DOCSLIB.ORG

Stopping Cyber Crime

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Stopping Cyber Crime Lee Thostenson Stopping Cyber Crime They investigate the transfer of millions of dollars, the trafficking of illegal drugs and weapons, terrorism, fraud and identity theft. They protect the livelihood and infrastructure of businesses and government systems all over the world. No, I am not talking about members of a S.W.A.T. team or C.I.A. operatives. I am referring to the men and women who make up the agencies policing our internet for serious cyber crimes. Day by day the scale and number of these crimes increases, and with that so does the need for protection. Although it is an electronic battle, these agencies still use some of the same kinds of techniques they use to capture drug lords or gangsters to capture cyber criminals. Undercover sting operations have worked well to bring down hacker rings, and on the flip side, some of the bad guys have been hired by security companies to help them. Money is the main motivation for the crimes (and there is plenty of it – estimates of the size of the industry range from a couple hundred million dollars to over a trillion,) but criminal acts are also performed for revenge, to spite other countries or their policies, or just to prove the perpetrators can do it. Whatever the crime is, one thing is for sure. There is a war going on that most people know little about. It is obvious that cyber crime is a huge problem threatening technological advancement and the integrity of the internet, as well as our own personal lives, but what exactly is it? Cyber crime is generally defined as making any computer or computer network the target of criminal activity. This can include theft, fraud, hacking (spreading malicious code, stealing information), child pornography, denial of service (DoS) attacks, copyright infringement, drug and weapon trafficking, embezzlement, SPAM, etc. Establishing and using botnets seems to be the most popular and profitable new form of cyber crime. The term ‘botnet’ can refer to any collection of 1 autonomous software robots, but it usually means the type that run malicious software. The botnet is usually running on multiple computers (sometimes millions) hidden from the user. Its creator can control the group and steal bits of information and data from each computer. How prevalent are these crimes? The head of the Southern California High Technology Task Force, Lt. Rocky Costain, estimates that computer-related crimes make up approximately a quarter of all crimes his unit sees (Wolf). The Internet Crime Complaint Center’s annual report listed 275,284 complaints, resulting in the loss of $265 million in 2008 alone: IC3 Complaints from 2004-2008 Year Complaints Received Dollar Loss 2004 207,449 $68.14 million 2005 231,493 $183.12 million 2006 207,492 $198.44 million 2007 206,884 $239.09 million 2008 275,284 $265 million Data Courtesy of ic3.gov 1 Of that lost money, 32.9% came from non-delivery of merchandise, 25.5% from internet auction fraud, and 9.0% from credit and debit card fraud (“IC3 2008 Annual Report on Internet Crime”). Add the $265 million to the amount of losses that go unreported as well as the complaints that are handled by other agencies, and these numbers are getting extremely high (Wolf). Experts agree that only about one in seven crimes is reported. The 2005 FBI estimates actually put annual losses from cyber crime at about $67 billion in the U.S (Wolf.) A recent Consumer Reports survey estimates that one in five online shoppers has been a victim in one way or another, and over the past year 1.7 million households were victims of online identity 2 theft. Aside from crimes that incur the loss of a specific dollar figure, cyber crime protection agencies are constantly on the lookout for child pornography, acts that cause mass panic, efforts to target national security, etc. The fact that the internet is so new means that most of the laws outlawing cyber crimes are very new and in the early stages of development. To put this in perspective, it took radio thirty-eight years to reach 50 million users, the computer sixteen years, and the internet only four (Koenig). Many people involved in investigating and prosecuting cyber criminals are not familiar with many of the crimes they are dealing with. The President of the Foundation of Internet Security and Technology in India says of cyber crime: “Politicians and judges do not understand how to deal with it, and in fact few of them ever use the Internet. Police are reluctant to register cases because they prove too difficult to prosecute” (Messmer). Also, these crimes come from all over the world and are very difficult to trace. Criminals go to great lengths to misdirect their attacks so that it looks like they are originating in a totally different place than they actually are. To make things worse, some countries do not cooperate with foreign enforcement agencies for security reasons, and other countries are especially lax in prosecuting criminals. Some even are thought to be helping cyber criminals and hindering prosecution efforts. Most security professionals agree that the majority of quality, large-scale attacks originate from Russia (Messmer). Recently, criminals have been using the economic recession as another tool to conduct crime. They are trying such things as sending out emails pretending to be banks responding to the crisis and also making phony resume-builder sites to gather personal information. It is clear that many different factors are working against cyber-crime enforcement. For these reasons, a person would think that the strategies for investigation should still be improving, 3 as well as the effectiveness of the prosecution of the criminals. Since the money to be gained by engaging in cyber crime continues to increase, as well as the savvy of its perpetrators, cyber crime continues to flourish. At the same time law enforcement is likely to improve. So who are the invisible guardians of the integrity of the internet? A lot of the effectiveness in minimizing cyber crime depends on the victims reporting the crimes. The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) is the most prominent medium for this. The IC3 is a partnership between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C), and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). Filing a complaint involves the party that is thought to be defrauded or a friend or relative giving the IC3 all of their information, telling who they believe to be the culprit, and providing specific details on what happened to them. The IC3 then refers the complaint to the right agency or law enforcement, whether it be local, state, national, or international. Every complaint is referred, but not guaranteed to be investigated by the agency or agencies it is referred to. The main pluses of the IC3 are that it is an easy-to-use way for victims to get their complaint heard, hopefully get their money back, and also alert law enforcement and other authorities about new frauds, viruses, and other crimes. The IC3 typically deals only with acts such as fraud, theft, hacking, and crimes of that nature, so time-sensitive problems such as cyber terrorism and online threats are taken up by other agencies (“IC3 2008 Annual Report on Internet Crime”). The FBI plays the biggest role in stopping all types of cyber crime, with 56 field offices in the United States. Citizens can file online complaints or contact these offices. The FBI describes their mission in stopping cyber crime as “fourfold.” Their intentions are to deal with sexual predators and child pornography, and in their own words, “computer intrusions and the spread of malicious code,” threats to national security, and “criminal enterprises engaging in 4 Internet fraud” (“Federal Bureau of Investigation – Cyber Investigation.”) To fulfill one of those missions, stopping computer intrusions and hacking, the FBI has pulled out a variety of stops. Growing ties with other agencies such as the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security are a major help in their efforts. They have their own “Cyber Division” to deal with such attacks, as well as 93 Computer Crimes Task Forces. They also have “cyber squads” at all of the field offices and their headquarters, made up of a highly trained staff specializing in computer intrusions. The FBI also has Cyber Action teams that “travel around the world on a moment’s notice to assist in computer intrusion cases” and “gather vital intelligence that helps us identify the cyber crimes that are most dangerous to our national security and to our economy” (“Federal Bureau of Investigation – Cyber Investigation”). In regard to crimes such as child pornography and sexual predation, arguably the most effective way to stop them is to educate children so that they never happen. The FBI has published a brochure called A Parent’s Guide to Internet Safety and has provided numerous links to safety websites and tips for keeping the internet safe for children. Even so, children and teens don’t always act in their own best interest, so to combat these crimes and prevent them from occurring, the FBI has started the “Innocent Images National Initiative” (IINI). The IINI was formed in 1995 after the 1993 investigation of two previously identified sexual offenders led to the conclusion that communication through computers was a growing technique for sending and receiving illegal pornographic content as well as recruiting minors for illegal sexual conduct. The IINI now commands the most personnel out of all of the cyber crime divisions in the FBI and accounts for 39% of investigations conducted by the FBI Cyber Crime Division (“Federal Bureau of Investigation – Innocent Images National Initiative.”) In addition to investigating producers and possessors of child pornography and those who are willing to engage in sexual 5 activity with a minor, the IINI looks to identify victims and take further measures to keep the internet safe.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Is the Mafia Taking Over Cybercrime?*
    Is the Mafia Taking Over Cybercrime?* Jonathan Lusthaus Director of the Human Cybercriminal Project Department of Sociology University of Oxford * This paper is adapted from Jonathan Lusthaus, Industry of Anonymity: Inside the Business of Cybercrime (Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 2018). 1. Introduction Claims abound that the Mafia is not only getting involved in cybercrime, but taking a leading role in the enterprise. One can find such arguments regularly in media articles and on blogs, with a number of broad quotes on this subject, including that: the “Mafia, which has been using the internet as a communication vehicle for some time, is using it increasingly as a resource for carrying out mass identity theft and financial fraud”.1 Others prescribe a central role to the Russian mafia in particular: “The Russian Mafia are the most prolific cybercriminals in the world”.2 Discussions and interviews with members of the information security industry suggest such views are commonly held. But strong empirical evidence is rarely provided on these points. Unfortunately, the issue is not dealt with in a much better fashion by the academic literature with a distinct lack of data.3 In some sense, the view that mafias and organised crime groups (OCGs) play an important role in cybercrime has become a relatively mainstream position. But what evidence actually exists to support such claims? Drawing on a broader 7-year study into the organisation of cybercrime, this paper evaluates whether the Mafia is in fact taking over cybercrime, or whether the structure of the cybercriminal underground is something new. It brings serious empirical rigor to a question where such evidence is often lacking.
    [Show full text]
  • Cybercrime-As-A-Service: Identifying Control Points to Disrupt Keman Huang Michael Siegel Stuart Madnick
    Cybercrime-as-a-Service: Identifying Control Points to Disrupt Keman Huang Michael Siegel Stuart Madnick Working Paper CISL# 2017-17 November 2017 Cybersecurity Interdisciplinary Systems Laboratory (CISL) Sloan School of Management, Room E62-422 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02142 Cybercrime-as-a-Service: Identifying Control Points to Disrupt KEMAN HUANG, MICHAEL SIEGEL, and STUART MADNICK, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cyber attacks are increasingly menacing businesses. Based on literature review and publicly available reports, this paper analyses the growing cybercrime business and some of the reasons for its rapid growth. A value chain model is constructed and used to describe 25 key value-added activities, which can be offered on the Dark Web as a service, i.e., “cybercrime-as-a-service,” for use in a cyber attack. Understanding the specialization, commercialization, and cooperation of these services for cyber attacks helps to anticipate emerging cyber attack services. Finally, this paper identifies cybercrime control-points that could be disrupted and strategies for assigning defense responsibilities to encourage collaboration. CCS Concepts: • General and reference Surveys and overviews; • Social and professional topics Computing and business; Socio-technical systems; Computer crime; • Security and privacy Social aspects of security and privacy; → → → Additional Key Words and Phrases: Cyber Attack Business; Value Chain Model; Cyber-crime-as-a-Service; Hacking Innovation; Control Point; Sharing Responsibility 1 INTRODUCTION “Where there is commerce, there is also the risk for cybercrime”[139]. Cybercrime is a tremendous threat to today’s digital society. It is extimated that the cost of cybercrime will grow from an annual sum of $3 trillion in 2015 to $6 trillion by the year 2021 [115].
    [Show full text]
  • An Analysis of the Nature of Groups Engaged in Cyber Crime
    International Journal of Cyber Criminology Vol 8 Issue 1 January - June 2014 Copyright © 2014 International Journal of Cyber Criminology (IJCC) ISSN: 0974 – 2891 January – June 2014, Vol 8 (1): 1–20. This is an Open Access paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non- Commercial-Share Alike License, which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. This license does not permit commercial exploitation or the creation of derivative works without specific permission. Organizations and Cyber crime: An Analysis of the Nature of Groups engaged in Cyber Crime Roderic Broadhurst,1 Peter Grabosky,2 Mamoun Alazab3 & Steve Chon4 ANU Cybercrime Observatory, Australian National University, Australia Abstract This paper explores the nature of groups engaged in cyber crime. It briefly outlines the definition and scope of cyber crime, theoretical and empirical challenges in addressing what is known about cyber offenders, and the likely role of organized crime groups. The paper gives examples of known cases that illustrate individual and group behaviour, and motivations of typical offenders, including state actors. Different types of cyber crime and different forms of criminal organization are described drawing on the typology suggested by McGuire (2012). It is apparent that a wide variety of organizational structures are involved in cyber crime. Enterprise or profit-oriented activities, and especially cyber crime committed by state actors, appear to require leadership, structure, and specialisation. By contrast, protest activity tends to be less organized, with weak (if any) chain of command. Keywords: Cybercrime, Organized Crime, Crime Groups; Internet Crime; Cyber Offenders; Online Offenders, State Crime.
    [Show full text]
  • Case Studies of U.S. Law Enforcement Techniques Against Organized Crime Groups
    CASE STUDIES OF U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS Joseph K. Wheatley＊ I. INTRODUCTION U.S. law enforcement authorities face a variety of domestic and transnational organized crime groups. Those groups run the gamut in the types of crimes committed; structure and unifying purposes; from small to large in size; and from local to regional to national and transnational in scope. While not statutorily binding, there are several major definitions of organized crime in the United States, including the following two definitions, which may aid decision-makers in setting priorities and focusing resources as new criminal threats are identified and prosecuted. In 1986, the Presidentʼs Commission on Organized Crime released a report, which listed six characteristics of organized crime groups: The criminal group is a continuing, structured collectivity of persons who utilize criminality, violence, and a willingness to corrupt in order to gain and maintain power and profit. The characteristics of the criminal group, which must be evidenced concurrently, are: [1] continuity, [2] structure, [3] criminality, [4] violence, [5] membership based on a common denominator, [6] a willingness to corrupt and a power/profit goal.1 In 2008, the Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime defined international organized crime groups as: [T]hose self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate internationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence. There is no single structure under which international organized criminals operate; they vary from hierarchies to clans, networks and cells, and may evolve to other structures.
    [Show full text]
  • Check and Card Fraud, 2Nd Edition
    Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Problem-Specific Guide Series No. 23 Check and Card Fraud, 2nd Edition Graeme R. Newman and Jessica Herbert This project was supported by cooperative agreement #2002CKWX0003 by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice. © 2019 Arizona Board of Regents. The U.S. Department of Justice reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive, and irrevocable license to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use, and authorize others to use, this publication for Federal Government purposes. Contents About the Problem-Specific Guide Series……………………………………………………… Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………………… The Problem of Check and Card Fraud……………..…………………………………………. Illegal Acquisition of Checks and Cards……………………………………………… Illegal Use of Checks and Cards……………………………………………………… Low Reporting of Check and Card Fraud…..………………………………………….. Factors Contributing to Check and Card Fraud………………………………………… Understanding Your Local Problem…………….………..……………………………………. Asking the Right Questions……………………………………………………………... Incidents……………………………………………………………………….. Offenders………..……………………………………………………………... Victims…………………………………………………………………………. Locations/Times………………………………………………………………… Measuring Your Effectiveness………………………………………………………….. Responses to the Problem of Check and Card Fraud…………………….…………………….. General Considerations for an Effective Response Strategy…………………………….. Working
    [Show full text]
  • Moving Toward the Future of Policing
    CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND Purchase this document TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Security Research Division View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Moving Toward the Future of Policing Gregory F. Treverton, Matt Wollman, Elizabeth Wilke, Deborah Lai NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION The research described in this report was conducted within the RAND Center for Global Risk and Security under the auspices of the International Programs of the RAND Corporation.
    [Show full text]
  • Cyberfraud and the Implications for Effective Risk-Based Responses: Themes from UK Research
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Liverpool Repository Cyberfraud and the Implications for Effective Risk-Based Responses: Themes from UK Research Michael Levi, Professor of Criminology, School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Wales, UK. CF10 3WT1 Alan Doig, Visiting Professor, Northumbria University. Rajeev Gundur, Lecturer in in Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology, University of Liverpool in Singapore David Wall, Professor of Criminology, Centre for Criminal Justice Studies, Leeds University Matthew Williams, Professor of Criminology, School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University. We are grateful to the City of London Corporation for funding this research and to the City of London Police and Steve Strickland for their substantial assistance with the project. Crime, Law and Social Change, DOI: 10.1007/s10611-016-9648-0. Abstract The nature of the risk or threat posed by ‘cyberfraud’ - fraud with a cyber dimension – is examined empirically based on data reported by the public and business to Action Fraud. These are used to examine the implications for a more effective risk-based response, both by category of fraud and also responding to cyberfraud generally, not just in the UK. A key characteristics of cyberfraud is that it can be globalised, unless there are major national differences in attractiveness of targets or in the organisation of control. This does not mean that all cyberfraud is international, however: not only do some involve face to face interactions at some stage of the crime cycle, but in online auction selling frauds, it appears to be common for the perpetrators and victims to reside in the same country.
    [Show full text]
  • Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation”
    STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. MUELLER, III DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AT A HEARING ENTITLED “OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION” PRESENTED MARCH 16, 2011 STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD OF ROBERT S. MUELLER, III DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AT A HEARING ENTITLED “OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION” PRESENTED MARCH 16, 2011 I. Introduction Good morning, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Conyers, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today. The FBI has never faced a more complex threat environment than it does today, whether one considers terrorism, espionage, cyber-based attacks, or traditional crimes. Indeed, during the past year, the FBI has faced an extraordinary range of national security and criminal threats. There were last October’s attempted bombings on air cargo flights bound for the United States from Yemen, directed by al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). There was last May’s attempted car bombing in Times Square, aided by Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan (TTP). These two attempted attacks demonstrate how al Qa’ida's affiliates and allies have the intent to strike inside the United States. We have also seen a number of terrorist plots by lone offenders, involving such possible targets as the home of former president George W. Bush; a Christmas-tree lighting ceremony in Portland; and subway stations in the Washington, D.C., Metro system. There were the arrests last summer of ten Russian spies, known as “illegals,” who secretly blended into American society, committed to the long-term goal of clandestinely gathering information for Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Book and Is Not Responsible for the Web: Content of the External Sources, Including External Websites Referenced in This Publication
    2020 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict 20/20 Vision: The Next Decade T. Jančárková, L. Lindström, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.) 2020 12TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLicT 20/20 VISION: THE NEXT DECADE Copyright © 2020 by NATO CCDCOE Publications. All rights reserved. IEEE Catalog Number: CFP2026N-PRT ISBN (print): 978-9949-9904-6-7 ISBN (pdf): 978-9949-9904-7-4 COPYRIGHT AND REPRINT PERMissiONS No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence ([email protected]). This restriction does not apply to making digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within NATO, or for personal or educational use when for non-profit or non-commercial purposes, providing that copies bear this notice and a full citation on the first page as follows: [Article author(s)], [full article title] 2020 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict 20/20 Vision: The Next Decade T. Jančárková, L. Lindström, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.) 2020 © NATO CCDCOE Publications NATO CCDCOE Publications LEGAL NOTICE: This publication contains the opinions of the respective authors only. They do not Filtri tee 12, 10132 Tallinn, Estonia necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of NATO Phone: +372 717 6800 CCDCOE, NATO, or any agency or any government. NATO CCDCOE may not be held responsible for Fax: +372 717 6308 any loss or harm arising from the use of information E-mail: [email protected] contained in this book and is not responsible for the Web: www.ccdcoe.org content of the external sources, including external websites referenced in this publication.
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber-Enabled Financial Abuse of Older Americans: A
    Cyber-Enabled Financial Abuse of Older Americans: A Public Policy Problem An interpretative framework investigating the social, economic, and policy characteristics of cyber-enabled older American financial abuse Christine Lyons A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Public Administration College of Public Affairs University of Baltimore Baltimore, Maryland December, 2019 This dissertation is dedicated to those who bravely shared their story with me in confidence. I am truly honored to be entrusted by you with the details of your financial and emotional trauma stemming from a time in your life so vividly painful. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS No one writes a dissertation without significant help from others and this is so very true with this endeavor. I would like to give a special thanks to three strong, admiralty intelligent, and hard-working women, my committee: Dr. Heather Wyatt- Nichol (chair), Dr. Lorenda Naylor, and Dr. Shelly Bumphus. Thank you for not giving up on me and encouraging me to continue to research a much under-studied public administration topic. Without your support, this dissertation would not be finished. I wish to express my thanks to Ms. Nina Helwig; the Adult Protective Services of Montgomery County, MD; and the Fraud Department of the Montgomery County, MD Police. I am also thankful for the time and assistance from Dr. Richard Mestas, as well as two of the best research librarians – Ms. Elizabeth Ventura and Mr. Andrew Wheeler, I am unable to adequately express my gratitude for the unwavering and unconditional support from my life partner of almost forty years, Clint Lyons; our son Clinton, his wife Annie, and our grandchildren CJ, Gabby, Natalie, and Alex; and our daughter Mary-Michael.
    [Show full text]
  • Office of the Deputy Attorney General Baker Testimony Re Cybersecurity
    STATEMENT OF JAMES A. BAKER ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BEFORE THE SENATE JUDlClARY COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY AT A HEARING ENTITLED "CYBERSECURITY: PREVENTING TERRORIST ATTACKS AND PROTECTING PRIVACY RIGHTS IN CYBERSPACE" PRESENTED NOVEMBER 17,2009 Good afternoon, Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Kyl, and Members of the Senate Judicial-y Terrorism and Homeland Security Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before qou to testify about securing our nation's information infrastructure, I am pleased to share with the Subcommittee an overview ofthe Department of Justice's [.ole in the U.S. Government's overall cybersecurity strategy. In light ofthe FBI's participation on the panel, I will limit my remarks pt'in-u:~rilyto the ways in which other compo~ientsof the Justice De~artmentaddress cybersecurity issues. 1. Cy bersecurity Threats As you know, information technology is embedded within and interconnects virtually all of the Nation's information and cotnmunications infrastructure, which we depend upon to conduct commercial, financial, personal, and governmental transactions. We face ongoing threats to the security of our information and information infrastructul-e from a wide range of actors, including nation-states. ct4iminals,and terrorists who exploit our pervasive dcpendet~cyon information technology to misappropriate or destroy information, steal money, and disrupt services, including those provided by critical infrastructures. As recognized in the Preface to the President's Cyberspace Policy Review, a 60-day, comprehensive, "clean-slate" review to assess U.S. policies and structures for cybersecurity, [tlhe architecture of the Nation's digital infrastructure. based largely upon the Internet, is not secure or resilient.
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber-OC – Scope and Manifestations in Selected EU Member States
    Edited by Gergana Bulanova-Hristova Karsten Kasper Geralda Odinot Maite Verhoeven Ronald Pool Christianne de Poot Yael Werner Lars Korsell Cyber-OC – Scope and manifestations in selected EU member states This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. Cyber-OC – Scope and manifestations in selected EU member states This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This pu- blication reflects the views only of the authors, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. Polizei + Forschung Volume 50 Published by the Bundeskriminalamt Criminalistic Institute BKA Advisory Board: Professorin Dr. Regina Ammicht Quinn Universitt TÅbingen, Internationales Zentrum fÅr Ethik in den Wissenschaften Professor Dr. Johannes Buchmann Direktor des Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt Professorin Dr. Petra Grimm Hochschule der Medien Stuttgart Professorin Dr. Rita Haverkamp Universitt TÅbingen, Stiftungsprofessur fÅr Kriminalprvention und Risikomanagement Professor em. Dr. Hans-JÅrgen Kerner Universitt TÅbingen, Institut fÅr Kriminologie Uwe Kolmey Prsident des Landeskriminalamtes Niedersachsen Professor Dr. Hans-JÅrgen Lange Prsident der Deutschen Hochschule der Polizei Professor Dr. Peter Wetzels Universitt Hamburg, Fakultt fÅr Rechtswissenschaft, Institut fÅr Kriminologie Klaus Zuch Senatsverwaltung fÅr Inneres und Sport Berlin Edited by Gergana Bulanova-Hristova Karsten Kasper Geralda Odinot Maite Verhoeven Ronald Pool Christianne de Poot Yael Werner Lars Korsell Cyber-OC – Scope and manifestations in selected EU member states (HOME/2012/ISEC/AG/4000004382) This project has been funded with support from the European Com- mission.
    [Show full text]