PH.D DISSERTATION

Governing Pluralistic Societies: A Case Study of (1988-99)

Submitted by: Supervisor:

Lubna Batool Dr.Husnul Amin

Reg No.65-SS/PHDPIR/F11 Assistant Professor

Department of Politics & IR Faculty of Social Sciences INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD 2018

Governing Pluralistic Societies: A Case Study of

Pakistan (1988-99)

Lubna Batool

Registration No:65-SS/PHDPSIR/F11

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Ph.D in

Politics and International Relations at

the Faculty of Social Sciences

International Islamic University,

Islamabad

Supervisor Dr. Husnul Amin Assistant Professor, International Islamic University, Islamabad. May, 2018

DEDICATION

Dedicated To My Motherland ‘Pakistan’ As My All Possessions Belong To It

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank the Almighty Allah, the most beneficent, the most merciful for blessing me with the opportunity of conducting and completing this study.

I am highly obliged to my supervisor and teacher Dr. Husnul Amin for his suggestions and consistent guidance during completion of this research project. Apart from academics he taught me so many skills that are going to help me in life, long for the better management of my contributions to my area of study. His initiative, dedication, and work ethics have no match.

Besides Dr. Husnul Amin, I pay my special gratitude to Dr. Nabi Bux Jumani, Ex. Dean Faculty of Social Sciences and Professor Dr. Amna Mehmood, In charge of the Department of Politics and International Relations for their thoughtful suggestions and continuous support. They selflessly guided and remained a source of motivation and encouragement for me, Moreover their cooperation in administrative issues during my study in International Islamic University Islamabad cannot be overlooked.

I would like to extend my regards to the entire department’s staff in providing assistance whenever I needed it.

Table of Contents

Abstract.…………….... i List of Abbreviations… ii

CHAPTER-1…………… 1-27

Introduction

Central Research Question Relevant Research Questions Thesis Arguments Objectives of the Study Research Methodology Theoretical Framework Outline of the Study

CHAPTER-2…………. 28-56

Review of the Literature

CHAPTER-3………………. 58-91 Formation Of Ethnicity IN POST-COLONIAL PAKISTAN

Introduction Historical Colonial Legacies Administrative Colonial Legacies Pre-1971 Pakistan Post-1971 Pakistan Federating Units of Pakistan: Ethno-Lingual Formation of Society Punjab KPK Sindh Baluchistan Conclusion

CHAPTER-4…………. 92-144 Current Federalism, Ethnic Diversity And Mobilization In Pakistan

Introduction Majoritarian Model: Exclusion of Smaller Ethno-Lingual Communities Lack of Power-Sharing in Federating Structure of Pakistan Distributive Issues Among Provinces National Finance Commission Award (NFC) Water Assets: Kalabagh Dam Issue Ethnic Disputes and Demand of Autonomy Mismanagement of Ethno-Linguistic Diversity: Incompatibility or Less Satisfactory Performance of Majoritarian Model and Exclusion Ethnic Mobilization in Pakhtuns Nationalist Approach from Baluch Ethno-Lingual Mobilization in Sindhi Rise of Muhajir Movement Ethno-Political Movement For Siraikistan Conclusion

CHAPTER-5…………. 146-170

The Decade of Sheer Political Instability: Constitutional and Political decay

Introduction The federal Constitution of 1973 The Constitutional Deadlock: The 8th Amendment after Zia Regime Conflicting Relationship Between Prime Minster and President: to (1988-99) The Judiciary and the Elected Governments in 1990s Civil-Military Bureaucracy and the Elected Governments Provisions for Provinces and Minority Groups The Impact of the 8th Amendment on Federalism Ethnic Mobilization in Sindh: The Military Operation and MQM Conclusion

CHAPTER-6…………. 171-198

The Quality Democracy for Plural Societies: A Model of Four Consociations

Introduction A Model of Four Successful Consociations India

Malaysia Kenya Belgium Conclusion

CHAPTER-7…………. 199-227 Quality Democracy for Pakistan: A Comparative Analysis of Model Consociations and Pakistan Introduction Consociationalism for Developing Consensus in Pakistan Favorable Factors of Consociationalism and Pakistan Comparative Analysis of Favorable Factors in Model Consociations and Pakistan Conclusion CHAPTER-8………….. 228-271

A Critique on the Political Structure Of Pakistan: Findings Of The Data Taken From Electronic And Print Media Of Pakistan

Introduction Methodology of the Chapter Electronic Media (Television Talk Shows) Print Media (Newspaper’s Articles) Findings of the Data Conclusion CHAPTER-9…………. 272-284

Conclusion/S BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………..285-309

Abstract

Pakistan has a plural society; its governance model is more focused on state-building rather than nation-building. This model is a colonial legacy which is incompatible with its diverse society and hence not mending to needs of diverse polity. The since existence has thrown up governability issues; its governance model (Majoritarian) tends to provide an effective governance system through majority or one party rule (based on electoral mechanism) rather than representing all important segments of society. The reality lies in the incompatibility of this governance system and the social norms of Pakistan. This system was used by colonial power to exploit the society and resources of sub-continent. Pakistan, after its birth, had to face the major issue of a unanimously accepted and drafted constitution for years. Similarly, factional fissure in the founding political party i.e. the Muslim League and lack of consensus over lingua franca also generated issues. The adopted constitution (1935 Indian Act) was a continuity of the centralized federal and old British exploitative system. This system implanted seeds of many issues including the debacle of East-Pakistan. Pakistan inherited many colonial legacies and practiced them continuously. The most prominent channel of these legacies was constitutions formed and abrogated in different era i.e. Constitutions 1956, 1962 and finally 1973 which also saw many amendments by civilian and military governments. There are contradictions in the constitution and power-sharing mechanism which produced the conflict over distributive management. This thesis aims to raise issue of mainstreaming the marginalized groups into polity through quality democracy. Pakistan is a land of diverse people, cultures and languages. These identities are in constant and direct clash with central government over mismanagement of resources and un-proportional division of jobs in public leading institutions. The hegemony of few ethnic and lingual groups brought about political movements. However, NFC awards were announced many times and provinces agreed upon a shared formula. Same pattern of compromise by political elites can also be traced in political history of Pakistan. The same compromise, accommodation, consensus and positive role of the political elites are the very essence of the Consociationalism. This federal design has a history of development in Europe and growth and application in Asian and African countries, too. This study observes some successful stories of Consociations which has close resemblance to Pakistan in their political and social developments. Scholars inside and outside Pakistan are debating the incompatibility of Majoritarian Model to manage plural society of Pakistan. The print and electronic media of Pakistan is also raising the concern of intelligentsia with the relationship between structures of the federal system of Pakistan with its society. This debate is very important to find out some hypothetical panacea to provide quality democracy, although not aiming to refute another practice.

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List of Abbreviations AIML All Pakistan Muslim League APC All Parties Conference AMCJA All Malayan Council for Joint Action BJP Bharatiya Janata Party BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CIA Central Intelligence Agency CP Central Province COAS Chief of Army Staff COP Combined Oppositional Parties CMLA Chief Martial Law Administrator COD CLC Communities Liaison Committee FPTP First-Past-The-Post FORD Forum of Restoration of Democracy GDP Gross Domestic Production ICS Indian Civil service IJI Islami Jamhuri Ittihad IDP Internal Displaced Persons JI Jamiat-e-Islami KANU Kenya African National Union KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhaw LDCs Less Developed Countries MQM Muhajir Quami Movement MQM-H Muhajir Quami Movement- Haqiqi MIT Muhajir ittihad Tehrik MRC Muhajir Relation Council MRD Movement of Restoration of Democracy MMA Mutihida Majlis-e-Amal NWFP North West Frontier Provnces MIC Malaysian Indian Congress MNP Malayan Nationalist Party MCP Malayan Communist Party NAP National Awami Party NFC National Finance Award ODM Orange Democratic Movement PML Pakistan Muslim League PML-N Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz PONM Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement PILDAT Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Democracy PR Proportional Representation PNU Party of National Unity PAT Pakistan Awami Tehrik PTI Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf PUTERA Pusat Tenaga Rakyat QAU Quaid-e-Azam University

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SBPF Sindh Baloch Pakhtun Front UMNO United Malay National Organization UP Uttar Pradesh UDF United Democratic Front WFB World Fact Book

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Chapter-1

INTRODUCTION

Depending on the context, ideology, paradigm and culture, the term

„pluralistic/plurality‟ within a society can be interpreted in number of ways or in other words, the definition of plurality (also known as diversity or a plural society) is somewhat complicated. This term „plurality‟ or „diversity‟ within a society has been defined as a society, which is composed with two or more than two classes and include a range of people or things that are very different from each other (Oxford Dictionary

Definition). This definition of „pluralistic society‟ denotes a „heterogeneous‟, „polarized‟ or „segmented society‟ of a country based on culture, ethnic, religious or linguistic differences. Lijphart (1977) sometimes used „plural and divided‟ societies interchangeably. In these societies, conflicts are typically connected with group identities, where one group oppresses other groups. These conflicts have long histories across generations and a plural society is prone to conflict among ethnic groups (see Horowitz,

1993, 18; Guelke, 2012).

In this background, Pakistan being a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country has a plural society which is facing mobilization due to repressive governance system. Since inception, despite having a tendency of co-existence within its population, Pakistan is facing governability issues which are indicating flaws within its federal structure. The creation of Pakistan is based on an ideology (Islam). This religion-based nationalism was used as a tool to create unity among segments of society to create an independent state.

This was not an historical identity. After partition, Pakistan lost its coherence in the face existing ground realities based on societal divisions across sects, ethnicities, linguistics and cultures. After partition, Pakistan has to face multiple new administrative challenges while its leadership went on with old organizational mechanisms. It‟s the Constitution of

1973 provides a parliamentary set up of federalism that is based on Majoritarian Model inherited from colonial times. The old British system that failed to unite the multinational subcontinent is proving incapable again to negotiate the new ground realities and the societal norms of the new state. Such anachronism resulted in many ethnic, political and linguistic clashes that posed severe problems for Pakistan.

It is quite clear by now that Majoritarian Model is incompatible to resolve divisive issues in Pakistan. The present study tends to highlight such issues as mentioned in the research question designed for this study. The other model of democracy which is more suitable for plural society is Consociationalism. Both models, Majoritarian and

Consociationalism, have different features. These characteristics have been discussed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. The Majoritarian Model is non-satisfactorily working to deal

2 with societal norms while states are opting for Consociationalism to develop some level of consensus. After establishing the fact that Majoritarianism is an exclusive model (in

Chapters 3 and 4), the research will explore some problems-resolving methods based on the debate of Consociationalism as more conducive model of democracy for plural societies like Pakistan.

CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION

Ethnic and linguistic divisions of Pakistani society are not given equal representation in the political structure. We are assuming that the federal form of government (like

Majoritarian Model) is likely to be incompatible with societal divisions. The central question, which this study will examine, is as to why and how the Majoritarian Model is incompatible or less satisfactory in view of the ethnic and linguistic divisions of Pakistani society.

RELEVANT RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What are the characteristics of the Majoritarian model (the

Westminster/Majoritarian Model) that are incompatible with Pakistan‟s norms?

2. How democratization is problematic in heterogeneous states (the developed and

developing countries) with ethnic diversity that is a problem for an identity

construction?

3. Why should certain features of democratic practice i.e. rule by majority, are

considered to be superior to other ways of making political decisions?

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THESIS ARGUMENTS

1. The problems in the process of democratization related to the

Westminster/Majoritarian Model are emerging equally in developed and

underdeveloped countries despite the fact that developed countries are having

better economy and human rights indexes.

2. The changing demographic problems are closely associated with the current

unstable governance model being applied in Pakistan.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study observes the following objectives:

 To elaborate the incompatibility of Majoritarian Model with diverse societies

without aiming to replace it

 evaluate the multiethnic, multi-cultural and multi-linguistic society of Pakistani;

 To discuss the common problems of federalism worldwide;

 To evaluate Pakistan‟s federalism problem under the Majoritarian model;

 To discuss that after secession of East Wing, we chose to ignore lessons from

recent past and are still practicing same system at home which results in havoc

and disarray in the polity;

 To judge the validity of the Westminster/Majoritarian Model of democracy for

Pakistan;

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 To manage such type of analysis, this will elaborate the implication of

democratization, and causes and consequences of shortcomings of Majoritarian

system;

 To discuss some commonalities of implications of the Westminster/Majoritarian

Model in different countries;

 To highlight the role of political parties to build-up a democratic environment;

however, the issue of heterogeneity of the developing countries is a hallmark of

problems in the way of democratization;

 To analyze that differences exists in outcomes and implication of the

Westminster/Majoritarian Model among first and third world countries;

 To evaluate the validity of electoral system, and ratio of participation of different

ethnic classes in vote casting i.e. First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) and Proportional

representation (PR);

 To judge the government policy to mitigate multicultural characteristic of society

and its participation in political structure through inclusive models of governance;

 To evaluate that Pakistan needs to re-evaluate Majoritarian Model of governance

to make it compatible one, or diffuse it with few inclusive strategies like

Consociationalism, to resolve the issues of diversity

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study aims to achieve the goal through a broad analysis of the structure and working relationship of governance system and society of Pakistan. For this, the method of case study is to be used. A case study is a concentrated study of an entity (as a person or community) stressing developmental aspects in relation to a situation. For this purpose,

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I have chosen models of four consociations which fulfill the criteria of successful democracies. For example, the consociation of Belgium can be compared with Pakistan in respect of its plural society.

Besides European countries, many African and countries have also adopted

Consociational Model i.e. Kenya, because Majoritarian Model remained incompatible to resolve its societal and political issues. Similarly, many Asian countries are also facing problems and some have developed national consensus i.e. India and Malaysia. These successful Asian and African consociations are included in the model countries. This study is based on inductive approach and content analysis that follow many cross- sectional analyses to study state systems and quality of democracy. Firstly, constitution is one dependent variable among many. The in-depth study of constitution will be helpful to assess the system of the Majoritarian, Consensual and Consociational Models on the bases of their favorable and unfavorable factors in Pakistan. Secondly, the duration of intervals and trends of participation of ethnic classes in politics will also be examined.

The study is based on primary and secondary sources. Some data from electronic media such as television talk shows and print media i.e. opinion pages of leading newspapers of

Pakistan are also included. This all will be helpful to initiate and conclude a normative debate on governance system of Pakistan.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The roots of theoretical reinforcement for this study lies in the western political discourse from which the notion of modern nation-state has been derived (Aristotle, Kant,

Rousseau, Tocqueville and many others). This notion was reinforced by many political

6 scientists like Almond and Verba, Dhal, Dimond, MicGarry, O‟Leary, Zakria and

Horowitz; however, Lijphart is the most relevant to be discussed who proposed the theory of „Consociationalism‟ for the settlement of non-territorial issues of multiethnic and plural societies.

All countries around the world have a society plural to one extent or the other; yet since the end of Cold War, the number of deeply plural societies has increased sharply.

To manage ethnic diversity, federalism was considered the best mechanism. Federalism was debated on ideological (centrist, decentralization and balanced) and institutional levels (a sovereign state). Now those countries which advocated federalism are representing few basic types of democracy i.e. the Majoritarian, Consensual and

Consociational Models (however, debate on adoption of the Consociational Model supplemented with the Consensual Model is in vogue now a days). In the case of

Pakistani federalism, these models of democracy are discussed here as theoretical framework while concepts of centripetal and centrifugal forces are also relevant to be discussed in this section.

DICHOTOMY OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUAL MODELS

The scenario of democratization in developing countries in the wake of third wave

(1974-present) can be analyzed under the implication of the Westminster/Majoritarian

Model. This model was formed in Westminster palace on the patterns of the British political system to run the administration of the Commonwealth and ex-Commonwealth countries that were mostly post-colonial, „Less Developed Countries‟ (LDCs). The key characteristics of Majoritarian Model are applied occasionally and supplemented with

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Consensual Model. The dichotomous difference of the variables of both models work mutually; particular countries may differ to be at either at end of the scale or anywhere stuck in-between (Lijphart, 2012. 3-4). Both models (the Majoritarian and the

Consensual) are elaborated under ten variables.

Table 1: Dichotomous Combination of Majoritarian and Consensual Models

S. Majoritarian Model Consensual Model No.

1. Bi-party system Multi-Party system

2. Single party dominates cabinet Coalition cabinets in broad executive in case of Bipartite system power-sharing in case of multipartite system

3. Executive-legislative Balance of power between executive relationships in which the and legislature executive is central

4. Majoritarian and disproportional Proportional representation electoral structure 5. Pluralist interest-group systems Corporatist interest group systems with free-for-all competition intended to conciliation

6. Unitary and centralized federal Decentralization system 7. Unicameral legislature Bicameralism

8. Rigid constitutions Flexible constitutions

9. Sovereign legislatures Judicial review via Supreme Court

10. Central bank dependent on the Independent central bank executive Source: Data taken from Lijphart (1999, 3-4)

According to Patrick Dunleavy (2010), Majoritarian system is dying gradually because this model is giving different outputs in different countries. Though it has some common results, somewhere else it is implemented as a hung parliament under short- lived coalition government (in case of multi-ethnic states having multiparty system).

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Though Majoritarianism is the name of rule of bare majority, however coalition means a government in which no party rules with majority. This is generating an issue of opposition party which uses its blackmailing potential to pressurize the ruling party. Due to these problems, countries are seeking electoral reforms in their political system.

Moreover, for multiethnic and multilingual states it did not prove suitable.

In parallel with the above variables, the Consociational theory emerged in 1960s which can be explained under four characteristics as follows;

CONSOCIATIONALISM: QUALITY DEMOCRACY FOR PLURAL SOCIETIES

Consociationalism stresses relationship between equal social groups to develop quality of governance. According to Clark and Foweraker (2001, 91-92) in late 1960s, the theory was recognized by various political scientists as a specific form of power-sharing in small democracies of Western Europe that demonstrated political solidity regardless of their plural societies. These ethnic communities in consociations developed a structure in which they inter-mingled equal political patterns in spite of having different background.

They experienced self-rule in their relevant ethnic communities and have confidence that they are having identical and even share in the political arrangement. Their proportional representation (Kuper, 1985, 270) is secured through a specific mechanism which is supportive to categorize them politically and a grand coalition is formulated where politics of accommodation and bargaining is practiced after including and engaging their respective elites.

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The Conceptual Origin and Development of the Consociational Theory

Initially, this theory prompted out from West European states, i.e. Belgium,

Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands. Many developing states outside of Europe like

Iraq, Lebanon, Malaysia, Cyprus, Suriname, South Africa, Kenya, Afghanistan, India and many others were classified as Consociations. Consociational theory remained in instable state between 1980 to mid-1990s. An obvious downward tendency in consociations was noticed and Consociations dropped considerably; especially, South Africa demonstrated the failure of Consociational exploration. However, according to Taylor (2009, 5-6)

Consociationalism is reviving in recent times and innovative case studies for

Consociationalism have been acknowledged, like Afghanistan and Iraq in 2005, and

Kenya in 2008. Though Consociational theory has regenerated itself outside of its original area, but at the moment it is at the peak of its growth.

It is beyond any doubt that a heterogeneous society if not managed can be an alarming impediment to a secure and workable democracy (Lijphart, 1995, 854). This particular state of affair necessitates conscious and curious efforts to search out a governance system which can promise to generate coherence in plural societies. Resultantly, a number of theories sprang out and research papers reclaimed the traditional implication of democracy and its mechanism.

The connotations of governance systems are espoused by many political scientists.

But the configuration of political structure based on three political concepts of

„Deference, Consensus and Homogeneity‟ articulated by Verba and Almond in their book

„The Civic Culture‟ published in 1963 was challenged in 1969 by Lijphart. He recognized

10 its adequacy as less-satisfactory in comparison of the minor democracies of Europe. He stated that only two dimensions of role structure and political culture (Lijphart, 1977, 6-

7) are not enough to predict the political stability of a system. He criticized the speculation of „crosscutting cleavages‟ and strengthens his point of view by exampling

Switzerland and Austria which demonstrated political soundness regardless of their ethnicity level which differentiate them from each other by communally supporting groups. The theory states that these groups should be acquiescent and politically inactive.

Lijphart carefully examined these well-managed societies to find out the right function to maintain established democracies even with their plural political background. He proved that the variable of positive conduct of political elites is more significant for the political stability in these countries and emphasized that in presence of multiethnic classes, the cooperative behavior of political elites is most imperative to manage a plural society. He presented his articulated notion of Consociationalism with case studies of four plural societies that were stabilized with Consociationalism. He shared his model of

Consociationalism in a research critique (1969, 216) and elaborated it as, “a government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy”. Through Lijphart explored in the case of The Netherlands that it is an implication of accommodative politics with further development on the dimension of

“Democracy in Plural Societies”.

Beyond Europe, Lijphart (1977, 238) observed the political arrangements of many countries and according to this study he categorized them as consociations, semi- consociations and unsuccessful or abortive consociations. In his recommendations, he points out the importance of the role of elites to make a state stabilize or destabilize

11 politically. In Lijphart‟s words (1977, 238) “…for many plural societies of the non- western world, the realistic choice is not between the British normative model of democracy and the Consociational democracy, but between Consociational democracy and no democracy at all”.

Table 2: Origin and Development of Consociational Democracy

Classic cases Past cases Contemporary cases Netherlands (1917-67) Lebanon ( 1943-75) Malaysia (1971 – ) Belgium (1918 – ) India (1947-64) South Tyrol (1972 – ) Switzerland (1943 – ) Netherlands Antilles (1950- Lebanon (1989 – ) Austria (1945-66) 85) New wave Luxemburg Suriname (1950-85) Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995– Liechtenstein Malaysia (1955-69) ) Nigeria (1957-66) Burundi (1998 – ) Columbia (1958-74) Northern Ireland (1998 – ) Cyprus (1960-63) Macedonia (2000 – ) Fiji (1970-87) Afghanistan ( 2004 – ) Northern Ireland (1973-74) Iraq ( 2005 – ) Zimbabwe (1980-87) Kenya (2008 – ) Czechoslovakia (1989-93) South Africa (1993-96) Source: Taylor (2009, 6)

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSOCIATIONALISM

Lijphart articulated four features of Consociationalism (1977, 25) i.e. grand coalition, minority veto, proportional representation and segmental autonomy. In subsequent section, the features of Consociational mechanism will be entailed.

Grand Coalition

Lijphart related provisions of “grand coalition” and “executive power-sharing” randomly. This is the prime concern of Consociationalism which urges the political elites of major ethnic groups or parties to collude in an executive body. It is a mechanism that

12 involves diverse segments of society into an “executive power-sharing” system. There is no rigid or specified form of grand coalition or power-sharing in this theory because

Lijphart employed the expression “grand coalition” loosely and introduced varieties of grand coalitions (Lijphart, 1977, 31-36). Therefore, grand coalition is formed in different shapes in different cases of Consociational federalism (Halpern, 1986, 190). The justification behind the ambiguity of this notion is quite logical. The main emphasis of

Lijphart (1977, 31) is on contribution of the ethnic elites in managing a multiethnic, heterogeneous society and he did not confine it to any rigid “institutional” measures.

Lijphart‟s theory varies in a range of organizational patterns of grand coalitions. The incorporation of major religious and ethno-linguistic classes into a cabinet or a grand executive power-sharing body within federalism is the plain and basic structure. In this perspective, Belgium and now Malaysia is are obvious examples while from 1917 to

1967, the Netherlands also practiced cabinets in the same way when it formed representative cabinets through multiparty cabinets contributed by all ethnic and political parties. Through the mentioned period in the Netherlands all factions including Liberals,

Catholics, and Socialists had their respective political parties to represent their concerns.

Several rigid, ad-hoc and informal commissions included all factions for power-sharing in Dutch society.

One major case of grand coalition is coalition cabinets of major parties in Austria between 1945 and 1966. But parliament is not the only available form of power-sharing measures of Consociationalism as it can also be introduced in other systems and institutional set ups like in Indian case. This federal administrative structure of

Switzerland is a standard case where the inclusion of all main clusters (ethnic, linguistic

13 and religious) and the prominent political parties were guaranteed by the federal committee. The case of Lebanon as a consociation presented its own pattern of inclusion by distributing government posts between the important factions; during 1943-75 in

Lebanon, Christians was given presidency, Sunni Muslims got the post of Prime

Minister, and Shi‟a sect of Muslims was given speakership of the parliament while deputy speaker ship was reserved for the Greek Orthodox community.

Belgium, through constitution, established equal share in decision-making (executive) to French-speakers and Dutch while Cyprus, for a short tenure of Consociational scheme between 1960 to1963, provided the Turks and Greeks a method (according to their numerical strength of 7:3) based on proportional representation. The Consociational arrangements in India (1947-64) granted a possibility to different factions to share authority within the Indian National Congress party (Lijphart 1996, 260). The „grand coalition‟ is usually taken as a concept of multi-party coalition government in India.

Therefore it was a new experiment regarding power-sharing under Consociationalism.

Minority Veto

This is the second important feature of Consociationalism. Minority veto is a provision that grants minority group power to reject any bill or movement against their concerns and it such veto would not be turned down by the major factions (Lijphart,

1977, 119). This could be a useful combination; Consociational set-up and grand coalition though proposes significant security for the rights of minor communities but it is not consistent. In grand coalition, decisions are usually made by the majority vote but the inclusion of minority factions in grand coalition provide an opportunity to present and

14 secure their interests though majority might object it. This feature of Consociationalism has been criticized often for not being precise. He is hesitant to identify its structure and medium (Halpern, 1986, 190). It has various shapes; for example “absolute, suspensive, informal veto or formal veto”. According to Lijphart (1995b, 279), it can be used for all or particular concerns, i.e. in the fields of education and culture. It is a tool that is generally known as a mechanism to resolve the critical and basic issues. It is not based on formal legal or constitutional rules but it is a matter of comfort-ability and mutual understanding (Lijphart, 1995a, 856-57). Various linguistic groups in Belgium had been granted veto power vis-à-vis “educational and cultural” matters. Bosnia devised in

„Dayton Peace Accord‟ a system that involved the requirement of at least 1/3 support of three component factions for every decision in parliament. Consociational arrangements can be designed without applying full features of the entire model (Adeney, 2009, 90).

Proportional Representation

Principally, Lijphart points out the scheme of assigning jobs in public sector institutions and sharing of other possessions proportionally (1977, 51). Katharine Adeney

(2003, 81) has also described in her thesis the same principle in the following manner;

For Lijphart, the unjust allocation of these resources can affect smooth sailing of executive power-sharing while the proportional representation of ethnic segments in decision-making institutions is a secondary element.

Overall, this third primary characteristic of Consociational governance of

„Proportional Representation‟ converses about proportional share of ethnic and linguistic classes in political institutions, jobs and other resources. This feature suggests voting

15 system of Proportional Representation (PR) that grants power-sharing to all marginalized groups of society to join parliament. Lijphart (2004, 100) states that in developed plural societies, this electoral system is a practical option where all groups are given equal treatment and it generates proportional representation of communal or even „non- communal‟ faction as in the electoral mechanism used in Belgium and Switzerland that guaranteed proportional representation.

Table 3: The Elements and Variables to Test Federal Degrees of Consociationalism

Grand Coalition Executive Weightage

Proportionality Separate Electorates

Reserved Seats

Legislative Weightage

Bicameral Representation

Segmental Autonomy Religious reorganization

Linguistic reorganization

Residual powers

Mutual Veto Community veto rights

Source: K. Adeney (2003, 81)

But at times, outcomes of these techniques of „minority protection‟ determine overrepresentation of few ethnic or linguistic groups into power structure i.e., the constitution of Belgium (Lijphart, 1995a, 857) promotes “equal representation” between majority and minority as well as in federal cabinet. Similarly, Cyprus (the Constitution of 1960), allotted thirty percent of seats in the national parliament to Turkish group that was less than twenty percent of the entire population. The mechanism of proportional representation is considered a functional tool because its impartiality eliminates a range

16 of possible executive disagreements and consequently proves helpful for smooth function of governance (Lijphart, 1977, 39).

Segmental Autonomy

According to Lijphart (1977), the fourth and last major feature of Consociational democracy is the segmental autonomy. The segmental autonomy to a community secures its interests especially to administer its educational institutes to preserve its culture

(Lijphart, 2002, 39). Lijphart‟s articulated idea of autonomy is a „loose autonomy‟ and it varies from case to case. But three categories of autonomy to linguistic and religious segments in Consociationalism are prominent: i.e. first, by providing a substantial autonomy to homogenous provinces in a federalism similar to Switzerland, Belgium,

India and Czechoslovakia that grant the linguistic groups autonomy; secondly, a stipulation to allow minority groups to launch and manage independently their government funds like the Netherlands and Belgium have; and finally, a clause to provide for private regulations for minority groups associated to „family matters‟ (like inheritance marriage, divorce, etc.), like in Lebanon, Cyprus, and India .

Segmental autonomy can be based on non-territorial and territorial issues and these are treated as two forms of segmental autonomy (Lijphart, 1977, 43). Territorial autonomy can be provided easily if geographical concentration of ethnic, religious or linguistic segments is very appropriate to develop a federalism based on territorial autonomy (Lijphart, 2004, 104-105). Contrarily, non-territorial autonomy refers to federalism where these ethnic and linguistic segments are geographically mingled together. The Consociational measures in Cyprus granted this type of self-rule to Greek

17 and Turkish groups when Cyprus laid down split public commissions for Greek and

Turkish communities with special lawmaking (legislative) authority for „religious, cultural and educational‟ interests in its 1960 constitution (Lijphart, 2002, 856). Belgium exercised a blend of „territorial and non-territorial autonomy‟ through constitution that entrusted equal political power to both “Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking

Wallonia” regions (ethnically homogenous and geographically identified regions) and to

“French speakers and Dutch speakers in bilingual Brussels” (identified as non-territorial).

The federalism in Canada proposes that „segmental autonomy‟ can be granted to

„selective‟ segments in particular patterns. In this model, various „ethnic and linguistic‟ factions are provided autonomy in the field of education and, if required, they can run their language and religious schools with community support (McCulloch, 2009, 41). But the ambiguity in the idea of segmental autonomy has been criticized on the point that this notion of Lijphart does not differentiate clearly between matters of general concern and matters which recline in the „community‟ concern, and executive power-sharing is uncertain because it is not clear that it should lie at „group level‟ or at the „elite cartel level‟ regarding several community, provincial and national problems (Assaf, 2004, 14).

But the utility of this feature is beyond any doubt.

THE FAVORABLE FACTORS FOR CONSOCIATIONAL GOVERNMENT

The supportive conditions for Consociationalism evolved for years. In 1969, Lijphart reveled and discussed these factors for first time in his comparative research and revised it in 1977 after examining consociations around the world. But according to Lijphart

(1977, 54) these favorable factors for Consociational government are not crucial or

18 prerequisite for application of Consociational democracy but they change over time.

These factors are as under:

1. Multiple Balance of power/ No solid majority 2. Small population size 3. Geographical concentration of segments 4. External threat 5. Segments of roughly equal size 6. Small number of groups 7. Tradition of compromise and accommodation 8. Overarching loyalties 9. Absence of large socio-economic Differences

These factors are vital to study before application of Consociationalism in any country because they can help to analyze the probable success ratio of the model in any society.

But noticeable element about these favorable factors is that they were verified by using inductive approach after studying the societal norms in consociations. Consequently, these factors remained varied and Lijphart revised them for four times (in 1969, 1977,

1985 and 1996) according to need and content. However in view of Pakistan, they would be discussed latterly in coming chapters.

The concept of centripetal and centrifugal forces has a considerable space to be discussed under this theoretical framework. Soon after partition, Pakistan was faced with dual task of state and nation-building at a time. These tasks were considered simultaneous by the Pakistani elites while both have contradictory procedures to be implemented. In

Pakistan, elites concentrated on state-building which is based on centripetal forces

(binding force) and emphasized on centralized, unitary state and used Islam as the ideology and a binding force to keep the nation united. But, the task of nation-building involves centrifugal forces which urge a state to decentralize more powers to its

19 federating units. There are a number of centrifugal forces in Pakistan, mainly historical, political, ethnic, linguistic and tribal and they are gradually eroding and challenging the state-building process. These pulls and pushes are escalating ethnic mobilization.

Pakistan is a state composed of different nations (i.e., mainly Pakhtun, Sindi, Punjabi,

Kashmiri and Baluchi) besides deep religious divisions. However, present political and ground realities require a transformation of this force.

In this scenario, Pakistan can be aligned with those countries which are heterogeneous and has a plural society where the implication of the Consociational Model can be endorsed for few years to get consensus. It is a historical fact that Pakistan as an ex- imperial entity has inherited its Majoritarian political model from British. However, the major flaw of the model is that it was not implemented in its essence. To get success, it is rightly supplemented with Consensual Model wherever it is used. However, in Pakistan it has practically malfunctioned and proving less satisfactory because it is incompatible with the demography of Pakistan which is multi-ethnic and multi-lingual.

OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

It is an historical fact that different classes with different incentives joined the

Pakistan Movement. After partition, they split again in pursuit of their interests. The larger provinces remained hegemonic that generated alienation in smaller provinces. The smaller provinces grew vocal for their rights and the reason of this ethnic mobilization was the exclusive nature of Majoritarian Model. The present study tends to highlight such issues as mentioned in the research question designed for this study. It aims to cast light on Majoritarian Model and it‟s incompatibilities to settle the governance issues. The

20 other model of democracy which is more suitable for plural society is Consociationalism.

Both models, Majoritarian and Consociationalism, have different features and have been discussed in Chapter 1 under theoretical framework. Besides this, the chapter describes thesis arguments, objectives and research methodology of the study as well.

Chapter 2 revolves around the available literature on the study and it is arranged thematically. This literature covers relevant issues of this thesis i.e. deep societal division, the incompatible governance model, the colonial legacy in the shape of administrative mechanisms, and the executive and legislative system of Pakistan. This literature has been woven around the main themes and invited generous contribution of many renowned writers inside and outside of Pakistan. Tahir Amin (1988), Samad Yunus

(2012), Rounaq Jahan (1972), Muhammad Mushtaq (2011), Shahid Burki (1991), Feroz

Ahmed (1998), Muhammad Feyyaz (2011), Aisha Jalal (1995), Iftikhar Malik (1997),

Aisha Shahzad (2007), Akbar Zaidi (1992), Lawrence Ziring (1980), Maya Chadda

(2000), Stephan Cohen (1987, 2005), John Hippler (2012), Watts (1996, 1998, 2000),

Bastian and Luckham (2003), Charles Kennedy (1987, 1993, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2003) and many others are influential contributors while Arend Lijphart‟s (1969, 77, 85, 96 and other) work is the main theoretical plank in this area. Besides Lijphart, Katherine

Adeney‟s stance (2003, 2007) on Pakistan and Indian politics remained helpful in application of the theory.

In this specific background, the first fact to establish in Chapter 3 was that Pakistani governance model is a political inheritance of colonial times and besides its governance system, its present societal divisions are also a colonial legacy. To prove this, some variables like historical and administrative colonial background of Pakistan‟s formation

21 behind its geographical, political and societal problems are used. According to the theory of „two nations‟ by All India Muslim League (AIML), Pakistan inherited those areas where Muslims were in majority. The intra-Muslims division in AIML leadership based on colonial reforms 1919-1946 and other societal divisions based on class and caste envisioned in census depicted a plural society. Administratively, Pakistan inherited civil- military bureaucratic set up and central tendency in governance system. Soon after partition Pakistan was established on the same pattern. The geographic ambiguous division created governance problems in Pakistan i.e. Kashmir and Durand Line. The disagreement on colonial policies brought forth further divisions in post-partition ML.

Besides, Muslim elites joined AIML for different incentives and after partition ML disintegrated in different factions. Initially, the constitutional dilemma was a major cause of executive and legislative deadlocks at the levels of civil-military, prime-mister- president and center-province levels. For this, constitutional history of Pakistan proved a visible carrier of colonial executive, legislative and administrative policies.

The description of current federal features of Pakistan besides its ethnic diversity and extent of ethnic mobilization is covered in chapter 4. Pakistan lacks power-sharing structure in political and civil-military bureaucracy (proportional representation). Since inception, „Punjabization‟ of Pakistan is under discussion and uneven inter-provincial growth and regional disparities are the main source of anti-Punjabi resentment and ethnic mobilization. The National Finance Commission award and allocation of water resources are major distributive issues in today‟s Pakistan. All political parties protested for devolving power and maximum provincial autonomy. The Majoritarian Model mainly

22 remained a major cause of mismanagement of ethno-linguistic diversity of Pakistan that has been depicted in last portion of this chapter.

Chapter 5 discusses trends in Pakistani politics during the decade of 1988-99. In background of the 8th amendment, the Constitution of 1973 got ambiguity over separation of power between president and prime minister. This politics of this particular decade shows that all amendments will remain ambiguous if rulers will not behave positively for the consolidation of democracy.

Chapter 6 discusses comparative analysis and the theory of Arend Lijphart is applied elaborated favorable factors of which are contributing to this comparison. For better comparison, a model of four consociations i.e. Kenya, Malaysia, India and Belgium has been used for developing a normative debate on possibility of adoption of

Consociationalism for Pakistan as it was revived in the case of Kenya (2008). However, the chapter does not aim at refuting any theory or model in favor of another one. After studying these four model countries, it seems that Pakistan is not a deviant case like

India. In background of the diverse societies of Kenya, Malaysia, India and Belgium, it can be rightly said that the societies of these model countries are as complex as Pakistani society and these countries are considered the success stories of Consociationalism.

Indian case is the nearer one to Pakistan. Though various governments in different eras tried theoretically to address the ethnic grievances through different measures in Pakistan, they are never implemented practically. This proves that Pakistan needs such a political arrangement that can motivate and keep ethnic and political elites active to pursue good and pragmatic policies for their respective communities through accommodative politics

23 and process of reconciliation. The best of this can be achieved through Consociational arrangements.

Beside these indicators, in chapter 7 the favorable conditions are examined in four model consociations and in Pakistan. Regarding this aspect, Lijphart‟s article (1999) on

Indian democracy remained very helpful to initiate an analysis. The conditions are multiple balances of power, groups of equal size, small number of segments, small population size, external threat, overarching cleavages, socio-economic equality, regional concentration of segments, and finally tradition of elite accommodation. Pakistan is not more diverse than the societies of the model of four countries. But India is a closer example to which its society can be compared. According to Lijphart (1996) Indian

Consociational democracy is a puzzle because it does not fulfill all 9 favorable conditions to be a consociation. Pakistan fulfills 7 conditions like India but these conditions are used by Lijphart to measure the conduciveness of societal norms for Consociational arrangements. Moreover, Malaysia, Belgium and Kenya as successful consociations vary in their Consociational arrangements.

In the above mentioned background, to make some tangible changes, the public opinion is part of the thesis and chapter 8 is based on opinions mainly resourced from the vibrant electronic and print media of Pakistan. Mainstream Television talk shows and newspapers are included in this chapter where Pakistani politicians and intelligentsia is debating over futility of current governance model and (Chapter 8) suggesting ways for enhancing quality democracy.

24

The final chapter 9 is based on conclusion of the thesis. It follows three steps; first it summarizes that Majoritarian model is not working and the system is highly inefficient in

Pakistan; secondly the debate about change, and lastly a possible change is recommended which is pointing out the utility of Consociationalism for Pakistan.

References

Adeney, K. S. (2003). Federal formation and Consociational stabilization: the politics of national identity articulation and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan. PhD

Thesis. Government Department: London School of Economics. University of London.

Adeney, K. (2009) .The Limitations of Non-Consociational Federalism: The Example of

Pakistan. Ethnopolitics, 8 (1), 87 -106.

Burki, S. J. (1991). Pakistan: The Continuing search for Nationhood. Lahore: West View

Press.

Clark, P and Foweraker, J. (2001). Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, (Eds.) London:

Rout ledge.

Guelke, A. (2012). Politics in Divided Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Horowitz, D. L. (1993). Democracy in Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy, 4 (4), p.

18.

Retrieved from http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/summary/v004/4.4horowitz.html

25

Halpern, S. M. (1986). The Disorderly Universe of Consociational Democracy. West

European Politics. 9(2), 181-97.

Kuper, J. (1985). The Social Science Encyclopedia. London: Rout ledge.

Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New

Haven: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1985). Power-Sharing in South Africa. Berkeley: Institute of International

Studies, University of California.

Lijphart, A. (1995a). Multiethnic democracy. In Seymour Upset, (Eds.), the Encyclopedia of Democracy (pp. 853-65). Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc.

Lijphart, A. (1995b). Self-determination versus pre-determination of ethnic minorities in power-sharing systems. In W. Kymlicka, (Eds.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (pp.

275-87). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1996). The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation.

American Political Science Review. 90, 258-268.

Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of democracy. New Heaven: Yale University Press. 3-4.

Lijphart, A. (2002). The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy. In A. Reynolds (Eds.), The

Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and

Democracy (pp. 37-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, A. (2004). Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy.

15(2), 96-109.

McCulloch, A. (2009). Seeking Stability Amid Deep Division: Consociationalism And

Centripetalism In Comparative Perspective (Unpublished PhD‟s thesis). Queen‟s

University Kingston, Ontario, Canada. Accessed at 20th Feb. 2015.

26

Retrieved from https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/1974/1708/1/McCulloch_Allison_200902_Ph

D.pdf

Taylor, R. (2009). Consociational Theory: McGarry & O’ Leary and Northern Ireland

Conflict. Rout ledge: London.

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Chapter-2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION

States around the globe must have to adopt some state structure. In modern polity, this structure is usually based on Majoritarian, Proportional Representation (PR) or mixed voting system which translates votes into seats of Lower and Upper houses of a state.

Some scholars have pointed out flaws of Majoritarian Model (for detail see: Lijphart.

2008, Bastian and Luckham, 2003, Jahan, 1972); Lijphart (2007) calls Majoritarian

Model as a tool to curtail minorities‟ rights. He suggests reforms in electoral systems under proportional representation and plurality vote system and gives institutional remedies for low turnout in elections. Bastian and Luckham (2003) shed light on the limitation of Majoritarianism, like it is unchecked and has centralizing tendencies. These limitations are structural. In this system, powers are concentrated under the principle of

„winner takes all or First Past the Post‟ rule (FPTP).

Moreover, it does not protect minorities‟ right to have political representation, divide a society and centralize power. This decreases representativeness of democratic government by decreasing participation of marginalized groups. Democracy is incomplete if any of its characteristic is missing, and public participation is the most important component of it. However, this important characteristic is not given proper attention in Majoritarian Model. A representational system is undoubtedly designed to exclude/include people by restricting political choice to vote in elections. The „hollow citizenship‟ is created if a state fails to protect the rights of citizens by excluding them from the public sphere like Majoritarianism does (Bastian and Luckham, 2003).

Many countries in Asia and Africa are not nations in being but only nations in hope.

The starting point of their nationalism placed an “essentially diverse traditional social soil”. Though nation-building is a common problem in developing and developed states, a crucial difference is that in developed countries a well-informed ideology, elites and institutions exist and they only need to align their ethnic groups into existing system. But in developing states, there is no pre-existing independent system and they face a twofold problem; first to establish a workable national ideology, elites and institutions and secondly, to integrate their sub-national groups into the newly created national systems

(Jahan, 1972). For diverse, plural societies, Lijphart (1977) advocates Consociationalism as the solution to manage ethnic diversity to generate political stability and harmony.

29

Another school of thought points out the opposite side of the picture. Few scholars have presented examples where Majoritarian Model is successful (for details see:

Anthony J. McGann, 2002, Jeremy Waldron 1999, Pippa Norris 1995, 2000, 2005,

Healey, 2006 and many others). To support Majoritarian Model, Switzerland is a very good example of federalism which has ethnic and lingual diversity i.e., French, German and Italian community groups but the key to success there is that major groups are not coerced for consensus but these groups joined together voluntarily and created a pluralistic nation for overall interests (Healey, 2006). Switzerland is no longer a confederation but its success is a fruit of transitional process of centuries. Australian federation as Majoritarian is successful because it is a homogeneous society and has no antagonistic and powerful neighbor (Hicks, 1978).

Many scholars have pointed out unsuccessful example of Majoritarian model too (for detail see: Healey, 2006, Hicks, 1978, Bastian and Luckham, 2003). In Ireland, the indigenous Catholics were economically and politically challenged by migrant

Protestants from England. This generated a rigid competitive relationship between both communities. In location, Northern Ireland can be compared to ex-East Wing of Pakistan while in ethnic terms; the situation is close to Sindh. Currently, Ireland is demanding more autonomy. Eastern Europe is also ethnically and linguistically plural. Yugoslavia witnessed brutal ethnic clashes between Croats, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. In Rwanda and South Africa colonial powers used the „Divide and Rule‟ policy and perpetuated myths like “Martial Race” theory. South Africa is though changing now but still inequality and racism exist there. In the past apartheid regime was established in South

Africa to reinforce superiority of white people (Healey, 2006). Malaysian and

30

Singapore‟s federation was short lived (1963-65) (Hicks, 1978). Therefore, the liberal democracy is in fashion today because it meets the political aspirations of citizens of developing countries of South and post-communist East who felt themselves excluded and oppressed under authoritarian regimes (Bastian and Luckham, 2003).

The above debate depicts that Majoritarianism is successful in case of homogeneous society with better human development indexes and high voting turnout. It gives voice to average citizen and generate quick decision-making but if society is plural and low vote casting then practicing it would mean wastage of votes with ethnic problem and divisions in society because it is unchecked and generates exclusive governance.

FEDERALISM IN PAKISTAN: WHY AND HOW MAJORITARIANISM IS

UNSUCCESSFUL?

Pakistan is facing governance problems since inception. Ethnic and linguistic divisions of Pakistani society are not given equal representation in its political structure.

We are assuming that the federal form of government (like Majoritarian Model) is likely to be incompatible with societal divisions. To test this hypothesis, literature is plural into following categories:

a. Governance System in Pakistan

Pakistan is a federal state based on Majoritarian Model. Its current Constitution of

1973 declares it as an Islamic Republic with a bicameral sovereign parliament. This hybridism is one major cause of conflict. Pakistan is a land of many nations having diverse perceptions while leaders in Pakistan used thought-suppression policies instead of mainstreaming them.

31

In this background the role of initial hierarchy is very important. In colonial India, the colonial power was not ready to make subcontinent a modern nation-state. Contrarily, their policy was to maximize power with minimum expenditures. After partition,

Pakistani elites instead of building a genuine federalism, emphasized on colonial policies of centralized decision-making and authoritarian rule (Ziring, 1980). Initial state and power structures, as described by Burki (1991), was primarily responsible for warped policy and decision-making. This power structure comprised on political elites, the army and bureaucracy comprised of Punjabi, Muhajir and Pakhtuns in upper hierarchy. The religious parties mainly Jamaiat-i-Islami (JI) in the lower rung. In early eleven years

(1947-1958) conflict erupted between secular, liberal and religious groups primarily

Bengalis, Muhajirs, Punjabis and Pakhtuns, for different incentives. These details were broadly explained by Adeel (2005) who writes that initially power hierarchy was dominated by the Muhajir-Punjabi alliance which kept other ethnic groups out of power- sharing scheme. The Bengali demand of greater provincial autonomy was a threat to their rule (Khan, 2005).

Same details are given by Lodhi (2011) which shows the power overlaps between different power contenders. Governance failure is attributed to missed opportunities which are burden of the history. In post-1971 era soon after secession of ,

PPP government under Bhutto (during 1973-77) raised an ethnic and nationalist rift in

Baluchistan and NWFP. Political parties became personal fiefdoms. This characteristic is still an obstacle to wider participation and inclusion of ethnic mosaic to integrate them in one nation. National unity was tested by the regional and religious pressures, while breach of constitution by military generals became a routine matter. The real tension is

32 political survival of political parties and minority groups in Pakistan. They sustained their ideality but were suppressed. They could not think about further developments other than their survival (Chadda, 2000).

Punjabi domination over smaller provinces was another major issue in governance system of Pakistan. Bengalis were in numerical majority and they demanded a representative government but Punjabi elites resisted their demand. There were Punjabi-

Bengali conflicts over constitution-making and Punjabi colonialism raised provincial resentments (Ziring, 1980). (2011) is also of the view that Pakistani politicians entangled themselves in useless personal conflicts over constitution-making and did not force reforms. The secession of East Pakistan was mainly attributed to stubbornness of the wining party (Pakistan People‟s Party (PPP) from West Pakistan and military elites‟ resistance to accommodation of Bengali grievances.

Singh and Talbot (1996) also opined that hegemonic role of Punjab over smaller provinces is visible. Punjab dominated other provinces and there were many anti-Punjabi nationalist parties particularly in Sindh which protested against Sindh‟s exploitation by

Punjab. One Unit scheme was also a political tool to encounter the numerical majority of

East-Pakistan and to suppress the nationalist movements and establish Punjabi dominance

(Nayak, 1984). In the beginning, the Muhajir phenomenon and its quest for power with the help of Civil-Military anarchists against the indigenous Sindhis was unbearable for

Punjabi dominant group which see itself on right because of their numerical majority in

West Pakistan (Lodhi, 1999). Feudal lords also indulged in gaining their share of power by any means (Chadda, 2000). The center was dominated by Punjabi and Muhajir elites

33

(Morris, N.D). The undue domination of the Punjab province raised anti-Punjabi resentments which still exist among provinces (Chadda, 2000).

The constitutional limbo was at the core issues in post-partitioned Pakistan. The

Indian Act of 1935 was adopted initially as an interim constitution and that formed foundation of all constitutions framed after separation of East-Pakistan. This adaptation fostered the movement of provincial autonomy in West-Pakistan. The vice-regal system of power haunted power structure to be developed horizontally. The center was dominated by an alliance formed by civil-military-bureaucracy and feudals who were reluctant to adopt decentralization (Nayak, 1984). There were Punjabi-Bengali conflicts over constitution-making (Ziring, 1980). Finally, a unanimously accepted constitution was formed in 1973. But this constitution was amended many times by military governments to change its federal nature from parliamentary to presidential one. The constitutional limitations often affected the proper separation of power among executive, legislature and judiciary (Chadda, 2000).

Majoritarianism is not a unique dogma and many Muslim states around the world have unitary federation but Pakistan is a multiethnic and multilingual state in its essence

(Nayak, 1984). Its diversity demanded serious efforts to mainstreaming the society. But initially politicians were incapable of reforming colonial legacies and martial laws never allowed any political activity for growth of political parties‟ role. This fostered ethnic- linguistic and nationalistic mobilization in every part of the country among alienated groups. For example, General Zia used proportional representation in electoral system just to squeeze the political strength of PPP and constitutional amendments were introduced to convert parliamentary system into a presidential one (Ziring, 1980). Same

34 views are shared by Samad; (2012) he says that Pakistani federalism based on

Majoritarian Model has a troubled history and long military rule has intensified difficulties to manage diversity as it is a top-down, highly centralized and exclusive model in nature.

Federalism is successful in those countries where some efforts have been made to recognize the differences. Pakistan was unable to manage differences based on ethnicity, language and culture. Hippler (2012) has the same views. He says that Pakistani federalism is a “top-down” model in which the state was created with hope to develop its own social base and development from societal roots or nationalist movements were ignored. The reason of splitting of Pakistan in 1971 was exclusion of Bengalis from power and exploitation of their natural resources by the central government. In post-1971 scenario, West Pakistan remained heterogeneous as it was ever before. The writer is of the view that in future Pakistan will not face any disaster like split in a big way but its unity will slowly erode until final fracture if the old colonial legacies overshadowed it continuously (Hipler, 2012).

All important segments of Pakistan do not have a proportional representation in important spheres of government. Ahmed (1998) explored history of ethnicity since separation of East Pakistan and claimed that emergence of nationalist movements in other provinces were due to use of brutal methods by central government to suppress them instead of finding means of peaceful reconciliation. Another view is that the successful

Bengali movement aggravated ethnic movements in other regions of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh was the reason for which central government dealt hard with regional and ethnic movements in post-1971 era (Feyyaz, 2011)

35

In the nascent state of Pakistan, state-building was focused at the expense of nation- building. The regional and ethnic elites were not ready to settle their scores and even not sincere with their own people and many of them raised slogan of nationalism to divert the attention of their community fellows from their misdeeds (Amin, 1988). The urge of state-building was stronger than nation-building and the elites took these processes simultaneously while both have contradictory mechanism (Jahan, 1972). The central government used exclusionist politics to suppress ethnic and linguistic movements which was not suitable for integrity of a state (Khan, 2005).

Ethnicity factor is deep-rooted than identity of a separate Muslim nation-state.

Therefore, demand of provincial autonomy has remained an integral part of Pakistani politics. The above mentioned governance policies fostered movements based on nationalism like greater Baluchistan, Pakhtunistan, Sindhu Desh and Muhajiristan and now demands for Hazara and Siraiki Provinces are indications of presence of heterogeneous entities (Samad, 2013). According to Aftab Kazi (1987), the political instability led to decision-making system which was not based on a larger and natural constituency. The Baluchs, Pakhtuns and Sindhis have been demanding provincial autonomy since inception. Representation of ethnic classes in power structure remained disparate and this inequality continued in other spheres of society.

Inherited weaknesses of the model remained an obstacle to develop an effective mechanism for settling of regional claims, too. Pakistan after partition could not resolve the issues of ethno-linguistic movements because it inherited and continued the pre- partition British policies to control ethnic groups. These policies remained an obstacle in the way of nation-building.

36

Three main inherited weaknesses were noticed by Amin (1988) i.e., absence of consensus over the shape of the polity, absence of a procedure for settling regional claims and finally weak organizational structure of the Muslim League in central and provincial governments. There was Pakhtun Movement despite over-representation of Pakhtuns in power hierarchy (civil-military bureaucracy) (Amin, 1988). The lack of accommodation of different classes in power-sharing created a deep division in Pakistani society which produced grievances at national level. These provincial, ethnic and class grievances and exclusion led to political mobilization and ethnic problems emerged as an integral part of the civil society. Muslim nationalism was challenged by ethnicity and wrong policies of leaders and weaknesses in inherited governance model from colonial times become a hurdle in good governance (Malik, 1997). Commitment to the ideal of democracy based on the Majoritarian model guaranteed a proper division between bureaucracy and a representative political executive. But in real practice, the bureaucratic authoritarianism inherited in the post-colonial state structure became essential. It proved very difficult to institutionalize the theory of legislative supremacy over the executive. The principle of personal patronage became customary in the function of elected and non-elected institutions. We have noticed the center-province conflicts on some issues; for example, appointment of governor of the provinces by the central government which is a constitutional provision of colonial times and the same provisions are under practice in today‟s Pakistan. Though, it has given a greater autonomy to provinces but in bureaucratic setup only (Jalal, 1995). This unequal distribution of power is a dominant feature of governance model of Pakistan (Jetly, 2009).

37

Governance system of Pakistan is an exclusionist model. Bengali nationalism was the ever first sign of exclusion that led to dismemberment of Pakistan. After that, many nationalist movements emerged including political alliances against democratic and elected governments (Singh and Talbot, 1996). Same view is given by Jahan (197) that

Pakistani government is a systemic domination of one or two nations which is meant for exclusion of other sub-national groups. The reason of splitting of Pakistan in 1971 was exclusion of Bengalis from power and exploitation of their natural resources by the central government (Hipler, 2012).Regional conflicts in addition to different Islamic brands of politics were a particular feature of Pakistani history (Shafqat, 1997). The emergence of ethno-national movements in Bengal, Baluchistan, NWFP and Sindh are showing incompatible governance pattern of Pakistani federal model. The exclusion of ethno-lingual groups has created a serious situation of weak governance that leads to lawlessness and disorders. These movements were suppressed for time being by the ruling party and the military dictators (Shahzad, 2007). Same detail is shared by Siddiqi

(2002) about Pakistan‟s governance model and its incompatibility. Being a multiethnic state, Pakistan needs to develop a governance system which can represent the whole society adequately through a just and equitable distribution of power. In the past, Bengali ethnic movement was based on political and economic exclusion from state structure.

There were Baluch movements (1970s and 2000s) Sindhu Desh Movement (1980s),

Muhajir Quami Movement (1980s). The state used force to suppress these movements with no room for accommodation and compromise (Siddiqi, 2002) and ethnicity was considered a law and order question instead of governability problem (Malik, 1997).

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b. Ethnic and Linguistic Divisions in Pakistan

In establishing the problem of ethnic divisions and governance problems, we have to look back into political history of Pakistan. In Pakistan, the meaning of pluralism is buried in a wrong interpretation of separate electorates that led to societal insecurity. This generated an excludable class concept whose loyalty to the state was called in question

(Ahmed, 2010). The ethnic and linguistic division of Pakistani society is very visible which is excluded from the governance system of Pakistan.

There are many variables of ethnicity like religion, language, territory, caste etc. which have potential to give birth to violent conflicts in Pakistan. These ethnic groups should be managed to avoid conflicts by giving them proper representation according to constitution (Majeed, 2011). Muhammad Mushtaq (2009) examines a relationship between centralization of political power and ethnic mobilization in Pakistan. Managing ethnic diversity remained problem in Pakistan as witnessed through Baluch uprising

(1973-77, 2002-to date), Pakhtun‟s wish of self-rule (1970s), Sindhi demand of autonomy

(1980s) and Muhajir mobilization (1990s). The exclusive nature of power structure and centralized government has marginalized specific ethnic groups. This marginalization pushed alienated groups to mobilize against central government to seek their rights.

Power-sharing, decentralization and inclusive polities would generate such type of federation in Pakistan which can facilitate it to lodge all ethnic and linguistic groups together. Political negotiations are important along with distributive justice to ensure power-sharing within the framework of the Constitution of 1973 (Mushtaq, 2009).

39

In Pakistan, many political parties used different interpretations of Islam. It developed such a complex polity based on Islamic ideology that excluded non-Muslims and women in general and certain communities (nationality and sect based) in particular. That generated a sectarian rift within society. The issue of disagreement on distribution of financial resources is tried to be resolved through National Finance Commission (NFC) awards, but no further consensus has been developed on many national interests, and most important is religious harmony. Pakistani Nation is still busy to purify the ideology and there is a strong disagreement on methods and measures how to do it, which shows lack of national consensus (Ahmed, 2010). The ideology of Islam did not prove workable to keep the nation united for a long time and unstable political situation plural the society

(Burki, 1991). In Pakistan, Islamization was introduced at the expense of democracy and equal rights. Moudodi‟s version of Islamic state appeared as an alarming entity against radical threats like PPP. Moreover Yahya‟s declaration of Islam as the exclusive ideology could not remain Pakistan united. Military always tried to prove itself as the guardian and protector of the ideology of state and used this slogan to legitimize its rule after ousting elected democratic governments many times. Deep divisions in society came with an economic boom and migration of labor force to Gulf States during General Zia‟s regime that brought back sectarian extremism with it. This Shi‟a-Sunni rift gave rise to sect- based ethnic parties (Jetly, 2009). The central government failed to unite the nation under perceptive Islamic banner and ethnic appeal became more powerful (Zaidi, 1992). There were a number of subordinate aspects of the great exertion of the fake, overarching

Pakistani nationalism. The ruling elites remained dominant and demands of minorities

40 were ignored; especially, the demand for an appropriate constitution for Pakistan as a multi-ethnic state.

National language issue haunted Pakistani integrity. Pakistan was the result of a struggle of a variety of people belonging to different backgrounds; As a result the

Pakistan that came into existence contained a wide variety of ethnic and linguistic groups and subgroups which had very little in common besides being Muslim.

Two official languages ( and English ), six or seven important regional languages (Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, Baluchi, Siraiki) and about two dozen of small or local ones (mainly in Northern areas of Pakistan) indicate the linguistic colors of Pakistan

(Hippler, 2012). According to latest census of Pakistan held in 2017, nine languages are registered while about seventy are estimated (Times of Islamabad, 14 March 2017;

Dawn, 12 March 2017).

In pre-1971 Pakistan, geographic distance between both parts, heterogeneity in provinces and distribution of the financial resources among them exacerbated tensions.

One unit formula created two types of provinces; one (ex-East-Pakistan) linguistically homogeneous (98% Bengali speaking) and second (present Pakistan) was linguistically/ethnically heterogeneous. However, a shift was noted in the Constitution of

1973 towards bicameral system and language policy in which provincial languages were permitted alongside Urdu (Adeney, 2012). But practically, the issue still exists despite orders of Supreme Court to make Urdu as official language instead of English. According to few scholars, Urdu has no roots because it is the language of the inhabitants of central

India who migrated to Pakistan after partition (Jetly, 2009). The national language was not an issue at start when Jinnah declared „Urdu‟ as a national language for the new state

41 of Pakistan. But after Jinnah, the leaders from Bengal made this issue controversial

(Ahmed, 2010).

A society is prone to conflicts where groups face imbalances in strengths. Political system should initiate economic, social and political measures to curb ethnic conflicts.

Contrarily, the strategies and policies formulated and implemented by various governments fall short of achieving the objective of nation-building (Majeed, 2011). The present ethnic situation demands a governance system incorporated with all ethnic groups. Ethnic problem is more a product of bad governance, economic deprivation of particular areas, and poor representation of certain ethnic groups in national institutions, dominance of few groups and absence of regional/segmental autonomy. Some writers argue that inclusion of other ethnic groups into power structure is against interests of ruling elites (Feyyaz, 2011).

c. Colonial Legacies in Administration and Society

The governance model of Pakistan is itself a colonial legacy. Besides divisions in society, the continuation of colonial legacies is another major problem with governance of Pakistan. These legacies have exacerbated societal divisions because Pakistan is a plural state. The British ruled the subcontinent, and after partition Pakistan depended heavily on the colonial state‟s practice of bureaucratic control and centralization. Mainly, commitment to the ideal of democracy based on the Majoritarian Model of parliamentary government guaranteed a proper division between bureaucracy and a representative political executive. But in real practice, the bureaucratic authoritarianism inherited in the post-colonial state structure became essential. It proved very difficult to institutionalize

42 the theory of legislative supremacy over the executive. The principle of personal patronage became customary in the function of elected and non-elected institutions as well.

We have noticed the center-province conflicts on some issues; for example, appointment of governor for provinces by the central government which is a constitutional provision of colonial times and the same provisions are under practice in today‟s Pakistan. Though, federal government has given a greater autonomy to provinces but in bureaucratic setup only (Jalal, 1995). Same British colonial policies of recruitment patterns were practiced to recruit army officers as the so-called myth of „Martial Races‟ continued (Amin, 1988). The internal colonialism of governance model5 brought the dismemberment of state within two decades of birth (Kazi, 1987). Colonial legacies of

British rule have contributed to the existing disparities in the political system of Pakistan

(Kazi, 1987).

d. Civil-Military Relations

The imbalance in civil-military relations is one of the core reasons to generate political instability in Pakistan. In colonial times, military had a primary role in state affairs. But it is not a democratic institution like parliament, an elected and democratic institution and hence has preference over military. But the British before departure from India left some core issues of permanent conflict through the demarcation plan of India, i.e. Kashmir

(between Pakistan and India) and Durand Line (between Pakistan and Afghanistan).

Therefore, due to security issues, military remained a central contender of power. The rise of military in Pakistan, and the limited and controlled transfer of power to civilian

43 governments have placed severe limitations on functioning of civilian government and the later lost social base of support in public (Kennedy and Rais, 1995). The colonial power was not ready to make subcontinent a modern nation-state. Contrarily, their policy was to maximize power with minimum expenditures (Ziring, 1980).

But according to Nayak (1984) that though problems of Pakistan are generated by colonial legacies, same are also caused due to political maladministration. The civil- military conflicts were mainly due to imbalances of power in the troika of president, prime minister and Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Throughout the political history of

Pakistan, the balance between elected and non-elected forces fluctuated and democratic forces remained under severe pressure for survival. The real tension is survival of political parties and minority groups in Pakistan. They remained busy in sustaining their ideality but they were suppressed. They could not think about further developments other than their survival (Chadda, 2000).

It is therefore beyond any doubt that a strained civil-military relation is a major impediment of democracy in Pakistan. Hence democracy is practiced only as a lip-service in developing countries like Pakistan where it can be implemented in its true essence1.

DEBATE ON TYPE OF FEDERALISM IN PAKISTAN

In the background of above mentioned debate, the scholars on comparative study of states have given their mix views about Pakistan. Some scholars are hopeful for Pakistan

(for detail see: Adeney, 2003), Ahmed, 1996, Ali and Ansari, 2012). They are suggesting remedies for current societal divisions and governance problems in Pakistan.

44

According to Ahmed (1996), still a hope exists; despite visible tensions and confrontations between ethnic groups there is an unmistaken tendency of greater inter- dependence which can contribute to national integration. Secondly, he points out that the absence of cross-cutting cleavages turns the class and power conflicts into ethnic conflicts. He argues that harmony can be promoted by developing equity among, rather than suppression of ethnic classes. He suggests many methods to create tranquility and most of them fall under Consociationalism; like redrawing of provincial boundaries, cultural and demographic homogenization of population and constitutional recognition of nationality rights of fixed ethnic groups.

Pakistan‟s history is replete with ethnic and linguistic clashes. In 1971, this clash led towards dismemberment of Pakistan (Healey, 2006). Lijphart (1997, 2008) describes a constitutional design for plural society. According to him, systemic quality of democracy is more important which comes by building consensus between various ethnic groups existing in a plural society. He talks about Majoritarian system as the basis of politics in

Pakistan. These views are based on theoretical observations of Lijphart, to examine variables of Majoritarian and Consensual Models of democracy. According to Sameen

Ali and Ansari (2012), greater democratic representation however flawed, is the solution for Pakistan‟s problem. Power-sharing models of governments are the best one i.e., federalism and Consociationalism. They argue that power-sharing methods are meant to mitigate violence, develop consensus and are not actually meant to produce peace and democracy.

Pakistani system is dominated by bureaucratic-military oligarchy and patronage-based political relationship. The writers suggest that population census should be held on

45 regular bases and recruitment quota be revised for military, bureaucracy and national assembly also. Another suggestion is proportional representation based electoral system.

They gave examples from India, Malaysia and Bangladesh. Though the first two federations are stable and prosperous, but third one is itself a successor state of Pakistan where the same problems exists. It is unstable and facing the issue of electoral-based problems for regional parties which are further restrained by the lack of legislation.

In current situation in Pakistan, the positive role of political and ethnic elites is very vital. Elite bargain is important to lead a nation to consensus and compromise (Shafqat,

2011). The absence of Consociational mechanism has caused severe ethno-linguistic conflicts in Pakistan during military rule. Relations between ethno-linguistic groups can be managed by constituting a suitable institutional design. Federations can be

Majoritarian in which minorities are excluded from power-sharing but Consociational elements can be helpful to maintain stability. The elites‟ role is very important in the accommodation of differences (Adeney, 2012).

The above-mentioned detail provokes that Majoritarianism is an exclusionist model that suits to homogeneous societies more than a plural one. Pakistan is a multiethnic and multilingual state. It has a heterogeneous society that demands more inclusive strategies which can mainstream all ethno-lingual colors of Pakistan. Political scientists, since

1960s, have been in favor of an explicit form of government that can help to maintain democracy in multi-ethnic states like Pakistan. However, we labeled them with a little variance in characteristics occasionally as „Segmented Pluralism‟ (Lorwin 1971),

„Concordant Democracy‟ (Lehmbruch 1974) or score as „Consociationalism‟ (Lijphart, various strands since 1960s). Apparently in this background, power-sharing was

46 recommended as a therapy for Pakistan while Consociationalism was categorized as a vivid mechanism of power-sharing for multiethnic and plural societies. So, there was a need for probing the relevance of Consociational Model of power-sharing with the multiethnic society of Pakistan which has Majoritarian system in its post-colonial background.

Almost all arrangements dealing with political marginalization and ethnic friction in

Pakistan have called for power-sharing and political inclusion of excluded groups in the power structure. Though Pakistan used a number of strategies to manage diversities but every time the exclusive nature of Pakistani federalism remained a hurdle in the way of inclusion of ethnic and linguistic classes that caused political instability. The central government often approached the excluded groups, but due to the trust deficit such efforts ended in violence.

According to Samad (2007, 128), Pakistan “needs to adopt accommodative strategies that incorporate all groups, refine and enrich the concept and practice of federalism and move away from the present system”. The Pakistani elites adopted ad-hoc administrative policies instead of adopting inclusive and long term political and economic bargain.

Malik (1997, 171) suggests that “there are strong prospects of a positive pluralism leading to national integration and acculturation in Pakistan only if unevenness in state- led policies is removed and fully empowered democratic institutions are allowed to function in the country”. Feroz Ahmad also gives his opinion (1998, 271-72) that

Pakistani federation should ensure more provincial rights through modifications in its structure. Cohen (1987, 327) recommends management of plural society of Pakistan through elites‟ power-sharing by way of installing effective institutions. Same sort of

47 advice of elite bargain is given by Amin (1988, 255), while Kennedy (1993) suggested adoption of accommodative strategies through change in national political blueprint.

Some scholars criticized federal model of Pakistan; like Ursula Hicks (1978) illustrates Pakistan as a failure of federalism while some scholars like Muhammad

Mushtaq (2011) opine that there is no problem with the model and suggests that more decentralization is the solution of the problems of Pakistan. He suggests practicing

Majoritarian Model as the coalition cabinets remained short-lived in Pakistan. He says that the characteristics of Consociationalism like power-sharing under grand coalitions are not applicable for all multiethnic states. But he ignores the reality; though it is true that these cabinets in Pakistan were coalition cabinets, but they were made under

Majoritarian system and proved instable due to „hung parliament‟ feature of the model.

These coalitions were not formed under the implication of Consociationalism which emphasizes the inclusion of all ethnic groups alongside other important clauses of electoral and job related proportional representation, minority veto and autonomy.

Moreover, failure of the coalition cabinet is based on many reasons alongside the internal failure of the model i.e., bad inter-provinces relationship, civil-military relationship, executive powers distribution between prime minister and president and many others.

Hence the writer gives a self-explanatory statement under subheading of reconciliation during Post-Musharraf era in which coalition between PPP, Pakistan Muslim League-

Nawaz (PML-N), ANP, MQM, and MMA remained successful. This shows that problems lie in the system.

Almost all scholarly works regarding political marginalization and ethnic friction in

Pakistan have called for power sharing and political inclusion of excluded groups in the

48 power structures of Pakistan. Despite precise logics for power-sharing, these studies were unable to provide any clear blueprint of power-sharing. Political scientists, since 1960s, have been in favor of an explicit form of government that can help to maintain democracy in multi-ethnic states like Pakistan. However, we labeled them with a little variance in characteristics occasionally, like “Segmented Pluralism” (Lorwin 1971),

“Concordant Democracy” (Lehmbruch 1974) or “Consociationalism” (Lijphart, various strands since 1960s). Apparently in this background, power-sharing was recommended as a therapy for Pakistan while Consociationalism was categorized as a vivid mechanism of power-sharing for multiethnic states. So, there was a need for probing the relevance of

Consociational Model of power-sharing exclusively with the multiethnic society of

Pakistan which has Majoritarian system in its post-colonial background.

These evidences from history prove that state-building processes were stronger than national-building process. Central government used such an exclusionist politics to suppress ethnic and linguistic movements which was detrimental for the integrity of a state. The composition of power hierarchy is well-depicted in the available literature; on this base, the inter-provincial relationship, especially the role of Punjab, is further elaborated. The class structure of Pakistan, the pattern of Civil-Military relations, deadlocks in distribution of power, grievances due to repressive policies and incompatibility of governance model to address this exclusion are addressed in this literature, but few talk about inclusive strategies. This all proves futility of Majoritarian

Model; hence room is left for crucial discussion to build a better understanding of current model in Pakistan.

49

This provided in-depth study of colonial legacies, incompatibility and exclusiveness of

Majoritarian Model, but it did not cast light on further details of developing such political design which can eliminate cleavages and marginalization of society in Pakistan. It also talks about demographic structure, but misses to examine the intensity and function of separation of power.

The discussion offers crucial arguments about exclusive nature of Pakistani state; however a major part of the story concerns old Pakistani political history based on monopolization of power by different democratic and army rulers. This literature is an example to prove that political system is exclusive and government policies often rebound but it leaves a gap when as it lacks to provide or point out any solution or other tools for government to achieve a harmonious society.

End Notes

1. On Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan see for further study, Syed M. Hussain., A Recourse To The Analysis Of Civil-Military Relations In Pakistan-Borrowing Sociological Narratives In Contemporary Era. ISSRA Papers 2014. Pp. 79-98. Fatima, N., (2013). Impediments To Democracy In Pakistan Pakistan. Journal Of History And Culture, Vol. XXXIV, No. I (2013). Pp. 115-134. Greenwood, L. And Gowthaman Balacharan, The Search For Common Grounds: Civil-Military Relations In Pakistan. Humantarian Policy Group. Working Paper. Overseas Development Institute, London, United Kingdom. March 2014. Pp. 2-26. Hassan, M., Causes Of Military Intervention In Pakistan: A Revisionist Discourse. Pakistan Vision Vol. 12 (2), 2013. Pp. 66-100. Khan, J. Asmat Ullah Wazir, Civil-Military Imbalance In The Administration Of Pakistan: A Case Study Of Musharraf Era. The Dialogue, Vol. VI, (2012). Pp. 147-160. Rizvi, A. Javed. Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study Of Pakistan: From Barracks To Corporate Culture. International Research Journal of Interdisciplinary & Multidisciplinary Studies (IRJIMS). Volume-I, Issue-VIII, (2015). Pp. 34-44. Jenkins, C. Wesley. An Elusive Balance: Explaining Pakistan‟s Fluctuating Civil- Mi Litary Relationship. M.S Thesis in Security Studies. April 16, 2010. Georgetown University, Washington, DC. Hussain, E. Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in A Post-Colonial State. PCD Journal. Vol. IV No. 1 2012, Pp. 113- 146. Yousaf, M. Fixing Pakistan‟s Civil-Military Imbalance: A Dangerous Temptation, United States Institute of Peace May 3, 2012. Kotera Bhimaya, (1997).

50

Civil-Military reations: A Comparative Study of India and Pakistan. A dissertational work published by RAND Graduate School. Dr Noor ul Haq. Civil- Military Relations in Pakistan. IPRI Journal. Vol. XII, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 110-116.

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56

Chapter-3

FORMATION OF ETHNICITY IN POST-COLONIAL

PAKISTAN

INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to explain the phenomena of ethnic and linguistic divisions in

Pakistani society as a colonial legacy. The description begins with the historic invasion of

Arab Muslim invaders of sub-continent followed by rise of East India Company. Mughal rulers continued the divide and rule policy which already existed in indigenous Hindu population based on caste and creed. But they were also victimized by this policy later on

(Majumdar, 1953, 391-392). Afterwards, these Arab invaders were followed by the

Persians, Afghans, Turks and Indian races who adopted Islam. In the 18th century, British colonial powers in the guise of East India Company wound up the Muslim rule.

British Colonial power further exploited and cultivated ethnic politics. The next important part of this narration was the ebbs and flow of a milestone, namely the Pakistan

Movement that led makes history of state formation and three important streams i.e. constitutional deadlock, polarization of the founding political party and linguistic politics.

The political and social divisions in pre and post-1971 Pakistan are the crux of the discussion under this chapter. The constitutional development, haunted by the colonial legacies, still reigns supreme over the fate of multiethnic society of Pakistan. Finally, the ethno-linguistic composition of Pakistan is simply explored in the last section that will be supplementary to develop a normative debate regarding societal divisions in Pakistan and its inherited governance incompatibilities.

British-Indian army was recruited by following the myth of „martial races‟. British rule was largely bureaucratic and (Anderson and Killingray, 1991, 94) police force was organized in a semi-military fashion with the responsibility for implementation and maintenance of law and order. In wake of the Independence War of 1857, Muslims were thought chiefly responsible for the disorder. Consequently, the British developed their own „divide and rule‟ policy in which Hindus remained a privileged class (O‟Malley,

1965, 205-7). In this background, Indian National Congress (INC) emerged in 1885 and

All India Muslim League (AIML) was founded in 1906.

Until 20th century, there was little „give and take‟ between civilian population of India and colonial power. The start of World War I (1914-1918) brought a dramatic change in political, economic and social fabric of the sub-continent (Albrecht-Carrie, 1958, 387-8).

During this era, British changed their style of rule and introduced some laws in subcontinent to accommodate Hindus and Muslims together. These colonial legacies can

59 be termed both administrative and historical. Historical legacies gave birth to emergence of many factions in Muslim society while administrative legacies gave birth to post-1947 geography and governance patterns in Pakistan (this will be discussed in detail in coming chapters).

The colonial power pursued its strategic and economic advantages in India. It effectively formed a unitary state in India under two exploitative and instrumental combinations of centralism and regionalism on one hand, and communalism and nationalism on the other, (Jalal, 1995, 10) that became an integral part of geographical and political life of Pakistan afterwards.

HISTORICAL COLONIAL LEGACIES

The colonial rule was based on a joint mechanism of civil-military bureaucracy and local leaders while Muslims as a minority were not given importance (Robinson, 1974,

271-72). Therefore, the Muslim leaders were against the state structure based on

Majoritarian Model pioneered by the colonial power in British India. At the start of 20th century, British government introduced many constitutional reforms (Ali, 2009, 2) in sub- continent. For a sustainable unitary dogma the demand of electoral representation was accepted. The inconsistency in British policies was visible through emphasis on centralized government on one hand, and communally separate electorates on the other hand but this was used as political tool rather than accommodating alienated classes.

The most ironic result of these constitutional reforms was the emergence of rift within

Muslims. British encouraged formation of All Indian Muslim Category1 and facilitated it with separate electorate through Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in 1919. The government

60 of Indian Act 1935 implemented regional order in the Muslim majority provinces and it increased intra-Muslim differences over defined boundaries of Muslim electorate (Jalal,

1995, 11).

Moreover traditionally, categories of religion, region, language and biradari (clan) and many other identities had no firm roots in Indian soil before British colonial rule.

Many ethno-regional identities appeared due to the management and political distribution of British Empire. The class and occupation based categorization came beside the ethnic genesis of the provincial and regional distinctiveness like Punjabi, Baluchi, Sindhi,

Bengali and so on. They have become historical, apparently. In addition, this became dilemma for younger national identity like Pakistan to face these rigid entities.

Heterogeneity proliferated in the colonial system with overlapping identities; for example being Punjabi was not enough, so ones‟ caste and sect was also obligatory as depicted in census conducted by British rule in India (Szreter, Sholkamy and Dharmalingam, 2004,

45-46, Mukherjee, 2013, 805-820, Bhagat, 2001, 55).

Another divide emerged between feudals and peasants. Under British rule, the Punjabi landed-elites extended their influence. The Unionist Party thwarted the AIML to challenge its power but it ultimately joined hands when it noticed the British‟s intention to quit the sub-continent (Ziring, 1980, 138). AIML succeeded to win an appreciation in peasantry for which Unionist Party tried many times but failed. Therefore, joining hands with AIML was an advantage to the landlords of Unionist Party who brought peasantry under a weird state of dependency through legislation in Punjab which favored large landlords against Punjab‟s peasantry (O‟Malley, 1965, 76, Ziring, 1980, 138).The influential landlords of the Punjab continued to take part in policy and decision-making

61 after formation of Pakistan but under different names i.e., the “Noon faction” (headed by

Feroz Khan Noon) of Pakistan Muslim League (PML). He became chief minister of the

Punjab in 1953, the Republican Party later in 1956 and the Pakistan Muslim League

(Convention) of in 1960 (Baxter, 1977, 77; Ziring, 1980, 18). The PML kept forward the feudalist control in Punjab by giving dominant positions to few individuals who remained influential in policy and decision making afterwards.

ADMINISTRATIVE COLONIAL LEGACIES

After departure of colonial power, Pakistan had to establish an entirely new government before it could address the provincial and local level governments.

Therefore, the Pakistani leaders thought the unitary state system as the best solution to deal with the administrative issues.

British Indian Army and ICS were two key pillars of Colonial power. They operated as custodians of law and order (Jalal, 1995, 10). Settlement of millions of refugees and integration of princely states were the twin tasks which Muslim members of ex-ICS had to face in post-partition Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan borrowed bureaucratic control and centralization methods of colonial power. The Indian Act 1935 prepared this setup and

Majoritarian Model guaranteed a formal separation of political executive. Since inception, establishing the legislative supremacy over the executive proved difficult and executive-legislative relationship remained very tense (Chadda, 2000, 26). Politicians‟ intension to get executive hold strengthened the hands of bureaucrats. In independent

Pakistan, the Pakistani elite formed an alliance of convenience with civil-bureaucracy instead of installing such an organized setup which could guarantee the supremacy of

62 elected institutions; this was the lasting colonial legacy. The central government appointed provincial governors and gave greater autonomy but to bureaucracy only by empowering it over elected institutions.

During , AIML adopted theory of „two nations‟ to address the question of political representation of not only Indian Muslims but also the 562 princely states. Muslim leadership claimed creation of Pakistan in the North West and North East areas where Muslims were in majority. The capture of Bengal and Punjab as Muslim majority provinces remained decisive for AIML‟s political success as they had Muslim population in majority (Page, 1974, 262). But transparency of Radcliffe Award is doubted as many documents revealed that how Muslim majority areas of Ferozpur,

Gurdaspur and Zira were given to India unfairly. It enabled India to control Kashmir and rivers of Pakistan (Talbot, 1999, 11; Kazmi, 2009, 161). Jinnah accepted the award according to a promise he made with the Award as Pakistan was „honor bound‟.

After partition, “Pakistan overdeveloped administrative and military institutions to the colonial practice of emphasizing the requirements of law and order rather than those of popular representation” (Talbot, 1999, 54). On the same side, Pakistan inherited British treaties like Durand Line treaty of 1883. This treaty was signed between Lord Mortimer

Durand and Amir Abdurrahman of Afghanistan. But after , Afghanistan government refused to accept the nineteenth century treaties. This made transfer of power to provincial governments difficult because Khudai Khidmatgar of NWFP supported

Pakhtunistan Movement to favor Afghanistan. This boundary line remained contentious between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Talbot, 1999, 99-100). The administration of the two wings of Pakistan was difficult while having 1000 miles territorial distance covered by

63 hostile India. The political inheritance of refugees generated long-term political consequences for Pakistan. It produced center-provinces tensions in Pakistan when center asked Sindh to adjust refugees from East Punjab while Muhajir from other parts of India were also shifted to Sindh (Talbot, 1999, 106).

PAKISTAN LEGACY AND FORMATION OF ELITES

Politics in Pakistan is a manifestation of the irony of „old societies and new states, and primordial sentiments are yet to be transformed into trans-regional sentiments‟ (Hayes,

1982) while Joel Migdal (1988) elaborates such situation as „strong societies and weak states‟. In post-partition Pakistan, the executive efforts were mainly focused on state- building that delayed the process of integration of people into one united nation (For detail see: Jahan, 1972, 35; Ahmed, 2010, 191; Malik, 1997, 12-14; Nayak, 1994, 192).

The problems of polarization of the only leading party (Pakistan Muslim League), constitutional dilemma between East and West Pakistan and absence of national consensus on a lingua franca were the main issues which led to political instability. For better understanding of elite formation and governance incompatibilities in Pakistan, the description of the history of Pakistan is plural into two sections i.e. pre and post-1971 era.

PRE-1971 ERA

Two concepts of state were found in post-1947 Pakistan; first one was modern state with secular realm where parliament is sovereign and the provinces are given maximum degree of autonomy. The other concept is a conservative state with the fundamentalist concept of religion that emphasized on a strong center characterized by a presidential system (Azfar, 1987, 150).

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In the clash of these concepts, Pakistan Muslim League as a leading party that got hegemony over religious and regional political parties except sheikh Abdullah in

Kashmir and many tribes in Baluchistan (Singh and Talbot, 1996, 64). It adopted the same colonial policies of centralization. From 1947 to 1955, the government was established at first under interim Constitution of 1947, and then first constitution was implemented in 1956 after a great deal of delays and debates. Governor General was vested with extraordinary authority (vice regal powers). The central government demonstrated a strong hold on federating units and breach of constitution has been recorded in this era. Colonial legacies were frequently practiced; like appointment of provincial governors by governor general who acted like his agents at provincial level

(Hussain, 1989).

The failure to establish a viable and inclusive state structure was visible. The leading party could not build an Islamic state according to the given blueprint of Pakistan

Movement (Jetly, 2004, 127; Ziring, 1980, 45).It emphasized Islamic ideology as a binding force. Since General Ayub till date, a variety of ideologies under the banner of

Islam had been practiced by the leadership. But these efforts were seen as directed and forced from the top and advantageous only to a restricted class. It seems now that the people of Pakistan are getting sick of these “grand designs, exaggerated promises and complex programs” (Ahmed, 1994, 31).

To generate Muslim nationalism in sub-continent, the „two nation theory‟ was used for two major nations which remained successful to achieve the goal. In post-1947 scenario,

Pakistan is a soil of many ethnic and linguistic groups (Ziring, 1980, 134, Amin, 1988,

Musharraf, 2008, 2).Instead of including these groups in state structure, the leadership

65 chiefly based on Muslim League adopted centralization and authoritarian rule for building an indisputable federalism. This colonial form of government aggravated ethnic divisions of Pakistani society.

Polarization of Muslim League

AIML which renamed as Pakistan Muslim League was composed of different streams that joined with different incentives2. Division within the Muslim elites, which persisted during the British rule, damaged the growth of a single political doctrine for the party. Its hegemony was challenged by regional and religious political parties. First constitution was implemented in 1956, but till then Muslim League as political party was on the brink of disintegration which made the Constitution of 1956 impracticable (Wang, 1994, 207).

After partition, Muslim League split into many groups. The earliest structural and power hierarchy of Muslim league got plural in accordance with the party hierarchy

(Ahmed, 1994, 26). The most powerful of these factions was dominated by Muhajir group led by Prime Minister and made up of Muslim Leaguers from

Bengal, but it was plural from within and suffered electoral defeat in 1954.

Between1954-58, the battle of politics at national level was fought between the other two factions; Muhajir on one hand and landed aristocracy and religious leadership on the other. During 1951-54, political power remained in favor of Muhajir segment which later shifted to Punjabi groups when became Prime Minister (Burki, 1991,

41).

In Post-Jinnah political era, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan emphasized the non- secular practices in the political structure despite the popular demands for a secular

66 society by the Pakistani ethnic nationalities. Under his support, the refugee groups sought privileges by treating the indigenous nationalities as uncivilized and unsophisticated people and blaming them for their Hindu historical past. This has been particularly visible in Sindh and Baluchistan. Mistreating these claim of the ethnic elites and neglecting the assimilation of the refugees into the indigenous Sindhi culture led the country towards an unsettled antagonism between the various ethnic classes (Ahmed, 1994, 28).

Provincial forces were though under control, but dominated by Punjab or their sympathizers (landlords, bureaucrats) at that time. This flared anti-Punjabi resentments.

Punjab was anxious about the constitutional stipulation of Bengalis as they strived for a political and economic representation proportionate to their numerical strength. The

Punjabi dominant class feared them a threat to their own control and could not hide their scorn for the Bengalis (Loshak, 1971, 52).They claimed cultural, physical and psychological supremacy over Bengalis. The enigma of Punjabi domination upon every sphere of country was also seen as a form of colonialism in other parts of Pakistan and raised provincial passions to even higher levels of intensity (Ziring, 1980, 38).

In Bengal, nationalism was structured in new form (Singh and Talbot, 1996, 65).

…the East Pakistan renaissance society rejected Muslim nationalism in

favor of Bengali identification and inspired Raghib Ahsan‟s greater

Bengali scheme. Suhrwardy and Abdul Hashim popularized these ideas

and turned the Bengal Muslim League into a mass party. With the

prospect of partition looming large Suhrwardy openly disowned the two-

nation theory preferring the idea of independent Bengal outside of

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Pakistan. This ideological cleavage was the basis for the friction between

Punjab and Bengal that plagued Pakistan.

Constitutional Dilemma

The constitutional deadlock was the first major and identical conflict that erupted between both administrative territories (East and West Pakistan). The leadership of both sides indulged in a futile debate on the forum of constituent assembly. For four years,

Constituent Assembly debated for setting the constitution‟s basic principles. In the discussions, issues arose over the role of religion in the conduct of state and rights of provinces. West Pakistan was homogeneously Muslim, but East Pakistan contained a sizeable Hindu minority. Therefore, Islamization was not an easy task. Muhajir gave more secular approach towards politics; “before 1954, they had constituted a formidable pressure in the Constituent Assembly…a presence they used to keep at bay those who sought to turn the new country away from the Westminster Model of politics” (Burki,

1991, 44-45).

In this deadlock, the situation intensified with the dismissal of the constituent assembly (a sovereign body) by Governor General, Khwaja Nazimuddin. Molvi Tamez- ud-Din, the head of the constituent assembly, submitted a petition in Supreme Court against this illegal dismissal (Azfar, 1987, 79). But, the assembly was not restored and

Governor General suggested an alternate committee that suggested in 1950 a bicameral legislature almost similar to US federalism that designed the representation in Lower

House on population basis and equivalent powers and representation in Upper House.

Nearly equal powers were vested in parliament, and cabinet was held responsible for its

68 functions in case of disputes. This preliminary report was warmly welcomed in West

Pakistan but East Pakistan did not approve it. So it was sent back to committee for reconsideration (Hussain, 1989, 57). The revised report tried to resolve the representation problem by giving equal representation to both wings in both houses of parliament, but the proposal was rejected by various groups (Hussain, 1989, 58).

Finally, the Constitution of 1956 was passed after tough debate of nine years, but it proved short- lived. General Ayub, by imposing Martial Law, abrogated this constitution and imposed another constitution in 1962. This was also abrogated with the arrival of

General (Khan, 2005, 61). Kennedy (1995, 108) argued that the political direction of independent Pakistan was also determined by the legacy of colonial rule.

Muslim League governments soon became increasingly dependent on the inherited state apparatus because of lack of popular base and faced with internal and external tensions. It introduced a politicized ex-colonial military and provided it the opportunities to intrude, in partnership with the bureaucracy, in power structure at the expense of civil-society.

But military governments also could not formulate a unanimously accepted constitution for Pakistan.

Language Issue

Settling the national language issue was another major problem of Pakistan as a multi- ethnic and multi-lingual state. Pakistan has a wide range of regional sub-languages. In early days of Pakistan, Urdu and Sindhi were the most developed languages in Pakistan.

Declaring Urdu as national language became an issue. It was language of minor segment and was not spoken by other ethnic nationalities. It initialized a political crisis. Sindhis

69 were struggling for the recognition of their language. Bengalis struggled for years and sacrificed thousands of lives for the same issue. In pre-independence era, Urdu remained the lingua franca among the Muslims of northern India during the Pakistan Movement and the ethnic nationalities would have had no objection to accepting it as a national language if it had not been imposed upon them at the expense of their own languages

(Ahmed, 1994, 47). Pakistan is a multilingual and multiethnic society (Choudhury, 1988,

183; Amin, 1988). Therefore, it was very tough to require a lingua franca in Pakistan given the framework of linguistic heterogeneity but this fact was never admitted by the elites (Azfar, 1987, 63).

In post-1947, it was objected that Urdu has no roots in Pakistani soil. It is a language of central India (Muhajir community) and being spoken by 2% of the refugee population.

Therefore, it is a language of minority. Another opinion on language issue depicts that this issue came in limelight in post-Jinnah period and the language controversy was revived after assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat, Prime Minister Nazimuddin

(Bengali national) in 1952. He visited Dhaka and delivered controversial speeches on language issue for nothing (Ahmed, 2010, 183-185).

Overall, Pakistani elites used forced assimilation in place of adopting an accommodative federalism and refused not only the due acknowledgment of the local languages but also imposed a minority language as national language. As a result, consensus on national language could not be developed.

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COLONIAL LEGACIES IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1973

The colonial power in India pursued political arrangements on the patterns of territorial sovereignty which was found in the governing system of Mughal kingdom and distributed a significant self-rule to the provincial level. Adeney (2007, 25) examined that colonial power legislated (1919-1946) and proposed provincial self-rule to some extent.

But it was not practiced in reality. Pakistan adopted Indian Act 1935 as interim constitution with addition of some provisions on Islamization. A formal federal structure was implemented in which a proper separation of power was indicated between center and provinces. But, the center had an authoritative position and effective power rested in the hands of prime minister chosen by parliament.

Meanwhile, after abrogation of two constitutions and breaking away of Eastern unit, the nation adopted the third constitution in 1973. The constitution clearly emphasized a strong central government. This remained disputed among the provinces (Wang, 1994,

209). At the time of framing the Constitution of 1973, it was pointed out that Pakistan is a multilingual and multicultural country. It has different provinces and people who have different cultures, languages, script, habits and economies. Therefore Pakistan has to adopt a federal structure which can accommodate them. Contrary to this argument, it continued such a federal form of government which allowed maximum provincial autonomy just in theory but not practically (Choudhry, 1988, 183-184). But highly centralized federal structure of Pakistan has been a subject of severe criticism and the centripetal forces seemed to be getting stronger than centrifugal forces in Pakistan

(Choudhry, 1988, 194).

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Several studies about Pakistani politics reveal that there has been no sharp conceptual break with the colonial past. Ralph Braibanti (1966, 67) says that government apparatus remained essentially the same with few adjustments with modernization; like mixing the concept of President Ship with Parliamentary system was a process of modernization.

The Constitution of 1973 (Nayak, 1994, 27) in its democratic and federal structure has powerful non-democratic and unitary characteristics.

According to Watts (1996, 155), the “constitutional distribution of the legislative and executive powers and of financial resources between two orders of the government” is a common and core feature of federalism. Thus, the discussion on the distribution of the executive, legislative and administrative powers between federation and provinces of

Pakistan is an imperative part to be noted which remained ever controversial till date.

Strained political relationship between prime minister and president is a permanent feature of political history of Pakistan. During 1951-57, political leaders vied for grabbing the office of prime minister, which resulted in sacking of seven prime ministers in seven years (Ziring, 1980, 153, Azfar, 1987, 46).

During 1990s like 1951-58, the relations between prime minister and president remained troubled. In 1990s, this situation emerged after exertion of the 8th amendment

(introduced “Article 58 2(b)” of the Constitution of 1973) by General Zia. The politics of the 8th amendment changed the balance of power in Pakistan from the office of prime minister to president. The president enjoyed powers of a governor general/viceroy

(Chadda, 2000, 36; Azfar, 1987, 54). Reason of these strained relations between prime

72 minister and president was the wish to legislate changes in constitution to increase executive powers of their respective offices (Kennedy, 1995, 119).

The Constitution of 1973 provides (seventh schedule) three legislative lists i.e. the federal, provincial and concurrent. First two belonged exclusively to the legislative domains of central and provincial governments respectively. But concurrent list contains matters shared by both. After the 18th amendment, the Constitution of 1973 specifies legislative powers in two lists i.e. the federal and the provincial legislative lists3.

The parliament as the federal legislature is the supreme body. In past, it could legislate any domain in federal and concurrent lists. But the uneven division of law-making power between center and provinces was very visible. About 59 items are included in the federal list that covers from defense and foreign affairs to the taxation, while eight items like railway, mineral oil and natural gas etc. were included in second part of the list. The concurrent list consisted of 47 items and these tasks were considered to be managed by provinces (Watts, 1999, 65). The elimination of the concurrent list was guaranteed to be done after ten years of the promulgation of constitution-1973. But unfortunately, it could not happen as guaranteed. Finally it was removed in 2010 after the 18th amendment

(Adeney, 2012, 8-9). But provinces are still complaining of intervention of center into provincial matters.

The Constitution of 1973 was approved by the parliament, unanimously. But minor ethnic groups remained vocal for its implementation and demanded to curtail the powers of central government to the subjects of currency, national defense and foreign policy only. Richter (1986, 33) points out some other elements; for example Sindh Baluch

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Pakhtun Front (SBPF) who are demanding a loose union while Pakistan‟s Oppressed

Nations Movement (PONM)4is still criticizing the nature of Pakistani federalism and demanding decentralization in true essence (Rizvi, 2000, 23). But a lot of Articles are left behind which could not be implemented.

Fair administrative distribution remained a utopian idea in Pakistan. Even in colonial

India, AIML, living in unitary state structure, demanded maximum transfer of power for

Muslim majority provinces. But after the achievement of Pakistan, decentralization in true sense became impossible. In Pakistan, the smaller federating units are still struggling for autonomy and sharing of power in the central government (Adeney, 2002, 31).

The Constitution of 1973 narrates the smooth dealings between center-provinces as the prime guarantee of a federation. Article 149(1) affirms “the executive authority of every province shall be so exercised as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive authority of the federation, and the executive authority of the federation shall extend to the giving of such directions to a province as may appear to the federal government to be necessary for that purpose” (Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Part IV). Though concurrent list is abolished after 18th amendment in Pakistan but the constitution also authorized the center to interfere and command a province to execute any central law, ensue the „construction and maintenance of means of communication and to impede „any threat to the peace or economic life of Pakistan.

One more controversial constitutional provision on the Constitution of 1973 is that it grants right of the possession of land to the central government for federal use. The smaller provinces, especially Sindh, have been criticizing the allocation of land to retired military staff and the custody of terrain for settlement of army (Singh and Talbot, 1996, 87).

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This political dilemma emerged when president/governor general took position of viceroy of British era as described in Indian Act 1935 (Sayeed, 1967, 233-57). After

Jinnah, these special powers were misused for self-interest or to serve a specific faction.

Political rulers of Pakistan were ambitious and they thought provincial governments of

Sindh, Baluchistan and NWFP as hindrance in the way of political designs. So they used emergency provisions of constitution against these provinces. To understand the situation of East Pakistan, we have to examine the political culture within which constitution of

Pakistan developed; it can be simply described as vice regal (Nayak, 1994, 25-26).

In post-1971 Pakistan, the central government dismissed various provincial governments many times by using the emergency provisions (Hussain, 1989, 77-80). The emergency provisions are mentioned under Part X of the Constitution of 1973. President can issue the decree in case of domestic disorder, failure of constitutional mechanism and financial instability in a province5. However, the inappropriate and political use of these provisions became controversial. The smaller provinces have strong complaints against the emergency powers and struggling for amendments in constitution. But even the 18th amendment could not meet their grievances.

Political history of Pakistan is replete with examples of center‟s intervention in provinces.

In 1947, NWFP assembly was dismissed and substituted by a ministry of PML (Hussain,

1989, 77). The chief minister of Sindh was dismissed by the central government when he moved a resolution against the decision of central government to take Karachi out of the control of Sindh. The resolution was passed unanimously by the Sindh assembly but central government did not bother it. Federal spirit was also missing during Ayub era

(1962-69) when the entire authority was concentrated in presidential office. The

75 provincial governors were assigned by the president exclusively. It pretty resembled the colonial pattern of Governor General as he was authorized only to pick a governor for provinces who can act like his agent (Hussain, 1989, 78).

Table 4: Some instances of interference of Center in Provincial Governments (1947- 2015)

Period Conflict between Central Governments and Provinces 1947 1. Congress ministry in NWFP was replaced by a Muslim League ministry6 2. Ayub Khoro, Chief Minister of Sindh was dismissed regardless of majority in assembly 1955 One-unit Scheme (unification of four provinces of West Pakistan into one province) 1962-69 During this period, no adequate autonomy was given to provinces under a unitary federal system 1971 separation of East Pakistan 1972-74 The central government dissolved the Baluchistan government and NWFP provincial government resigned in protest.

1977-88 Martial Law by Zia-ul-Haq 1988-93 Repeated dissolution of national and provincial assemblies ( 1988, 90, 93, 96) 1994-95 Governor Rule in KP and Punjab and installation of new governments 1999 Removal of central and provincial governments 1999- 1. Martial Law by in 1999. 2007 2. Emergency rule in 2007 and removal of judges. 2014 Baluchistan MPAs resigned in protest against interference of central government into provincial affairs of Baluchistan 2015-16 Sindh government protested over bill for extending more executive powers to Rangers 2017- 1. KPK and Baluchistan representation is curtailed in ICC. 2018 2. Baluchistan‟s plea for extra-judicial killing and missing persons is on rise. Source: By Author

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FEDERATING UNITS OF PAKISTAN: ETHNO-LINGUAL FORMATION OF SOCIETY

Pakistan is among federations that are considered the world‟s most plural societies.

This ethno-lingual mosaic is complex because each of its provinces is inhabited by various linguistic groups; Punjab with 76% Punjabis; Sindh with 60% Sindhi;

Baluchistan with 59% Baluch; and NWFP with 74% Pakhtun population (See Elazar,

1987, 189; Cohen, 2005, 204).

Table 5: Territorial distribution of the population of Pakistan (2005) Provinces Area (sq. Population km)

Baluchistan 347,190 6,566,000 (5.0) Punjab 205,344 73,621,000(55.6) Sindh 140,914 30,440,000 (23.0) NWF Province 74,521 17,744,000(13.4) FATA 27,219 3, 176,000 (2.4) Federal Capital Territory 907 805,000 (0.6) (Islamabad)

Source: Elazar (1987: 189); Cohen (2005: 204).

Table 7: Numerical Strength (%) of Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan

(1998)

Language Punjabi Siraiki Sindhi Urdu(Muhajir) Pashto Baluchi Others Overall 45.4 10.9 14.6 7.8 13.0 3.5 4.8

Urban 47.6 5.5 9.3 20.5 9.6 2.6 4.8

Source: Kennedy (2002, 41)

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These provincial demarcations are not measured strictly with the administrative limits, while minor ethnic groups including non-Muslims are also residing along the border area.

The ethno-linguistic composition of the region was reorganized in 1947 due to the massive entry of Muhajirs. Moreover, the internal migration (IDPs) and the immense influx of Afghan refugees further deepened this heterogeneity (Burki, 1991, 17-19).

A summary of ethno-linguistic composition of provinces of Pakistan has been given below.

PUNJAB

Punjab is not a homogeneous province. It has three different communities and three different cultural and linguistic strands. Some people say these are just dialectical variations and do not indicate separate culture or language (Singh and Talbot, 1996, 67).

Many Punjabis do not speak Punjabi. Punjabi identity is hard to pin down. It can be referred by territory, language and ethnic group. In partition of the sub-continent, Punjab was plural between Pakistan and India and people from East Punjab migrated to Pakistani

Punjab. Now they are dispersed in other parts of Pakistan (Singh and Talbot, 1996, 87).

Officially, three vernaculars are found in Punjab and it can be plural in three regions accordingly. Three linguistic zones of Punjabi speaking (Central Punjab) are; the

Pothowhari speaking (Northern Punjab) and the Siraiki speaking (Southern Punjab) can be demarcated in three new provinces. Pothowhari is official vernacular of Punjabi. But

Siraiki has a distinct dialect (PONM is a strong movement over demarcation of new provinces in Punjab province). Details are provided as follows.

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Punjabi Speaking District of Punjab

Punjabi speaking areas are comprised of the central and northern parts of Punjab which are entirely Punjabi-speaking regions. But the adjoining districts of NWFP namely

Mianwali (10%), (5.3%) and Attock (8.28%) have some Pakhtuns patches.

Some Urdu-speaking population has occurrence in the urban centers like Lahore (10.2%) and Rawalpindi (7.5%). In addition, few Siraikis reside in close proximity to Siraiki speaking region like Mianwali (12%), Vehari (11.4%) and Khanewal (5.8%). Baluch and

Sindhis have no presence in this area (Census Reports, 1998).

Pothowhari Speaking Region in Punjab

Western Punjab that is also called Lahnda has its specific Punjabi dialect namely

Pothowhari or Pothowhari. According to Masica (1991), residents in

Northern Punjab, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, particularly of Poonch, also speak this dialect. Historically, Punjab owns it too as depicted in Linguistic survey done by George

A. Grierson (1903, 28) on languages of British India7 that marked it as a dialect of

Western Punjab. But it was considered as an identical variation of a distinctive language rather than being a dialect of Punjabi and this claim remained controversial. Since 1981, the data of Pothowhari speakers has been tabularized in the national census of Pakistan whenever conducted.

After partition, the region south of Murree hills, Rawalpindi, Rawat, Gujar Khan,

Jhelum, to north of Azad Kashmir (Muzaffarabad, Bhimber and Rawalakot) were considered Pothowhari speaking.

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Siraiki Speaking Regions of Punjab

South-West Punjabis around Multan and Bahawalpur made conscious efforts to be aloof from dominant groups in Punjab. Half of Multan population is originally migrants from East Punjab who dominated the city‟s commercial and industrial sector. This established the city as a cultural center for these refugees.

The initial development of the Siraiki movement began in 1960s. Many literary efforts were made, but would not get to political pitch of demands for a Siraiki province.

Many Siraiki organizations are still active for this cause i.e., the Pakistan Siraiki Party and the Siraiki Quami Movement and many others (Singh and Talbot, 1996, 79), though sizeable Punjabis also reside in this region. Rajanpur and which are the neighboring districts to the province of Baluchistan have some Baluchi-speaking population with ratio of (17%) and (14.3%) respectively. Urdu-speaking population has fairly important existence in the urban areas while Pakhtuns and Sindhis are also evident, though in a small strength (Census Reports, 1998).

KHYBER PAKHTUNKHAWA8 (KPK)

KPK is demographically plural between native and tribal peoples. The Pakhtuns are superior numerically but the region is home to other communities too, i.e. the Punjabis

(Awans, Gujars, Jatts) and Baluchs. The Pakhtuns were plural into several distinct tribal units. The major ones are Yousafzai of the Malakand agency; the Mohamands and

Afridis of the Khyber Agency and Kohat Pass; the Orakzais of Tirah; the Turis of

Khurram; the Waziris of North and South Waziristan; the Mahsuds, the Bhillanis and

Shiranis of the Dera Ismail khan frontier. The groups who live in the settled areas of the

80 provinces are Yousafzai of Mardan; the Khalils, Mohamands, Muhammandzais,

Daudzais, Gigianis and Khattaks of Peshawar District; the Khattak and Bangash of

Kohat; the Marwats, Bannuchis and Wazirs of Bannu; the Gandapurs, Kundies and

MianKhels of Dera Ismail Khan. Some of the important minor tribes are the Jaduns of

Hazara and Sawabi, the Shinwaris and Mullagories of the Khyber and Babers, Turis and

Dawars. The largest tribe is the Yousafzai which is also found in Swat and Dir. Awan are supposed to be the most important non-Pakhtun elements known for agricultural activity

(Ziring, 1980, 148-150).

KPK is considered as an overwhelmingly homogeneous region (Pakhtun dominated province), but Siraiki segment is also the major portion residing in the district of Dera

Ismail Khan. Pakhtuns reportedly make minor segments of the districts of Mansehra,

Abbotabad, Haripur and Chitral. The non-Pakhtun belt of the KPK is dominant with smaller linguistic group, mainly Hindko-speaking (Census Reports, 1998).

SINDH

After partition, the massive arrival of refugees converted Sindh into the most ethnically diverse province. The International and internal migration resulted in settlement of a great number of Punjabis, Pakhtuns, and Baluchs in Sindh. Karachi is called a “Mini Pakistan” now, because it has a proportion of almost every ethnic segment inside it. The rural area has been resided by indigenous inhabitant of Sindh alongside a substantial number of Baluchs who have assimilated here by adopting Sindhi language and culture. Punjabis are another major portion of Sindh‟s population residing in the districts of Umerkot, Mirpur Khas, Badin and Sukkar. The urban areas of Sukkar,

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Sanghar, Mirpur Khas, Hyderabad, Thatta, Ferozpur, Nausharo and Nawab Shah are mainly populated by Muhajirs. Pakhtuns also live in substantial number in Karachi and rural Sindh as well, though in a very small portion (Census Reports, 1998). This ethnic division split Sindh into rural and urban areas. The urban centers of Sindh are dominated by Muhajirs, but Sindhis are the overwhelming part of rural areas (The Muhajir phenomenon will be discussed in next chapter).

BALUCHISTAN

Before 1947, Baluchistan was mainly plural in three parts (Buffer zone under

British);border territories under British rule; Baluchistan sates governed by local rulers; and the most powerful was state of Kalat rules by Khan of Kalat. Tribal states formed the

Baluchistan states union and were self-governed when Pakistan was created. British let the self-rule continue and minimized its control there. It was anticipated that Pakistan government will continue this policy. The original Baluchistan states were Kalat,

Makran, Lasbela and Kharan. Baluchistan has redundant natural resource (Ziring, 1980,

161) though the population is less than fifty percent Baluchs. Northern area of the province is predominantly inhabited by Pakhtuns. In the Sibi and Las Bela districts,

Sindhi or Siraiki origin people are the major population.

In Quetta-Pishin and Loralai, the languages most in use are Punjabi and Pashtu.The vast Kalat district is Brahvi speaking region. The dominant Baluchi-speaking tribes are to be found in the border area with Iran. These are the districts of Kharan, Makran and

Chaghai. Interestingly, more Baluch live in Karachi and western Sindh than in their native province.

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Baluchs and Pathans claim some common territory and this makes them suspicious of one another. That often brings them into conflict (Ziring, 1980, 66). Marri and Bugtti tribes are supposed to be major and largest tribes. Mengal are other major decedents of

Mongolian invaders. Brahvi who live among Baluchs are considered the original inhabitants of the area. They are Dravidians and culturally related to a dominant racial group in southern India. Semi-feudal sardari political system is giving coherence to this confused ethnic picture. Sardars are not showing accommodative and supportive inclinations and this cleavages have always been exploited by the outsiders and anti-state elements.

Baluchistan is a multiethnic province with a few important minorities. Census report

1998 indicates that the districts of Ziarat, Zhob, Pishin, Killa Abdullah, Killa Saifullah,

Loralai and Musakhel are mainly Pakhtun majority areas. Sindhi and Siraiki segments are also part of Baluchistan but in minor proportion.

CONCLUSION

Politically, Pakistan is a highly centralized state that is a hurdle in its way to fulfill the real criteria of a federation. Although the share and separation of power between center and provinces has been explained in constitution 1973 of Pakistan, despite this federal tone the state is rather centralized one. After evaluating the political instability, ethnic mobilization caused the gap in constitutional theory and practice. This chapter challenges that the adopted governance model is incompatible or less facilitating to manage and accommodate the ethno-lingual diversity of Pakistan. The next episode of thesis will evaluate the incompatibility of the functions of governance model.

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Finally, the challenging demography of the federating units is demanding more accommodating federalism than the current colonial adaptation of unitary set-up. The

Constitution of 1973 though promises a federal set up with more decentralization to provinces, it remained restricted to theory only. Even the 18th amendment could not produce tangible results regarding decentralization and empowering provinces.

End Notes

1. Muslims being a distinct political category with separate electorate. 2. Muslim League divided along incentives lines too. There were three Muslim communities of British India that campaigned for the creation of Pakistan did so in pursuit of different interests for urban community of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Bombay and other provinces of North-central India the objective was to overcome what was perceived as the Hindu majority‟s reluctance to grant the Muslims their due share in government and economy. The Muslims of Bengal and Assam also demanded the creation of Pakistan for economic reasons but unlike Muslims of the North-central provinces they wanted Pakistan not in order to gain opportunity for themselves equal to that of the non-Muslims but to improve the distribution of income. From 1951-57 the consistent fall of ministries commenced the leadership crisis. The turning point of this tug of war was the humiliating dismissal of Bengali Prime Minister Nazim-ud-Din by Military-Bureaucratic oligarchic establishment, omission of east Pakistani from the central government, intervention of center, intensive handling of language issue and economic exploitation set East Pakistan along the road to separation. The dismissal of Prime Minister Nazim-ud-Din from Bengal initiated the crisis. Language and constitutional deadlocks were the factors in Pakistan which continued to play a significant role in ethnic identification and mobilization. Pakistan is a multilingual and multiethnic society. It was very tough to require a lingua franca in Pakistan given in the framework of linguistic heterogeneity. 3. Concurrent list was abolished after 18th amendment in 2010. It was consisted on 47 items which were given to provinces to maximize their autonomy. But the subjects listed in the concurrent list are not of much importance these are about will, bankruptcy, arbitration, trust and trustees, arms and ammunitions, explosives, drugs, medicines, population welfare, Zakat (Alms), tourism, Auqaf (donation or charitable spending) marriage and divorce, infants and minors‟ adoption etc. It was

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supposed that transferring of these subjects to the provinces will enhance provincial autonomy and change the fate of provinces. But these matters are not that mush important which can make some sense to maximize provincial autonomy. Therefore, abolition of concurrent list is not a big move towards maximum autonomy to provinces. 4. PONM is a fusion of 28 ethno-nationalist groups and parties united in 1990s 5. Further the Constitution 1973, Article (234) allows the president to declare emergency in if provincial government fails to maintain constitutional mechanism. This provision proves that the central government reacts like a unitary state. 6. For another perception over this, see an article by Dr. Safdar Mehmud (5th June, 2015). Subah Bakhair: Tarekhi Haqaiq Kia Kehte Hain (Good Morning: What Do Historical Facts Narrate) The Jang. 7. For further reading see Grierson, G. A. (2005). Linguistic Survey of India. Vol. 19(1-9). Delhi: Low Priced publication. Retrieved at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/342414/Linguistic- Survey-of-India 8. After 18th amendment, NWFP was renamed as KPK.

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Chapter-4

CURRENT FEDERALISM: ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND

MOBILIZATION IN PAKISTAN

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the meaning and types of federalism in general and examines the Pakistani federal system in general and its exclusiveness in particular. First section is addressing the complaint of smaller segments based on lack of power-sharing. The second part of the chapter comprises the existing tensions over distributive issues within provinces i.e. National Finance Awards and water distribution. The third section will talk about the protests of the minor communities over lack of provincial autonomy while the last section of this chapter is demonstrating the incompatibility of Majoritarian based governance system to accommodate the grievances of ethnic and linguistic segments of the society of Pakistan. Mostly parts of the chapter cover history of Pakistan since its inception.

Like Pakistan, all states more or less are created through violence and after creation they often plunge into domestic disagreements that sometimes lead to civil war. After dealing with this civil war, an accommodating process is produced that is labeled as national consensus. It is a conscious and purposeful development of “indoctrination” that creates mutual consensus on some fundamentals. Adeney (2003, 23) states that adoption of a compatible federalism or federation1 is one of those abstract ideas that demand national consensus. According to Watts (1970, 11) Federalism is a concept of government based on the separation of powers between at least two levels of government i.e. center and constituent units and this power can be in the form of self-rule and shared- rule (Watts, 1998, 120) under different types of federalism i.e. federation, confederation and other hybrid political system. A federal system can be either “Unitary, Decentralized,

Majoritarian or Consociational” and a governance type is decided by specific features that a federation obtains.

The blend of power-sharing and elements of decentralization or autonomy characterize the spirit of federalism, though it can be developed under different structures. Federations may differ from each other by the temperament and degree of decentralization and power-sharing. For example, Canadian federalism emphasizes on provincial self-rule while Germany prefers shared federal decision making (Watts, 2000,

44).

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The 20th century‟s decolonization is very vital regarding debate on federalism. In continuity with their colonial past, many states opted for federal arrangements for managing their diversity or to preserve institutions. To regulate ethnic conflicts, federalism is a way to control ethnic/racial variations in place of eradication (McGarry and O'Leary, 1993, 4). For this purpose, federalism usually adopts some supplementary approaches for organizing diverse population i.e. Consociationalism and multiculturalism2.

In the discourse on federalism, „diversity‟ has earned a special implication. In federalism, not all diversity is significant. This is important when it implies some territorial significance and a specific group with its ethnic, culture, language or other traits became minority and requires special protection of its rights. According to Wheare

(1953, 49), federalism is a means of reconciliation for diversity and for unity to preserve these diversities with their peculiar ethics.

Diversity is very complicated to be managed because it affects the federal arrangements. To manage diversity for the sake of unity in multiethnic societies, the use of federal arrangements is pretty common. But states like Pakistan, since inception, have taken institutional measures to manage diversity inappropriately and half-heartedly

(Bhattacharyya, 2010, 23) and the particular style of governance of British colonial model (Majoritarian) is the main cause of the ethnic tensions to a large extent in this region (Bhattacharyya, 2010, 43).

There is a deep rooted relation between federation and ethnic mobilization. Federal systems differ in how it regulates ethnic diversities and mobilization. Ethnic groups can be accommodated within a federal type through give and take method. According to

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Kohli (2004, 37), a centralized government is not an ideal system to eliminate or reduce the territory-based differences. Pakistan is a constitutional state in all respects but it is functioning as a unitary system practically. This subject requires to be examined and reasons behind the occurrence of strained relations between center and provinces and intra-provincial dissatisfaction in Pakistan can be clearly observed despite having all standard constitutional measures.

According to Nayak (1984, 22), there are two typical implications of federalism, i.e.

„judicio-legal‟ logic that refers constitution for separation of powers and second is „socio- cultural‟ reason pointing out existence of a multi-dimensional pluralism within a society.

In this way, federalism is a structure and a process as well. In Pakistan, federalism remained unsuccessful to take roots mainly because of the temperament of ruling elites, patterns of its implementation and policies it practiced to achieve its goals. “The structural peculiarities of the state of Pakistan are diverse as they ought to be. But for

Pakistan, they also proved to be suicidal as the emergence of Bangladesh demonstrated.

The dangerous features this state structure continues to assert as the country is moving from one crisis to another (Nayak, 1984, 24).

The ethnic conflicts were endemic since the very inception of Pakistan (Nayak, 1984,

30). It is constituted of such ethnic and tribal groups who have unique history and rely only on their years-old and trusted local leaders. Patience and wisdom is the only way to get them integrated into a modern polity when they could forget their parochial and primordial attachments. Though the common bond and the dominant belief system of this diverse society was Islam but it rarely caused any reduction in regional, ethnic and tribal distinctiveness or primordial cooperation (Ziring, 1980, 135).

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Pakistan‟s weak public organizations have often been jolted by major demographic developments (Malik, 1997, 12). Absence of a responsible check and balance mechanism, non-proportional education and voting arrangements, absence of equal economic opportunities, partisan judiciary and unfair media are few reasons of political instability. Such a complex „dichotomous‟ relationship has pessimistic impact on the cross-ethnic cohesion in country. In its colonial background, the process of national integration was ill-planned because of conflicting centripetal and centrifugal forces within the very basis of the state. In pre-independence era, struggle against the well- established forces and the similar blocks through constitutional means, i.e. Pakistan

Movement, was an achievement of political process. But personalized politics and neglecting Consociational arrangements damaged democratization after independence and pushed the country into a political paralysis. In developed countries, state evolves out of a developed nationhood, but in post-colonial countries the state and nation building had to be fixed out concurrently. These processes involve opposite trajectories. If state- building requires concentration of power, contrarily, nation-building demands distribution of powers, cooption of minor groups and decentralization (Malik, 1997, 14).

In Pakistan these both stem out of authority and state-building was done at the expense of nation-building (Rehman, 1987, 14-15).

MAJORITARIAN MODEL: EXCLUSION OF SMALLER ETHNO-

LINGUAL COMMUNITIES

After 1971, Punjab became the dominant province with the strength of its population.

The grievances of minor provinces are based on anti-Punjabi resentment mainly, while

96 intra or inter-provincial strained relationship involves many different variables. The

Punjabi supremacy over smaller provinces is also multidimensional. It enjoys overrepresentation in national institutions because it holds more than half (63%) population of Pakistan. It has relatively improved socio-economic state of affairs. This comparatively beneficial position of the Punjabis has irritated the people of underprivileged areas and their alienated groups (Singh and Talbot, 1996, 44). They accused Punjab of the exploitation of their resources for the sake of its own development.

Accordingly, this Punjabi predominance and virtual deprivation of the smaller provinces has been alleged as the „Punjabization’3 of Pakistan (Talbot, 2000, 215).

The perception of Punjabization or Punjabi predominance is strengthened evidently with distributive formulas i.e. sharing of political, diplomatic and civil-military bureaucratic positions, water resources distribution and fiscal decentralization (NFC awards). Hence, this part mainly attempts to appraise these anti-Punjab resentments and accusations of smaller provinces and alienated communities.

LACK OF POWER-SHARING IN FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN

One of the basic problems of Pakistani federalism is the lack of power-sharing of political, diplomatic and civil-military bureaucratic positions which is annoying smaller units. They complain about the curbing of their due share in the state and public institutions. The subsequent part of this chapter will detail this concern.

Exclusion of Smaller Communities on Political Level

First and foremost complaint of smaller communities is an exclusive power structure of Pakistan which serves only major factions of population. Initial years of Pakistan were

97 unstable politically and during 1950s it was at its peak (rapid fall of ministries). However, separation of East-Pakistan produced a unanimously accepted constitution in 1973. The

Constitution of 1973 states that structure of Pakistan is „parliamentary‟. Although the

Constitution of 1973 has been amended many times and some amendments for example,

8th and 14th amendments, alter the state structure from parliamentary system to presidential that is undermining this character of the 1973 constitution. Resultantly, the parliamentary system functioned in parallel to presidential system or sometimes operated more like a semi-parliamentary system in Pakistan. However, the ethno-linguistic groups are concerned that the larger portion of political positions is shared by the major group.

The smaller communities were kept underrepresented and given the high posts, particularly Premiership and Presidentship, for short period of time. Sindhis are relatively overrepresented but they were not free to operate the government machinery. After dismemberment of Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto first became “civilian chief martial law administrator” (CMLA) and after some time took hold of presidential office.

After passing of the Constitution of 1973, he took charge of prime minister of Pakistan

(1972-1977). But after his execution, PPP and Sindh were indirectly kept under extreme pressure and observation by general Zia who was a Punjabi military ruler (who ruled about a decade from 1977-1988). After non-party based elections of 1985, Junejo (a

Sindhi national) took charge of prime minister but he remained in continuous clash with

President Zia who removed him from premiership and was finally murdered. Next general elections were held in 1988 and Benazir Bhutto (daughter of Z. A Bhutto) managed to take hold of the office of prime minister. After clash on executive power- sharing issues between prime minister and president, President Ishaq Khan used 58 2(b)

98 to dismiss her government. This was the second time that the 58 2(b) was used by the (first time used by President Zia against Prime Minister Junejo).

A was installed under Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, (as a caretaker prime minster) who was also a Sindhi. Meanwhile General Zia (President too) ruled, and power actually remained confined to Punjabi group only. After Benazir, power shifted to Punjab mainly in 1990 elections. Nawaz Sharif was elected to the office of prime minister. He was replaced by Benazir Bhutto in 1993 and Benazir was replaced by Nawaz in 1996.Dduring this period, the three caretaker Prime Ministers (Balakh Sher Mazari, Moeenuddin Ahmad and Miraj Khalid) were from Punjabi groups. Then Muhajirs enjoyed power for a decade in the form of General Musharraf rule. He controlled reign of powers exclusively from 1999 to

2008. During this period, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Shujaat Hussain and Shaukat Aziz were his nominees as prime ministers.

Zafarullah Khan Jamali was first ever Baluch as Prime Minister and that too by a military ruler and not through democratic mechanism. He remained in office for few months and unwillingly resigned. He was replaced by Shujaat Hussain. Shujaat Hussain was removed from office by Musharraf to pave way for Shaukat Aziz, both from Punjab. KPK enjoyed overrepresentation first under the rule of General Muhammad Ayub Khan (1958-1969). Then

KPK shared power along with Punjab and Sindh as (1988-1993) was a

Pakhtun who was inclined to be an authoritative president for six years.

President Farooq Ahmad Leghari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani (a Siraiki speaking) were also from the Punjab province. After resignation of President Pervez

Musharraf in 2007, President (2008 to 2013) from Sindh enjoyed power. But after general elections-2013, Punjab dominated central government again. In figures though,

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Punjabis may not have overrepresentation but they controlled the real power from behind the curtain. This is the actual reason of anti-Punjabi resentment in smaller communities.

Exclusive Recruitment in Military Posts

Military is the most influential and prominent institution in Pakistan. Punjab again is dominant here. According to Samad (2007, 113) and Amin (1988, 48) to understand the process of Punjabization this is important to seek Punjab‟s multiple relationships with the army and state in pre-independence era.

The myth of “Martial Races” was the ground for recruitment policy that Pakistan adopted from its Colonial masters while the British developed it in the wake of the mutiny that occurred in the background of “Independence War 1857” to curtail any further disturbances, (Amin, 1988, 21; Kennedy and Rais, 1995, 107; Nayak, 1995, 193).

According to Ali (1983, 63) politically backward rural localities of the Punjab and the

KPK were the areas that were given recruitment in the new-style army while South

Indians and Bengalis were measured as inappropriate for the job. Cohen (1987, 316) rightly points out that this policy was the main reason of the overrepresentation of

Punjabis and Pakhtuns in Indian army. Punjabis were evidently prevalent as the single biggest class in the Indian army by the beginning of the World War II.

After partition, this recruitment policy was carried forward by Pakistani political elites and Punjab remained the chief area for the recruitment that once had served the British rule in pre-independence era (Ali, 1983, 65) and followed by Pakhtuns of KPK. Cohen

(1987, 318) argues that after partition Pakistan received almost 75 percent of all ex- servicemen recruited mainly from Punjab (Rawalpindi, Attack, Jhelum) and KPK (Kohat and Mardan). The ethnic underrepresentation of army is very visible in the wake of

Punjabi and Pakhtun dominance/overrepresentation while Sindh and Baluchistan are

100 neglected, though the ethnic composition of the has never been disclosed in any form (Cohen, 1987, 318). For this reason, the smaller units and the excluded groups labeled military rule in Pakistan as the Punjabization of Pakistan.

Pakistan frequently experienced direct military rules and it deeply impacted the relationship between state and the army. According to Siddiqa (2007, 72) the industrialization during the era of General Ayub Khan enhanced future role of military in state-building through preserving its fiscal and political autonomy that remained crucial to maintain a permanent authority over the state structure. General Zia-ul-Haq (next to

Ayub) as army dictator introduced some fundamental reforms which remained beneficial mainly for armed forces. During his rule, military emerged as the most privileged class in Pakistan because he obliged the higher ranks with regular and wide-ranging distribution of rewards i.e., increased budgetary allocation, granting valued posts after retirement and their benefits were institutionalized through „the Fauji Foundation‟. The ex-army officers were sent to Gulf States and offered valued pieces of land and other facilities.

Same pattern was followed in the era of General Pervez Musharraf by providing better future prospects to serving and retired military officers particularly in „public-sector‟

(Siddiqa, 2007, 110) including Prime Minister Secretariat, Ministry of Information

Technology, the Ministry of Interior, Federal Public Service Commission, the

Establishment Division, Civil Service Training Institutions and the National

Accountability Bureau and vice versa. According to Samad (2007, 61) army also intervened into sports and educational organizations.

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Furthermore military adopted a permanent role in executive power-sharing. In 2004, a regulation was passed namely „The National Security Council Act‟ that led military to take a decisive position in many core issues i.e. defense, state sovereignty and to manage disasters. According to Siddiqa (2007, 107) the interests of military are secured under the umbrella of this act that enhanced its contribution to reshape the state‟s stance on many political, social and economic issues.

Table 8: Ethnic Origins of the Top Military Elites Number Percent Punjabi 20 40 Pakhtuns 17 34 Muhajir 10 20 Others 2 4 Sindhis 1 2 Baloch 0 0 Total 50 100 Source: Tahir Amin, 1980.

The overrepresentation of Punjab in armed forces has been frustrating for the smaller units since military turns into an imperative organization and providing maximum welfare for its serving and retired staff.

Exclusion of Smaller Segments from Civil-Bureaucracy

The penetration of bureaucracy into political affairs of Pakistan has grown so deeper that we cannot avoid having its critical and central role in the state-building process. This was mainly due to fragile political institutions and chaotic deadlocks between ethnic groups of early years. Civil bureaucracy was also dominant upon few political factions who did not share powers with the marginalized ones. It is a common view that the early political leadership of Pakistan such as M. A Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, trusted bureaucracy and

102 were profoundly dependent upon their set-up. Moreover, their successors did not try to curtail that influential and increasing bureaucratic legacy from the state machinery.

In the subsequent years, the political instability in Pakistan paved the way for the bureaucracy‟s involvement. The bureaucracy demonstrated its professional potential to deal with the demanding circumstances. Meanwhile in the succeeding years, the military also established itself and comparatively augmented its role in Pakistani politics.

However, the role of civil bureaucracy in Pakistani politics remained integral. In pre-

1971 scenario, Bengali nationalism emerged in the background of distributive disparity and discrimination perpetrated by politicians from the West wing. Their numerical strength was not translated into their rightful share in government institutions, mainly civil-military bureaucracy.

In 1956, Islam (1981, 33) states that at top level policy-making positions in the central secretariat, only 51 out of a total of 741 seats were occupied by the Bengalis and about

97% of the higher cadre was occupied by West . This biasness was a colonial legacy. British recruitment policies and the uneven regional growth of Indo-Pak

Subcontinent under British rule is a prominent part of history. After the partition, about

133 Muslim senior bureaucrats preferred to opt for Pakistan and only one among them was from Bengal and the remaining hailed from Central India (Muhajir) and the Punjab

(Samad, 1995, 128).

In early decades of partition, Muhajirs and Punjabis maintained this position.

However, after 1971, Punjabis were overrepresented in bureaucracy and emerged as the single dominant group. After 1980, Muhajirs‟ dominance declined in the higher stratum of civil bureaucracy in Pakistan, though they are still slightly overrepresented than the

103 other marginalized communities (Rahman, 1995, 28). On the other hand, Samad (2007,

105) argued that the professional Punjabi class, being in majority, persistently claimed its dominance and maintained that laws and national policies should serve the majority interests.

The grievance of minor groups about the allocation of diplomatic posts is genuine because these posts demonstrate an honor and trust that a nation attributes to the post holder. But unfortunately in Pakistan, the allocation of these posts is a political matter.

The collective data on the sharing of diplomatic positions from 1971-97 suggests that minor communities were neglected. In this period, 72 ambassadors were posted in 8 countries, among them “45 were Punjabis, 14 were Pakhtuns, 11 were Muhajirs and 2 were Sindhis while Baluchistan had no representation” (Mushtaq and Alqama, 2009,

121). This study points out two groups, first as „Punjabi, Muhajir, and Pakhtun‟ who have overrepresentation and second group is „Sindhi, Baluch, and Siraiki‟ who are given least presentation. This is main cause of anti-Punjabi resentments and inter-provincial conflicts. Conversely, a “quota system” was introduced in bureaucracy that transformed it relatively in a better representative body. But some data reveals the dominance of few groups particularly Sindh and the Punjab in bureaucracy at the expense of the smaller communities.

The Punjabi dominance deepened in civil-military bureaucracy during General Zia‟s era (1977-88) but gradually a Punjabi-Pakhtun partnership evolved over time (Ahmed,

1988, 65). Yet, the Sindhi and Baluchi were alienated from the state‟s machinery.

Apparently, the above-mentioned table shows that rural Sindh is gradually enhancing its power in bureaucracy. Contrarily, Baluchistan faced the worst discrimination. However, the

104 data discloses a proper Baluchi representation in jobs against their quota of 3.50%. But, practically couple of complications persisted as it consisted of mere representation of

Baluchistan rather than the Baluch people. In 1972, only 5 per cent Baluch were given jobs in civil sector in Baluchistan and moreover they were employed only at lower ranks (Nayak,

1984, 193; Ali, 1983, 117).

DISTRIBUTIVE ISSUES AMONG PROVINCES

The smaller provinces and alienated groups in Pakistan have been offended by the unjust, discriminatory and unequal sharing of national resources. The formula for the allocation of resources between center-provinces and inter-provinces is disputed for various reasons.

Particularly, the matter of water resources distribution and construction of major dams is a bone of contention among federating units. The following part will discuss these concerns of minority communities.

The National Financial Commission Award (NFC)

This award is alleged to be directed for the benefit of and interests of the Punjab. This allegation of smaller provinces has very serious implications for national politics. NFC

Award has remained contentious among provinces and since 1973 National Finance

Commission announced its recommendations for three times only.

Table 9: NFC Award 2010

Award Vertical Horizontal Grants and Aid Straight Divisible Pool Year Distribution Distribution Criteria Transfers 1974 Taxes on Provincial Share Population. KP100 million. Income. 80percent. Federal Share 20 Balochistan 50 Taxes on Goods percent. million. sales and Purchase.

Export Duties on Cotton. 1990 Similar as Provincial Share Population. Punjab one billion Share in total 1975+. 80 percent. for 3 years. Crude oil

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Federal Share 20 royalties on the FED on percent. Sindh700 million for basis of a share Tobacco and five years. in crude oil tobacco production. manufactures KP 200 million for Share in and sugar. three years. Natural Gas surcharges. Balochistan100 million for three years. 1996 Taxes on Provincial Share Population. KP 3.31 billion for Share in total Income. 37.5 percent. five years. Crude oil Federal Share royalties on the Wealth Tax. 62.5 percent. Balochistan 4.08 basis of a share billion for five in crude oil Capital Value years. production. Tax. Additional grant to Share in Taxes on Sale each province on Natural Gas and Purchase. achieving a growth surcharges. of 14.2 percent in Export Duties provincial receipts.a on Cotton.

Custom Duties FED excluding FED on Gas.

Any other tax. 2006* Similar as 1997 Provincial Share Population. 27.750 Billion Grant NFC and Sales 41.5-46.25 will increase each Tax on Services percent.b year at same rate as (CE mode). growth in divisible pool. 2009 Similar as 1997 Provincial Share Population. 0.66 percent in the Share in total NFC.d 56percent share of each Crude oil 201011 and 57.5 Poverty and province in divisible royalties on the percent in 2011- backwardness. pool. basis of a share 12 onward. in crude oil Revenue production collection and Share in Generation. Natural Gas surcharges on Inverse the bases of population average rate per density. MMBUT.

Source: Ozair and Irfan (2017, 134)

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Table 10: Allocation Shares to Provinces under Various NFC Awards

Province NFC 1974 NFC 1990 NFC 1997 NFC 2010*

Punjab 60.25 (60.10) 57.87 (57.87) 57.88 (57.88) 51.74 Sindh 22.50 (22.62) 23.29 (23.29) 23.28 (23.28) 24.55 NWFP 13.39 (13.40) 13.54 (13.54) 13.54 (13.54) 14.62 Baluchistan 3.86 (3.88) 5.30 (5.30) 5.3 (5.3) 09.09 Total 100 100 100 100 Source: Jaffery and Sadaqat (2006, 54s) NFC 2010*: data collect and tabulated by writer

Dispute over distribution of financial and natural resources i.e. water, gas and other disparities among ethnic groups is another cause of intra-provincial conflicts. The eighteen years dispute over resources distribution remained a hurdle in the way of consensus but finally an agreement was reached in NFC Award 2010 (Lodhi, 2011, 63).

These intra-provincial tensions prompted ethnic segments to raise their voice for separate provinces; like Hazara province in KPK and Siraiki province in Punjab.

Therefore these issues of distributive justices have mingled with the ongoing problem of consensus-building. The distribution formula of 47% for provinces and 50% for center is not acceptable now and all provinces want distribution funds on different basis. The disagreement tone of provinces is very visible and if it continues then the federation would cease its functions it is supposed to do (Shahzad, 2007, 217).

WATER ASSETS: KALABAGH DAM ISSUE

All provinces of Pakistan have strong concern over distribution of water. It remained ever disputed between the provinces of Pakistan (Ozair and Irfan, 2017, 186). Moreover this has been highlighted as an environmental issue (Hadi, 2015). The Indus Basin Water

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Treaty in 1960 initially settled down the disagreements over water-sharing between India and Pakistan. The use of water from three rivers “Sutlej, Ravi and Beas” were allocated to India and three rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were given to Pakistan.

But, Pakistan could not develop consensus over the division of water resources domestically. This issue increased ethnic alienation in general and in Sindh particularly

(Kennedy and Rais, 1995, 119). The main conflicting issues were “Greater Thal Canal,

Kalabagh Dam and sharing of Indus water” among the provinces, particularly between

Sindh and Punjab. Various commissions were constituted to sort out the conflict, but lack of consensus only produced ad-hoc distribution measures until 1990. Finally Nawaz

Sharif‟s first tenure government was able to forge a consensus in 1991 on intra- provincial, commonly agreed and undisputed, Water Apportionment Accord (Rajput,

2005, 13). This treaty was signed by all constituent units and ratified by the “Council of

Common Interests (CCI)” of Pakistan.

The Greater Thal Canal is another major inter-provincial issue over distribution of water resources. Data released by the “Indus River System Authority (Irsa)” had certified this scheme with 2/3 majority. This canal has a storage capacity of 8,500 cusecs water.

The area of southern Punjab would be irrigated by this canal. But Sindh has reservations about this canal system and its provincial assembly unanimously voiced concerns against this project (Business Recorder Daily, 08 May, 2002)

The Kalabagh Dam and Reservations of Minor Provinces

The gradual decrease of water resources is alarming; population explosion, higher consumption of water, shrinking of storage capacity because of silting in dams, climate

108 change, and droughts/famine in 1990s and 2000shave exacerbated water shortage issues.

Kalabagh dam is an issue on which Pakistan is facing the most important inter-provincial controversy. It is a matter of common but special concern. This is generating a new version of nationalism built on the back of opposition to the Kalabagh Dam and this has evaporated consensus over water distribution that is no longer a consensual subject between provinces (Shahzad, 2007, 217).

The Pakhtuns nationalists of KPK believe that the dam would be advantageous only to

Punjab and destroy the economy of the whole province by submerging areas of

Nowshera, Peshawar, Swabi, Charsadda, and Mardan districts. Moreover, countless families would suffer through dislocation due to its construction. Furthermore, residential area of Nowshera has to face an everlasting hazard of flooding and gradual increase in underground water level would pose threat of land salinity, unproductiveness or water logging in many areas of KPK.

Similarly, Sindhis are also against construction of Kalabagh dam and emphasize that

Indus River System has not sufficient water for such a big dam. It casts doubts on the fair distribution system as many promises of the past are yet to be fulfilled. Sindh argued for its consent first without disturbing the flow of river. Sindhis also pointed out some other issues related to reduction in water flow; like, it would generate scarcity of fish and shrimps, soil erosion due to inward stretch of Indian Ocean and farming in Sindh.

Moreover, it might affect the regions down the “Kotri barrage” due to insufficient supply of water that can damage forestry too (Rajput, 2005, 91).

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Baluchistan is not riparian in any case but the Pat Feeder canal at Guddu Barrage provides it a substantial flow of irrigation water. But still, it has reservation that construction of Kalabagh dam will affect its demand for more share of water from River

Indus and Kalabagh Dam could further curtail its allocation of irrigation water share.

On the other hand, there is a strong argument in support of the dam. The demand for construction of the dam comes mainly from the Punjab. In addition, its feasibility and viability has been recommended by numerous technical and parliamentary committees. It is said that smaller provinces are exaggerating their reservations. The need for water reservoirs is markedly recognized in Water Accord of 1991 which grants the construction of dams according to feasibility. In this way, Sindh remained privileged when it received a greater allocation of water for irrigation. Hence Punjab is inclined to surrender its share but sought favor of Sindh on Kalabagh dam but all in vain. This issue is still unresolved.

According to Ahmad (2004, 149), the feasibility and efficacy of the Kalabagh dam for the national economy convinced all civilian and military rulers of its importance and they remained interested to proceed with the plan but smaller provinces severely resisted this project.

Since 1988, as many as seven substitutes or alteration in the blueprint of the project were recommended for developing consensus. But Sindh and KPK governments, followed by Baluchistan afterwards, did not agree and threatened to resign. The anti-

Kalabagh dam conferences were held in Hyderabad (Sindh) and Peshawar (KPK) in which people took part from different backgrounds. Contrarily, the central government and the Punjabi leadership persistently supported this construction as crucial to meet

110 proposed energy requirements of Pakistan (Ahmad, 2004, 151-55). Benazir Bhutto in her

1st tenure of premiership (1988-90) tried to focus the project to fix the issue after getting feasibility and recommendations from a committee of foreign and national experts but

Sindh assembly unanimously rejected it.

The tussle continued when the Punjab assembly unanimously favored construction of the dam but the provincial assemblies of Sindh, the KPK and the Baluchistan passed resolutions against construction of Kalabagh dam.

Endorsement of the „Water Apportionment Accord (1991)‟ during first term of Nawaz

Sharif as Prime Minister, Punjab started another sequence of arguments in support of the dam, but inter-provincial consensus and compromise could not be developed. This time this effort was opposed by PPP as a political move and it departed from its earlier that complicated the issue for government to handle. In the following years from 1990 to

2015, consensus is yet too far to be reached.

Though General Musharraf in his era tried to take some strict measures to resolve this issue but his announcement about the construction of Kalabagh Dam annoyed minor provinces. From KPK, Asfandyar Wali Khan, the president of the “Awami National Party

(ANP)” cautioned about the potential calamity of the project. He suggested the removal of controversial projects and implicitly stated that the construction of the controversial dam would be considered equal to declaring war against the three smaller provinces. The

Sindh Chief Minister Arbab Ghulam Rahim also criticized Kalabagh dam and stated that nothing would be done without the consent of Sindh (Ghori, 2005, 89). The chairman of

Mutihida Quami Movement (MQM), Altaf Hussain, also condemned the project. Rallies

111 in protest were held in districts of Sindh, mainly in Hyderabad, Sukkar, Khairpur,

Nausharo Feroz, and Sindh expressed almost unanimous opposition to construction of the dam. Pir Pagara, the head of Pakistan Muslim League (Functional group), was the only one who advocated for the dam. General Musharraf in his era, regardless of all the protest against the Kalabagh dam, tried to resolve this issue and due to severe scarcity of water r eservoirs, assured the construction at all costs. But the successor governments finally discarded the project.

ETHNIC DISPUTES AND DEMANDS OF AUTONOMY

A close evaluation of numerous uncertainties shows that smaller communities sensed alienation and exclusion. At various occasions of Pakistan‟s history when central government intervened in provincial matters, they expressed anger, which originated from the feeling of exclusion and marginalization, in the forms of political aggression and violence. The subsequent section will try to sum up a number of substantial demonstrations of these groups or communities. Bengalis began secessionist movement and separated their way in 1971.

In post-1971 Pakistan, Baluch protested repeatedly and obviously more than other communities. Sindhis too demonstrated strongly but with irregular intervals. Since mid-

1980s, Muhajirs remained active along ethnic and communal lines for the interests of their community which caused hostilities between indigenous Sindhis and Muhajirs.

Conversely, since Zia era (1977-88), Pakhtuns appeared comparatively a little satiated.

The ethno-linguistic and nationalist activities are conversed in this chapter in detail. The review of some obvious and important protests is aimed to establish the importance of the

112 dilemma of unmanaged ethno-lingual diversity, the impact of its exclusion and incompatibility or less satisfactory working of the governance model in Pakistan.

The multiethnic status of Pakistan and diversity issue accordingly has been accepted by various political parties. Addressing the complaints and demands of alienated communities and smaller provinces is an integral part of their electoral manifestos which attracts votes of their respective communities. To enhance the provincial role at center level, they developed a consensus to broaden the functions of Senate which is the upper house of legislature. Accordingly, the elimination of the concurrent list is a result of this consensus to guarantee decentralization and provincial autonomy.

To formulate a more acceptable policy particularly for smaller units, the procedure of sharing of funds was modified between center and federating units and among units and nearly all parties gave consent over this formula. However, comparative to the mainstream parties, they excluded ethno-lingual and regional parties of smaller units who are more mobilized to pursue their demands. The consistent demands for self-rule by regional parties propose a fundamental alteration in the federal design of Pakistan. For that reason, diversified opinions are floating among the think tanks about the federal structure and constitutional design of Pakistan. Political representatives of smaller provinces have diverse opinion regarding regional autonomy, Kalabagh dam, royalty issues and NFC Award.

In this specific background, Pakistan needs alternative approaches that can include all groups and enhance integrity with the centre (Samad, 2007, 128). The need for modification and enhancement of the notion and application of federalism and a

113 paradigm shift in the existing governance system is widely emphasized. The indulgence of academicians to scrutinize the relevance of different federal arrangements and its regulation to manage ethnic diversity of Pakistan is increasing. Therefore, the author is aiming to address this issue with some limitations. Currently, Consociationalism has become a leading speculation of comparative politics. It has been practiced in different parts of the world i.e., Belgium, Austria, Netherland, Northern Ireland, South Africa,

Malaysia, Burundi, Fiji, Lebanon, South Tyrol, Nigeria, Cyprus, Kenya, Macedonia,

Columbia, Afghanistan, Iraq and many others. This type of federalism is sometime adopted temporarily to develop consensus among contending groups. In the near past, some countries used it temporarily (like India) to get consensus and after developing it successfully, they reverted to previously used models. After a careful observance of the recognition and efficacy of Consociationalism in such plural societies, this study is aiming to evaluate a limited or feasible extension of Consociationalism as possible alternate in the case of Pakistan.

MISMANAGEMENT OF ETHNO-LINGUAL DIVERSITY:

INCOMPATIBILITY OR LESS SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE

OF MAJORITARIAN MODEL IN PAKISTAN

Soon after partition, surge of ethno-lingual and national movements and political mobilization became an integral part of Pakistani society. Bengali nationalism was the strongest one that won a separate state. After that, Pakhtun regionalism, Sindhi nationalism, and Baluch separatism challenged federal structure of state at various stages of Pakistani history; they are still latent issues needed to be resolved. Since 1980s,

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Muhajir community has been organized under ethnic banner to pursue their interests. A reticent mobilization has also been noticed in the Siraiki region of Punjab.

Having a sharp overview of ethno-linguistic mobilization in Pakistan, this section will sum up the discussion to examine the applicability of Consociation in Pakistan.

Federalism has different types and characteristics. It can vary at centralization level and form of governance, roughly labeled as centralized, Majoritarian or Consociationalism.

Multiethnic societies are prone to conflict (Adeney, 2009, 48). Therefore,

Consociationalism can be best possible solution to develop consensus on fundamental issues. Adeney (2009) suggests that the “absence of Consociational mechanism has caused much of the conflict in Pakistan” (Adeney, 2009, 45).

Both models, Majoritarian and Consociationalism, have different features. The

Majoritarian Model is non-satisfactorily working to deal with Pakistani norms (Adeney,

2009). We can adopt Consociationalism temporarily and partially to develop some level of consensus like India did. These characteristics have been discussed in detail in Chapter

2. Adeney (2009, 34) says that Consociational features can lessen by proportional application of elements of Consociationalism. According to her, “…Pakhtuns in NWFP possess a strong sense of identity, but they have not seen this as incompatible with their membership of Pakistan”. One reason for this is their co-option in the core institutions of state”. Although a few characteristics are not suitable to Pakistan as some groups have small proportion of population but this proportionality can be converted into political proportionality. The language and educational rights are more pertinent fields for which smaller communities are more concerned about. Finally, Adeney winded up her argument by pointing out Consociationalism that can solve much of the ethnic conflicts in Pakistan.

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The following section tried to examine the relevancy of Consociationalism with various ethno-linguistic mobilizations in Pakistan. This analysis will enhance the importance and adaptation of Consociationalism for Pakistan.

Apart from a leading faction from Punjab, the alienated and excluded groups are proving to be vocal in opposition to centralization of state. Punjab is comparatively industrious and crowded province of Pakistan. It has more strength in army and in the bureaucracy than other communities. This is the main reason of anti-Punjabi resentments in smaller and marginalized communities (Kennedy, 1993, 81; Lawrence, 1980, 135;

Singh and Talbot, 1996, 85). They are enjoying their numerous weightages and never thought about greater autonomy (Jones, 2002, 4). In the subsequent parts, the politics of identity by the excluded groups has been narrated.

Ethnic Mobilization in Pakhtuns

The Pakhtuns of KPK have a strong feeling of individuality developed in the wake of rural- based nationalist Pakhtun movement of Khudai Khidmatgar (servants of God) in the mainly Pakhtun districts of the region of British India. The Khudai Khidmatgar formed provincial government after succeeding in two consecutive provincial elections of

1937 and 1946. On the eve of partition in 1947, the Pakhtun nationalists opposed the fusion of their region into Pakistan and claimed a sovereign Pakhtun state. Only two choices were given to the people of KPK (The then NWFP) in a referendum whether to choose India or Pakistan for inclusion. The Pakhtuns strived to influence Lord

Mountbatten to incorporate an alternative choice for Pakhtuns to opt for a sovereign state of Pakhtunistan. But this futile effort brought Abdul Ghaffar Khan to make an open call

116 for support to the Congress working committee (Azad, 1998, 55). But the British government also refused this demand. As a result, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his supporters did not take part in the referendum. This absence of any rival force gave an opportunity to AIML to manage votes in its favor (get 99% of the polled) and consequently NWFP was merged into Pakistan.

In independent state of Pakistan, nationalist parties demanded a sovereign state of

Pakhtunistan or at least renaming their province, which was met in the 18th amendment in

2010. This demand was raised to merge KPK region with Pakhtun areas ranging from

Pakistan to the Pakhtun belt of Afghanistan to establish a Pakhtun state (Kennedy, 1993,

135). Although in early years (1947-55), Pakhtun nationalist parties defined

„Pakhtunistan‟ as decentralization of power in shape of regional autonomy to the provincial government of KPK (Amin, 1988, 11).

The transient power-sharing (April 1972- February 1973) in the tripartite settlement

(between PPP, ANP and JI) temporarily suppressed the Pakhtunistan issue. This decentralization brought nationalists to pronounce that the demand for Pakhtunistan has been met (Amin, 1988, 115). But the Pakhtun nationalism reemerged after intervention of central government in the matters of provincial government, and finally dismissal of NAP government in Baluchistan. As a protest, the coalition government resigned in KPK. The central government barred the NAP from political activities accusing it of anti-Pakistan activities (Ziring, 1980, 157; Shahzad, 2007, 45; Nayak, 1984, 29). Consequently, NAP leadership challenged the decision of central government in the Supreme Court of

Pakistan. Meanwhile they remained strongly integrated with Pakhtun identity. This association was visible in a question-answer session with Wali Khan when he replied; I

117 am “a six thousand years old Pakhtun, a thousand years old Muslim and 27 years old

Pakistani”. This clearly denotes his attachment to his ethnic background.

With the passage of time, the changing demography altered the ethnic mosaic of all provinces. The flow of migration of Pakhtuns into urban centers of Punjab and Sindh, mainly in Karachi, provided them a predominant position in transport sectors and better allocation in other services. However in industrial sector, they could not prevail. But they had their own industrial capital investors who provided capital for the industries of sugar, textile, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals and others. In respect of industrial capitalists, they are thought more united than Baluch and Sindhis but, they are less prone towards nationalist demands (Ahmad, 1998, 71).

The Pakhtuns have been provided a better incorporation in the political power-sharing structure and in the army (Noman, 1988, 67). According to Jaffrelot (2002), to suppress the autonomy demands the majority of Pakhtun soldiers and officials have been taken from the areas which constituted the origin of the “Pakhtunistan Movement”. Resultantly, the Pakhtuns‟ inclusion in the power-structure left no room for further call of independent and sovereign Pakhtunistan.

The Pakhtun nationalist party (ANP) enhanced its electoral hold in the KPK and proved it in the general elections- 2008 after establishing its provincial government. The announcement of discarding the project of mega dam and altering the name of NWFP to

„Khyber Pakhtunkhawa (KPK)‟ by the government were two major moves for which

Pakhtuns showed their contentment for first time in political history of Pakistan. It can be concluded that the initially reluctant Pakhtun leadership has been successfully integrated

118 into Pakistan (Ahmad, 1998, 278). This is being stated and debated that Pakhtun movement has died down finally (Amin, 1988, 123). Some scholars are cautioning that the Pakhtunistan movement has not ceased but is latent and it can re-emerge in the wake of increasing insecurity and disintegrative inclination in Pakhtun region (Harrison, 2007,

87).

Pakhtuns are not an organized community, though having a strong sense of uniqueness. They are further plural alongside ideological, political and religious lines.

The Pakhtuns of KPK and Baluchistan have their relevant representative political parties.

ANP is recognized as a Pakhtun party in KPK while PKMAP leads in the Pakhtun areas of Baluchistan.

Pakhtuns enjoy adherence to their specific culture but their overrepresentation in military has mitigated their secessionist tune (Adeney, 2009, 45). This virtual representation of Pakhtuns in military is statistically established but this representation in the military is unequally dispersed amid different areas of Pakhtuns. Cohen (1987, 318) observed that “75% of all military ex-servicemen come from only three districts of the

Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jhelum, and Attack (Cambellpur), and two adjacent districts of the

NWFP (Kohat and Mardan)”. In this way they are given unequal representation in armed forces. Pakhtuns in general compose a complete majority in most of the KPK.

Consequently, recruitment from only two districts of KPK in military is not acceptable as a particular illustrative reason to quit the „Pakhtunistan Movement‟.

On the other side, Pakhtuns are slightly anxious about the identification of their language and customs than other communities like Sindhis and Muhajirs but they are

119 prevailing in almost every sphere of society and now Pashtu is emerging as a very important language of Pakistan. Another reason of this relative calmness over linguistic issue can be that Pakhtuns have not faced any rivalry over Pashtu in KPK as Sindhis faced in Sindh. This is why during 1972 NAP-JUI administration and after that ANP government in KPK, they did not suggest any considerable modification in language or educational policies.

Likewise, the current PTI‟s government is also calm over this matter. But it does not mean that Pakhtuns are not concerned about their segmental autonomy. Though inter- provincial dialogues have been arranged to discuss NFC Award and Kalabagh dam project and renaming of NWFP as KPK, but NFC award is yet not implemented successfully as was promised. This progress points out the importance of „veto power‟ feature of Consociationalism applicable to smaller communities. Entire features of

Consociationalism seem pertinent to the political temperament of KPK.

It is pertinent to cite that whenever power is shared with smaller communities they become dormant. It has been proved in the history of Pakistan. This in view, it is vital to note the reasons behind the Pakhtun mobilization since 1970s.

The matter of greater autonomy is being demanded by ANP so far. It proposes that center should only administer issues of defense, foreign affairs, and currency. ANP claims it will support the government on national platform. This gives an impression to advocate the reliance of ANP on federalism but ANP has not been treated fairly.

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Nationalist Approach from Baluchistan

Baluchistan comprises of three regions since the Colonial period; “Pakhtun majority region and the Bugtti and Marri tribal areas, Kalat state and the states of Kharan, Makran and Lasbela” (Ziring, 1980, 157, Adeney, 2003, 56-7). The British Baluchistan merged into Pakistan, but a day after independence, on August 15, 1947, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan as the ruler of Kalat state announced the establishment of an autonomous Kalat state.

Furthermore, both houses of the Kalat Assembly discarded succession with Pakistan.

However, Khan later consented to and signed papers to accede Kalat with Pakistan eventually. But Prince Abdul Karim, younger brother of Khan started an armed uprising in the Jhalawan area to demonstrate public disapproval and Baluch nationalists joined him in resisting the pronouncement (Breseeg, 2004, 73). Ghous Bax Bizenjo, while referring to the policies adopted by central government, said that “we do want modernization but not of the type that perpetuates our minority status” (Nayak, 1984,

192). This insurgency was soon overcome by the government of Pakistan.

In this background, Harrison (1981, 28) argued that the “One Unit Scheme” rekindled the Baluch nationalist movement for the second time against the centralization of the government. This revolt was also crushed and the Baluch leader Mir Noroz Khan was detained and he finally died in jail.

The dissolution of One Unit in 1970 proved a breakthrough for Baluchistan and for the first time it got the status of a province. The Baluch nationalists under the banner of

NAP won elections and installed their government in Baluchistan. But, this power- sharing proved short-lived as the “Mengal-Bizenjo” government was removed in 1974 on

121 the charges of failure to maintain law and order. The central government of Z. A. Bhutto announced the end of Sardari system in Baluchistan and claimed that people of

Baluchistan are free now to choose their leaders (Ziring, 1980, 165). This dismissal and intervention by central government led to an uprising that lingered from 1973 to 1977

(Jetly, 2004, 132). There were around 55,000 Baluchi tribal men including 11,500 organized fighters combating against the 80,000 trained and well-equipped military men to crush intra-tribal confrontation (Shahzad, 2007, 88; Harrison, 1981, 36).

This mess ended at the arrival of General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 after dismissal of Bhutto government. He assumed a comparatively softer policy by releasing the apprehended

Baluch influential. He declared a general amnesty for the Baluch nationalists and guerrilla fighters. But demands for pulling out troops from the province and providing compensation for the victims of insurgency were not fulfilled (Ziring, 1980, 165, Shah,

1997, 39).

The nationalist feelings were latent during the interval 1988-99 which was a period of a short-lived democratic decade. But it did not settle Baluch grievances despite the so- called participatory democracy. Consequently, a low-level insurgency emerged again since the military takeover of 1999. However, the military rule ended in 2008 and the 18th amendment, Baluchistan Package and NFC awards were introduced. But Baluch nationalist leaders are continuously struggling to attain their constitutional rights living inside a centralized and parliamentary structure. This all is indicative of some essential missing ingredients in developing a national consensus. It is very obvious that national consensus in Pakistan has not been achieved mainly due to lack of accord between center and provinces that led to tensions between Punjab and other provinces (Shahzad, 2007,

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217). The Baluch uprising still persists, though a lot of armed and political measures were used by the center to curb it (Harrison, 2007, 80).

On the account of these Baluch insurgencies, it can be said that the power-sharing structure is deficient in Pakistan. The alienation of minor ethnic groups and centralization of federalism is the key to generate unrest in the major part of Pakistan including Baluch region. Till 1970s barely one Baluch got position in the central cabinet, while of the 60 people only one Baluch got central political post from 1971-2014. Baluch barely benefitted from any diplomatic posts and shared least proportion of high level civil- military ranks (Nayak, 1984, 193).

Baluch are protesting at uneven distribution of funds in the hands of non-Baluch, particularly Punjabi bureaucrats. Anti-Punjabi resentments are also due to grabbing of cultivatable land of Baluchistan by Punjab. Baluchistan complained about the exploitative attitude of central government that is harnessing its natural resources and getting „lion‟s share‟ (Nayak, 1984, 193). Regardless of some shared suspicion, the

Baluch and the Pakhtuns are developing a sort of consensus inside Baluchistan over their complaints.

Gawader has become a non-consensual issue (Shahzad, 2007, 218) and Baluchistan demands an effective and responsible role in decision-making concerning Gawader Port project (Jetly, 2004, 132). During 2005-06, in the Board of Directors of the port, only two members out of the total eleven were taken from Baluchistan. Furthermore, the Baluch leaders suspect that the project would change the demography which would not be in favor of indigenous people of Baluchistan as Gawader Port and establishment of an

123 export processing zone there would draw people from all over Pakistan. The resultant flow of settlers would change the demography against indigenous Baluchs. Beside the

Gawader port, the Baluch leadership insisted on withdrawal of plans for establishing new cantonments in Baluchistan. They demanded gas royalty at par with other provinces.

Another valid demand of the people of Baluchistan is their rightful proportion of representation in the entire federal government sector. For jobs in Baluchistan, they insist that these posts should be filled by the local Baluchs only and the allocation of funds in

NFC Award should not be based on the formula of population size and other factors must also be included. For example, the degree and balance of regional growth, poverty, inverse population density and loss sustained due to terrorism etc should also be included in the formula. In short, the Baluch grievances are mainly related to centralization of state structure and unjust allocation of resources.

Pakistan has seen inter-ethnic clashes and linguistic conflicts of various groups; a common medium of communication, traditions, religious convictions or additional characteristics, are not essentially a mark of harmony and unity of purpose within a group

(Siddiqi, 2010, 76). In case of the Baluch nationalists, this concept is true and empirically proved. The Census Report 1998 states that Baluchs are 3.5% of the entire population of

Pakistan.

Beside tiny population size, they have numerous platforms of representation. But

Baluch cannot enjoy proportional representation because they are a very small segment of the population (Adeney, 2009, 54). Though Baluchistan has been provided their job quota of 3.5% in federal jobs and its share in federal civil service has increased from 2.5% in

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1973 to 3.1% in 1983, it is a figure for all tribes and races living in Baluchistan, and not for Baluchs alone. Pakhtuns of Baluchistan are given an overwhelming share in the

Baluchistan provincial bureaucracy despite a quota for distribution of jobs between

Pakhtun belt and Baluch countryside. However, this quota system could still work.

Baluchs are very sensitive to their tribal customs, language and traditional background. But, the Baluchi language and script is comparatively underdeveloped.

However, pro-autonomy Baluch governments did not voice any considerable concerns or gave policy regarding language and education. But it does not mean that they do not have any concerns about this issue. Moreover, neither central government nor Baluch tribal leaders thought to educate their people.

Baluch reservations related to territory of Baluchistan can also be allayed within a suitable federal framework. Baluch mobilization against center is more visible in recent years. Baluch insurgency during the 1970s was also against the center‟s intrusion in provincial subjects when Mengal-Bizenjo government (1973-74) in Baluchistan was removed. A center-provincial clash started in the wake of this removal which lasted till removal of Bhutto government in 1977.

To note the political era and geographical spread of this collision is also essential; after elimination of Marri-Mengal provincial government, Nawab Akbar Bugtti settled to run the office of governor of Baluchistan during this clash. For this reason, Marri-Mengal tribes revolted against the center. This demonstrates the inner splits of Baluch tribes. The concentration of political power is the main issue of this disagreement in particular, and most of the other Baluch divergences in general. In post-Zia period through the civilian

125 period (1988-99), Baluch remained inactive and tied to different alliances at Islamabad and Quetta. During the Musharraf era, Baluch were alienated as a result of a coalition between PML-Q and MMA in Baluchistan. This exclusion led another armed clash of

Baluch with the center. Currently, Baluch nationalist are active again on many issues including missing persons and gas royalty. According to Nayak (1984, 201) “The Baluch movement has thus been shorn of its collective strength in the absence of an overarching unified leadership.”The above-mentioned description recommended that political decentralization and Consociational method is more pertinent and potent to handle the

Baluch concerns.

Ethno-Lingual Mobilization in Sindh

Till 1936, Sindh remained a part of Bombay when it got the status of a separate province after disjointing from Bombay. But AIML had a narrow electoral support base in Sindh and it could not get any nominee in the 1937 elections. Then in 1938, G. M.

Syed who was also a member of provincial assembly resolved this issue. He joined

AIML and managed to move a bill in Sindh assembly in favor of a separate state for

Muslims and managed to pass it from the assembly. Chandio (2007, 29) wrote that finally in 1942, AIML established its rule in Sindh and on March 3, 1943 approved a motion in support of the cession of “Lahore Resolution 1940”. Consequently, with 20 votes out of

33, Sindh opted to be a proposed part of Pakistan after partition.

The Indian partition led to a massive migration on both sides of borders. Muslim

Muhajirs from Indian Punjab (East-Punjab) migrated to Pakistani Punjab (West-Punjab), the migrants of UP, CP and other areas of India entered into Sindh, mainly industrial

126 areas of Karachi. Sindhis unwillingly received the influx of a great number of cultured, nomadic and creative Muhajirs (Malik, 1997, 74).

The demography, politics and fiscal features of Pakistani urban Sindh underwent a change in favor of Muhajirs due to this influx (Malik, 1997, 75). The pre-partition heterogeneous society of Sindh did not have any significant hostility against other ethnic or linguistic classes. These groups (Punjabi and Baluchi) mixed up into the Sindhi culture and even adopted Sindhi language (Cohen, 2005, 34). Contrarily, the Muhajirs did not assimilate and tended to safeguard their distinctiveness and language. This resistance cultivated anti-Muhajir resentments in Sindhis.

Furthermore, the Sindh-center strained relations were going side by side because of insufficient representation in the parliament and administration. Soon after independence, this imbalance was very visible; in the constituent assembly, out of the total sixty-nine members only four were from Sindh. Similarly, Sindh was unrepresented in central cabinet, too. In 1954, Sindh demanded reunification of Karachi with Sindh. Sindh opposed one unit scheme of central government and about three-quarters of the members of Sindh Assembly voted against it (Samad, 1995, 150). Their fears came true when they remained alienated during one unit period (1955-69) i.e., the Sindhi medium schools were sealed just to curb Sindhi language (Rahman, 1995, 68).

This suppression policy of the central government generated anti-center resentments among the Sindhis. Furthermore, scholars from Sindh were not promoted; Sindhi publications were held back with extensive suppression. Bhutto took advantage of this situation and got a massive popularity in Sindh afterwards (Chandio 2007, 95). In 1970s,

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Bhutto arrived with the aim to defend rights of Sindhis and said that they were not like

“Red-Indian” to be disposed off (Endnote do). During this decade, the marginalization brought frustration in Bengalis contrarily to Sindh where inclusion brought to develop a consensus successfully (Jaffrelot, 2002). Bhutto met with Sindhi demands and his strategies privileged Sindhis considerably.

The removal of Bhutto government in 1977 remobilized the feelings of exclusion in

Sindh. This mind-set augmented in 1983 during the anti-Zia national campaign of

Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD). The interior Sindh was the hub of riots and rage spread with a greater degree. More active membership came from students, peasants and workers and it became so strong that the army took four months to curb it

(Noman, 1988, 45; Burki, 1991, 73-74; Kennedy and Rais, 1995, 112).

This movement was mainly aimed at political power-sharing and fairer economic allocations to Sindh. The ethnic hostility in the province was stimulated because of the dismissal of the first Sindhi government and its substitution with Punjabi-Pakhtun dominated army. Mumtaz Bhutto, the ex-governor of Sindh devised, sketched out and articulated the claim for a confederation according to local and provincial ambitions

(Noman, 1988, 184,).

Sindh re-emerged in the Post-Zia period (1988-99) and Sindhi ethnicity became highly politicized (Kennedy and Rais, 1995, 112). However, Benazir Bhutto successfully defused the nationalist feelings in the offended society of Sindh when Pakistan Peoples‟

Party won again and managed to form its provincial government. PPP ruled in rural areas of Sindh and Sindh‟s nationalist parties did not dare to test its hold. These parties neither

128 attracted more than 5-6% of votes nor won elections openly on nominated seats for

National Assembly (Jones, 2002, 68). However, at the regional level the PPP constantly supported the slogan of Sindhi nationalism (Waseem, 2006, 86) and several PPP contestants appeared with nationalist approach and their counterparts in the party committed to problems related to Sindh (Jones, 2002, 87). Sindhi nationalists, regardless of their fragile association, did not give up and remained consistent to show their anti-

Punjabi resentments and intrusion in the provincial matters (Jones, 2002, 88). The murder of Benazir Bhutto during election campaign at Rawalpindi brought them to violent agitation. But, an elite bargain between PML-N and PPP ended up this problem effectively.

Comparatively visible underdevelopment and lack of impartiality in power and resource-sharing cultivated the nationalist feelings in Sindh. They stipulated the removal of Kalabagh dam project from national agenda and commencement of a compound formula for NFC Award. They are also vocal against their under-representation in civil- military bureaucracy. Though the Sindhi-Urdu language controversy emerged in 1972, but they never gave precedence to language issue in their demands. Sindhis are comparatively less violent as compared to Baluchs and the reason is their irregular political inclusion and virtual adjustment in the power-sharing unlike the Baluchs.

Sindhis are the second major ethno-linguistic cluster; according to census report, they are 14.6% of total population of Pakistan (Census Report, 1998). Sindhi society is plural regardless of its common language and civilization. Numerous groups who settled in

Sindh, mainly Baluch, have incorporated themselves in the Sindhi culture. Internal divisions of Sindhi society are primarily based on political differences (Siddiqi, 2010,

129

99). PPPP enjoys support of the majority of Sindhis for its ideology and vision. Different splinter groups of PML still have substantial electoral hold in Sindhi-speaking constituencies. The hard-liners, like Jeay Sindh and Awami Tehreek, have partial and sparse hold among Sindhis. In spite of being members of a common racial group, they are plural over political ideas and aspirations. For instance, divergence of political views exists between Jeay Sindh and Awami Tehreek. Actually, the Jeay Sindh party has further been plural into various blocs (Siddiqi, 2010, 94). However, in comparison to other smaller communities, Sindhis enjoyed relatively overrepresentation at high ranks.

In the post-1971 political scenario, Sindhis got representation in higher political posts and every time People‟s party successfully incorporated Sindh community. At provincial level, Sindhi-Muhajir tussles are still very visible. Furthermore, they cry for their inclusion in center which actually holds power to decide about the fate of the federating units.

The identification of language and education rights is the most apprehensive issues for

Sindhis (Adeney, 2009, 53). In fact, Sindhi language has a rich background. It enjoyed the status of a medium of education in Sindh throughout British rule and Sindhi script is the most sophisticated one. After partition, Sindhi language was the most developed regional language of Pakistan. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi nationalist and landlord during his provincial government, attempted to restore its historic glory. To cover the rural and less sophisticated background of indigenous Sindhis, the representation in civil- military bureaucracy has been plural in Sindhis and Muhajirs proportionally. They have been provided a quota system for the rural-urban division (60-40%) commenced by

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

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The ratio of Sindhis in federal bureaucracy is specified as 11.4% but their actual shares were 3.01% in 1973 and 5.4% in 1983. It has been conversed that urban areas are populated by Muhajirs and rural Sindh is populated by Sindhis. Muhajirs have been insisting for the elimination of this quota system because 11.4% is in fact quota for the indigenous Sindhis. Sindhis are comparatively less educated and cultured than the

Muhajirs. In addition, Pakistan army has decided to adopt policies in which Sindhi and

Baluch youth will be promoted to join the armed forces. For this reason, Sindhis will be comfortable with this accommodation and this enhanced representation will lessen the disparity level and sense of exclusion in the course of time.

To conclude, we can say that both communities Sindhis and Muhajirs are still concerned about the issues of their “proportional representation and segmental autonomy”. Yet, Bhutto and his successors tried to involve Sindhis in national politics only. But, the on-going and historic clashes between Sindhis and Muhajir are not about to settle soon. Karachi and other rural-urban areas are burning with ethnic riots. The lack of proper segmental autonomy or proportional representation in various public and semi- government/private sectors can cause a threat to the smooth working of the federation, political stability and economic prosperity.

Sindhis have proved to be vocal, but periodical than Baluch and powerful than

Pakhtuns. The significant disputes and demonstrations came forth after the overthrow of

Bhutto government in 1977. During his regime, Bhutto himself violated the spirit of federation by intruding in Baluchistan and KPK. However, after removing him Zia switched the official parliamentary structure of Pakistan to function more like a presidential unitary state (Burki, 1991, 80). In 1983, MRD was initiated by PPP and allies

131 and that was supported most by the interior Sindh. It demanded that after restoration of democracy, more decentralization through constitution should be channelized properly

(Hussain, 1989, 191). The Sindhis who participated vigorously in MRD and exalted its popularity actually supported it for greater autonomy. Lastly, the Sindhi grievances settled down with the installation of another Sindhi government in 1988. It is significant that Sindhis are more anxious about the regional autonomy. Evidently, PPP‟s Sindhi leadership is more sensitive about the subject of autonomy than leaders from other provinces.

Consequently, a conclusion can be drawn that centralization of political power is a key concern of Sindhis. But contrarily, decentralization is also not mitigating the Sindhis grievances.

Rise of Muhajir Movement

There was no settlement plan for the heavy influx of refugees after partition. They were directed to Sindh, mainly. Communal riots were created deliberately and Sindhi

Hindus were forced to leave Pakistan from the urban areas of Sindh (Alavi, 1989, 240).

The evacuated property and places were plural among the new settlers in Sukkar, Karachi and Hyderabad. Until 1970s, they backed the state ideology of Muslim nationalism and voted for Islamic parties, mainly the JI. Bhutto in his regime (1971-77) initiated such policies which were for the benefit of indigenous Sindhis. According to Muhajir community, these policies were biased and they violently rose against them. In 1984, they gathered under the banner of Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) to protect their rights

132 and identity (Khan, 2004, 88) and since 1980s, MQM successfully sustained its support base in Muhajir constituencies.

Since inception, the was dominated by Punjabis and Muhajirs

(Jaffrelot, 2002). Though Punjabis remained relatively over-represented in state institutions, but Muhajirs overcame the center of powers i.e., civil service and executive ranks. For that reason, Muhajirs remained a comparatively privileged group. They antagonistically opposed regional and ethnic based movements and parties (Alavi, 1989,

71). But soon Punjabis overpowered them. Furthermore, in 1958 General Ayub Khan introduced a new Pathan-Punjabi partnership at the expense of Muhajirs (Jaffrelot, 2002).

When their hold was challenged by other communities, they reneged on previous favor for Pakistani nationalism and emphasized the Muhajir distinctiveness (Samad, 2002, 90).

Muhajirs‟ representation in jobs was reduced in 1973-86 period; the records show decline in overall official positions from 30.1% to 18.2% and in higher places of civil bureaucracy from 33.5% to 18.3%. Punjabi and Pakhtuns were included after exclusion of Muhajir community and this changed the ethnic equilibrium of civil-military bureaucracy. This alienation generated the identity politics in Muhajirs (Samad, 2002, 91) and in 1980s, Muhajirs allied with Sindhis in opposition to the ethnic groups (the Baluch,

Punjabi and Pakhtun) from other provinces to settle in Sindh. They were considered

„outsiders‟. The ethnic and armed clashes of Muhajirs with other ethnic groups increased after a mishap in which a Pakhtun-driven mini-bus crushed a Muhajir school girl „Bushra

Zaidi‟ to death. Resultantly, Pakhtuns joined hands with Punjabis in March 1987 and the

„Punjabi-Pakhtun Ittehad‟ (Union) surfaced to counter the Muhajir politics (Talbot, 2000,

217).

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The management of Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM before renaming) and its campaigners stand for the lower middle class who faced joblessness (Malik, 1997, 35).

The MQM articulated Qarardad-e-Maqasid (Charter of Demand) primarily to handle the

Muhajir complaints against the recluses. The contract proposed that the Muhajirs were more concerned about the “outsiders” than the indigenous Sindhis. In 1988, when MQM participated in electoral politics, Muhajirs came across with Sindhis mainly because of this competitive interaction. The Pakhtun-Muhajir hostility was replaced by Sindhi-

Muhajir disagreement (Talbot, 2000, 233-34).

Muhajirs enjoyed over-representation in chief national organizations. However the quota system introduced for rural-urban population in Sindh curtailed their prior position but still they have over-representation in civil military bureaucracy. They were given high ranks of politics. For instance, General Musharraf was a Muhajir and remained attached with MQM (add references Mush altered constituencies in Hyderabad and

Karachi). The alteration in constituencies alleviated the burning Karachi since 1990s which became remarkably dormant in Musharraf period. But after that, Sindh is again in trouble for the demands that regional autonomy and representation is a fundamental concern of Muhajir community. Therefore, proportionality factor of Consociationalism is pertinent to the Muhajir issue.

Language is not an issue for Muhajirs because Urdu is already enjoying the status of the national language of Pakistan. Although, the Sindhi language bill passed in 1972 conditioned that the learning of Sindhi language would be obligatory for provincial officers, it threatened Muhajirs' interests and consequently, ethnic riots were recorded in

Sindh during 1970s. They later rebelled against this act and the government had to take

134 back this move. As a result, presently Muhajirs are linguistically privileged. But they are still concerned about segmental autonomy. Since 1990s, MQM is campaigning for the territorial injustices. This issue can be settled through provoking some elements of

Consociationalism.

Since 1990s, MQM is claiming that it is a multiethnic or mixed party and renaming

MQM was meant to prove this assertion that it includes members from other groups too.

It aims to get a status of a mainstream political party of Pakistan; however it still advocates for territorial claims, proportional representation and regional autonomy.

Though decentralization has been hailed but on papers only and it is not meeting the

Muhajirs‟ requirements. They still press the Muhajir identity even after 68 years of partition; their Pakistani born generation is still calling itself „Muhajir‟. They are not ready to assimilate or abandon their particular identity and for them Pakistani nationality is not that much lucrative as Muhajir identity is. For this reason, Consociationalism is the best preference to settle Muhajir case.

Ethno-Political Development of Siraikistan

Regarding population size, the biggest province of Pakistan is Punjab (73.6 millions in

1998 census). Internal disparities in such a huge population are expected. It has been explained in previous chapter that Punjab is plural into three recognized linguistic and territorial clusters namely, the Central, Northern and Southern Punjab and their division is based on ethno-linguistic categories as their relative population speak Punjabi,

Pothowhari and Siraiki languages respectively.

135

The region of Central Punjab is the main industrial area of Pakistan. It is consisted of provincial center (Lahore) which is the most industrialized and urbanized region. It is the agrarian market and its professional organizations generate Pakistan‟s bureaucratic machinery (Shah, 1997, 124-125). Recruitment policy of army also benefits this area of the Central and the Northern Punjab which is based on the myth of “Martial Race”.

Consequently, these areas of Punjab make the Pakistani ruling group dominated by

Punjab (Shackle, 1977, 68). Siraiki class (the Southern Punjab) of Punjab is comparatively inferior and alienated area. It indicates the denial and isolation of Southern

Punjab in relation to Upper Punjab.

Siraiki subject is yet a novel occurrence as people from this dialectical category are supposed to have a unique description (Samad, 2007, 116). Bahawalpur was once a princely state that acceded to Punjab in 1970 and in this region the language of the majority was called “Riyasti” while Multan was a part of Sindh and had its local language “Multani”. “Derewal” was the language of Dera Ghazi Khan and the inhabitants had an historical inclination to Baluch identity (Ahmed, 1998, 124).

People from Siraiki belt were demanding for evenhanded treatment and better recognition of the Siraiki language. During 1990s, they came forth to defend their rights, language and traditions and mobilized themselves alongside of other subjugated groups of smaller provinces from the forum of PONM. PONM espoused „Siraikistan‟ as an independent unit for Siraiki people within Pakistan. The oppressed nations demanded for self-government, equality in representation for all provinces in the federal institutions, armed forces and other organizations.

136

Siraiki political parties are not mainstream parties and they had no popularity in

Siraiki speaking people regardless of emphasize on the exclusion of Siraiki group. But their performance was poor due to lack of support base. However, the Siraiki subject is a vital issue in the regional politics. Indigenous Siraiki people and Punjabi settlers are in clash in many areas. The electoral data collected from Siraiki villages shows that Punjabi settlers of these villages supported PMLN and Siraiki people went for PPP (Wilder, 1995,

90). The local elites of Siraiki regions are part of these mainstream parties and this integration apparently shows that Siraikis are ready to resolve their problems in multiethnic perspective (Ahmed, 1998, 276).

It has been explained already that Siraiki movement is in its infancy and no important mobilization has been noted in the Southern region of the Punjab. However the core concern of this area presently is their claim for a separate province. But no consensus has been developed over name and borders of the anticipated province. On the other hand,

Bahawalpur is clamoring for a separate province out of proposed Siraiki constituencies

(Zaman, PILDAT).

CONCLUSION

This chapter aims to suggest that Pakistan meets the lowest definition of federalism.

The reasons that led to distortion in federalism are vertical power structure that recommended vice-regal powers and top-down model, concentration of power in civil- military-feudal combination of alliance and highly ambitious and dishonest leadership that used Islam for self-interests (Nayak, 1984, 30). However the Constitution of 1973 addresses the proper and equal distribution of legislative, administrative and fiscal

137 powers with in all provinces. But in its decentralization and other characteristics, Pakistan is neither a deviant case nor it is unique in this sense. It is a centralized state despite NFC awards and other announced programs. It is politically centralized and this centralization influences r flow of administrative or fiscal decentralization.

This chapter summarizes the situation of ethnic mobilization and political instability in

Pakistan. Despite being federal and packages of decentralization, it is a unitary state. This has been proved by history; the center tried to control provincial politics and interfered in provincial affairs and many times fired provincial governments denying its federal structure on the pretext that constitution „authorizes the federal government to intervene in a province to protect it from internal disturbance and to ensure that its government is carried on in accordance with the constitution‟.

A series of anti-center disputes arose against centralized tendencies. Mainly those groups protested that were kept underprivileged and denied their right of autonomy. This mobilization is specific to some regions where ethnic groups were further plural.

Lastly, it has been noted that it is the lack of Consociational characteristics, absence of power-sharing, exclusion and marginalization which urge ethnic and linguistic classes to be vocal to secure their interests according to federal tone of Pakistan. Pakistan needs such type of federalism which can be helpful to develop consensus among coalition parties for smooth running of government so that political instability can be eradicated in

Pakistan.

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End Notes

1. Adeney states the difference about the federalism and federation in her thesis (2003) that “federalism is a concept and federation is a structure of government”. 2. The both federalism are considered liberal concept of federalism. 3. As Geo TV channel has reinterpreted ideology of Pakistan from “Pakistan ka matlab kia? La-ila-ha ill Allah” to “Parhanay Likhnay ky Siwa, Pakistan ka matlab kia? (Pakistan is no meant other than education). „Parhnay Likhnay‟ means education and this was a slogan given by provincial government of Punjab and this interpretation is demonstrating Punjabization of Pakistan. 4. It is pertinent to mention that Sindh is the only province of Pakistan that divides its quota of federal jobs between rural Sindh and urban Sindh between Urdu speaking population and indigenous Sindhis. 5. The Charter recommended that releasing a Sindhi domicile twenty years permanent residence must be the requirement a certificate that classify an individual as Sindh‟s resident to get the federal/provincial job on the basis of prescribed quota; all non-Sindhi police officers serving in Sindh must be transferred to their home provinces and only the people of Sindh should be recruited in future ; the influx of workforce in Sindh must be blocked ; the local bus services in the urban centers of Sindh should be given away to the concerned metro/municipal/city corporations, and licenses should be issued to only literate drivers; Afghans refugees must be constrained to the refugee camps in the KPK and Baluchistan; Bihari must be allowed to settle in Pakistan; a revised federal quota, based on a fresh census, should be executed in Sindh ; and the „outsiders‟ must not be allowed to buy property in Sindh ,For more detail see the following book (Ather, K. (2006). Sufer-e-Zindgi: MQM Ki Kahani, Altaf Hussain Ki Zabani (Passage of life: story of MQM, by Altaf Hussain). Lahore: Jang publishers. pp. 107-121). 6. Pakhtun reasons of mobilization why the Pakhtuns associated with Khudai Khidmatgar Tehreek in 1947 and then with National Awami Party (NAP) in 1970s resisted against the central authorities. Why Dr. Khan Sahib, the younger brother of Ghaffar Khan and ex-chief minister of KPK whose government was dismissed in 1947, agreed to become the chief minister of the West Pakistan after the introduction of One-Unit scheme in 1950s. Why Ghaffar Khan declared in early 1970s that their demand for Pakhtunistan has been fulfilled. The clear answer to these questions is that this political group was driven out from office of the government in 1947 and 1973 by the central authorities but was provided an opportunity to join government in 1955 and 1972. It was the installation of NAP- JUI government in NWFP that led Ghaffar Khan to declare that Pakhtunistan issue has been ended. This account seems to suggest that it is the interference of central authorities in provincial or regional matters that influence the identity formation and articulation among various groups of Pakistan.

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Chapter-5

THE DECADE OF SHEER POLITICAL INSTABILITY:

CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DECAY (1988-99)

INTRODUCTION

After establishing the central question that Majoritarian federal system is not an ideal one for plural society of Pakistan which is homogenous apparently but has deep religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic divisions inside (mentioned in previous chapters) this chapter aims to reflect some core federal problems in Pakistan. The analysis of the

Constitution of 1973 in chapter 3 and a detailed description of the facts of political history of Pakistan remained helpful to establish the thesis arguments about the exclusion of ethnic groups because of centralized governance model. This chapter is specifically modeled to explain the typical nature of Pakistani politics which was at its peak during the decade of 1988-1999. The prime aim of democracy was not achieved during this period because this was the decade of political instability. This chapter shows that role of elites and their positive participation is more important besides of amending constitution. The working relationship on political front, troubling civil- military relationship, conflict with judiciary, ethnic mobilization in Sindh (MQM-PPP) and Punjab (inter and intra-sects conflicts in 1990s) were some major developments seen in this decade which are discussed in this chapter.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1973

The current Constitution of 1973 of Pakistan has been described in chapter 3 in the context of containing colonial practices. It was a semi-rigid constitution and in case of treason, the constitution recommends death sentence under Article 6. Islam was declared the state religion as majority of population is Muslim in all four federal constituencies.

The economy was to be established on the principle of equality and collective and these principles were preference over the concept of individual property.

The center-provinces relationship was made smooth through proper legislation. Most powers were decentralized to provinces and complete provincial autonomy was promised to be delivered within 10 years (18th amendment has resolved this issue too). Punjab as the dominant province guaranteed to the smaller provinces of no future Martial Law. The

Upper House was given an equal representation and Governor Raj/emergency would be imposed if majority of the both houses voted for it. But since 1973, Pakistan faced two more Martial Law governments of 1977 and 1999. The Constitution of 1973 was

146 parliamentary in nature but federalism was highly centralized in practice. All political parties passed it unanimously (Siddiqui, 1986, 64). After 1973, the constitution was repeatedly amended that changed its nature. Here the 8th amendment is the center of discussion that was passed in 1985 and its destructive impacts can be traced out during the period of 1988 to 1999.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLOCKS: THE 8TH AMENDMENT

AFTER ZIA REGIME

The political development of General Zia‟s regime affected the politics of 1990s in

Pakistan. Three key changes of Zia regime can be highlighted i.e. presidential referendum

(1984), Restoration of Constitution Ordinance (RCO) (1985) and non-party based elections (1985). The Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) boycotted the referendum and party-less elections as they were held in violation of the Constitution of

1973. But these both features of Zia government were the key elements which provided a level of confidence to him to allow limited and controlled political activity.

Moreover conduct of elections though party-less, remained helpful to let the steam out from the popular pressure cooker (Chadda, 2000, 70). With RCO 1985, Constitution

1973 was restored but the 8th amendment changed its nature entirely from parliamentary to semi-presidential constitution by shifting all executive powers to president. During Zia era, (Chadda, 2000, 73) the “power structure remained narrowly based on the military, civil service, business and industrial entrepreneurs and large landlords.” After Zia,

(Haqqani, 2005, 68) the 8th amendment generated a new alliance or power center called as „Troika politics‟ (President, Prime Minister and COAS) or another name as „zero-sum

147 game‟ (Cohen, 2002, 43) while Benazir Bhutto called this alliance as „Islamabad

Establishment‟1 (Burki, 1998, 87, Shafqat, 1997, 41).

In the 8th amendment, many articles of the Constitution of 1973 were amended. The amendment was a combination of a number of commendable and some repulsive provisions. But this chapter includes only relevant areas of discussion that concerns with political, ethnic and judicial development. Mainly, there were two major areas affected by the amendment i.e. President-Prime Minister Relationship and state-judiciary dealings.

The coming sections will discuss these amendments respectively. Although after 18th amendment the original constitution of 1973 has been restored but the 8th amendment is the hallmark of this era that remained the main cause to generate political instability.

Conflicting Working Relationship between Prime Mister and President: Benazir

Bhutto to Nawaz Sharif (1988-1999)

In the original Constitution of 1973, prime minister was considered the steering personality in the federal structure of Pakistan. Mainly, there were five powers which were shifted to president i.e. under Article 90, all direct and indirect executive powers were granted to president; power to appoint heads of key institutions of Pakistan and formulation of their policies; dissolving of national and provincial assemblies under

Article 58 2(B); appointments of provincial governors under Articles 213-245 (as viceroy of British India could do in colonial times) and finally act as a supreme commander of armed forces.

The 8th amendment altered the balance of power from prime ministerial office to presidential. In original constitution 1973, a president was supposed to act upon prime

148 minister‟s advice which could not be challenged in courts and under Article 99 the presidential orders were applicable if countersigned by prime minister but RCO changed the situation.

There was no balance of power in working relationship of president and Prime minster in the Constitution of 1973 (1990, 65-68). But even the monarchy in Britain is not given powers to dissolve a popularly elected government. The 8th amendment did not prove a guarantee against any unconstitutional adventure. The tough and rough relationship between COAS, president and Prime Minister proved fatal for the growth of federalism in

Pakistan.

After party-less elections of 1985, Junejo (a Sindhi national), took charge of prime minister but he remained in continuous clash with the president Zia and was removed by him afterwards. Next general election was held in 1988 and Benazir Bhutto (daughter of

Z. A Bhutto) managed to take hold of the office of prime minister. She had to make a number of compromises to make a government (Jafferlot, 2002, 317, Chadda, 2000, 76).

The second term of Benazir Bhutto as prime Minister was supposed to work smoothly because as president was also from PPP. He defeated the strong rival

Wasim Sajjad (PML) (Ziring, 1997, 550). But unfortunately it could not happen because of the contention between the policies of elected and non-elected elements in power

(Schaffer and Schafer, 2011, 46).

Initially, she showed great understanding over issues of bargaining and consensus building and let the military to deal with foreign and defense policies by retaining

Sahabzada Yaqoob Ali Khan (senator IJI) as foreign minister (Shafqat, 1998, 43). But after clash on executive power-sharing issue between prime minister and president

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(Pucca Qila issue in 1990 and appointment of COAS), President Ishaq Khan imposed 58

2(b) to remove her (Ziring, 1997, 518). This was second time when 58 2(b) was used by a president in Pakistan (first time used by President Zia against Prime Minister Junejo).

Moreover it was a result of leg pulling politics between PPP-IJI while establishment was also concerned over its interests and feared that Benazir Bhutto will take revenge of her father‟s death (Cohen, 2005, 100).

After her removal, a care taker government was installed under Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi,

(as a caretaker prime minister) who was also a Sindhi. After Benazir, power shifted to

Punjab mainly as in elections 1990, Nawaz Sharif was elected for the office of prime minister. He was removed in 1993 and replaced with Benazir Bhutto and Benazir was replaced with Nawaz in 1996 again apparently after conduct of popular elections2. During this period, the three caretaker prime ministers (Balakh Sher Mazari, Moeen-ud-Din

Ahmad and Miraj Khalid) were from Punjabi groups. Then Muhajirs enjoyed power for a decade in the person of General Musharraf rule. He controlled reigns of powers of the state; exclusively from 1999 to 2008. During this period, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Shujaat

Hussain and Shaukat Aziz were his nominees as prime ministers.

On dissolution of assemblies, Nawaz Sharif during his first tenure put a petition in the court and judicial review came in favor of Nawaz Sharif by restoring his government and declaring presidential orders as unconstitutional. But meanwhile general elections were held and Benazir Bhutto took charge of the office as leader of the wining party. Bhutto also petitioned in the court when her government was dissolved by the president and got the same decision by the court as was in case of Nawaz‟s first tenure. But courts are not free to decide a sensitive issue and this is against the spirit of a federal system. It was in

150 fact the continuity of the Martial Law. First, Muhammad Khan Junejo was given charge of Prime Minister after getting his consent over the 8th amendment. Afterwards, when he tried to remove the amendment, the president dissolved the assemblies. In this way,

Pakistan was called a parliamentary federalism but it practiced presidential system in reality. This was the root cause in the imbalance relationship of two most important institutions.

The 8th amendment disfigured the constitution and the role of Punjab (Punjab guaranteed no further army interventions) that was constitutionalized became the reason of marginalization of smaller provinces. The tussle between president-Prime Ministers became an ethnic issue too. Ghulm Ishaq was from KPK, a smaller province, but he dismissed Benazir Bhutto‟s government (Sindh) and Nawaz‟s government (Punjab) while these both prime ministers were from larger provinces. Another controversy was that every time in Pakistan popularly elected prime ministers were removed but no parliament and court could impeach or punish presidents to remove governments and generals to impose Martial Law unconstitutionally. This way, the Constitution provided no effective check and balance mechanism over relationship of president and prime minister.

In an effective federal structure, judicial reviews should be given prime importance as judiciary is considered independent to keep check and balance over state. But in this era the major drawback in the system was the persuasion of personal interest over national interests that brought one man rule in form of the 8th amendment.

In democracy, citizens are the main recipients of state conduct. Public representatives are accountable to public. But in Pakistan, federal arrangements were modeled on

151 colonial pattern of government. The English came in the sub-continent and set a colonial rule according to plans of the British Empire. A viceroy was given ultimate powers in

India on behalf of the British crown. He had two iron administrative hands i.e. ICS and

British Indian Army to exploit India for the interests of colonial power (Lodhi, 2011, 52,

Jalal, 1995, 39; Lawrence, 1980, 213). The ICS run the state and got backing of the army in case of any rebellion. Feudal worked as mediators between people and the colonial administration. After partition, viceroy was replaced with governor general (latterly president) with all vice-regal powers while the rest of the state structure remained the same with civil-military setup (as described in chapter 3).

In the new state that bureaucratic setup was in favor of one man show and favored presidential system. This block was against public representative system in the form of parliamentary federal system and growth of political parties that was the very essence of colonial patterns of governance. As discussed in previous chapters, Governor General

Ghulam Muhammad dissolved Nazim-ud-Din government in 1953 that became a precedent for a series of dissolutions of government that generated political instability.

The year 1958 saw abrogation of constitution and imposition of Martial Law because of governance vacuums. Same happened in the era of 1988-1999. This was a crisis between anti-democratic forces mainly (viceroy system) and democratic forces (Lodhi,

2011, 31; Chadda, 2000, 75; Saeed, 1997, 89). The 8th amendment could not prove a safety gauge against Martial Law and for fourth time it was imposed in 1999 by General

Pervez Musharraf.

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The articles of the Constitution of 1973 which were amended to enhance powers of a president were Articles 31 (2C), 41 (), 46, 48, 50, 57 (1), 58, 91, 96, 101, 105, 119. These were about working relationship of President and Prime Minister. The Article 46 was amended. The original article elaborates that “the prime minister shall keep the president informed on matters of internal and foreign policy and on all legislative proposals the federal government intends to bring before president” (Rizvi, ND, 70).

After the 8th amendment it reversed the authority as the prime minister will converse to the president all pronouncements of the cabinet that narrate the governing and legislative affairs. In this case prime minister was shown a subordinate to president.

Before this, the president was assigned to share policy matters of the federation but the amendment includes president into the administrative affairs. This could hinder the smooth sailing of cabinet decisions. In a popular government, a prime minister is accountable to the public but after amendment he was answerable to the president. But president could never be impeached in the parliament according to the constitutional procedure ever in history as Article 57 (1) explains that the president may be impeached on the charges of misconduct, physical or mental incapability or breach of the constitution.

The Article 48 was also included in support of the original Constitution of 1973 which advised president to act upon the advice of cabinet or prime minister but Article 48 (2) entailed that orders of president would not be called into question on any grounds.

Moreover it said that the president may require the cabinet or prime minister to reconsider such advice. In this case prime minister and cabinet were supposed to be two different bodies.

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Article 50 of the original constitution said that there shall be a parliament consisting of two houses i.e. the National Assembly and The Senate. Under the 8th amendment it declares parliament as Majlis-e-Shoora that included the president as the third house. But the controversy was that after dismissing the government, the president did not leave office when the other two houses were dissolved.

Confusion existed over the dissolution of the assemblies too. The Article 58 (1) explained that assemblies would be dissolved on the recommendation of the prime minister but such a prime minister who was elected with popular majority votes (Iqbal

Ahmed, 1989, 19-20). But this clause was amended in the 8th amendment; the amendment empowered the president to dissolve the National Assembly in his prudence

(Rizvi, 86). Many other articles which were amended to give supremacy to presidential office i.e. Articles 91, 92, 96, 99, 101 affected the conduct of prime minister‟s office. But after examining this amendment, it can be concluded that it was a risk for the parliamentary system of government.

The Judiciary and the Elected Governments in 1990s

Judiciary before 1990s also supported Martial Law as a „Law of Necessity‟ (Shafqat,

1997, 193). But to avoid clash with judiciary, many articles of the constitution were amended in the 8th amendment i.e. Articles 175, 179, 180, 181, 195, 196, 198, 199, 200,

203, 204 and 212 (military courts and tribunals). Federal Shari’at courts were also established through the amendment.

In the 8th amendment under Articles 269 and 270 no court could challenge the amended constitution. The conflict between judiciary and military was also obvious in this era as Dr. Waseem Muhammad (1989, 388) narrates that “The Martial Law

154 government felt increasingly unhappy over the interference of the prevalent judicial system in its exercise of authority. On 6th May 1980, it amended Article 199 of the constitution barring High Courts from reviewing Martial Law orders or challenging the judgment of a military court”.

Although on the petitions of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, courts acted independently and restored the elected leaders but the judicial review were given no attention (has been discussed above). But during 1990s, the confrontation with judiciary was a common trait. The Supreme Court cancelled the 14th amendment passed by the government of Nawaz Sharif in 1995 and in retaliation Nawaz Sharif tried to amend the article that was related to the contempt of court (Chadda, 2000, 88). The 8th amendment also influenced the procedure for the appointments of judges as the powers for the appointment of judges was vested in the president office.

Civil-Military Bureaucracy and Relations with Elected Governments

After inception of Pakistan in 1947, security issues arose with hostile India which hardly swallowed the partition of sub-continent in the hope of its reunification sooner than expected. This mindset in India caused concerns in the nascent state which called it

„Indian Threat‟. So the military bureaucracy got a permanent role in foreign and defense policy making (Jaffrelot, 2002, 150).

The death of , the father of the nation in very initial years after inception, brought further political uncertainty. The same old British Indian bureaucratic setup hindered establishment of better educational institutions. Meanwhile military developed a patron-client relationship with bureaucracy and Islamic political parties to

155 get legitimacy of its rule (Lodhi, 2011, 82). This scenario provided military with opportunity to play vital role to protect boundaries and national integration of the homeland. Military ruled Pakistan for thirty-eight years in Pakistan in the face of internal divisions in provinces and between the forces of liberal democracy and radical Islam.

The debate over a liberal democratic Pakistan and an ideological-theological state boiled over into the realm of national identity discourse. Pakistan is yet to decide the supremacy of civilian rule over military rule as was envisaged by the Quaid-e- Azam. Its political parties are evolving democratically but entangled in personal patronage and familial fiefdoms (Khan, 2002, 677, Lodhi, 2011, 80). But there is a huge institutional imbalance between weak political system and strong and well-organized army. Maleeha

Lodhi (2011, 81) quoted statement of the General , former COAS that

“whenever there is a breakdown in…stability, as has happened frequently in Pakistan, the military translates its potential into the will to dominate and we have military intervention followed by military rule”.

To protect boundaries of the new state, that military leadership preferred centralized state structure as need of the hour to generate internal harmony. Here the presidential system and supremacy of presidential office was the key institution that was thought most appropriate for the centralized model. But Chadda (2000, 96) explains the power structure in Pakistan; “the military cannot administer the country without support from

Pakistan‟s bureaucracy. The two institutions have therefore developed a symbiotic relationship in which ideologies, policies and individual preferences have often merged.

This is certainly true at the higher levels of two organizations”

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The political instability allowed army to grow in size and strength political leaders made no efforts to reestablish the institutional balance while they ever invited or provided a chance to army to invade or mediate to settle down their internal issues as was seen during the last decade 1988-1999. The military has adopted a strict policy over relationship with India but General Zia initiated a process to normalization of relations and visited India in December 1985.

Contrarily, Junejo passed a resolution in Parliament to condemn India and fired

Mehbub-ul-Haq; from the post of the Information secretary followed by dismissal of

Agha Nek Muhammad, a nearer companion of Zia and head of ISI. Moreover Junejo began criticizing Zia over occupying two posts (President and COAS) at that time

(Chadda, 2000, 72-73). Same happened during Benazir Bhutto‟s first tenure. She could not work on the guidelines given by her father in 1970s and could not reactivate the class alliance of poor urban workers with lower middle class Pakistanis. Moreover balance of power between the civil and military leaders had begun to tilt towards the latter.

During his first tenure, Nawaz Sharif (1990-93) remained successful to consolidate his popularity base inside and outside of the parliament and it was the main threat to civil- military bureaucracy that felt vulnerable to losing power of this axis (Chadda, 2000, 78).

The sudden death of Asif Nawaz Janjua became an issue between Prime Minister and

President when the matter of new appointment arose (Jafferlot, 2002, 317). They both needed the support of military head for their future survival but the 8th amendment had generated a constitutional flaw over the powers to appoint new COAS. President and

Prime mister made their choices and Nawaz sent his suggestion to Ishaq Khan but he ignored it and appointed Abdul Waheed Kakar by passing six senior nominees. Nawaz

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Sharif in retaliation tried to amend the Article 58 2(B) in parliament and Ishaq Khan dismissed his government.

Although Nawaz‟s government was restored in a petition but military demanded resignation from both and new elections were held. There was a real possibility of

Martial Law during this period but the army showed its positive attitude towards democracy (Chadda, 2000, 80).

The clean sweep of PPP in the general elections 1988 was a surprise as it was termed

„anti-establishment‟. So the seeds of mutual distrust were sown between Benazir government and military (Shafqat, 1998, 243). In May 1989 she appointed ISI chief,

Lieutenant General Shams-ur-Rahmam by removing Lieutenant General Hamid Gul. It was against the will of COAS because LG Hamid Gul was the key personality to shape the Jihad policy in Afghanistan (Cohen, 2012, 231).

It was true that apparently Afghan Jihad was over after defeat of Russian forces in

1988 but strategically another tug of war followed in this region (Haqqani, 2005, 191).

Same was the fate of Nawaz Sharif in 1990 because of the old power politics (Haqqani,

2005, 143; Ziring, 2004, 246). The second term of Benazir Bhutto (1993-1996) did not go smooth either. Although she was inclined towards US but growing tensions with neighboring India intensified the US pressure over freezing of the nuclear program of

Pakistan. The reason was the rise of Shiv Sena in India and demolition of Babri Mosque in 1992 (Haqqani, 2005, 226) that led to worst protests in Pakistan. This led to retaliatory attacks against Hindu sacred places in Pakistan and both societies faced threats of internal communal riots (Cohen, 2012, 231).

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Meanwhile scandal came forth and Benazir Bhutto along with other politician and former military officers were accused of benefiting from huge sums in kickbacks (Jaffrelot, 2002, 143). Two more challenges to Benazir Bhutto were a bad situation in Karachi and the return of , her self-exiled brother, as a legitimate heir to lead PPP. This all diverted her attention from governing with peace of mind and finally her government was sacked in 1996 by the president under imposition of the 58 2(B) (Haqqani, 2005, 229-232).

Next came Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999) with 2/3 majority (50% votes and 66% seats). In this tenure he successfully abolished the Article 58 2(B) and tried to build his own power base. He transferred judges freely and made reforms to curtail power of bureaucracy. He diverted his attention towards army and in 1998; Jehangir Karamat quit when Nawaz

Sharif choose another COAS, Pervez Musharraf, by passing two senior nominations. He made this nomination to show his grip on the levers of government (Cohen, 2002, 151,

Chadda, 2000, 94). This time, the president could not use the 58 2(B) but another Martial

Law awaited in the wings to wind up the heavy-mandate government

PROVISIONS FOR PROVINCES AND MINORITY GROUPS IN

THE 8th AMENDMENT

The 8th amendment affected many articles but the list of center and provincial obligations and rights remained untouched because it was a highly sensitive issue and the most important part of the federal structure. Although Articles 112, 116, 129, 130, 131,

132, 134, 35, 136, 144 were amended that belonged to authority of provincial governor and the other mechanism. The powers of president and provincial governors were

159 boosted and Articles about judiciary were also amended. Parliament had the powers to legislate over issues which did not fall under provincial jurisdiction and on request of provinces could interfere in provincial matters. In case of emergency, the central government could interfere into provincial matters too but this power was used unnecessarily and unconstitutionally many a times.

The 8th amendment could help to cease the intervention of central government into provincial affairs but it did not address the problem. However the 8th amendment restored quota system for provincial and backward areas in Article 27(1). Under Article 41(3) of

The Constitution, both houses were given the right to elect a president and all four provincial assemblies were also included in the electorate. It enhanced the provincial autonomy but also meant to increase the popular vote base for president.

Article 51 was important for representation of provinces in parliament. The 8th amendment extended the seats of national Assembly from 200 to 207. The justification was an increase in population. For minorities, clause 2A of Article 51; increased reserved seats for non-Muslims from 6 to 10 (Khan, 2002, 54); four for Christians, four for scheduled Hindu caste, four for Sikh, one for Budh, Parsis and others, one for Ahmadis.

Clause 4 increased reserved seats for women from 10 to 20. This was a good gesture to include women in the government. The Zia regime remained highly restrictive for female participation in politics. Senator Iqbal Haider opined that there was no women participation in the assemblies though they are half of the population of Pakistan. He said that the 2/3 majority of Nawaz government could be helpful to legislate over this issue

(Haider, 1995, 3) but unfortunately it could not happen.

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Article 51 (4A) sanctions separate electorate while the original Constitution of 1973 describes it as joint electorate. Since inception there was joint electorate system. Clause 5 said that the reserved seats would be filled through direct elections. Single Transferable

Vote (STV) will be used in provincial assemblies to fill reserved seats.

During 1988-99, central government interfered in provincial matters many times. In

1988 Baluchistan assembly was dissolved by removing Chief Minister, Zafarullah Khan

Jamali, and this was repeated in 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1999. Governor Rule was imposed in KP (1994) and Punjab (1995) and favorite governments were installed.

During Bhutto‟s first tenure central government dissolved Baluchistan Assembly. The

Chief Minister of Baluchistan, Zafarullah Khan Jamali was removed in 1988 through vote of no confidence in provincial assembly. But Benazir and Ishaq Khan both pretended to be unaware of the dissolution. This brought distrust between center and

Baluchistan government. Meanwhile ANP and MQM, the coalition parties of PPP, shifted their camp and joined IJI. MQM also withdrew from the agreement signed with

PPP and this resulted in outbreak of ethnic riots in Sindh. The center-provinces relationship remained on the path of discord during this era.

THE IMPACT OF THE 8TH AMENDMENT ON FEDERALISM

The 8th amendment brought an entire change in the nature of federalism. The

Constitution of 1973 was a parliamentary constitution for a federal welfare Islamic state.

Though there was proper separation of powers. The 8th amendment included all those orders which were passed by the Martial Law government from 1977-1985 alongside the

RCO 1985. The objective Resolution was again given a special place in preamble of the

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Constitution of 1973 while it was already included in the annexure (Rizvi, 2000, 22).

This was just a repetition.

Some provisions of the 8th amendment includes some badly needed clauses to articulate more provincial representation through an increase number of seats in Senate and National Assembly. It had added provincial assemblies in Electoral College, alongside both Houses, for presidential elections. But the major flaw was misbalancing major institutions of the federalism i.e. mismatch the powers of prime minister and presidential offices. This amendment stipulates that the president‟s orders could not be challenged in courts hence there was no check and balance on the conduct of presidential office. The president became the symbol of federation but under parliamentary government. The role of a president remained highly controversial in 1990s. Moreover

General Zia introduced many reforms i.e. Zakat, Ushr and Hudood, riba-free (free of interest) banking and Shari’at courts (Bahadur, 1998, 41). Some of these reforms were positive but overall the 8th amendment divided the nation into sects and minority groups became second class citizens of the state (Shafqat, 1997, 219; Kalia, 2011, 170). The

Articles amended under this amendment were used intensely against popularly elected governments. These powers could be shifted to any council of public representatives and other stake holders instead of presidential office which was equal to one man show.

According to the Constitution of 1973, the prime minister was a sovereign body and he was accountable to president. No one could remove the public representative unless there are serious charges of misconduct.

Contrarily, Junejo as Prime Minister gestured to work as independent office holder and his moves annoyed both the president and civil-military bureaucracy. He called APC

162 against the will of the president and delayed signatures over Geneva Pact. He appointed

Zain Norani as in-charge of Afghan policy and external affairs after removing Sahabzada

Yaqoob Ali Khan. Moreover, he declared that all responsible military officials will face trials for the Ojhiri Camp incident in 1988. This was the final blow to the Junejo government. Contrarily to Junejo government, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif challenged the dismissal of their government and courts overruled the exercise of the 58

2(B) by the president as unconstitutional. Alongside this practice the common behavior of political parties, either ruling or opposition, was immature towards politics. They remained busy in playing zero sum game and leg pulling and tug of power politics ultimately invited anti-democratic forces to overthrow the popularly elected leadership.

This was an anti-federal move that enhanced centralization of the state and restlessness in smaller provinces was noticed.

Ethnic Mobilization in Sindh: The Military Operations and MQM

Ethnic diversity, mobilization, intra and inter-ethnic clashes have been discussed in previous chapters. Therefore the ethnic mobilization during 1988-1999 will be shortly summed up here. Sindh remained the hub of ethnic violence in this era; the reason was curbing PPP mobilization and growth as a political party because its workers agitated against military government over execution of Z. A. Bhutto in 1979 for the murder of

Nawab Muhammad Ahmed Khan. The Muhajir ethnicity was allowed to rise to balance the PPP hold in Sindh (Chadda, 2000, 100).

MQM emerged in 1986 as a party to represent lower and middle class Muhajirs of

Karachi. Initially it remained democratic and secular but its further development was not

163 smooth because it took to itself in criminal activities. „Muhajir‟ identity was used to pursue a share in key institutions and it became politicized because it emerged after 39 years of partition. After emergence of MQM, a rise in street crimes and causalities rate was noticed and extortion (Bhata) was collected from Muhajir community for its funding

(Khan, 2005, 177). It kept a strong hold over Karachi under Altaf Hussain by all means either fair or foul (Ahmar, 1996, 1037; Verkaaik, 2004, 68).

Karachi and Hyderabad appeared as leading constituencies of Muhajir community and provided electoral hold to MQM. In 1988, MQM made a coalition government with PPP but the government was not smooth in Sindh. The confrontation of Pakka Qila is the most horrible incident of 1990 that started between police and MQM workers. This break up proved fatal for peace in Sindh when Karachi was compared to Beirut and Mogadishu after having the most dreadful ethnic riots in1990s (Christine, 2005, 77). This brought end of PPP government in center on the charge of bad law and order in Sindh.

Shortly, in the period from 1985 to 1998, ethnic clashes in Karachi caused some 9,000 causalities. The military conducted operations against Muhajirs that were opposed by

PPP and Islami Jamhouri Ittehad (IJI) governments in their respective periods of rule but the military overruled this decision and the IJI-MQM accord broke up finally (Kennedy and Rais, 1995, 120). The aggression saw its climax in the 1994-96 when official resources reported a total of 5,000 causalities.

Afterwards Karachi remained a continuous operational zone of army on the request of civilian governments (Kennedy, 2003, 154-155). These operations and their under- representation in national and provincial institutions were mainly the cause of MQM uprising. In 1994, MQM formulated another catalog of demands to secure rights of

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Muhajirs, namely Muhajireen Kay Aieini Aur Buniadi Huquq (the constitutional and basic rights of Muhajirs). MQM demanded an end to the military operation „clean up‟ in

Karachi against MQM; the proportional representation for Muhajirs in central regional governments, police jobs, educational and professional organizations and development funds; alternation of higher political positions between Sindhis and Muhajirs; self-rule for

Karachi and Hyderabad; the pulling out of decree on the subject of the division of

Hyderabad and the resettlement and reparation for the distressed masses of Karachi.

Muhajirs are a smaller community. An inter-ethnic conflict has been going among them that have a detailed background (Siddiqi, 2010, 103; Rehman, 2013, 26). Siddiqi documented three Muhajir based political parties, but these are anti-MQM. These parties comprise of “Muhajir National Movement (Haqiqi group), Muhajir Unity Movement

(MIT), and Muhajir Linkage Council (MRC)”. MQM-H is a forward bloc of the leading

Muhajir party i.e. MQM. The support base of MQM was broadening by its leadership to and enhances its influence outside the urban Sindh (mainly Karachi and Hyderabad) and aimed to convert MQM from a uni-ethnic to a multiethnic party. Karachi witnessed political violence in 1990s mainly because of the hostility between both factions, MQM and MQM-H. During the Operation „Clean Up‟ (1990s) MQM-H struck against MQM

(Siddiqi, 2010, 208-234).

Muhajirs are largely settled in Karachi and Hyderabad but a significant number is resident in smaller urban centers and municipalities of Sindh as well. They differ in views and visions. In smaller urban centers, MIT got popular recognition than MQM while during 1980s MQM remained allied with Jeay Sindh, the Sindhi nationalist party. In

1988, the early Muhajir settlers formulated MRC to oppose MQM for its stance of ethnic

165 distinctiveness of Muhajirs. Unlike MQM, MRC favored the word “community” than

“nationality” for Muhajirs. In 1990s, it supported army for its anti-MQM crack down and stated that the outcome of the operation would be in advantage of Muhajir community

(Siddiqi, 2010, 210).

This description of inner split up of Muhajir community shows that MQM does not stand exclusively to represent the Muhajir identity. Numerous Muhajirs do not support the political ideology of MQM and prefer to stay nonaligned. Many have been attracted towards Haqiqi group or MRC that deny the hold of MQM as a single leading Muhajirs‟ party (Siddiqi, 2010, 228). This account confront the case that MQM ought to be given a room in grand coalition at regional and state level as a representative of Muhajirs but on other side some say that Muhajir have denied other parties and factions of MQM specially Haqiqi and MQM has emerged as the only leading party. MQM-H was inducted into provincial cabinet of Sindh but soon internal dissent erupted and finally murder of

Azeem Tariq (leader of Haqiqi and a potential replacement of Altaf Hussain) ended the politics of this party (Kennedy and Rais, 1995, 112).

Progressively, Muhajirs abandoned their previous claim of being documented as the

„fifth nationality‟ of Pakistan (besides Punjabis, Sindhis, Pakhtuns, and Baluchs). The leadership after renaming MQM in 1997 has assumed an inclusive attitude however its support base proves that it depends basically on the votes casted by the Muhajir community supporters (Waseem, 2006, 145) Moreover it still strives for regional autonomy. In spite of its distinct temperament and strategy, the political aggression in the urban Sindh proposes that it is the pursuit of leadership inclusion that urges the political enlistment alongside ethnic and linguistic lines. According to Yunus Samad (2002, 76)

166 this shift was not ideological but strategic one because of the criticism over MQM as an anti-state entity. Therefore it tried to enhance its social base by renaming itself. This narration seems true as in 2011, MQM presented a bill in national assembly to declare

Karachi a separate province (Kalia, 2011, 37) and Karachi is again under operation since

2013.

CONCLUSION

Entire history of Pakistan and its important developments on political and constitutional levels particularly in the decade of 1988-1999 remained highly contentious because of a tug-of-war among various contenders of power i.e. Prime Minister,

President and COAS. The 8th amendment was introduced as a safety valve against

Martial Law and to avoid deadlocks in politics, but the military again intervened in politics in 1999, although much General Musharraf avoided using the term „Martial

Law‟. It can be called the “Great Divide” as in the words of Shahid Burki (1998, 93-95)

“the country had failed to bridge the great divide that separated the structure of the society from the structure of political system. The society had evolved rapidly since independence. A number of new socio-economic groups had emerged that wanted a place for them in the political structure. This was not done since the political system remained dominated by a few socio-economic groups…” He further stated that “persistence of the phenomenon… calling the “Great Divide” the divide between social and political structures. For as long as the political system remained less than totally representative of the entire society; it was vulnerable for such actions.”

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A president could work for the betterment of the federation but during 1990s it mostly worked for the vice regal forces. The Constitution of 1973 was extensively amended but it could not develop consensus among different contenders of power and during 1990s these clashes reached its peak. This shows that nothing can assure maturity in Pakistani politics unless the political parties and political elites do not adopt a positive thinking in policy and decision making. It is not about amending constitution or debating merely in parliament or elsewhere but a practical effort to develop consensus by adopting an inclusive political system through patience, cooperation and positive role that can bridge the great socio-political divide.

End Notes

1. This was a name given by Benazir Bhutto to the coalition of groups that manipulated a massive political power in capital of Pakistan included the senior army and civil officers and the industrialists. 1. The Mehrangate Scandal revealed that during 1990s elections were not free and fair, for more information visit http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=144506 and http://tribune.com.pk/story/347218/asghar-khan-petition-former-mehran- bank-chief-admits-distributing-rs400m/

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Chapter-6

THE QUALITY DEMOCRACY FOR PLURAL SOCIETIES: A

MODEL OF FOUR CONSOCIATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Pluralism is a reality of our times and many polities have problems dealing with it. So they end up opting for centralization. Managing diversity in multiethnic and multilingual societies has huge importance, from both theoretical and practical perspectives, in the present state of affairs. Emergence of ethno-lingual differences and conflicts are not a new subject, but the frequency of their occurrence and intensity is an expansion which requires a conscious and in-depth assessment. To provide an effective conflict resolution mechanism, this study highlights the need of quality democracy. For this purpose, a debate was articulated about different models of democracy and analyzing them by their quality performance. The quality of democracy can be defined through three important steps i.e, procedure, contents and results. It portends that a democratic model can produce good governance if it results in satisfaction of citizens (Morlino, 2002, 3-4). In this era, it is a common concept that the best government is to be a democracy and every country should practice it.

But the emerging important debate is the level of quality1 of democracy in democratic states. Quality of democracy means good governance which can help generate political stability that leads to a sustainable democratic government. For plural societies, the study of Lijphart is very credible. Lijphart (1993, 149) says that the term “quality” refers to the degree to which a system meets such democratic norms as representativeness, accountability, equality and participation. He articulated the notion of Consociationalism in 1969 to overcome political instability of plural societies through maintaining sustainability of a democratic government, mitigating violence level, increasing legitimacy and decisional effectiveness of a state structure. His idea is normative because it generates good governance by fulfilling the main objectives of democracy i.e. rule of law, accountability, and responsiveness, respect of rights and equality of all citizens. It will be discussed in subsequent section of this chapter.

Developing countries are facing critical political instability caused by ethnic conflicts.

The in-depth study of plural states reveals some relationship between forms of institutional mechanism and the rise of ethnicity. In these multiethnic states, different forms of federal arrangements, especially power-sharing provisions, are recommended for the management of ethno-linguistic diversity to ensure quality democracy.

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The issues in managing diversity are addressed through different approaches in various regions of the world. Consociational arrangements have proved helpful to provide quality democracy in plural societies. Many European, African, South and Central Asian states have controlled diversity by applying Consociational federal system, but with some variations of outcomes. This model of democracy remained supportive to develop consensus at national level and worked as a conflict resolution mechanism. Therefore, this model has been taken as a tool for delivering quality democracy. This episode examines traits of four successful Consociational models and suggests supportive practice of Consociational federalism for the multiethnic and multilingual Pakistani society to sure quality democracy

A Model of Four Successful Consociations

Lijphart has identified many states in different regions as consociations. He has propounded four basic models of Consociationalism, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands. For this study, I selected diversified Consociational models and compared their supportive traits and indicators with Pakistan in next chapter. For this purpose, Malaysia and India (Asian state), Kenya (African state) and Belgium (European state) have been taken. They are success stories of Consociationalism, but in their political, social background and growth, more or less, they are similar to Pakistan. This similarity will help us for generating a better comparison. This will also explain that democratization is problematic in heterogeneous states (the developed and developing countries) with ethnic diversity as it poses a problem for identity construction.

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In this background, Daniel Elazar (1987, 247) made an interesting comparison among

African and Asian federations and argued that soil of African countries is less welcoming for federalism as compared to Asian countries. According to Tendi (2010), British- planted federal model is not working, particularly in Africa. The ratio of success of federations varies state to state and region to region. This difference is because of the variations in developmental phases in which they are. Some are under-developed like

Kenya, some are developing like Pakistan, India, Malaysia and some are developed countries like Belgium.

In Asia, three federations India, Pakistan and Malaysia are considered successful because they sustained their federal system after getting independence from British

Colonial rule. Pakistan and Malaysia faced disintegration in 1971 and 1965 respectively, but they did not experience further dismemberment (Bhattacharyya, 2010, 12).

In this background, Indian political system will be examined firstly that claims to be the world‟s largest democracy despite its deep ethno-lingual diversity.

India

Lijphart categorizes India as a success story of Consociational arrangements since its inception, with a pause for a decade from 1965 to 1977. It is a South Asian country with a

3,287,263 km2 area that borders “on the North-West and West by Pakistan; to the

North by China, Nepal and Bhutan; to the East by Bangladesh and Myanmar; to the

South-East by the Palk Strait and Sri Lanka and the Bay of Bengal and to South-West by the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean” (Bhattacharyya, 2010, 26).

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Its population is 1,236,344,631 (2014) that marks it the 2nd largest country as population-wise. According to 2001 census, Hindus (80.5%) are in majority while other minor ethnic groups are Muslim (13.4%), Christian (2.3%), Sikh (1.9%) and others

(1.8%). According to CIA fact book data (2014) “41% Indian people speak Hindi, 8.1%

Bengali, 7.2% Telugu, 7% Marathi, 5.9% Tamil, 5% Urdu, 4.5% Gujarati, 3.7%

Kannada, 3.2% Malayalam, 3.2% Oriya, 2.8% Punjabi, 1.3% Assamese, 1.2% Maithili and 5.9% other” languages while English is official language besides 18 other official languages (2001 census). India has 29 constituent units and 7 union territories (CIA Fact book, 2014).

According to Bhattacharyya (2010, 26), India is “distributed among many languages, religions, castes, tribes, races, regions, sub-regions, communities, sub-nationalist groups, and off course classes. India‟s diversity is truly continental”. Many of the constituent units of the Indian Federation today are bigger in size and population than many countries of the world7. India is a successful democracy and claims to be the world‟s largest democracy. Since inception, it practiced accommodative politics that is the soul of

Consociationalism. But it entangled after rise of Indera Gandhi in 1966-77 (Emergency rule from June 1975 to March 1977) and then rise of Hindu nationalism in the form of

BJP and „Punjab problem‟ in 1980s and 1990s (Bhattacharyya, 2010, 107-108; Adeney,

2003, 173).

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Table 11: Demographic composition of the Indian States and Union Territories

States Population

Andhra Pradesh 76,210,007 Arunachal Pradesh 1,097,968 Assam 26,655,528 Bihar 82,998,509 Chhattisgarh 20,833,803 Delhi 13,850,507 Gujarat 50,671,017 Haryana 21,144,564 Himachal Pradesh 6,077,900 Jammu and Kashmir 10,143,700 Jharkhand 26,945,829 Karnataka 52,850,562 Kerala 31,841,374 Madhya Pradesh 60,348,023 Manipur (excl. of three subdivisions) 2,166,788 Meghalaya 2,318,822 Maharashtra 96,878,627 Mizoram 888,573 Nagaland 1,990,036 Orissa 36,804,660 Punjab 24,358,999 Rajasthan 56,507,188 Sikkim 540,851 Tamil Nadu 62,405,679 Tripura 3,199,203 Uttarakhand 8,489,349 Uttar Pradesh 166,197,921 West Bengal 80,176,197 Union Territories Andaman and Nicobar Islands 356,152 Chandigarh 900,365 Dadra and Nagar Haveli 220,490 Daman and Diu 158,204 Goa 1,347,668 Lakhadweep 60,650 Pondichery 974,345

Source: Census Reports of India (2001).

In India, members of minority groups in the Constituent Assembly, like Muslims, favored the Swiss federal system or proportional representation but the major groups voiced for “traditional cabinet government”, while Nehru clearly rejected a “power- sharing executive” coalition. Contrarily to his report in 1928 that he presented in pre- partition India, he incorporated three such Consociational clauses i.e. linguistic and

176 religious re-organization and reserved seats for minority etc (Austin, 1966, 118-123). But after partition, India opted for Majoritarian Model and adopted Majoritarian constitution by annulling India Act 1935 (Phatak, 1993, 96). It was categorized as Majoritarian state because of one party rule (but INC incorporated all ethnic classes in its membership) and highly disproportional representation (Wheare, 1964, 28). But Rajni Kothari (1970, 421),

Lijphart (1996) and Bogaards (2002, 9) stated that INC was a coalition government with proportional representation and with autonomy to major ethnic groups. While for minor groups, according to Balveer Arora (2015, 313) soon after partition, there was a reluctance to accept the demand of linguistic and cultural diversity.

Figure 1: Sample of All Incidents of Ethnic Mobilization in India 1950-1995

Source: Wilkinson (2002, 15)

In early two decades (1947-1967), India practiced Consociationalism but after

1967 in an attenuated form. Wilkinson (2002, 15) proves with his statistical data the ratio

177 of ethno-lingual conflicts increased when India adopted Majoritarian federalism. (as the following figure depicts).

This section discusses how India mixed Consociationalism with Majoritarian set up. After partition, India was homogeneous (80% Hindu population) but minor groups were also a part of its society. Although India at the outset rejected separate electorate but latter on constitutionalized reserved seats for minorities in legislature, based on population size, initially for ten years (Constituent Assembly of India, 1947, 267). After two years in 1949, India removed this reservation. Same happened with the issue of linguistic and religious reorganizations of provinces. This tendency was Majoritarian in nature (Lijphart, 1996, 3). But Indian constitution of 1950 gives protection to linguistic identities in its Article 345. To secure the employment rights of non-Hindi population and to eliminate the domination of Hindi speakers in jobs, Articles 346 and 347 provoked different languages as official at provincial level (Brass, 1994, 164). But afterwards language bill was passed in 1964 that created ambiguities (Brass, 1994, 166).

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Table 12: Official languages and speakers in India

Languages Speakers (‟000) Percentage of total population

Hindi 337,272 40.20 Bengali 69,595 8.30 Telegu 66,017 7.87 Marathi 62,481 7.45 Tamil 53,006 6.32 Urdu 43,406 5.18 Gujarati 40,673 4.85 Kannada 30,377 3.91 Malayalam 30,377 3.62 Oriya 28,061 3.35 Punjabi 23,378 2.79 Assamese 13,079 1.56 Sindhi 2,122 0.25 Nepali 2,076 0.25 Konkani 1,760 0.21 Manipuri 1,270 0.15 Kashmiri 56 0.01 Sanskrit 49 0.01

Source: Census Reports of India (1991)

Since inception, India is a secular state in essence. But the “Secularism in India did not entail the separation of state and religion. It sought to maintain the neutrality of the state with regard to different religions. The Indian state does not deny the legitimacy of religion in the public sphere and has funded educational institutions of all denominations”

(Adeney, 2003, 208).

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Table 13: Religious composition of the Indian population

Religions Population (2000) % of total population Hindus 827,579 80.5 Muslims 138,188 13.4 Christians 24,080 2.34 Sikhs 19,216 1.94 Buddhists 7,955 0.9 Jains 4,225 0.4 Other religions 6,640 0.6 Total 1,028,610 100 100

Source: Census Report of India (2001)

According to Lijphart (1996, 1-10), India had all four features and 7 out of 9 favorable factors for consolidation of Consociationalism through supposedly Majoritarian federalism. From 1960s, some of its Consociational arrangements got undermined due to mass mobilization and intergroup violence increased. Indian National Congress was a grand coalition until the rise of Indera when hierarchical trend and centralization augmented (Panandiker and Mehra, 1996). INC granted ethno-lingual autonomy through an agreement in 1965, which stated that Hindi would not be given the status of an official language until prior confirmation by ethno-lingual segments. Through electoral laws, proportional guarantee was provided to scheduled casts and scheduled tribes through

“reserve seats” in parliament and reserved quota in employments and admission (Prasad,

1991, Mehta, 1991, SrinivasaVaradan, 1992, 105-132).

After 1960s, power-sharing arrangements weakened in India though it continued.

According to Lijphart (1996, 6), its reason was the role of political elites and pressure from voters and supporters or workers.

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India has consensual form of federalism like Belgium. It has bicameral system but its legislature is subjected to judicial reviews. The segmental autonomy and reconciliation that is the essence of mutual/minority veto has been endowed in the very foundation of

Indian politics. This all led no segment to rule solely (Kaiser, 1997, 436). Remarks of

Lijphart (1996, 6-10) that it has 7 out of 9 favorable factors also fit well with Pakistan.

These indicators will be evaluated in coming chapter.

Malaysia

Malaysia is another glorious example of Consociationalism. It is a Southeast Asian country bordering Indonesia, Brunei, Vietnam and the South China Sea. Its total land area is 329,847 km2 with 30,073,353 population size. It is a multiethnic country where various ethnicities are; Malay 50.1%, Chinese

22.6%, indigenous 11.8%, Indian 6.7%, other 0.7%, and non-citizens 8.2%. It has a multilingual society and Bahasa is its official language while English,

Chinese (various dialect of Chinese language) Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam,

Panjabi and Thai are also used. East Malaysia is a hub of many indigenous languages (CIA WFB, 2014).

According to CIA fact book (2014), Muslim are in majority in Malaysia with the ratio of 61.3%, while various minor groups like “Buddhist 19.8%,

Christian 9.2%, 6.3% Confucian, Tao, other traditional Chinese religions

1.3%, reside inside Malaysia”. It has thirteen states and one federal territory

(with three components i.e. Kuala Lumpur, Labuan, and Putrajaya) (Bakar

2007, 70–71).

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Table 14: Ethnic composition of the population of Malaysia (2000)

Year Total (in millions) Indigenous (%) Chinese (%) Indian (%) Others (%)

1947 4.9 49.8 10.8 38.4 1.0 1957 6.2 49.8 37.2 11.3 1.7 1961 7.23 50.0 36.0 11.3 2.7 1970 8.8 50.0 37.0 11.0 2.0 1980 11.47 55.1 33.9 10.3 0.7 1991 18.38 60.0 28.1 7.9 1.4 2000 23.27 65.1 26.0 7.7 1.2

Source: Bakar (2007: 70)

In 1957, Malaysia got independence from British colonial power. In comparison with

Pakistan and India, Malaysia is more diverse by some aspects; its diversity is more complicated by some aspects. Malaysia is not densely populated state but the population size is not as important as Malaysian ethnic composition is.

In British government policies, Malay were given overrepresentation in state institutions; like in Pakistan and India few ethnic groups became more privileged at the expense of other minor communities (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 3) and these policies were followed even after partition of Malaysia.

Consequently, ethnic riots erupted in Malaysia on 13th May 1969. This was a major signal that governance system that Malaysia opted for after partition was not compatible to maintain political stability. However Malaysia afterwards successfully accommodated its diverse communities through power-sharing method within a single state structure. On the other side, violence is increasing globally (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 6). For this

182 purpose, Malaysia, at least in the center, has altered its leadership, and also its political arrangements while living in democratic and federal system.

Regular general elections are being conducted in Malaysia since 1957. It has maintained a democratic system, though the system experienced a short pause when it faced dismemberment and a temporary breakdown due to imposition of emergency rule from 1969 to 1971(like India after rise of Indera). For this reason, Lijphart (1977) categories Malaysia as Consociation since 1955 till 1969 and still it is working as it was working before emergency period.

In this background, Abdillah Noh (2013, 31) describes that “Early Consociational arrangement was seen through the partnership between the All Malayan Council for Joint

Action (AMCJA), the Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (PUTERA) and the alliance between

Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the Malayan Nationalist Party (MNP). It was later followed by the setting up of the Communities Liaison Committee8 (CLC) and later the

UMNO-MCA alliance between Malaya‟s largest political parties, the United Malay

National Organization (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA)…”9.

According to Charles E. Shumaker (2010, 65), this Consociational agreement contained

65 clauses.

But this agreement is a form of “gentleman‟s promise” among three parties i.e., the

UMNO, the MCA and the MIC and this has never been regularized. Each ethnic segment has right to preserve its identity and freedom of action. Initially, three parties voluntarily participated to strengthen this agreement under a loose political alliance. Unlike former alliance between AMCJA-PUTERA, MCP-MNP, this new partnership between UMNO-

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MCA and MIC worked because, in this partnership ethnic groups were accommodated through inter-elite cooperation10. This type of mixed arrangements are also important as

Lijphart (1975, 165) has described the presence of a mixed arrangement or joint representation at the elite level as a prerequisite for a successful Consociational democracy because that generate cross cutting loyalties and encourage moderation. The feature of executive power-sharing practice managed equal opportunities for coalition partners and consequently increased an inter-elite cooperation and enhanced mutual cooperation among members.

Consociationalism has proved as a rational choice for diverse society like Malaysia.

But, Malaysian Consociationalism has no hard and fast rules in practice. Many renowned scholars worked on Malaysia model; like Horowitz in 1993, Stafford in 1997 and

Edwards in 2005 and their work proved that even remaining under the umbrella of

Consociationalism, Malaysia opted for institutional changes. The Study by Streeck and

Thelen (2005) and Mahoney and Thelen (2010) evaluate Malaysian institutions through a different angle but that discussion is beyond the scope of this study.

Table 15: Constituent Parties of Barisan National (BN) (as of May 2008)

1. United Malay National Organization (UMNO) 2. Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) 3. Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) 4. Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People‟s Movement) 5. People‟s Progressive Party (PPP) 6. Parti Pesaka Bhumiputera Bersatu (PPBB) 7. Sarawak United People‟s Party (SUPP) 8. Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP, withdrew on 17 September 2008) 9. PartiBersatu Sabah (PBS) 10. Liberal Democratic Party 11. PartiBersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS) 12. United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organization 13. Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP)

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14. Sarawak People‟s Party (Parti Rakyat Sarawak) (PRS) Source: Compiled from various Internet sources of the BN (http://www.2008bn.org.my/as at 23. May 2009).

For this grand coalition, Abdillah Noh (2013, 32) criticized that “Malaysia‟s

Consociational arrangement remains fraught with paradoxes and anomalies, which are in fact manifestations of the state‟s attempt to negotiate exclusive institutions, while at the same time, attempting to create common ones. The state will continue to experience institutional change, albeit small, incremental in nature”. Coalition in Malaysia was jolted many times by few movements of ethnic elites but they managed to avoid political fragmentation wisely by understanding the grave necessity to preserve accommodative political institutions at that critical time.

After securing public consent, consensus was reached at the elite level and carried forward the Consociational practice by registering itself as Barisan National (BN) in 1973 that is dominant in UMNO, MCA and MIC (Sani, 2009, 98). Malaysia today has such democratic arrangements that, according to William Case (1996, 270), shows that

“Malaysia's allocations of state benefits have been neither proportional to communal sizes nor crudely monopolistic. Its national cultural policies are neither pluralist nor ruthlessly assimilationist and its ethnic relations at the mass level are neither amicable nor relentlessly hostile”. To conclude the debate on Malaysian politics, it would be appropriate to say that “Consociationalism, consensual decision-making and respect for authority are important factors that maintain political stability and power-sharing among races in Malaysia” (Sani, 2009, 99).

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Kenya

In Africa, many countries are considered as consociations i.e., Suriname (1950-85),

Nigeria (1957-66), Fiji (1970-87), Zimbabwe (1980-87), South Africa (199-96) and

Burundi (1998-till date). Kenya (2008-till date) is the latest example of Consociational democracy in Africa that had Majoritarian system since its creation in 1963 and was facing severe ethnic tensions.

Kenya is an East African country that has 581,309 km2 areas with a population of 44 million (CIA world Fact book, 2015). It has a very unique ethnic diversity; the major ethno-linguistic groups of African region are residing inside its borders. It has 42 different communities. The major segments are Bantus and Nilotes with the ratio of 67% and 30% respectively (Asongu and Marvee, 2007, 12 and112) while Arabs, Indians and

Europeans are considered minor religious communities (Okoth and Ndaloh, 2006, 60–

61). According to the CIA World Fact Book (2014), the ethnic groups are 22% Kikuyu,

14% Luhya, 13% Luo, 12% Kalenjin, 11% Kamba, 6% Kisii, 6% Meru and 15% other minor African and 1% non African groups like Arabs, Europeans and Asians. According to Bogaards (2002, 13-14),in Kenya Kikuyu (21%) was the major segment in comparison to other five major groups which constituted only three-fourth of the total population.

The major religious group of Kenya is Christian 83% (47.7% Protestant and 23.5%

Roman Catholic, while 621,200 are Orthodox Christians). Minor communities like

Hindus (around 300,000), Muslim including Shia and Sunni (11.2%), indigenous believers (1.7%), and nonreligious (2.4%) also exists (CIA WFB, 2014).

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Table 16: Consociational Model of Kenya

Unanimity rules None in legislative arena. In the Cabinet, appointments and removals must

be approved by both parties.

Grand coalition Yes

Fixed equality of representation among different No, except that Cabinet positions and top administration posts will be groups shared evenly by the two main political parties. No specific provisions for particular ethnic or religious groups. Proportionality in election results No. Kenya retains a presidential system with first-past-the post constituencies for Parliament. Proportionality in government appointments, contracts, Yes, only with regard to higher-level appointments. No specific provision rewards for lower-level appointments in civil service, contracts, or other rewards. Federalism No

Group autonomy provision, for example with respect to No legal regulations, education, or religious matters

Guarantees of individual liberties No new provisions added above those already contained in the existing constitutions. Power-dividing rules (restricting the government from No regulation of certain policy areas, such as religious practices, language) Wealth-sharing No Sunset (temporary) provisions with respect to any Yes. The coalition government will be dissolved if the tenth parliament is aspects of power-sharing dissolved; if the parties agree in writing; or if one coalition partner withdraws from the coalition.

Source: Horowitz (2009)

Linguistically, Kenya is a multilingual country and altogether 68 languages are spoken in today‟s Kenya (Languages of Kenya, Ethnologue.com). Various ethnic languages are being spoken at community level while British English and Kiswahili/Swahili dialect are recognized at official level (Encyclopedia Britannica, Ethnologue.com)

The colonial history of Kenya starts from 1885 (German colony) and followed by the colonial British East Africa Company in 1888 (Encyclopedia Britannica). Total colonial period is 68 years from 1895 to1963. Mau Mau uprising (1952-1959), an anti-British rule movement, put Kenya into a state of emergency and the independent Republic of Kenya was established in December 1963.

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Kenya has an enriched ethno-lingual society, but it is a source of contention too. Since

1963 and afterwards throughout1980s, Kenya African National Union (KANU) remained the only ruling and legal party. In this period, Kenya remained dominated by Jomo

Kenyatta till 1978 and followed by Daniel Arap Moi till 2002 (both were members of

KANU and Kenyan president). Kenyatta preferred his own ethnic group (Kikuyu) and altered constitution frequently to concentrate power in the hands of the presidency. After a bitter internal struggle, his successor Daniel Arap Moi came to power and substituted dominant Kikuyu with his own ethnic group (Kalenjin and other associated ethnic groups) and further centralized powers (Widner, 1992, 89; Encyclopedia Britannica).

The monopolistic politics of 1980s irritated civil society including churches, ethnic movements, the Forum for the Restoration of Consociational Democracy (FORD) and foreign Donors. Consequently, in late 1991, US and European Council (EC) halted economic aid to Kenya that forced Kenya to initiate political reforms (Eichengreen et. al.

1995, 210). President Arap Moi announced constitutional amendments to restore multiparty system and it was done in early 1990s when the government shared powers through multiparty system (mainly three parties).But still KANU remained in power through electoral rigging in 1992, 1997 and 2002 (Kabanda, 2012).

Multiparty system in Kenya was restored in 1990s; in general election 2002 Mwai

Kibaki ended nearly 40 years rule of KANU with his massive win. But next general elections 2007 became disputed and ethnic riots erupted once again. In March 2008, a power-sharing agreement was implemented to bring an end to these ethnic clashes. It remained on track to achieve this primary goal. The signatories of the accord competed in

188 electoral arena freely. In August 2010, a referendum was held and a new constitution was adopted.

The main victory of the agreement is formulation of a grand coalition to include major ethnic elements into it. It has developed consensus at initial level (Horowitz, 2009, 23s).

The future potential threats to the agreement exist because long-term grievances and underlying issues have not been addressed and remain latent sources of conflict.

Executive functions and cabinet positions are shared between Kenya‟s two main parties namely Party of National Unity (PNU) and Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in this agreement. Soon after the agreement was reached, a debate started about its functional potentialities.

But after passing of 8 years, it is still working (Waituru, 2013). Consequently the subsequent general elections 2013 were peaceful which was won by Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Jomo Kenyatta. Since 2011, Kenya is facing external threat too, and Kenyan army is engaged to curb „Al-Shabab‟ (an Islamist militant group) that has opened up more terrible sequence of retaliation strategy in Kenya since 2013 (BBC NEWS). In this background, the agreement-2008 has drawn short-term benefits and its durability for long-term settlement depends on the ability of political elites of Kenya that how they implement it over time6.

Belgium

From Europe, the model country Belgium has a very rich history but full of brutal conflicts. After passing through bloody ethnic riots, it finally developed sound state structure. Actually, Federalism has basic roots in European soil. It remained practicing

189 power structure when the rest of world, especially Asia, was following European steps of federal arrangements. Then Europe itself was at the height of federal evolution. It had paved way for its political, social and economic growth after spending of hundred years in war.

Belgium parted ways with the Netherlands in 1830. After partition, it had to pass through two World Wars. According to CIA world Fact book (2014), it is a West

European state with 30,528 km2 area, having population of 10,449,361 (July 2014 est.) and borders France, Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. Religiously, it has

Roman Catholics 75%, and others including Protestant 25%. Linguistically it has “Dutch

(official) 59.2%, French (official) 40%, German (official) less than 1% population.

Legally, it is bilingual (Dutch and French)”. It granted segmental autonomy to its ethno- linguistic groups; the Dutch-speaking majority (Flemings 58%) in North and the French- speaking minority (Walloons 31%) in South enjoy regional autonomy through constitutional amendments11 and has accommodated all segments in the cabinet with equal representation (Lijphart, 1999, 35-39; Willemyns, 1988, 65). Belgium‟s first constitution was promulgated in 1830 with its inception. In 1993, government levels were constitutionally amended and rearranged at three levels “with a complex division of responsibilities” i.e. federal, regional, and linguistic community (CIA WFB, 2014).

Historically, when the Thirty Years War started (1618-1648), since then the title of

“battlefield and cockpit” of Europe was given to Belgium because of its geo-strategic importance (Patak, 2010, 565). Belgium, after its independence, has been considered first recipient of industrial revolution. This is the major cause of political conflicts that started between liberal and socialists.

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Before 1830 when Belgium was part of the Netherlands, although protestant were given their rights just in theory, but not practically, because they were in minority and never played any vital role in state politics. They were deprived of their cultural and linguistic rights and Dutch was imposed as an official language over French speaking population (Map, 2015, Schama, 1972, 86-87). Meanwhile French revolution in 1830 erupted and south provinces of The Netherlands sought autonomy (Blom and Lamberts,

1999, 307-12).At that time, there were lingual conflicts between Dutch and French speakers. After independence, French speaking people ruled Belgium initially (Cameron,

2000, 343, Louis Vos, 1966, 89-90) and Flemish were forced to live as a second class cultural group which reacted and raised voices for equal rights (Cook, 2004, 81).

Meanwhile labor party, trade unions and Socialist party of Belgium emerged in 1890s.

They voiced for male and female voting rights. The Flemish movement in Belgium turned political power in their favor and the constitution was translated into Dutch language in 1967 (Deschouwer, 2004, 75). This linguistic conflict fragmented Belgian society politically and the three main parties, Catholics, Labor and Socialists were plural into their respective Flemish and Dutch electorates (Liebman, 1966, 44–65). Belgium was linguistically reorganized into two regions in 1962 and afterwards in second state by

1980. The ethno-linguistic groups were given cultural autonomy. The third state of 1988 -

1989 brought reforms for bilingual Brussels. Under fourth state in 1993, further consolidation of the previous reforms was done followed by fifth state reforms in 2001.

The sixth state reforms were approved in 2012 that introduced some judicial reforms in

Belgium (Belgium. be). Currently, Belgium has a grand coalition of fourteen elected parties in the Lower House (bicameral).

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Belgium is practicing Consensual aspects (have been explained in Chapter 2) of democracy besides its Consociational arrangements (Lijphart, 1990, 31-47). It has executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalition, proportional representation, corporatist interest groups, gradually more decentralizing federal system since 1970, bicameral legislature and multi-party system, balance of power in executive and legislature branches, judicial review, semi-rigid constitution and independent central bank. These all characteristics are the reason to make Belgium a politically stable democracy since centuries (Lijphart, 2012, 34-42). Besides, it is practicing all four features of Consociationalism.

CONCLUSION

All of these model consociations are multiethnic and multi lingual. India as a South

Asian country is considered as the world‟s largest democracy. It is a multiethnic and multilingual state with 18 other official languages besides English. Lijphart (1969, 77, 89,

96) considered it a consociation with a pause of a decade (1965-77). INC was the forum with grand coalition of all major and important segments. Its history shows conflicts in regards language protection and segmental autonomy. Soon after independence in 1947, it constitutionalized reserved seats for minority segments and reorganized provinces on language basis. Article 345, 346, 347 of its Constitution - 1950 gave protection to languages. It provided segmental autonomy and minority veto; like bill of 1965 for protections of languages. Moreover it has bicameral legislation bound to judicial review.

India is facing ethnic violence. According to Wilkinson (2005), this instability is due to intentional departure from Consociationalism.

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Malaysia is next successful Asian consociation. It is a diverse country with a conflict resolution mechanism. Eastern part of Malaysia is a hub of different languages and ethnic segments. Its ethnic composition is more complicated than its population size. After independence, it got monopoly of Malay people from colonial times which were the strongest segment by every aspect. Gradually, Malaysia altered leadership and political arrangements at center but also went through ethnic and linguistic clashes and resultant dismemberment. General elections were conducted on regular basis that brought a stable political culture. The Consociational agreement was mainly between three parties that played positive role in developing consensus. The current grand coalition is a composition of 14 parties; conflicts came forth many times but every time they were resolved despite having no hard and fast rules of Consociational arrangements.

Kenya with 581, 309 km2and 44 million populations has a unique diversity of 42 segments and 62 languages. It is religiously diverse, too. It has two official languages. Its colonial history begins with Majoritarian Model that remained in practice in post- partition Kenya. Its current Consociational arrangement since2008 is not strictly having all features of the model. There is no specific representational provision for ethnic groups in power. It conducts presidential and elections parliament under FPTP system.

Proportional representation is given but only at higher level of government positions. But power-sharing under grand coalition with minority veto is in practice. Initially, Kenyan political horizon was dominated by one party rule, and the current coalition is between two parties.

Belgium is a basic example of consociation. Being a multiethnic and multilingual country, its history is full of clashes. Segmental autonomy and proportional

193 representation are incorporated in its constitution. Initially, industrial revolution produced clashes between Socialists and Liberals and hence their respective political parties emerged out of such conflict. These parties often remained plural over language issues.

As such, Belgian constitution was drafted and redrafted many times i.e. 1962, 80, 88-89,

9 and finally 2001. This is called state reformation. Current grand coalition consists of 14 parties in bicameral legislature bound by judicial review. Belgium is a brilliant example of Consensual and Consociational democracy.

It is clear enough that these model countries closely resemble with Pakistan on account of indicators of societal division, political instability, governance system, experience with Majoritarian Model, ethnic and linguistic conflicts, presence of external threats and many others. These indicators along with favorable conditions or

Consociationalism would be the base of discussion in coming chapter.

End Note

1. For example, public voting is a democratic norm but low turnout will be called poor quality of democracy and high turnout will be labeled as high quality of democracy. 2. The success of Kenyan Consociational agreement is dependent on the role of elites. Although, till date it is working effectively. For details see “Omolo, K. Social Movements and The Democratization Process in Kenya Lecturer at Department of Government, University of Nairobi. Retrieved at http://www.dpmf.org/images/social-omolo.htm) 3. For further study see Bhattacharyya, H. (2010). Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan and Malaysia. London: Rutledge. 4. The CLC smoother the progress of the Consociational bargain as it channelized the opportunity to the political elites of Malaysia to institute personal relations and to be sensitized to the reality of plural society of Malaysia. It exposed elites to the divergent interests and complexities of Malaya‟s problems and helped elites to realize the need to build common institutions and forced them to seek an agreeable political solution and avoid fragmentation. For further study see Noh, A. (2013). Malaysia And The Consociational Option: Is There a Path Dependent Logic? Working Paper# 2013/1, University of Abdul Razak.

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5. See for more information Ramasamy P. (1980). Malaysia‟s Experience with Consociationalism. M.Phil Thesis. Department of Political Science. McGill University. Montreal, Canada Denker, M. S. The Plural Society and Consociational Democracy Theory: Malaysia‟s Case. GHEE, T. (1983). “Malaysia: Changing Occupational Patterns: The Growth of the Worker Class and Its Implications in Social Relations”. Hing, Lee Kam. (1981). „Malaya: New State and Old Elites‟ in Jeffrey, R. (ed.) Asia: the Winning of Independence, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 213–225. 6. For detail see William Case, (1996), Elites and Regimes in Malaysia, Monash University Asia Institute, Australia) 7. Belgian constitution is available at…. is also facing ethnic and socio-economic inequality see Deschouwer, K. (2004). Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Belgium. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Willemyn, R. (2002). The Dutch-French Language Border in Belgium. Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development Vol. 23 (1 and 2).

References Asongu, J. J. and Marvee, M. (2007). Doing Business Abroad: A Handbook for Expatriates. Green view Publishing Co. Andaya, B. W. and Andaya, L. Y. (2001). A History of Malaysia. Hampshire: Palgrave. Adeney, K. S. (2003). Federal formation and Consociational stabilization: the politics of national identity articulation and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan. Ph.D Thesis. Government Department: London School of Economics. University of London. Austin, G. (1966). The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a nation. New Delhi, Oxford University Press. Bogaards, M. (2002). Consociational Parties and Political Accommodation in Ethno- plural Societies. Southampton: University of Southampton. Bhattacharyya, H. (2010). Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan and Malaysia. London, Rutledge. Brass, P. (1994). The Politics of India since Independence. New Delhi and Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Bakar, I. (2007) „Multinational Federations: the Case of Malaysia‟ in Burgess, M. and Pinder, J. (Eds), Multinational Federations, London: Rutledge, pp. 68–85. Belgium. be http://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/country/history/belgium_from_1830/formation _federal_state/) Blenkinsop, P. and Bartunek, R. J. “Flemish Separatists are Big Winners in Belgian election”. Brussels, May 25, 2014. Reuters. Retrieved from

195 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/25/uk-belgium-election- idUKKBN0E50U520140525 Blom, J. C. H. and Lamberts E. (Ed.) (1999). History of the Low Countries. The Netherlands: Berghahn books.

Census Reports of India (1999) and (2001) Central Report of India, New Delhi: Government of India. Cameron, E. R. (2000). France and the economic development of Europe, 1800-1914. London: Rutledge. Cook, B. A. (2004). Belgium: A History. New York: Peter Lang Publishers. CIA World Fact Book, (2014). Retrieved at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.../ke.html Case, W. (1996). Elites and Regimes in Malaysia: Revisiting a Consociational Democracy. Clayton: Monash Asia Institute. Deschouwer, K. (2004). Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Belgium. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Eichengreen, B. Jeffery Frienden and Jurgen N. Hagen. (1995). Politics and Institutions in an Integrated Europe. Springer. USA Elazar, D. (1987). Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc. (1958-1999). Britannica Book of the Year (various volumes 1958-1999). Chicago. Faiz, A. (2015). Making Federation Work. Karachi: Oxford University Press, Pakistan. P313. Horowitz, J. (2009). Power-Sharing in Kenya. Paper for presentation at the Workshop on Political Inclusion in Africa, California University. Kothari. R. (1970). Politics in India. Boston: Little Brown. Kabanda, U. (2012). Consociationalism in Kenya. American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2012) Volume 2, No 1, pp 1-14. Kaiser, A. (1997). Types of Democracy: From Classical to New Institutionalism. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 9(4). 1997. 419-44. Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational Democracy. World Politics. 21 (2), 207-225. Lijphart, A. (1975). The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (2nd Ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press. Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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Lijphart, A. (1985). Power-Sharing in South Africa. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California. Lijphart, Arend. (1993). “Constitutional Choices for New Democracies”, in: Larry Diamond and Mark F. Platter, eds. The Global Resurgence of Democracy. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London. 146-58. Lijphart, A. (1995a). Multiethnic democracy. In Seymour Upset, (Eds.), the Encyclopedia of Democracy (853-65). Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc. Lijphart, A. (1995b). Self-determination versus pre-determination of ethnic minorities in power-sharing systems. In W. Kymlicka, (Eds.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (pp. 275-87). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lijphart, A. (1996). The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation. American Political Science Review. 90, 258-268. Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy. New York: Yale University Press. Lijphart, A. (2002).The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy. In A. Reynolds (Eds.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy (pp. 37-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lijphart, A. (2004). Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy. 15(2), 96-109.

Languages of Kenya, Ethnologue.com,http://www.ethnologue.com/country/KE Louis Vos, (1966). "Nationalism, Democracy and the Belgian State" in Richard Caplan and John Feffer, Europe's New Nationalism: States and Minorities in Conflict (Oxford, 1966). Pp.89-90. Liebman, M. (1966). The Crisis of Belgian Social Democracy. The Socialist Register 1966. pp. 44–65. Retrieved 26 November 2012.) Mehra, K. A. and Kueck, G. W. (Ed.). (2003). Indian Parliament: A Comparative perspective. Center for Public Affairs. Konard Publishers. Morlino, Leonardo. Nalysis. Paper presented at “The European Union, Nations State, and the Quality of Democracy, Lessons from Southern Europe.” University of California, Berkeley, October 31st - November 2nd 2002. Mehta, Piaray Lal. (1991). Constitutional Protection to Scheduled Tribes in India: In Retrospect and Prospects. Delhi: H. K. Publishers. Map, 2015, http://www.quirksmode.org/politics/kuyper.html) Noh, A. (2013). Malaysia And The Consociational Option: Is There a Path Dependent Logic? Working Paper# 2013/1, University of Abdul Razak.

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Okoth, A. and Ndaloh, A. (2006). Peak Revision K. C. P. E Social Studies. Nairobi: East African Publisher. African Study Center, http://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/kethnic.htm, Panandiker, P and Mehra, A. (1996). The Indian Cabinet and governance of India. New Delhi: Konark. Patak, B. (2010). Glimpses of Europe: A Crucible of Winning Ideas, Great Civilizations and Bloodiest Wars. Gyan Publishing House. Prasad, A. (1991). Reservation Policy and Practice in India. A Means to an End. New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publication. Pinder, J. (2007) „Introduction to Multinational Federations‟ in Burgess, M. and Pinder, J. (eds) Multinational Federations: Concept, Theory and Case Studies, London: Rutledge, pp. 1–13. Shumaker, (2010). The formative Years of Malaysian Politics. New York: Xlibris Corporation. Srinivasavarandan, T. C. A. (1992). Federal Concept: The Indian experience. New Delhi: Allied. Sani, M. A.M. (2009). The Emergence of New Politics in Malaysia: From Consociational To Deliberative Democracy. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5 (2): 97-125. Schama, Simon. (1972). "The Rights of Ignorance: Dutch Educational Policy in Belgium 1815-30,"History of Education,1(1), (1972), pp 81-89. Waituru, M. (2013) „Lessons from the Implementation of MDGs in Kenya: Options for a Post-2015 Framework‟, IDS Bulletin, 44.5-6, pp. 30-33. Retrieved at http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/2925/IDSB44%205- 6_Waituru_submitted.pdf?sequence=1

Wilkinson, S. (2002). Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence in Post-Independence India. APSA, Boston Willemyns, R. (1988) Belgium. In U. Ammon, N. Dittmar and K. Mattheier (eds). Sociolinguistics (pp. 1254–1258). Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter.

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Chapter-7

QUALITY DEMOCRACY FOR PAKISTAN: A COMPARATIVE

ANALYSIS OF MODEL CONSOCIATIONS AND PAKISTAN

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan faced a range of ethno-linguistic mobilization despite the fact that Islam is the basic ingredient of Pakistani society that abides strong sense of Muslim nationalism.

Soon after partition in 1947, the emerging state of Pakistan had to confront tasks of state formation, political instability and ethnic conflict. The quality of democracy was an issue of no concern at that time. However after seventy years of existence, the debate on quality of democracy should point out the proper institutionalization of state structure.

Several professionals have related the increase and decrease of ethno-linguistic activities with the flow of power-sharing, while various others have pointed out exclusion and proposed inclusion as a correcting mechanism1. Therefore, this issue is not unattended as political scientists are working on best possible solution of ethnic violence.

It has been detailed in previous chapter that the exclusive nature of Majoritarian Model and centralized federal system are reasons of ethnic conflicts in Pakistan, which functions like a unitary state because of practicing lowest criterion of a federation2. Subsequently, the absence of Consociational federalism has rightly been considered as the reason of incapability of Pakistani federation to control and accommodate its diversity phenomenon. Therefore, the feature of power-sharing of Consociationalism seems to be the right option to handle ethnic diversity in Pakistan. This thesis is not aiming to alter the existing governance system, but this section of the study would review the possible function of Consociationalism to develop consensus in Pakistan to manage its multiethnic and multilingual society. This evaluation will facilitate us to reveal the efficacy and utility of Consociationalism for Pakistan to cope with domestic violence and deliver quality democracy.

CONSOCIATIONALISM FOR DEVELOPING CONSENSUS IN

PAKISTAN

Since 2002, Pakistan is debating the theoretical grounds of Consociationalism after realizing that it needs politics of accommodation. Before 2002, it was neglected due to political history which is full of ethnic riots. Before partition, Muslims and Hindus of subcontinent had a different history. AIML opted for Consociational arrangements for securing Muslim rights (Adeney, 2002, 34), while Indian National Congress went for

Majoritarian set up. After partition, AIML adopted an opposite strategy in its constitution

200 and paved way for Majoritarianism in Pakistan. Afterwards, AIML adopted „One Unit‟ scheme to handle the numerical strength of Bengal. This detail has been given in previous chapters (3 and 4). But imposition of such arrangements led to political mobilization of smaller and alienated ethnic communities due to sense of deprivation and exclusive nature of Majoritarian-based federalism. Contrarily, India reorganized its states boundaries along linguistic lines.

The debacle of East Pakistan, despite having common and strong bond of Islam, and massacre in Bengal compelled many scholars to think that Majoritarianism is not addressing ethnic issues of Pakistan. According to McGarry and O‟Leary (2005, 64),

Pakistan needs to implement and retain Consociationalism at federal level. There is difference in approaches adopted by Pakistan and India after partition. India adopted relatively more inclusive strategy than Pakistan. This is a major reason that India remained successful to align its ethnic groups into a political system (Consociationalism) that brought political stability. But the absence of non-Consociational arrangements in

Pakistan resulted in political insecurity and instability (Adeney, 2007, 76).

Therefore, it is needed that Consociational mechanism should be implemented in

Pakistan that would deal with issues of heterogeneity to develop consensus over fundamental issues (Adeney, 2009, 43). The following section would address the question that if Majoritarianism is less satisfactory or incompatible, then how

Consociationalism is a better option to fill this gap and to develop consensus over fundamental issues due to be an inclusive governance model.

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The Pakistan movement was the strongest and successful movement of the 20th century that resulted in the partition of subcontinent into Pakistan and India. This movement was based on Muslim nationalism and Islam was supposed to be the strongest common bond between different nationalities of Muslims in various parts of

Subcontinent. Therefore, they got Pakistan in the name of Islam and „Two Nation

Theory”. But after partition, a number of “ethno-linguistic” movements emerged in

Pakistan which caused political mobilization based on feelings of political and social exclusion and anti-Punjabi resentments. Lack of power-sharing arrangements and political exclusion due to centralized/unitary state system are the major factors behind ethnic mobilization (this has been discussed in previous chapters in detail) while this chapter would evaluate the compatibility of Consociational democracy in Pakistan for generating political stability through developing consensus among important ethnic classes. The debate on adoption of Consociationalism in Pakistan has been around for more than a decade now.

By evaluating these suggestions, a recommendation can be developed to adopt

Consociationalism for a suitable period of time. This thesis is not aiming to replace the existing governance system of Pakistan with Consociationalism; The aim of the research is to diagnose the actual ailment and then suggesting some cure. For this purpose, it will explore the inclusive nature of Consociational democracy after discussing the

Majoritarianism as incompatible or less satisfactory to include the ethno-linguistic classes for political stability.

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FAVORABLE FACTORS OF CONSOCIATIONALISM AND THE

PLURAL SOCIETY OF PAKISTAN

Lijphart identify some favorable factors (as elaborated in chapter 2) necessary for establishing a sustainable Consociational government in a multiethnic society that would be harbinger of stability in political and social domains of a state. Therefore it is imperative to examine presence of these factors in Pakistani society to see if Pakistan has suitable grounds for the adoption of Consociationalism. For this purpose, comparison of

Pakistan would be made with other states where Consociational Model is working successfully. These factors varied from time to time and Lijphart, in his theoretical research work during 1969, 1977, 1985 and 1996, maintained a revised list of these factors. In his recent study in 1996, he identifies nine factors for Consociationalism that is discussed in subsequent part3.

1. Multiple Balance Of Power

The opening provision for maintaining Consociational mechanism in a state is that no segment should have an overriding majority in multiethnic society. Lebanon (194-75),

Cyprus (1960-63) and Ireland (1973-74) are examples in this regard that are supposed to be failed cases. These cases depict that major segments (Greeks in Cyprus and Protestant in Ireland) were responsible for the failure of Consociationalism in their respective states.

On the other side, Belgium and Switzerland sustained Consociational arrangements despite having major segmented societies i.e. “Flemish in Belgium and German-speaking

203 in Switzerland”, but these factions were further plural ideologically and religiously

(Lijphart, 1985, 120). This might be the reason of the success of Consociationalism there.

The same sort of reason contributes to the success of Consociational arrangement in India where despite the fact that Hindu majority is further plural and no major segment is dominant, it enjoyed political stability in early decades (Lijphart, 1996, 61). In recent past in Pakistan, Punjabis were the major and dominant faction but with passage of time, it was plural along ideological and territorial lines and many ethno-linguistic movements emerged (This has been discussed in previous chapters).

Moreover, the pending construction of Kalabagh dam proves that Punjab is no more a dominant segment in Pakistan. In comparison to India, Malaysia and Kenya, it too has no major segment to rule; the emergence of middle class and ideological shifts in Muslim majority state (different religious school of thought) in Pakistan has developed new horizons for the adoption of Consociationalism in Pakistan.

2. Groups of Equal Size and Multiparty System

According to Lijphart equal size of segments is more accommodating factor throughout the dialogue process for the institutionalization of Consociationalism into the state structure (Lijphart, 1985, 73). In Pakistan, apparently Punjabi group is one but all

Punjabis are not from the beneficial class of the Punjab4 (Singh and Talbot, 1996, 134).

After effecting division into proposed provinces along ethno-linguistic lines (Siraiki,

Bahawalpur, Potowar, Hindko belts) of Punjab, it is now likely to cut down the numerous strength of Punjab over other constituent units of Pakistan. Moreover, Punjabis are plural on the basis of class, sect and religious lines.

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In comparison with model consociations, its ethnic groups are not that much uneven as supposed, particularly in the background of different ethno-regional movements. This all generate almost equal sizes of segments in today‟s Pakistan. Secondly, all major segments of Pakistan have their relevant political parties to represent them. This multi- party system is also a helpful condition to represent these segments in grand coalition according to their proportionality. Therefore, Consociationalism may take and flourish roots deep inside the soil of Pakistani society.

3. Small Number of Segments

To pave way for an efficient Consociational set up in a multiethnic society, it is important to have ethno-lingual groups in small numbers5. Small number of segments is a supportive variable of Consociationalism for political stability. Large number of segments complicate the process of collaboration among segments and contribution of these segments in conciliation grow to be more complex as well (Lijphart 1977, 56-57).

At initial stages of evolution of Consociationalism, Lijphart recommended that existence of 3 or 4 segments are favorable for the arrangements (Lijphart, 1977, 51). But he increased the number in 1985 from 3 to 5. If we examine this factor in Pakistan, then it appears positive to adopt Consociational government. According to the last official census report 1998, the number of ethnic segments in Pakistan is six. But in Pakistan, as we have argued previously, the exact figure of ethno-linguistic groups is complex to mention.

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4. Small Population Size

Small population is a vital factor for sustainable Consociational arrangement as has been derived by Lijphart after studying the basic Consociational models of small

European countries (1977, 65). Small size of population has a great impact on the strength of grand coalition and smooth sailing of Consociational government by encompassing diverse segments into fruitful negotiation. Lijphart (1985, 123) justifies that small number of population is influential because the ethnic elites are more familiar with one another personally. Therefore the executive power-sharing is smoother and functional and the state does not need to rely on other powerful actors for domestic peace.

Indian case6 is surprising regarding this factor; it is considered the world‟s second largest nation by population, yet it is a successful democratic country while using few

Consociational arrangements. Pakistan has 6th position on the list of population density, the possibility of the success of Consociationalism cannot be ruled out.

Table 17: Five model countries with world ranking and population size S. No. World Ranking Model Countries Population (World Bank Data) Population Wise

1. 2 India 1,252,139,596 2. 7 Pakistan 182,142,594 3. 31 Kenya 44,353,691 4. 44 Malaysia 29,716,965 5. 84 Belgium 11,195,138

Source: Compiled by Author.

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5. External Threats

Presence of an „external threat(s)‟ is constructive when it generates coherent and cohesive bond in a nation to get it united to cope with threats. This can produce better grounds for the function of Consociationalism (Lijphart, 1996, 263). To justify this,

Lijphart refers the examples of the better ratio of expansion of Consociationalism in „the

Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland‟ for the period of two World Wars.

In case of Pakistan, threat from India endangered its internal peace permanently, but it also generated domestic coherence. During Pakistan Movement, Muslim political elites presented the Hindu domination as a threat to generate unity in Muslim nation successfully. After partition, Kashmir issue and some other overt and covert elements revived this danger from India. But, India is a permanent external threat7 (Shahzad, 2007,

220, Javed, 2007, 76). According to Marwah (1979, 13-14), the East Pakistan did not separate on the strength of indigenous movement but became successful because of the intervention of Indian army. After 9/11, the „War on Terror‟ brought in the terrorism factor into the borders of Pakistan that created external and internal threats. This scenario forcefully advocates the implementation of Consociationalism for building consensus and political stability.

6. Overarching Cleavages

Overarching loyalties‟ are considered to be the most important element of a nation.

They influence every part of a nation or segment. It is an important factor of

Consociational democracy. They possibly will function concurrently and might fabricate unity among all subcultures or a specific faction (Lijphart, 1977, 81-82).A mutual feeling

207 of coherence can be generated if the fragmentations among the groups are compensated by providing a common cleavage i.e. nationalism and religion etc. (Lijphart, 1985, 124).

In Pakistan, Muslims are in majority (96%); therefore Muslim nationalism and national language (Urdu) are considered overarching cleavages. Although separation of

East Pakistan raise a question on „two-nation theory‟ and common bond of Islam, but still

Pakistanis prefer Islam over ethnic distinctiveness8. It is a separate issue that they are exploited in the name of governance. This fact has been revealed in a survey which determined that 61% responded to prefer Islam in their first choice and 31% citizens opt it as second choice, while 29% preferred Pakistani identity as their first choice, 56% opted it as their second choice. This shows that that Islam and Pakistani nationalism are most favorite identities (Fair et. al., 2008, 78).

7. Socio-economic Equality

Economic and social stability of all segments are very important factors for establishment and sustaining of Consociationalism. Importance wise, Lijphart placed them at second position (Lijphart 1996, 262). But he amended it further as „roughly socio-economic inequality‟. This demonstrates flexibility in his view. The cooperation between elites is confronted with severe challenge if this equality is missing because deprived classes in coalition may emphasize the reallocation of resources that can fashion a “zero-sum game” (Andeweg, 2000, 522).

Socio-economic inequality widens the gap among groups that might jeopardize the feasibility and practicality of Consociational democracy. In Pakistani case, Punjab is considered the most developed province, comparatively. This province has been given

208 attention since the colonial times when British government facilitated Punjab more for its exploitative designs. But all Punjabis are not benefitted in Punjab (Singh and Talbot,

1996, 213). Although other constituent units are also provided budget, but that is either insufficient to meet all the needs of the provinces or is not utilized properly. This badly affects the running of the governance mechanism smoothly.

Therefore, the unequal socio-economic conditions of groups is very visible in Pakistan but this can be overcome with providing proper participation and representation to elites of all segments in executive power-sharing. In parallel to this inequality, data on fiscal decentralization in Pakistan reveals that it meets the maximum criteria.

8. Regional Concentration of Groups

Viable Consociational arrangements demand the regional concentration of ethnic groups. It will make ethno-linguistic reorganization easy. Lijphart (1977, 88) argues that the territorial limitation generates lesser mutual interaction between different segments that can mitigate the chances of violence between multiethnic groups. Pakistan meets this factor because boundaries are already fixed according to the concentration of ethno- linguistic segments although a slight diffusion of Punjabis and Pakhtun exists9.

Therefore, Pakistani societal norms regarding this factor are compatible with

Consociationalism. Regional autonomy is the most desired thing by these segments

(Nayak, 1994, 206) and this group concentration would be helpful to grant them more segmental autonomy.

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9. Traditions of Elite Accommodation

This factor is feasible for the swift relief associated with Consociational democracy

(Lijphart, 1996, 263). The positive participation and contribution of political elites in executive power-sharing can have the benefit of constant elected regimes even living in a multiethnic state (Lijphart, 1977, 99-100). The region of South Asia has yet to develop this sense of accommodation that is absent at present.

The partition of Indian Subcontinent in 1947 was mainly due to the lack of dispute resolution mechanism and non-consensual behavior over constitutionalism. Furthermore in 1971, same sort of power-sharing and autonomy issues resulted into the dismemberment of Pakistan. Even after this carnage, Pakistani elites remained in dispute over sharing of power and the transient tripartite accord between ruling party and opposition in early 1970s and the instable decade of 1988 to 1999 are examples of this disagreement10. However, the politics of accommodation and compromise emerged during Musharraf period. The reluctant President Musharraf surrendered power to elected civilian leaders, made them united latter, and consequently, the leading political elites, specifically Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, agreed over the restoration of democracy in 2006 by signing a pact popularly known as „Charter of Democracy‟ or

Misaq-i-Jamohuriat. This was the era when the debate on Consociationalism started in

Pakistan.

After the death of Benazir Bhutto in 2007, the PPP chairman Asif Ali Zardari and

Nawaz Sharif honored this pact during 2007-2013. Though the era from 1971-2001 was not stable politically, the events that occurred in the first decade of the new century augur

210 well for the cultivation of a tradition of compromise and political accommodation into the soil of multiethnic Pakistani society.

Moreover, the situation after 2013 general elections and recent „sit-in‟ politics by

Imran Khan (Chairman Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) and Tahir-ul-Qadri (chairman Pakistan

Awami Tehreek) reminded the same leg-pulling episode of the politics of 1990s. The failure of sit-ins proved that political elites are getting united for the sake of political stability. Moreover, many APCs were held on different issues i.e. passing anti-terrorism act, electing Chairman Senate during the Senate elections 2015, to address concerns of provincial government of Baluchistan, construction of Pak-China Economic corridor and many others, were passed unanimously as efforts to build mutual consensus bear fruit.

Hence this factor is also establishing Pakistan as a suitable case for Consociationalism.

Comparative Analysis of Favorable Factors in Model Consociations and

Pakistan

For this study Belgium, India, Malaysia and Kenya are the model countries where

Consociationalism is working and they would be compared with Pakistan.

Pakistan has ethno-linguistic diversity comparable to these four states. Among them,

Kenya is a fit case to discuss suitability of Consociationalism. It has about 70 indigenous and non-indigenous ethno-lingual groups; 15 among them are considered as major groups

(African Study Center; Makoloo, 2005, 75). By population, it comes at number 31 (see

Table) after India and Pakistan. It has external threat of terrorist group Al-Shabab (like

Pakistan is facing from India; Malaysia from Indonesia (Lijphart, 1977, 154); India from

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China and Pakistan and Belgium in the past from Germany). There is wide-spread socio- economic inequality11.

The ethnic groups are geographically concentrated in Kenya. The agreement of 2008 demonstrates a compromise and accommodation the success of which depends on the elites‟ role. The majority (83%) of population confess Christianity that provides them an overarching cleavage. There is no major dominant group in Kenya that can be harmful to

Consociational arrangements (Christian majority is further plural into other school of thoughts). Hence Kenya meets 7 out of 9 favorable factors of Consociationalism, like

India.

Pakistan is the 7th largest country by population, the 2nd after India It is a case that according to Lijphart it is not a deviant case of Consociationalism because it fulfills 7 out of 9 favorable factors of Consociationalism (as has been discussed earlier in this chapter).

According to Dhal and Tufte (1973, 40), those small populations are very crucial for better function of democratic institutions. But to justify Indian democracy that is still sustaining, Weiner (1989, 5-6) says the reason of this marvelous success is the federal and power-sharing system. This way, it can be rightly assumed that large population size affects smooth sailing of power-sharing arrangements but after certain limit of size, it reverses.

In Pakistan, Muslims as religious group and Punjabi as ethnic group are supposed as dominant and majority. But these are further plural (as noticed in chapters 3 and 4) on the basis of caste and sect. Same is the case with India where Hindus are the dominant segment. The success story of Malaysia is not much different from India. Malays are in

212 fair majority but the Malay elites are willing to compromise and accommodate other ethnic groups in power-sharing. It has no dominant group, has small number of groups, and small size of groups with overarching cleavages and sense of accommodation but with economic and social disparities. Though it had not any potential external threat but it was dismembered in 1965 and lost Singapore and other important parts. In the past it had some confrontations with Indonesia (1963-65) and experienced some level of internal insurgency.

Belgium is one of basic Consociational model. There is no need to say that it fulfills the criteria of the best example of a consociation. Despite having political stability, it has to face some constitutional reforms too as has been discussed in previous pages in this chapter and in chapter 7.

In Malaysia like Kenya, India and Pakistan, political arrangements were initiated by the colonial powers in late 1940 and afterwards tried to destroy it too. But the alliance partners in political coalitions remained united. According to Lijphart (1977, 150-157), the reason of Malaysian success was adherence to the rule of proportionality. It was initiated by Malay and Chinese leaders in 1950s and was jolted by Indians in 1955.

Malaysian ethnic segments are not geographically bound, but still enjoying autonomy.

Contrarily, Malaysia is a highly centralized state and electoral system is based on old

British FPTP. After 1971, quality of democracy decreased in Malaysia but it was working.

About British India, Adeney (2003, 45) argues that pre-partition politics of INC and

British policies were Consociational and communal regulations–based, like the Cripps

213 mission, Nehru Report etc. But the British colonial administration was not consistent in its policies. The politics of INC was Consociational-based. However the AIML opted for unitary state system, centralization and Majoritarian Model as British used them before to exploit subcontinent and AIML went for separation through „Two Nation Theory”. After partition, INC kept its policies forward consociationally, but in Pakistan the Muslim

League politics and ideological flaw worsened the situation (see discussion on Jinnah‟s speeches, in coming pages). Pakistan was a diverse nation and it was felt by Jinnah himself after partition. This new ground reality is well-depicted in his speeches and addresses to the nation.

After studying these four model countries, it is right to say that Pakistan is not a deviant case and would not be in near future12. In Pakistan like India, the Indian Act-1935 was implemented as interim constitution of Pakistan. According to Adeney (2003, 95), this act was Majoritarian in nature. First constitution of 1956 behooved much of the

Majoritarian nature although Muslim League put forward same strategy adopted in pre- partition India (Adeney, 2003, 97). Before partition, Muslims feared they would be treated as minority if British left without partitioning India. But after partition, Muslims turned into majority, therefore preferences changed. In the constitution of 1956, provisions of separate electorate (during Zia era too see Ziring, 1980, 211-212) and reserved seats were incorporated, but minority veto was not envisioned constitutionally.

The third important feature, language and linguistic reorganization of regions/provinces, was ignored. The One Unit Scheme and efforts to transform West

Pakistan from four heterogeneous provinces into a single homogeneous province was resisted by Bengalis that resulted into dismemberment of the counrty13.

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There was a pragmatic and paradigmatic shift in Jinnah‟s views about Muslim state.

According to Kaura (1977, 55) and Dove (1987, 89), Jinnah sought coalition setting with

INC. Adeney (2003, 98) says that, after Partition, Jinnah favored and articulated

Consociational arrangements in Pakistan. He declared that

“…minorities to whichever community they may belong will be

safeguarded. Their religion or faith or belief will be secured...they will be,

in all respects, the citizens of Pakistan without any distinction...”

(For detail see Z. H. Zaidi, 1996, 1003; Sondy, 2014, 32; Mukherjee,

2011, 54)

In all three constitutions, religious rights of minority and their personal laws were protected but they were not given equal status with Muslims. Islam was declared state religion and Pakistani and Muslim identity were considered as synonyms (Choudhry,

1969, 103). But Jinnah believed in federalism as his speech on10th December, 1945 depicts. He said that

Our Pakistani government will probably be a Federal Government

modeled on the lines of autonomous provinces, with the key powers in

matters of defense and foreign affair, etc. at the Centre (Ahmed, 1990, 56).

After partition, while addressing the first Constituent assembly on 11th August, 1947, he said that;

215

We are all citizens and equal citizens of one state….Now I think we

should keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in course

of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be

Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of

each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.

(Moller, U. and Schierenbeck, I, 2014, 78; Quaid-i-Azam

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Governor General of

Pakistan, 1947-1948, 18; Pakistan Vision, 2001, (Quaid-i-

Azam Number) Vol. II (1 and 2).

According to Muhammad Munir (1979, 29), state structure in view of the Quaid-i-

Azam‟s speeches, was an inclusive democratic government. Sonia Malik (12, August

2012, The Tribune) and Maleeha Lodhi (2011, 116) also hold the same views about

Jinnah‟s decision about the nature of Pakistani federalism. Quaid-e-Azam wanted a pluralist and inclusive state structure for Pakistan, instead of present state of affair.

This paradigmatic difference depicted in Jinnah‟s views and speeches about nature of a separate state for Muslims, when he recognized the issue of diversity in Pakistan before and right after partition, should be observed as well (Burki, 1991). This useful and huge debate on the versions of speeches delivered by Jinnah on different occasions before partition and right after partition is definitely for the betterment of Pakistan14. But for this purpose, we need consensus first, that is the very first prerequisite of democracy (Batool,

2014).

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In Pakistan, Islam was declared as state religion (but was manipulated for seeking self-interests by a specific elite group) (Aftab, 1986, 27-28), and in Islam ethnic identities are irrelevant. Provincialism and ethnic identities were seen as evil and declared prohibited (Nayak, 1984, 192). The leaders of the Pakistan Muslim League (AIML renamed as PML after partition) who favored Urdu to be national language of Pakistan, were mainly from Calcutta (Central India and Urdu speaking region) (Talbot, 2000, 148) and Urdu has no basis in post-partitioned Pakistan (Burki, 1991). The denial of regional claims for recognition was always going to create tensions and the inequality in access to state resources only exacerbated it. Pakistan's strategy in relation to language has fluctuated over time (Masood, 1970, 63).

With reference to ethnicity and language issues, practice of Pakistani federalism questions the rationality of the ethnic conflicts; and so regulations were adopted to manage diversity. Muslim nationalism has been challenged many a times in Pakistan.

Brass (1994, 195-196) states that in India, after rise of Indera Gandhi in 1960s and then

BJP in 1980s, religion was used as a tool of political mobilization as was done in

Pakistan right after partition in1947. In Pakistan, the concept of Islamic state failed to accommodate all Muslims equally. Muslim League could not translate the blueprint of an

Islamic state into an overarching identity that was used once for mass mobilization for

Pakistan Movement (Ziring, 1980). After partition, the integrationist strategy of PML turned into a segregationist one, regarding control over the East Wing and suppression of ethnic mobilization in West Pakistan. This affected the federal capacity to provide accommodation to ethno-linguistic groups. In post-1971 Pakistan, though government tried to settle linguistic grievances, but un-proportion representation of constituent

217 nationalities was visible in public institutions as seen in the civil-military bureaucracy (as has been discussed in chapter 3 and 4 in details). In comparison to India, Pakistan refused ethno-linguistic identities which consistently led to political instability while India recognized regional languages in executive institutions that brought stability to Indian state (Adeney, 2003).

As has been narrated before, multi-ethnicity was not accepted and provincialism was seen as evil in Pakistan. But a single thread of Islam could not keep the Pakistani nation united. After creation of Pakistan, a vigorous national movement emerged in East

Pakistan. In this background, Hewitt (1997) says that during suppression of East Pakistan separation Movement, about 1,000, 000 to 3,000,000 Bengalis were killed and

10,000,000 refugees were stranded on both sides of borders. This all questioned the very basis of Muslim nationalism and brotherhood. After this disaster, Pakistani federalism refused to meet ethnic requirements and Baluchi separation movement occurred in the

1970s (Hewitt, 1996, Talbot, 1998, 226).

In the 1980s, according to Vali Nasr (2001, 169), Muhajir identity was created; in

1996, MQM came out as leading Muhajir party to start a movement for an independent

Muhajir province consisting parts of Sindh province. About 2000 causalities were recorded in the outcome of Sindhi-Muhajir ethnic conflict (detail has been mentioned in chapter 4).

The separation of East Pakistan is a testament to the fact that ethno-lingual suppression, or an apparent homogeneous society, does not entail development of a smooth federal mechanism. The incorporation of ethno-linguistic classes at central level

218 and their protection within a homogeneous state are also important. It can be achieved through ethno-linguistic reorganization that is the basic tool of Consociationalism.

In Pakistan, ethno-linguistic classes were not recognized besides their underrepresentation in public institutions. Moreover, schemes like One Unit Plan further undermined the essence of federalism by putting minor ethno-linguistic groups under domination of Punjab. In the past, regional parties were entangled in conflicts with their rival parties and against the center. This lack of cooperation and accommodation benefitted center to take advantage in form of concentration of more power.

According to Lijphart, the role of political and ethnic elites is very important for political stability (Lijphart, 1977, 1). This accommodative behavior can generate a smooth mechanism for policy-making and implementations. This accommodative politics15 is very visible in the basic models of Consociationalism which is a secret of success of countries practicing it (Lijphart, 1977, 99-103). In Pakistani history, many accords were signed and practiced but unfortunately they were short-lived. This shows that political and ethnic elites of Pakistan have at least a tendency and willingness to develop some sort of consensus. The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, is gradually proceeding towards accommodative politics; since 2000s this trend is getting clearer.

Europe got unity in diversity after spending hundreds of years in turmoil. Therefore,

Pakistan is not a deviant case regarding its shaky political development. The era of

Bhutto in the wake of the tripartite accord of 1972, the decade of the coalition politics

(1988-99) after General Zia-ul-Haq, the Pact of democracy between Nawaz Sharif and

Late Benazir Bhutto (2006), and the period after General Musharraf concerning power-

219 sharing measures between PML-N and PPP16 can be categorized as gradual developments on accommodative path.

The level of ethnicity in a society has been considered as an important variable for the viability of Consociationalism. Lijphart emphasized Consociationalism as a genuine solution for a plural society. The multiethnic states from third world were cautioned for their pathetic domestic circumstances and advised to opt for Consociationalism instead of

Majoritarian Model given by colonial powers. These two models of democracy require different levels of pluralism in society. The Majoritarian Model is more likely to be compatible in a homogeneous society (Lijphart, 1977, 238), while the probability of its success decreases if a society is plural. Conversely, no model guarantees peace in an excessively plural society.

However, Consociationalism is supposed to be a possible panacea for multiethnic societies that try to fill this theoretical vacuum by asserting that peace and consensus can be developed in multiethnic societies through elite incorporation (Lijphart, 1977, 237-

38). Mehra and Kueck (2003, 3) argue that Majoritarian Model generates clear winners and clear losers. That is why it cannot cope with minor ethnic groups. In short,

Majoritarianism suits homogeneous countries rather than plural societies. Consensual

Consociational democracy is more suitable to heterogeneous societies like Pakistan. The model being practiced in Belgium resembles Consociational democracy. In fact, consensual model is supplementary to Majoritarian Model and both can work together.

This supplementary model is successfully working in Malaysia and India.

220

In this background, Pinder (2007, 8) and Watts (1996) suggest that the rigid and despotic attitude of leadership towards power-sharing is the main reason for the failure of federations in different regions of the world. According to Pinder (2007), a hegemonic group can smash the real concept of federal system. The dominance of Punjab over smaller constituents of Pakistan is an obvious reason for the failure of federalism in

Pakistan (Bhattacharyya, 2010). This is why the debate on creation of new provinces in

Pakistan is not new; at present political elites and intelligentsia is talking very vigorously about the division of Punjab to cut down its dominant position17.

CONCLUSION

In examination of the diverse societies of Kenya, Malaysia, India and Belgium, it can be concluded that these model countries are as complex as Pakistani society and these countries are considered the success stories of Consociationalism. Indian case is the nearest one to Pakistan. Though various governments in different eras tried theoretically to address the ethnic grievances through different measures in Pakistan, but such measures were never practically implemented. This proves that Pakistan needs such a political arrangement that can motivate and keep ethnic and political elites active to pursue good and pragmatic policies for their respective communities through accommodative politics and process of reconciliation. The best of this can be achieved through Consociational arrangements. This can either be entrenched in the federal constitution of Pakistan through unanimously accepted amendments or can be practiced otherwise.

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End Note

1. For example scholars like Tahir Amin emphasis on the centralized nature of federalism of Pakistan as a reason of ethnic mobility and on the other hand, scholars like Katherine Adeney states that the remedy is Consociational arrangements in Pakistan and absence of Consociational mechanism is the reason of ethnic mobilization. 2. Pakistan meets the minimum criteria of a federation because of Majoritarian system that is not supplemented with Consensual Model. The theoretical perspectives have been elaborated in chapter 2 and the nature of Constitution 1973 has been explained in Chapter 3. To develop this debate for implication of favorable factors of Consociational democracy on Pakistan, I took help from Lijphart‟s article, The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: The Consociational Interpretation. (1996). American Political Science Review, Vol. 90 (2). 4. See Singh, G. and Talbot, I. (1996) Punjabi Identity: Continuity and Change. New Delhi. Mahnor Publishers. 65-87. 5. According to Lijphart (1977), 3-5 segments are ideal for the smooth mechanism while two groups create “minority-majority split” therefore they are not favorable. It is understandable in the background of four small and basic consociations of Europe. But outside of Europe, societies are more complicated and deeply divided. 6. See Lijphart, A. (1996). The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation. American Political Science Review. 90, 258-268. 7. See K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan and Terrorism: A summary, CRS Report for congress .specialist in Asian affairs 8. See Smruti S. Pattanaik, Islam and the Ideology of Pakistan, strategic analysis, Vol. 22, Issue 9, December 1998, pp: 1273-1295. 9. See end note 22. 10. Three accords are important regarding political history of Pakistan. 11. On the first factor, Pakistan receives apparently unfavorable rating because it has a dominant Punjabi community but all Punjabi are not benefited and they are further divided on caste and language moreover in comparison of India, Kenya and Malaysia it is less unfavorable. Malaysia, India, Kenya and Belgium have major and dominant segments but they are considered successful consociations. On the second factor, it also receives neither favorable nor unfavorable rating due to unequal size of its segments but again in comparison of four model countries this is less unfavorable. On the third factor, it has though six segments but this division is not empirically proved because of visible further division. On the fourth factor, it gets apparently unfavorable rating because it is world‟s 7th populous country but in comparison of successful democratic India it is less populous. On the fifth factor, it receives a favorable rating because of its security concerns. On the sixth factor, it receives a favorable rating because Islam is a unifying force in Pakistan. On the seventh factor, it receives an unfavorable rating because its ethno-lingual segments have uneven socio-economic equality but comparison with India, Malaysia and Kenya demonstrates it as an irrelevant factor

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at initial stages. On the eighth factor, it gets a favorable rating because more or less ethno-linguistic groups are geographically concentrated. On the ninth factor, it obtains favorable rating. 12. Before One-Unit Scheme (from 1947 to 1955 when it was imposed), there were 12 provinces were considered in Pakistan. In Pakistan many commission were established for demarcations of provinces for creating new one like Ansari Commission in era of General Zia and now Committee of demarcation of provinces. National Defense University has conducted a very useful survey and suggested for 15 provinces in Pakistan (khalil Ahmed Nanitalwala, Daily Jang, 26 Oct, 2014). For more detail see book Soobay Kyun Zaroori Hain (Why Provinces are Necessary?) by Khalil Ahmed Nanitalwala. 13. The debate on inclusion of Quaide-Azam‟s speeches as a preamble or part of the Constitution of 197 has begun in Pakistan. The document said “…The resolution said Quaid-i-Azam‟s vision of Pakistan was enlightened, moderate, democratic, federalist, pluralist, tolerant and inclusive of all religious, ethnicities and the people of all shades and classes, poor, women and minorities in particular…” for more detail see Dawn Newspaper, 14th August 2015. Retrieved at http://www.dawn.com/news/1200378/lawmakers-urged-to-make- quaids-vision-preamble-to-constitution 14. The debate on inclusion of Quaid‟s speeches as a preamble or part of constitution has begun in Pakistan. The document said “…The resolution said Quaid-i-Azam‟s vision of Pakistan was enlightened, moderate, democratic, federalist, pluralist, tolerant and inclusive of all religious, ethnicities and the people of all shades and classes, poor, women and minorities in particular…” for more detail see Dawn newspaper, 14th August 2015. Retrieved at http://www.dawn.com/news/1200378/lawmakers-urged-to-make- quaids-vision-preamble-to-constitution 15. Lijphart used the term of accommodation in the sense of settlement of decisive issues and conflicts where only a minimal consensus exists. 16. Reconciliation is gradually emerging in Pakistani politics examples are some above narrated accords though transient. At the start of the millennium the Accord of Democracy and Bhurban declaration between PML-N-PPP was an extension of Misaq-e-Jamohuriat. This agreement clauses the continuation of a democratic government with a coalition with full support of all partied to the nominated candidate from PPP for the position of the prime minister. It was agreed that the post of speaker and the deputy speaker of the national assembly would be reserved for the PPP while the speaker and the deputy speaker of the Punjab assembly would be reserved for the PML-N. PML-N was given space in federal government and PPP in Punjab government alternatively (The News International, Sunday, March 09, 2008) and more recently PML-N-PTI reconciliation process is in betterment of Pakistan. 17. See end note 20.

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Nayak, P. (1984). Pakistan: society and politics. University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, South Asian Publishers. 22-196. Nasr, S. Vali (2001). "The Negotiable State: Borders and Power Struggles in Pakistan", In Rightsizing the state: the politics of moving borders. B. O'Leary, I. Lustick and T. Callaghy, (Eds.) Oxford, OUP: pp. 168-200. African Study Center, http://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/kethnic.htm, Pinder, J. (2007) „Introduction to Multinational Federations‟ in Burgess, M. and Pinder, J. (eds) Multinational Federations: Concept, Theory and Case Studies, London: Rutledge, pp. 1–13. Sondy, A. D. (2014).The Crisis of Islamic Masculinities. New York: Bloomsbury. Stafford, Geoffrey S. D. 1997. "Malaysia's new economic policy and the global economy: The evolution of ethnic accommodation." The Pacific Review 10 (4):556 - 80. Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Ann Thelen. 2005. Beyond continuity : institutional change in advanced political economies. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Shahzad, A. (2007). The Issues of Ethnicity in Pakistan (1972-85). HEC: Islamabad. Singh, G. and Talbot, I. (1996) Punjabi Identity: Continuity and Change. New Delhi. Mahnor Publishers. P.65-87. Tendi, B. M. 2010. The Westminster Model Failed Africa, the Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/may/19/africa-colonies-british- parliament-reform Talbot, I. (2002). The Punjabization of Pakistan: Myth or Reality? In C. Jaffrelot, (Eds.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation (pp.51-62). London: Zed Books Ltd. Wheare, K. C. (1964). Federal Government. New York: Oxford University Press,

Watts, R. L. (1996) Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s. Kingston: Queen‟s McGill University Press. Ziring L. (1980). Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, Westview Press, Colorado, Praeger Publishers. Zaidi, Z. H. (1996). Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers. Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan.

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Chapter-8

A CRITIQUE ON THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN:

FINDINGS OF THE DATA TAKEN FROM ELECTRONIC AND

PRINT MEDIA OF PAKISTAN

INTRODUCTION

It is obvious that current governance system of Pakistan is not working satisfactorily.

It is not addressing the provincial grievances and issues of exclusion of ethnic and linguistic classes. Hence the thesis is not aiming to replace it with other models i.e.

Consociationalism. The research intends to evaluate compatibility of Consociationalism with Pakistani society. The previous chapter is based on this effort. The conclusion discovered that it can be a possible solution of current social and political problems of Pakistan. Pakistan needs to develop consensus, at least, over very basic issues that is the very essence of democracy. The case of India also demonstrates that the

Consociationalism can be used for a specific time period to develop consensus; afterwards Pakistan can revert to Majoritarian Model.

In this chapter, the public opinion of the members of every walk of life i.e. members of civil society, politicians, political scientists and economists is included. The channel of these opinions is media (electronic and print). Media is a vibrant pillar of democracy, and through a positive role, it can bring some constructive transformation in society and further enhance political maturity in Pakistan. This chapter includes eight talk shows on very important and sensitive topics and participants have enough expertise to discuss them. The second criterion is opinion and Op-ed pages of mainstream newspapers where youth, seasoned political scientists and lawyers etc. share their opinions on various issues

Pakistan faces. Media is a watch-dog for quality democracy and in developed countries government uses it to play an decisive role to aware public about their betterment before introducing reforms (Kuo, 2014). Pakistani media is very vibrant and hopefully showing that Pakistan is passing through reformation era where public is getting awarded gradually but positively of their betterment through dialogues and debates.

Therefore, these channels can be considered a nationally representative sample so far.

It can be noted that everyone is talking about the incompatibility of the Majoritarian

Model with Pakistani society because of a heap of governance problems. They are talking about reforms and moreover building of consensus among various political parties, elites and ethnic and linguistic classes.

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Through talk shows and newspapers‟ opinion pages, the central question to be addressed in this chapter that ethnic and linguistic divisions of Pakistani society are not considered to be given equal representation in its political structure. We are assuming that the federal form of government (like Majoritarian Model) is likely to be incompatible with societal divisions.

METHODOLOGY OF THE CHAPTER

The methodology in this chapter includes data collection from media (electronic and print) to support hypothesis and draw recommendations/conclusions. Through talk shows, newspapers based public and elites are depicting their opinions on governance system of Pakistan and recommending necessary reforms in it. This research aims to observe the incompatibility of the Majoritarianism in Pakistani society.

ELECTRONIC MEDIA (TELEVISION TALK SHOWS)

1. Talk Show: Aaj ki Baat Channel: Din TV Date: 14th March, 2015 Topic: Would consensual politics and reconciliation lead the country to development and unity of nation bring peace in society? Host: Dr. Saeed Elahi, Participants: 1. Khalid Rasul Maqbool (Analyst) 2. Dr. Aasimullah Bakhsh (Analyst) 3. Brig. (R) Nadir Mir (Analyst)

All participants were of the view that though mudslinging is a common trend in politics everywhere, consensus and reconciliation is the only way to development.

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Political parties have to quit their own politics and think about federation first. In

Pakistan, MQM, Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) are working for electoral reforms. Power politics is a cruel game. But if any party acts out of the way, then through legal means it should be questioned, trailed and taken on board.

Brig. Nadir Mir said that we have to initiate uniform policies and use them across the board. The grievances of the smaller provinces should be addressed properly. Equal justice is needed. We as a nation have developed consensus against violence and terrorism.

Khalid Rasul Maqbool was of the view that politics and state have their own peculiar paradigms and dynamics but when politicians are given power to make and execute decisions, they take it equal to the level of a state‟s capacity. We need a system that would consider public welfare as top priority. Conduct of elections and politics in

Pakistan has become a money game. The source of funding in elections should be traced and elections‟ expenditures and financial status of a candidate should be scrutinized. The record from ECP can be helpful regarding this issue. Interest groups remained involved in and with the passage of time it became a routine matter and turned into political culture afterwards.

Interestingly, Dr. Saeed Elahi questioned that all political parties can develop consensus over night to pass 21st amendment (anti-terrorism act) and for senate elections because of their own party interests, but for the sake of public interest they never do so.

We often talk about hurdles and delay in public/welfare projects due to lack of material and resources but to develop consensus no material or resources are needed. They need a

230 sitting to negotiate. So, what is the problem behind this lack of efforts to develop a mutual national consensus?

Dr. Aasimullah Bakhsh elaborated that existence of an absolute consensus in power politics is a utopia because it cannot exist. But if we are hell to neck then you use other subjects like sit-in politics or horse-trading. To manipulate, destabilize or exploit democratic governments by using these tactics, is not fair. This makes big players hostages. Consensus and reconciliation are the most admirable way to the extent it is achievable. Government can change the fate of common people through appointments.

Dr. Elahi questioned that how governments can change fate of their common people through appointments? About 150 countries around the world are passing through the same circumstances as Pakistan.

Dr. Aasimullah Bakhsh proceeded that intent is important to show your concern through proper appointments of people who execute system. Selection of a team is important. It has some tools i.e. competency (in cabinet positions and integrity) and most of the developing countries, like Pakistan, are lacking in having its letter of intent and its important applicators.

Dr. Elahi stated that there are two sides of a picture of reconciliation and understanding; from political standpoint it is good. The second side is self-interest of political parties and politicians and that should be surrendered before national interest.

Recently, PM stated that with consensus, the chairman and deputy chairman of national assembly will be elected.

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Khalid Rasul Maqbool stated that political parties should not use seat power for pursuing self-interests as happened in the case of Chairmanship of Islamic Ideology

Council that was given to Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F), but which proved unfruitful.

Dr. Elahi raised another issue; how the strategy of the continuation of public projects can be developed because every new government usually halts the process of ongoing projects initiated by previous government?

Khalid Rasul Maqbool stated that there are some very important pacts like the Charter of Democracy (COD). This should be implemented for the continuation of democracy.

To keep check and balance over interruption in democratization, parties have to develop consensus and pacts like COD should be formulated. Few days ago, , the federal finance minister has given a proposal to develop a unanimously accepted economic agenda with mutual consensus of every political party that would be pursued regardless of which party comes in power. India has recently experienced such a national economic agenda but we have trust deficit as compared to India. We need to produce political discourse and maintain merit while political misunderstandings and disputes should be resolved with mutual consensus without publicizing or highlighting it.

Dr. Aasimullah Bakhsh said that when a national achievement is secured, its credit should be mutually distributed rather than using it for political purposes. This will enhance environment of goodwill and compromise among parties and society. For this purpose, he quoted the event of the inaugural ceremony of Multan airport where Prime

Minister Sharif credited only PPP for this success while it was a national achievement.

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Dr Elahi concluded the session and stated that despite having party rivalries, our leaders should pursue national interests through consensus.

2. Talk Show: Naya Pakistan with Talat Hussain Channel: Geo TV, Date: 8th March 2015. Topic: Senate Elections and distribution of seats Host: Talat Hussain Participants: 1. Rubina Khalid (Senator, affiliation PPP) 2. Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo (Senator Baluchistan, President National Party)

Talat Hussain opened the debate with some details about chairmanship of Senate where a total of 46 seats were needed. PML-N and PPP are two major parties; PPP has majority in Senate and if chairman is from PPP then vice chairperson could be from

Baluchistan. PML-N will announce chairman after conducting a dialogue with other parties. Participants showed their concern over senate elections and remarked that who will be the chairman of Senate?

Rubina Khalid discussed the negative patterns of politics in Senate and pointed out that parties do not legislate because they wait for Senate elections to get majority so they can legislate according to their interests. For this purpose horse-trading occurs even in

Senate elections.

Talat Hussain regretted that these two seats (chairman and vice chairmanship) do not offer perks and privileges and political parties should not play foul for acquiring majority in upper house to get these seats. Instead of this, members should sit together and develop consensus for legislation over crucial and sensitive issues. A possible coalition of two

233 major parties is under way to evaluate parties‟ seats (after few days the APC met and

Raza Rabani (PPP) was elected as chairman senate and Molana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri

(JUI-F Baluchistan) was elected as vice chairman.)

Table 18: Coalition of Political Parties in Senate after Senate election 2015 Possible coalition of PML-N Seats Possible coalition of PPP Seats PML-N 24 PPP 27 ANP 3 MQM 8 PKMAP 3 ANP 7 PML-Functional 1 PML-Q 4 Independent 6 Total 37 Total 46 Source: Talk Show, Naya Pakistan with Talat Hussain

Bizenjo stated that as an individual, he is a nationalist and because his party has few seats in Senate, therefore he has no hope to be elected as chairman Senate. He was of the view that statehood is different from politics. To develop federalism, consensus is crucial.

A party in majority should sacrifice for other parties. These parties have potential and can do a lot of tasks for the betterment of federation. They all made the 18th amendment possible and reconciled after PTI‟s sit-in and these two parties PML-N and PPP are major and mainstream parties. If they turned positive then they can do wonders. Alternatively, they can create problems as happened in KP and Baluchistan. But now the situation is getting better in Baluchistan and they came to this forum after competing elections.

Before 2013, in previous elections Baluchistan had to face 70% horse-trading but for the first time establishment remained neutral in Baluchistan. Therefore we can say that subjects are developing but still horse-trading is a common trend. Political parties should not act like franchises; instead they should give positive political and democratic incentives to attract candidates. Major parties have reliance on minor parties. Therefore

234 they should adopt inclusive politics. A unanimously accepted legislation and reform is needed to be introduced to stop this sort of situation again.

3. Talk Show: Capital Talk, Channel: Geo TV Date: 31st March 2015, Topic: Future of Quaid-e-Azam’s Pakistan Host: Hamid Mir Participants: 1. Dr. Tahir Amin (Political Scientist, Professor, Political Science department QAU, Director national institute of Pakistan Studies) 2. Dr. Masood Akhtar (Professor, history department QAU)

Hamid Mir opened the session and asked about the reasons of ongoing problems in

Pakistan and their possible solutions.

Dr. Tahir Amin responded in this connection that current direction of Pakistani politics is 180 degree opposite to the given perception of Quaid-e-Azam. If we observe our current situation, we can notice failure on every level i.e. political, economic, and social. We have to rethink intellectually that how we can drive Pakistan to that particular direction envisioned by Quaid and leadership of the Pakistan movement. According to

Amin, the major setback is lack of institutionalization of political system. Four military governments hindered development of political institutions. First military rule disintegrated Pakistan; then Zia‟s Islamization to legitimatize his rule initiated further negative tendencies. No one is taking provincial matters seriously. Inappropriate policy making of previous 20-25 years has distracted us from the right path and direction.

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Dr. Masood Akhtar stated that the current failure has multiple reasons. We could not develop an identity as a nation-state. As a result of biased British demarcation award,

Pakistan constituted the most backward areas of India which had no infrastructure, education and got racial divisions and institutional imbalances. In this background, interested politicians grabbed the reign of power in the new state. They never drove

Pakistani politics towards right direction.

Both participants of the show shed light on reasons but intentionally avoided to put forward rational solutions of these problems (to understand the background of this reluctance, an article „A Culture of Dialogue” by Muhammad Amir in Dawn dated 03-05-

2015 is interesting; he mentions that it is needed to develop a dialogue and trust between intelligentsia and the Pakistani state).

4. Talk Show: Jaiza Channel: Dawn News Date: 28th April 2015 Topic: Demarcation of New Provinces Host: Ameer Abbas Participants 1. Khush Bakht Shuja’at (MNA, Presenter and educationalist affiliation MQM) 2. Mushtaq Ahmed Ghani (MNA affiliation PTI) 3. Rubina Khalid (Senator affiliation PPP) 4. Syed Zaeem Hussain Qadri (MNA affiliation PML-N)

The host opened the show and stated that in 200 states that can be compared to

Pakistan regarding their population and resources, Pakistan has the minimum number of provinces. These developing states have better development, population and resources.

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Our known politicians like Zardari have talked about creation of new provinces; PM

Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan also stated positively over this issue. Altaf Hussain demanded creation of either Sindh-one or Sindh-two or division of Sindh in four zones of south, north, east or west Sindh if the proposal of Muhajir or Karachi provinces was not acceptable. In range of those countries having 100 million populations, Pakistan is the only country that has four provinces. China and India (the world‟s most populated countries) have thirty-four provinces. United States is the third major populated country and has fifty states. Indonesia is on number four and has thirty-three provinces. Brazil is at fifth position in the ranking and has twenty-six states. Pakistan is at sixth position in population but has only four provinces. Nigeria is at number seven with eleven provinces.

Bangladesh is at eighth position with six provinces. Russia is at ninth position with forty- six provinces. Japan has forty-eight provinces, with number ten population at world ranking. Philippine is in twelfth number and has eighty provinces. Egypt is on fifteenth number and has two hundred thirty-two provinces. What is the reason that we in Pakistan could not demarcate new administrative units? Why political parties use the slogan of formation of new provinces just to attract votes and forget when they come in power?

PTI gave the slogan of „change‟ and Imran Khan supported the movement for Hazara

Province during his election campaign.

Mushtaq Ghani stated that Imran Khan is determined to be with the movement of

Hazara province and suggested the formulation of a commission to demarcate new administrative units where needed and viable, and Hazara would be one of them. KP provincial assembly has passed a resolution in favor of Hazara province and has been sent to federal government where PML-N is in power. Formulation of new provinces is

237 in the manifesto of PML-N too, and it has 2/3 majority but still it could not show any progress. PTI has the party consensus over forming of maximum new administrative units to lessen hatred and conflict over division of resources but it should not be done on racial basis.

Current Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, during his election campaign 2013 stated that he as a party leader is convinced that more provinces should be formulated and he invited the nation to keep pace with him in this process. He stated that Pakistan will progress and perform better if more small administrative units are created.

Syed Zaeem Hussain Qadri cleared his party position over this issue and stated that it is a pure provincial matter and no one can deny its importance. PML-N has a very clear stance over formulation of new productive and effective administrative units in Pakistan.

But we strongly condemn the demarcation of provinces on racial and linguistic basis or for any specific crowd or group. Provincial assembly of Punjab has passed a resolution in favor of Bahawalpur region and has been sent to the central government.

He opinionated that there is consensus and every party is convinced and committed to this issue. We just need to sit together and decide about it. One thing should be kept in mind that new provinces should be formulated where they are feasible, otherwise they would be again dependent over central government to run their provincial machinery and public projects. To create more productive and viable administrative units, we have to monitor the calculation of resources and population of that particular region. If we formulate unviable units, then it would be devastating and few particular groups will overcome the resources to manipulate and maneuver in their favor.

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He further pointed out that the provincial assemblies are passing resolutions and unanimous bills over demarcation of new provinces but now we have to attain 2/3 majority for the final implementation of these bills from central government. At least there is consensus over three provinces i.e. Bahawalpur, Siraiki and Hazara; therefore there should be some further development at least for these 3 provinces. We all are

Pakistanis and we should seek its prosperity first. But we have to calculate that whether these provinces will be sustainable or not. Will such provinces be independent enough to support them or they will seek support from central government? If anyone talks about

Karachi as a province, then the revenue receipts of Karachi are five hundred times greater than its expenditure. That is enough to run Karachi and its allied areas. Therefore, making

Karachi a province means to snatch the right of allied areas. If we reserve resources of

Karachi to only its population, then we cannot address the integrity and solidarity of state.

Sometimes you have to sacrifice for others; for example in the seventh NFC award,

Punjab sacrificed a reasonable portion of its share in favor of Baluchistan. With formulation of new provinces, you have to lay down structural changes that demand a bulk of funds. Therefore, we have to adopt a self-sustainable model.

Ameer Hussain stated, while pointing to Khush Bakhat Shuja‟at, that no political party is against formation of new provinces, but Altaf Hussain talks about formulation of

Karachi province specifically for an ethnic class. The party in government PML-N is also endorsing it but they are criticizing demand of MQM because of its ethnic touch.

Khush Bakhat Shuja‟at replied that no doubt the number of provinces should be increased in for demarcating new administrative units. But Karachi is a metropolitan city and people belonging to other parts of Pakistan are also residing inside it. Problems come

239 forth when imbalances between resources and their distribution increase. But Karachi earns the most through taxes, therefore there should be no problem in giving Karachi a status of a full-fledge province. Karachi already has been plural into two zones, i.e. upper

Karachi and Lower Karachi. Lower Karachi is constituted by remote and underdeveloped areas of Karachi like Liari, Kimari and Ben Qasim and these areas are getting 15% less resources than other areas of Karachi. There is a proportional gap in distribution of jobs in these areas. So, public resentment and grievances are getting stronger by the day. We can exemplify a family here; when a family gets larger then it brings more land utility and new family units sometimes leaves the previous land in search of new resources.

Likewise, when population increases then new administrative units become inevitable.

All political parties have given their consent and have a good intention but the problem is that what would be the mechanism and how it will be attained. In fact there is a great trust deficit and every party blames and suspects the other. The 18th amendment happened so quickly because political forces intended and willed to do it. Therefore a

Council of Common Interests (CCI) should be formed and issues like this should be brought to CCI where all stakeholders will ponder over the issue and further mechanism of implementation.

Ameer Hussain used many video clips in which political leaders gave statements over formation of new provinces. He commented that the problems in the way of formation of new provinces should be resolved through parliament. In this 21st century, it would be ridiculous if we ask that why new provinces are inevitable? A universal consensus has been developed over the utility of new autonomous administrative units in favor of public welfare. Imran Khan also said that the idea of new units is a fair idea and it will improve

240 administrative network. Pakistani federation has a centralized set up; moreover we do not have a network of local governments.

Rubina Khalid also endorsed the discussion and stated that a thorough debate is needed over this sensitive issue because we already have a plural society and Pakistan has every type of division inside it i.e. lingual, racial and religious. Therefore, we have to calculate our strength to keep Pakistan integrated in place of creating further divisions.

We should initiate the process of formation of new administrative units but we have to do that very carefully. We should develop consensus and have to surrender our political and party interests.

Ameer Hussain said that new provinces should be formulated on administrative basis.

Zardari is often vociferous for it. Many movements erupted in Hazara region for new province. Muhammad Ali Durani and many other names can be quoted who support creation of new provinces. During premiership, Yousaf Raza Gilani stated while addressing people of Siraiki belt of Punjab that he will go for Siraiki Province. During his speech, he conditioned the development of the Siraiki people with the formation of their own provincial mechanism.

The host concluded that everyone is supporting carving of new provinces out of existing units, but the issue is who is going to bell the cat! Many states around the world did not born with their present number of provinces. They formed them latter. It would not be fair to neglect formation of new provinces just to avoid infrastructural implications. Although PTI in KP has no 2/3 majority, but it can ally with JI and PML-N to form 2/3 majority and PML-N has no 2/3 majority in center but it can ally with PPP

241 and PTI. Same is the case in Sindh where PPP has not got 2/3 majority, but can achieve that after allying with MQM. In Punjab assembly, PML-N is already enjoying a fair 2/3 majority.

5. Talk Show: Live with Talat Hussain Channel: Aaj TV Date: 1st October 2014 Topic: How we can resolve problems of Pakistan? Host: Talat Hussain Participants 1. Dr. Riffat Hussain (Professor Pakistan Studies affiliation QAU) 2. Zahid Hussain (Analyst) 3. Aasia Riaz (Director Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) 4. Ahsan Iqbal (Federal Minister of Planning Commission affiliation PML-N)

Talat Hussain said that there is a great repetition of some topics and people are fed up with listening them. Therefore we would go for some other solutions today. He questioned Dr. Riffat Hussain to suggest any solution for dissatisfied public and republic of Pakistan.

Dr. Riffat stated that projects of general good should be preferred. We have to think about public good while surrendering our party and political interests. We cannot progress unless we do have „public centric approach‟. Although, canvas of the expectation of public is very vast but we should at least categorize these expectations according to their importance; for example crisis of electricity. We have been facing this issue for more than 10 years but no serious efforts have been taken to overcome this. But

242 this issue is highlighted for political purpose by every government. Similarly, law and order should be the prime concern of every government.

He further stated that here are millions of developmental projects waiting for proper attention. Developed countries around the world took such projects a challenge and they accomplished it at every cost. For example, China took poverty alleviation as a challenge and made tremendous economic growth in next 30 years. If the state structure is not delivering, then it is useless for public. For example 77% of Pakistani population is deprived of safe drinking water facilities while it does not cost too much to government to provide it. To get progress on our human indexes, government can mark some targets to achieve within a specific time period and then monitor to accomplish them. Malaysia is a model country for us where Mahatir fixed a period of 10 years for a specific measurement of progress. Indonesia and Sri Lanka are also good examples to follow. Sri

Lanka has achieved literacy ratio according to its target.

Talat Hussain stated that national goals of China are very clear unlike us as we have divergent opinions. Even we don‟t have a single definition of „welfare‟. Therefore, how we can implement a clear definition of public welfare?

In response to a question, Zahid Hussain stated that four things should be always on the top of government‟s priority list; Good governance should be on number one priority; second is law and order, third is economy and the final one is education. These areas are correlated with a lot of other subjects and it can be said that an initiative can transform our society to a great extent. In this modern era, the indexes of development have been shifted to better human indexes and a country‟s development is measured by this now.

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Pakistan ranked at number 146th at UNDP ranking of development. The concept of governance depends on state structure. Provincial autonomy refers to a vast range of responsibilities. After the 18th amendment, the problems of governance have also been distributed too (but we do not have constitutional mechanism). It can be further distributed to local government that is an ever neglected topic in Pakistan. Therefore we need proper devolution of power to local level. But whenever a civilian government came to power, it avoided further devolution. But provincial government showed their lack of competency to administer provincial machinery under 18th amendment.

Talat Hussain asked Ahsan Iqbal that why governments fail to respond and why they cannot accomplish their very basic duty to provide basic needs to public and can we do better at human index of UNDP?

Ahsan Iqbal stated that our issues are complicated because our institutions have been dysfunctional. When institutions become dysfunctional, then politics become „personality centric‟. This is a major issue of our country. The reason behind dysfunction is discontinuity of the institutionalization process. The devolution issue is the biggest one and it was devolved to provinces at once, therefore they could not manage it properly.

We are restructuring the institutions after the 18thamendment. Our priority is coal plants, education and reviving of Punchayyat system at local level. For better human indexes, the central government can sensitize provincial government because after the 18th amendment these subjects have been devolved to provinces.

In response to the question that why governments do not deliver good governance;

Aasia Riaz pointed out the lack of conflict resolving mechanism and old dealing tactics

244 with the new governance challenges. Governments should adopt some new techniques.

Our politics is personality centric and whenever goals are set, governments do not bother to get public opinion on these issues. Now bipartite politics has ended in Pakistan; PTI has emerged and young people have been brought forth. Furthermore the presence of third tier of government is also necessary where potential of these young people can be utilized.

Talat Hussain concluded this session and stated that revolution occurred in different parts of world but they initiated a structure that delivered to people. Pakistan does not lack in anything; it has executive, legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy and other essential pillars of a good structure but all it needs is direction and determination to deliver general good.

6. Talk Show: Capital Talk Channel: Geo News Date: 5th May 2015 Topic: Religious Reforms, Sectarian Harmony Host: Hamid Mir Participant 1. Sardar Muhammad Yousaf (Minister of Religious Affairs) 2. Professor Dr. Qibla Ayaz (KP) 3. Allama Amin Shaheedi (Deputy Secretary Majlis Wahdat-ul- Muslemeen, Shia Scholar) 4. Mufti Raghib Naeemi (Religious Scholar, Head of Jamia-e-Naeemia Lahore, Vice President of Tanzeem-ul-Madaris, Anti-Taliban)

Hamid Mir raised few issues in front of religious scholars. He asked Sardar

Muhammad Yousaf that religious reforms taken by government are exclusively for

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Islamabad. Why it is not implemented in other areas of Pakistan? And is this model workable in other areas if implemented? How it is a fruitful effort? He asked the following 4 issues;

1. Can this model be implemented in other parts of Pakistan and what are its

benefits?

2. Is it possible to deliver Friday sermons on same topic simultaneously in all

mosques?

3. The number of namazi (who offer prayer) is getting lowered according to Gallup

survey. Is it true and what are the factors?

4. Is it possible to develop consensus on celebrating Eid on same day and offer Eid

prayer at same time?

On the first issue, Sardar Muhammad Yousaf stated that the government (Ministry of

Religious Affairs) fulfilled its responsibility to facilitate a dialogue at national level and religious scholars decided and scheduled same timings for Azan and prayer. Government formulated a committee composed of ten members on the recommendation of these religious scholars that draw on all sects and this model has been implemented in the center only. This committee met many times before reaching a consensus. On a suggestion by the host, Sardar Yusuf asserted that soon a conference will be held in

Islamabad in which religious scholars from all areas of Pakistan would be invited to schedule prayers for other parts of Pakistan. He stated that all provinces are ready for it.

To fix a day of Ramadan (The Fasting month) and Eid prayer times, government is trying to communicate with scholars and soon we will resolve this issue too.

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Dr Qibla Ayaz stated that it is a very wise decision and credit goes to religious scholars of Islamabad. Administratively, it is very good to bring sectarian harmony in

Pakistan. One more thing is very important; that is suitable use of loud speaker because now Azan and Friday sermons would be delivered at same time and inappropriate use of loud speaker will create clash that might be destructive for this very good effort.

Therefore, the intensity of voice through speaker should be limited to nearby population only or those people inside Mosque. If we talk about the feasibility of the model, then it is working in Maldives very successfully where people belong to Fiqh

Shafi are in majority, like Pakistan where followers of Fiqh Hanfi are in majority. In

Maldives, mosques are built by government at a proper distance where needed. He justified the divergence of Fast and Eid celebration in KP and rest of Pakistan as KP is not taken on board before announcing Fast and Eid days. To this, Sardar Muhammad

Yousaf replied that government is trying to establish communication between Rawait-e-

Halal Committee (moon sightseers to declare Eid or a new Islamic month) and KP board and soon this issue will be overcome.

Amin Shaheedi also gave his consent to the feasibility of the model and added that

Pakistan is a deeply plural society that needed consensus from all the major section of the society. They should be taken on board. Every fiqh has its own interpretation of Sha’ariat

(Islamic laws) and every city of Pakistan has its own sunset times. Therefore it can be implemented there according to local timings. He stated that an effort was done to fix the subjects of Friday sermons by Mili Yakjahiti Council (council for national unity), a committee comprising different religious scholars who were responsible to prepare sermons for a whole month. But we should ensure to keep these efforts on non-political

247 basis; otherwise this can be used by governments negatively to pursue political interests.

He stated that these institutions are meant to demonstrate unity and strength of Muslims but we are making them controversial. This has caused a decline in the usefulness of these institutions.

Mufti Naeem stated that Prayer is a very important topic of Islam. This sort of model was tried to be implemented in Pakistan but was not successfully implemented. We pray for its success this time. It can work and we just need to surrender our ego and self- interests and try to accommodate each other. It is an administrative issue; therefore we should address it according to the directions of state. It is not the end but means to an end. It is an initiative to settle down a lot of other issues. Moreover, we need to control the institution of Friday Sermons and to develop such sort of mechanism that can fix same topics to be delivered at same time in all mosques.

The host concluded that there are a range of issues awaiting the consensus of religious scholars. If it happens, then it will enhance the image of Pakistan and respect of these scholars too.

7. Talk Show: DNA Channel: Channel 24 Date: 29th April, 2015 Topic: NFC Award Host: Chaudhary Ghulam Hussain and Arif Nizami (affiliation Dunya News) Participant: 1. Farhan Bukhari (Economist)

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Arif Nizami stated that we are making the NFC Award controversial like Kalabagh

Dam. Many groups and parties have reservations on NFC. After the 7th NFC, the government is negotiating for 8th NFC nowadays. Ishaq Dar as federal finance minister is chairing the session. Baluchistan has asked for increase in its share and Chief Minister

Baluchistan, Dr. Abdul Malick has demanded a change in NFC formula for distribution of resources. Aisha Pasha (head of the delegation of the Punjab government) refused to surrender Punjab‟s share under demands for revision.

The incumbent finance secretary, Mr. Waqar Masud stated that there is no constitutional limit to increase share of a province; however according to 18th amendment share of a province cannot be decreased but can be increased from the current percentage. The center is getting poorer day by day because tax to GDP ratio is increasing at negligible pace i.e. from 9 to 10% only. This is a very serious issue. The economy of Pakistan is worth is 0.3$ Billions only while the central government has to spend large sums on defense projects, a subject of central government. Therefore we should analyze the issues behind NFC and ways to extend Taxes to GDP ratio.

Farhan Bukhari stated that the most problematic thing is population explosion. But we do not have any reliable census data in Pakistan. How we can deal with NFC fairly if no fair data is available. It is like a ticking time bomb. Pakistan also needs tax and land reforms. Major feudals do not pay taxes while industrialists are also evading it. This is happening across the board and is deteriorating the writ of the government. Many developed countries around the world have strict policies to collect taxes. But in Pakistan, no mechanism is working to collect taxes and except political cases no one is arrested or convicted for tax theft.

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Arif Nizami stated that we have no policies to collect taxes from agriculture sector and no one is ready to pay taxes. We should not increase tax rates but we have to broaden tax net.

Farhan Bukhari asserted that we have to tackle problems facing the economy of

Pakistan as different views are coming forth regarding development agenda. Public is crying for basic needs but politicians proudly boast about positive developmental indicators. If we compare Pakistan with other countries in this South Asian region, then we come to know that Pakistan stands very low on the list of human resources and development indexes. Our government and political parties should ponder over these issues.

PRINT MEDIA (NEWSPAPER)

Various articles from the opinion pages of the main stream newspapers have been included in this section. These pieces dwell upon different current issues in Pakistan that help generate a clear background of issues surrounding Pakistani federalism in view of public opinion.

Formation of judicial commission for electoral reforms is doing rounds nowadays. It is a burning issue that would bring electoral reforms for conduct of future general elections.

Babar Sattar (a lawyer) in his article “A Road to Nowhere” published in The News dated

30th March, 2015, wrote about the conditions of the agreement between PTI and PML-N over this commission. This commission will (1) probe whether 2013 general elections were free and fair and were conducted according to law (2) identify any systematic manipulation of votes (3) fair reflection of public mandate. He talks about the limitation

250 of legal issues regarding judicial commission and goes that “our constitution conceives of no mechanism to declare illegal collective result of an election. He says that without amending Article 25 and/or the 1976 Act, election results cannot be called into question by any commission. This commission has no power to dissolve assemblies if election is proved rigged. Only prime minister can do so for national assembly under article 58 and chief ministers under Article 112.”

According to the writer, it is just a face-saving exercise because every elite group has its own interests but many other recognized writers have some other views. Nafees

Siddiqui (advocate) in his article “Judicial Commission: Last Hope to Reforms in

System” in the Jang dated 13th April, 2015 wrote that there are two important facts of the political history of Pakistan; (1) most of the general elections in Pakistan are alleged as rigged, stolen or manipulated, therefore there is nothing new behind this long march; (2)

Formulation of judicial commissions has remained a historical fact of Pakistan. They were made and dissolved but their reports were never made public in the name of „greater interests‟ of Pakistan. In the wake of 1970 free and fair general elections, Pakistan got dismembered. Therefore, in view of establishment, manipulation of elections is necessary to avoid further break and to continue democracy and national integrity. But this time around, the judicial commission would be the first attempt ever to sort out facts behind rigging stories in elections-2013. Many groups are declaring it unconstitutional; however this time, the report will be made public and will set the course forever as all political parties are assuring their help to the commission. The writer suggests that with the arrival of commission‟s report, if parliamentary committee also introduces its recommendations,

251 then reformation of the electoral system can be done immediately. Same views are shared by Adeeb Jawadani in daily Nawa-e-Waqat dated 15th April 2015.

Rabia Rahman in her article “Judicial Commission” in Nawa-e-Waqat on 10th April

2015 says that before PTI‟s long march, PM Nawaz Sharif proposed a judicial commission but at that time Imran khan spoiled the chance. An elite bargain could have worked better at that time. Malik Muhammad Ashraf also suggests in his article “The

PTI‟s culture of Intolerance” in The News on 17th December 2014that political parties should pursue reforms through constitutional forums like parliament.

Mussarat Qayyum, in her article “electoral reforms are dire necessity” in Nawa-e-

Waqat dated 1st April 2015, suggested that the trend of family fiefdoms in political parties should be eradicated and paralyzed political system should be rehabilitated with mutual consensus. She suggests formulation of a committee that would work for the betterment of political system of Pakistan. For such a committee, she gives following proposals to ponder over;

1. Duration of assemblies should decrease from 5 to 4 years.

2. Parliament should be declared the only legal forum to decide about the

constitutional supremacy and negotiation of interests and all other forums of

unconstitutional ways should be avoided.

3. Prime minister, President, governors and chief ministers should be re-elected after

every two years.

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4. Members of ECP should be taken from all four provinces on the basis of equal

representation and should be guided by a council based on authentic political and

civil experts.

5. It should be decided constitutionally that no national day will be celebrated for

political purpose.

6. Media should be taken on board. Those who are alleged for taking foreign

funding should be convicted and media should explore their wrong deeds instead

of giving them coverage.

7. Only journalism-degree holder should be allowed to work in the media.

8. Intellectuals and educated people should be allowed to work in media.

9. The qualification of an electoral candidate should be increased from bachelor to

master level.

10. Awareness campaign for voters should start at least 4 months before elections.

11. A clause of conduct of elections under supervision of army should be accepted

unanimously.

12. ECP should work as an ultimate autonomous body and in elections days,

government should not announce developmental projects, allocation of funds and

transfers.

13. Heavy punishment should be given to voters who abstain from casting their votes.

14. All parties, political elites and media owners should sign and ratify these reforms

and a punishment should be agreed in case of breaking the treaty.

Huma Yusaf (a freelance journalist) in her article “More than words” in Dawn dated

30th March 2015 wrote about the state structure of Pakistan. She states that Quaid‟s

253 speech was more than words. The Quaid had said that “you are free to go to your temple…” Pakistan needs tolerance as was shown during Holi (a Hindu community festival) celebration at a Hindu temple in Karachi which was given security by national student federation (of Muslim students) in the form of a human shield to protect them.

Jinnah‟s speech which he delivered on 11th August 1947 is also noticeable.

Communalism can be eradicated by managing humanitarian acts and equal citizenship. A separate strip on national flag demonstrates a privileged distinction for unity and Jinnah‟s speech should be considered more than a speech to eradicate these deep-rooted divisions.

Shamshad Ahmad (a former foreign Secretary) in his article “Painful reflections” in

Dawn dated 30th March 2015 opined that Quaid‟s vision about Pakistan was progressive and democratic but his successors were corrupt and his untimely death brought endemic crisis of leadership.

Pakistan is an ideological state. But the ongoing different paradigms of secularism and theocracy statehood are clashing and proving fatal for a smooth nationhood. Niaz

Murtaza (a political and development economist and a senior fellow at UC Berkeley) in his article “Ideological state” in Dawn Dated 2nd April 2015 states that we have yet to decide our creed clearly. Pakistan is an ideological state. Ideology is a complete code of conduct that provides guidelines for economic, political and cultural policies. Many countries around the world consider the realms of politics and economy as public domains, and culture as private one. States that do not do so often function poorly. The writer elaborates four levels of ideology i.e. timeless values, state structure, economic structure and political structure. Ideologies provide timeless values on which state structure is built to run economy and politics, but policies and procedures are prone to

254 change by the changing situation over time. He says that policies are formulated for the wellbeing of the citizens. He provides very interesting debate on Pakistan ideology and criticizes. Pakistan ideology was imposed by establishment and a specific group of elites bypassed first three levels and imposed the 4th level directly. He commented that “thus the challenge facing Pakistani ideologists is to enunciate clear politico-economic” structures and broad but flexible policies that can work today based on the timeless valid

Islamic values rather than championing inflexible minute procedures”. He concludes that

Pakistani ideology is used to unite Pakistani nation but it is just a book with colorful cover but blank pages inside.

Asif Ezdi (a former member of Foreign Service) in his article “Making Devolution

Work” in Daily The News dated 22nd December 2014 talks about devolution of power. He casts light on provincial/segmental autonomy and discusses 18th amendment in the parameters of education devolved to provinces (that is also a feature of

Consociationalism). He said that according to 18th amendment, education is a purely provincial affair yet l federal government has powers to interfere. Federal government should not impede implementation through delaying tactics. This move has recently been raised on the floor of Sindh assembly by education minister and a unanimous resolution has been passed by provincial assembly. This was a crucial move against the central government‟s attempts to the “…establishment of National Curriculum Council (NCC) for laying down minimum countrywide standards for education.” This idea of NCC was presented on the forum of inter-provincial education ministers‟ conference (IPEMC) in

February 2014 in supervision of federal government. On this move of federal government, Baluchistan and KP also protested. But it was assured by the central

255 government that the council will take decision after building mutual consensus and will be implemented by respective provincial governments. Sindh government boycotted this conference and demanded a meeting of council of common interests (CCI) (CCI is a type of grand coalition) over the suggestion.

According to the writer, absence of an institutional framework for coordinating policy at the national level on some of the important subjects that were previously on the concurrent list will remain intact. These amendments further need a vision of coordination at national level in the area of devolution to transfer complete autonomy to provinces. For this purpose, the author talks about proper activation of CCI with equal representation, voice and weight of all provinces for issues where harmonization of policy at the national level is considered desirable. This council can work effectively because at present, the constitution lacks a proper mechanism but ad-hoc arrangements are made that does not provide substitute to permanent arrangements such as NCC.

The Author suggests a solution and according to him it lies in empowering CCI through constitutional amendments. After that CCI can work by issuing policy guidelines and directives on selected matters in the interest of IPEMC. He further stated that 18th amendment is a good sign of transition to democracy and socio-economic development of provinces. But the dark side of the picture is that after the 18th amendment, Pakistan has no education, agriculture, health, and population policies due to lack of mechanism and proper transfer and devolution. The 18th amendment is the best way to end anti-Punjabi resentments among smaller provinces but unfortunately delay in implementation of it is widening the gap in place of bridging it. IPMEC can be helpful to formulate national policies that are modeled on German education ministers‟ conference. The author talks

256 about proportion of seats in national assembly based on population. He criticized Punjab for having 55.1% seats and can veto any policy easily. After giving details, improper proportionality should be reviewed and no province would have more than 50% and less than 7.5% seats in national assembly but it could happen after constitutional amendments.

Through this, monopoly of Punjab can be curtailed that can elect a prime minister without taking consent of smaller provinces. This article is a very good piece of thought for crucial reformation for the betterment of Pakistani federation.

Tahir Mehdi (an advocate that works with Punjab Lok Sujag, a research advocacy group) in his article “The Next Democratic Milestone” in Dawn dated 8th July 2014 suggests legal reforms in ECP. He states that electoral committee has a tough task to deal with. He talks about electoral and legal reforms in ECP in two areas i.e. pre-election and post-election contexts.

The pith of his article can be elaborated as (1) chief election commissioner should be a retired judge so that he would be non-partisan (2) President Ghulam Ishaq Khan handed over constituency-level duties to judiciary in 1990s and since then it is considered a duty of the judiciary only. It should be corrected. (3) There are two confusions; firstly, conduct of elections is an auxiliary function of judiciary and ECP‟s job has been reduced to issuing notification, directives and statements only. (4) ECP needs immunity from judicial intervention because if solutions are subjected to be delayed then they are bound to prove useless (5) ECP needs to be empowered over civil administration (6) In pre- election environment, ECP, all government departments and law enforcement agencies should ensure that voters are not bribed or forced to vote for any specific person or party

(7) ECP and caretaker government have to satisfy the political parties about their non-

257 affiliation. In this case, Indian example can be followed where no caretaker government is installed (8) ECP needs new legal reforms (9) electoral reforms committee needs to avoid rephrasing old laws and needs some innovation. This article overall gives some new directions to common people of Pakistan.

Dr Farrukh Saleem in his article “Motherland” in The News, 21st December 2014, wrote about three essential ingredients for survival of Pakistani state and nation i.e. unity of command, purpose and efforts. He says Pakistani nationhood, unity of command and efforts are lacking in comparison with our enemies who have these three ingredients. He suggests that all stakeholders should be on same page.

Niaz Murtaza in his article “Poll System Reforms” in Dawn dated 16th April 2015 explains that Pakistan should adopt a mixed electoral system of Majoritarian (for

National assembly) and proportional Representation (PR) (for Senate) initially. He gives details of present vote bank of mainstream parties (PML-N 33%, PTI 17%, and PPP

15%) and their respective seat scheme (PML-N 46%, PTI 10%, and PPP 12%) in parliament. He says that governors should be elected by the provincial assemblies instead of federal government. He criticizes FPTP electoral system but some of his arguments may not be convincing; like his opinion that under PR system, parliament will be a hung parliament and FPTP would be better for elections of National Assembly. Contrarily during 1990s in Pakistan, parliament remained hung due to constituency based politics

(FPTP). The writer is of the opinion that a demand for demarcations of new provinces has become prominent in Pakistan; like Gilgat-Baltistan that deserves to be a province,

Karachi as Muhajir province based on ethnicity is opposed. Pakistan has bicameral legislation at national level but unicameral at provincial level. Therefore the writer

258 suggests that a provincial senate should also be designed. The writer says that PR is good for multiparty system like Pakistan. Present day weaknesses of Pakistani federation can be removed by adopting these means.

Naziha Syed Ali in her article “war on Language” in Dawn dated 8th April 2015 talks about segmental autonomy for provinces. She points out the miserable conditions and violation of this right in Baluchistan. Baluch are striving hard for the restoration and survival of their peculiar languages and culture. No government school is teaching

Baluchi or Brahvi in Baluchistan but some private schools and academies are doing so.

Printing Baluchi literature is banned in Baluchistan and this forced-assimilation is agitating young generation. The case of missing persons was also highlighted with a long march under the leadership of Mama Qadir.

Recently, LUMS was going to conduct a talk on this issue and Mama Qadir was one of participant; but unfortunately this event was not allowed to be conducted due to some policy clash with the government. I.A Rahman in his article “No Quarter for the Baluch?” in Dawn dated 6th April 2015 and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar in his article “Baluchistan test” in

Dawn dated 10th April 2015 also talked about this issue.

Amr Jaleel in his article „Sab Jhot’ (All is A Lie) in Jang dated 8th April 2015 stated that the language issue in Pakistan is an artificial issue. He suggested following solutions:

1. Pakistani nation speaks, writes and reads Urdu, Sindhi, Punjabi, Pashtu and

Baluchi. Therefore, these become natural languages of Pakistan.

2. Urdu is spoken and being understood in every part of Pakistan. Therefore it is a

language of central government and official language of Pakistan.

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3. The central government has to keep in touch with the whole world; therefore

second language would be English.

4. Urdu will be a co-language of Sindhi, Baluchi, Pashtu and Punjabi along with

their other regional languages.

5. Being an international language, English would be a provincial language too.

The writer stated that in Pakistan all above is already in practice except clause number one because aristocracy has a problem with it. They criticize other languages except Urdu because being provincial languages they cannot be given a status of national language (if a provincial language cannot be considered as a national language and in case Karachi is given status of a separate province then being a language of Muhajir of Karachi, Urdu would become a provincial language too. Then what will be the fate of Urdu?).

Pakistani nation is not made of unknown elements; it is made of Punjab, Sindh,

Baluchistan and KPK. These are the ground realities of Pakistan. They are not inferior languages of Pakistan. Refusing their status will fan provincialism instead of alleviating it. They are needed to be mainstreamed to lessen the provincial grievances. The ruling class has to correct the perception that one language or religion flourishes sense of one nation. Arabs have one language and are one nation, but they have been fighting with one another for fourteen centuries. India is a good example regarding segmental autonomy.

Hindi and English both are official languages. It has thirty languages and all are given status of national language. Among them, two languages (Sindhi and Urdu) are not provincial. India has defined a standard; a language should be written, spoken and read and must be a source of teaching. In Pakistan, the ruling elites has created this fuss and taken shelter behind the cover of mismanagements and bad governance. This article

260 received a bulk of criticism, but still it generated a noticeable debate. An article by Saad

Hafiz, „Divergent paths of India and Pakistan‟ in Daily times dated 11th Jan, 2015 is also important to endorse Amr Jaleel.

Nafees Ahmed Siddiqui‟s article „Nowishta-e-Dewar: Kia Ho Raha Hai, Kia Hony

Wala Hai?‟ (What is happening, what is going to happen?), in Jang on 11th May 2015, describe Pakistani politics and its current dynamics. The writer states that the reigns of

Pakistani politics is practically in the hands of establishment and it is playing the role of policy and decision makers. Politicians have entangled themselves in corruption and ad- hoc policies.

The writer gave his view that solution does not lie in conduct of new general elections as Pakistan needs a new social contract and a Grand National dialogue. It is facing ideological, economic and social issues; therefore, current approach is not working. He talks about a meeting of think-tanks consisting bureaucrats, economists, civil servants and members from NGOs. Nasim Baig suggests reforms for Pakistan in its typical political background. Nasim Baig wrote that there are two major issues which Pakistan is facing; that it‟s a plural society where aristocracy runs Pakistan for the sake of its interests. Rest of the issues is related with these two issues. He explained the background of plural society by writing that in Indo-Pak Subcontinent people had remained under the influence of foreign invaders for centuries and this slave mindset does not allow them to protest against the present aristocracy. The invaders functioned through civil service, feudal lords and tribal leaders. These feudals were mostly Muslims, therefore after independence India introduced land reforms to eradicate Muslim feudalism. But in

Pakistan, the Pakistan Movement was perceived against Hindu domination as before

261 partition, Indian Congress had presented „Land Reform‟ act that terrified Muslim feudals and they joined Muslim League and supported partition. After British departure, the administrative vacuum was filled by Pakistani establishment through feudals, civil servants and army. First parliament was constituted of feudals and rest of two classes supported them to get their share. With passage of time, this elite structure changed a little but divisions persisted. In urban areas, many political parties came forth but their vote bank was based on money and power. The ruling class used religion to pursue their interests and absence of rule of law brought further havoc in society. The unjust taxation policies fashioned a culture of exploitation and corruption on large scale. The inappropriate policies of rulers flourished extremism in masses.

In this background, Nasim Baig still emphasizes continuity besides loyalty of civil servants and media while educated middle class is also playing its part. But due to absence of competition and accountability, Pakistan is not getting rid of aristocracy. For this to happen, we need to develop human capital through accessibility of people to standard education besides good governance.

The issue of local bodies‟ election is a major issue in Pakistan. Currently, judiciary has taken up the issue of non-conduct of local bodies elections. The Supreme Court of

Pakistan ordered local bodies‟ election till September 2015. On these orders, on 30th May

2015, LG elections would be held in KP. Huzefah Rahman wrote an article „Khula Raaz:

Local Government Elections aur Janubi Punjab‟ (An Open Secret: Local Government

Elections and South Punjab) in Jang dated, 26th March 2015. He describes constitutional clauses on conduct and importance of local bodies. Article 7 of Constitution 1973 describes local bodies as an essential part of statehood. Article 32 affirms that LG will be

262 installed while Article 219 authorizes ECP to conduct LG elections. Article (140-A) states that every province will manage a network of LG according to law and then devolve political, administrative and fiscal powers to members of LG. Therefore, it would be unconstitutional if LGs are ignored. The absence of it is evolving a sense of deprivation in public and South Punjab is a special victim of this denial. Therefore, local government elections should be conducted on party-basis now no matter which political party wins.

Saleem Safi in his article “Jorge: Nay Intakhabaat Aur Naay Rules of Game” (New

Elections and New Rules of Game) in Jang dated 8th May 2015 wrote about state structure of Pakistan and evaluated it historically. He stated that dictatorship was a bad option throughout, whether it was General Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan, General

Zia-ul-Haq or General Pervez Musharraf. It has proved destructive for Pakistan.

Disintegration of Pakistan started during Ayub‟s era and in Yahya‟s era Pakistan disintegrated, finally. Zia‟s era brought extremism, religious franchises and sectarianism.

Dictatorship of General Musharraf lit fire of extremism and delivered fire at every door step. Continuity of democracy may be our prime demand of patriotism but it has disappointed us too. What sort of democracy should be a right option; that given by

Bhutto, PML-N or PTI? Every time civilian governments committed a record corruption and introduced an ancestral politics in political parties. They promoted politics of non- issues and never discussed and legislated over public issues. The real issues of Pakistan i.e. poverty, illiteracy, inflation, law and order, extremism, terrorism, misallocation of resources etc are ever neglected. No one is giving importance to good governance.

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Currently, every major party except some minor ones like Awami National Party

(ANP), MQM, BNP (Mengal), Sindhi Nationalists, are part of either central or provincial government. PML-N is ruling in center, FATA, Punjab and Gilgat-Baltistan, JUI is a shareholder in center, PPP in Sindh, PTI and JI in KP and PKMAP and NP in Baluchistan

But no one is successful in relieving public hardships.

ECP is also working and many MNAs from different parties have been de-seated.

Everyone is convinced about rigging, electoral mismanagement and dysfunction of current system. Therefore we should go for conduct of new general elections. But without introducing and implementing electoral reforms and bridging trust deficits, no election could give us relief. Therefore, Pakistan needs constitutional, electoral and administrative reforms first. For this purpose, a commission should be formed under chairmanship of

Raza Rabani (Chairman Senate) or anyone with mutual consensus. Every political party, province, judiciary and other stake holders i.e. army and civil bureaucracy should be given proper and equal representation in this commission. Within 1 month, this commission will suggest some core issues for legislation that will be done through current parliament. Soon after, general elections should be conducted. According to the writer, the suggestion can be as following:

1. A system of accountability: unlike present NAB, this institution would conduct

across the board accountability.

2. Constitutional role of army in government: It is very necessary because

practically army is running this state but it does not share responsibilities overtly

because of constitutional limitations.

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3. Formulation of new provinces on administrative basis; a clearly defined center-

provincial relationship, distribution of resources and powers between districts

within a province are important issues.

4. Electoral reforms and an independent ECP in real sense.

5. Basic reforms in judicial system.

6. Relationship between politics and religion and a defined role of religion in

politics

7. Legislation for generation of democratic norms inside a political party.

8. Local government system: such LG system should be formed that could not be

abolished by any future government.

9. A fixed time schedule for the conduct of general elections

These suggestions can be amended according to consensus or any mechanism other than commission can be adopted for reformations. We have to do something to ensure good governance. Statehood is impossible with current constitutional structure and way of governance that is leading us to another marshal law and Pakistan would not survive another one.

FINDINGS OF THE DATA

After general elections 2013, elite structure in Pakistan has been plural into two visible groups. Parties like PAT, MQM, PML-Q, JI and PTI are in one camp and PPP and

PMLN (main stream parties) were seen in the other camp. The first camp is enough to take the form of a grand alliance. Qadri attempted to convince PPP leadership but Zardari did not join PAT-led anti-PML-N drive. At this juncture, PML-N also called APC for

265 continuation of democratic government contrary to Qadri‟s APC that sharpened the divide between anti-system and pro-system camps.

After Peshawar carnage, PTI quit sit-in and agitation policy. An APC was held for passing an anti-terrorism act that passed the law unanimously. Before this, APC was called many times but no consensus was developed for the benefit of common man.

This demonstrates that every political party and political elite has its own interests to pursue; they never think about common people who vote them to be an MNA or MPA.

Before this, PTI and PAT were outside the alliance but now every party is in one alliance.

PTI was back to parliament and a judicial commission was formed with an agreement between PTI and PML-N for electoral reforms and investigating electoral rigging in general elections-2013. That is a much highlighted issue in Pakistan and now everyone is focused on its findings that will initiate a further debate of electoral reforms. Latest APC was held over selection of Chairman Senate and with a mutual consensus Raza Rabani has been elected unopposed as Chairman Senate ; while Abdul Ghafoor Haideri (JUI-F) from Baluchistan won the deputy chairman seat with 74 votes, against 16 votes of Shibli

Faraz (PTI).

PPP has pointed out the need of unity to cope with the existing threat to democracy in the country. Chairman Senate, Raza Rabani (Raza Rabani a famous name in the constitutional reforms known as the 18th amendment) emphasized it and stated that

Charter of Democracy (COD) is the best possible way to bring harmony between political parties. The COD talks about a crucial issue i.e. provincial autonomy. The COD has suggested many reforms about army but there islittle progress on it. Yet a “level of

266 maturity was displayed by political parties in parliament over some other sensitive issues”. PPP has crucial importance for PML-N because of the agreement to bridge the growing political divides. But Dr Farrukh Saleem has cautioned in his article “End of

Charter of Democracy?” in The News dated 27th March 2015 that out of 36 articles of

COD, barely 12 are implemented, that too rather reluctantly, and 2/3 of COD is yet to be implemented.

The legacy of local bodies (last election was held in 2005) is a very critical stage in

Pakistan. Supreme Court has asked for conduct of LG elections before 15th September while High court of Lahore has ordered to conduct cantonment election for LG on party basis. The PML-N led government has passed a bill to conduct non-party based local government elections against the spirit of charter of democracy. Its sole purpose is to devolve government at lower level that could serve common people but this thing has been neglected. The PPP has secured 33% women presentation, 5% for peasants, non-

Muslim and youth and 2% for technocrats. PML-N showed disagreement to allow two major amendments that could enable political parties to nominate candidates for local bodies‟ elections. But now local government elections are going to be held on party basis finally. This is the last but most important tier of government that is going to be installed soon in Pakistan after seven years.

Though Pakistan is getting political maturity and stability gradually, but one thing is very obvious in this debate that is „constitutional change and change in the state/federal structure. A coalition of all parties is under process in Pakistan. Only those parties are criticizing it that is excluded from this coalition, like APML, BNA and other small parties. The CCI is very important as stated by many politicians and intellectuals.

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Secondly, no one is clearly talking about proportional representation of small units into civil and military bureaucracy that is very crucial. Constitutional role of the army should be defined clearly and center of power should be changed from civil-military bureaucracy to political institutions to eradicate power politics. Power should be diverted from political parties to public in true sense through local governments on regular basis. CCI is a good option to taken all parties and provinces on board and religious reforms should be adopted side by side. Education and other cultural activities should be allowed for all constituents.

We are yet to define the role of specific cultures and languages of provinces in

Pakistan. About fifty years ago (1964-65) Manzor Qadir, a former Chief Justice of high court (West Pakistan) articulated an idea to fuse “various Pakistani languages enriched by words from English which might as a medium ultimately become a common language of

Pakistan while speaking to Pakistan federation of National integration. He said that though English is a language of a major proportion of world population but ignoring our own languages will hurt our national pride. The suggestions by Amr Jaleel are also remarkable as nothing offensive is found in the proposals presented by him.

In short, everyone is suggesting an „elite bargain‟ through formation of committee with proportional representation of all stakeholders. This all will lead us to a grand coalition to include all important ethnic and linguistic classes and other stakeholder i.e. political parties, political elites, army, bureaucracy and small provinces.

In background of this debate, one thing is very visible and that is constitutional modifications to change the federal structure. There is still a long road to reforms.

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Pakistan has a long history of marches, but unconstitutional way of demanding constitutional amendments proved bad for Pakistan every time. For this purpose, parliament and some other forums where every important class of Pakistan is represented can be strengthened if used wisely. These issues should be settled down now so that next phase of reforms can be initiated. After this, political parties can concentrate on election campaign. Political parties and elites should show political maturity and talk about problems of the people.

CONCLUSION

The findings of the data based on the opinions of political, social and economic intellectuals show the need for a grand alliance with equal representation of all important segments of politics and society of Pakistan. Besides this, segmental autonomy of education, religious institutions and proportional representation in public institutions is very necessary. . The call for elite bargain and building of mutual consensus is getting louder day by day. Alongside, the rapid and repeated deadly incidents are urging political, civil-military and religious elites to come on same page, ignoring the clash of their relevant paradigms, regarding religious reforms under government supervision. This environment of accommodation and compromise is conducive to develop consensus on basic responsibilities of the state. Protection of the rights of minority groups can be ensured through giving them „minority veto‟ system. A clear discomfort is visible within existing political system of Pakistan that has now multi-party politics and a deeply plural society. Our efforts to deal with new kind of problems with old system are the main cause of political instability.

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15, 2014, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. Stanford University,

USA.

Talk Shows 1. Aaj ki Baat, Din TV. 14th March, 2015, 2. Naya Pakistan with Talat Hussain, Geo TV. 8th March, 2015. 3. Capital Talk, Geo TV, 31st March 2015, 4. Jaiza, Dawn News, 28th April 2015, 5. Live with Talat Hussain, Aaj TV, 1st October 2014, 6. Capital Talk, Geo News, 5th May 2015 7. DNA, Channel 24, 29th April. 2015

Articles, Opinion, OP-ED Pages

1. Ezdi, A. (22nd, December, 2014). Making Devolution. The News International. 2. Saleem D. F. (21st December, 2014). Motherland. The News. 3. Ashraf, M. M. (17th December, 2014). The PTI‟s Culture of Intolerance. The News. 4. Mehdi, T. (July, 2014). The Next Democratic Milestone. Dawn. 5. Zaidi. H. (2015). Lost in Punjab. The News. 6. Hafiz, S. (11th Jan, 2015). Divergent paths of India and Pakistan. Daily times. 7. Murtaza, N. (April, 2015). Ideological States. Dawn. 8. Siddiqui, N. (13th April 2015). Nowishta Diwar:A’adalati Commission: Nizam Ko Theak Krny Ki Aakhri Umeed (Judicial commission: The Last Hope to Reform the System). Jang, 9. Safi, S. (8th May 2015). Jirga: Naay Intakhabaat Aur Naay Rules of Games” (New Elections and New Rules of Game). Jang. 10. Akhtar, A. S. (10th April 2015). Balochistan Test. dawn, 11. Sattar, B. (13th April 2015). Into the Political Thickest. Dawn.

270

12. Murtaza. N. (16 April, 2015). Poll System Reform. Dawn. 13. Ali, N. S. (8th April 2015). War on Language. Dawn. 14. Rehman, I.A. (16th April, 2015). No Quarter for the Baloch? Dawn. 15. Jawadani, A. (15th April, 2015). Systemic Electoral Rigging and Formulation of Judicial Commission. Daily Nawa-e-Waqat. 16. Rehman. R. (10th April, 2015). Judicial Commission. Daily Nawa-e-Waqat. 17. Mansori, M. (7th April 2015). PTI Ky Leay Road Map (Road Map for PTI). Jang. 18. Qayyum, M. (1st April, 2015). Electoral Reforms are Very Crucial. Daily Nawa-e- Waqat. 19. Yusaf, H. (30th March, 2015). More than Words. Dawn. 20. Saleem, D. F. (27th March, 2015). End of Charter of Democracy? The News. 21. Rahman, H. (26th March 2015). Khula Raaz: Local Government Elections aur Janubi Punjab‟ (An Open Secret: Local Government Elections and South Punjab). Daily Jang. 22. Siddiqui, N. (11th May 2015). Nowishta Diwar: Kia Ho Raha Hai, Kia Hony Wala Hai?‟ (What is happening, what is going to be happened?). Daily Jang. 23. Jaleel, A. (8th April 2015). Sab Jhot (All is A Lie). Daily Jang. 24. Amir, M. (3rd May, 2015). A Culture of Dialogue. Daily Dawn.

271

Chapter-9

CONCLUSION/S

There is a consensus among different political trajectories in Pakistan that its governance system is exhausted and seemingly less satisfying to accommodate the ethnic mosaic effectively. At the same time, Consociationalism is reviving its vitality as can be seen in Kenyan case (2008). Pakistan has a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multicultural society and multiparty politics. Therefore, it needs more accommodative and inclusive governance model to deal with new administrative problems while having a parliamentary constitutional set up.

The Pakistan movement was joined by different streams with different incentives

(Burki, 1991). The major incentive was to build less centralized or unitary patterns unlike

British colonial government. The Indian Muslims demanded unanimously and successfully achieved Pakistan by putting their ethnic identities and cultural differences behind but for a very short period of time. The reason of the ethnic mobilization was the exclusive nature of Majoritarian Model. After partition, differences in opinions re- emerged and it was very natural in a deeply plural society like Pakistan. The constitution- making debate, disintegration of the leading party (PML) and the issue of lingua franca are some examples to demonstrate the political and social divisions based on exclusive governance system that resultantly dismembered the country within 24 years of creation.

Despite having Jinnah‟s directions in the form of addresses and speeches, the

Pakistani leadership could not decide the nature of governance in Pakistan. In post-1971 scenario, a nation state emerged that was not in accordance with Jinnah‟s view of

Pakistan. Bengal was overwhelmingly a Bengali speaking province and after losing it,

Pakistan did not lose much of its colorful ethno-lingual mosaic. It already has linguistic provincial demarcation but with a very minor proportion of other communities. Uneven regional development is also a colonial legacy that is a major cause of ethnic mobilization in Pakistan. The reason of the anti-Punjabi resentment is the leading socio-political and economic developments of Punjab, but all parts of Punjab have not benefitted from this development. South Punjab is less developed in comparison to other areas of Punjab.

Moreover, the less developed and marginalized communities and areas coincide in

Pakistan; like Baluchi, Sindhi, and Siraiki.

Contrarily Muhajirs, Punjabis, and Pakhtuns inhabit relatively thriving regions. The ethno-lingual grievances are based on territorial and non-territorial concerns of respective segments. Non-territorial concerns are based on insufficient and improper representation in public institutions and contentious distributive formulas. The reconciliation measures, besides need of decentralization, are though reached at many times but never implemented in Pakistan due to concentration of political powers in few hands. This is a

273 major cause for the demand of autonomy by alienated ethno-lingual segments. Even after the 18th amendment, the situation is not much different than earlier. Regional and mainstream parties are enthusiastic to meet these grievances of each segment as part of their respective political manifestos. This is an interesting subject that alienated political parties are more concerned about these issues as they are excluded from the power structure. This shows incompatibility and less satisfactory performance of the governance model of Pakistan.

Contrary to federal soul of the Constitution of 1973, Pakistan is a centralized state and in case of emergency it reacts like a unitary state. In Pakistan, it has been a practice during military and civilian regimes as they used constitution to curb oppositional or rival parties inside or outside parliament. Therefore, the problem lies elsewhere in governance structure of Pakistan and for this Adeney (2009) says that “the absence of Consociational mechanisms has caused much of the conflict in Pakistan”. This thesis aims to clarify this incompatibility and views Consociationalism as a supposed apocryphal panacea for

Pakistan to develop political and social consensus by practicing accommodative politics.

After evaluating constitution in Chapter 3, it was visible that Pakistan is practicing a pure Majoritarian Model. Pakistan sustained bipartite system despite having multi parties in political arena, and only two parties i.e. PML-N and PPP shared the bulk of political powers besides allegations of rigging in general elections. In this background, the dominant party was the focus of executive power and oppositional parties could not perform as they were supposed to do. The strained relationship between PM and

President demonstrated that some constitutional practices are harmful for the political stability in Pakistan. There was no balance of power between executive and legislature

274 beside disproportional electoral system. Pakistani federalism acts like a unitary state.

Constitution is flexible and prone to amendments but state bank is dependent on legislature. This demonstrates that Pakistan is missing consensual tone as a supplementation of Majoritarian federalism.

This thesis is neither aiming to refute nor establish benefits of Consociationalism for

Pakistan. It aims to highlight emergence of ethnic conflicts, governmental policies to reconciliation, and functional limitations of the adopted regulations and finally practicality of Consociationalism in Pakistan. Moreover, though Majoritarian model is working, but the central issue is that the Majoritarian model is incompatible or less satisfactory in Pakistan to accommodate and include all its ethnic and linguistic classes for political stability.

In this background, the debate on the adoption of Consociationalism for Pakistan is not a work of few years, but it might take decades to judge the vitality of the theoretical practicality. However, I tried to demonstrate the relevance of Consociationalism with the politics of exclusion in Pakistan through the careful scrutiny of the theory and the

Pakistani society. In Pakistan though, the role of political elites is not accommodative in history but now it is emerging gradually and this is the theme of Consociationalism.

Pakistani society is a deeply plural one where every segment is further internally plural despite presence of some commonalities like religion. But this is not meant to be common interests.

Initially at partition, the PML and JI got support from many ethnic groups but with passage of time, regional and ethnic political parties emerged and shared this vote bank

275 with PML and JI. MQM is an example in this regard. Urdu was criticized for being a language of minority and it remained a barrier for ethno-lingual groups to get their share in public institutions. This proves the importance of proportional representation and segmental autonomy. To eliminate the anti-Punjabi resentments, the minority veto is necessary. This will enhance a sense of security among alienated groups. Last but not the least, the presence of multiparty system in Pakistan is itself demanding a grand coalition.

The present government system is not resolving the nation-building issues that need proper and positive involvement of all major ethnic and political leaders in policy and decision-making process. Therefore, this thesis is looking into an alternative approach of

Consociationalism for Pakistan.

In the above mentioned background, in chapter 6 and 7, a debate has started on the adoption of Consociationalism in Pakistan. First, in comparison to India, the soil of

Pakistani society is very rich to accept seeds of Consociational democracy. After examining four Consociational models and comparing such models of India, Malaysia and Kenya with Pakistan, it can be assumed that Pakistan can develop consensus through setting up Consociational arrangements.

Pakistan has less complex society than that of India, Malaysia and Kenya and if these states can maintain Consociationalism then its scope of success in Pakistan is larger.

Pakistan also fulfills favorable conditions of Consociationalism in comparison of Indian case that score 7 out of 9 and its social norms, more or less, resemble with Pakistan to a large extent. The favorable factors support Consociationalism to flourish; but after examining Indian case, it became obvious that sometime few crucial things cover up the absence of other factors. Pakistan has no solid majority, but it has 7th position on world

276 ranking by population in comparison to India that ranks at second number. It has uneven size of groups and socio-economic conditions, but at the time it has regional concentration of segments, small number of segments, overarching cleavages, external threat and a tendency of accommodation and compromise.

After examining norms of Pakistani society and its compatibility with

Consociationalism, the outcome can be drawn that firstly, Pakistan fulfills the criteria for the Consociational arrangements to a great extent. Secondly, it has been developing the politics of compromise. Thirdly, it has deeply plural society. It is a very rare occurrence that a consociation can fulfill all four characteristics given by Lijphart. Some deviation must exist there in all cases of consociations.

Currently Pakistan is a highly centralized state and despite consensus on many packages of decentralization, they could not be implemented. Some segments of society remained vocal for decentralization, more autonomy and power-sharing in true sense while living within federal settings. There was visibly a feeling of discomfort for the existing federal model. It is beyond any doubt that Pakistan is a heterogeneous society and the current governance model is not meeting the demands of its social norms. The basic consensus on fundamental principles is yet to be achieved. Even Objective

Resolution could not achieve that and the streams of liberal/secular and fundamentalists have locked horns, which are proving a hurdle in smooth sailing of political system.

Political stability can be achieved through inclusion of all important classes into power structure and the best possible consensus can be achieved through Consociational arrangements.

277

Findings of the data collected from Pakistani media suggests the need for elites‟ consensus, a grand coalition for constitutional change, land and tax reforms, devolution of power, proportional representation, minority protection measures in and outside of the parliament, inclusion of all ethnic and linguistic classes in power structure through proper representation and minority veto.

The above mentioned findings suggest that Pakistan might need Consociational federal arrangements. An optimistic role of leaders, like in Malaysia where crises hit the political structure many times, but the positive and constructive role of leaders from grand coalition did not break their collaboration through sacrifice and accommodation.

After examining Pakistani society, it can be assumed that the ethnic mold of Pakistan does not have an identical class composition nor does it have an equal or even proportional representation in important spheres of state affair (Ahmed, 1998).

Governance issues of Pakistan are a manifestation of the power struggle between different power contenders. Governance failure is a product of missed opportunities which is a burden of the history of Pakistan (Lodhi, 2011). Now a new pattern of politics is emerging in Pakistan, but the clash is related to the ideological rifts and contested ideas of Aligarh and Deoband School of pre-partition era which still continues (Shafqat, 2011).

It has been discussed in detail earlier that Pakistan Movement remained successful to attain its aim but after partition the ideology of Islam did not prove workable to keep the nation united for a long time and instable political situation plural the society (Burki,

1991). In Pakistan the state based on Islamic ideology excluded non-Muslims and women in general and certain communities (nationality and sect based) in particular. That

278 generated a sectarian rift within society. Pakistani Nation is still busy to clarify the ideology and there is a strong disagreement on measures to achieve this clarity (Ahmed,

2010). Niaz Murtaza (2015) stated in his article that the ideology bypassed the initial essential phases and was imposed on 4th level directly which is about formulation of a political structure. Amr Jaleel (2015) also stated that ruling class should correct their perception that one language and one religion can generate one united nation. He quotes the example of Arabs who have been in rivalry of one other since fourteen centuries despite having one language and religion.

In this background, after partition the lack of accommodation of different classes in power-sharing created further division in Pakistani society which produced grievances at national level. These provincial, ethnic and class grievances and exclusion led to political mobilization and ethnicity emerged as an integral part of the civil society. Muslim nationalism was challenged by ethnicity and wrong policies of leaders and weaknesses in inherited governance model from colonial times became a hurdle in good governance.

Ethnicity was considered as law and order question instead of governability problem

(Malik, 1997). Regional conflicts with addition of different Islamic brands were a particular feature of Pakistani history (Shafqat, 1997).

Moreover history of Pakistan shows lack of an effective mechanism for settling of regional claims; even after the 18th amendment no such mechanism exists there (Ezdi,

2015). In fact, Pakistan after partition could not resolve the issues of ethno-linguistic movements. According to Amin (1988), there were three main inherited weaknesses i.e., absence of consensus over the shape of the polity, absence of a precedent procedures for settling regional claims and finally weak organizational structure of the Muslim League

279 in central and provincial governments to become the weakness of political system as well.

For the above mentioned details, Majoritarian system is alleged as unchecked and having centralizing tendencies. These limitations are structural. Majoritarian Model is a system in which powers concentrate under „winner takes all‟ (FPTP). Moreover it does not protect minorities‟ right to have political representation, divide a society and centralizes power. This decreases responsiveness of democratic government by decreasing participation of marginalized groups (Bastian and Luckham 2003).

To point out the real problem with Pakistan, Adeney (2012) stated that the absence of

Consociational mechanism has caused severe ethno-linguistic conflicts. Relations between ethno-linguistic groups can be managed by constituting a suitable institutional design. There are many structural problems with the Pakistani federation that have assumed ethnic connotation. This has remained ever a problem for Pakistan. Most ethnic concerns are visible in core institutions (civil-military bureaucracy) and allocation of resources to federating units. The gap issues with this article is that it talks about ethnic conflict during martial law periods only, and ignores the record of clashes during currency of democracy. In Pakistan, democratic governments also failed or proved less effective to accommodate the alienated ethnic and linguistic classes.

Pakistan was the result of the struggle of a variety of people belonging to different backgrounds and the Pakistan that came into existence contained a wide variety of ethnic and linguistic groups and subgroups which had very little in common despite confessing the same faith. (Hippler, 2012). These ethnic groups should

280 be managed to avoid conflicts by giving proper representation in line with the constitution of Pakistan. When groups face imbalances in society, they come into conflict. Political system should initiate such economic, social and political measures to curb ethnic conflicts (Majeed, 2011). Pakistani federalism based on Majoritarian Model has a troubled history and long military rule has intensified the difficulties of managing diversity, due mainly to a top-down, highly centralized and exclusive model in nature.

Lijphart‟s concept of elite contract was in field between leaders of the main parties of

PPP and PML-N after 2008‟s general elections (Samad, 2013) and still in progress.

To resolve likewise problems as Pakistan has, political scientists, since 1960s, have been in favor of an explicit form of government that can help maintain democracy in multi-ethnic states like Pakistan. However, we labeled them with a little variance in characteristics occasionally as “Segmented Pluralism” (Lorwin 1971), “Concordant

Democracy” (Lehmbruch 1974) or score as “Consociationalism” (Lijphart, various strands since 1960s). Apparently, in this background, power-sharing was recommended as a therapy for Pakistan while Consociationalism was categorized as a vivid mechanism of power-sharing for multiethnic and plural societies. So, there was a need for probing the relevance of Consociational Model of power-sharing exclusively, with the multiethnic society of Pakistan which has Majoritarian system in its post-colonial background.

Approximately, all arrangements dealing with political marginalization and ethnic friction in Pakistan have called for power-sharing and political inclusion of excluded groups in the power structures of Pakistan. Though Pakistan used a number of strategies to manage diversities, but every time the exclusive nature of Pakistani federalism remained a hurdle in the way of inclusion of ethnic and linguistic classes that caused

281 political instability. The central government often persuaded the excluded groups but due to the trust deficit these policies ended in violence. According to Samad (2007, 128)

Pakistan “needs to adopt accommodative strategies that incorporate all groups and the refinement and enrichment of the concept and practice of federalism and a move away from the present system”.

The Pakistani elites adopted ad-hoc administrative policies instead of adopting inclusive and long term political and economic bargain. For this, Malik (1997, 171) suggests “there are strong prospects for a positive pluralism leading to national integration and acculturation in Pakistan, but only if unevenness in state-led policies is removed and fully empowered democratic institutions are allowed to function in the country”. Feroz Ahmad also gives his opinion (1998, 271-72) that Pakistani federation should ensure more provincial rights through modifications in its structure. Cohen (1987,

327) recommended to manage deeply plural society of Pakistan and its elites should share power through installing effective institutions. Same sort of advice of elite bargain is given by Amin (1988, 255) while Kennedy (1993) suggested adoption of accommodative strategies through change in national political blueprint.

In short, these studies emphasized the use of power-sharing measures, and

Consociationalism is the name of elite-bargain that initiates this process.

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Live with Talat Hussain, Aaj TV, 1st October 2014,

Pakistan at 7, Aaj News, 29th April 2015

Capital Talk, Geo News, 5th May 2015

DNA, Channel 24, 29th April. 2015.

309