What Could the United States Have Been? How England Hindered American Manufacturing by an anonymous, but awesome (Andrea Awesnymonous??) student ECON 40413: John Lovett 5 December 2018
Abstract: Mercantilism was the dominant economic system throughout the colonial era. These policies lauded acquisition of raw materials and export-driven economies that would bring glory to the motherland. England exercised these policies heavily over its own colonial holdings. Seen as a both a threat and asset to England, colonial America was relegated to the duty of raw material-provider. England’s imperial policymaking largely staunched the ability of its colonies to develop a manufacturing industry, despite evident demand in the colonies for manufactured goods and potential decreases in shipping costs from domestic production. Instead, England utilized a variety of tax incentives and deterrents to coerce colonists into importing manufactured goods and artificially inflate England’s trade surplus. Because of this, what eventually became the United States suffered heavy economic loses as well as wasted opportunities to get a head start in the industrial era that approached rapidly after decolonization. Besides the heavy financial losses, there was also lost opportunities to develop good growth institutions, such as equality and investment in human capital. Ultimately, the United States is estimated to have lost millions of dollars from its relationship with England and was theoretically set back decades from its potential in the manufacturing industry. This paper concludes with a short discussion of the negative impacts English mercantilism had on less well-situated colonies, exemplified by Jamaica. The consequences of English mercantile insecurities pave the way for understanding economic development within its former colonies and the hinderances that plagued those countries following decolonization. Anderea Awesnymonous 1
What Could the United States Have Been? How England Hindered American Manufacturing By: Anderea Awesnymonous Abstract: Mercantilism was the dominant economic system throughout the colonial era. These policies lauded acquisition of raw materials and export-driven economies that would bring glory to the motherland. England exercised these policies heavily over its own colonial holdings. Seen as a both a threat and asset to England, colonial America was relegated to the duty of raw material-provider. England’s imperial policymaking largely staunched the ability of its colonies to develop a manufacturing industry, despite evident demand in the colonies for manufactured goods and potential decreases in shipping costs from domestic production. Instead, England utilized a variety of tax incentives and deterrents to coerce colonists into importing manufactured goods and artificially inflate England’s trade surplus. Because of this, what eventually became the United States suffered heavy economic loses as well as wasted opportunities to get a head start in the industrial era that approached rapidly after decolonization. Besides the heavy financial losses, there was also lost opportunities to develop good growth institutions, such as equality and investment in human capital. Ultimately, the United States is estimated to have lost millions of dollars from its relationship with England and was theoretically set back decades from its potential in the manufacturing industry. This paper concludes with a short discussion of the negative impacts English mercantilism had on less well-situated colonies, exemplified by Jamaica. The consequences of English mercantile insecurities pave the way for understanding economic development within its former colonies and the hinderances that plagued those countries following decolonization.
Introduction
The United States is considered the quintessential example of a successful colonial survivor. Following the American Revolution, the infantile country was able to establish itself politically and economically, sowing the seeds of the world power it is today. However, the
United States was not immediately set up for success under its colonial master of England. A crucial part of the economy was left underdeveloped for far longer than it might have been without colonial interference: manufacturing. Due to mercantilist policies of the era, England feared manufacturing competition from its own colonies and tightly restricted their ability to develop industries specializing in secondary goods. Because of these policies and despite the success the United States did come to enjoy, the question remains: what could the United States have been without interference from England? How much development was lost as a result of Anderea Awesnymonous 2
England’s policymaking that could have spurred years of economic success and perhaps even an earlier industrialization?
These questions are imperative to understanding the effects of colonizers on their colonies. There is great discrepancy between the development levels of former colonies, so understanding what policies led to successful countries after decolonization is the first step towards correcting mistakes of the past and paving the way towards a more prosperous future.
Although the United States is a colonial “success,” certain policies may have hindered the potential afforded to the American colonists by the exceptional Goldilocks conditions of the original thirteen American colonies. The greatest boon to studying the ways in which England failed its, arguably, most successful colony is that it provides a critical frame of reference for the damage inflicted to other colonies. If the United States did in fact lose out on enormous amounts of economic development, it is worrisome to think what the consequences have been for less fortunately situated colonies.
I will begin by outlining the theoretical framework for mercantilism that led England to both depend upon and fear its own American colonies. This discussion will transition into an overview of how England enforced her mercantilist values on the Americas and what each of these policies meant for the manufacturing sector both during the colonial period and
immediately following independence. I will attempt to estimate some of the financial value lost
by stymied manufacturing and speculate about the consequences of delaying important
institutional factors that are central to economic development. After examining the American
case, I will briefly touch on the impact of mercantilism in other areas of the world. Ultimately,
this paper will derive the consequences of English mercantilism on both the colonial economy
and post-colonial development. Anderea Awesnymonous 3
British Mercantilist Policy: Accidentally Creating Desire to, and Demand for, Supply
Mercantilism is an economic policy that seeks to push the supremacy of the state by
accumulating great national wealth, usually in the form of gold, silver, and other precious metals
(i.e. specie). Although not a formal school of economic thought, its philosophies dominated the
decisions that European governments undertook from about the 16th to the 18th centuries. The
most notable aspect of mercantilist theory is the assumption that economics is a zero-sum game –
one country can only benefit at the expense of another country, which led European governments
to pursue absolute trade surpluses throughout this era. Operating under this assumption, England
faced a crossroads: their colonial holdings in America were absolutely necessary to provide them
with raw materials, but they were also a potential source of fierce competition if the colonies
evolved beyond dependence upon the mother country and primary sector specialization (Nettels,
1952). Given that England ultimate goal was to out-compete its European rivals by acquiring
specie wealth via trade surpluses, it could not run the risk of losing trading opportunities to its
colonies.
Nevertheless, England still had a strong incentive to encourage the colonies to be
productive, for their productivity generated more raw materials for English manufacturing
(Nettels, 1952, p107). According to mercantilism, imports are strictly negative. Increasing
imports results in an outflow of specie wealth, which means a country is losing by zero-sum rules. Because of this assumption, the ability to extract raw materials was a requirement for countries. Having to import raw materials to make manufactured goods would immediately decrease a country’s progress towards a trade surplus, thus decreasing their supposed wealth.
Given the already over-crowded, exploited land in Europe, the best way for colonial powers to ensure their access to raw materials was through the process of colonization. Nettels argues that Anderea Awesnymonous 4
England’s primary motivation for affording its famously progressive property rights to colonial settlers was derived from a need to increase raw material production; he states that “small holdings inspired the colonists to work; their labor expanded production; and increased production enlarged English commerce” (1952, p107). Besides the direct benefits England derived from raw material production in the colonies, there was the hope that encouragement of raw material production would keep colonists from pursuing manufacturing (Scrivenor, 1968).
However, encouraging development in the colonies was a double-edged sword.
Naturally, the entrepreneurial colonists had their own incentives to develop, evolve, and expand into new industries. Simply put, many enterprises the English sought to curtail were extremely profitable for colonists, which makes redirection away from those activities difficult (Nettels,
1952, p109). As much as England may have wanted colonists to become exceptionally efficient raw materials producers, she fiercely rejected competition from her own colonies in the area of manufacturing. Nettels writes: “after [an industry] had taken root under the influence of general economic conditions, the government stepped in to regulate” (1952, p108). Mercantilist ideology set England on a path of desperate attempts to hinder American manufacturing and promote its own secondary goods on an artificially receptive market.
Besides fearing manufacturing competition from American colonists, the English were in another mercantilist battle with other European nations. Successfully making England the sole source of manufactured goods for the colonists satisfied the mercantilist need to have exports exceed imports; consequently, the English worked diligently to staunch the flow of manufactured goods to the colonies from anywhere besides England itself.
Stephen Conway (2015) outlined some of the numerous measures the English government undertook in order to assert themselves as the dominant manufacturer for the Anderea Awesnymonous 5
Americas in his essay “British Governments, Colonial Consumers, and Continental European
Goods in the British Atlantic Empire.” Primarily, the English government attempted to curtail smuggling and legal re-exports from England to the thirteen colonies and Caribbean, especially following the Seven Years War when there were exceptional political incentives to generate more wealth than other European nations (Conway, 2015, p711-712). Various pieces of legislation, such as the Molasses Act of 1733, added duties to foreign goods imported by the colonies to make them costlier than their English counterparts. Other legislation prohibited the colonists from exporting manufactured goods; for example, the Hat Act of 1732 prohibited colonists from exporting beaver hats, and by 1750, England had banned the finishing of iron and
steel and the use of certain metallurgy equipment (Walton & Rockoff, 2014, p104; Scrivenor,
1968, p73). Besides incentivizing colonists to buy British, duties and bans provided revenue
directly to England. According to Conway, at one point in time “the government hoped to raise
₤50,000 in revenue from the new duties on foreign linens” alone (2015, p722). Unfettered access
to colonial markets (or the ability to tax the parts of the market that were not dominated by
England) was clearly seen by the English as indescribably crucial to their economic standing.
In a great irony, the English attempts to block the import of foreign goods into the
colonies likely exacerbated colonial demand for manufactured goods. For example, Conway
states that “the British linen industry was unable to satisfy even home demand,” let alone out-
compete total European production (2015, p718). Essentially, this means that England was
denying the colonists foreign exports and opportunities to pursue domestic manufacturing but
leaving the demand that was then created unfulfilled. By stopping colonists from manufacturing
their own products, England clearly repressed an enormous economic opportunity that existed in
the growing colonial population. Anderea Awesnymonous 6
Estimating the Financial Costs of Lost Manufacturing Potential
The previous section identified the motivation for the repressive nature of the English
over American colonial manufacturing, as well as the unfulfilled demand for manufactured
goods that was subsequently created. The difficulty in this analysis, however, lies in assessing what the United States lost from its delayed entry into the world of serious manufacturing. One way to determine the fiscal cost is through the examination of what the English gained from
mercantilism. This section will attempt to make some estimates about the secondary sector that
could have developed early in North American history.
In his 1998 article, “The Market for Manufactures in the Thirteen Continental Colonies,”
Smith examined the demand for manufactured goods within the American colonies by looking at
the value England derived from exporting to the American colonies. From 1772 to 1774, the
value of English exports to the colonies was estimated to be about ₤4,176,000, making the
colonies the most valuable American export market (Smith, 1998, p677). A quote attributed to
Benjamin Franklin in the 1750s claimed that “Pennsylvania may save ₤3,280,000 in seven
years… by giving up, ‘superfluities’” imported from the British (Smith, 1998, p677). These
numbers alone are staggering but become even more dramatic when the goods being imported
are examined; most goods were consumer goods, including textiles (e.g. wool products) and light
metal ware (e.g. iron nails). The simplistic nature of these goods demonstrates that they could
have been produced within the colonies themselves were the economic barriers removed. For
example, the first “iron plantation” was established in the 1640s in the Massachusetts
Hammersmith colony (Walton, n.d.). The iron was extracted from the colonies, processed in the
colonies into the useable raw material, and then exported to England to be made into consumer
goods, which were shipped back to the colonies. Although the colonies had a land-driven Anderea Awesnymonous 7
advantage in the production of crude iron, it would have been natural for more advanced iron
products to be produced in the colonies after extraction were it not for the manufacturing barriers
(Harper, 1942, p7). Likewise, textiles made up 62.9 percent of total exports from England to the
colonies, despite the ability of the colonies to produce them (Smith, 1998, p689). This
redundancy forced the colonists to pay for a good they were equipped to extract and utilize
themselves without the unnecessary shuffling across an ocean.
An important caveat here is that the American colonies may not have been able to
directly out-compete English manufactures prices. In other words, the colonies did not
necessarily have a comparative advantage (or comparative equality) in manufacturing, largely
due to the high costs of labor. Consequently, without accounting for shipping costs, it might
seem that the colonists were better off avoiding manufacturing activities. However, shipping costs did play a major role in the price of manufactures and were a detriment to the colonists
(Harper, 1942, p3). Thomas (1965) estimates that the colonists imported an average of ₤412,000 worth of goods per year during the period between 1963-1972 and that the shipping burden averaged ₤66,000 per year (p630-631). Essentially, this means that there was roughly a 19 percent increase in the cost of imported goods due to shipping costs, which is an enormous economic burden on a bourgeoning country. As the iron nails example in Figure 1 demonstrates, the colonists may not have immediately been able to compete in the global marketplace due to the higher costs of manufacturing combined with shipping costs, but at the very least they would have been better off not importing English manufactures and producing their own for domestic consumption. Anderea Awesnymonous 8
Figure 1. The values in this example are fabricated in order to demonstrate the effects of shipping costs on the colonial marketplace. Although American manufactures were initially too expensive to rival England on the global scale, they would have benefitted from reduced shipping costs by producing their own manufactures. Ultimately, this implies that had the colonists been allowed to exploit their own talents and markets in the New World, millions of pounds could have been saved by colonists and injected back into their own markets. This would raise the value of GDP in the colonies and set up the infantile United States as an industrial power from the outset of its history.
Later in his article, Smith continued to assert the existence of a strong demand for manufactured goods within the colonies – the average annual imports of English merchandize from 1700 to 1704 was ₤0.95 per person, compared to ₤1.32 per person from 1770 to 1774
(1998, p685). Concurrently, the population in the colonies multiplied by a factor of 8.6 (Smith,
1998, p695). Despite the dramatic increase in demand for these goods, England remained insistent upon trying to enforce its supply monopoly. For example, prior to the Revolutionary
War, alum – a mordant necessary for high-quality dyeing of textiles and producing leather – was Anderea Awesnymonous 9
“exclusively supplied from Great Britain and was mined off the north-east coast of England”
(Smith, 1998, p690). This meant that England enjoyed a monopoly on quality textile and leather
production by failing to share via export the raw materials for production. With alum relatively
unavailable to colonists, England further solidified its dominance in the production of these
goods and most of the colonists’ textile needs had to be met by imports (Smith, 1998, p697).
Other acts of dominance came from the previously mentioned Wool Act of 1699, which
restricted inter-colonial trade in wool and wool products, and the Hat Act of 1732, which
prohibited colonists to manufacture hats even though wool and beaver fur were both plentifully
supplied by the colonies (Smith, 1998).
Even the limited colonial manufacturing that did manage to gain a foothold was no match
for the triumph of England’s economic manipulation, for “the greater part of the colonial labour
force (perhaps up to 80 per cent of the total) were engaged primarily in farming” (Smith, 1998,
p700). There was a clear, voracious demand for manufactured goods that colonists were largely unable to enjoy. Potentially millions of pounds and an entire economic sector went unexploited by colonists during the pre-revolutionary era. Had the United States had access to manufacturing, perhaps its dominating economy could have developed sooner and garnered an early edge in the industrial era looming around the corner.
In a classic piece of economic historical literature, Lawrence Harper states that English mercantilist policies “had as its purpose, exploitation, and as its means, regulation” (1942, p2).
This claim is the basis for Robert Thomas’ 1965 quantitative analysis of British imperial policy.
Primarily, Thomas concerns himself with the effects of the Navigation Acts, which he breaks down into four distinct regulatory sections: (1) laws regulating shipping, particularly when concerning nationality of the crew and ship, (2) laws regulating the destinations of colonial Anderea Awesnymonous 10
exports, (3) laws that encouraged the colonists to pursue particular industries, and (4) laws that
directly prohibited colonists from participating in industries that competed with England itself.
These areas are systematically analyzed by the real monetary impact they had on the colonies in
an attempt to discern the cost of living as a colonial Englishman rather than an independent
“American.”
The focus of my extrapolation from this article is the third facet of the Navigation Acts:
laws that pushed colonists to pursue certain industries above others. These laws operated under
“an elaborate system of rebates and drawbacks… to encourage the production of specific goods
for export to Great Britain” (Thomas, 1965, p620). Using this system, England hoped to protect
the most important manufactured goods and goods that yielded a large customs revenue (Walton
& Rockoff, 2014, p94). For example, enumerated goods – which could only be shipped to
England from the colonies – were given preferential duties to encourage their production. These
goods included tobacco, sugar, indigo, cotton-wool, pig iron, and other raw materials (Thomas,
1965, p620-621). Notably, the goods that England made the most profitable for production from
their artificial manipulations of pricing via various tax schemes were overwhelmingly raw materials. Not only did England explicitly ban certain products from being produced in the
colonies, she strongly incentivized the colonies to keep industries other than the primary sector
underdeveloped.
Thomas also outlines various numerical indicators of the Navigation Acts’ harmful
effects on the colonies; his calculations ultimately estimate that the average net burden on the
colonies by the year 1763 was a staggering $2,255,000 per year, not adjusted to present values
(1965, p626). Part of this stems from an inefficient allocation of resources; for example, indigo
would likely not have been an exported product for the colonies without artificial bounties (i.e. Anderea Awesnymonous 11 money to encourage trade) (Thomas, 1965, p629). England’s policies pushed the colonies away from the activities they may have otherwise found profitable, such as textile production, and towards agricultural activities that England could not compete in anyway. Furthermore, the colonies were coerced into buying English goods that, in some cases, they would not have if they were independent from England (Thomas, 1965, p631). Again, this occurred on a scale of millions of dollars annually. Had the American colonists been independent of England, there were likely significant economic benefits to reap. Although the per capita burden was not astronomical, I would argue that the aggregate is what matters when considering the development of the country in the long run, making the staggering total a significant blow to the
United States’ potential economic development.
The analysis of the economic burden of English imperial policy harbors is not without criticism in both directions, economists such as Larry Sawers argue that, if anything, Thomas’ estimates are too conservative. In his 1992 essay, “The Navigation Acts Revisited,” Sawers outlines his belief that Thomas has understated the burden imposed by the English on the
American colonists. There appears to be a fair bit of academic consensus that the English policies, especially the Navigation Acts, were fiscally detrimental to the colonies. Whether or not these costs were offset by other financial benefits, such as necessary military spending the
English absorbed to protect the colonists, is debatable. However, this is inconsequential to the discussion of manufacturing in colonial America, for the Acts can reasonably be assumed to negatively affect manufacturing development regardless of their other benefits. Given the potential for industrial dominance after decolonization that could have occurred if the colonies had been allowed to respond to their enormous demand for consumer goods early on, it is Anderea Awesnymonous 12
reasonable to argue that English policy may have set the United States back decades in terms of
its fiscal health and industrial development.
Evidence for Developmental Importance of Manufacturing
As stated above, some economists have examined the English mercantilist policies in the
American colonies and concluded that the Navigation Acts and other economic policies had little consequence on the American pocketbook or development (Walton & Rockoff, 2014).
Furthermore, they note that there were benefits to being part of England’s colonial empire - defense spending was not the colonists’ burden, and although their trade was restricted to
England, she was a massive empire with which to enjoy a partnership. However, these theories are shortsighted. Manufacturing has been shown to be an important factor in economic development and economy growth. As Rocha asserts in his 2018 article on the development of manufacturing sectors, “countries that achieved the fastest economic growth… are the countries where the increase shift towards manufacturing has been largest” (p117). This is apparent when we examine the impacts of the industrial revolution. Thanks to industrialization and the rise of the manufacturing industry, many countries saw an explosion of GDP per capita, declines in birthrates, increases in life expectancy, increased literacy, and an expansion of gender equality
(Diebolt & Perrin, 2013). Broadly speaking, the rise of the manufacturing sector that led to the
Industrialization ultimately led to increased living standards in the parts of the world lucky enough to be able to take advantage of it.
An important way that this translates to better growth for a country is the better equality that accompanied industrialization1. For example, manufacturing jobs allowed many women to
1 Although this may not be true equality by today’s standards, it was a relative improvement for the time. Anderea Awesnymonous 13
enter the workforce outside the home. The expansion of manufactured textiles and linens were dominated early on by women and children, for they were a cheap source of labor relative to their male counterparts (Humphries & Weisdorf, 2015, p427, 432). Women who worked in textile factories were uniquely able to support themselves without the assistance of a husband and consequently saw their socioeconomic position improve (Humphries & Weisdorf, 2015, p430). This early improvement in equality that resulted from the higher wage, less male-
dominated manufacturing industry was an important stepping stone to economic development.
As argued by Diebolt and Perrin (2013), the technological progress that allows for manufacturing
processes (as opposed to primary sector production or small-scale subsistence “manufacturing”)
spurs a positive feedback loop that enriches equality. Again, looking at the case of women, they
assert that as manufacturing takes off, the returns to human capital increase sufficiently to make
having men and women in the workforce viable against them staying at home for childcare.
Consequently, women receive more education in order to enter the workforce, which contributes
to their economic well-being, human capital, and the health and human capital of their offspring.
These developments encourage more technological advancement, human capital investment, and
equality of workers, which begins the cycle again and encourages an upward trend of equality.
Because of this feedback mechanism, equality is arguably one of the most important
factors of long-term development; it can break the cycle of low human capital and induce a
prioritization of human capital that ultimately breeds more equality, and so on (Engerman &
Sokoloff, 2005). Although it may be cynical, calculating reasoning, if there are economic gains
from educating and involving more diverse classes of society (e.g. women) in the labor market,
that trend will eventually be fostered. Manufacturing provided those economic gains, opening the
door to economic success for those previously excluded – poor farmers, unskilled workers, Anderea Awesnymonous 14
women, etc. Additionally, it breeds a demand for good, economically institutions, such as
education (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005).
Ultimately, what has been derived above is a movement of development from
manufacturing, to industrialization, to equality, to economic prosperity. This suggests that
America did not only lose out on immediate financial benefits during the time that England hindered the manufacturing sector, but rather it sustained social and long-term economic losses as well. Institutional equality may have arisen sooner under an early, robust manufacturing sector, especially since women were such an important source of labor during protoindustrialization; moreover, allowing manufacturing to develop and draw women into the
labor force could have alleviated some of the issues of labor scarcity in the thirteen colonies.
Additionally, this equality, besides being a moral and philosophical success, may have spurred
exceptional development of human capital, which is one of the most important factors for
economic growth (Chirwa & Odhiambo, 2016). The short-sighted, fundamentally misguided
mercantilist policies imposed upon the American colonies by the British may have stunted the
development of key institutions that produce massive economic growth.
Discussion
The implications of the burdensome forces of English mercantilism paint a bleak picture
for the success of her colonial offspring. Throughout colonization, England acquired roughly one
hundred colonial territories (Sawe, 2018). Of these colonies, few had the exceptional conditions
of the thirteen original American colonies that made them ideal for Europeans settlement. While
the American colonists were eventually able to push back against economic restrictions they felt
were unjust, other colonies did not have a free population present that allowed for such dissent.
In colonies that were extractive or plantation in nature, they felt the consequences of Anderea Awesnymonous 15
mercantilism without any of the benefits or the ability to readily oust the imposing English. They
were used solely to feed the need for raw materials at the expense of their own wellbeing.
The American colonists may have suffered from lost manufacturing potential under the
English empire, but many other countries were left in a position where the development of a
robust secondary sector could not even be fathomed imminently after decolonialization. America colonists were at least able to settle the land and were not mere resource-extractors for the
English. Instead, they were afforded a moderate degree of autonomy and property rights that did not exist in more oppressive colonies that led to a successful, earlier revolution. Other countries, such as Jamaica, were purely plantation colonies for the purpose of obtaining resources for the
English. No significant settler population was instituted, and independence did not come until much later. To this day the effect of mercantilism can be seen in Jamaica; as of 2017, nearly 20 percent of its population is still engaged in primary sector activities, versus under 2 percent of the population in the United States (“Jamaica,” 2018; “United States,” 2018). Furthermore, the
United States’ GDP (at purchasing power parity) per capita is nearly $60,000, while Jamaica is at roughly $9,000 (“GDP per capita,” 2018). The divergence between these two former English colonies demonstrates the disparate paths countries take after decolonization and the potential harm that English mercantilism caused globally. Although the American colonial case alone shows the enormous economic impacts of these policies, their effects may have been devastating on less fortunately established colonies.
Conclusion
This paper aimed to examine the effects of English mercantilist policies on the American colonial development of manufacturing. Throughout the colonial era, the predominant, informal school of thought about economic matters was mercantilism, which prioritized resource Anderea Awesnymonous 16
extraction and constant trade surpluses. This led England to both need and fear the American colonies, for they were a critical source of raw materials, but presented a threat to England’s
trade surplus if they could develop into a formidable rival. Consequently, England pursued
mercantilist policies by imposing a plethora of regulations on the American colonies that
restricted manufacturing activities either directly or by price manipulations (e.g. duties or
subsidies). Through encouragement to pursue primary sector activities, England hoped to distract
the colonists and secure her manufacturing dominance.
These regulations ultimately stunted the growth of the American colonial manufacturing
sector. Although the level of importation of manufactures into the thirteen colonies demonstrated
that there was a clear demand for such goods, the colonists were not allowed to produce their
own manufactures or import them from anywhere besides England. Furthermore, the Navigation
Acts alone are estimated to have costs the colony millions from their economic restrictions. In
addition to immediate fiscal losses, there are long-term developmental losses from England’s policymaking. Manufacturing expansion tended to result in relative increases in equality, which led to positive institutional development, such as investments in human capital. Essentially, the
English mercantilist policies stymied American manufacturing, resulting in enormous losses to both short- and long-term economic development. As demonstrated by the case of Jamaica, the
American colonies may still have been able to operate successfully under mercantilism in a way that allowed them to develop even under harmful policies, but not all nations were so fortunate.
In its totality, the damage done to much of the world from English mercantilism is likely
unquantifiable and irredeemable.
Anderea Awesnymonous 17
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