Death by Consensus: the WESTRAY MINE STORY

SPECIAL REPO Death by Consensus: THE WESTRAY MINE STORY BY HARRY GLASBEEK AND ERIC TUCKER 1995 CanLIIDocs 20 L INTRODUCTION realized. The reason why this dreary sequence — accidents, inquiries, recommendations — does not bring T ABOUT 5:20 ON THE MORNING OF about much amelioration is that whatever changes in May 9, 1992, an explosion ripped through practices are sought to be implemented, both the broader the Westray coal mine in Pictou County, political economic and some specific operative Nova Scotia, killing 26 miners. A 10-day assumptions about occupational health and safety search and rescue operation led to the regulation remain unexamined, leaving the improved Arecovery of only 15 of the miners' bodies. The horror and practices subject to the same weaknesses as the preceding anxiety of the familles and friends can only be imagined. standards of operation. (5) Politicians and the mine owner expressed their it is these assumptions on which we focus in this condolences in sonorous tones and praised the herculean paper. We want to explore how the Canadian, and more efforts of the unsuccessful rescue workers. particularly the Nova Scotian, political economic context In a sense, all of this is humdrum. Mining disasters creates an environment in which the protection of involving mass deaths are familiar events. In Pictou workers from harm is only a minor consideration in the County itself, 246 miners already had been killed in a decision-making and behavior of government officiais series of explosions which occurred between 1838 and and private investors. 1952. Most miners killed on the job, however, die in less An especially important aspect of that context is the spectacular circumstances. Another 330 Pictou miners dominance of staple extraction in the economy. It has suffered accidental deaths from other causes (that is, falls colored relations between capital and the state as well as of stone, crushed by coal cars, mangled by mining between labor and capital. From the beginning, the machinery) between 1866-1972. In addition, an unknown exploitation of Canada's abundant natural resources has number of miners were killed between the time been seen as the engine of growth. This has required the commercial mining began, 1809, and the year record- state to be more directly supportive of private capital than keeping began, 1866. Also unknown is the number of is the case in economies whose growth is more tied to its workers who died prematurely from occupational manufacturing base. Governments have had to subsidize diseases.(1) In short, it is routine for miners to be killed, resource extraction through huge investments in maimed, or made ill by their work. (2) infrastructure. The hope is that the returns on the sale of The responses to these recurring mining catastrophes resources will lead to the development of domestic also are routine: doleful mourning, expression of anger industry which will supply local markets. For this followed by the setting up of an inquiry. Westray is only strategy to succeed, much depends on the international exceptional in the number of inquiries it has spawned: no market for the resources. Because the government cannot less than four have been initiated. (3) Invariably, these control those markets, it has very few tools with which ta inquiries reveal that the deaths and injuries are manage the economy. Its reliance on capital's willingness attributable, at least in part, to violations of existing to invest becomes a profound dependency. (6) Over time, mining regulations. (4) This finding inexorably leads to this creates an ideological climate in which governments statements of firm resolve that there will be no openly advocate that they should do everything in their recurrences, no more violations, no more disasters. But, as power to create a favorable climate for investment. This the record shows, these oft-asserted goals are never makes close links between elected politicians, 14 Sumner 1993 NEW SOLUTIONS government bureaucrats, and capitalists the norm rather done by examining the proposition that the corporate than the exception. In regions where the staple-led form is a neutral, facilitating device. growth strategy has failed to produce any kind of industrial development, potential employers are able to THE MAKING OF A DISASTER have governments create particularly attractive Am The Decision to Mine conditions for them. Nova Scotia — and Pictou County, Underground coal mining in Pictou County virtually Nova Scotia, especially is such a region. Michelin Tue, ceased by the end of the 1950s as a result of the loss of for example, was able to have the basic, well-established markets to fuel oil, aging facilities, and deep seams which labor laws re-drafted so that it could avoid unionization. were expensive to mine. (8) But, the local Forci coal seam The government's incentive was to retain the jobs created has some particularly attractive features, which made it by befidielin Tire. It succeeded. One of Michelin's factories likely that there would be someone new coming forward 1995 CanLIIDocs 20 is in Pictou County; indeed, it is the county's largest to resume mining in the area. The coal seam is unusually employer. (7) thick, varying from 2 to 8 meters, its sulphur content is Linked to, and reinforcing, this kind of political below one percent, and it is a high energy producer, economy are a number of assumptions to the following generating between 10,000 to 12,000 British Thermal Units effect per pound. Reserves are estimated at approximately 45 I.) as risk is a natural and unavoidable consequence million tons. But, as its history has shown, the seam also of productive activity in general, and staple extraction in presents some significant problems for profitable and safe particular, any given set of social relations of production mining. The area in which the seam is located is widely is not determinative of the level of risk created; known to be gaseous, exuding significant quantifies of 2.) private economic activity is preferable to public methane, and is highly geologically faulted. This activity; increases the risk that the roofs of the underground rooms 3.) occupational health and safety is an area in which will collapse. workers and employers share a common set of interests Spontaneous combustion also had been a problem in and objectives. While a shared ideology does not prevent previous mining operations in the area. The ash content workers and employers from having disputes over the of the coal seam varies significantly. (9) distribution of their joint productive efforts — requiring Although investors are always on the look-out for them to engage in adversarial bargaining from time to new opportunities which might arise as a result of lime — health and safety issues do not give rise to the changing market conditions and new technologies, none same kind of disputes and, therefore, problems should be could contemplate coal mining in the Pictou area before resolved as much as possible by consensus; 1982. The federal government had set up the Cape Breton 4.) legal forms, such as the contract of employment Development Corporation (Devco) as a crown and the corporate form, are neutral and facilitative. corporation to mine coal in Cape Breton in 1967. When it The events at Westray call into question the validity did so, it extracted an agreement from the province not to of all of these assumptions and, unless an inquiry finally issue new coal mining licenses on the mainland for a 15- faces up to these more fundamental issues, it is likely that year period. history will repeat itself again, not as farce, but as tragedy. As the end of the ban approached, Suncor was the The paper will proceed as follows. We will tell the first resource company to express interest in resuming Westray story in two parts, first, the decision to set up the underground mining in the Pictou coalfield. (10) It began mine and, second, the operation of the mine. These events intensive feasibility studies in 1981, acquired coal rights illuminate the salience of the broader political economic and exploration licenses from the province, and context to an understanding of what happened. Further, purchased and optioned land above the contemplated the story gives the lie to the assumptions which underpin mining site. But, Sunc:or decided not to exploit its leases. health and safety regulation. Next, we detail the In February 1987, Placer Development Ltd. took an option implications of the political economy and the prevailing on Suncor's interests and conducted its own feasibility ideology for the enforcement of health and safety study which was completed in July of that year. regulation. We then critically examine a component of, or An examination of the four volumes produced by prop for, the consensus theory which postulates that that study discloses a remarkable lack of direct and workers and capitalists share, in some roughly explicit concern for the health and safety of miners. To the comparable way, the risks of production. In part, this is extent that hazards are considered, they are discussed in NEW SOLUTIONS Summer1923 15 the context of whether they would render mining December 1987, purchased Suncor's interests. Kilborn's technically and economically infeasible. The health and study closely paralleled Placer's. Again, there was safety of miners is not identified as an independent factor virtually no expression of concern over mine workers' in the study. For example, the second volume considers health and safety. For example, the aiteria used to choose the mining operations. It begins by setting out the the most appropriate mining method made no mention of parameters which were used in developing a mine design the need to protect worker safety and health. (17) proposai. There is no express statement to the effect that Statutory health and safety requirements are dealt with the mine should be designed to minimize the risk of harm essentially by indicating that "Etlhe mine will be managed to workers.

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