CASE PROGRAM 2008-64.1 Reorganising Victoria Police’s approach to crime (A) October 13, 1999: 29-year-old drug dealer and manufacturer Carl Williams meets sometime-associates Mark and Jason Moran in a suburban park in Melbourne’s north- west. The Morans, brothers and members of a notorious crime family, are in a dispute with Williams over a faulty batch of amphetamine tablets and decide to teach him a lesson. Jason Moran produces a gun and shoots Williams in the stomach, ignoring his brother’s instruction to “finish the job”.1 Little did they know that this fateful decision would spark a series of retributional killings that would claim more than 20 victims and take an under-prepared police force by surprise. By 2003, the frequency and audacity of the murders had increased considerably, leading media outlets to declare that Melbourne was in the midst of a “gangland war”. As detectives struggled to cope with the climbing body-count and growing public anxiety, senior members of Victoria Police were prompted to rethink the organisation’s approach to major crime. Blood on the streets Upon leaving hospital, Williams vowed revenge on the Morans and those close to them. Biding his time, he eventually achieved one of his main goals in June 2000, when Mark Moran was ambushed in his driveway and shot dead. This sparked a slew of further killings involving at least five of Melbourne’s criminal gangs, as responsibility was attributed (rightly or wrongly) and revenge sought. The deaths also created power vacuums and power struggles as members jostled for control of (mainly) the city’s drug trade. Some of the most notable killings included that of This case was written by Marinella Padula, Australia and New Zealand School of Government, for Professor John Alford and Professor Amanda Sinclair as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The assistance of Christine Nixon, Simon Overland, Paul Hollowood, Toni Campbell and Craig Howard is gratefully acknowledged, however they are not responsible for the content herein. Cases are not necessarily intended as a complete account of the events described. While every reasonable effort has been made to ensure accuracy at the time of publication, subsequent developments may mean that certain details have since changed. This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence, except for logos, trademarks, photographs and other content marked as supplied by third parties. No licence is given in relation to third party material. Version 7-05-2008. Distributed by the Case Program, The Australia and New Zealand School of Government, www.anzsog.edu.au. 1 ‘Untold story: Melbourne's underground war’ The Age, 1 March, 2007. Williams’ associate Dino Dibra who was shot outside his home in October 2000; Victor Pierce, who was killed in his car outside a Port Melbourne supermarket in May, 2002; and Nick Radev who was gunned down on a suburban street in April 2003. By this stage, there had been close to a dozen suspected gang-related murders. Missed opportunities Like the Morans, Williams and his family had long been involved with organised crime and were no strangers to police. However, investigators initially underestimated the reach of his underworld connections and the size of his ambitions. Six weeks after his 1999 shooting, police (whilst conducting a fraud investigation) found $20 million worth of “speed” at a Broadmeadows house and Carl Williams hiding in one of the bedrooms. However, corruption allegations against two of the drug squad detectives involved saw the case delayed and allowed Williams ample opportunity to marshal resources and climb the criminal ladder.2 Later, police would hamper their own efforts: “In the case of Mark [Moran’s] death, police suspected Williams from the start, so much so that his house was raided the next day. But internal police politics terminally damaged the investigation. Members of the drug squad, who had worked on the Morans for years, deliberately concealed information from the homicide squad because they believed their investigation was more important than a murder probe they thought would fail. Their prediction was self-fulfilling.”3 But the Homicide Squad’s difficulties went beyond pinning charges on Carl Williams. As its function was to investigate all suspicious deaths in Victoria, the squad was initially responsible for pursuing the “gangland” murders. However, it became increasingly apparent that many of the victims and perpetrators were linked in ways the squad was only beginning to understand. While the squad was extremely skilled at investigating individual cases, detectives were struggling to make much headway with this series of killings. Solid intelligence on the main players was lacking. Each victim had numerous potential enemies and suspects were often aware they were under surveillance. The pervasive criminal “code of silence” meant that the victims’ family and friends typically refused to assist investigators. Likely targets of future shootings also routinely declined police protection. Another problem, according to the then Assistant Commissioner Simon Overland, was the disjointed, uncoordinated nature of the investigations. “For example,” he said, “if someone was shot and killed, it was a job for the Homicide Squad. If the victim was shot but survived, it went to the Armed Offenders Squad. If the shot was fired in Carlton and missed the target, the local Crime Investigation Unit (CIU) would investigate but if it happened in Sunshine, a different CIU would take it. And collaboration between the different units (and even within the same unit) was often very weak.” 2 ibid. 3 ibid. 2 The Purana Taskforce Chief Commissioner Christine Nixon recruited Overland from the Australian Federal Police in early 2003 and appointed him Assistant Commissioner of the Crime Department. Overland, along with Nixon and a number of other senior officers, recognised that the current set-up was not working and agreed that it was time to reassess their strategy. In June 2003, The Purana Taskforce was launched, comprising detectives drawn from the Homicide, Armed Offenders, Fraud and Drug Squads, as well as technical specialists including surveillance experts and forensic accountants. Preference was given to detectives who had worked in more than one area and it was hoped that the cross-disciplinary approach would break down some of the barriers between squads and start to build a “big picture” understanding of the situation. Soon after its inception, the taskforce swelled to more than 50 members but privately, senior police knew they were starting from behind and that tangible results could be some time coming. Their instincts were right. On 21 June, 2003 Jason Moran and associate Pasquale Barbaro were sitting in a van outside the Cross Keys Hotel in Essendon in northern-suburban Melbourne. Moran had been to watch his children at a nearby football clinic and they were about to leave when a masked gunman appeared, shooting them both dead. The children, who had been in the rear of the van, were uninjured. The case drew widespread media attention but would not be the only one to hit the headlines. From April to December 2003, there were seven gang-related killings, occurring at a rate of roughly one every four weeks. In October, suspected drug dealer Michael Marshall was killed in front of his five-year-old son outside his South Yarra home. Two months later, career criminal and Moran insider Graeme Kinniburgh was slain in his Kew driveway.4 While there was a break in activity over the New Year, March 2004 saw two more sensational killings. First, hit-man and Williams confidante Andrew Veniamin was shot dead in a Carlton pizza restaurant. Just over a week later, family patriarch Lewis Moran was assassinated at the Brunswick Club (an inner-city pokies5 venue) while staff and patrons looked on. His drinking companion was also shot but survived. Overland noted that generally the vast majority of crime reportage was devoted to a small percentage of major offences and the current situation was no exception. The issue was now receiving almost unremitting media coverage as Melbourne was declared the battleground of Australia’s bloodiest “underworld war”.6 Further complicating matters, there were suggestions of police involvement in the death of police informers Terrence and Christine Hodson in May that year. Changing times Criminal turf wars were a periodic phenomenon in Victoria and indeed in all jurisdictions but the latest episode represented a departure from the norm: “What was different about these killings,” explained Detective Superintendent Paul Hollowood, “was that the offenders seemed to be fairly indifferent to the fact that they would cause community concern. All of a sudden there was a real cold-bloodedness to the 4 ‘Melbourne's gangland killings’ Sydney Morning Herald, 1 April, 2004. 5 Poker (gambling) machine. 6 Silvester, J. et al ‘Shooting heightens fears of underworld war’ The Age, 23 July, 2003. 3 murders and it became very tit-for-tat. A lot of killing occurred within a short space of time which drew a lot of publicity. In the past, criminal groups would try to avoid drawing attention to themselves and would go to extremes to cover up a murder by hiding the body and so on. With this spate of killings, there wasn’t any of that. They wanted to be very public and send a message to the other group that they were serious about what they were doing.” Indeed, the murders were unusually brazen. They often occurred in public, during daylight hours or in front of bystanders, including children. They weren’t confined to deserted industrial backlots or remote areas but could occur anywhere including upscale leafy-treed suburbs. The alleged perpetrators didn’t seem to shy away from their new-found notoriety but to revel in it.