Appu, P.S. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings. New Delhi: Government or India, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation, 1971, Mimeo. 249

Chandra, Sekhar A. Census of India, 1971. Provisional Population T o t a l s , Paper I of 1971. D e l h i : Manager of Publications, l9"frl.

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India, Election Commission of. Report on the Fourth General Elections in India (1967). Vol. II. Statistical^ (belhl: Manager of Publications, 1967.)

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India, Government of. cabinet Secretariat, General statisti­ cal Organization, Statistical Abstract of Indian union 1963 and 1964. Delhi: Manager of Publications, HFST7

India, Government of. Statistical Abstract of the Indian Unlaw, 1965. Delhi: Manager of Publications, 176 6 .

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India, Government of. Statistical Abstract of the Indian Union, 1967. DelHTl Manager of Publications, 1966.

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India, Government of. Statistical Abstract, India, 1969. Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1970,

India, Government of. The Cabinet Secretariat. The National Sample Survey, Sixteenth Round July 1960- June 1^61, Number 1^9, Tables with Notes on Some" Aapecis of Land holdings in Rural India, belhi: The Manager of Publications, 1970. 250

India, Government of. The National Sample Survey, Seventeenth Round* September IS 6 l-july 1962, Number 1965, Tab lee wltii Notes on Some Xtpectiot Land Holding a In Urban indla. Balhi; Manager of Publications, 1970.

India, Government of. The national Sample Survey, Eighteenth Roundi February 1963-January 1964, Number 142,"Tables with No tea on Consumer Expenditure (Preliminary) . Delhi: Manager of Publications, T968 .

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India, Government of. Report of the [Mahavir Tyagi] Finance Commiesion, 1969. New Delhi: Ministry of Finance, i 5 ? r — ^ ------

India, Government of. Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation. Chief Ministers* Conference on Land Reforms, New Delhi, 26th, 27th Sept. 19*70: Summary Record. New Delhi: Department of Agriculture, 1SYO. Mimeo.

India, Government of. Ministry of Home Affairs, Administrative Reforms Commissions Report of the Study Team on F inane liT Administration, Volumes I~and II, May 1967. Delhi; The Manager of Publications, 1468, 251

India, Government of. The Registrar General of India. Census of India, 1971* National Industrial Classification~ 1970. N w ‘ BSThlt K a g l t i r t l z S . n . r . 1 o M H a i a , 147ft.------

India, Government of. Report on the Population Projections Worked Out Under the Guidance of the Expert Committee Set Up by The Planning commission Under the Chairmanship of the Registrar General of India. Delhi: Manager of Publications* 196 ",

India, Government of. Report of the (Mr. Justice Raghubar Dayal) Commission on Communal Disturbances* Ahmedahagar (September Tf, 1967) . Delhi; Manager Publications. 1970.

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India, Government of. Report of the Justice Raghubar Dayal} Commission or Enquiry on Communal Disturbances Sholapur (September lV, 1967). Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1970.

India, Government of. Research and Policy Division, The Causes and Nature of Current Agrarian Tension. New Delhii Research and Policy Division, l5ff5 (mimeo).

India, Government of. Review of Student Agitations. July- Decamber 1968. New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1969. m i m e o .

India, Government of. Review of Violence in Indian Society. New Delhi: Research and Policy Division, N.D, TMImeo) .

India, Government of. Ministry of information and Broadcasting. India; A Reference Annual. Delhi; Manager of Publica­ tions/ 1966,

India, Government of. India: A Reference Annual 1967. Delhi; Manager of Publications, 1967.

India* Government of. India; A Reference Annual, 1968. Delhi; Manager of Publications, 1969. 252

India, Government of. India; A Reference Annual, 1969. Delhi; Manager of Publication** 1969.

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India, Government of. Pres* in India, 1966, 10th Annual Report of the Registrar of Newspaper* for India, Eart~~l. Delhi: Manager of Publication*, 1 9 6 6 .

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India, Government of. Pres* in India, 1970, 14th Report of the Registrar of New*p*p*rs"Tbr India, frart I. Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1970.

India, Government of. Ministry of Labor, Employment and Rehabilitation. Employment Review, 1967-68. New Delhi; Directorate General of Employment and Training, 1969,

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India, Government of. Indian Labor Statietics, 1969. Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1969.

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India, Government of. Indian Labor Statistics, 1971. Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1971.

India, Government of. Labor Bureau. Pocket Book Labor Statistics, 1969. Simla: Labor Bureau^ 1970.

India, Government of. Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Transport Research Division. Review of Public Sector R o a d Transport, 1969-70. Hew DelKf: Ministry of Shipping and Transport, 1971, 253

India, Government of. Planning Commission, Identification of Backward Areas; Report of the Working flroup, Sew belhi; Planning Cosmtisiiion, TTffTZ

India, Government of. Implementation of U n d Reforms; A Review by the Land Reforms Implementation Committee of the National beveloixnentdouncli. (Hew Delhi: Planning Commission, 1966) -

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Ladejinsky, Wolf. A Study on Tenurlal Conditions in Package Dlstrlcte. New Delhi; Planning Commission, n.d.

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