The Russian American Company and Its Trading Relations

THE RUSSIAN AMERICAN COMPANY AND ITS TRADING RELATIONS

WITH FOREIGNERS IN ALASKA UNTIL 1839

by

John Duncan Lawrence Mcintosh

B.A., University of British Columbia, 1962

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

In the Department

of

Slavonic Studies

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

The University of British Columbia

January, 1969 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the

Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his represen• tatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of

The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is two-fold - to trace the development of Russian American Company relations with for• eigners in Alaska and to assess the effects of foreign trade there on the competitive position of the company. The closing year for this study, 1839» is the year in which the Russian

American Company made definite arrangements to receive much of its provisions from the Hudson's Bay Company in order to resolve its long-standing problem of supply.

As to the first aspect of this theme, this account of

Russian American Company foreign relations follows in broad outline the existing works dealing with the history of the company. However, some corrections and new material based on a careful study of unpublished sources in America and the

Soviet Union have been added concerning the details of foreign visits to Alaska. Various subject relevant to the development of foreign trade are considered: its beginnings, the evolu• tion of company and government attitudes to relations with foreigners, and the development-'o'f Hudson's Bay Company trade in the area. The financial, prosperity of the Russian American

Company is reassessed and revised downwards on the basis of some relatively unexploited archival material, with the in• flationary decrease in the value of the paper ruble being taken into account. Particular attention is paid to the events leading up to the lease of the Alaska panhandle (lisi^re) in 1839 in order to determine the essential significance of the agreement in terms of the foreign trade and further development of the

Russian American Company.

The main conclusions of the thesis can be stated brief• ly as follows. Although small in comparison with the total income and expenditure in the colony, foreign trade was abso• lutely necessary to the survival of the company in Alaska unless and until some reliable alternative source of vital provisions and supplies could be devised. The final decision to regularize and perpetuate the Russian American Company's dependence on foreign trade signified a final acceptance of the view that there was no feasible alternative. Whether this view was completely valid cannot be answered definitely on the basis of the available evidence. It seems clear that the decision was not made on the basis of economic feasibility or political considerations alone. In any case the principal result of the lease agreement was that the Russian American

Company's prospects for economic progress or even for holding its own financially practically disappeared. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author expresses his gratitude to Professor Cyril Bryner of the Slavonic Studies Department at the University of British Columbia for his patient encouragement and assistance, and to Professor Georgii Andreievich Novitskii of the History Faculty, Moscow State University, for valuable advice on source material. Special apprecia• tion is due to the University of British Columbia Committee of World University Service for providing the opportunity, through their exchange programme, to carry out study and research in the U.S.S.R. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction i

I The Historical Background to Foreign Trade in Novo Arkhangelsk 1

II Foreign Trade in Novo Arkhangelsk and the

Russian American Company, 1803 - 1817 17

III Foreign Trade in the Colony in the Light

of Russian American Company Income During

the First Charter Period 43

IV Foreign Trade in the Colony 1818 - 1825

and the Tsar's Decree of 1821 53

V The Russian American Company Crisis of the

Mid-1820»s: External and Internal Aspects 59

VI The Hudson's Bay Company Undermines

American Trade in Sitka, 1821 - 1837 70

VII The Lease of the Lisiere. 1839 100

Conclusion 111

Notes on the Source Material 114

Bibliography 117 INTRODUCTION

The following study is based on an examination of virtually all of the published and unpublished sources in

English and Russian dealing with the history of the Russian

American Company. The exchange programme arranged by the

University of British Columbia Committee of World University

Service provided the opportunity for me to do study and re• search in Soviet libraries and archives. However, unexploited or new material on Russian America turned out to be limited in quantity and value. For a description of the documents and works consulted the readerssis referred to the notes on source material on page 114 of this paper. There may be a few rele• vant documents in the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry; however access to that archive is especially difficult for a foreign student to obtain.

The purpose of this work is not to write a general company history, although the choice of subject matter has favoured the inclusion of a considerable amount of background narrative. Instead it is my intention to trace the develop• ment of Russian American Company trading relations with Ameri• can and British visitors to Alaska and to assess the signifi• cance of the trade in relation to the company's potential for prosperous growth.

For several reasons this account is not taken beyond the lease of the Alaska panhandle (or lisiere) to the Hudson's

Bay-Company in February, 1839. Although trade between the ii companies continued until the sale of Alaska in 1867> it had entered a new phase after the lease - that of a regularized, settled business arrangement. The post-lease period has been covered quite well by D. C. Davidson's article1 which concen• trates its attention on the commercial features of inter• company relations after 1839. The lease served to resolve the supply problem of the Russian American Company by commit• ting the Russian fur enterprise to a reliance on the Hudson's

Bay Company for food supplies and land furs. Davidson11 and

J. S. Galbraith111 have considered the arrangement to have been to the advantage of both parties. Two facts led me to question this interpretation. Firstly, the total amount of of peltry received declined substantially after 1839.1V.

Secondly, there is some evidence that monetary returns from fur sales also deereased.V Consequently I have reexamined the role of foreign trade in the history of the Russian Ameri• can Company and particularly the lease agreement to find out whether the lease was really in the company's long term

1D. C. Davidson, "Relations of the Hudson's Bay Com• pany with the Russian American Company on the Northwest Coast, 1829-1867," The British Columbia Historical Quarterly 5, No. 1, 1941, PP. 33 - 48. X10p. cit.

111J. S. Galbraith, The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor.

lvP. Tikhmenev, Istoricheskoe obozrenie ... Rossisko- amerikanskoi kompanii 1, p. 327, vol. 2, p. 221.

vNational Archives of the U.S.A., Microfilm Publications, o iii interest. To answer this question, one must consider the cevelopment of each company and of the inter-company rela• tions which led up to the settlement so as to determine the context in which each side had to bargain.

Graphs are used where possible to show trends in com• pany income. The effect of the inflationary loss in value of the paper ruble is illustrated so as to correct the impression of prosperity which uncritical use of some company statistics would suggest.

Since this is both an account of the development of foreign trade in Alaska and an examination of its basic sig• nificance, it was convenient to arrange the paper chrono• logically.

Records of the Russian American Company. Board of directors to governor, I848, p. 595. The table referred to covers only the years 1844 - 1847. CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO FOREIGN TRADE IN NOVO ARKHANGELSK

For a period of over a century, Imperial Russia ruled over the huge territory now known as the State of

Alaska. During the latter sixty-eight years of Russian dominion, the Russian American Company exercised monopoly rule over the area in the name of the Tsar.

Before examining the trading relations of the company we should recall briefly the early history of Alaska's dis• covery and exploration in order to understand the conditions under which the Russian American Company developed.

By the latter half of the seventeenth century, the

Russians had completed their rapid expansion eastward across

Siberia and had established settlements on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. When they first reached the extreme eastern part of Asia, they found the Chukchi, whom Tompkins describes as having "vague ideas about their own neighbour• hood and extremely meager information on what lay beyond it."

The Soviet historian M. Chernenko puts the situation somewhat more positively, stating that by the beginning of the eigh• teenth century Russians had already obtained "a certain

R. Tompkins, Alaska, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1945, p. 19. 2 amount" of evidence as to the position of the North American continent, its conditions and tribes owing to the ancient o trading ties of the Chukchi with the inhabitants of Alaska.

In any case, sufficiently precise knowledge had not gotten as far as St. Petersburg.

Through his contact with Western European scientists and statesmen Peter I had developed a strong enthusiasm for exploration of the far reaches of the immense territories he ruled. But it would be an oversimplification to suggest that the expeditions he initiated were intended merely to satisfy an academic curiosity. He fully realized that new and probably rich territories were there somewhere for the taking, and

Russia should get her share.

In 1719 Peter commissioned the surveyors Yevreinov and Luzhin to look for the coast of America in conjunction with their mission of exploration along the Kurile chain.

The expedition was almost a complete failure.

Much more significant were the expeditions of Vitus

Bering, the first of which received royal instructions from

Peter the Great in the year of his death, 1725. One impor• tant point of the instructions obliged Bering to look for

European settlements if the American coast were reached. On the second Bering expedition, he along with Chirikov discovered

^M. B. Chernenko, ed. Puteshestviia i issledovaniia . . . Zagoskina .... Moscow, Gos. Izd. Geog. Ltd., 1956, p. 6. 3 northwestern America in July, 1741. The next year, Bering's ship was wrecked off the coast of Kamchatka on the island that was to bear his name. Those members of the crew who lived through the rigours of the terrible winter that followed re• turned to civilization the following spring with news of the discovery of the sea otter, whose rich pelt soon was to become even more avidly hunted than that of the sable.

Later during the eighteenth century, many fur hunting expeditions went ever farther after the precious sea otter, opening the way to Alaska. Before long almost all of the islands of the Aleutian chain and several mainland points were discovered. By 1763, fur hunters had reached Kodiak Island. In a period of fifty-six years from the time of Emelian Basov's voyage from Okhotsk via Kamchatka in 1743 until the founding of the Russian American Company in 1799, a total of eighty- six Russian expeditions sailed to the coast of Alaska.**

Eventually, with the accession to the throne of the Empress Catherine, government interest in Far Eastern discov• eries reawakened after the period of inactivity following the final, and long unappreciated, Bering expedition. Measures were begun to investigate the newly discovered lands and map them accurately, althoughninterrupted from time to time by government preoccupation with the partitions of Poland and

°R. V. Makarov, "Ekspeditsii russkikh promyshlennykh liudei v Tikhom Okeane v XVIII veke," Voprosy Geografii, 17, 1950. 4 wars with Turkey. One of the chief backers of these efforts was Mikhail Lomonosov, who was calling for the development of Russian shipping in the north and on the Pacific. The expedi• tions of Krenitsyn-Levashev in the Aleutian area in 1768-69 and the geographical and astronomical investigations of the Bill• ings expedition in the northern Pacific in 1790-92 were among fruitful efforts in that direction. Lending urgency to the exertions of the Russian government was the fact that by 1780 both the English and the Spanish had arrived in the North Paci• fic. Captain James Cook's expedition (1776-80) had resulted in the naming of islands, bays, and inlets all the way through Bering Strait, and in a quickening of interest in the wealth to be won by hunting the sea otter, as Cook's men had disposed of £2000 worth of sea otter skins in Canton. Catherine II was thereupon warned by at least one of her advisors that Russian hunting posts were in imminent danger from extensive and harm• ful competition on the part of other nations.^ Rumours of Russian advance in the 1760's and 1770*s had aroused the Span• ish to extend their settlements northward eight hundred miles to present-day San Francisco. Perez proceeded in 1774 along the coast as far as the Queen Charlotte Islands, taking posses• sion of the lands in the name of the King of Spain. In 1775 the expedition of Hecate and Quadra discovered the mouth of the Columbia and explored the coast northwards to Norfolk Sound.

4s. B. Okun, The Russian American Company. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951* (first Russian edition, 1939): p. 13. Catherine made plans in the 1780fs to dispatch four naval vessels to ward off encroachment by foreign traders in the hunting and trade of the North Pacific. However, the out• break of war again with Turkey in 1786 forced the cancellation of her plan, which would not likely have had any positive effect anyway, owing to the growing number of enterprising foreign merchants and traders. It is indicative in the light of the later course of events in Russian America that the im• plementation of decisive and forceful government action depend• ed clearly on the European political situation, and was judged therefore to be of relatively secondary importance.

By the mid-eighties of the XVIII century permanent Russian settlements appeared in Alaska, set up by competing fur companies: that of Grigorii Ivanovich Shelikhov on the island of Kodiak, ("Three Saints"), and that of Lebedev- Lastochkin in Norfolk Sound. Shelikhov had been Lebedev- Lastochkin's partner on their first trading voyage to the Aleutians from Okhotsk in 1776. After organizing several very successful voyages, Shelikhov in 1781 entered into partnership with Ivan Golikov. Then, having fitted out three ships, he had arranged and accompanied a large expedition to establish a settlement on Kodiak Island, which he named after his flagship, the "Three Saints".

The primary market for the furs the Russian promvsh- lenniks^ brought back from America was Russia, but a significant

^The name used in Siberia and Russian America for free• lance hunters and fishermen of that time; from the verb "promyshliafc*"- to carry on business. proportion was exported to China. However, during the second half of the 18th Century until 1794* the Chinese government would permit no trade with Russia, with the result that Russian furs had to get into China by sea under the flags of other na• tions. The Chinese were most pleased with the quality of furs brought by the English to Canton, but would not agree to give the English monopoly rights in furs. In 1794 China agreed to reestablish trade with Russia, which would be allowed in one town only, Kiakhta, on the border of China and Siberia.

By that time, however, the supply of furs from Alaska and the Aleutians had begun to diminish as a result of uncon• trolled hunting by the many companies and individuals engaged in the business.. Competition became ruinous for many of the smaller operators and harmful to Russian state interest in the area. In addition the increased incidence of organized resis• tance on the part of the natives made clear the need for strong• ly fortified settlements with a consequent large increase in the number of settlers, yet that was beyond the means of most of the fur companies. Add to these factors the need for lar• ger, systematically organized supply expeditions, and it be• comes clear why influential people began to press for the es• tablishment of a fur monopoly with government authority to run the fur business and to govern and defend the region with gov• ernment financial and logistics support. There were numerous examples of such enterprises. The success of the East India

Company and the Hudson Bay Company were well known. Previously the Russian government had sanctioned similar efforts with the setting up of the Russian Trading Company in Constantinople (1757)> and the Company for Trade with Persia (1758). Expan• sion of the Russian empire thus could also, in the manner of the English and Dutch, take place by indirect government action through the activities of an ostensibly private concern. In such a manner, diplomatic complications could be kept to a minimum in case of clashes with foreign powers.

Of course it was also in the interest of the more power ful Russian private operators to obtain monopoly privileges so as to put down the opposition, as business conditions were de• teriorating year by year. One of the most successful of these was Grigorii Ivanovich Shelikhov, previously mentioned as the founder of "Three Saints". He had invested in the voyage of the Nikolai in 1777 and had soon risen to the position of stockholder in the majority of Alaskan expeditions. According to Okun, he had "participated with his capital in the equip• ping of fourteen out of the thirty-six ships returning from the hunting posts in the twenty-one year period from 1777 to 1797."^ As early as 1787 Shelikhov put forward to the governor of Irkutsk a plan for the establishment of a single strong com• pany, including provisions for armed defense personnel and a sufficient supply of Russian labour to supplement the native nucleus, to be made up of people with lapsed passports, bank• rupt debtors, and convicts. Shortly thereafter in his petition to Catherine II, Shelikhov openly requested monopoly privileges

Okun, op. cit.« p. 23. 8

in the area. However, beset by wars with Turkey and Sweden, and constrained from antagonizing England which shared her hos• tility toward the French Revolution, Catherine refrained from

granting Shelikhov*s requests. The formation of the monopoly 7 is described in convincing detail by Professor Okun. Pending

a change in the situation, preparations were made in the years

that followed so that the Shelikhov-Golikov Company would be

ready for the transformation into a monopolistic company.

Alexander Andreievich Baranov, Shelikhov*s administrator on the

islands and in America, was instructed to choose a suitable location for a colonial center and given detailed specifica•

tions as to its layout. About 1794 over one hundred more men were sent, some of them artisans who could be used in carrying

out these plans. Parallel with this, Shelikhov was busy en•

deavoring to open up new markets for Russian trade. However, he died in 1795, before his plans could be carried out.

Meanwhile, competition in the North Pacific had become

very fierce indeed, both from Russian rivals and from the ever more frequent foreign marine expeditions. As Okun points out,

"The situation in the Russian colonies in America and on the

islands had, by the end of the 1790*s, become a question of 8 their very existence."

In 1797 government action was taken which in effect

limited the number of companies in the field. Approval was Okun, op. cit.. Chapter 2.

Okun, op. cit.. p. 36. 9 given for the formation of a new company, headed by the mer• chant Mylnikov, but Tsar Paul ordered that this approval not harm Shelikhov*s company. This led to an uneasy union of the

Shelikhov-Golikov Company and the Mylnikov group in 1797, known as the United American Company. However, this was but a first step in carrying out the government's intention to bring about a union of all the companies working in the colonies. At this stage only the Shelikhov-Golikov Company, enjoying the pre• eminent position, supported the plan, and much lobbying was done by representatives of the other merchants who felt that they would be swallowed up in such an amalgamation. Key sup• port for the Shelikhov family's interests was given by his brother-in-law Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov, Head Procurator of the First Department of the Senate. The final decision to grant exclusive rights to the Company was made on July 8, 1799.

It was henceforth to be known as the Russian American Company, with Baranov the new governor of the Russian colonies in Amer• ica, which at that time consisted of settlements on Komandor- skii Islands, a small hunting post on Atka Island of about fifty Russians overseeing another three hundred odd Aleuts, on

Unalaska of about thirty Russians in charge of over one thou• sand Aleuts, and one small post on the Pribilof Islands.^

Closer to the mainland was the center of operations until 1804,

^The traditionally accepted spelling of proper names of geographical locations is used, rather than the modern transliteration. 10

"Three Saints" on Kodiak Island, under whose immediate juris• diction were several posts on Cook Inlet (called Kenai Bay by the Russians). In addition, there were three trading posts in the Chugatsk Gulf.

Trade with foreigners had already posed a problem for

Baranov soon after his appointment to supervise the Shelikhov interests in Alaska in 1791. He had been warned to be wary about foreign visitors, both to ward off foreign competition and also in view of Russia's current war with Sweden. It had even been suggested that Russia's Pacific outposts might be attacked. Nevertheless, his first encounter turned out to be a pleasant one, when on a visit to Prince William Sound during

Baranov's first North American summer, 1792, Captain Hugh

Moore, an English trader working out of Calcutta, appeared on the Phoenix at Nuchek Island to replace one of its masts.

Although Baranov made it clear to Moore, a representative of the East India Company, and his mate, Joseph O'Cain, of Boston, that he was not authorized to engage in trade, he let it be known that he would otherwise have had no objection personally.

In fact, his brief presence in the colonies had already shown

Baranov quite clearly that Shelikhov's visions had blinded him to the practical problem of vital food and other material sup• plies, and he foresaw possible shortages. While his men help• ed the crew of the Phoenix replace her mast, Baranov learned much from his visitors regarding the way business was done in

Canton and who was involved in Northern Pacific shipping. As a reward for this hospitality and the courtesy his men had 11 extended to the British expedition of Captain George Vancouver,

Baranov was severely reprimanded by Shelikhov, who accused

Baranov of betraying Company and Russian interests; he should instead have tried to capture the visitor. Visits of foreign ships were not to be tolerated. Thus Baranov, very early, came face to face with the fundamental conflict which for many years was to cloud the question of trade with foreign vessels. Good reasons existed for discouraging the presence of foreign ships in the area. Baranov recognized this. But the colonies were regularly lacking in many things necessary for their sustenance and development. Moreover in that lonely and forbidding region, always in some danger from neighbouring Indian tribes and even from his own unruly men, Baranov would have welcomed the occa• sional company of fellow traders with commercial interests akin to his own. This dilemma reappeared in various circumstances and situations to each of the governors of Russian America.

During the years before the Russian American Company was formed, no foreign trade was carried out in Alaska. War in

Europe kept Spanish, English and French ships away during the mid-90's. After Vancouver's expedition, only Captain Henry

Barber's Unicorn is recorded as being in the area until 1798, when Americans began to appear in increasing numbers; one in

1798, three in 1799, bringing with them liquor and firearms to trade to the Indians for the furs the Russians had been getting.

They would load at home with English goods, in Alaska trade for furs, then trade furs in turn for Chinese goods to sell to the

United States. Unless something could be done to exclude the enterprising Yankees, the loss would be catastrophic. Nor would the United States captains listen to Baranov1s protests that arms were not suitable goods to sell to a primitive people

Their avowed aim was profit. Baranov decided that it was nec• essary to move his headquarters east and south to a location where he could cut off American access to the sea otter-rich inlets and passages of the Alexander Archipelago.

In May, 1799, Baranov led a party of men to the island of Sitka^® in three ships and over three hundred baidars. ^

The journey was marred by rough seas and an attack by the Kol- osh that cost several lives. When he had chosen the spot where they would build, an agreement was made with the local Kolosh chiefs for the desired land. However, the natives of the Archi pelago were not the subdued Aleuts of Kodiak and had been trad• ing extensively with foreign ships for firearms. While Baranov was at Sitka, three English and American ships were there; in

1800, two, with three not far away. Extreme watchfulness was an absolute necessity. The situation was greatly aggravated when over a hundred of his Aleuts suddenly died from eating poisoned mussels. In the spring came another disaster - traces of the supply ship Phoenix were found, indicating that she had been wrecked on the way from Okhotsk. Goods were already in short supply. Now food supplies could not be expected in quantity for another year. Temporary respite was afforded by

•LUNow known as Baranof Island.

•'••'•Large open hide boats, held together with wooden cleats. 13 the arrival of the Zakhar i Elizaveta, but the accompanying letters were discouragingly critical of Baranov1s management.

As if all this were not sufficient, Baranov found on his return to Kodiak that the priests had been undermining his authority by preaching open revolt to the Aleuts. They had even gone so far as to persuade his own native consort to leave him. Native dissatisfaction was rife even without ecclesiastical encourage• ment, owing to the high loss of life and the fact that the com• pany had not been able to pay them for some time. In view of all these complications, it is not difficult to understand

Baranov's desperation, or his joy when in May, 1801, the Ameri• can ship Enterprise arrived with Joseph O'Cain and a plentiful cargo of goods which Baranov's old acquaintance was eager to sell. (Joseph O'Cain was the first mate. The captain, accord• ing to Khlebnikov's table, part of which is reproduced on page 12 17, and Howay's list, was Ezekiel Hubbel, not Scott as Tomp•

kins^ indicates.) Permission or no permission,tBaranov could wait no longer for supplies from Russia from directors who were not satisfied with him anyway. ' This time without hesitation he purchased arms, ammunition, foodstuffs, rum, tobacco, canvas and other necessities. However, his enthusiasm did not prevent him from bargaining shrewdly. Apparently it was only his sup• erior drinking capacity that kept the price to two thousand red

XiiF. W. Howay, "A List of Trading Vessels in the Mari• time Fur Trade, 1795-1804," Proceedings and Transactions of the Roval Society of Canada. Series III, 25:137, 1931.

^Tompkins, p_p_. cit., p. 112. 14 and silver fox skins. From the visitors Baranov heard for the first time about the outbreak of war in Europe in 1799, and of the possible consequent threat to the colonies from Spain. Trading with foreign ships thus began in Russian Amer• ica because of a combination of circumstances which left Bara• nov no other choice. Neither could the directors be blamed at that time, for they had no way of knowing that the Phoenix had not arrived. Lack of swift and reliable communication was a continuing problem of the colony, located as it was so far from the head office in St. Petersburg.

The windfall good fortune of the Enterprise soon became well known to Pacific mariners, who began to visit Alaska more often than ever. Hopes that Baranov*s deal with the Enterprise would be repeated were not in vain, as the supply situation did not improve, and bad fortune continued to dog the colony itself. In June, 1802, the garrison on Sitka was overwhelmed in Bara• nov* s absence by the Tlingits. Only three Russians and twenty Aleuts (and of those only two males) survived the massacre, only to be held for ransom by their rescuer, Captain Henry Bar• ber of the Unicorn. This English freebooter, who may have « played a large part in antagonizing the natives on that occa• sion, demanded payment from Baranov for the Aleuts* release. Baranov paid what he could - ten thousand rubles in pelts of various kinds.

Later the same year, Baranov learned for the first time from dispatches sent on the brig 01ga of the establishment of the new Russian American Company, its charter, and his new official title, complete with imperial honours from the Tsar.

However, the dispatches included neither new instructions re•

garding trade nor firm guarantees of more frequent supply-

expeditions.

To get their captured garrison back from the Tlingits,

the Russians needed arms badly, and again, it was a foreign

ship that first was able to fulfil their need. In 1803 Joseph

O'Cain returned, now captain of the O'Cain and a partner of the prosperous Winships of Boston. O'Cain had learned in Hawaii

that Baranov was planning to recapture Sitka, and had stocked

up there on arms and ammunition, along with tools and food•

stuffs. O'Cain proposed a longer-term business arrangement whereby the colony would be steadily supplied, not only with

goods, but even with skilled workmen, -in return for which O'Cain

would sell Russian furs at Canton. Although Baranov did not

have the authority to permit such an agreement, however advan•

tageous, he certainly did need the present cargo. The diffi•

culty was that he had just sent all available furs to Siberia

on the Zakhar i Elizaveta. O'Cain was quick in coming up with

a solution to Baranov's inability to pay. The captain would

borrow the services of a number of Aleuts with their baidarkas

to carry out what amounted to a poaching expedition along the

California coast, where the sea otter was most plentiful. The

Spaniards did not patrol the coast frequently. Moreover, the

Aleuts had no potential enemies like the Tlingits in that re•

gion. Baranov would then be in a position to buy the cargo out

of his share of the sea otter catch. At length Baranov con- 16 sented, providing that the Aleuts be paid $2.50 a pelt and their families $250 in case of a death.The expedition was successful enough to satisfy the needs of both parties, with the result that Baranov gave verbal assent to the proposed alliance, while reserving the right to trade with others. Evi• dently by this time Baranov had given up in despair all hopes of adhering strictly to Company policy in this matter. The enterprising governor was to show his resourcefulness and shrewdness in carrying on a trade which he had long avoided.

4H. Chevigny, Russian America. New York, Viking, 1965: p. 102. I

CHAPTER II

FOREIGN TRADE IN NOVO ARKHANGELSK AND THE

RUSSIAN AMERICAN COMPANY, 1803 - 1817

Baranov's arrangement with Joseph O'Cain marked the

Russian governor's decision to agree at least tentatively to continue such dealings in Novo Arkhangelsk. Much information on the frequency and magnitude of this trade as it developed after 1803 is contained in notes on the colony written by the accountant Kirill Khlebnikov, which are now located in the archives of the State Geographical Society in Leningrad."^

Reproduced below is the first part of Khlebnikov's statistics covering the Baranov period, listing briefly the names of visiting ships, their captains, the value of goods purchased, i & and the furs or bills paid out in exchange. The table will be followed by an account of the evolution of this trade.

15K. Khlebnikov, Zapiski o koloniiakh v Amerike Rossiisko-Amerikanskoi Kompanii.(Notes on the Russian Ameri- can Company Colonies in America), manuscript in Archives of the State Geographical Society, Leningrad, section 99* index 1, item 111, pp. 10 (reverse side) to 13 (reverse side).

•^Names in parentheses were missing in the manuscript, and have been determined from F. V7. Howay's "A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade", published in consecutive issues of Proceedings of the Royal Society of Canada. Series III, vols. 25, 26, and 27, 1931 - 1933. Howay»s list does not include a second visitor to Sitka in 1805, hence the spelling of "Trescott" is based only on approximate transliteration. 18

NAMES OF CAPTAINS AND SHIPS QUANTITY OF FUR BEARING TRADING AT NOVO ARKHANGELSK, ANIMALS TRADED OUT AND 1805 - 1817 AND AMOUNT SPENT THEIR PRICE ON CARGOES (RUBLES)

Year Ship Captain Amount Mode of Payment Price/pelt

1805 Juno D*Wolf 12,320.00 112 sea otters 80.00 rub. 84 yearlings 40.00 " "(sic) Trescott 9,040.50 113 sea otters 80.00 Juno & D'Wolf 136,000.00 300 piasters 2.00 r/p. cargo 472 sea otters 100.00 101 yearlings & bills of ex• change on St. Petersburg: 54,637.50 p. 2.00 r/p.

O'Cain Winship 9,767.60 credit: 9,697.25 Vancouver Brown 3,529.60 1,520 fur seals 2.00 6 sea otters 80.00 Peacock Kimball 345.00 5 sea otters 63.00 Eclipse 0'Cain 9,689.80

(Myrtle) Barber , 84,000.00 bill: : 40,050 p. 2.00 950.00 p. cash Peacock Kimball 7,921.28 2,296 fur seals 3.00 J. Winship13,746.08 1,315 beaver 3.00 170 red fox 5.00 65 Kodiak fox 3.00 9 sea otters 80.00 1 sea otter 75.00 20 tails 4.50 1,391 fur seals 2.00 Derby Swift 18,036.11 258 sea otters 70.00 Mercury Ayres 4,709.80 general produce

Derby Swift 34,516.00 2,485 beavers 6.00 1,200 n 5.00 132 tt 4.00 100 tt 2.00 47 otters 7.00 1,407 beaver tails 6.00 377 beaver tails 5.00 1 sea otter 80.00

Mercury Ayres 1,209.67 190 beaver 6.00 O'Cain Winship 40,427.08 1,619 beaver 6.00 19

Year Ship Captain Amount Mode of Payment Price/Pelt

1810 Mercury Ayres 7*725.60 3*722 sea otters (total: (Various 36,988 r.) prices) 10,852 fur seals (total: 16,875 r.) Isabella Davis 24,750.00 2,363 fur seals 2.00 10,440 » » 1.50

1811 Mercury Ayres 25,400.17 5*000 fur seals 2.00 3,600 " " 1.50 5 poods of bone 18.00 O'Cain Winship 10,889.34 823 otter 7.00 908 beaver tails 3.60 7,470 fur seals 1.20 4,844 " " for 346 barrels of tar. Katherine Blanchard 22,050.45 3,000 fur seals 2.00 7,458 » » 1.00 Enterprise Ebbets 94,843.12 1,477 beavers 6.00 41 otters 6.00 16,646 fur seals 2.00 34,764 » » 1.50 Isabella Davis 19,693.08 529 beavers 6.00 297 " tails 3.60 70 sable 2.00 7,470 fur seals 1.20

1812 Charon Whittemore 22,617.00 12,565 fur seals 1.80 Beaver Hunt17 (sic) 124,056.74 20,000 fur seals 2.00 53,045 » n 1.50 1812 -13 Mercury Ayres 12,425.36 3,000 fur seals 1.50 72 sable 2.00

Charon Whittemore 6,065.00 Atahualpa Suter 27*753.30 3,160 fur seals 3.00 & Cargo 20,000.00 2,175 » » 2.80 (for ship) 6,768 » ti 1.80 Lydia Bennett 55,512.50 28,000 " it 2.00 (brig) 20,000.00 13,000 " n 1.50 & cargo (for ship) 10,000 » n 2.00

•^Wilson Hunt was John Jacob Astor's person repre• sentative on the Beaver. The captain, according to Howay, was Cornelius Sowle. 20

Year Ship Captain Amount Mode of Payment Price/pelt

1813 (Pedlar) Clark 22,377.62 3,996 fur seals 2.80 6,216 » " 1.80 Isabella Davis 2,432.00 535 fur seals 2.00 713 " " 1.50 Amethyst Meek 25,477.32 2,000 fur seals 3.00 & cargo 2,219 " " 2.00 5,128 " " 1.50 700 tails 3.60 5,749 fur seals for ship: from Kodiak 1.50 10,000.00 (paid after Bara• nov fs retirement.) 1814 Pedlar Pi^ott 75,981.81 15,000 fur seals 1.75 24,000.00 50,768 » » 1.50

1815 Brutus Meek 43,287.84 (paid after Bara• nov* s retirement.)

1817 Lydia Gyzelaar 33,204.00 general produce (schooner) 21

In the years following Baranov*s deal with O'Cain, several other American captains arranged to go shares with

Baranov in similar California coastal sea otter expeditions.

Khlebnikov summed up the results of the California hunts separately from the preceding table, as follows:

Mature One and two Year Captain Sea Otters year olds Cubs Total 1803 0»Cain 1806 Kimball 753 228 250 1,231 1808 Ayres 1809 John Winship 2,251 267 288 2,726 1810 Nathan Winship 389 70 101 560 1811 William Davis 989 (sic) 216 283 2,488 1811 Thomas Meek 655 49 17 721 1811 William Blanchard i 626 93 39 758 1813 Whittemore 798 68 30 896

After the awarding of the Russian American Company char• ter in 1799, there was considerable concern in St. Petersburg on the part of the directors and the government about the state of affairs in America. Despite the quantities of furs being sent back, there were signs that all was not well. The missionaries there were complaining vehemently about Baranov*s rule, and one had succeeded in bringing two Aleuts all the way to St. Peters• burg to air their grievances personally to Tsar Paul. Moreover, Baranov himself had once already tried to resign. Now with the company officially launched, grandiose plans for Russian expan- 22 sion and for a flourishing colonial economy were being develop• ed, in particular by the Company's representative in the Tsar's government, Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov, the Head-Procurator of the First Department of the Senate, and the man most respon• sible for obtaining the Charter for the Russian American Com• pany. Close government cooperation now could be expected^ and was in fact not long in coming. A diplomatic mission was as• signed to visit Peking, with instructions to secure the opening of the Amur to navigation and, most important, to obtain permis• sion for Russian ships to trade in Canton. With that port open, the Russians would no longer have to resort to foreign merchant middlemen to sell their furs there. Also in the wind was a plan to break down trading barriers with the Japanese, who were still carrying on but a limited trade with Europeans, and at that only with the Dutch.

So as to facilitate communication and supply for the colony, investigations were begun as to direct voyages from St.

Petersburg, which promised to be more convenient than the long precarious haul across the vast length of Siberia and then the

Pacific. At the same time Russia's position in the north Paci• fic would be strengthened by the presence of vessels of the

Imperial Navy, and an opportunity presented for establishing diplomatic relations with Japan. To facilitate this project, the Russian American Company purchased an English frigate; the government obtained another. These three-masted ships, the

Leander and the Thames, were renamed the Nadezhda and the

Neva.18 23

Owing to his enthusiasm, knowledge, and position both in government and in the Russian American Company, Rezanov was the natural choice to accompany the expedition to conduct nego• tiations with the Japanese and to inspect the American colony.

With the title of "Correspondent" of the Russian American Com• pany he was authorized to supersede Baranov for the duration of his stay in America; for his diplomatic duties he was given ambassadorial rank. The expedition set out from Kronshtadt on

August 7> 1803 on the Neva. under naval officer Yurii Lisian- skii, and the Nadezhda. under Adam Krusenstern.

Not until the two ships arrived in Hawaii did Lisian- skii and Krusenstern receive news of the massacre on Sitka. At that the expedition split up, the Neva proceeding direct to

Kodiak, and the Nadezhda with Rezanov aboard to Petropavlovsk to prepare for his mission to Japan.

Meanwhile, Lisianskii, upon his arrival at Kodiak July

13, 1804, had been instructed to proceed to Norfolk Sound off

Sitka. Baranov was at the earliest opportunity gathering his forces for recapturing the fort from the Tlingits. Already two company vessels were on the scene. In September Baranov arrived with two more ships and three hundred baidarkas. After an un• successful initial attack, the Neva's guns decided the issue, and the garrison was reoccupied by the Russians. The rebuilt fort was named Novo Arkhangelsk.

is evident in this arrangement, as in many other aspects of Russian American Company activity, the Company was, even at this early stage, virtually an arm of Russian foreign policy and worked in the closest cooperation with the govern• ment. Okun has convincingly confirmed this close association in his Russian American Company already cited. 24

The next summer Rezanov arrived on the Nadezhda after the complete failure of his attempts to open trade with Japan.

Just as depressing was the condition of the colony in 1805.

What a contrast with the forecasts of Grigorii Shelikhov!

Shelikhov had envisioned a series of centers of culture, con• taining schools, hospitals, numbers of skilled craftsmen en• gaged in diversified industry, busy shipyards, and flourishing churches for the conversion and civilization of the natives.

Instead, Rezanov found a few miserable outposts in a vast in• hospitable wilderness. Disease, especially scurvy, was wide• spread, and there was not one doctor in the colony. The prin• cipal reason for poor health was obvious - a scarcity of the basic food requirements. Without doubt Rezanov then began to realize how ignorant of the true state of affairs had been the theoreticians, himself included, back in St. Petersburg.

Things were especially bad that year, of course, owing to the need to rebuild the fort at Sitka. Little time could be spent on proper organization of the far-flung fledgling empire. No men were available for catching fish to supplement their meager diet, as those who were not busy rebuilding the garrison were too sick to work. There were far too few even working in the colony even when they were all healthy. As to the prime goal of company activity, the acquisition of furs, Rezanov saw dis• turbing signs that the fur-seal population, especially of the

Pribilof Islands, was diminishing rapidly. It is not surpris• ing that morale was very low. To make matters worse, Baranov was having to take abuse from naval officers in company service who had no desire to obey a mere trader, a man of a despised class.

Rezanov soon became convinced that Baranov could not be blamed for the sad state of the colony. In fact, he came to believe that only Baranov possessed the qualities necessary for bringing the colony to prosperity. In his reports Rezanov urged that Baranov be protected against the insults and in• subordination of navy men. In addition, in order to persuade

Baranov to stay on, Rezanov promised to do all he could to pro• vide improvements in medical assistance, pensions, and facili• ties for education.

Above all, Rezanov recognized the absurdity of forbid• ding trade with foreign ships while there was such an unreli• able domestic supply system. He gave Baranov a free hand to decide for himself in future how and when to enter into commer• cial relations with foreigners. So that he would not always have to pay in furs, credit was arranged for him by making it possible for him to issue bills of exchange payable at St.

Petersburg banks on the account of the Board of Directors of the Russian American Company.

Owing to the desperate lack of provisions, Rezanov himself decided to buy the American ship Juno together with her cargo. The transaction afforded the Russians only temporary material relief; however, the acquisition of the large new ship proved to be useful in obtaining more supplies. As the winter of 1805-06 went on, the number of deaths from scurvy increased, and to add to the general depression, the Company ship Zakhar i 26

Elizaveta was lost. To make the food situation even more cri• tical, hunting and fishing became impossible owing to the renewed belligerency of the Tlingits. The settlement at Yaku- tat was wiped out. Rezanov could finally wait no longer, and in late February with some trade goods, the Juno and thirty- three men, some of them ill, he set out southwards, hoping to get game or fish from the natives in the region of the Columbia's mouth.

The attempt to enter the Columbia with a ship manned by sick men was vain and costly. Eight men died, and of the living only a few could still fulfil their duties.

The only place Rezanov could then visit in the hopes of getting fresh food was the small Spanish mission of San Fran• cisco. He still had documents confirming his ambassadorial status, and hoped that the European situation had not changed so much in his absence that the local Spaniards could not con• sider relaxing the ban of foreign trade. He may have surmised the fact that California was in a somewhat similar situation to that of Alaska - ill-supplied from Mexico, yet discouraged from trade with anyone else.

It turned out that the European situation was not favourable, owing to some diplomatic moves of Napoleon which promised to put Spain and Russia at odds. Nevertheless, Reza• nov was eventually successful, primarily through his rather precipitate haste in becoming betrothed to the Commander's daughter, in a move which may, or may not, have been merely a strategem. 27

On June 8, 1806, Rezanov arrived in Sitka to find that a good herring catch had somewhat replenished the food supply and that Baranov had already obtained some additional supplies through trade with Captain Joseph 0*Cain who was accompanied on his ship, the 0*Cain. by one of the owner partners,

Jonathan Winship,x^

In spite of all of the hardships and immediate needs that Rezanov had seen in the colony, he had not forgotten the ambitions and far-reaching plans he had discussed with high government officials and the Board of Directors in St. Peters• burg. Despite his disillusionment with the colony, the worst seemed to be over, and he had every confidence in Baranov as a leader, although Baranov showed considerable reluctance to continue. The important consideration now was to expand south- wards. The North American coast was unoccupied as far as

Spanish California, which itself was not strong and perhaps could be taken at some future time. Southward expansion was not only a strategic desirability, it held great hope for im• proving the food supply. In the light of these factors plans were made to establish posts at the mouth of the Columbia and as close as possible to San Francisco, and more tentative plans

xvHector Chevigny in his book Russian America errs, ac• cording to Howay and Khlebnikov, in suggesting that in the spring previous to Rezanov*s arrival in 1805, "... the Yankees came, among them Captain Oliver Kimball, . . .in the brig Pea• cock .... Jonathan Winship also came ... in the brig 0*Cain . . . ." Chevigny, Russian America p. 112. These ships actu• ally arrived following the most critical winter of 1805-06, as Khlebnikov records. Partial corroboration of this point was 28

were made to make trading inroads in Hawaii with a view toward eventual control of the islands.

Rezanov himself decided to return to St. Petersburg rather than carry out his original intention of visiting Canton and India to explore the possibility of establishing commercial relations with the East India Company. It was desirable to follow up his success in California with diplomatic efforts at home to obtain Spanish consent to Alaska-California trade. All of his plans came to naught, however, as Rezanov died en route to St. Petersburg in March, 1807.

Baranov was left alone to carry out Russian policy in North America. Trade with foreign ships became more rather than less necessary owing to the inability of the company to arrange more frequent supply expeditions from Okhotsk, and the unavailability of provisions from other sources. The govern• ment was not able to spare vessels for the purpose, as from 1805 on, Russia was at war; first with Napoleon until 1807; then beginning in 1809, with Finland. Finally all of Europe erupted in 1812 and until 1815 Russia had to suspend sea voyages to the Russian colony in Alaska.

During that time, Baranov1s attitude towards trade with foreign traders was necessarily ambivalent. He now enjoyed more freedom of action in this matter than he had before Reza•

nov1 s visit. But the necessary trade still contradicted

found by Howay (pp. cit. vol. 26, p. 54) in the log of the O'Cain, which did visit Sitka in 1806, not 1805. 29 general policy, for the traders visited not only the Russians, but the surrounding natives as well. One of the arguments used by the directors in 1808 to persuade Baranov to stay on had been that he had the closest acquaintance with the foreign traders upon whom the colony would have to depend almost en- 20 tirely. Yet 1808 was the year in which Russia first began to complain officially to the United States about the traffic of the American traders in firearms and liquor among the Indians.

Not only did this practice cutainto the amount of furs received by the Russians; it also undermined Russian prices, thus lead• ing the natives to unrest and violence. Moreover, in the long run the unrestricted presence of American vessels would belie

Russian claims to sovereignty in the area., and seriously hinder the fulfilment of company and government plans for further territorial expansion.

On the other hand, the fact that company trade with foreign ships was profitable has largely been ignored. Indeed, the prices received in North America for Baranov*s furs were often better for the company than those received in Kiakhta, especially when it is taken into account that the company had to pay both transportation and duty charges to the Russian government on the furs traded in Russia. For example, consid• ering the two principal sources of company income, sea otters 21 and fur seals, the following price ranges were in effect:

zuChevigny, op. cit.. p. 127. 21 Tikhmenev, op. cit.. v. I, p. 254 and Khlebnikov»s table, p. 18-20, of this paper. 30

Price at Novo Arkhangelsk Price at Kiakhta Sea otter 20, 40, 50 piasters 55-62 p. (if traded (mostly at 50 p.) for tea.) 30 p. (for silk.)

Fur seal 1.00, 1.50, 1.75 p. 2.60-3.60 (for tea.) (Mostly at 1.00 p.) 1.20-1.30 (for silk.)

Another positive feature of the presence of the Ameri• can captains was their possible usefulness in times of native hostility. In J.807, for example, Captain Oliver Kimball of the

Peacock helped to ransom two captive natives of Kodiak from the

Tlingits. Of course, such assistance was generally given with the expectation that favours would be granted in return. Bar• anov* s friendship with American captains was at best a frontier relationship of necessity, despite the manifestations of hospitality for which he was famous. A case in point is

Joseph 0'Cain, whose longstanding friendship with Baranov is given considerable attention in Chevigny*s romanticized his• tory, Russian America. However Khlebnikov, who had the oppor• tunity to interview Baranov over a period of several months in

1818, remarks in the notes accompanying his list only that

O'Cain had deceived Baranov in connection with the cooperative 22 sea otter hunt of 1803. In proposing the expedition, O'Cain had referred to an island abounding in sea otter he had dis• covered off the coast of California. Khlebnikov believed this to have been a lie, indicating that O'Cain was not trusted.

Later, at the time of the recapture of Novo Arkhangelsk from

22Khlebnikov, op., cit.. p. 7. 31 the Tlingits, O'Cain's ship is described as lying at anchor

. . . to await the issue of the forthcoming struggle between the Russians and the Kolosh and to do business with the victors.23

Evidently there was a strained relationship between the Russ• ians and even the more reliable of the visitors. Nevertheless the immediate needs of the colony during the period of European warfare dictated that the trade continue.

During the period 1808-1812 both Russian and American governments became interested in working out mutually advanta• geous arrangements for supplying Russian America. Up until that period, the Russian government had only very grudgingly acquiesced to occasional foreign trade in the colony as an emergency measure. Too much danger to territorial ambitions was felt to be involved, as well as danger from Indians equip• ped with guns, ammunition, and liquor supplied by the foreign• ers. In 1808 the first official complaint was delivered to the

United States government about the misdeeds of American traders; only the absence of diplomatic relations had prevented such a protest before that year. However, the impossibility of pro• viding enough goods from Europe or Siberia in wartime compelled the Russian government to change its tune quite radically. In these circumstances the United States embargo on all foreign trade, imposed in 1807 as a protest against Napoleon's blockade

23Tompkins, op. cit.. p. 119. The terms "Tlingit" and "Kolosh" are interchangeable, the latter being used primarily by Russian sources. 32 of Europe and Great Britain's impressment of seamen in the open ocean, caused alarm rather than relief in St. Petersburg. The embargo threatened to cut off Novo Arkhangelsk's only emergency source of supplies.^ One of Andrei Dashkov's first tasks upon his appointment as Russian representative in the United States was to try to obtain an agreement to furnish the colony with foodstuffs, while endeavoring at the same time to put an end to illicit trade with the natives.

One merchant very interested in Dashkov's proposals was

John Jacob Astor. After purchasing the ship Enterprise. Astor loaded her with a cargo of goods which he thought the colony would need- and sent her to Baranov in 1810 along with a letter proposing partnership. The proposed agreement between the

Russian American Company and Astor*s American Fur Company would exclude all rivals in the northwestern coastal fur trade.

Astor also undertook to send larger quantities and better sel• ections of goods in future. As Baranov expected to retire shortly, he told Captain Ebbets of the Enterprise that a long term agreement was not within his authority to sign. Baranov did buy the cargo, however, and agreed on terms for one more voyage. No doubt there were reasons in addition to those given for not giving full approval yet to Astor's plan. The prices

Astor was charging for his goods exceeded colonial prices by fifty percent, and at such prices the governor would not have

24lt can be seen from Khlebnikov's table, on pages 18- 20 of this paper that not all U. S. vessels observed the "Jefferson embargo," which was soon repealed in 1809. 33 wanted to promise much in advance, in case the war with England should end quickly and the company succeed soon in sending sufficient supplies from Russia. Baranov used the Enterprise to ship furs to Canton, which were sold there successfully.

Baranov*s caution seems to have been borne out, as on the second visit of an Astor ship, the Beaver. in 1812, the

Americans insisted on charging higher prices than earlier agreed upon, blaming it on hostilities between England and the

United States. Part of that cargo remained unsold.^5 Accord• ing to 0kun*s account, an agreement was signed between the

Russian American Company and Astor*s firm in 1812, but Astor proved to have no effective influence in discouraging other traders from doing business with the natives.^6 Really Astor was not in a position to guarantee anything in 1812. His es• tablishment at Astoria near the mouth of the Columbia was soon to be lost to the North West Company; he had failed to get presidential approval for monopoly rights in the area, and one of his ships, the Tonquin, had been lost in a fight with natives near Astoria.

On the government level attempts to reach agreement were also unsuccessful. Dashkov had attempted to persuade the

United States government to ban the trade by American sailors in fire-arms and ammunition. Discussion foundered basically

25p. Tikhmenev. Istoricheskoe obozrenie . . . Rossiisko- amerikanskoi kompanii . . . , v. I, St. Petersburg, Weimar Typography, 1861: p. 80.

2^0kun, op_. cit.. p. 78. 34 on the question of territorial limits. The United States re• fused to act against the Indian trade, arguing that such trade would be illicit only if the Indians were subject to Russia, in which case the responsibility for prevention rested on Russia, not the United States. In 1810 Count Nikolai Rumiantsev, the

Russian Commerce Minister, proposed that United States ships receive exclusive rights to carry Russian furs to Canton for sale to the Chinese, in return for an agreement to cease sell• ing arms and ammunition to the natives. Again the American government, through its minister in St. Petersburg, John Quincy

Adams, preferred to postpone any agreement relating to the

Indians until the world situation would allow the conclusion of a general treaty between the two countries. Adams became es• pecially wary after Rumiantsev intimated that Russia might make territorial claims as far south as the Columbia River. The outbreak of war between France and Russia forced the abandonment for a long time of plans for a general treaty that would settle the territorial issue.

Meanwhile, Baranov had been getting supplies as best he could. Uncertain ties with Siberia had resulted in a continued reliance on United States vessels. To counteract the American trade with the natives, the Russian government had dispatched the sloop-of-war Diana, under Captain Vasilii Golovnin, which arrived in Novo Arkhangelsk in 1810. However, the presence of one war vessel proved to be an ineffectual gesture.

Baranov decided to make a bold move to establish a farming base on the coast of North America to the south of the 35

Columbia, a project which held promise of alleviating the food shortage while at the same time laying the foundation for later territorial expansion. Information on the country had come with Ivan Kuskov on his return from a sea otter hunt in 1809-10 that reached almost as far south as San Francisco. Baranov lost no time in assembling the necessary personnel, including again some Siberian convicts, for the new colony. After one false start, which ended when the party was attacked by Haida

Indians from the Queen Charlotte Islands, Kuskov set out with his men in the Chirikov late in 1811. He chose land sixty miles north of San Francisco, and in 1812 the Russian settle• ment known as Ross took shape. Great hopes were held that Ross would become an important hunting, agricultural, and industrial center, and indeed, farms, orchards, vineyards, and cattle ranges were soon laid out. However, Ross never really lived up to its promise, and long continued to experience annual deficits.

Its location had several disadvantages as a farming center.

The fort was surrounded by hills which became densely wooded a short distance inland. The grain was damaged by the summer fogs near the ocean, and much of the growing crops were ruined by squirrels and gophers. Yields were poor, and it was not until 1826 that any significant volume of grain was sent to

Novo Arkhangelsk.

Until a reliable alternative became available, Baranov had to keep on making the best deals he could with the Ameri• cans. But in early 1813, only one trader showed up, as British warships in the Pacific were threatening to seize American 36 ships should they leave the safety of neutral ports. The situ• ation gave the company an opportunity, in Baranov*s view, to acquire some needed ships. It was certain that American ships were not making money lying at anchor in neutral ports around the Pacific. Baranov told the captain of the visiting ship that the company was in a position to lease or buy ships, whose crews could work safely for the Russians while under the com• pany flag. By the end of the year Baranov had purchased three ships and had leased another, enabling him to send vessels to the Philippines, Indonesia, Hawaii, and California.^ The years 1813 and 1814 were very profitable for Novo Arkhangelsk, but the Americans with whom Baranov was dealing were not above taking advantage of his position in ways which harmed the Russ• ian American Company as a whole. Captain Bennett sold goods at

Novo Arkhangelsk for furs, and then contrary to instructions sold the same furs back to the company office in Okhotsk at considerably inflated prices. The following year Captain Pig- got tried to repeat Bennett*s trick, selling Baranov*s fur seals to the Russian American Company commissioner in Kamchatka at fifteen rubles a pelt for a total of 61,000 rubles in prom• issory notes, when the purchase price in Novo Arkhangelsk had been only two and a half rubles per pelt. However, this time the Board of Directors refused payment on the notes, claiming that colonial regulations were well known to the buyer, and instead began proceedings to recover from Piggott 35,000 rubles

'Chevigny, op. cit. . p. 151s-152. Neither Chevigny nor other sources consulted identify the lone American visitor in the spring of 1813. 37 to cover freight charges from Kamchatka to Okhotsk. Piggott did very little business with the Russians after that.

Baranov was told to cut down his trade with foreigners, in order to retain fur seals- for supporting the lucrative Chinese trade at Kiakhta. He in turn demanded to know whether the Board expected to be able to guarantee an adequate food supply, and gave the directors to understand that the trading would continue. He did endeavor whenever possible to pay in notes payable in St. Petersburg rather than in furs. Fortunately, the supply situation eased considerably with the arrival of the Suvorov in November, 1814. At the same time the governor's relations with naval officers were aggravated by the attitude of the Suvorov*s commanding officer, Mikhail Lazarev, later to become an admiral, who was not one to take orders from a mere merchant. When in 1815 Baranov had Astor*s brig Pedlar seized for selling arms and ammunition openly to the natives, he blamed Lazarev for encouraging dis• obedience to colonial authority. Lazarev refused to sanction the seizure, and friction increased to the point where Lazarev left with his ship under cover of darkness for St. Petersburg.

Back in the capital, Lazarev was tried before a naval court of inquiry on charges brought by the company head office. He was charged with immorality, with leaving Novo Arkhangelsk without the company*s supercargo, without the ship*s doctor, without bills of lading, Baranov* s dispatches to headquarters or even his permission. Evidently Lazarev*s colleagues found in his favour, for when the Suvurov was again sent to Novo 38

Arkhangelsk under Leontii Hagemeister, the new commander was authorized to assume control of the colony in place of Baranov, should he find it necessary.

In the spring preceding the arrival of the Suvorov,

Alexander Baranov had begun a final major undertaking for ex• panding Russia's influence in the Pacific. This ambitious goal, which the aging governor had discussed with Rezanov eight years before, was the establishment of trading stations and plantations on the Hawaiian Islands. This enterprise would gain a share for Russia in the lucrative sandalwood trade, another important source of food produce, and a possible base for control of the islands.

Back in 1809, Captain Hagemeister had started things off badly by telling King Kamehameha, the native ruler of the islands, that Russia might take by force what she could not gain by diplomacy. The king had ruled against the establish• ment of any foreign settlements.

In the spring of 1814 a situation arose which gave

Baranov an opportunity to try to repair the damage. At that time one of the ships purchased by the company from Captain

Bennett, the Bering, ran aground on Kauai, where it was con• fiscated by King Kaumualii of Kauai. As Kaumualii had pre• viously submitted himself to the jurisdiction of Kamehameha, the Russians could expect cooperation from Kamehameha, hope• fully in the form of settlement rights within Kaumualii*s domain. 39

When Baranov heard that Kamehameha no longer had a per•

sonal physician, it seemed to him that Doctor Egor Nikolaievich 28 Sheffer, who had been left behind when the Suvorov had fled, would be an ideal ambassador whose interest in the natural sciences would stand him in good stead with the king. Shef• fer *s mission began successfully with his appointment as Kame• hameha' s personal physician, but opposition from the Americans hindered his efforts to deal in sandalwood and establish plan• tations. His decision to work with Kaumaulii resulted in an agreement which was contrary to his orders and disastrous for Russian interests. Not only were land and sandalwood rights made available, but Sheffer also committed the Company to help Kaumualii overthrow Kamehameha, a move which cost the support of Hawaiians of both camps as soon as it became clear that Russian military aid to the lesser king was not forthcoming. Finally, the Russian and Aleut workers had to flee for their lives. By 1816 the supply problem at Novo Arkhangelsk was much less critical owing to the arrival of five ships from Russia in two years. Khlebnikov records no trading with foreign ships that year, despite the fact that a total of fifteen ships visi• ted Novo Arkhangelsk in 1816. Tikhmenev notes that foreign captains were very reluctant to accept bills payable in St. Petersburg, demanding Spanish piasters instead, at a rate of exchange very different from that operating in Europe. Accord-

Real name: Georg Anton Schaffer. 40 ing to the American captains, one piaster was equivalent to two rubles (paper) while in St. Petersburg, one piaster was valued at five and a half rubles (paper).^

No progress had been made towards the end of Baranov*s governorship in persuading or forcing foreign merchants to refrain from trading with the Indians. The Boston firm of

Bryant & Sturgis in instructions to Captain Suter of the Mentor.

August 6, 1816, stated that the cargo was of two classes - one intended for trade with the Russians; the other, with the In• dians. 3® Even the virtual cessation of foreign trading by

Baranov from 1815 to 1817 did not discourage the visitors, whose trade with the natives was sufficiently profitable to justify the effort and investment expended.

As the end of the Company*s first twenty year charter approached, the navy began to lobby in St. Petersburg for con• trol of the American colonies so as to extend Russian naval power in the Pacific. Navy captains had often resented mer• chant authority in Alaska and had brought back much informa• tion which could be used against the Russian American Company and Baranov*s management. The poverty of the Russian and native employees of the company was often cited, as was the lack of medical facilities or even a doctor. In addition, rumour had it that Baranov had made a personal fortune through the misappropriation of company funds. Whether or not this was

30Howay, OP. cit. (1933), p. 121. ^Tikhmenev, op. cit.. v. I, p. 173. 41 true, Baranov*s judgment was suspect over the Suvorov affair -

Lazarev had been cleared by a navy tribunal - and it now looked as if the governor had chosen the wrong man to superintend the

Hawaiian venture.

To forestall possible loss of the colony, the Company consented to cooperate with the navy. In 1817 the directors sent the Suvorov. under Captain Leontii Hagemeister, and the

Kutuzov. under Captain Ponfidin on a round-the-cape voyage to

Novo Arkhangelsk. Hagemeister was authorized to make a thor• ough inspection of the company facilities and its financial records in particular, and was empowered to supersede Baranov.

The accountant brought along to examine the books was Kirill

Khlebnikov. Instead of finding discrepancies, Khlebnikov found the books in perfect order and came to admire Baranov for his honesty and generosityand for the respect he had won even 31 among the Tlingits:

He never knew what avarice was, and never hoarded riches. He did not wait until his death to make pro• vision for the living, and gave freely to all who had any claims on him. Some said he had large deposits in foreign banks, but no proof was to be found when he died ....

As to the necessity for trade with Yankee captains,

Khlebnikov had this to say in his Zapiski:32

31H. H. Bancroft, History of Alaska. 1886, pp. 514, 515. 32 Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 86 (reverse side). 42

(The Americans) keep coming, and it is to be hoped that every year ships will come from Boston, Canton, or Hawaii; from here they turn their atten• tion toward California and sell as much as they can all the way down the coast to Chile. The inordin• ate activity of the Americans is a source of wonder; they come straight from Boston to Sitka stopping only at the Hawaiian Islands for three to five days for water, etc. . . .

In any case, Hagemeister used the powers conferred on him to remove Baranov quite unceremoniously from office, naming Lieutenant Semen Yanovskii, Baranov*s new son-in-law, to the post of governor.

On December 1, 1818, Alexander Baranov left America on the Kutuzov. However, he never reached his native Russia, as he died of a fever shortly after setting sail from Batavia in

April, 1819. CHAPTER III

FOREIGN TRADE IN THE COLONY IN THE LIGHT OF RUSSIAN AMERICAN

COMPANY INCOME DURING THE FIRST CHARTER PERIOD

In order to assess the significance of the trade in

Novo Arkhangelsk to the economy of the Russian American Com• pany operations in America as a whole, it is instructive to examine the total returns of the Company from the colony during the same period. Through the Historical Calendar of the Russ• ian American Company. 1741-1817.33 it is possible to describe in much greater detail than in the past the fluctuations in

Company income during the period of the first imperial charter.

The information found there is particularly valuable as it per• tains to the first period of operations, for which there is a large gap from 1802-1818 in the colonial records of the Company.

Here, from the Historical Calendar, is the list of ships transporting Alaskan furs to Russia (including those of the Shelikhov-Golikov partnership before the formation of the

Russian American Company), together with the value of the im• ported furs and details of the voyages made by each ship:34

°JIstoricheskii kalendar* Rossiisko-Amerikanskoi Kom- panii. 1741-1817 gg. manuscript, 57 sheets. Central State Archive for Ancient Documents, Moscow. Yudin collection 796, index 1, item 160. Russian scholars discovered this document among the papers of G. V. Yudin in Krasnoyarsk only in 1957. However, it is also to be found among the F. Golder collection of photostatic copies of documents in the Russian archives, carried out in St. Petersburg in 1917, thus indicating that the Historical Calendar was known of at that time. 1) . Simeon: made 3 trips, in 1793 took out from the colony from the wreck of the Ioann Predtecha a cargo worth 128,000 rubles. In 1794 with Predtechevskii Company furs worth 224,815 rubles. On its third voyage in 1799 wrecked near the Seal Islands. 2) . Mikhail: made 2 trips, in 1792 brought a cargo worth 376,000 rubles; in 1800 a cargo worth 320,000 rubles. Wrecked on Unalaska in 1801.

3) . Trekh Sviatitelei (Three Saints); made, three trips; in 1785 worth 56,000 rubles in 1789 worth 300,000 rubles. Wrecked on its third voyage on Unalaska. 3). Ioann Predtecha (John the Baptist); set out in 1790 and was wrecked near the Seal Islands its cargo was salvaged by the first-mentioned Simeon.

5) . Predpriiatie Sv. Aleksandr (Enterprise of St. Alexander); made three trips - in 1795 worth 276,550 rubles, in 1798 worth 431,931.50 rubles and in 1802 worth 228,380 rubles. Wrecked on Unalaska.

6) . Phoenix; (built in America); made three trips; in 1795 worth 321,138 rubles; in 1798 worth 525,937 rubles. Was sent in 1799 to Kodiak, but never arrived, but by available evidence sank in the sea.

7) . Severnvi Orel (Northern Eagle); sailed in 1792, brought furs worth 21,912.30 rubles. Then in 1799 was wrecked along the Chugach coast. 8) . Ekaterina (Katherine); this ship never sailes to Okhotsk, but was soon broken up on account of decrepitude.

9) . Dmitrii: made two trips - in 1803 brought furs worth 583,196.25. Set out for the second time in 1803 and was wrecked in October of that year near Umnak Island. However the cargo and crew were saved.

34iDid.. p. 25 (reverse side) f. 10) . Petr i Pavel (Peter and Paul); made two voyages - in 1809 worth 400,000 rubles. On account of decrepitude this ship was left in Okhotsk and turned into a storage depot.

11) . Zakhariia i Elizavetv (Zakhar and Elizabeth) sailed twice - in 1803 brought a cargo worth 1,166,392.50 rubles. Sailed in 1804 and was wrecked in America in December, 1805.

12) . Aleksandr Nevskii; saied from Okhotsk in 1803 and remained at Kodiak for use in the colony; wrecked in 1813, but the cargo worth 784,548 rubles was saved.

13) . Neva; wrecked in 1813.

14) . Nadezhda: capsized in the Baltic. These two ships, which had been sent around the world from Kronshtadt in 1803, brought furs out in 1806 worth 582,214.25 r.

15) . Maria; made two trips, the first in 1807 bringing furs worth 357,703 rubles. The second time she set out in 1810 from Okhotsk; spent the winter in Kamchatka, and then was sent to America, from which it set out on its return voyage to Okhotsk; however, it could not enter the harbour, and so that it would not be wrecked by the wind near the rocky shore, it was necessary to ground the vessel, which so damaged it that it could not be repaired. The furs brought on it were worth 800,000 rubles.

16) . Konstantin: two trips; in 1805 took a cargo of furs to the Nadezhda in Kamchatka for trade intended for Canton - the cargo is shown included with that of the Nadezhda. This little ship arrived last year (1816) with a cargo of 7000 fur seals worth 70,000 r.

17) . Yunona (Juno); purchased in America, left there in 1807 and was used in a special expedition for Sakhalin; finally wrecked in 1808 at Kamchatka near the Viliuichik R. More than 200,000 rubles worth of Canton goods were lost.

18) . Tender Avos*; built in America, left in 1807 for Okhotsk and was used in the special Sakhalin expedition; finally in 1808 was wrecked in America at the mouth of Icy Strait. 19) . Rostislav; built in America, left for Okhotsk in 1807 and was also employed in the Sakhalin expedition. On its second trip from America it car• ried to Kamchatka along with the Neva furs totalling 778,521 rubles in value, which were then taken to Okhotsk on crown ships. The third time it sailed for Atkha Island.

20) . Sitka; built in America, sailed to Kamchatka in 1807, where it was wrecked in the mouth of the Kamchatka River.

21) . Finlandiia: built in Okhotsk; sailed for the first time in 1810 to survey the Kurile Islands. On its second voyage it brought furs to Okhotsk worth 200,000 rubles. In the same year it sailed to Atkha Island; on its return it wintered in Okhotsk; in 1815 it carried 200,000 rubles worth of furs from America. The same year it sailed to Sitka Island. In 1810 the crown vessel Diana took company furs of value 80,627.35 rubles.

22) . The ship Suvorov; sailed from Kronshtadt around the world in 1813; arrived at the island of Sitka in November, 1814, returning to Kron• shtadt in July, 1816 with a fur cargo valued at 900,000 rubles. Then in company with the ship Kutuzov sailed to the colony for a second time with a cargo of Russian and German goods, an illustrious cargo for these ships, and various provisions.

23) . The ship Otkrvtie (Discovery); built on Sitka; on its first crossing brought furs to Okhotsk worth 515,905 rubles.

24) . (The ship) Bering, purchased from a Boston skipper; on its first crossing took 581,169.50 rubles worth of furs. Then, having been sent to Sitka, was wrecked on the Hawaiian Islands.

25) . (The ship) Kutuzov; sent last year (1816) along with the Suvorov under the general command of Lieutenant-Commander Hagemeister - called the 4th expedition. 47

The total value of fur goods collected and taken to Russia by the Russian American Company alone from 1783 to the present (1817) is 10,700,067 rubles.

The same data on furs exported to Russia from the colony, expressed graphically, appear as follows, taking into account the years 1798 to 1816:

solid line ~- silver ruble, value.

dotted lint —paper ruble value

I- Rubles millions)

O^im 'too ieoi moi nob /so; 1109 mo itiv ihi Hi*, ifis t&b Year

Graph 1 VALUE OF FURS SHIPPED BY RUSSIAN AMERICAN COMPANY FROM AMERICA, 1798 r 1816 48

On this graph the solid line together with the dotted line represents the cargo value totals each year from 1798 to 1816, which would seem to indicate that fur output was quite steady over the period, with the exception of the time just prior to

Rezanov*s visit and the years of the Napoleonic war. However, it should be kept in mind that the figures used are in paper rubles, whose real value steadily decreased with respect to the silver ruble during this period. The silver ruble value of imports is represented on this graph by the solid portion of the lines.35

35A table of the relative values of silver and paper currency is to be found in A. Del Mar, Money and Civilization. London, Bell & Sons, 1886, p. 308. 49

Graphic representation of Company capital over the same period, using annual inventory data from the Historical

Calendar. tells much the same story. The solid line again represents the value of goods on hand in silver rubles, and the dotted line - the original data in paper currency. Again we can readily see that conversion to the more stable silver currency suggests that the period was not really characterized by rising profits as the original figures would suggest.

In comparison with the size of the quantities shown on

Graphs 1 and 2, the annual value of furs traded to foreign ships in Novo Arkhangelsk would appear quite small, at most just 190,000 rubles (approximately) in 1813, marked on the graphs by an asterisk. More significant is the company esti• mate that the Americans were taking from 10,000 to 15,000 sea otters annually from the north west coast.^ Taking the lower figure, and using the minimum Kiakhta price of 110 rubles per sea otter skin,"5 we may conclude that such a quantity of sea otters would have increased company income by over a million rubles a year, assuming of course that the order of magnitude of the Russian estimate is not too wildly exaggerated and that the Russians could have caught the others if the Americans had not.

36(3p. cit.. pp. 31 (reverse side), 32.

J/0kun, OP. cit... pp. 74 - 75. ^Tikhmenev, op. cit., v. 1, p. 254. See otters traded for cloth received a lower price, but the majority were traded for tea. 50

A study of annual income over the first charter period thus reveals that the value of furs received, rather than increasing as it would seem from Company accounts, was at best only holding steady as the value of paper currency declined. The very small proportion of furs sold to foreigners at Sitka had little effect on total Russian American Company income. However, the trade had a very significant effect in reducing company expenses, both of freight and duty charges on those furs, and in particular of the cost of sending supply expeditions.

As the capital outline which has been illustrated in Graph 2, discovered in 1957, represents the only existing de• tailed information on Russian American Company income during the first charter period, it is included in full on page 51 of this paper.

Taking the Baranov period as a whole, we may conclude that the Russian American Company achieved a limited improve• ment in its financial condition. However, the Hawaiian venture had failed; American mariners through their uninterrupted trade with the natives were diverting large quantities of furs into their own hands; and the area was still very sparsely populated by Russians. Moreover, there were clouds on the economic horizon, and the supply of marine fursfewa's dwindling. The next few years would show whether the company's management and its support from the government were sufficiently effec• tive to succeed in solving the problems which were hindering TABLE I CAPITAL OUTLINE - 1798 to 1817 From taking of Inventories Capital (paper rubles) Credits included Credits removed; Year In sea hunting In land hunting Altogether in capital Capital remaining

1798 1,671,020.765 917,682.74 2,588, 704.505 1,290,244.0475 1,298,459.457 5 1799 1,663,551.4375 1,593,029.3825 3,256, 580.82 1,280,253.895 1,976,344.92 5 1800 2,101,862.5175 1,907,451.07 4,009,313.587 5 1,374,957.01 2,634,356 .5775 1801 2,269,017.69 1,685,547.7175 3,954, 565.4075 1,207,506.72 2,744,004,687 5 1802 2,420,683.23 1,818,767.3775 4,239, 450.6075 1,399,449.285 2,840,001.312 5 1803 2,860.073.045 2,590,625.4125 5,450, 694.4575 1,674,848.5425 3,775,845.91 5 1804 2,295,480.7725 4,159,225.8425 6,454, 706.615 2,010,376.985 4,444,329.6 3 1805 2,907,927.96 3,713,473.6975 6,621, 387.6575 1,991,583.325 4,629,814.332 5 1806 2,964,843.465 3,771,007.07 6,375. 920.535 2,574.576.625 4,161,343.9 1 1807 3,396,048.845 3,182^02.795 6,578, 451.6375 2,394,362.3775 4,184,089.2 6 1808 2,686,844.6825 3,426,955.7675 6,113, 800.45 2,184,770.505 3,929,029 .945 1809 2,195,617.37 3,487,920.09 5,683, 537.46 1,774,911.0925 3,908,626.367 5 1810 2,326,970.1275 3,091,878.29 5,418, 848.4175 1,476,344.2425 3,942,504.17 5 1811 2,254,048.14 3,349,173.53 5,603, 221.67 1,595,975.74 4,007,245.9 3 1812 2,244,488.40 3,329,076.60 5,573, 565.00 1,304,065.00 4,269,500.0 0 ,722 .26 4,337, 1813 3,477,065.55 2,583,109.94 6,060, 175.49 1 ,538 637.23 5,681,086.8 2 1,242,676.59 4,438,410 .23 1814 3,751,066.91 1,930,019.91 4,316, 1815 3,421,443.74 2,928,272.52 6,349, 716.26 1,628,430.04 082.95 6,836, 682.61 1,236,767.30 4,799,041.5 1 1816 3,615,167.81 3,221,514.80 Remaining Unaccounted for 800,873.80 52 colonial development and threatening the company's livelihood.

The Russian American Company stood to gain both in furs and territorial control in the long run if some alternative to

American sources of supply could be found. Initiatives from the government were needed to exclude or resist foreign competition while ensuring alternative means of supply. CHAPTER IV

FOREIGN TRADE IN THE COLONY 1818 - 1825

AND THE TSAR'S DECREE OF 1821

A committee had been named upon the expiration of the first charter to examine Russian American Company activities so as to decide whether or not its privileges should be con• tinued. It concluded that the company's privileges should be renewed, with a recommendation that territorial limits be de• fined as soon as possible, and that, most importantly, foreign• ers should be excluded entirely from the region.

Accordingly, a decree was issued by the Tsar on Septem• ber 4, 1821, which reserved for Russian subjects all activities within an area extending on the coast of America from Bering

Strait south to latitude 51° north. Foreign vessels were for• bidden to approach within less than one hundred Italian miles of this coast at any point.

Nine days after the decree was issued, a new charter was finally granted, securing for the Company exclusive privi• leges in the hunting of fur-bearing animals and for fishing within the waters reserved for the Russians by the decree.

Additionally, governors would be chosen exclusively from the ranks of naval officers, a move which had the effect of making the job a temporary stepping stone to a higher position, rather than an opportunity to fashion a permanent career. 54

The international situation at the time made it impos• sible for the government to ignore the strong protests which the decree quite predictably evoked from the governments of the United States and Great Britain. Russia wished to placate

American and English governments at a time when she was endea• voring to be given responsibility for the restoration of order in the Balkans following the Greek Revolution of 1821, in an effort to attain one of Russia's long sought after goals, control of the Dardanelles. As Okun has pointed out,

It was not worthwhile to allow relations with the powers to deteriorate over an acquisition such as the American colonies, while those powers were also opposed to Russian intervention in the Greek affair.39

Within eight months of the decree, when faced with British support of the American position, the Russian Foreign Ministry found it expedient to issue instructions to vessels in America which for all intents and purposes cancelled the September decree of 1821. On June 3, 1822, the Russian foreign minister,

Count Karl Nesselrode, informed Count Dmitrii Guriev, the Mini• ster of Finance, that ships in Russian America had been instruc• ted to confine their patrols to the latitudes within which the

Russian American Company "actually enjoyed its prerogatives in hunting and fishing . . .

39okun, op. cit.. p. 83.

4°Ibid. 55

In any case, the only effect of hampering the trade of Americans with the Indians was to arouse hostility among the natives. The Russians were paying them only one half to two- thirds the price given by the Americans. As the following table shows, the decline in the main items of the Tlingit trade with the Russian American Company was only partially alleviated in the years immediately following the ban on foreign trade at Novo Arkhangelsk

FURS RECEIVED FROM TLINGITS BY RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COMPANY

1818 - 1825 (Main Items Only) 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 182,5

Seal 54 54 27 21 20 24 16 22 Mink 1,807 1,302 842 272 137 433 602 165 Beaver 265 147 115 41 39 177 198 74

Trade with foreign ships was carried on in other places so as to adhere to the letter of the 1821 decree, but it never ceased entirely, as the colony still depended on the Americans for a sufficient supply of provisions and other supplies.

For reasons of higher state interest the government had attempted to deal with foreign competition without enforcing its decisions or ensuring effective alternative means of sup• ply. Colonial governor Matvei Muraviev, the Navy captain who succeeded Semen Yanovskii in 1820, thus carried on a vir• tually uninterrupted trade with the Americans, as is shown in

Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 61. 56 the continuation of Khlebnikov*s table from the year 1818. It should be noted that the prices in this section of the table are given in Spanish piasters rather than rubles. 42 Price* Year Ship Captain Amount Mode of payment /Pelt

1818 Eagle Meek 2,436.00 1,211 fur seals 1.75 le Bordelais Roquefeuil 5,514.06 1819 Brutus Nye 2,700 fur seals 1.75 4,917.83 5,000 fur seals (small) Eagle Meek 605 fur seals 1.75 1,789.97 remainder on account Clarion Gyzelaar 2,288.60 1,308 fur seals 1.75 Volunteer Bennett 380.90 Clarion (Gyzelaar) 1,863.53 Brutus Davis 1,285.90

1820 Clarion Bennett 302.80 Pedlar Piggot f Thaddeus Blanchard

1821 Arab Meek 12,939.31 5,155 fur seals 1822 Sultan Clark 898.83 483 fur seals 1.75 Pedlar Meek J. 7,775.98 4,361 fur seals 1.75 Arab Meek 21,177.77 2,400 beaver 4.00 4,739 fur seals 1.75 Remainder—Russ. goods of value - 3,274.00 Pearl Stephens 680.75 373 fur seals 1.75 Note: the brig Pearl was in port when the Appollon arrived with news of the ban on trade with foreigners in the colonies. After this the scarcity of goods and supplies forced further trade via the Hawaiian Islands and California:-

42Ibid.. p. 51 ( reverse side) to 52 (reverse side). 57

Price* Year Ship Captain Amount Mode of payment /Pelt

1823 Mentor Newell 13,991.08 2,995 fur seals 1.75 credit: 8,749.83 Hartnell 6,043.00 3,276 fur seals 1.75 (English goods: 310.00 trader in California)

1824 Mentor Newell 8,866.15 5,000 fur seals 1.75 5,000 •» " (for 1823) 1.75 3,150.00 1,800 fur sealsll.75 1,190.00 700 fur seals 1.70(sic) Washington Elville 812.25 500 fur seals 1.75 (from T. 34,203.17 4,428 fur seals 1.75 Meek). 12,825 fur seals 1.75 500 beaver 4.00 11,000 fur seals 1.75

1825 Lapwing Blanchard 42,655.00 24,325 fur seals 1.75 (including ship). Parf ianin(* Wells 1,212.30 603 fur seals 1.75

"Spanish piasters.

There was by this time only the occasional exception to the exclusively American presence in the North Pacific. The not• able exception in this list is le Bordelais. which was only the second French trading expedition to the waters adjacent to

Alaska, the first being that of le Solide in 1790-92. Le Bor• delais. under Captain Camille Roquefeuil, arrived in Novo

Arkhangelsk in April, 1818. After the example of the sea otter hunts of Baranov*s time, Roquefeuil obtained a party of Aleut hunters from the Russians. The party was attacked by Tlingits on Prince of Wales Island, and the captain himself barely escaped with his life. At that the remains of the expedition 58 returned to Novo Arkhangelsk to pay the Russian American Com• pany the agreed amount of two hundred piasters for each Aleut lost (perhaps by cancelling the debt for goods bought, shown in the preceding table), and then left for France.

TikhmenevTs statistics on the quantities of various kinds of peltry sent from the colony in the periods 1797 -

1820 and 1821 - 1841 show that there was a great decrease in the average quantity of marine animals obtained annually from the former period to the latter, especially in the numbers of valuable sea otter processed. At the same time there was a corresponding though more gradual increase in the number of land animals obtained. This shift occurred because of the depletion of fur seals and sea otters and as a result of the energetic activities of the Americans.

During the period 1818-25 referred to by the above table, a total of 1,028,262.50 rubles worth of peltry was paid out to foreigners in the colony, compared with 1,170,000.00 rubles in the longer period 1805-17. Hence, the rather sur• prising conclusion to be drawn is that average annual trade with foreign ships actually increased in value in the years when the greatest efforts were being made to keep it to a minimum. The following chapter will deal with some of the reasons why Company policy as expressed at the beginning of the second charter period was markedly lacking in success. CHAPTER V

THE RUSSIAN AMERICAN COMPANY CRISIS OF THE MID-1820»s: EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL ASPECTS

The United States government was taking an active interest in the territorial claims of the Russians, even to the point of insisting on being a party to a final boundary settlement, on the strength of its 1818 treaty with Britain at the time of the Louisiana Purchase, by which the English and the Americans enjoyed equal rights in the territory west of the Rocky Mountains. This treaty had drawn American atten• tion to the resources of that whole territory, including that within Russian influence. Public attention in the United States had been drawn to Russia's North American colony in 1821 by a congressional investigation of an American expedition sent to occupy the land along the Columbia River. A special committee reported to Congress warning of Russian expansionism, noting the development of settlements and trade in Alaska and California, even overstating the case by including one of the Hawaiian Islands, a Russian attempt which had not succeeded. Russian opposition to American shipping near the colony also served to intensify American interest in the north coastal region. There were even fears expressed that Russia might be about to take California from Spain in exchange for assistance in restoring Spanish rule over the newly-declared Spanish- American republics of South America. 60

When notified of the Tsar's decree, the British Prime

Minister had immediately sent instructions to the Duke of Well• ington, who was representing England at the European Congress of Verona, to convey to Alexander I Britain's displeasure.

The Tsar asked that negotiations be initiated in St. Peters• burg by the British ambassador.

However, it was not until February of 1824 that Russian plenipotentiaries received treaty negotiating powers. During the preceding year, as it became clear that the United States would insist on a part in negotiations on Russian territorial limits, the Russian government had decided to negotiate simul• taneously with both powers in St. Petersburg.

Prior to the commencement of official negotiations, while unofficial talks were under way, President Monroe of the

United States declared in his message to Congress on December 2,

1823 that "the American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any Euro• pean power."43 This unequivocal assertion, to be known as the

"Monroe Doctrine," gave the American representative in St.

Petersburg a valuable bargaining position from which he could retreat gracefully in order to secure his minimum objectives, which included a complete withdrawal of Russia's exclusion of foreign shipping and a southern limit of around 55° for her southern boundary.

Chevigny, Russian America, pp. 184 - 185. 61

Britain contended for a limit set further north than

60°. Unfortunately for her maximum hopes, the Americans came to terms with the Russians first, achieving a satisfactory ten year convention by April S> 1824, that set 54°40f north lati• tude as the southern limit of Russia's territory. Since Bri• tain had admitted the United States to an equal say in deciding sovereignty in lands west of the Rockies, it was virtually inevitable that the Russian negotiators would succeed in back• ing the English down to conform to the American agreement, for the Russians were anxious to obtain enough of a coastal strip to serve as a protective barrier between the Russian American

Company and the approaching operations of the Hudson's Bay

Company. It was easy to argue that England's initial demands were unreasonable, as the main settlement of the Russian Ameri• can Company was situated at latitude 57°. After several months of hard bargaining, the English and the Russians concluded an agreement on February 16, 1825. Sir^Charles "Bagot, the chief

British negotiator, succeeded in having the boundary north of

59° moved from the one hundred and thirty-ninth meridian to the one hundred and forty first, and in establishing that the line supposedly to follow the crest of the mountains along the lisi&re should never exceed a distance of ten marine leagues from the sea.44

4*The absence of a single crest along the lisiere led to a dispute over the interpretation of this clause between Canada and the United States at the turn of the century. 62

The over-all advantage from these conventions did not go to the Russians, as they both confirmed the annulment of the

Tsar*s 1821 decree by officially opening all parts of the Paci• fic Ocean in the area to the subjects of all three powers for purposes of trade and fishing,^5 ^he only condition being that no citizen of either country would visit places on the coast occupied by citizens of one of the other powers. This meant that the Company was deprived of any perspectives of expanding its operations even within the limits of the territory formally belonging to Russia.

These conventions were concluded, as we have seen, at a time most favorable for exerting pressure on the Russian government, and resulted in the failure of Russian efforts to eradicate "smuggling" along the coast of the colony. The trea• ties of 1824-25 marked the end also of Russia's hope for terri• torial expansion in North America; and boded ill for the colony at Ross, which was not mentioned in either document.

Naturally enough, Russian American Company officials in

St. Petersburg tried to prevent the ratification of the United

States treaty until the very last moment. The poet Kondratii

Ryleev, who served as office manager of the Company, tried to persuade the Minister of Finance that if foreigners were to be given legal rights to compete alongside the Company at the very sources of its income, the result would be an intensification

45ihe term "pSche" in the original referring to aquatic animals as well as fish. 63 of hunting of fur-bearing animals and of trade with the natives that would in turn further estrange the natives from the Russ• ians, who could not pay equivalent prices. Ryleev indicated that round-the-world supply expeditions had already proved prohibitively expensive.

The treaty with England also came under severe Critic• ism, because of the article allowing foreigners to navigate the rivers in Russian territory freely and for all time. Dmitrii Zavalishin, among others, strenuously objected to its ratifica• tion, and when that fight was lost, put forth proposals designed to circumvent its provisions. He proposed that trading stations be established in all places suitable for commerce, so as to keep foreigners away from those areas, and that the Company at last send out large quantities of merchandise with which to undersell competition, so as to discourage the English and the Americans from exercising their rights.

These suggestions were not followed, in part owing to the untimely involvement of several members of the Company exec• utive, including Ryleev and Zavalishin, in the abortive Decemb• rist uprising of December, 1825. Russian American Company in• terests suffered through its implication in the affair, for which Ryleev and others outside the Company paid with their lives.45*

In fact it often happened that proposals were rejected simply because they were put forward by merchants. Okun quotes Zavalishin*s memoirs to show that Alexander I

45a Okun, Russian American Company, pp. 106 - 114. 64

was infuriated at the idea of the merchants trying to teach the diplomats, and ordered that the manager be reprimanded, saying that the merchants did not understand anything . . . . °

The reputation of the Company and the conduct of its policies were damaged in. the mid-twenties of the nineteenth century by another set of serious problems concerned with internal mismanagement of the Company's affairs. At the time of the treaties with the United States and Britain, discontent among the shareholders had been growing for several years, as a result of several factors. The Company practice of delaying the publishing of balance figures was itself a source of dis• trust. When reports were made available to the shareholders, they were misleading, for depreciation of equipment was often ignored, and income figures would be padded with nonexistent returns from expected sales.

A principal grievance of the shareholders was that they had reason to believe that the directors worked more diligently for their own short term enrichment than for the general wel• fare of the Company. During the period 1808 to 1820 the Russ• ian American Company spent 2,317,318 rubles on supplying and maintaining the colonies, while spending 4,696,364 rubles during the same period on the running of the main office in

St. Petersburg.47 Each of the directors received a salary of

15,000 rubles; the senior director, Mikhailo Buldakov, received

Okun, Russian American Company, p. 113.

Ibid., p. 67. an additional 10,000 rubles. It was alleged by one of the shareholders, Lobanov, in repeated complaints to the tsar, that at the most critical time for the Company's finances, each one of the directors received a bonus of 100,000 rubles. From 1822-1826 no dividends were paid out to the shareholders and no one would buy those shares which were offered for sale The situation deteriorated to the point where at the general meeting of the Company in March, 1825> the director Benedict Kramer would not appear to sign the balance sheet for 1822-23 and subsequently was forced to resign. One of Kramer's exploits as a Company director is described by Okun:49

When it was decided in 1821 to send out the usual round-the-world expedition, the purchase of the ship was entrusted to the firm of the Kramer brothers, at the head of which was the director of the Company V. Kramer. Upon procuring the "Yelena" for the Company in the United States, Kramer was, first of all, paid a commission amounting to 6 per cent of the cost of the vessel. Not only that, but, when it had already become known that the "Yelena" was on its way and would arrive in Kronstadt in the near future, Kramer purchased another boat for the Company, the "Yelizaveta", a vessel that was known to be completely unseaworthy. The "Yelizaveta" had belonged to an insolvent debtor of Kramer's. The director acquired the half-rotted ship for the Company at a cost of 30,000 rubles. Then he put the amount of the debt in his pocket, and the Company was forced to spend 70,000 rubles addi• tional in repairs on that "acquisition" ....

48Ibid., p. 71.

49ibid. 66

Only one of these two ships ever set out, and it made its way only as far as the Cape of Good Hope, where the cargo was sold at a loss.

Indications of some of the complaints against the dir• ectors are also to be found in the hitherto unpublished letter of January, 1820 from Fedor Startsov, nephew of the former

Director of Siberian and American Affairs, to Count Nikolai

Mordvinov, the head of the Department of Civil Affairs of the

State Council, Member of the Finance Committee, and former

Navy Minister. This letter was among the documents found in

1957 in Krasnoiarsk with part of the Gennadii Yudin archive, which has since been transferred to the Central State Archives for Ancient Documents in Moscow.$®

When I was in St. Petersburg in 1816 I had the pleasure to be with Your Excellency in the. head offices of the Russian American Company at the general meeting of the shareholders, where the subjects under discussion were the capital balance for that year and the proposal to return to our family 18 shares, which however, the Board of Directors decided to keep within the control of the company. Our family had already for many years dedicated ourselves solely to the good of the company, both with financial sacrifices and with personal services, particularly by my late uncle in the course of his seven year absence as Director of Siberian and American Affairs. In this, Your Excellency, the following can bear witness: His Grace Count Nikolai Petrovich Reza• nov (!) and His Excellency Ivan Andreievich Veide- meier, and to a greater degree one of the first directors of the Company, Mikhail Buldakov, who

50startsov, F. P., Letter to N. S. Mordvinov . . . , January, 1820, Central State Historical Archives, Leningrad, Mordvinov Archive 994, index 2, item 835. is aware of all our participation from the very beginning of the establishment of this company. Thus I, also being in equal measure motivated by the same feelings, have already with indefatigable efforts obtained profits from the company approach• ing 200,000 rubles, for which in 1809 I received personal recognition from the directors. And if you yourself deign to hark back to the time when American and Siberian affairs directly depended on my late uncle's management, you will clearly see that from the time of his death even the profits from reliable and detailed capital inven• tories have ceased, and we have been left for almost ten years completely without profit, and the expectation of sure benefits and those so great privileges which our August Monarch saw fit to bestow have cost many families their last possessions. (Especially I refer to) the lowering of the Company's credit by those managing it, which has resulted in the fall in value of a share to 200 rubles. As securities they are accepted for no more than 150 rubles, while the crown treasury refuses to accept them at all. In this I dare to cite myself as an example, Your Excellency; for having had more than 300 shares, for which I had personally sacrificed myself and all my wel• fare, yet with all our sources of income and expenses we have not been able to retain more than 40. All this, according to my twenty-year long observation, can be attributed to the elections of directors, because of the previous ones there re• mains only one, Mr. Buldakov, who was chosen by the class of original shareholders who had found appreciable advantage in joining with the original Shelikhov mass of shareholders. But now they are chosen only by their personal merit, and even from the ranks of foreigners, as if there were not enough merchant families in Russia . . . when Germans and Greeks began to have a say in manage• ment after 1805, the company began to wither. • ••••••••• I do not wish to burden you with a history of our family's long company service - I shall turn to the Kiakhta trade as my main theme. From long observation and experience I can say that in this trade we lose considerable profits every year from the fact that all Chinese goods from the time of the restoration of the trade have changed in an unbelievable manner in weight, measure, and qual• ity, and we pay not only with our best goods, but in greater quantity than ever before. As an 68

example - the foreign cloth manufactures known by the name "oilcloths", received mainly for silver and gold, were at first eagerly bought by the Chinese at the rate of a chest of tea for 16 arshins^l of cloth. Now we have to pay 30 arshins of cloth for one chest of tea; besides this there are many other losses, so that it may be said that in general it is a rare trader in Kiakhta that is not losing at least 30$ on the ruble. . . .

F. P. Startsov Moscow, January 5> 1820. Irkutsk Meshchanin.

While this letter shows by the reference to the long-deceased

Rezanov that the writer was not very acquainted with some aspects of Russian American Company activities, his letter does testify to the lack of confidence prevalent in a company which had not distributed dividends for several years. It is very likely in view of the laxity of the directors in issuing finan• cial reports that Startsov's criticisms of trading practice in

Kiakhta had considerable validity.

Beset by financial difficulties, discontent amongst the shareholders, and government disfavour for its involvement in the Decembrist uprising, the Russian American Company was in no position to offer any effective opposition to the damaging treaties with Britain and the United States or to provide any alternative to continued dependence on visiting traders for supplying the colony in Alaska. Only a company with a very healthy economy or strong government support could have afforded to invest the necessary capital in large supply expeditions,

5lQne arshin equals 2.33 feet. 69 either by land and sea across Siberia and the Pacific, or by sea via the Cape of Good Hope. Although the treaties marked the end of Russian expan• sion on the North American continent, the area used by the Russian American Company did now enjoy undisputed legal status, and was still a land rich in furs and other undeveloped re• sources. There was yet hope that the Company, through sounder business practices and a more plentiful supply?of quality trad• ing goods could consolidate its hold on the territory and be able to compete effectively with foreign traders. With more settlers, a more diversified economy could be developed to put the company on a firmer base. Without basic changes, the Russian American Company could not hope for long to keep the territory under its jurisdiction under Russian control. The effect of the international situation would again be crucial, as the company could not afford to be used again as a pawn to gain Russian government objectives elsewhere.

New dangers and new opportunities were presented by the approach by land of the traders of the Hudson's Bay Company. We shall now turn our attention to the trading relations of the Russian American Company with the Hudson's Bay Company, and the effect of the latter's activities on Russian trade with foreign ships in Novo Arkhangelsk. CHAPTER VI

THE HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY UNDERMINES

AMERICAN TRADE IN SITKA, 1821 - 1837

By the mid-twenties of the nineteenth century a second major fur-trading enterprise had extended its activities almost to the point of contact with the commerce of Sitka, hitherto enjoyed solely by the Russians and the Americans. The English, through the Hudson's Bay Company, which had amalgamated in 1821 with the rival North West Company, were extending their trade northwards and westwards in an effort to hold off Russian expansion.

As early as 1814 the North West Company had attempted to enter the Canton market with its furs. In the years 1814> 1815, and 1816 that company sent out the Isaac Todd, the Columbia. and the Colonel Allen with trading goods to the Columbia River. After discharging the goods for Fort Van• couver the vessels loaded North West Company furs to be sold in China. However each of these attempts resulted in financial loss, owing to the refusal of the East India Company to permit the vessels to sell their furs for Chinese goods to be taken back to England. Later, in the period 1817-21, the North West Company sold some of its furs in Canton through the Perkins firm of Boston. Thus even before any direct mutual dealings with the Russians, the British had begun to compete for a share in the sale of North American furs in Canton. 71

As to the Hudson's Bay Company itself, only one party of its traders, that of Joseph Howse in 1810-11, had crossed the Rocky Mountains before 1821. However, the amalgamation of the Hudson's Bay Company in that year with the enterprising North West Company brought under its management several posts which had already been established west of the mountains: Fort McLeod on McLeod Lake ("Babine Fort") founded by Simon Fraser in 18053 Fort St. James on Stuart Lake and a fort on Fraser Lake, both built in 1806, Fort George, at the junction of the Fraser and the Nechako, built in 1807; Fort Alexandria near the junction of the Fraser and the Thompson Rivers, and several posts in the vicinity of the Kootenay and Columbia Rivers. The enlarged company now turned its attention with renewed vigour to the territory west of the Rockies, particularly as that territory, by the agreement of 1818, had been given the status of joint occupancy between the Americans and the British. It was urgent to head off the Americans in order for the English to control as large a part as possible of the land certain soon to be in dispute. At the same time, however, the Russians were advancing bold claims to vastly increased maritime jurisdiction along with coastal territory down to latitude 51°. Instructions issued by the Governor and Committee in February, 1822, assumed that eventual settlement of the territorial question would favour the side with the most actual settlement rather than the most ambitious formal claims. The returns from the north• ward expansion were not expected to be great, but ". . . the Russians are endeavoring to set up claims ... as low as 72

Latitude 51, and we thank it desirable to extend our trading posts as far to the West and North from Frazerfs River in 52 Caledonia, as may be practicable." In September, 1822, the

Chief Factors of the Hudson's Bay Company west of the Rockfes,

John Haldane and John Dugald Cameron, were further instructed by the Governor and Committee "to ascertain the number and tonnage of the Russian Vessells that have appeared on the North

West coast in the neighbourhood of the Columbia; and whether 53 the Russians have made any fixed establishments . . . ."-^

Expansion of the fur trade would, it was hoped, divert furs away from the Russians: ". . .we depend on your strenuous exertions to secure the Fur Trade to Great Britain by your liberality to and kind treatment of the natives."-*4 Hudson's

Bay Company officials in London recognized that Russia's

"... vast plans of aggrandisement & extension of Country . . , may be within range of possibility."^^

The rivalry between the companies was at this stage principally territorial in nature. Although both companies were selling beaver in Russia, the amount sold there by the 52E. E. Rich, ed., Minutes of Council Northern Depart• ment of Rupert Land. 1821-31. London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1940, p. 303.

53Ibid.. p. 335.

54Ibid.. p. 336.

^^Unknown person to John Lock, 1823, London, in E. E. Rich, ed., Simpson's 1828 Journey to the Columbia. London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1947, p. 129. 73

Hudson's Bay Company was small, and the most important furs obtained along the coast of the Alaska panhandle were still seal and sea otter pelts. Moreover the Hudson's Bay Company had only just begun to hunt beaver in the area west of the

Rockies, a region that was still separated from the coast by mountain ranges and hostile Indians. The Hudson's Bay Company was interested in the coast primarily to obtain an access route to the sea for interior furs.

Hudson's Bay Company plans for closing the gap between its own posts and the Russians were not implemented at once, primarily because at that time the main competitor for terri• tory west of the Rockies was not the Russians, but the Ameri• cans. The Americans presented a continent-wide challenge which now focussed on the land west of the Great Divide. The terri• tory west of the Rockies had only just come under the control of the Hudson's Bay Company. Consequently, the Governor of the

Northern Department, George Simpson, considered it essential for him to survey company activities and establishments in the

Columbia region personally before initiating new policies for consolidating presently controlled territory in the face of

American expansion, or for setting up more trading posts in the direction of the Russian American Company. After his visit of l824-25> Simpson found that there were serious shortcomings in the organization inherited from the North West Company, and instituted reforms which he believed could result in doubling profits for the region. An indication of the severity of his criticism and the ruthlessness of his reforms is given by the 74 fact that forty-nine of the one hundred and thirty-six staff personnel in the Columbia District were dismissed and their jobs eliminated at the very time when expansion was urgently contemplated.

Simpson also concluded from his visit to the Columbia

Department that the Russian trade was "highly vulnerable."

Much more urgent was the need for the Hudson's Bay Company to act quickly and effectively to retain its control of the Colum• bia basin. Alternatively, on the chance that American claims were to be acknowledged by the British Government, the company had to prepare a second line of defense by establishing a major trading and goods depot to the north, on the lower Fraser River.

Fur hunting was now to be concentrated in the Snake River area, so as to undermine American opposition there and at the same time to exhaust the supply of fur-bearing animals to the extent that the Americans would not find the area profitable should they obtain it through negotiations.

Despite this concentration of company activity in the south, Simpson hoped to obtain a share of the coastal trade by means of the ship William and Ann which arrived in the Columbia in April, 1825. However, Captain Hanwell proved to be unco• operative, and the ship had difficult passage and did not man• age to get any further north than the mouth of the Fraser.

More might have been done at an earlier date to expand company activity northwards if Governor Simpson had carried out his plan to return to the Columbia in 1826. He was obliged to postpone his second journey owing to his appointment as Governor of the Southern Department. 5° For some time Simpson was busily- occupied with putting the business of the Southern Department in order and was further held up by floods on the Red River.

Simpson did not return to the west coast until the autumn of

1828. During his absence he had been influential in leading the British government to break negotiations with the United

States in 1826 over partition of the Oregon territory. The stalemate had resulted in an indefinite renewal of the 1818 joint occupancy arrangement.

In anticipation of possible negotiations on the Colum• bia, Simpson was instructed in 1828 to secure as ample an occupation of the country as possible - to the south, as well as the north of the river - for bargaining purposes. Not until

1828-29 did George Simpson focus his attention and that of the

Hudson's Bay Company on New Caledonia, the coastal trade, and 17 the Fraser River. '

Nevertheless, John McLoughlin, the Chief Factor of the

Columbia District, had maintained a lively interest in the coastal trade after the first visit of Captain Kelly of the

American brig Owhvhee to the northwest coast in 1825. McLaugh• lin learned from Kelly that the mouth of the Nass River was a

3 The Southern Department included all territory east of a line roughly joining Rainy Lake in the south west corner of present-day Ontario with the center of the Hudson's Bay coastline of that province. Territories west of that line formed the Northern Department. 57 New Caledonia was the name given by the Hudson's Bay Company to the Department roughly encompassing the area west of the Rockies between latitudes 50 and 59 degrees. 76 very busy trading place, which very likely was located near the outlet to an inland water route. Poor quality ships and insub• ordinate captains caused the delay of plans for investigating the Nass until the arrival of Lieutenant Aemilius Simpson, a relative of the governor, in 1826. He had been selected to take charge of a ship ordered from England for the coastal trade. Lieutenant Simpson proved to be much more cooperative, being a clerk in the company and thus having a direct interest in the fur trade. His ship, the Cadboro. did not arrive until mid-1827, however.

The first step McLoughlin's programme took for gaining control of the coastal trade was to establish a post at the mouth of the Fraser. On his first coastal voyage Aemilius

Simpson helped establish Fort Langley on the lower Fraser River, after charting part of the Columbia. However, a shortage of goods in 1827 prevented the Cadboro from being outfitted for a trading voyage.

The next year Lieutenant Simpson led a trading expedi• tion northward along the coast. Its main accomplishment was to obtain knowledge of the coast and its commerce, as the American traders had got there ahead of him that year.

Although Lieutenant Simpson's report on the coastal trade has not been found, the Governor's letters indicate that the report made clear the desirability of making some arrange• ment with the Russians. Simpson reported that the coastal trade was less in volume than had been supposed: the Americans obtained only about six hundred sea otters annually and about 77 six thousand beaver and land otters, the land furs being for the most part brought from the northern inland regions of New

Caledonia to Nass, at the mouth of the Nass River. There the

Indians, well supplied with spirits, guns, and ammunition, were numerous and hostile.^

Having discovered by his own experience in 1828 that the Fraser River was not suitable for inland transport, Gover• nor George Simpson decided, in view of his cousin's report, that the Hudson's Bay Company should set up a strong post at

Nass in order to cut off the Americans from their source of furs and enjoy, hopefully, a good inland communication route by way of the Nass River. Such a post, in conjunction with well-organized shipping, was expected to drive the Americans from the coastal trade within two or three years. George

Simpson stated in his report on his journey of 1828-29 that the country up to latitude 54° was undoubtedly valuable. More• over, the British had a right to it by the 1825 convention, as well as access from the coast to the northern part of New

Caledonia by rivers flowing through Russian territory.^9

Simpson was already making plans for Hudson's Bay Company to take over the Americans* business with the Russians at Novo

Arkhangelsk. The company would sell the Russians manufactured

E. Rich, The Hudson's Bav Company. 1670 - 1870. vol. II: 1763 - 1870, London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1959, p. 615. 59E. E. Rich, Simpson's 1828 Journey to the Columbia. London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, p. 81. 78 goods from England, and grain and meat produced at Fort

Vancouver.

Simpson intended to send the Cadboro and the William and Ann, which was expected shortly from England, to the north; the Cadboro would supply the Fraser River post, and the other would visit the Russians at Novo Arkhangelsk, after which they would investigate the Nass River together in order to choose a site for a post. During the winter they would load lumber in

Fort Vancouver and transport it south for sale in Hawaii and along the coast as far as Chile. These plans were to be put into effect during 1829 and 1830.

However, in March 1829 a pair of American trading ships sailed to the Columbia and began cutting into Hudson's Bay Com• pany trade by charging very low prices for manufactured goods.

Shortly afterwards came the news that the William and Ann had been lost together with her whole crew. Plans were further postponed in the next year, 1830, when the special additional ship the Committee had purchased, the Isabella, was also lost, although the men and cargo were saved. The same year, an out• break of malaria in the Columbia region slowed work down considerably.

Meanwhile Governor Simpson had taken another step to• wards depriving the Americans of the benefits of trade with the

Russians. In March, 1829, Simpson sent a letter to the governor of the Russian colony in Novo Arkhangelsk by way of Aemilius

Simpson, who sailed north in the Cadboro in August of that year.

The letter began by expressing the desire of the Hudson's Bay 79

Company to enter into mutually beneficial relations with the

Russian American Company so as to prevent any "unfair rivalry and competition." Then Simpson presented his specific pro• posals:

... we receive our supplies from the manufactur• ers direct on the most advantageous conditions. It having come to our knowledge that you have no regular and direct communication, and thinking that perhaps at times you may want some English goods, we are ready to furnish you annually with from 50 to 100 tons or as much more as may be necessary, upon receiving a moderate guarantee deposit for the first expenses and we will be satisfied with a small profit. We, on our side, are willing to take furs at saving price, paying for them either in bills of exchange drawn on St. Petersburg or London, or in cash, as may be the most convenient to you . . . We also agree to furnish annually from 8000 to 10,000 hams and salt meats for a certain number of years at a fair price. Lieutenant Simpson will give you the des• cription of goods which we order and, should they prove not suitable for your use, you have only to send us samples and exact descriptions of all the goods you desire, mentioning the price and the mode of payment you offer. We, for our part, will not leave you in ignorance as to next year, if we agree to your offers . . . .°®

On Simpson's advice, the Hudson's Bay Company head office in

London followed up this conciliatory proposal with a similar letter to the Board of Directors of the Russian American Com• pany in December of 1829.

In line with the Hudson's Bay Company's overall plan,

Aemilius Simpson sailed north from the Columbia again in 1830, now bearing the title "Superintendent of the Marine Department."

60Alaska Boundary Tribunal: The Case of the United States. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1903, p. 260. 80

He looked for a suitable site for a post on the Nass while trading with the local Indians. After leaving Nass, Simpson met vigorous competition in the presence of several American ships, which he managed to challenge successfully only through the use of spirits in his trade.

It would seem at first glance that the Russians could have been expected to seize the opportunity presented by the

Hudson's Bay Company proposal to rid themselves of the Ameri• cans upon whom they had depended for such a long time, and whose use of liquor and fire-arms in their trade with the

"Russian" Indians had so long been aggravating Indian-Russian

American Company relations. It was in the interests of both companies to cut off the supply of arms, ammunition, and spirits to the natives, as both companies had territorial claims and land posts, whereas the American freebooters did not.

Moreover, the proposals promised to fulfil the longstanding needs of the Russian American Company.

However, the Russian company was not to be hurried by the English reference to "next year." There are several rea• sons for the delays which followed the Hudson's Bay Company proposals. Governor Chistiakov did not have the authority to make such a decision on his own, and in any case, he was just about to leave the colony as his period of service was coming to an end. More important was the desire of the directors not to have to depend for vital supplies on a company with whom relations could be broken owing to political strain between

Russia and Britain. American captains had shown their willing- 81 ness to come to Sitka regardless of the current attitudes of the United States government. Surprisingly, the directors of the Russian American Company were still not willing to admit, or had still not grasped the fact that the Company could not assure a reliable supply of food staples from Russia by land and sea. In their dispatch of March 21, 1830 to the newly- appointed governor, Ferdinand Wrangel1, announcing the British company's proposals, the directors begin by belittling in gen•

eral terms the savings which might be achieved by accepting the proposal, and then go on in a curiously indecisive manner:

. . . Nevertheless, the company, though not fore• seeing very interesting consequences from taking up the Hudson's Bay Company proposal, will not completely reject it. We shall propose to the Hudson's Bay Company that they supply the manu• factured goods that we need. If the Hudson's Bay Company agrees, and we agree to her terms and prices, then we may as an experiment send via that company next year a years proportion, and depend• ing on the circumstances, will obtain more needed manufactured goods. Further increases will depend on the situation and on the success of our first trial attempt. We repeat that manufactured goods can be supplied profitably by the dry land route through Okhotsk. However, we have nothing to lose in establishing limited contact with the Hudson's Bay Company.61

Not until the spring of 1831, a year later, did the directors send any further instructions regarding the Hudson's

0lBoard of Directors to Wrangell, Dispatch #240, March 21, 1830, p. 20, National Archives of the U.S.A., Microfilm Publications, Records of the Russian-American Company. 1802- 1867, rolls 1 - 77.(Referred to from now on as "Records".) Letters cited from the Records are translated by the author. 82

Bay Company offer. Correspondence with their head office in

London had confirmed that the Hudson's Bay Company would accept payment only in furs according to current local prices. In

answer to a letter from St. Petersburg inquiring about grain,

the Hudson's Bay Company ignored the subject, while proposing

that the Novo Arkhangelsk office take part of a shipment of

goods recently sent from England to Fort Vancouver. Clearly

the blame for stalling should not rest on the Russian American

Company alone, and it is understandable that this dispatch

concluded pessimistically:

. . . there is no use to be made of their initial proposals, and we should not count on receiving grain through the Hudson's Bay Company. 62

Nevertheless, the same letter gives Wrangell permission to make

a deal with representatives of the Hudson's Bay Company, should

a satisfactory offer be made, provided that payment for English

goods be made in bills payable in St. Petersburg. Shortly

after receiving this dispatch, Governor Wrangell was analyzing

Simpson's intentions quite accurately in a letter to the

directors:

the Hudson's Bay Company . . . wishes to do no more nor less than grasp into her own hands our trade as well, while demanding payment in furs.63

62Russian American Company Board of Directors to Wran• gell, March 31, 1831, #360, Records.

63Wrangell to Board of Directors, May 6, 1832, #132, Records. 83

However, Wrangell warns that he will have to depend on the Hudson's Bay Company if relations with Americans are dis• continued, a distinct possibility in view of English competi• tion in the straits near Sitka and the expiry of American rights in 1834. At the same time, Wrangell already knew that the English company had finally succeeded in establishing a post at Nass in Observatory Inlet:

. . . That company has taken a firm step into the aforementioned inlet, at the place called Naze (sic), their establishment being located in a well defended condition and their stores overflowing with necessary goods. They have gained the favour of the natives through generous gifts to the chiefs and by treating them all flatteringly. This spring their company ship called in at Kaigany (Puerto Cordova) for trade with the natives, where two Americans were already situated. Having goods of better quality than the Americans had to offer, their paying the same number of blankets as the latter (i.e. 1 blanket per beaver) completely ruined their rivals* trade, and by their own testimony within a short time will drive them out of competition. Mr. Simpson, who was in charge of the coast establishments made a survey of the northern inlets, fully intending last year to found in the southern outlet of Prince Frederick Sound (where the Stikine Indians are) a settlement far enough up the river flowing into the Sound so as hot to violate the provi• sions of the last Convention between Russia and England that refer to our boundaries. Although this enterprise has been put off for a time owing to the sudden death of Mr. Simpson, it is probably not for long, and within a year or two the English will start up a post here as well, causing un- , doubted harm to our trading ties with the Kolosh. 4

°4lbid., #133 84

At this point Wrangell expresses very frank dissatisfaction with the supplies arranged by the Russian American Company directors.

For the superiority in both quality and quantity of the English goods is a magnet for the Kolosh, against which we have no means to compete,and there is no doubt that if the Board does not take measures to supply the colony with goods of suf• ficient quality and in sufficient quantity to counteract the Hudson's Bay Company, that company will soon see itself in full control of the fur trade of northwestern America from Cross Sound or even further north all the way to the coast of California. Here are the principal goods offered by the English: good blankets, Virginia tobacco, cinnabar, sewn dresses and shirts. In return they receive mainly beaver at the rate of up to 10,000 pelts a year; i.e. aside from other minor expense, the Hudson's Bay Company provides about 10,000 blankets a year, which is the only large expense! I will leave this for the Board to determine, ask• ing that you decide the question: should we and can we enter into competition with the Hudson's Bay Company? If I may be permitted to express my own opinion,it is that it seems to me that the Russian American Company should not have to stand by as a suffering witness to the activities of the English, but should take measures to resist them, which can be achieved only by supplying the colony with the requisite goods and plenty of them. Then we will be able to visit all the channels our• selves: but there is no sense going with empty hands and being made a laughing stock when they discover our poverty. I hope that I have relieved the Board of the responsibility for sending grain from Okhotsk by supplying the colony with a two year supply myself, (I cannot fully expect to repeat this in future); for this reason I think the Board can turn its resources and attention toward sending a large supply of goods. I repeat, that all the efforts of the Governor here to ex• tend our fur production through trade can enjoy no measure of success at all under the present short• age of goods, and, if I may express it this way, of our extreme stinginess in payment, for beads and rattles will never attract the savages to trading, but their labour should be rewarded with something of material use: i.e. clothing. Of 85

course our percentage profit will drop a little, but afterwards the quantity of traded goods will increase and instead of 5000 beavers we will in time be able to send twice as many. 65

The dispatches from the Board of Directors for 1832 report that no letters had been exchanged with the Hudson's Bay Company during the past year. However, Chief Factor Peter Ogden visited Sitka along with Aemilius Simpson that spring. Governor Wrangell and the Hudson's Bay Company representatives found that they had much in common against the Americans. They agreed on the need to refrain from trading dangerous items to the natives> and Ogden promised not to use liquor in his trade as long as others did likewise. Wrangell proposed that they set up a joint enterprise to oppose the Americans. He offered to buy all the wheat that was available from the Columbia De• partment, and to buy his supplies of manufactured goods from the Hudson's Bay Company. Payment for these goods and food• stuffs was to be made, according to the directors' instructions, in bills payable at St. Petersburg, at prime cost only. Prob• ably Ogden knew that his company would never agree to these terms; in fact, Governor George Simpson would refer to the

Russian counterproposal as "preposterous.?1 Ogden merely intimated to Wrangell that the Hudson's Bay Company would not likely insist on payment in furs.

65lbid.

^Rich, The Hudson's Bay Company, p. 625. 86

The Russian American Company directors soon found out from the Hudson's Bay Company in London that

. . . the Hudson's Bay Company does not agree with Mr. Ogden and remains adamant not to let us have its goods except for payment in furs. We do not think it necessary to repeat that this is unacceptable. 67

Wrangell is instructed to make purchases from the Hudson's Bay

Company "only if absolutely necessary" and only for bills on

St. Petersburg. As to the use of liquor in the fur trade, even where necessary if unscrupulous American competition were to be effectively met, the directors in this letter are uncompromis• ing:

Although the Americans and the English have violated the agreements about the sale of liquor, we need not follow their example. Such sale must not be permitted.68

Wrangell showed exasperation in his reply to this message, as his instructions on this matter had not been consistent:

I consider it my duty to beg the Board of Directors to clarify an important contradiction in dispatch #267, referring to the sale of arms and strong drink to the Kolosh, where in one place it says "we may not violate the convention by selling arms and spirits to the savages," but in another place: "You are granted full rights to sell the Kolosh not only strong drink, but also firearms and amunition." Likewise I was told in #258 not

"'Russian American Company Board of Directors to Wrangell, March 31, 1833, #258, Records.

68Ibid. 87

to follow the example of the Americans and the English. Nevertheless, in dispatch #301 of 1832 I was given permission to sell liquor to the Kolosh. How am I to understand all this?69

A certain lack of coordination could be expected be• tween the colonial governor and his superiors, who were at least six months away by mail. However, an excessive lack of harmony is evident in Wrangell*s relations with St. Petersburg. Not only on the liquor question was there unsatisfactory under• standing. The directors* reply to Wrangell*s request for men and goods in 1832 in order to compete with the English must have fallen far short of the Governor*s hopes. The urgent need for more Russian settlers was treated in a particularly casual manner:

You asked for more men for new settlements, but you did not say how many men you need and for what purpose. We cannot say anything definite at this time. 70 The request for high-quality trading goods was turned down, the reason given being that even if the Russian American Company had a greater supply to offer, the transportation cost would be double that for the goods brought to the northwest coast by the

English. Financially the company was not in a position to in• vest on a large enough scale to compete with the English. To convince Wrangell of this, the directors reminded him that the

Novo Arkhangelsk office had ended the year 1831 with a loss of

69wrangell to Board of Directors, April 10, 1834, #79, Records. 7°Board to Wrangell, March 31, 1833, #267, Records. 88

391,097 rubles, compared with a clear profit of 75,429 rubles in 1825.71

One of the ways in which Governor Wrangell was instruc• ted to cut costs was by keeping his purchases from American ships to an absolute minimum. However, by this time Wrangell saw more danger to his company from the Hudson*s Bay Company than from the Americans, and until a sufficient alternative source of supplies was found by the directors, he was very reluctant to discourage his American visitors. Moreover, he was not convinced that the directors would carry out alterna• tive supply arrangements effectively:

. . . So as to counteract the disadvantages here which prevent the Russian American Company from competing with the Hudson English, the Board of Directors intends to hire a ship in England to supply the colony with goods for the Kolosh . . . such a proposal pleases me greatly, but I shall be even more pleased when it is really implemented.

It would be an oversimplification to consider the Russian American Company and the Hudson*s Bay Company to be equivalent examples of government-controlled monopolies pro• moting the territorial ambitions of the empires to which they belonged. The two companies differed both in their relations with their respective governments and in the personalities of the men who governed and directed them. Wrangell*s relations

71lbid.. #268.

72Wrangell to Board, April 10, 1834, #79, Records. 89 with his company superiors illustrate some of these differ• ences. According to his correspondence with the directors, Wrangell always awaited approval for new projects and carried out instructions faithfully even while expressing serious doubts about the wisdom and even the consistency of the directors* policy decisions. Colonial leaders of the Hudson*s Bay Company, in contrast, took more authority into their own hands. George Simpson took personal charge of company expan• sion northwards around 1829; only when his plans were already being carried out did he refer matters to London. In terms of its procedures, the Russian firm was more tightly bound to government management; after 1819 its governors were chosen exclusively from the ranks of Imperial Navy captains and its affairs were directly subordinated to the finance ministry, which exercised thorough control- of all its activities.' ° British companies exhibited more freedom from .government con• trol in the degree to which they were allowed to compete one against another, sometimes even to the detriment of the inter• ests of empire expansion, as in the refusal of the East India Company to allow the North West Company to sell its furs in Canton.74

As Wrangell was writing his letters to the directors in early 1834, he knew that a new and dangerous challenge to

'^J. S. Galbraith, The Hudson*s Bay Company as an Im• perial Factor. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1957, P. 115. ?4Howay, OP. cit.. (1933), pp. 119 - 120. 90

Russian trade was soon to come from the direction of the Hud- son's Bay Company. He had learned that the previous autumn Peter Ogden had sailed up the Stikine River in Russian terri• tory in order to find a suitable site for a post to be located just inside the English frontier. In 1832 Ogden had denied rumours of such a plan knowing well that Wrangell would oppose the establishment of a post so close to the Russian boundary that many furs would be diverted away from the Russians. It was a difficult position indeed for Wrangell, as he had been denied a sufficient supply of trading goods from home or even the opportunity to buy in quantity from the Americans. More• over, according to the treaty of 1825, Britain had the right for all time to sail in the rivers and streams which passed through the lisiere.7^

Lacking any sure means of resistance, Wrangell decided that somehow he would have to prevent the Hudson's Bay Company from setting up a post on the Stikine. In his letter to the directors, he expresses the hope that any new treaty replacing the 1825 convention upon its expiry in 1835 would limit free sailing to the downstream direction - an unrealistic hope in view of the fact that the original clause guaranteed free sail• ing "for all time." In the meantime Wrangell vowed to "stop the English by force" if they attempted to sail up the Stikine.

75xhe lisiere. or coastal strip, comprised the territory running northwestward from latitude 54°40IN. to the line drawn between Cape Spencer at Cross Sound and Mount Fairweather.

'Wrangell to Board, April 28, 1834, #190, Records. 91

Instead of applying force directly, which would have been a clear violation of the 1825 treaty, Wrangell chose to create a situation which would either cause the Hudsonfs Bay

Company men to turn around without setting up a post or would put the onus on them to force their way up the river. His method: to establish a small fort near the mouth of the Sti- kine. By one article of the treaty, neither side could land at a place occupied by the other without the permission of the resident commander. As visitors would be trading with the local Indians whether or not their vessel had actually put to shore, Governor Wrangell intended to take the broadest possible interpretation of the term "to land" in order to deny the Brit• ish permission to enter the river. He would attempt to stretch one article of the treaty far enough to circumvent the article guaranteeing free access to the interior.

The Hudson1s Bay Company schooner Dryad arrived with

Ogden and his men on June 18, 1834. While still several miles away from the newly established fort, Ogden was shown a procla• mation from Governor Wrangell notifying him that the provisions of the conventions had elapsed (which was not yet in fact the case), and that henceforth they would be barred from these waters. While the British had the right to navigate any rivers that crossed the lisiere, they could not pass a post without the permission of the commander.

After several days of strained discussions, made more difficult by the lack of competent interpreters, Ogden and his 92 men finally departed. It is highly probable that Ogden would not risk disobeying the Russian order primarily because of the manifest hostility of the Stikine Indians.^ Although an armed Russian brig was present, correspondence between its captain and Novo Arkhangelsk indicates clearly that the use of force was not contemplated.78 Nevertheless, it is quite pos• sible, as Ogden was to charge, that Lieutenant Zarembo saw fit to threaten to prevent the Dryad from anchoring in the river, by force if necessary.

There would seem to be little basis for ChevignyTs contention that Wrangell wanted the British to force their way up the river, thereby giving the Russians an excuse to scrap the treaty entirely.79 This tactic would have been to Wran• gell *s advantage only if he had had a supply of provisions, trading goods and other needed equipment sufficient to enable the Russians to enter into open trading competition with the

English. However, a dispatch from the directors not long be• fore had requested that Wrangell refrain from such open competition.ou

77Tompkins, Alaska, p. 153. 78Etolin to Lieutenant Zarembo, June 13, 1834, in Alaska Boundary Tribunal: Proceedings. Vol. II, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1904, p. 270. 79chevigny, Russian America, p. 190.

8oBoard to Wrangell, March 31, 1833, #267, Records. 93

The Hudson's Bay Company's claim for damages arising out of the "Dryad affair," which amounted to 250,000 rubles, led to extended negotiations which served to delay action on proposals for cooperation in fur trading and the supply of pro• visions to Novo Arkhangelsk. The year 1834 might otherwise have been appropriate for the two companies to reach an agree• ment regarding supply, as the Russian treaty with the Americans terminated at that time. The Russians lost no time in barring American ships from shoreline waters in an attempt to reduce the liquor and arms traffic, but this ban was ineffective with• out adequate means of enforcement. As for arriving at an agreement with the Hudson's Bay Company, the Russians were understandably very cautious in the face of the vigorous ef• forts of the English to intercept the furs passing to the coast by way of the Stikine, a policy considered unfair in view of the abundance of land controlled by the British further to the south.

In his reply to the Hudson's Bay Company claim, the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Karl Nesselrode, made a damag• ing admission. He acknowledged that the authorities in the Russian settlements in Alaska had ". . . acted in a manner far from the intentions of the Imperial government .... It appears . . . the latter were mistaken in the interpretation and application of some of the stipulations of the treaty of 1825 . . . Nesselrode denied that threats had been made,

0J-Nesselrode to Durham, Dec. 21, 1835, Alaska Boundary Tribunal: Proceedings. Vol. 2, pp. 287 - 288. 94 maintaining that the British demand for indemnity was in• applicable, Ogden having been prevented from ascending the Stikine through "an excess of prudence" rather than by threats of physical restraint.

Meanwhile the colony lost one of its most vigorous governors with the departure of Ferdinand Wrangell at the end of his term in 1835. His successor, Captain Ivan Kuprianov, took over at a time when uninterrupted colonial leadership would have been desirable in safeguarding and promoting the Russian fur trade at a time when the British were approaching.

On the other hand, a man with Wrangellfs intimate knowledge of colonial affairs could be of great benefit to the company in St. Petersburg, especially when negotiations were expected concerning the "Dryad Affair."

Wrangell returned to Russia by way of Mexico, where he did his best to obtain the secession of a fertile valley adja• cent to the Ross settlement. The Mexican authorities expressed willingness to agree to the proposal, in return for official recognition of the new Mexican regime. When in his verbal re• port to the tsar, Wrangell referred to the example of Prussia, which while officially refusing to recognize the new republic, had nevertheless concluded profitable trading agreements indir• ectly, Nicholas was quick to interrupt: "For Prussia, profits come before honour, but for me it is the other way round."

°^Entsiklopedicheskii slovar1, Vol. VII, St. Peters burg, Efron, 1892, p. 338. 95

Thus it turned out that Wrangell had really nothing to offer to the Mexicans. Upon Wrangell*s arrival in St. Petersburg, he was appointed to head the department which managed the supply of timber for naval ship-building. While this post was related to the problem of supplying the Russian colony in Alaska, it was rather far removed from actual involvement in the manage• ment of the Russian American Company, where Wrangell's know• ledge of company problems could have been applied most effectively.

The directors of the Russian American Company felt un• derstandably betrayed by Nesselrode's admission that they had been guilty of violating the 1825 treaty, continuing however to resist the almost certain outcome, free British navigation, by pressing for a counterclaim against the Hudson's Bay Company based on Ogden's admitted use of liquor in meeting American competition during the summer of 1832.

The Hudson's Bay Company continued to press its advan• tage through diplomatic correspondence, while in 1836 the Coun• cil of its Northern Department passed a resolution to proceed with plans for establishing a post on the Stikine from the 81 east. One way or another, the Hudson's Bay Company was de• termined to capture the fur trade of the Stikine area. Thus, when Chief Factor Duncan Finlayson came to Sitka in September,

"'As early as 1834, J. McLeod had reached the head• waters of the Stikine River by an overland route. 96

1836 with attractive offers of grain and a request that free access to British territory be granted—proposals that would solve the Russian American Company supply problem while forcing the Americans out of the coastal trade—Governor Kuprianov was hard put to oppose him. Kuprianov knew well that the Americans could sell goods to the Indians at under cost prices only when they knew that they could cover themselves from sales in Novo Arkhangelsk. Kuprianov could not act unilaterally to accept the proposal, however, as any long term agreement would have to be made between London and St. Petersburg. Dependence on a single foreign company would be more risky than having the choice of several independently competing shipping firms. In any case, recent trade with American ships had furnished the colony with a two year supply of everything except tobacco, so there was for once no urgent need for provisions. Finlayson found out in Sitka that the Russian American Company had con• tracted for supplies with the single Boston firm that showed the least interest in engaging in the fur trade. This agree• ment inadvertently helped the British, as it further undermined the profits to be made by other American visitors to the coastal straits.

The end of American trade in Novo Arkhangelsk was near. Finlayson and the Nereide were very effective in competing with the LaGrange and the Joseph Peabodv during the summer of 1836.

Russian relations with the Americans were becoming more and more strained because of the continued violation of the ban on 97 the trade of liquor and arms to the Indians. The American sailors were trading as much of the latter on the sly as they could, restrained only by their need to ensure that the bills issued to them for supplies be honoured in St. Petersburg. In 1836 the Russians began to take firm action by seizing the American ship Loriot. which was then ordered away under threats of force. This incident gave rise to lively protests within the United States. A diplomatic note from Count Nesselrode finally disposed of the argument on March 21, 1838. The United States could not avoid a diplomatic rebuff at that time, and lost the right to sail in Russian waters. There was little that could be done in any case, as the Hudson's Bay Company had already effectively undermined American trade with the natives along the northwest coast by reducing the price of goods for the natives when American ships were present, a tactic causing financial set backs which the relatively small shipping com• panies could not survive for long, dependent as they were on trade in that one area. By the latter part of 1837, United States vessels no longer found it profitable to visit Russian America. The course of American trade in Novo Arkhangelsk during the final years is shown in the last section of Khleb• nikov' s table, which illustrates the frequency and extent ot

Russian trade with American ships from 1826 to 1830.84 Less detailed data for the remaining years, 1831 - 1837, are taken principally from the correspondence of the Russian governors in the Records and may not be comprehensive. 97a

Year Ship Captain Price (piasters) Mode of payment Price /pelt

1826 Sultan Hammet 17,550.55 10,000 seals 1.75 & goods Chinchilla Meek 19,092.40 10,778 seals 1.75 Tally Ho McGill 2,873.30 1,603 seals 1.75 1827 Tally Ho McGill 7,462.61 4,264 seals 1.75 14,875.00 for ship 8,500 seals 1.75 Courier Cunningham 9,400.9 2 5,000 seals 1.625 & goods worth 1,275.92 Active Cumming 8,253.65 4,716 seals 1.75 Treyton Bryant 4,191.89 2,395 seals 1.75 Chinchilla Meek 23,227.39 10), 000 seals 9 materials worth 4,545.90 Diana Blanchard 28,108.68 13,625 seals 1.75 1828 Sultan Allen 9,461.25 4,000 seals 1.75 Washington Carter 5,650.87 1,100 seals 1.75 1,345.87 400 seals 2.75 & 80 poods copper 16.00 Chinchilla Meek 15,514.60 7,354 seals 1.75 & goods

1829 Herald Hammett 2,272.17 1,298 seals 1.75 Volunteer Taylor 296.60 materials Plant Steele 7,031.50 4,018 seals 1.75 Alabama Debrot 905.30 410 fir spars

84 Khlebnikov, op. cit., p. 100. 98

Year Ship Captain Price (piasters) Mode of payment

1830 Sultan Genseman 10,949.75 6,257 seals 1.75 Convoy Thompson 27.00 materials

For the years 1831 to 1837, payment was made almost exclu• sively in bills of exchange payable in St. Petersburg rather than furs:

1831 Wm Little Carter 907.69 (English) Diana Jones 12,618.00 Crusader J. Meek 2,123.00 Smirna Barker 14,657.41 Lama McNeill 4,090.15 Bolivar- Liberator Underwood 5,583.48 Crusader Isaacs 12,888.13 Diana Little - 14,000.00 1832 Hamilton Barker 41,314.41 1834 Diana ) 14,932.19 LaGrange Snow Peabody Moore Bolivar- Liberator 1836 Peabody Moore 6,768.81 LaGrange Snow 8,646.99

Europa Benton) R , (both ships owned by

Diana Carter) 504.43 Mr# French of Boston) LaGrange Snow 2,367.89 1837 Hamilton Barker 40,408.69

Upon receiving FinlaysonTs report on his voyage of

1836, John McLoughlin, the Chief Factor of the Hudson's Bay

Company in Fort Vancouver, became convinced that the trade of the whole northwest coast would soon fall into British hands. Kuprianov's guardedly encouraging response of Finlay-

son's proposals and the likelihood that the Americans would

soon decide to quit the fur trade lent weight to McLoughlin's

conviction. In order to preserve Russian good will in the 99 meantime, he ordered his officers to respect Russian terri• torial rights. At the same time, however, he requested per• mission from London to renew the Stikine venture. McLoughlin's optimism was well founded. While the Americans step by step were dropping out of the coastal trade in 1837, British returns were good, despite tribal wars and a serious outbreak of smallpox among the natives.

By this time there was no point in continuing to bar British passage into the lower Stikine, as the men of the Hudson's Bay Company were penetrating the region from another direction. In 1838 Robert Campbell was sent from the east side of the coastal mountains to renew the Hudson's Bay Com• pany's attempt to set up a post on the Stikine. Consequently, Governor Kuprianov informed John McLeod, a Hudson's Bay Com• pany representative whom he encountered on a voyage to Cali• fornia during the summer of that year that the British might in future use the river without hindrance.

The Hudson's Bay Company continued to press its claim over the Dryad incident, however, as the Russian American Company maintained its efforts to solve its basic problem of supply. Both of these outstanding issues were finally resolved by a general agreement arrived at in February, 1839, which in• cluded the lease of the Alaskan lisiere. The lease agreement and its significance are discussed in the following chapter. CHAPTER VII

THE LEASE OF THE LISIERE. 1839

On February 6, 1839* an agreement was signed in

Hamburg by George Simpson and Ferdinand Wrangell which finally settled the Dryad affair while guaranteeing the colony a steadier supply of goods to replace that which until 1837 had been furnished by the Americans. By the terms of the agree• ment, the Russians ceded the lisiere for a period of ten years from June 1, 1840. The British were to take over the Russian post at the mouth of the Stikine and could build their own posts, which would be turned over to the Russians on the ex• piration of the ten year term. The Hudson1s Bay Company would pay an annual rental of two thousand land-otter skins, and would sell the Russians a quantity of up to two thousand addi• tional land-otters from the west side of the Rockies at 23 shillings a skin and up to three thousand land-otters a year from east of the mountains at 32 shillings a skin. Further, the British agreed not to trade furs on the islands off the coastal strip or on the Russian territory to the north. The

Hudson's Bay Company undertook to supply two thousand fanegas of wheat (one fanega equals one hundred and twenty six pounds) in 1840 , and four thousand fanegas annually thereafter. Flour, beans, barley, ham, salt beef and butter were to be supplied at fixed prices. Payment for goods was to be made in bills of exchange drawn on St. Petersburg. Finally, the Hudson's Bay

Company renounced its claim over the Stikine incident. 101

The lease has been described as a triumph for Wrangell personally and as a windfall for the Russian American Company.

Tikhmenev writes:

The results of the negotiations fulfilled the expectations of Baron Wrangell that Mr. Simpson would be prepared to back down in many areas so that friendly relations between the companies could be maintained. Having personally governed the domain of the Hudson's Bay Company for many years, he (Simpson) knew what an advantage the Russian American Company enjoyed over the English• men in areas of contact, and consequently could not help but be afraid of giving the Russian a pretext to act in their turn to the detriment of his countrymen. ->

Some Western historians have also chosen to emphasize the advantages of the lease for the Russian American Company. Davidson, for example, states that

The Russian American Company considered it advan• tageous, because it allowed them to forget the threat of American competition, avoided occasions for hostile collisions with the Hudson's Bay Com• pany and solved some of its major problems of provisioning, supplies, and marketing.®6

As to the primary motivation for the lease, North

American scholars have generally held to the view that com• mercial considerations were foremost. John S. Galbraith

"^Tikhmenev, Istoricheskoe obozrenie, vol. 1, p. 267. 86 Davidson, D. C. "Relations of the Hudson's Bay Com• pany with the Russian American Company on the Northwest Coast 1829-1867," The British Columbia Historical Quarterly. 5, No.l P. 49. 102 maintains that "there is no reason to suspect that the agree• ment was dictated by political considerations."87 A close examination of the available documents suggests that each of the foregoing conclusions is misleading. Let us now return to I838 to trace the development of the lease agreement.

The seemingly endless diplomatic correspondence over the Dryad affair had continued to drag on into I838. Count

Nesselrode had succeeded in drawing out the argument over the incident, first by contending that Peter Skene Ogden had de• cided against entering the Stikine on account of native hostil• ity rather than the Russian prohibition, and later by citing alleged earlier British violations of the 1825 treaty.

Meanwhile the Hudson's Bay Company was renewing its efforts to conciliate the Russians and woo them with offers of quality goods. The general features of Simpson's proposals had been well known ever since his letter of 1829, in which he had offered to provide goods of high quality for the express purpose of putting down unfair rivalry from the Americans, but for reasons already outlined in this paper, action had been long delayed. Suspicion of British motives, indecisiveness on the part of the directors, and, most of all, the hope of find• ing a reliable alternative to dependence on any foreign source had postponed ultimate decision on the problem. The Hudson's

0/Galbraith, The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor, p. 154. 103

Bay Company's continued optimism was encouraged by Finlayson's visit to Novo Arkhangelsk in 1836. In March, I838, George Simpson described the prospect of arriving at a trading agree- 00 ment as "more than probable." Later that year George Simpson together with John Pelly, the Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company in London, having grown impatient of further delay, decided to try to hasten the conclusion of an agreement by travelling to St. Petersburg themselves to enter into direct talks with the directors of the Russian American Company. They arrived in St. Petersburg on August 27, but it was not until August 31 that they were able to arrange an interview with the board of directors. The directors showed much inter• est, but seemed evasive, informing Pelly and Simpson that they could not make any final decision until the arrival of Ferdi• nand Wrangell, who according to Galbraith had "apparently 8Q become the most powerful member of the board." y Similarly,

E. E. Rich writes that "questions of trade were closely con•

trolled by Baron Wrangell." in fact Wrangell was only just

returning to Russian American Company activity in September,

I838, as is shown by a letter which he wrote to the directors

of the company after the talks with Simpson and Pelly had

already commenced. That the directors were unwilling to act

Simpson to Gentlemen Chief Factors and Chief Traders of Columbia and New Caledonia, March 7, 1838, Doc.4/23, Hud• son's Bay Company archives as cited in Galbraith, oj>. ext., p. 151. 89 Galbraith, op_. ext., p. 151. Rich, History of the Hudson's Bay Company, p. 650. 104

without him even before he had actually joined the board

testifies to a markedly low level of morale and ability in

the leadership of the Russian American Company. Wrangell's

low opinion of the directors is evident from his reaction

upon being invited to become a member of the board. This

letter, which is to be found among the recently discovered

part of the Yudin collection, is evidently a reply to his

appointment by the general meeting of shareholder's held on

September 24, 1838:

. . . Now I should like to suggest what the word "consultation" means to me. 1. I ask that affairs concerning the colonies be decided in absolutely no other manner than by by consultation with me. 2. So that I will be in a position to survey affairs in all their aspects, I would ask that all incoming colonial dispatches be brought to me for my examination, and that my signature be affixed to all outgoing documents in that sector. and 3. With the same end in view, that all papers of past years be made available to me as well.91

Wrangell's talks with the representatives of the

Hudson's Bay Company were limited to the question of trade,

as it turned out that the issue of damages could not even be

discussed without the participation of Count Nesselrode, the

foreign minister, who was not in St. Petersburg at the time.

Pelly proposed that the Russians agree for a term to purchase

y*Wrangell to board, September 27, 1838, Central State Historical Archive, Leningrad, Mordvinov collection (994), index 2, item 865. from the Hudson's Bay Company the goods it had been customar• ily buying from the Americans, that the sale of arms, ammuni• tion, and liquor be forbidden, and that the two companies should confine their trade to their respective territories. The American competitors would thus be deprived of their income and the two companies could operate profitably without friction.

While not objecting in principle, Wrangell strove hard to lower the wheat prices offered, maintaining that he could buy wheat on better terms from California. However, he was unsuccessful in this attempt, as Pelly had discovered that the Russians had refused to renew permission for the Americans to engage in the coastal tradea and had decided not to buy supplies from them in future. Nevertheless, Wrangell also held firm, and the talks had almost broken off before Pelly came up with a very attractive new proposal; to supply land-otter skins which the Russians needed for their domestic markets and for their trade with China. Normally the Russian American Company would have had to pay competitive prices and import duties on them.

So attractive did this proposal appear at this stage to V/rangell that he brought up the idea of a lease, suggest• ing that the Hudson's Bay Company might lease the southern coastal area of the Russian colony in return for a supply of land-otters. After Simpson had returned to London, he and Wrangell began an exchange of correspondence regarding the 106 possible details of such a pact. Virtual agreement was Q 9 reached by the beginning of December. In answer to the latter message, Simpson suggested that remaining difficulties could quickly be overcome at a personal meeting between the two men before SimpsonTs return to Canada. On the government level, exchanges concerning the Dryad incident had continued, but the British government was becoming impatient. When Milbanke, the British rep• resentative in St. Petersburg, refusing to be led into further side issues, insisted on treating the Stikine affair on its own merits,93 Count Nesselrode could not deny in the final analysis that the Russian authorities had indeed re• fused passage to the British into the Stikine, instead of issuing a protest after the fact, as they would have had every right to do under the provisions of the treaty. Close attention to the chronology of Russian government corres• pondence during 1838 indicates that Nesselrode had not merely run out of arguments, but was acting in accordance with direct orders from the tsar. In his letter

92Simpson to Wrangell, November 27, 1838, Doc. 4/25, HudsonTs Bay Company Archives, as cited in Galbraith, op. cit.. p. 154; and Wrangell to Simpson, December 14, 1838, referred to in Alaska Boundary Tribunal: Appendix to the Case of the United States. Papers relating to the lease . . . , p. 4.

93Mi lbanke to Nesselrode, October 6, 1838, Alaska Boundary Tribunal, Appendix to the Case of the United States, P. 304. 107 to the Minister of Finance, Count Egor Kankrin, on December 9,

I838, Nesselrode reveals that as early as March of that year

Nicholas had decided not to support the Russian American Com-

i pany further in its dispute, and that the Minister of Finance, under whose control the company operated, had been so informed:

. . . I consider it my duty to refer to my report of March 19th in which I had the honour of inform• ing you, that His Imperial Majesty, after having duly considered the matter, was pleased to admit that it would be more in accord with the rules of strict justice to admit the principles on which the claim is based and to enter into negotiations with the Hudson's Bay Company in regard to the amount of the indemnification claimed by the Com• pany, rather than to continue a dispute, which we shall be obliged utlimately to give in to because the clear provisions of the treaty are not calcu• lated to strengthen the side we have defended

until now.94c

Count Kankrin would not have been likely to support the Russian American Company and may have influenced the tsar in this matter. Recent historians in America and the Soviet

Union emphasize the conservative economic policies of Nicholas'

Finance Ministerh W. L. Blaekwell describes Kankrin's career as typifying ". . . the inconsistency, paralysis of will, and lack of motivation in the industrial policy of the Russian state during this period" by his "... consistent refusal to divert any significant funds to industrial development."^

^Nesselrode to Kankrin, December 9> 1838, Alaska Blundary Tribunal: Appendix to the Case of the United States. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1903, p. 307.

*^A discussion of this revised view of Kankrin's 108

Nesselrode*s above-mentioned letter to Kankrin goes on to suggest that the Russian American Company should "... enter into friendly negotiations with the Hudson's Bay Company 96 for a settlement of the damage claims." John S. Galbraith concludes from this: "these were not the words of a man inti• mately acquainted with the progress already made by the com• panies themselves toward settlement of the dispute," and hence that the agreement was motivated solely by commercial consid• erations. 97 In this passage Galbraith is endeavoring to refute Okun's contention that the agreement was primarily the result of the tsar's desire not to risk a diplomatic clash with Eng• land at a time when Russia was considering armed intervention 08 in Turkey. Quite correctly Okun is criticized for his faulty chronology in stating that "precisely" at the time of the

Simpson-Wrangell negotiations, "between August 1839 and July

1840," the Russian ambassador in London was trying to promote an understanding on the Straits question when in fact the com- 99 panies had reached substantial agreement long before this. policieNevertheless cans untibe founl Nesselrode'd in W. L. s Blackwellletter th,e Thissue Beginninge of damages osf Russian Industrialization 1800-1860. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 140 - 144.

96AI aska Boundary Tribunal, loc. cit. 97 Galbraith, op. cit.. pp. 154 - 155.

980kun, pjDj. cit. . pp. 218 - 219. 99oalbraith, op. cit.. p. 450, n. 58. 109 had been avoided. This is one indication that government intervention played a role in the negotiations.

The argument that the lease was not primarily the result of commercial considerations can be supported by a more indirect line of reasoning. While the main features of the lease agreement had been worked out before the res• pective governments were officially consulted, it is important to bear in mind that agreements negotiated between rivals generally reflect the bargaining strength enjoyed by each side. Although both Wrangell and Simpson earned reputations as shrewd negotiators, the inferior bargaining power of the Russian American Company was largely determined by the tsarist government's decision not to give whole-hearted support to the company over the Stikine affair.

In contrast to the Russian company, the Hudson's Bay Company was in a very favorable situation in the late 1830s. Under confident, imaginative leadership and with reliable supply lines, the latter enterprise was continuing its advance to the north and west. As we have seen, the British company was planning to gain control of the coastal trade with the natives by an inland route to the Stikine region without waiting for formal permission should negotiations with the Russians prove fruitless. Instead of the Russian American Company enjoying an advantage over the Hudson's Bay Company, as Tikhmenev, the company's official historian optimistically described the situation, uu the real advantage was entirely on the other side.

The advantages which the Russian American Company obtained from the lease—peace with the Hudson's Bay Company and a more reliable source of supplies—were more than over• shadowed by the fact that the Russians were now prevented from increasing their fur harvest from the lisi^re. Only through an increase in land furs could the Russians have off• set the steady depletion in fur seals, which were the most valuable fur resource in the marine areas still under Russian

American Company control.1^"*"

The lease of the panhandle was neither to the company's long term advantage nor were its causes strictly commercial in character.

1G0Tikhmenev, op. cit.. vol. 1, p. 267.

101Tikhmenev, op. cit.. vol. 1, p. 239, 327; vol. 2, pp. 221. CONCLUSION

Foreign trade, though small by comparison with the total turnover of capital, played an important part in the history of Russian American Company activities in North

America. Having started as a stop-gap emergency measure, it continued while the company tried to find alternative means of supplying the colony from Russia or California. It was recognized from the first that commercial dealings with

foreign visitors could cut costs tremendously. However, the directors of the company were continually suspicious of the dangers inherent in trading with prime rivals for the riches of northwestern America. There were two reasons for their

apprehension. They considered that self-sufficiency would be desirable in case of strains in Russian-American or Russian-

British relations. Secondly, they were aware that American

ships, through their trade of arms, ammunition and liquor,

were making inroads into Russian sources of furs while endan•

gering Russian relations with the natives. Later the tactics

of the Hudson's Bay Company, while eliminating the American

abuses, gave rise to another danger—that the English would

be able to divert furs from Russian coastal areas by means of

trading goods of superior quality. It was the misfortune of

the Russian American Company never to succeed in finding an

alternative to foreign sources of supply. Various influences

contributed to this result: the conservatism of government

and company officials, the stagnation of the Russian economy 112

as a whole, the serious mismanagement of the company's finan•

cial affairs and Russia's position in international politics.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, Baron Wran•

gell 's bargaining position in the negotiations leading to the lease of the panhandle was weak. There would seem to be no other explanation for the fact that this energetic former

governor of the Alaskan colony, who had been willing to risk violationsof the Russian-English treaty of 1835 by preventing the British from entering the Stikine, was by 1838, four years later, prepared to cede the whole panhandle. Without a doubt he was one man who with government support might have altered the fortunes of the company. But government support was lack• ing. If in addition we recall his frustration with the dir•

ectors while he was governor, his failure to persuade the tsar to consider dealing with the Mexican republican govern• ment to save California, and perhaps even his recent experi•

ence running a government department, it is not surprising that he settled for immediate commercial benefits rather than

continuing to pursue the dream of an independently prosperous

Russian enterprise in North America.

It may be objected that too much attention has been paid in this study to the internal problems of the Russian

American Company, when in the end it was Nicholas' decision

to conciliate England that determined the outcome of the negotiations which regularized foreign trade. Whether supply

from Russia to the colony was economically feasible cannot be 113 decided definitely on the basis of the limited data at our disposal. However, the answer does depend on the extent to which the government was willing to support the Russian Ameri• can Company. If the company had been efficiently managed and had avoided the taint of involvement in the Decembrist affair, its interests might well have received higher priority in the allocation of government resources. While this conclusion is at best tentative, the relevance of internal aspects of the company's history should not be disregarded.

The final decision to regularize trade with the

Hudson's Bay Company signified that the Russians had given up hope of solving the supply problem. Foreign trade in

Alaska took a new turn with the 1839 lease of the panhandle to the company's chief competitor. It was to be only a matter of time before other world powers would draw appropriate con• clusions from the evident Russian willingness to trade away control of territory in return for short-term benefits in the colony and favour with other governments. APPENDIX

NOTES ON THE SOURCE MATERIAL

The only primary source in North America for this paper is the Records of the Russian American Company. 1802- 1867 * which are kept in the National Archives of the United States of America, and are to be found in microfilm copy at several North American universities. These Records include the correspondence of the Russian American Company governors in Novo Arkhangelsk with the main office of the company in St. Petersburg and communications received from the Hudson's Bay Company.

Several documents in Moscow and Leningrad State Archives proved to be useful, and considerable information has been obtained from the few valuable research works on the subject, especially that of P. Tikhmenev, Istoricheskoe obozrenie . . . Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii (Historical Survey ... of the Russian American Company), which contains much economic information not elsewhere available, as the author had access to the archives of the main office of the company, which disappeared later in the nineteenth century.

As the Records have a gap lasting from 1802 to 1816, there has been a decided lack of knowledge about company activities during the period of the first company charter (1799-1819). Consequently, the discovery of the Istoricheskii kalendar1 Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii. 1747-1817 gg.. (Historical Calendar of the Russian American Company, 1747-

1817) is of great interest, as it considerably clarifies the

economic position of the company during the first period.

The existence of this document was known before its supposed discovery in 1957 (see page 43n.); however, it has only re• cently received attention from Soviet scholars.

Also important for its detailed first-hand informa• tion on foreign maritime trade in Alaska is K. Khlebnikov's

Zapiski o koloniakh v Amerike Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii.

(Notes on the Russian American Company's American Colony), part of which was published in a supplement to Morskoi Sbornik

(Marine Journal) in St. Petersburg in 1861-1862. The greater part of these notes is presently located in manuscript form in the archives of the State Geographical Society in Leningrad.

A concise general survey of significant archival and

secondary sources in the Soviet Union is given in the preface

to Professor S. B. Okun's Rossiisko-amerikanskaia kompaniia

(The Russian American Company), the only fairly comprehensive modern Russian work on the company, which deals with its role

as an instrument of tsarist foreign policy. However, several

of Okun's source references are out of date owing to the fact

that Soviet archives have undergone reorganization in recent years, with some documents being transferred to different

archives. For example, the documents cited by Okun in ANKh

(Archive of the People's Economy) in Moscow and AVPK i B

(Archive of Internal Politics, Culture, and Way of Life) in 116

Leningrad now form part of TsGADA (Central State Archive for Ancient Documents) in Moscow, the former institutions having been superseded in the course of general reorganization. One addition which should be made to Okun's survey is the small collection of papers dealing with economic aspects of company activity, discovered in Krasnoyarsk in 1957 among the papers of G. V. Yudin and since transferred to TsGADA.

As to English language references on Alaskan history, particular mention should be made of the general works of H. H. Bancroft, H. Chevigny, and S. R. Tompkins given in the bibliography.

Much information on Hudson's Bay Company history and relations between British and Russian fur companies is to be found in the works of E. E. Rich, and the documents published in connection with the Alaska Boundary Tribunal of 1901 and the Fur Seal Arbitration of 1895. The latter government pub• lications are the only English language works which pay ade• quate attention to Russian sources. One of the main short• comings of modern scholarship in this field, both in the West and in the Soviet Union, is failure to consult foreign language sources, resulting in the perpetuation of certain misconceptions, and ignorance as to recent discoveries. BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following list includes those works which have proven useful in the preparation of this paper, and is not exhaustive.

Section I: Government Publications

Alaska Boundary Tribunal: The Case of the United States. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903. Appendix to the Case of the United States. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903. : Protocols. Oral Arguments. Award of the Tribunal. and Opinions of its Members. London, Harrison and Sons, 1903. Fur-Seal Arbitration: Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1895.

Section II: Books

Adamov, A. G. Po neizvedannvm putjam. Moscow, Gos. Uch.- ped, izd., 1950.

. Perwe russkie issledovateli Aliaski. Moscow, Gos. Uch.- ped. izd., 1950. Afanasiev, D. Rossiisko-amerikanskaia vladeniia. Parts 1, 2. St. Petersburg, 1864. Anderson, A. C. History of the Northwest Coast. Typewritten copy in the University of British Columbia Library. (The original is located in the Academy of Pacific Coast History, University of California.) 1878.

Andreev, A. I., ed. Russkie otkrvtiia v Tikhom okeane i severnoi Amerike v XVIII veke. Moscow, Gos. Izd. Geog. Lit., 1943.

Andrews, C. L. The Story of Alaska. Caldwell, Idaho, Caxton Printers, 1938. 118

Bancroft, H. H. The History of Alaska. San Francisco, The History Company, 1886.

. The History of British Columbia. San Francisco, The History Company, 1890. Barbeau, Marius. Pathfinders in the North Pacific. Toronto, Ryerson, 1958.

Bellingsgauzen, F. F. Dvukratnoe izvskanie. Parts 1, 2. St. Petersburg, 1831. Berkh, V. N. Khronologicheskaia istoriia otkrvtiia Aleutskikh ostrov. St. Petersburg, Akad. Nauk, 1823.

Caughey, J. History of the Pacific Coast. Los Angeles, Published privately by the author, 1933.

Chernenkov, M. B. et al. Puteshestviia i issledovaniia leitenanta Lavrentiia Zagoskina v Russkoi Amerike v 1842-1844 godakh. Moscow, Gos. Izd. Geog. Lit., 1956.

Chevigny, H. Lord of Alaska. Portland, Binfords & Mort, 1951.

. Lost Empire. Portland, Binfords & Mort, 1958.

. Russian America. New York, Viking, 1965. Corney, P. Voyages in the Northern Pacific. Honolulu, Thrum, 1896.

Del Mar, A. Money and Civilization. London, Bell & Sons, 1886.

Efimov, A. V., ed. Atlas geograficheskikh otkrvtii v Sibiri i severo-zapadnoi Amerike s XVII po XVIII v. Moscow, Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1945.

. Iz istorii velikikh russkikh geograficheskikh otkrvtii. Moscow, Gos. Izd. Geog. Ltd., 1950. Essig, E. 0. The Russians in California. San Francisco, California Historical Society, 1933. Galbraith, J. S. The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1957. Golder, F. A. A Guide to Materials for American History in Russian Archives. Volumes 1, 2. Washington, Carnegie Institute, 1917, 1937. 119

Golovnin, V. M. Puteshestvie vokrug sveta . . . na voennom shliupe "Kamchatke" v 1817. 1818. i 1819 godakh. Parts 1, 2. St. Petersburg, Morsk. Tipograf., 1822.

Hulley, C. C. Alaska. 1741-19 53. Portland, Binfords & Mort, 1953.

Innis, H. A. The Fur Trade in Canada. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962.

Ivashintsova, N. Russkie krugosvetnve puteshestviia s 1803 DO 1849 g. St. Petersburg, Morsk. Tipograf., 1872.

Khlebnikov, K. T. Zhizneopisanie A. A. Baranova. St. Peters• burg, Naval Printing Office, 1835.

Langsdorff, G. H. Voyages and Travels in Various Parts of the World. (English translation.) Carlisle, Philips, 1817.

Lisianskii, Yu. A Voyage around the World in the Years 1803. 4. 5. and 6.(English translation.) London, Booth, 1814.

Lupach, V. S., ed. Russkie moreplavateli. Moscow, Ministerstvo Oborony, 1953.

Lutke, F. P. Puteshestvie vokrug sveta na voennom shliupe "Seniavin." 1826-29. Moscow, Gos. Izd. Geog. Lit., 1948.

Manning, C. A. Russian Influence on Early America. New York, Library Publishers, 1953.

Markov, A. Russkie na Vostochnom Okeane. St. Petersburg. Dimitrieva, 1856.

Markov, S. Letopis* Aliaski. Moscow-Leningrad, 1948.

Materialv dlia istorii russkikh zaselenii po beregam Vostoch- nogo Okeana. St. Petersburg, v Morskoi Tipografii, 1861.

Merk, F., ed. Fur Trade and Empire. George Simpson's Journal . . . 1824-25. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1931.

Mordvinov, N. S. Arkhiv Grafov Mordvinowkh. vol. 6.

. Izbrannve proizvedeniia. Moscow, OGIZ, 1945. (introductory article by F. M. Morozov.) 120 Okun1, S. B. Russian American Company, trans. C.Ginsburg, Harvard, 1951. 0kunT, S. B. Rossiisko-amerikanskaia kompaniia. Moscow- Leningrad, Gos. Sots.- ekon. Izd., 1939. Ormsby, M. A. British Columbia; a History. Toronto, Macmillan, 1958. Pavlov, P. N., ed. K istorii Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii. Krasnoiarsk, Krasnoiarsk State Archive, 1957.

Philips, C. H. The East India Company. 1784-18.14. Manchester, University Press, 1940. Pierce, R. A. Russia's Hawaiian Adventure. 1815-1817. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965. Rich, E. E. The History of the Hudson's Bay Company. 1670- 1870. London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1958. , ed. The Letters of John McLoughlin from Fort Van• couver to the Governor and Committee. First Series, 1825-38. London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1941.

. Simpson's 1828 Journey to the Columbia. London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1947. Shashkov, S. S. "Rossiisko-amerikanskaia kompaniia" in Sobranie sochinenii S. S. Shashkova. Book 4: Istoricheskie etiudi. St. Petersburg, 1898.

Shemelin, F. Zhurnal pervogo puteshestviia rossiian vokrug zemnogo shara. St. Petersburg, 1816, 1818. Slodkevich, V. S. Iz istorii otkrvtiia i osvoeniia russkimi Severozapadnoi Ameriki. Petrozavodsk, Gos. Izd. KFSSR, 1956. Tikhmenev, P. Istoricheskoe obozrenie obrazovaniia Rossiisko- amerikanskoi kompanii . . . vol. I, II. St. Peters• burg, Weimar, 1861, 1863. Tompkins, S. R. Alaska. Promvshlennik and Sourdough. Norman, Oklahoma, Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1945. Veselago, F. Kratkaia istoriia russkogo flota. Moscow- Leningrad, 1939.

Williams, W. A. American Russian Relations. 1781-1947. New York, Rinehart, 1952.

Zagoskin, L. Peshekhodnaia opis'. St. Petersburg, 1847. 121

Section III: Periodicals

Andrews, C. L. "Russian Plans for American Dominion," Washington Historical Quarterly. 18:83 - 92, 1927. Basanoff, V. "Archives of the Russian Church in Alaska in the Library of Congress," Pacific Historical Review. 2:72 - 84, 1933. Baskakov, E. F. et al. "Documents of the Russian American Company in the National Archive of the U.S.A." Istoriia SSSR. 5:212 - 216, 1963. Berg, L. S. "Otkrytiia," Tikhii Okean. Collection of Articles, Lengrad, Izd. Akad, Nauk SSSR, 1926.

Briukhanov, A. F. "K sud'be arkhiva Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii," Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR. 9-"37 - 38, 1934. Davidson, D. C. "Relations of the Hudson's Bay Company with the Russian American Company of the Northwest Coast, 1829 - 1867," The British Columbia Historical Quarterly 5, No.1:33 - 58, 1941. Howay, F. W. "A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1795-1804," Proceedings and Transactions of the Roval Society of Canada. Series III, 25:117 - 149, 1931 . "A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1805-14," Proceedings and Transactions of the Roval Society of Canada, Series III, 26:43 - 86, 1932. . "A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1815-18," Proceedings and Transactions of the Roval Society of Canada. Series III, 27:119 - 147, 1933

. "International Aspects of the Maritime Fur Trade," Proceedings and Transactions of the Roval Society of Canada. Series III, 36:59 - 78, 1942. Inkersley, Arthur. "Alexander Baranof and the Russian Colonies of America," Overland Monthly. 7:9 - 22, 1897. Ireland, W. E. "James Douglas and the Russian American Com• pany, 1840," The British Columbia Historical Quarterly 5, No. 1:53 - 66, 1941. Kashevarov, A. F. "Otvet g. Yanovskomu na ego zametku o materialakh dlia istorii Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii," Morskoi Sbornik. 54:19 - 20, 1861. 122

Kerner, R. J. "Russian Expansion to America," Bibliographical Society of America. Papers. 25:111 - 129, 1931. Laut, Agnes C. "Alexander Baranof, Czar of Russian America," America Illustrated Magazine. 11:60 - 69, 1905.

Makarov, R. V. "Ekspeditsii russkikh promyshlennykh liudei v Tikhom Okeane

Shirokii, B. F. "Iz istorii khoziaistvennoi deiatelTnosti Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii," Istoricheskie Zapiski. 13:207 - 221, 1942. Shternberg, L. Ya. "Etnografiia," Tikhii Okean. Collection of articles, Leningrad, Izd, Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1926. Vavilov, M. I. "Poslednie dni v Russkoi Amerike," Russkaia Starina. 49, 50, 51, 1886. Vishniakov, N. "Rossiia, Kaliforniia, i Sandvicheskie ostrova," Russkaia Starina. 124:249 - 289, 1905. (cites Materialv dlia istorii russkikh zaselenii po beregam Vostochnogo okeana. I-IV, St. Petersburg, Morskoe Ministerstvo, 1861.) Wrangell, F. F. "Ferdinand Petrovich Wrangell," Entsiklo- pedicheskii slovar*. St. Petersburg, Efron, 1892. Yarmolinsky, A. "Studies in Russian Americana," Bulletin of the New York Public Library. 4:376 - 377, 1942. 123

Section IV: Unpublished Theses

Dahlstrom, Lawrence. The Attitude of the Russian-American Company under Baranov towards subordinate groups in Alaska. Seattle, University of Washington M.A. Thesis, 1962. Strausz, David A. The Russian-American Company to 1825. Seattle, University of Washington M.A. Thesis, 1962.

Section V: Archive Sources

A. Materials in Russian archives.

Each document is identified by the collection (fond) number, the index (opis') number, and the item (edinitsa khraneniia) number as used in Soviet archives. The cover descriptions for each document have been rendered here in word for word translation.

Baranov, A. A. Report to an unknown person'" addressed as "Ivan Alexandrovich" of the working out of a plan for an expedition to the coast of America, October, 1808, copy, 7 pages. TsGADA, Yudin collection (796), index 1, item 364. Buldakov, M. M. Notes on the willful trade of the English and Americans in Kamchatka and in Siberia, 1820, written copy, 5 pages. GPB, M. M. Speranskii archive (731), item 547. Golovnin, V. M. Report on the Russian-American colony Ross. Oct., 1825, original, 11 pages. TsGADA, Division XXIV, item 68.

Hagemeister, L. A. Report by the commander of the ship "Kutuzov" to the Board of Directors of the Russian

xFrom the report it is quite clear that the addressee was Ivan Alexandrovich Kuskov, Baranov's assistant, who was to take charge of the expedition along the west coast. 124

American Company regarding unsuccessful trade talks with officials of the city of Lima, April, 1817, copy, 8 pages. TsGADA, Yudin collection (796), index 1, item 172.

Kankrin, Ye. F. Letter from Kankrin, the Minister of Finance, to N. S. Mordvinov concerning the shortage of goods in the colonies of the Russian American Company and the supply of provisions to Kamchatka, November, 1823, original, 1 page. TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 845.

. Report of the State Council of the Department of the Economy on the new charter of the RAC, December, 1842, original, 17 sheets, TsGIAL, collection (1152), index 3, item 185. Khlebnikov, K. Notes concernhg the colonies of the RAC in America, January-February,2 rough duplicate specimen, 132 sheets, ARGO, Section 99, index 1, item 111. Kozodavlev, G. Papers concerning the RAC in various questions relating to it. January, 1819, copies, 2 pages. TsGIAL, Imperial Chancery archive (1409), index 1, item 2911. Krusenstern, A. Notes on the ports of Ross and San Francisco. October, 1821, copy, 2 pages. Division XXIV, item 68. (pages 12 and 12 reverse side of Golovninfs report; see under Golovnin.)

Rezanov, N. P. Outline of the formation, activity, and measures for the strengthening of the RAC. Beginning of the 19th century, copy, 16 sheets. GPB, Olenin archive, item 799. Rumiantsev, N. P. Notification of the Board of Directors of the RAC by the Minister of Commerce concerning the presentation of a loan of 25,000 rubles to the company; notification regarding consideration by the State Council of the Barber affair. August, 1802; May, 1813, unfinished copy, 2 sheets. TsGADA, collection 786, (sic)3 index 1, item 168.

Undated. Probably written circa 1832.

^Judging from the title and the item number, the • collection number should undoubtedly be 796, which refers to the Yudin collection elsewhere cited. 125

Startsov, F. P. Letter to N. S. Mordvinov from a shareholder concerning the fall in the value of shares in recent years. January, 1820, original, 4 sheets, TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 835. Vorontsov, A. R. Notes of the State Chancellor to Tsar Alexander I regarding government and trade and of measures towards their regularization. November, 1801, 12 sheets. TsGADA, Vorontsov archive (1261), item 803.

. Notes for a report of State Chancellor Vorontsov to Tsar Alexander I concerning privileges for RAC ships in foreign ports and of the necessity of con• sidering the issuance of instructions to the company, so as to avoid abuses in the advantage of private interests, capable of leading Russia into unpleasant •explanations1 to marine powers possessing colonies. February, 1803, 4 sheets, copy, TsGADA, Vorontsov archive (1261), item 808. Wrangell, F. Notification of the RAC Board of Directors in regard to his participation in the colonial affairs of the direction of the company. September, 1838, copy, 1 page. TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 865.

In addition to the foregoing listing by author, the following are RAC documents and records for which individual authors are not given.

Historical calendar of the RAC, 1741-1817. 1817, manuscript, 57 sheets. TsGADA, Yudin collection (796), index 1, item 160.

Report of the RAC Board of Directors to Tsar Alexander I concerning the activities of A. A. Baranov towards expanding the trade of the company. September, 1810, copy, 13 sheets. TsGADA, Yudin collection (796), index 1, item 161.. Representation by the RAC Council to Tsar Alexander I con• cerning the conclusion of a trading agreement with Spanish California for supplying the company's colonies. December, 1813, copy, 10 sheets. TsGADA, Yudin collection (796), index 1, item 163. 126

Notes on the bestowal of privileges to RAC ships of war by the East India Company, on the prohibition of the Negro trade and other points of international agree• ment. 1827, 4 sheets in French. TsGADA, Yudin collection (796), index 1, item 178.

Financial balance of the RAC as of January 1, 1804, and Jan. 1, 1812. Printed, 1 sheet. TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 827. Information regarding the trading expenditures of the RAC in Siberia and America for 1820-22: excerpts from the general balance as of January 1, 1820, and January 1, 1822. Original, 3 sheets, TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 836.

Estimate of the circulation of RAC capital for 1824. Original, 5 sheets. TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 847.

Capital balance (brief) of the RAC as of January 1, 1836. Original with attached remarks, 8 sheets. TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 861. Account by the RAC Board of Directors of trade and capital turnover in Russia for 1836 and 1837 and in the colonies, for 1835 and 1836. Printed, 6 sheets. TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 862.

B. Archival sources outside the Soviet Union.

National Archives of the U.S.A. Microfilm publications. Records of the Russian-American Company. 1802-1867, Rolls 1-77, (Microcopy No. 11 is located in the Library of the University of British Columbia). 127

Key to abbreviations used above:

TsGADA - Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnykh Aktov, (Central State Archive of Ancient Documents), Moscow. TsGIAL - Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii ArkhivvLeningrade, (Central State Historical Archive in Leningrad).

RAC Russian American Company.

GPB Gosudarstvennaia Publichnaia Biblioteka imeni M. E. Saltykova-Shchedrina v Leningrade. (State Public Library named after M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin.) Otdel rukopisei, (Manuscript department).

ARGO Arkhiv Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva, (Archive of the Russian Geographical Society), Leningrad.