The Impact of Internal Migration on Sons of the Soil Conflict in China and Indonesia

Unsettling Migrants? The Impact of Internal Migration on Sons of the Soil Conflict in China and Indonesia

Isabelle Lucie Côté

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Political Science University of Toronto

Unsettling Migrants? The Impact of Internal Migration on Sons of the Soil

Conflict in China and Indonesia

Isabelle Lucie Côté

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Department of Political Science

University of Toronto

2014

Abstract

Recent instances of large-scale inter-provincial migration have resulted in open clashes between indigenous populations and migrants—i.e., ‘Sons of the Soil’ (SoS) conflict—in several minority regions around the world. Yet, equally large population movements have been peacefully integrated elsewhere. Under what conditions does internal migration lead to SoS conflicts?

Based on quantitative population data and over 100 interviews conducted in nine months of fieldwork in China and in Indonesia, I argue that large and consistent socio-economic and political Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) between migrants and locals is a key condition explaining why some minority regions erupt in SoS conflicts while others remain relatively quiet. Fearing demographically-induced socio-economic and political marginalization, local communities resort to violence against migrants when the latter appear to benefit disproportionately from their relocation at the expense of the local population –i.e. when they are “dominant migrants” with close connection to the State and its dominant ethnicity. However, any single dimension of HIs is unlikely to result in SoS conflict independently. It is the coalescing of various mutually- reinforcing HIs that render the situation most explosive.

Yet, local people do not always act on these grievances and mobilize against migration. A favourable institutional context is necessary for migration-related tensions to transform into SoS conflicts. Alongside HIs, I contend that political liberalization influences the likelihood, frequency and intensity of SoS conflicts, as it affects internal migratory patterns and local people’s abilities to organize or mobilize against migrants. As political liberalization also contributes to socio- economic and political inequalities between migrants and locals, it simultaneously tilts the balance of power between groups.

By analyzing the different migration trajectories and how they relate to SoS conflict, this dissertation highlights the conditions transforming the otherwise peaceful internal migration into a violent process. The empirically-informed model herein developed puts migrant/local relations squarely at the center of our analysis, providing a more nuanced and disaggregated analysis of the different dimensions of their relations. While the empirical focus is on migration-conflict dynamics in China and Indonesia, the model developed provides important insights for countries with large-scale internal migration to minority regions.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We say that it takes a village to raise a baby; it also takes a village to complete a PhD. Throughout this six year-and-some long process interrupted by the arrival of our little älskling, I was fortunate to be surrounded by a group of people who provided the support, motivation and inspiration I needed to bring this chapter of my life to an end. I would first like to acknowledge the generous financial assistance I received from the Social Science and Humanities Research Councils (SSHRC), the Ethnicity and Democratic Governance (EDG) project, multiple David Chu awards and the Chiang Chu Kuo (CCK) Foundation. I am incredibly grateful to the 155 people who welcomed me into their home and workplace. I have respected their wish to remain anonymous as they willingly discussed sensitive subjects with me. Thank you to my supervisor, Jacques Bertrand, who provided thorough and careful feedback on countless chapters, manuscripts and applications. His abilities to distill the essence of any text and situate it in the literature are unparalleled. Supervising at a distance involves long periods of ‘radio silence’ followed by a quick flood of often distraught emails. Jacques’ beliefs in my own abilities to complete this project motivated me and pushed me intellectually. He constantly adapted his supervising style as I progressed throughout my PhD: providing plenty of leeway for me to tailor a research project I was passionate about, finding the right balance of constructive criticisms and encouragements during the writing of my dissertation, and providing sound career advices as I approached the end of my academic journey. I am grateful to Monica Duffy Toft, Jeffrey Kopstein, Bill Hurst and Ed Schatz for forcing me to see my work from new and different angles. Their challenging comments and intellectually stimulating discussions were highly valued. An additional ‘thank you’ to Ed who not only sparked my interests in qualitative research but provided much needed reassurance when I came back from the field, more confused and overwhelmed than when I left. His ability to see the person behind the student/scholar is one I intend to emulate. At the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI), I felt especially privileged to have Pak Riwanto take me under his wing and provide me with such mentorship and illuminating comments. My stay in Indonesia would not have been the same without the laughter and conversations shared with Imelda, Lita, Aulia, and Tine and without the guidance of Thung Ju Lan, Rudolf, Julina and Doddy. Thank you for making Indonesia my home away from home.

At Minzu University in Beijing, Zhang laoshi went out of his way to provide me with all the support I could have ever needed. The entire staff and student body at the Ethnic Minority Study Center of China was just wonderful. In particular, a big ‘thank you’ goes to Vanilla and Dai Qifu who made me feel so welcome, and to my three wonderful research assistants without whom this work could have never taken shape. The academic journey can be painstakingly repetitive, isolating, and fraught with anxiety and competition. I was fortunate to meet exceptionally smart- yet incredibly kind- fellow academics early on while in Canada, including David Houle, Yannick Dufresne, Ethel Tungohan, Cliff Van der Linden, Chantal Amirault, Gabriel Eidelman, Olga Kesarchuk, Sanjay Jeram, Jessica Sodiergo, Dubi Kanengisser, Elizabeth King, Sarah Eaton and Jean-Michel Montsion. Matthew Mitchell and Shane Barter: your professionalism, sharp analytical skills and sense of humour made collaborating a breeze. I have learnt a lot from you. Thank you also to Carolynn Branton and all the staff at the Political Science department who kept me in the loop despite the distance. And my sincere gratitude to Karen Campbell for reading an earlier draft of this thesis and for making me sound so much better than am I. As I relocated to Lund/Sweden to write my dissertation, I had the good fortune of meeting more inspiring scholars in Mike Sundström, Malena Rosén-Sundström and Christian Fernandez. Thank you for including me into your research projects and into your lives. Thank you also to the members of the Nordic Indonesian Network and the recently formed Nordic Network on Southeast Asia. Your enthusiasm, stimulating discussions and constructive comments were just what this lonely Canadian scholar needed. I must have been born under a lucky star, for everywhere I went, I found amazing people who I now call friends. It all started with you, Myriam Croteau. To my UWC/Pearson friends, thank you for instilling in me the belief that I too can help change the world, one person or thesis at the time. To my Hong Kong friends –Daniel Horn, Louis-Etienne Vigneault-Dubois, Ingri Revheim, Amy Cheung-Viklund, Marianne Aasvestad-Hoel, Norman Voss, Christian Neuhaeuser and Jenni Viittala- you are such an integral part of who I am today. Thank you. To my Glendon people, Véronique Perron, Laurence Jollez, Brian Desrosiers-Tam, Leanne Legault, Sophie Gravel, Valérie Roy and Marie-France Nadeau: I am in awe of your brains, your energy, your “stand-upness”, and your all-around awesomeness. Toronto will always be cool in my eyes thanks to you. To Véronique Lacasse, my soulsister: thank you for being you. I found in you a true friend. Thank you also to my cousin Geneviève St-Laurent, with whom I commiserated countless times over the ordeals of being a mother in academia while in ‘exile’. Any relocation brings its share of

v hardship, and I wish to thank Sylvia Stipic, Annette Jönsson, Henke Brink, Maria Rra, Guillermo Chaminade and Emilie Gervais for making Sweden –including its winters- such a great place to live. Thank you also to my Swedish family who has welcomed me with open arms from day one. Tusen tack Lena, Jan-Inge, Gunilla, Kent, Johanna, Jesper, Ulrika, Thomas, Tim, Ella och Lova! Un gros merci à mes parents, Denise et Bernard. C’est en grande partie grâce à eux que j’ai pu compléter cette thèse. Ils m’ont enseigné la valeur du travail bien fait, la patience, le respect d’autrui et la capacité d’apprécier les petits et les grands bonheurs de la vie. Je ne pourrais être plus fière d’être votre fille. Etant maintenant parent, j’apprécie enfin à sa juste valeur tout le temps, l’énergie, et la dedication nécessaire pour élever un autre être humain. A ma soeur Melanie: merci de m’avoir continuellement poussée à m’affirmer depuis mon tout jeune âge; une qualité qui m’est particulièrement utile aujourd’hui. Merci aussi à mon beau-frère et à mes nieces Maude et Julianne, que je ne vois que trop rarement: vos photos et vos histoires ont égayé mes longues journées de recherche et de dissertation. A toute la grande famille Côté et Verreault: merci de n’avoir jamais ris de cette nièce/cousine qui “était encore à l’école”. To those who ask what is the key to successfully completing a PhD, I say this: Find yourself a patient, supportive and loving partner who doesn’t mind you working when inspiration comes, usually late at night or during the weekend. Someone who takes you as you are, including the constant rambling over theoretical framework, grant applications, and publications. Someone who doesn’t mind footing more than his share of the bills when you are between grants. Someone who has unwavering confidence that you can do it, even when you doubt it yourself. In short, someone who has none of the highs but all of the lows of your academic journey. Stef: there is no doubt in my mind that without you, I would have never made it this far. Merci chéri. Finally, to my Beatrice. Despite all those sleepless nights, you made me stop obsessing over a thesis that represents, after all, only one of the several facets of my life. I see you trying to imitate me, tapping on the keys of my computers. I hope you too find a career that interest you as much on the first days as it does seven years later. Comme dirait grand-papa Bernard, je t’aime plus qu’hier et moins que demain ma puce. This thesis is dedicated to all of you who made this process one worth completing.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... II ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... IV LIST OF TABLES ...... IX LIST OF FIGURES ...... XI

PART A: RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 SECTION 1.1 RESEARCH PUZZLE ...... 2 SECTION 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION ...... 3 SECTION 1.3 WHAT ARE SONS OF THE SOIL CONFLICT? ...... 5 SECTION 1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT ...... 13

CHAPTER 2 INTERNAL MIGRATION AND SONS OF THE SOIL CONFLICT 16 SECTION 2.1 MIGRATION AS A DIRECT CAUSE OF CONFLICT ...... 17 SECTION 2.2 THE CONDITIONAL EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ...... 23 Subsection 2.2.1 Horizontal inequalities and dominant migrants ...... 23 Subsection 2.2.2 Political regime and political liberalization...... 30 SECTION 2.3 CONCLUSION ...... 33

CHAPTER 3 METHODS AND RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 35 SECTION 3.1 PROBLEMS WITH DEMOGRAPHIC DATA ...... 35 SECTION 3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 38 SECTION 3.3 CASE SELECTION ...... 39 SECTION 3.4 DATA COLLECTION...... 42 SECTION 3.5 CONCLUSION ...... 45

PART B: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CHAPTER 4 THE IMPACT OF HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES ON SONS OF THE SOIL CONFLICT IN CHINA ...... 47 SECTION 4.1 XINJIANG ...... 50 Subsection 4.1.1 HIs in Xinjiang ...... 54 Subsection 4.1.2 HIs and SoS conflicts in Xinjiang ...... 68 SECTION 4.2 QINGHAI ...... 72 Subsection 4.2.1 HIs in Qinghai ...... 76 Subsection 4.2.2 HIs and SoS conflicts in Qinghai ...... 81 SECTION 4.3 INNER MONGOLIA (IMAR) ...... 87 Subsection 4.3.1 HIs in IMAR ...... 90 Subsection 4.3.2 HIs and SoS conflicts in IMAR ...... 97 SECTION 4.4 CONCLUSION ...... 102

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CHAPTER 5 THE IMPACT OF HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES ON SONS OF THE SOIL CONFLICT IN INDONESIA ...... 106 SECTION 5.1 KEPULAUAN RIAU (KEPRI)...... 110 Subsection 5.1.1 HIs in Kepri ...... 113 Subsection 5.1.2 HIs and SoS conflicts in Kepri ...... 118 SECTION 5.2 PAPUA ...... 122 Subsection 5.2.1 HIs in Papua ...... 127 Subsection 5.2.2 HIs and SoS conflicts in Papua ...... 135 SECTION 5.3 LAMPUNG ...... 141 Subsection 5.3.1 HIs in Lampung ...... 145 Subsection 5.3.2 HIs and SoS conflicts in Lampung ...... 150 SECTION 5.4 CONCLUSION ...... 157

CHAPTER 6 THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS ON MIGRATION AND SONS OF THE SOIL CONFLICTS IN CHINA AND INDONESIA ...... 162 SECTION 6.1 INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS, MIGRATION AND SOS CONFLICTS IN CHINA ...... 162 SECTION 6.2 INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS, MIGRATION AND SOS CONFLICTS IN INDONESIA. 173 SECTION 6.3 CONCLUSION ...... 189

PART C: CONCLUSION CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION ...... 191

APPENDIX 1 ...... 199 REFERENCES ...... 206

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LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 2.1 MIGRATION AND INCIDENCE OF CONFLICTS IN INDONESIA, 1990-2003 ...... 19 TABLE 3.1 TABULATIONS OF FIELDWORK INTERVIEWS ...... 45 TABLE 4.1.1 ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF XINJIANG’S POPULATION, 1953-2010 ...... 53 TABLE 4.1.2 ETHNIC AND MIGRANT POPULATIONS OF XINJIANG’S PREFECTURES AND CITIES, 2010 ...... 53 TABLE 4.1.3 AVERAGE MONEY WAGE OF STAFF AND WORKERS BY SECTORS AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE MAIN INDUSTRIES IN XINJIANG ...... 55 TABLE 4.1.4 ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN XINJIANG ...... 56 TABLE 4.1.5 REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT IN URBAN AREAS IN XINJIANG’S PREFECTURES AND CITIES ...... 56 TABLE 4.1.6 PERCENTAGE OF INTER-PROVINCIAL MIGRANTS INVOLVED IN VARIOUS OCCUPATIONS IN XINJIANG ...... 57 TABLE 4.1.7 AVERAGE MONEY WAGE OF STAFF AND WORKERS BY SECTORS IN XINJIANG, QINGHAI AND IMAR ...... 60 TABLE 4.1.8 ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF XINJIANG’S PREFECTURES AND CITIES ..... 62 TABLE 4.2.1 ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF QINGHAI’S POPULATION, 1953-2010...... 75 TABLE 4.2.2 ETHNIC AND MIGRANT POPULATIONS OF QINGHAI’S PREFECTURES AND CITIES, 2010 ...... 75 TABLE 4.2.3 AVERAGE MONEY WAGE OF STAFF AND WORKERS BY SECTORS AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE MAIN INDUSTRIES IN QINGHAI ...... 77 TABLE 4.2.4 ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN QINGHAI ...... 77 TABLE 4.2.5 REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT IN URBAN AREAS IN QINGHAI’S PREFECTURES AND CITIES ...... 77 TABLE 4.2.6 PERCENTAGE OF INTER-PROVINCIAL MIGRANTS INVOLVED IN VARIOUS OCCUPATIONS IN QINGHAI ...... 78 TABLE 4.2.7 POPULATION OVER 6 YEARS OF AGE PER ETHNIC GROUP AND MIGRATION STATUS AND EDUCATION IN QINGHAI ...... 79 TABLE 4.2.8 ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF QINGHAI’S PREFECTURES AND CITIES ...... 80 TABLE 4.3.1 ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF INNER MONGOLIA’S POPULATION, 1953-2010 ...... 89 TABLE 4.3.2 ETHNIC AND MIGRANT POPULATIONS OF INNER MONGOLIA’S PREFECTURES AND CITIES, 2010 ...... 90 TABLE 4.3.3 AVERAGE MONEY WAGE OF STAFF AND WORKERS BY SECTORS AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE MAIN INDUSTRIES IN IMAR, XINJIANG AND QINGHAI ...... 91 TABLE 4.3.4 ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN IMAR ...... 91 TABLE 4.3.5 REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT IN URBAN AREAS IN IMAR’S PREFECTURES AND CITIES ...... 92 TABLE 4.3.6 PERCENTAGE OF INTER-PROVINCIAL MIGRANTS INVOLVED IN VARIOUS OCCUPATIONS IN IMAR, XINJIANG AND QINGHAI ...... 92 TABLE 4.3.7 POPULATION OVER 6 YEARS OF AGE PER ETHNIC GROUP AND MIGRATION STATUS AND EDUCATION IN IMAR, XINJIANG AND QINGHAI ...... 93 TABLE 4.3.8 ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF IMAR’S PREFECTURES AND CITIES ...... 94 TABLE 5.1.1 MIGRANT POPULATION OF KEPRI, 2010 ...... 112

TABLE 5.1.2 ETHNIC POPULATION OF KEPRI, 2000 ...... 112 TABLE 5.1.3 POPULATION OF KEPRI BY INDUSTRIES, 2010 ...... 114 TABLE 5.1.4 KEPRI’S GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA, 2009 ...... 114 TABLE 5.1.5 KEPRI’S POPULATION 5 YEAR OF AGE AND OVER BY EDUCATION ATTAINMENT, 2010 ...... 115 TABLE 5.1.6 KEPRI’S UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 2010 ...... 116 TABLE 5.2.1 MIGRANT POPULATION OF PAPUA, 2010 ...... 124 TABLE 5.2.2 ETHNIC POPULATION OF PAPUA, 2000 ...... 126 TABLE 5.2.3 POPULATION OF PAPUA BY INDUSTRIES, 2010 ...... 127 TABLE 5.2.4 PAPUA’S GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA, 2009 ...... 129 TABLE 5.2.5 PAPUA’S UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 2010 ...... 130 TABLE 5.2.6 PAPUA’S POPULATION 5 YEAR OF AGE AND OVER BY EDUCATION ATTAINMENT, 2010 ...... 131 TABLE 5.2.7 AVERAGE YEARS OF EDUCATION OF MIGRANTS, 1990, 2000 ...... 133 TABLE 5.3.1 MIGRANT POPULATION OF LAMPUNG, 2010 ...... 144 TABLE 5.3.2 ETHNIC POPULATION OF LAMPUNG, 2000 ...... 144 TABLE 5.3.3 POPULATION OF LAMPUNG BY INDUSTRIES, 2010 ...... 146 TABLE 5.3.4 LAMPUNG’S GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA, 2009 ...... 147 TABLE 5.3.5 LAMPUNG’S UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 2010 ...... 147 TABLE 5.3.6 LAMPUNG’S POPULATION 5 YEAR OF AGE AND OVER BY EDUCATION ATTAINMENT, 2010 ...... 148 TABLE 7.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS ...... 194

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 4.1 MAP OF XINJIANG ...... 54 FIGURE 4.2 MAP OF QINGHAI ...... 76 FIGURE 4.3 MAP OF INNER MONGOLIA ...... 90 FIGURE 5.1 TRANSMIGRATION 1970-1985 AS PROPORTION OF THE 1980 PROVINCIAL POPULATION ...... 108 FIGURE 5.2 INTER-PROVINCIAL MIGRANTS IN INDONESIA AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION OF EACH PROVINCE, 2000 ...... 110 FIGURE 5.3 MAP OF KEPRI ...... 113 FIGURE 5.4 TRANSMIGRATION IN PAPUA, 1984 ...... 123 FIGURE 5.5 MAP OF PAPUA ...... 126 FIGURE 5.6 TRANSMIGRATION SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTHERN SUMATRA, 1990 ...... 142 FIGURE 5.7 MAP OF LAMPUNG ...... 145 FIGURE 6.1 STREET POSTER OF XINJIANG’S ETHNIC GROUPS ...... 166 FIGURE 6.2 STATE LOYALTY SIGN IN KUQA’S UYGHUR NEIGHBORHOOD ...... 171 FIGURE 6.3 MAP OF INDONESIA, 1950-1955 ...... 184 FIGURE 6.4 MAP OF INDONESIA, 2007 ...... 184 FIGURE 6.5 MAP OF LAMPUNG, 1999 ...... 185 FIGURE 6.6 MAP OF LAMPUNG, 2007 ...... 185

CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

On July 5th 2009, a peaceful Uyghur protest spiraled out of control when shops and vehicles were set afire and (mostly Han) passersby were attacked in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The incident triggered months of violence throughout the entire region (see BBC 2009). What caused this sudden surge in inter-group violence in Xinjiang? The Chinese government was quick to blame the three forces of separatism, terrorism, and extremism and Rebiya Kadeer, the leader of the World Uyghur Congress (Lei, Cui and Hooi 2009; Hogg 2009). Since then, an alternative explanation has gradually come to the forefront: that the ever-increasing presence of Han settlers in the region is a major factor contributing to the recent surge of conflicts in Xinjiang. Though the state-led program of internal migration to the frontier regions was discontinued in the late 1970s, Han migration to and state presence in Xinjiang have anything but abated thanks to the relaxation of the household registration system and Xinjiang’s emergent economic and trading opportunities. While the migration of many young and technically qualified Han Chinese from the eastern provinces has been associated with regional economic development and growth (Information Office PRC 2009), it has also created deep-seated resentment among the Uyghurs who view this migration as a government plot to dilute their numbers and power, undermine their culture, and prevent any serious resistance to Beijing’s control (Dillon 2009a; Jacobs 2010; Lorenz 2009; Demick and Pierson 2009)—charges that are vehemently denied by the Chinese government (AFP 2009). Elsewhere in Asia, the newly formed Indonesian province of Kepulauan Riau or Riau Archipelago (hereafter Kepri) continues to experience unparalleled inflows of internal migrants. When inter-provincial population movements peaked, at the turn of the 20th century, uncontrolled migrants were estimated at 4,000/day, fuelling Batam’s—Kepri’s largest city—record-breaking population growth of 13-14% per annum (Jakarta Post 2001c). Today, nearly every other resident of Kepri is born outside of the archipelago (BPS 2010). Kepri’s ethnic make-up is accordingly highly diverse, earning the province the nickname of ‘little Indonesia’. Some of these migrants came as part of government programs like transmigrasi, but the large majority resettled voluntarily, hoping to benefit from Kepri’s booming economy. If like in Xinjiang, such large inter- provincial population movements into Kepri were at times opposed by the native Malay population (Yuliandini 2001; Jakarta Post 2001c), they rarely if ever resulted in large violent conflict pitting internal migrants to non-migrants. In fact, Kepri’s few instances of migration- related clashes either involved two groups of migrants from Indonesia, international migrants and

1 2 local people.

1.1 Research Puzzle The presence of migration-related conflict and violence in places like Xinjiang—and its absence in other high-migration regions like Kepri—calls for a systematic investigation of the dynamics between ‘locals’ and ‘migrants’1 in Asia and, more generally, a greater examination of the migration/conflict nexus in minority regions around the world.2 In his study of India, political scientist Myron Weiner (1978) provides one of the first and most insightful analyses of the potentially explosive situation stemming from clashes between migrants and indigenous populations—what he termed ‘Sons of the Soil’ (SoS) conflicts. It is regrettable that for over two decades SoS dynamics have largely been ignored in both cross-national and single case studies examining the occurrence of internal conflicts. Literature has emerged post 9/11 that underlines the security implications of demographic factors in general and of migration in particular (Choucri 2002; Goldstone 2002, 2001; Weiner and Russell 2001). Two main limitations afflict this body of work. First, most of this literature focuses on international migration and its potential for threatening international security (e.g., Teitelbaum and Winters 1998). The role of internal migration in threatening national security and fuelling civil wars, ethnic clashes, and SoS conflicts is not specifically explored, despite mounting evidence of such connections from in-depth case studies (see section 1.3 of this Chapter). Second, existing research has principally focused on the broader concept of ‘security’, failing to explore the conditions potentially turning the everyday occurrence of population movements into an explosive situation. This lacuna is particularly detrimental, as migration-related conflicts appear to be the exception rather than the norm. Were migration to inherently carry the seeds of conflicts, SoS clashes would occur in every migrant-receiving locality and on a much more frequent basis. For every case of mass migration into a minority region that is connected to widespread conflicts (for instance Xinjiang), one can find a counterexample in which similar large-scale movements of populations into a minority region have been accompanied by limited and localized outbursts of violence, or no violence at all (e.g., Kepri). Whether internal migration is indeed correlated to

1 Throughout this thesis, I use locals/natives/indigenous/Sons of the Soil interchangeably to distinguish them from those that are ‘not of the soil’ (i.e. migrants, non-locals, newcomers, etc) but who are nevertheless from the same country.

2 Here, the term ‘minority region’ refers to both provinces and autonomous regions with substantial populations belonging to one or more of the country’s national minorities.

3 internal conflicts needs to be theoretically explained, and the nature of this relationship ought to be examined more closely. If there is a direct relationship between internal migration and internal conflict, the mechanisms making conflict possible ought to be better reviewed. If there is an indirect relationship, the missing intervening variables or conditions ought to be better established.

1.2 Research Questions This dissertation develops our understanding of the internal migration/conflict nexus. Building on the literature on SoS conflicts, political demography, dominant ethnicity, and horizontal inequalities, this study focuses on the impact of a particular instance of internal migration: the migration of an ethnic group into a ‘minority region’. The main questions guiding this work is as follows: Why does internal migration into a minority region sometimes lead to SoS conflicts, and sometimes not? Or stated otherwise: Under what conditions does internal migration lead to SoS conflicts?

To investigate these questions, I examine population movements into three minority regions in China (Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Inner Mongolia) and three minority regions in Indonesia (Papua, Lampung, and Kepri). The two countries were selected given their large population and the presence of population movements into minority regions over roughly the same period (see Chapter 3.3). Whilst both countries face similar challenges as hundreds of million of people move, or have moved, within their countries’ borders, the policies implemented and their consequences are very different. I argue that SoS conflicts do not automatically arise from large- scale inter-provincial migration to minority regions and that no “demographic threshold” exists after which a host region with a large proportion of migrant population is doomed to experience SoS conflict. The presence of certain socio-economic and political conditions is necessary for this otherwise peaceful process to become lethal. This investigation shows that SoS conflicts are more likely to occur in regions with substantial minority and migrant populations if:

1) Substantial socio-economic and political inequalities exist between migrants and locals belonging to different ethnic or religious groups (horizontal inequalities –or HI- condition); and

4 2) Political liberalization disrupts the previously established balance of power between migrants and locals (political liberalization condition). The horizontal inequalities condition stipulates that the greater the socio-economic and political horizontal inequalities between migrants and locals, the greater the likelihood that inter-provincial migration results in conflict. Whenever there are large, consistent HIs between migrants and locals over competition for economic resources and political representation, tensions and conflict are likely to erupt over migration. Fearing migration-induced socio-economic and political marginalization and lacking appropriate channels to voice their grievances, local communities resort to violence against migrants when the latter appear to benefit disproportionately from their resettlement at the expense of the local population. The host region’s political and economic contexts also help generate HIs, making a specific type of inequality most relevant to a particular case. Regions with sub-nationalist and secessionist movements like Papua, Xinjiang and, to a lesser degree Qinghai, are particularly prone to the creation of strong, mutually-reinforcing socio- economic and political inequalities between locals and migrants. Alternatively, in regions well- endowed with natural resources such as Inner Mongolia, economic HIs over the control of such resources is the most important source of group tension and conflict. However, any single dimension of HI is unlikely to result in SoS conflict on its own. It is the coalescing of various mutually-reinforcing HIs simultaneously that render the situation most explosive. When those who migrate are “dominant migrants” with a pre-existing socio-economic and political advantage over the local population due to their closer connection to the State and its dominant ethnicity, migration-related tensions and conflicts become all the more likely as they generate or magnify group disparities between migrants and locals. This distinction between the migration of “dominant migrants” and that of any other socio-economic or ethnic group has, until now, eluded scholarly migration discussions. Besides, when HIs and exclusion are experienced both at the lower end of the labour hierarchy (e.g., through land deterioration or lack of employment alternatives) and for local elites (e.g., through barriers to joining the civil service), large-scale group tensions are most likely to transform into SoS conflict. As Xinjiang and Papua combine all of these contributive factors –i.e. both provinces rely on natural resource exploitation and possess a sub-nationalist/secessionist movement that motivated the relocation of dominant migrants, who then contributed to the creation of large socio-economic and political HIs at both ends of the labor hierarchy – these provinces are more prone to SoS conflicts than the other minority regions investigated.

5 Even when migration-related tensions and grievances exist, local people do not always act on them and mobilize against migration. A favorable political context is necessary for migration- related tensions to be transformed into SoS conflicts. The political liberalization condition offers a qualitative, cross-country assessment of institutional impacts on migration flows and local mobilization in authoritarian China and democratizing Indonesia. I explain sub-national variations in SoS conflicts over time in both countries. Alongside HIs, political liberalization and institutional factors influence the likelihood of SoS conflicts in a given region as they affects internal migratory patterns and locals’ abilities to organize or mobilize against migrants. As it contributes to socio-economic and political inequalities between locals and migrants, political liberalization also changes the balance of power between groups. Indeed, inter-group differences are not entirely intrinsic, and are constantly created or recreated by exogenous factors such as elections and the implementation of new economic policies that shift the previously agreed upon mechanisms of resource distribution from migrants to natives, or vice versa. The two conditions can be present independently or coincide with one another, thereby increasing the possibility that a host region (a country, a province, or a district) will experience a SoS conflict. Likewise, these conditions are shown to influence the various modalities of migration-related conflicts—i.e., the frequency of conflict, scale of the confrontations and who is targeted in the conflict.

1.3 What are Sons of the Soil Conflicts? Despite their pervasiveness, SoS dynamics have largely been overlooked in cross-national and micro-level studies, and are conflated with similar concepts such as civil wars and ethnic conflicts. I now demonstrate why SoS conflict is the appropriate dependent variable for this investigation. First analyzed by Weiner (1978), SoS conflicts possess the following core features. They involve an ‘indigenous’ element, i.e., members of a group born and raised in their current regency of residence make historical claims over the land on which they reside. SoS conflicts also involve an ‘ethnic’ element, as they pit members of a minority ethnic group concentrated in a given region against ethnically distinct migrants hailing from other parts of the same country. In several cases, those regions have been granted various levels of cultural, economic, and even political autonomy by their respective state due to ethnic and cultural distinctiveness. Group autonomy and historical attachment between an ethnic group and its territory reinforce the group’s belief that they are ‘from the land’—i.e., that it is their homeland and that they are the land’s rightful owners. Political scientist Monica Duffy Toft astutely writes: “No matter how barren, no territory is worthless if it

6 is a homeland. […] This is because territory is simultaneously a divisible, quantifiable object and an indivisible and romantic subject” (2003:1). According to her theory of indivisible territory and ethnic war, violence is most likely when both sides in a conflict regard a disputed territory as their homeland, thus explaining why people are caught in such a bitter fight in the control over Jerusalem/Palestine or Kosovo. In the current thesis, the objective is not to demonstrate the historical accuracy of a group’s claims over a territory: as the individual case studies will soon demonstrate, the Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Papuans, Lampungese and Malays are all largely believed to be the first people to have settled and continuously inhabited their current territory. All of these groups derive legitimate ownership of their homeland from the fact that the bodies of their ancestors rest in the lands they are now tilling or herding. In contrast, the migrant populations in Xinjiang, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Papua, Lampung and Kepri never exhibited the same sense of ownership or entitlement to the lands they are currently occupying. Afterall, their ancestors were often buried elsewhere, several hundred of kilometers away, in their home region. But if migrants do not personally see their current location as ‘their homeland’, the Chinese and Indonesian states certainly see these regions as part of a greater indivisible national homeland for their citizens and undercut local claims of land ownership or “homelandship” by asserting that no/all ethnic and religious groups are “native” or “indigenous” to the country. For this reason, while discourses on indigeneity and autochtony have recently grown in popularity around the world (see Jung 2003; Geshiere 2009), they have largely failed to gain ground in Asia. In Indonesia, indigenous movements—including the relatively recent Adat Movement3—have had limited success in securing rights to self-determination or greater rights over land and natural resources for its indigenous populations (Bertrand 2011). And in China, few national minorities have explicitly used the “indigenous” language in dealing with the Chinese state given the latter’s declaration that “in China, there were no indigenous people and therefore there were no indigenous issues” (cited in Wang 2004: 176).4 If one group is “of the soil” or local, the corollary is that other people are non-locals or migrants, including those who are second or third generation migrants. In most regions, the non-

3 As shown in Acciaioli (2001), masyarakat adat —i.e. social groups that have ancestral origins in a specific territory, along with possessing an economy, politics, culture, and society of their own—have been used to revive certain discourses on local customs and make claims to lands, particularly against migrants. This led to the creation of AMAN or Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (or Alliance of indigenous people of the archipelago) in 1999.

4 This may soon change as recent research projects at China’s Minzu University in Beijing have considered looking at the Canadian experience of dealing with indigenous communities (personal communication with PhD candidates at Minzu University, May 2011).

7 local population consists of more recently arrived and ethnically distinct populations hailing from other parts of the same country (internal migrants) rather than foreigners or international migrants. Indeed, the latest UN estimate of 214 million international migrants—approximately 3% of the world’s population (IOM 2008)—pales in comparison to the 261.39 million Chinese ‘floating people’ or liudong renkou who relocated without having secured a permanent household registration status in their place of destination (Ma 2011), the 300 million people classified as internal migrants in India according to the 2001 census (Deshingkar 2006:3), or the 27.9 million Indonesian people who live in a region different from their place of birth (BPS Indonesia 2010). Today’s so-called “age of migration” (Castles and Miller 2009) is undoubtedly one of international and internal migration, especially in countries that are less developed but rapidly developing (King, Skeldon and Vullnetari 2008:3). Accurate estimates of internal migration are notoriously difficult to make due to the difficulty of deciding the minimal threshold distance for an internal move to be recorded. For this reason, the term internal migration typically encompasses both inter-provincial and intra- provincial migration. To be recorded in most national censuses, population movements need to be for a minimum of one year.5 Movements may be either economically motivated—in which case they are (mostly) the result of individuals’ cost-benefit analysis and are thus relatively ‘spontaneous’—or politically motivated—in which case they are directly or indirectly induced by the central government and may be labeled as ‘organized’.6 With these caveats in mind, SoS conflicts are defined in this thesis as violent –though not necessarily deadly- clashes erupting from interactions between migrants and locals, and where conflict has been meaningfully oriented toward migration. SoS violence is generally directed by natives against migrants rather than the other way round (see Laitin 2009; Bhavnani and Lacina, forthcoming: 5). As violence targeting migrants often leads to their mass exodus from an area, this measure is, for the host population’s perspective, one of the few means at their disposal to

5 This limitation explains why short-term movements—despite estimates putting their numbers at 86.3 million people in 2000 in China alone (Sun and Fan 2011)—are harder to quantify, as they are not captured in the census, the main tool for calculating migration.

6 Organized state migration is sometimes described as ‘involuntary’ or ‘forced’ migration, though these qualifications are harder to prove (see Rohlf 2007). For this reason, the term ‘organized’ migration will be used in this thesis. Yet, it is true that migration often occurs under a variety of pull and push factors, making the distinction between ‘spontaneous/organized’ or ‘economic/political’ migration much harder to establish (Hugo 2005). Though imperfect, this distinction is nonetheless helpful in comparing and contrasting different types of migration and how they may initiate or fuel SoS conflicts.

8 reduce or control migration. The definition above thus includes ‘classic’ SoS clashes over economic competition. However, it also makes room for brawls and vigilante nativist attacks on migrants and their properties, such as their houses, trucks or their place of work (e.g. government buildings or companies exploiting natural resources), when these are meant to show discontent regarding migration or even reduce it. It also departs from the definition used by Fearon and Laitin, who purposefully excluded conflicts in which locals protested natural resource exploitation (2011: 209, notes 2) despite the fact that such natural resource companies recruit heavily outside the locale and thus crucially affect migration and migrant/indigenous population dynamics in the region. Adopting a wider definition of SoS conflict allows for a better grasp of the variety of conflicts related to migration and a better understanding of the various dynamics involving indigenous and migrant populations as individuals are never only ‘migrants’: they simultaneously respond to various ethnic, religious, sexual or occupational identities. If one of the warring parties can be just as adequately labelled a migrant, Muslim, Javanese or civil servant, what makes a conflict a SoS conflict rather than an ethnic, communal or religious conflict? As a rule of thumb, the orientation of a conflict toward migration is established when at least two sources (e.g. newspapers or respondents) voluntarily highlight migration as a factor in the conflict. A prominent strand of the conflict literature argues that violent events cannot be reliably distinguished by the issue at stake due to the endogeneity of political interpretations of violence (see Brubaker 2004) and because in most violent events, participants have highly individualized motivations (e.g. Kalyvas 2003). Notwithstanding these limitations, recent datasets on relatively organized forms of conflict often rely on the official statements of belligerents to code the issues at stake (e.g. UCDP/PRIO, 2013:8). Qualitative studies using interviews or surveys are also susceptible to this caveat, hence the need to have more than one sources confirm the migration dimension to violence. A SoS conflict can be deadly (e.g., targeted killings or riots), but this is not always the case. Political scientists James Fearon and David Laitin demonstrate that SoS conflicts have surprisingly few fatalities worldwide, with an average of 33,254 people killed versus 138,534 for all other civil wars (2011: 200-201). Small pogroms or demonstrations where no one was killed, but properties were destroyed, can also be characteristic of SoS conflicts, especially in authoritarian or semi-democratic contexts in which the repressive nature of the state greatly limits the extent of the violence employed by non-state actors (Scott, 1990). Unfortunately, the high lethality threshold of most quantitative studies examining the link between migration and conflict

9 glosses over these less violent acts of resistance.7 This results in a high lethality-bias in cross- country quantitative analyses. Qualitative studies involving fewer case studies are better at circumventing this limitation, for they examine the full scale of range and intensity of migration- related conflicts rather than explain the presence or absence of migration-related deaths and violence. Finally, opposition to large-scale migration may also take the form of non-violent demonstrations or other types of peaceful ‘under the radar’ resistance, but as these events are notoriously difficult to track and codify, they are not included in our definition. SoS conflicts are not a new phenomenon, nor are they rare in occurrence. In a recent study, Fearon and Laitin estimate that 22% of all civil wars fought between 1945 and 2008 and nearly one-third of all ethnic civil strife during that period were sparked by violence between locals and recent migrants from other parts of the country (2011: 200). Interestingly, they also find a potent correlation between SoS conflict and one geographical region, Asia, where half of all SoS cases occurred (2011:200). As the authors speculate, the region’s unique physical and social geography, where a large lowland plain area is typically overpopulated by members of the dominant ethnic group and is surrounded by peripheral hill areas inhabited by ethnic minorities, may be a cause (2011). However, considering the positive correlation between civil wars and countries with a large population (Fearon and Laitin 2003), it is not utterly unexpected that Asia, a region comprising five of the seven most populous countries in the world, has a strong prevalence of SoS conflicts. SoS conflicts between migrants and indigenous populations in Asia have been reported in India (Devotta 2002; Forsberg 2010); Indonesia (Tirtosudarmo 2006; Ananta 2006; McGibbons 2004; Noveria 2002); Malaysia (Sadiq 2009); Papua New Guinea (Koczberski and Curry 2004); Fiji (Leuprecht 2007-2008); China (Becquelin 2000; Dillon 2004, 2009); and the Philippines (Tigno 2006), though they were not always labelled as such. The fact that SoS dynamics are particularly concentrated in one geographical region does not mean that this phenomenon is unheard of elsewhere or that it is region-specific. Conflicts between migrants and indigenous populations have been reported in a wide variety of regions outside of Asia, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa. Bates (2008), for instance, argues that land conflicts between locals and migrants have grown increasingly common in Africa and that it is an important factor in the collapse of political order in many states in this area. Case studies on Kenya

7 Among these, Fearon and Laitin’s (2003; 2011: 209) lethality threshold for inclusion was 1,000 killed over the course of the conflict, with an average of at least 100 per year, and with at least 100 killed on both (or all) sides. In the UCDP dataset used by Forsberg (2010), there needed to be at least 25 battle deaths in a year for conflicts to be included. A recent, non-published study by Bhavnani and Lacina has thankfully lowered the lethality threshold by focusing on riots rather than civil wars.

10 (Lynch 2011), Uganda (Green 2007), Nigeria (Kraxberger 2005), the Ivory Coast (Marshall- Fratan 2006; Mitchell 2011), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Jackson 2006) confirm this observation. The various names given to the concept of SoS is also proof of the prevalence of SoS dynamics around the world, from the very general label of ‘locals’, to the North American ‘natives’ or Latin American ‘indigenous people’, to the Québécois ‘de souche’, to the term ‘autochtony’ prevalent in Central and Western Francophone (and Anglophone) Africa, and to the Southeast Asian pribumi or putra daerah. Even the Chinese concept of shaoshu minzu, used to refer to Chinese national minorities generally and based on the Soviet concept of ‘nationality’, captures, to a certain degree, the same elements of cultural or ethnic distinctiveness and territorially concentrated population that SoS possess. Not only are SoS conflicts present around the world but they will likely increase in occurrence in the years to come, making them all the more important to examine. Indeed, if SoS conflicts involve, by definition, issues of migration and migration trends are on the rise, then SoS conflicts are likely to persist. This is especially the case if states continue to shy away from intervening, thus making the causes and modalities of SoS conflicts all the more important to investigate. Three trends are expected to fuel to migration in the coming decades. First, development and improvements in transportation and telecommunications facilitate population movements. Studies have shown that railway and road construction have not only indirectly contributed to migration by facilitating the dispersion of a country’s population over its entire territory, they have also directly contributed to population movements through the creation of new towns and villages along the transportation lines (Colombijn 2002; Wong 2010; Clarke 1994: 229). Likewise, social networks have always constituted a major ‘pull’ factor in a migrant’s decision to move to a new destination (Liang 2001), and new technological devices and services are making it increasingly easier to (re-) establish contact with friends and relatives who may be able to provide crucial information, and sometimes jobs, to facilitate migration. Thanks to these technological developments it has become much easier for people to relocate, and spontaneous economic migrants have taken full advantage of such opportunities for themselves and their families. Finally, the fact that minority regions are now becoming increasingly popular as migration destinations due to programs of economic development represents a significant shift from earlier migration trends, and one that is expected to impact SoS conflict as well. The 2010 Indonesian census reveals that, aside from the main urban areas, the provinces of West Papua, East Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, and Riau, which have substantial resource reserves and minority

11 populations, have the highest numbers of recent migrants in Indonesia (BPS Indonesia 2010). In China, Tibet and Xinjiang ranked 7th and 11th respectively out of 31 provinces for their proportion of net migration as a percentage of the population in 2010 (Fisher 2012). Earlier internal population movements have typically brought people from the same ethnic group to urban areas. Conflicts arising in such contexts were thus mainly economic in nature. However, migration to minority regions involves another crucial layer, as migrants come from an ethnic group different than that of the locals. Considering how sensitive such migration was in the case of Xinjiang (Dillon 2009a; Jacobs 2010; Lorenz 2009; Demick and Pierson 2009) and Papua (Upton, 2009; McGibbon, 2004) alone, it is surprising that so little has been written on migration into minority regions. Difficulties in conducting research, limited data available on migration, and the general sensitivity of the topic may explain the dearth of research in this area. Notwithstanding these limitations and considering that minority groups oftentimes occupying large, resource-rich regions located near a country’s international frontier (Iredale et al 2001: 12-13), migration to minority regions should occupy a greater place in the migration literature given that it combines the ‘traditional’ migration issues of social progress and political stability with matters of national security and resource control. It is important to distinguish SoS conflicts from other types of conflicts that may or may not involve migration-related issues. The literature on civil wars provides important insights into the study of SoS conflict, namely the causes of large-scale, violent, state-directed attacks. However, this body of literature does not contribute to our understanding of conflicts in which the state is not involved and in which conflict are less violent. To be classified as a civil war, a civil conflict ought to meet the following criteria: 1) The conflict involves fighting between agents of the state and organized, non-state groups; 2) At least 1,000 are killed over the conflict’s duration; and 3) at least 100 are killed on both sides of the conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 76). Based on these criteria, two organized non-state groups such as migrants and indigenous populations—the archetype SoS conflicts—would be excluded. The high threshold for violence would also exclude several SoS clashes that did not lead to mass violence but that continued to linger and influence SoS dynamics. For these reasons, the broader concept of civil wars is inappropriate for this study, as it fails to capture what is at stake: the often violent, though rarely very lethal dynamic interactions between indigenous and migrant populations. Even if the concept of civil war were to capture those essential characteristics, several qualities distinguish SoS conflicts from civil wars and justify their consideration as a separate object of inquiry. SoS conflicts have been shown to be statistically more prevalent in larger countries and to simmer at a lower level than other

12 types of civil conflicts (Fearon and Laitin 2011: 200-1). They also last longer, with a median duration of 15 years compared to 7 years for civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2011: 200-1). These statistical discrepancies are significant, for “all these differences would be extremely unlikely to arise by chance if in fact the distribution for SoS and non-SoS wars were the same” (2011: 200). Compared to civil wars, ethnic conflicts encompass less violent confrontations between non-state actors. Ethnic groups are often defined as people sharing common origins and ascriptive characteristics that may include cultural, linguistic, religious, or racial criteria (Smith 1986; 2004). Incidentally, ethnic conflict refers to conflict between groups that self-identify as distinct from others based either on their culture, language, religion, or race—or on all of those criteria. A conflict is labeled ‘ethnic’ when it has meaningfully been oriented to the different ethnicity of the target, though this ‘ethnic quality’ may also emerge through after-the-fact interpretative claims (Brass 1996; 1997). Ethnic conflict, then, refers to conflict between ethnies that have been mobilized. However, just because they have been mobilized and are in conflict does not automatically necessitate violent relations (Leuprecht 2003). SoS conflict represents a distinct subset of the broader category of ethnic conflict. Both are, at the core, ‘identity’-type conflicts, but the two should not be conflated. Even though clashes between migrants and locals often adopt an ethno-religious character as they exploit the substantial ethno-religious differences between the two groups, the ethnic nature of SoS conflict should not be over-emphasized at the expense of other, as important characteristics. In Xinjiang, for instance, local Uyghurs sometimes form informal inter-ethnic coalitions as they band with “older” migrants against the influx of recent Han economic migrants to the region. And in Qinghai, attacks against migrants typically target recent economic migrants who relocate to Yushu, but not older economic and political migrants established in northeast Qinghai. In both cases, duration of residence in Xinjiang and Qinghai are considered more important than ethnicity. In Indonesia, there are also numerous instances of migrants belonging to a non-local ethnic group who have come to be accepted as locals after having continually resided in the host region for an extended period of time. The best example is Raja Ali Haji and his successors who were known as ‘champions of Malay customs and traditions’ in 19th century Penyengat (in today’s Kepri), even though they were in fact of noble Bugis descent. Even when ethnicity comes into play, further distinction should be made. Indeed, not all ethnically distinct migrants are equally at risk of attacks by locals. In West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan, Chinese and Madurese—but not the larger group of Javanese migrants—were specifically targeted by the Dayaks in the 1968 and 1996-97 clashes, respectively (Peluso and Harwell, 2001). To frame the debate in terms of one ethnic or

13 religious group versus another glosses over an important fact: such conflicts involve, first and foremost, people who consider themselves to be ‘locals’ or from the land, often sharing ethnic characteristics, and those who are considered and/or consider themselves to be ‘migrants’ or non- locals. Narrowing the focus to SoS conflicts as a field of research is useful, because SoS conflicts present a unique challenge. They may or may not be violent, thus including analyses of SoS conflicts in the civil war literature would be inappropriate. SoS conflicts may or may not presume that a group’s ethnic identity takes precedence over other types of group identification (e.g., place of birth, length of residence), and they may or may not emphasize the role of ethnicity in contributing to conflict, thus including SoS conflict within the literature on ethnic conflict would exclude important distinctions. Why did some SoS conflicts become ethnicized from the start while others did not, or did so after several decades of competition over local resources between migrants and locals? Why are some categories of migrants perceived as more threatening to locals than others? As this section demonstrates, such distinctions are better captured within the literature on SoS conflicts.

1.4 Structure of the Argument Given the prevalence of SoS conflicts and the relatively limited academic attention given to migration in minority regions and SoS conflicts, this three-part study sheds much-needed light on SoS dynamics. Part A is devoted to the problem of SoS conflicts: the role of demographic factors in general, and internal migration in particular, in these conflicts, and what method is most appropriate to examine the connection. Specifically, Chapter One presents the research puzzle and research questions and, citing empirical evidence, defends Sons of the Soil conflicts as a separate object of inquiry. Chapter Two reviews the literature on explanations for SoS conflicts. It first examines political demography explanations, which largely presume that migration is an independent variable playing a direct role in SoS conflicts. A brief quantitative analysis of migration and conflict in Indonesia points to flaws in this logic and disproves the widely-held assumption that an increase in migration directly correlates to SoS conflicts in host regions. Alternative explanations that do not start from the assumption that migration automatically results in conflict are then reviewed. In particular, two socio-economic and political conditions increasing the probability of conflict are identified: 1) the horizontal inequalities condition and 2) the political liberalization condition. Chapter Three frames a method for testing these conditions. The research design is premised on the contention that examining the role of political

14 demography/internal migration in SoS conflicts does not lend itself to state-level, cross-national statistical correlation using multiple regressions. Instead, this chapter argues for a comparative sub-state analysis with select case studies drawing on extensive fieldwork and statistical reports to uncover the association between migration and conflict. It also justifies the selection of China and Indonesia and of the sub-national regions by providing a brief portray of their demographics and migratory movements. Part B provides empirical evidence for the thesis and qualitatively scrutinizes the conditions expected to increase the risks that migration into a minority region result in SoS conflicts. It also unearth the mechanisms connecting migration to conflict. Chapter Four compares the impact of large-scale inter-provincial migration in Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Inner Mongolia. I demonstrate that Chinese minority regions with lower socio-economic and political HIs –e.g. Inner Mongolia- experience fewer, more localized SoS conflicts than Xinjiang and Qinghai, two secessionist regions with large discrepancies in political representation, education level, access to economic resources and jobs between inter-provincial migrants and locals, and Han Chinese and minority groups. In particular, I emphasize how the migration of Han Chinese – i.e. China’s dominant ethnicity- to minority regions solidified the socio-economic and political gap between migrants and locals and contributed to SoS conflicts. The fact that HIs are most experienced by local elites (e.g., through barriers to joining the civil service) than by those at the lower end of the labour hierarchy explains why conflicts are less prevalent in Qinghai than in Xinjiang, where exclusion is experienced both at the lower and higher ends of the labour hierarchy. I conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of the mechanisms through which objective and/or subjective socio-economic and political asymmetries are transformed into grievances, and how such grievances trigger violent actions targeting migrants through a process of group mobilization. Chapter Five corroborates these findings by exploring the same linkages and mechanisms in democratizing Indonesia. Despite being the province with the largest migrant population, Kepri experiences next to no SoS conflict as a result of the limited competition for economic and political resources between migrants and local Malay. At the other end of the spectrum, the secessionist movement in Papua, along with its resource-oriented economy, have created strong and mutually reinforcing political and socio-economic HIs between migrants and locals, which contributes to the frequent SoS conflicts in the autonomous province. Lampung is located somewhere between these two extremes as it experiences some localized migration-related violence associated with group disparities in resource access, but those are usually peacefully

15 resolved thanks to comparatively smaller political HIs between migrants and locals and the presence of well-established local mechanisms of conflict resolutions. But again, SoS conflicts do not erupt every time locals resent the migration of a socio- economically and politically dominant group. A favorable political context is necessary. While the last two chapters looked at sub-national variations, Chapter Six assesses cross-national variations in SoS conflict in China and Indonesia. I examine how two state-level institutional factors –i.e. political regimes and political liberalization- influence internal migratory trends, locals’ ability to mobilize against migration and ultimately, SoS conflicts. In authoritarian China, State repression, limited freedom of expression and the presence of a national discourse condoning inter-provincial migration all hamper local mobilization against migration. The timid political liberalization underway since the late 1970s has however granted local populations some modest windows of opportunities to organize against inter-provincial migrants, especially non- hukou migrants. The role of political liberalization is especially visible in Indonesia, where the end of the repressive Suharto era, along with the introduction of Reformasi disrupted the previously established mechanisms of resource distribution and shifted the balance of power between migrants and locals. These institutional transformations facilitated local mobilization against migration and contributed to the rise of SoS conflicts in several Indonesian provinces since 1998, especially those targeting spontaneous migrants. Part C draws conclusions from the investigation of SoS conflicts through the lens of political demography and horizontal inequalities, and emphasizes their contingency pending the availability of a broader set of reliable data on migration and SoS conflict at the local level. Chapter Seven summarizes my research findings, highlighting the applicability of the two conditions to my six case studies. I conclude by speculating on the implications of the study’s findings for the migration/conflict nexus and for minority-related policies in other minority regions in Asia and around the world.

CHAPTER TWO – SONS OF THE SOIL CONFLICT AND INTERNAL MIGRATION Despite the prevalence and persistence of SoS conflicts, most commentaries on the impact of internal migration on conflict lack strong empirical data and remain largely anecdotal. Comprehensive analyses of demographic dynamics and their relationship to conflicts are rare. Migration literature generally emphasizes either push and pull socio-economic factors influencing migrants’ decisions to move abroad (e.g., Liu 1991) or integration/assimilation into host regions (e.g., Yang and Ebaugh 2001), inadequately explaining the dynamic relationship between internal migration and conflict. The literature on political demography has looked at this problem occasionally, but most studies have focused on the role of migrants in international conflicts (Teitelbaum and Winters 1998). Last but not least, the conflict literature has generally failed to acknowledge that migrants have a significant effect on both the grievances and the opportunity structures inducing conflicts. In light of these theoretical and empirical limitations, a better understanding of the demography/internal conflict nexus is needed.8 Compared to other demographic indicators such as fertility and mortality rates, large-scale population movements are especially relevant and significant for SoS conflicts. On one hand, the impact of a sudden inflow of people into a minority region can be felt much more rapidly than the impact of, for instance, a change in fertility rate. On the other, migration is an important source of population mixing and ethnic diversity as it brings together people from vastly different linguistic, religious, and socio-economic backgrounds who had, until then, little contact and/or awareness of each other (Weiner and Russell 2001: 5-8). Despite the intuitive sense that internal migration ought to be connected to conflict in some way, population movements into peripheral minority regions do not automatically lead to SoS conflict. Under what conditions do demographic factors in general, and migration in particular, increase the probability of SoS conflict? Through what mechanisms is migration translated into conflict? This chapter reviews the literature on SoS conflict. It first examines political demography explanations that oftentimes presume that migration is an independent variable playing a direct role in SoS conflict. I challenge the claim that migration is directly correlated to SoS conflict through a brief quantitative analysis of internal migration and conflict in Indonesia.Alternative explanations highlighting the role of socio-economic and political conditions are then identified,

8 This emphasis on demographic factors in general and on internal migration in particular should not be confused with the more restrictive argument that demographic factors are the sole source of violent conflicts, or that ‘demography is destiny’. Claims of demographic and environmental determinism are often attributed to early Malthusian and neo-Malthusian theorists. Since 1980s, however, neo-Malthusian works have been more sensitive to this critique (Urdal, 2005).

16 17 focusing in particular on explanations invoking horizontal inequalities (HIs) and political liberalization.

2.1 Migration as a direct cause of SoS conflicts The academic literature offers several explanations for the emergence of intrastate conflicts, but demographic factors have thus far rarely been taken into account despite the fact that demography’s three basic variables—fertility, mortality, and migration—significantly affect power and politics (Kaufmann, 2011). Though this omission has recently been corrected (e.g., Goldstone et al., 2012), most of this work has been confined to examining the impact of differential fertility rates or age structures among populations,9 leaving the intervening variable of migration largely outside the conversation. Even if scholars of political demography review the impact of a wide range of variables on different conceptualizations of ‘conflict’ (i.e., civil wars, ethno-nationalist violence, etc.) and do not always explicitly address migration, important insights on the potential implications of demography on conflicts can be gained from their work. Weiner (1978) first explored the potentially explosive situation stemming from clashes between migrants and indigenous populations by focusing on the size, composition, and distribution of the population in relation to both government and politics. As goes the assumption, the larger a group the greater its power to appropriate and control resources, the greater its representation and legitimacy in the political arena, and the greater its input in policy making (Bookman, 1997; 2002a: 9-13; 2002b: 26). The advantages associated with being a numerically important ethnic group are substantial, and in some cases groups even fight over numbers or implement strategies of ‘demographic engineering’ in hopes of altering the current composition of the population in their favour (see Horowitz, 1985; Bookman, 2002b; McGarry, 1998; MacDonald, 2000; Ananta, 2006b). Group size also matters for minority groups, as a study has found a correlation between group size and minority/immigrant antipathy (Blalock, 1967). Despite the intuitive appeal of the hypothesis that group size influences conflict, there is limited evidence supporting the often-heard claim that an absolute increase in the number of migrants directly correlates with an increase in conflict in host areas (Bertrand 2004: 92; Hjerm 2007). The three Chinese provinces with the greatest population changes according to the latest Chinese census—Beijing (41.9%), Shanghai (37.5%), and Tianjin (29.3%) (Fisher 2012: 10)—

9 See, for instance, Toft (2012) on differential fertility rates or 'wombfare'; Leuprecht (2012) on the timing of fertility transition on ethno-nationalist mobilization, and Urdal (2012) on youth bulge and violence.

18 are not particularly known for open conflict between local and migrant populations. In Indonesia, the provinces that have captured worldwide attention for disputes pitting locals against migrants— Maluku (Human Rights Watch 1999; Cohen 2000), North Maluku (Smith 2000), Central Sulawesi (Rhodes 2001; Acciaioli 2001), Central and West Kalimantan (Djalal 2001; Loveband and Young 2006), and Papua (McGibbons 2004; Upton 2009; Widjojo 2010)—do not have a particularly high number of migrants according to the 2010 census.10 The absence of a quantitative empirical correlation between migration and SoS conflict in Indonesia is confirmed by a simple statistical analysis. 11 Using migration data from the 1990 and 2000 national censuses and two United Nation Special Force on Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) databases detailing the occurrence of violent collective conflict in Indonesia, a bivariate statistical analysis was conducted models to systematically assess the role of the total number of migrants in fuelling conflict in Indonesia.12 Two models were created. The first model relies on UNSFIR database 1 that contains information collected from Antara (the national news agency) and Kompas (the main national newspaper) and provides information on social violence in 26 Indonesian provinces from 1990 to 2001. In total, the database covers 1,093 incidents and 6,208 deaths (Tadjoeddin, 2002). The second model uses UNSFIR database 2, which provides data on conflicts and fatalities from 1990 and 2003 for the 14 Indonesian provinces that represent 84.5% of all violent incidents and 96.4% of all deaths recorded in the first database, leaving aside Papua and Aceh due to concerns for the safety of researchers. By complementing data from the latter database with provincial newspapers and extending the period under review to 2003, the size of the second database is increased to 3,600 incidents and over 10,700 deaths (Varshney et al., 2004).13 The second model provides a more time-sensitive approach, as it separates conflicts occurring prior to June 30th 2000 (the date from census-taking in 2000) from those occurring

10 For instance, the proportion of lifetime migrants in Maluku (8.83%), North Maluku (10.37%), and West Kalimantan (1,08%) was lower than the national average (11.7%) in 2010, though Central Sulawesi (23.81%) and Central Kalimantan (17.18%) were higher (BPS Indonesia 2010).

11 A similar quantitative analysis of the migration/conflict nexus in China was impossible to conduct given the lack of a nation-wide reliable database covering violent collective conflict.

12 Given the limited number of cases and the fact that there was multi-collinearity between our migration variables—i.e., an increase in recent migration is bound to affect lifetime migration, though the opposite if not applicable—a simple bivariate correlation is the most appropriate statistical test.

13 Nevertheless, scholars have criticized the databases for their delimitation of conflict (e.g., 24hrs of non-conflict), which overestimates the number of conflicts in regions in which conflicts tended to last longer, e.g., Maluku (see Bertrand, 2008).

19 afterward. This distinction ensures that an instance of collective violence occurring in 1998 is not mistakenly attributed to migrants who relocated in 2003. Table 2.1 shows that Indonesian provinces with a higher number of lifetime migrants (i.e., people who, at the time of the census, reside in a province other than that of their birth) were not those where most violent collective conflict occurred, though these findings are not statistically significant. Likewise, provinces with a higher proportion of recent migrants (i.e., people who reside in a province other than the one they were residing in five years prior to census taking) are not positively correlated to violent conflict. That no substantial difference is found between lifetime and recent migration when it comes to the strength and sign of their relationship with conflict is noteworthy, suggesting that the timing of migration does not quantitatively affect the likelihood that migration will result in conflict. From these findings, it appears that there is no quantitative evidence or ‘smoking gun’ connecting an increase in absolute migration to collective violence or SoS conflicts at the provincial level in Indonesia.14 Table 2.1 Migration and violent collective conflicts in Indonesia, 1990-2003 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 2 Number of conflicts Number of conflicts Number of conflicts 1990-2001 1990-2000 2000-2003 Pearson coefficient Pearson coefficient Pearson coefficient (significance, 2-tailed) (significance, 2-tailed) (significance, 2-tailed) Lifetime migrants -0.187 (0.361) -0.286 (0.322) -0.251 (0.386) Recent migrants -0.249 (0.219) -0.193 (0.508) -0.226 (0.436) N 26 14 14

Since Weiner’s pioneering work, research emphasis has moved from absolute values of population growth and population density, deemed insufficient in explaining the emergence of militarized or violent (inter-state) conflicts (Green 2007; Urdal 2005; Tir and Diehl 1998), to a greater investigation of the kind of demographic changes occurring (de Sherbinen 1995). In

14 It is possible that, unlike Fearon and Laitin (2011) and Forsberg (2010), this study does not show a statistically significant correlation between migrants/non-indigenous people and conflicts given the smaller samples used for our quantitative analyses. The type of migration data collected only allows for one data point by province over a 10-year period. Nevertheless, since the provinces with the highest absolute and relative number of migrants are included along with those with the most conflicts, one can safely assume that the negative correlation between our migration variables and conflict would have only been strengthened were the other provinces included. Another aspect that may have led to different results is the inclusion of all occurrences of collective conflict in which violence was employed, with no minimum threshold requirement. Many of the most prominent quantitative studies on this topic have opted to drop non-lethal conflict from their database given the difficulties in tracking and codifying such events, even if this meant rejecting a number of otherwise valid SoS conflicts that failed to meet those studies' high violence thresholds. Perhaps the proportion of non-native people in the total population only affects relatively lethal conflicts.

20 particular, relative changes, such as those transforming the local balance among major ethnic groups, can be a source of violence and conflicts. As political scientist Jack Goldstone writes: The crucial element here is not migration per se; economic migration often leads to substantial benefits for both migrants and the destination country. What appears to matter for conflict are those cases wherein migration leads to clashes of national identity, that is where one ethnic group migrates into an area that is considered ‘homeland’ by another ethnic group and challenges the dominance of the latter, then conflicts are likely to arise. If these conflicts escalate into a contest for political control of the region, then ethnic war and even genocide often results. (Goldstone 2002: 13-14)

Goldstone should gain credit for correctly pointing out the possibility that international and internal migration into a minority region may lead to conflict—ethnic or otherwise. Unfortunately, this reasoning stops short of acknowledging differences among migrant groups. Migrants belonging to different ethnic and socio-economic groups have access to different political, economic, and social resources. Group differentials may affect the likelihood of conflict. For example, the migration of a specific class of migrants (e.g., well-educated or entrepreneurial migrants) or ethnic group (e.g., those identifying with the country’s dominant ethnic group) may elevate the risk of ethnic conflict or economic competition, while migration to the same region of those from another ethnic group or economic class may not have the same effect. This important distinction is further elaborated in the following section. In addition, Goldstone refers to a book by Teitelbaum and Winters (1998) for further discussion of so-called ‘clashes of national identity’. Since the work in question focuses on conflicts involving high migration levels of predominantly non-European peoples into Western societies (i.e., international migration), one can wonder if the same logic applies in the case of internal migration where the ‘clash’ is likely between two identities that are arguably more alike. Internal migration’s potential to produce a clash of national identities in Indonesia is explored by Bertrand (2004: 92-4) and Ananta (2006a, 2006b), whose separate works both conclude that inter- provincial migration creates tensions in areas where migrant communities from a different religious group outnumber the local populations. Though a rapid shift in a region’s demographic balance appears to discombobulate local-migrant relations, such a sharp transformation of a province’s religious landscape over the course of one generation is quite rare whilst SoS tensions are rather common, thus limiting our ability to generalize this finding to a broader range of SoS conflicts.15 Besides, with its near absence of violent conflict between migrants and local Malays

15 In fact, such drastic demographic changes only happened in 3 of the 60 provinces and autonomous regions included in this study (Xinjiang, Maluku, and Papua), three provinces that coincidentally experienced several, large SoS conflicts.

21 and its migrant population totalling nearly 50% of the total population, the case of Kepri challenges the hypothesis that passed a certain demographic threshold, large and rapid surges in migrant populations are doomed to result in violent SoS conflicts. A widespread hypothesis connecting relative demographic factors to conflicts is that differential population growth among ethnic groups, due to different birth, death, or migratory rates, sparks conflicts. Rapidly growing groups may employ their newfound power to restructure existing political, economic, and social institutions at the expense of the declining groups (see Bookman 2002b; Goldstone 2002: 9-14). Majority-minority group conflicts, for instance, are by nature related to the demographic composition of their population. If the size or the rate of increase of the minority relative to the majority were to suddenly change, group conflict may ensue (Hewitt 1977; Tirtosudarmo 2006). In her comparative study, Toft (2002) finds that the more rapid the rate of differential growth between groups and the closer in size the growing group is to other groups, the more likely a democratic state is to be destabilized. This finding is not likely regime specific. A review of various non-democratic or democratizing countries shows that differential demographic growth may engender ethnic tension and conflicts in these contexts as well. In Lebanon, to cite only one example, no new phone books were published in the 1970s during the so-called ‘Maronite neurosis’ for fear that they would contain more Muslim names than Christian names (Hewitt 1977: 158). There are four empirical problems with the differential population growth hypothesis. First, because population growth consists of the cumulative rates of birth, death, and migration, variations in one factor—e.g., locals’ fertility rate—may counterbalance the effect of another group’s migration into the region, thus providing an incomplete if not misleading picture of the differential population growth among these two groups. In China, for instance, Uyghurs and other national minority groups are not required to follow the one-child policy that is otherwise en vigueur for all Han Chinese (eg. Cohen 2014). As a result of this higher fertility rate, Uyghurs’ relative proportion of the population continues to slowly augment, despite the estimated 3,000,000+ Han migrants who have moved to Xinjiang since the creation of the autonomous region in 1955 (Yuan, 1990). If differential population growth rate were truly a source of anger, we should find fewer conflicts in Xinjiang for the Uyghurs’ relative proportion of the population has remained stable, perhaps increasing, recently (NBCS 2000). However, as the introductory chapter demonstrates, this is not the case. A more detailed and disaggregated analysis of the different components of population growth between groups is needed if analyses are to have explanatory power. Second, the differential growth rate hypothesis over-predicts ethnic and SoS

22 conflict. Since ethnic groups in society generally have different fertility rates,16 conflicts would be expected to erupt everywhere, while we know from Fearon and Laitin’s work that ethnic conflict remains the exception rather than the rule (1996). Third, this hypothesis also takes for granted the mobilization of ethnic identity although the processes by which identities are mobilized are not particularly well understood (Krebs and Levy, 2001: 90). We need to better account for the critical role of agency in mobilizing masses around grievances. Fourth, most statistics available on differential population growth and/or migration are based on national level data, whereas mounting evidence suggests that sub-state statistics would be more accurate and revealing (e.g. see Chapter 3.1). The above discussion shows that demographic factors in general and internal migration in particular influence migrant-related tensions and conflict. Yet, the relationship is not as direct or as causal as some of the literature on political demography initially suggests. The brief quantitative exercise undertaken in this section supports Kaufmann’s claim that “demography is not destiny” (2011); an absolute increase in lifetime and recent migrants is not directly correlated to SoS conflict in Indonesia, and probably not in China either. There is nothing a priori dangerous about migration. Population movements are only part of the complex contributing forces influencing violent and non-violent conflict; other socio-economic and political factors need to be present in order for migration to result in group tensions and conflict. The relative importance of these factors varies across cases, and the likelihood of conflict increases as more forces operate simultaneously. Since internal migration is assumed to interact and overlap in varying degrees with other such factors contributing to the risks of SoS conflict, it is now necessary to shed a light on those intervening conditions.

2.2 Conditions heightening the probabilities that migration will result in SoS conflict Competition or disputes between an indigenous group and migrants over scarce local resources is a constitutive element of SoS conflict (Weiner 1978: 7). Several studies show that group competition occur over most resources in limited supply, including lower-skilled jobs (Fisher,

16 According to the 2000 census, the Gaoshan minority had the highest annual population growth rate among China’s 56 minzu at 5.5%, followed closely by the Qiang at 5.4%. The Koreans nearly had a null growth rate during that period, whereas both Tatars and Uzbek had a negative annual population growth rate, with -0.34% and - 1,62% respectively (China’s Ethnic Statistical Yearbook 2004: 487-488).

23 2004; Noveria, 2002; Green, 2007; Ware, 2005; Kolsto, 2008), highly skilled jobs (Goldstone, 2001; Kolsto, 2008); housing (Kolsto, 2008), and natural resources (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 1994; Reuveny, 2005; Ren and Yuan, 2003; Pan, 2006; Chang, 1949; Green, 2007; Ananta, 2006b; Tyler, 2005). Increased competition over scarce resources is especially likely to result in conflict in developing countries given their lower capacity to deal with environmental issues and scarcity. Group conflicts over land are common in the developing world, where agriculture remains the main source of income and subsistence, thus exacerbating the situation (Bates, 2008; Yegar, 2002; Noveria, 2002; Hoey, 2003; Hardjono, 1977; Fasbender and Erbe, 1990; Tyler, 2003; Tirtosudarmo, 2001; Kearney and Miller, 1987; Pan, 2006; Hansen, 1999; Fearon and Laitin, 2011; Weidmann, 2009; Chang, 1949; Tyler, 2005; Iredale et al., 2001). Where no alternative source of revenue exists, the economic motivation to fight over one’s share of natural resources increases drastically. Competition over land in ethnic homelands is also expected to be particularly conducive to conflict, for the locals’ socio-economic reliance on farming and agriculture is compounded by their strong historical attachment and association to “their [home]land”, thus giving the object of contest—the land—both objective value (e.g., economic or military advantage) and subjective value (e.g., culture and identity) (see Diehl 1991; Toft 2003). Not all group competition in minority regions of developing countries is equally likely to lead to SoS conflicts. I shall now review two socio-economic and political conditions that mediate the relationship between migration and SoS conflict, indicating how each condition increases the probability of migration-related tensions and conflict in the host region.

2.2.1 Horizontal inequalities and ‘dominant migrants’ Inequalities play a central role in classical theories of conflict. Gurr’s (1970) well-known theory of relative deprivation characterizes various types of collective violence as reactions to frustrations stemming from unfulfilled aspirations. As the end of the Cold War brought with it a wave of ethno-national conflicts, Gurr extended his theory and found that ethnic grievances contributed indirectly to collective violence through ethnic mobilization (1993; 2000). Relative deprivation theory remains perhaps the most prominent explanation that connects grievances with conflict, but when empirically tested, quantitative studies assessing the impact of unequal individual wealth on internal conflict consistently found no statistically distinguishable relationship (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

24 As a result, much of the work on the relationship between ethnicity and violent internal conflict has in recent years been dominated by quantitative research emerging from economic and rational choice perspectives that largely discredit grievance-based accounts. And yet, inequalities continue to occupy a prominent place in the literature on violent internal conflicts. In particular, the development economist Frances Stewart and her colleagues developed the concept of “horizontal inequalities” –or inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups (2008:3)– to better capture the link between uneven wealth distribution and conflict. The concept of HIs differs from the ‘normal’ definition of inequality (i.e. what is termed ‘vertical inequality’) because the latter type lines individuals or households up vertically and measures inequality over the range of individuals rather than groups. As explained by Stewart, shifting the explanatory focus from individualist to group-level accounts of inequality and conflict was necessary given that:

[...] the majority of internal conflicts are organized group conflicts –they are neither exclusively nor primarily a matter of individuals committing acts of violence against others. What is most often involved is group mobilization of people with particular shared identities or goals to attack others in the name of the group (Stewart 2008:11)

HIs are inherently multidimensional and encompass economic, social, cultural status and political dimensions (Stewart 2008: 13). The causes and origins or the prevailing socio-economic inequalities between different ethnic groups and/or regions are related to such factors as ecological and climatological differences, the geographical distribution of natural resources, the differential impact of colonialism and post-colonial economic and developmental policies (Brown and Langer 2010: 30). Political HIs consist of inequalities in the group distribution of political opportunities and power, as measured by a group’s control over –or exclusion from– the presidency, the cabinet, parliamentary assemblies, the security forces and regional and local government. Socio-economic HIs include inequalities in ownership of assets –financial, natural, resource-based, human and social– and of income and employment opportunities that depend on these assets. They also include access to a wide range of services such as health and education, and inequalities in achivements in health and educational outcomes. Finally, cultural HIs include the extent to which a society recognizes (or fails to recognize) a group’s cultural practices. The latter should not be mistaken for a cultural explanation of conflict, which has been refuted by many studies (Cohen 1974). Cultural differences between groups may lead to jokes or ridicule, but they do not lead to violent conflict unless there are also major economic and/or political causes (Stewart 2008:11).

25 Because cultural recognition is arguably the dimension of HIs that varies the least within a country and does not, on its own, cause conflict, cultural HIs are not investigated to the same extent in this study.17 According to Stewart (2008: 287), the greater and more consistent the HIs (e.g., if socio- economic and political HIs run in the same direction), the greater the potential for conflict. While the broad categories of HIs are relevant to every society, the specific inequality that is most relevant depends on the nature of the society, its political system, its economy, and its social structure (Stewart 2008: 13). For instance, in a region where most people work in the primary sector, access to and/or ownership of the land are of greater importance than job opportunities. In natural resource-rich economies, control over such resources is an important source of group competition. In a recently annexed or secessionist province where most political leaders are parachuted from the “center”, lack of political inclusion of local elites in the higher (and lower) spheres of power is critical. These examples also illustrate how certain political and economic situations—in particular, the presence of a secessionist movement or an economy largely resting on the widespread exploitation of its natural resources—are particularly likely to create mutually reinforcing HIs. For instance, in a secessionist region, the tendency to attribute the highest or best paid economic and political positions to (presumably more loyal) migrants sidelines local elites who grow wary of the social mobility powers of education and are then forced into other less profitable economic paths, ultimately contributing to the self-professing stereotype of the ‘backward’ indigenous people that then reinforces the hiring of the better educated, ‘modern’ migrants. As pointed out by Brown and Langer (2010:32), there are clear synergies between a multidimensional concept of HIs and other approaches to understanding the dynamics of mobilization in multi-ethnic countries, notably Gurr’s concept of ‘relative deprivation’ (1970) and Tilly’s concept of ‘categorical inequalities’ (1998). However, in contrast to relative deprivation, the HI hypothesis points to the fact that it can be both the relatively poor AND the relatively rich who initiate conflict. And unlike economic analyses that solely measure a country’s objective HIs in the analysis of violent group mobilization, the literature on HIs bears in mind that “it is perceptions as much as reality that is relevant to outcomes, both with respect to what differences actually are, as well how much group members mind about the differences (Stewart 2002:12). In short, HIs are structural asymmetries that make violent internal conflict more likely. A number of case studies have recently provided corroborative qualitative and quantitative empirical

17 Indeed, all ethnic groups investigated are, at least in principle, officially recognized by their respective state (though in practice cultural status varies).

26 evidence of the role of HIs in explaining communal and separatist conflicts, along with civil wars, around the world including in Cote d’Ivoire (Langer 2005), Nigeria (Ukiwo, 2009; Onwuzuruigbo 2011), Ghana (Langer 2009), in various Latin American countries (Caumartin, Molina, and Thorp 2008), India (Kaysser 2014), and Indonesia (Mancini 2008). Quantitative and large-N studies assessing economic and political HIs through the use of survey and/or satellite data have also started to emerge, such as those by Ostby (2008), Baldwin and Huber (2010), Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) and Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011). The latter authors suggest a two-step causal mechanisms linking HIs and, in their case, civil wars (2011:481-2). Inspired by Horowitz’s (1985) ‘positional psychology’ and Petersen’s conclusion that “resentment is the feeling of being politically dominated by a group that has no right to be in a superior position. It is the everyday experience of these perceived status relations that breeds the emotion” (2002:40), the authors first postulate that objective political and socio-economic asymmetries can be transformed into grievances through a process of group comparison driven by collective emotions. Then, considering how ‘injustice frames’ have played a central role in mobilization processes (Gamson 1992), the authors suggest that such grievances trigger violent collective action through a process of group mobilization. Migration to minority regions ties in with the literature linking HIs and violent internal conflicts, for inequalities between “local” and “migrant” populations represent one such example of inequalities between groups with shared identities that may ultimately contribute to group conflict. HIs have repeatedly been used by local entrepreneurs to tighten and increase the salience of local/migrant divisions (e.g. Côté and Mitchell, under review). It is true that, perhaps more so than ethnic categorizations, migrant and local groups are particularly fluid and shifting. A third- generation migrant often considers him or herself ‘from the soil’ or ‘local’, though people with even older ties to the area may disagree. As pointed out by Brown and Langer, HIs could thus be seen as an important process in the formation and mobilization of identities, particularly where these identities emerge in ‘imagined’ opposition to each other (2010:35). More so than ethnic identities that may take a variety of forms, SoS narratives are the quintessential dichotomous identities for one is either ‘from the Soil’ or they are not. Finally, it is important to situate HIs within a broader political context of migration and demographic policies given that migrants to minority regions often enjoy greater political participation, cultural recognition, and access to economic and social resources than the local populations, thus creating or maintaining socio- economic and political HIs in the host regions. Three reasons explain migrants’ positive differentials, I argue.

27 First, migrants—including those to minority regions—are by nature more competitive and less risk averse than non-migrants, as migration remains, in essence, a gamble. Individuals sell their possessions to relocate themselves and their families to an unfamiliar area. When migration takes place within the confines of a country’s borders, internal spontaneous migrants are often more educated than the local population (Viddyattama 2008: 257). These advantages give them a head start when it comes to job competition and may explain why many have been able to exploit or create an economic ‘niche’ for themselves in their destination region—a situation that aggravates economic inequalities between migrants and locals and which causes much anger and resentment among the local population (see Bertrand 2004; Noveria 2002; Chen 2008; Clarke 1994; Hugo 2002). Second, state support is paramount in instigating or consolidating internal migrants’ socio- economic and political advantages (sometimes dominance) in the minority-populated region of settlement, and has become an important source of conflict with the local population.18 Organized state migrants—e.g., those participating in the Indonesian government's transmigrasi programs (1969-2000), which resettled farmers from the “center” to the “peripheral islands” (see Chapter Five)—were typically granted land titles, housing, livestock, and transportation and livelihood subsidies by the state in an effort to convince them to participate in the program. Since local populations did not enjoy the same benefits, transmigrant villages often overtook long-established local communities after a few decades, contributing to the impression that migrants moved in “with the state on their side” (Noveria, 2002; Hoshour, 1997; Côté 2014). Even spontaneous migrants indirectly benefited from state support, though arguably to a lesser degree, as they often relocated near state-organized settlements that enjoyed above average transportation systems and communication infrastructure (McGarry 1998: 619-623). If state support coincides with a model of national development that divides a state’s territory between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’—i.e., internal colonialism—then a structural crystallization of the unequal distribution of resources and power between groups ensues (Hechter 1975).19 The Indonesian transmigration project (Hoey 2003; Adhiati and Bobsien 2001) and

18 It is important to mention that such support is most salient for migrants relocating to minority regions, and not rural-urban migrants who are generally disparaged by the state. In China, several regulations were put in place to limit the countryside’s exodus to the cities (see Meng 2010), and in the early 1970s, a former governor of Jakarta also tried to implement a citywide ban on rural migrants, with limited success (see Berry 1973, 100-1).

19 Settler societies also share certain common features and challenges pertaining to the coexistence of core/periphery and of diverse indigenous and migrant collectivities (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis 1995), though because settler states

28 migration from ‘Inner China’ to border regions (Bulag 2004)20 have both been qualified as ‘civilizing’ or ‘colonizing’, as was the case for ethnic Russians migrating to other Soviet Republics (see Kolsto 1995), Christian migration to Muslim Mindanao in the Philippines (Tigno 2006), and Sinhalese migration in Sri Lanka (Kearney and Miller 1987). Migration from the political core of the country to its minority areas has been shown to result in the political exclusion of local peripheral people (Harrell 1995) and, eventually, in their reacting against the domination of the core. This defensive mechanism was shown in their development of an ideology of ethnic consciousness (Smith 2002) and in the fostering of inter-ethnic and SoS conflict (McGarry 1998: 618). An additional layer to this type of ‘core migration’ has remained largely unexplored in the literature. Migrants’ socio-economic, political, and cultural advantages can be further consolidated if they are part of the country’s ‘dominant ethnicity’—i.e., the ethnic group that controls the economic, political, and social levers of a country. Scholars started paying attention to this concept in response to the often unconscious bias of the central government towards the needs and interests of members of the largest ethnic group, who, by virtue of their numerical majority or political hegemony, receive a disproportionately high share of jobs and resources (Kaufmann 2004; Smith 2004). While there are numerous exceptions to the rule,21 an ethnic group that constitutes either the majority of the population (e.g., Han Chinese in China, Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, or Russians in the former USSR) or its largest ethnic group (e.g., Javanese in Indonesia) is typically the dominant ethnic group of a country.22 Notions of indigenousness and power are central to the idea of dominant ethnicity, for a group’s dominance can be expressed twofold: through its raw political power and ranking within the ethnic power system (i.e., group ‘power’),

represent ‘home’ to a dominant group (Weitzer 1990: 24-25), conflict dynamics are likely to be different from those found in non-settler states.

20 Even Sautman, who argues that there are no “genocidal or colonial projects” in Tibet admitted that both the state and some Han have a sense of a “civilizing mission” there (2006: 256).

21 According to Bookman, exceptions to the positive link between ethnic size and power tend to occur under the following conditions: when there is no universal suffrage or when the political structure prevents the majority of the population from exerting power proportional to its size; when a colonial power favours one ethnic group; or when the majority-minority distinction at the state level does not coincide at the regional level (2002: 11-12).

22 Dominance of one group over another is not set in stone, as several groups who have been dominant one day have been marginalized the next (Bookman 2002: 235, ft 21). Examples of these socio-political transformations are plentiful: the Maronite Christians in Lebanon ceased to be preferred after the French departed, the Russians in Moldavia were no longer dominant after the demise of the USSR, and the Manchu in China became a mere ‘national minority’ after the fall of the Qing Dynasty, etc.

29 or through its capacity to rely on legitimating myths and symbols (i.e., ‘indigenousness’) (Kaufmann 2004: 3-4; 2011). An inflow of ‘dominant migrants’ who are well-educated, have political and economic connections, and may or may not belong to the country’s dominant ethnicity, can be expected to create or magnify socio-economic, political, and cultural HIs and affect the probability of SoS tensions and conflict. Migrants’ privileged connection to the state and, in some instances, membership of the dominant ethnic group, limits local people’s political inclusion. Their greater education level helps them secure the most profitable jobs, contributing to the further socio- economic exclusion of locals. Culturally, migrants who are members of the majority’s ethnic group are especially unlikely to integrate or assimilate into the indigenous culture of their host region. One explanation for such insufficient integration has been migrants’ general disregard for minority or indigenous cultures, and their feelings of cultural superiority (Smith 2002). Alternatively, the belief that minority cultures are only one among the several constitutive elements of the greater, multicultural national identity limits their desire and efforts to learn minority customs, religions, and languages. As a result, asymmetrical bilingualism often emerges in minority regions. While members of a Chinese, Russian, or Indonesian minority group are required to learn the national language, members of the country’s dominant ethnic group are under no obligation to learn a minority language, even if they live in a region where that minority language is the lingua franca (Grunfeld 1985: 66). Studies demonstrate that migrants’ insufficient efforts at assimilating into the local culture are often associated with (real or perceived) marginalization of the indigenous culture and group tensions (see Hardjono 1977: 42-3; Tirtosudarmo 2001). Aware of their demographic minority status at the national level, minorities are now seeing their cultural, economic, and political statuses threatened by the ‘Javanization’ (Errington 1997), ‘Russification’ (Anderson and Silver 1983), ‘Hanicization’ (Becquelin 2000), or ‘Sinhalisation’ (Veerasingam 2012) of their region, propelling them to demand an end to large- scale inter-provincial migration to their homelands. When the three aforementioned factors (natural proclivity, state support, and dominant ethnicity) are intertwined, migrants are presumably “destined to win” in their competition over scarce resources with the local population, which in turn creates or widens HIs between migrants and locals and strengthens the socio-economic, political, and cultural gaps between the two groups. As the socio-economic and political situation of migrants continues to improve vis-à-vis the local population, resentment and social jealousy ensue, creating migrant-local tensions. The limited empirical evidence available suggests that demographic variables, when combined with

30 high HIs, may lead to group conflict. A recent study by Ostby finds that Indonesian provinces combining high population growth and high HIs have an annual risk of routine violence (e.g., brawls) that is nearly 27% higher than regions with low HIs, though the same did not hold for episodic (i.e., ethno-religious) violence (Ostby et al., 2011: 392). As migration is one of the factors contributing to population growth, one can thus assume that migration would also be connected to group violence. However, since migration is closely associated with identity and “us/them” discourses and other narratives of “othering”, one may also presume that it would have more of an impact on episodic violence than would population growth. The policy implications of this literature are important, for if HIs between migrants and locals were to decrease (for instance, through affirmative action-type policies), then migration’s potential for conflict would simultaneously be expected to dwindle.

2.2.2 Political regime and political liberalization The wider political context within which groups interact has also been shown to affect the likelihood that migration will be translated into group tensions and violent conflict. Of particular interest is how regime type affects ethnic conflict and how it interacts with demographic factors. Several empirical studies report an inverted U-shape relationship between democracy and domestic political violence (e.g., Ellingsen 2000; and Ellingsen and Gleditsch 1997; Mousseau 2001). At one end of the curve, democratic regimes are shown to be less likely to experience political violence and conflict, as they use methods like cooperation and autonomy to handle ethnic conflict (Riggs 1995). At the other end of the curve, strong authoritarian regimes under single-party domination are likewise unlikely to experience much ethnic dissent, for they repress incipient rebellions before they begin (Gurr and Harff 1994: 85). When regimes are neither democracies nor autocracies (i.e., semi-democracies or ‘democratizing’) conflict is most likely to emerge, as these states can neither rely on democratic institutions and rules to forge an inclusive citizenship nor on their former repressive capacities to quell dissent. The literature reviewed above does not directly examine the role of migration in the equation. However, Mousseau’s large N study of democratization with ethnic divisions provides an interesting entry point. Her study reveals that democratization is especially associated with higher levels of political violence when it takes place in heterogeneous societies. As she explains: “Although the regime may gradually relax political restrictions on ethnic groups, it may not be capable of accommodating rising ethnic demands because of a lack of resources and democratic political culture” (2001: 561). This zero-sum environment in which uncertainty reigns bolsters

31 the ability of groups to mobilize along identity lines to promote their communal political agendas (Huntington 1997). In addition to religious and ethnic identities, I contend that where people are from—i.e., whether they are migrants or locals—constitutes an identity line that may be politicized in times of political liberalization. As Geshiere and Nyamnjoh note: Political liberalization leads, somewhat paradoxically, to an intensification of the politics of belonging: fierce debates on who belongs where, violent exclusion of “strangers” (even if this refers to people with the same nationality who have lived for generations in the area) and a general affirmation of roots and origins as the basic criteria of citizenship and belonging. (2000:423)

Political liberalization is here understood as regime transformations bringing the state closer to the democratic ideal; including democratization processes, direct local elections and decentralization, to granting of regional autonomy. It carries along potential for conflict, as competition for political spoils suddenly follows a different logic: that of majoritarian democracy. Three questions emerge in the context of democratization: Who can vote? Where can they vote? And who can stand as a candidate? (Dunn 2009). In this context, differential population growth between groups could lead to declines or increases in political power. Demography matters in democratic systems, though “even states without democratic systems of government have engineered dramatic policies aimed at altering the demographic composition of their states” (Toft 2002: 74). Indeed, authoritarian and semi-democratic states have been known to rely on and implement strict discriminatory policies to manage ethnic relations, whereas controversial assimilationist policies are part of settlement policies in a variety of communist countries (Connor 1984). Since these policies have repeatedly served as a catalyst transforming what were once inter-ethnic animosities into open conflicts (Bookman, 2002: 223- 4), one can surmise that demographic factors are as important in authoritarian contexts as in democratic ones. The literature suggests that political liberalization influences the probability of migrant- related tensions and open local mobilization against migration in three ways. First, the greater freedom of expression brought forth by a political liberalization makes it easier for people to mobilize and publicly express their objections to government policies, including government- organized migration programs, while making it easier for media outlets and social networking

32 websites to report dissenting views.23 Second, as repression is more prevalent in non-democracies (Davenport 1995), democratic liberalization limits a state’s capacity and ability to use repression (Davenport 2000), which is shown to suddenly decrease the cost of mobilization and conflict (Mousseau 2001; Saideman et al. 2002). Yet, one should not exaggerate the role of repression, for SoS conflicts do not always occur once repression is lifted. There are no reports as yet of local (internal) migrant conflict in Libya, for instance, following the end of one of the last true authoritarian regimes.24 Above all, political liberalization represents a critical juncture that influences locals’ ability to mobilize against migrants as it disrupts previously established mechanisms of resource distribution, and shifts the balance of power between groups, thereby increasing a group’s uncertainty level. Political liberalization, through such mechanisms as democratic transition or decentralization, suddenly makes new political and economic spoils (e.g., political offices and greater revenue from the exploitation of natural resources) available to a wider audience (e.g., any citizen should, in principle be able to run for office). As a result, fierce competition may emerge among candidates who then tap into whatever identity, rhetoric, or sources of grievance that can maximize his or her chance of being elected. If a relatively small population of migrants had, until a country’s democratization resumed, unfettered access to the highest and most lucrative political and economic positions in the country, local candidates may capitalize on these popular anti-migration grievances and use their own identity as ‘locals’ to be elected, thus further polarizing groups and contributing to group tensions and conflict. Political regime and political liberalization may also explain why SoS conflicts are more lethal in certain political contexts than in others. State repression of freedom of speech and association affect the ability to mobilize. In contrast, an unfortunate byproduct of liberalization has been to encourage political activities of all kinds, including those that are not expressed through democratic institutions or in a peaceful manner (Auvinen 1997). Framed in a rational cost and benefit analysis, the costs of mobilizing against migrants are deemed too high in an authoritarian setting, whereas the benefits of mobilization, even if violent, often supersede the costs in a democratizing setting. As a result, one could anticipate SoS conflict occurring in democratizing countries to be more lethal than SoS conflict in authoritarian countries.

23 For more on the democratizing and mobilizing roles of social networking websites during the Arab Spring, see for instance, Dubai school of government (2011) and Howard et al. (2011).

24 However, there have been reports of attacks against migrants from elsewhere in Africa since the fall of Ghadafi (Amnesty International 2013).

33 A country’s political regime could also affect the targets of SoS conflict. As mentioned in the previous section, some categories of migrants are explicitly or implicitly privileged with government support. Therefore, critiques of state-organized migrants imply a critique of state policies or worse, of the state itself—a situation that can be particularly dangerous in an authoritarian regime in which no public challenge to the state is tolerated. Even if state-organized migrants were to cause resentment in the local population due to the aforementioned political and socio-economic advantages, it is unlikely that they would become the main targets of SoS conflict. Instead, local resentment may be redirected towards more vulnerable migrants who do not enjoy state-support—e.g., spontaneous, economic migrants who relocate of their own volition. Last but not least, studies confirmed that political institutions play an intermediary role in explaining the link between HIs and internal conflict, especially secessionism. Focusing on the incidence of ethno-regional protests and using a dataset of political decentralization in relatively developed countries, Brown (2009) finds that the interaction between the extent of decentralisation and the extent of HIs has much greater explanatory power than each variable alone. More particularly, he finds that ‘self-rule’ dimension of political decentralization can be protest-mitigating in regions with relative high GDP per capita compared to the national average, but can exacertbate protest pressures in relatively poor regions. These findings suggest that, if HIs and political liberalization may contribute to SoS conflict on their own, their overlap may be even more conducive to SoS conflicts.

2.3 Conclusion Understanding whether and how internal migration affects migrant-local relations is key in this era, as migration is becoming the norm rather than the exception and intrastate conflicts outnumber conflicts between states. The political demography literature reviewed above does not provide a strong case for a direct, straightforward correlation between migration and conflict, as shown in our quantitative analysis of migration and violent collective conflict in Indonesia. Certain conditions ought to be present for large-scale migration to intensify group tensions and lead to SoS conflicts. The first condition identified focuses on the type of migrants moving into minority regions and captures the distinction between the internal migration of any socio- economic or ethnic group and that of the dominant or advantaged group. Based on the idea that migrants are often in a favourable socio-economic and political position vis-à-vis local populations in minority regions, the HI condition makes the strongest case for an intuitively plausible relationship between migration and conflict, especially in secessionist regions or in

34 regions with economies heavily dependent on natural resource exploitation. This condition borrows from the literature on dominant ethnicity, which hints, though it does not fully articulate, that mass migration to an ethnic homeland would be particularly conflict-prone were migrants to belong to a country’s dominant ethnic group. As they benefit from their competitive nature, the explicit or implicit support of the state, and their ethnic ties, (dominant) migrants are often resented for their advantageous position. Yet, most of the theories reviewed agree that there is nothing a priori dangerous about migration and population changes. Migration has always been a feature of social life, everywhere and around the world. As the literature on tipping point illustrates (see Bookman 2002), if groups coexist in a state of relative peace or subdued hostility for a period of time, an internally or externally-induced event may tip this balance to produce inter-group conflict. New or enhanced HIs between locals and migrants may represent one such tipping point, as do changes to the local and national contexts in which migration occurs. This line of argumentation is particularly appealing, as it suggests that factors that would otherwise not have been sources of tension feed or magnify group fears. The second condition focuses on institutional factors transforming migration into an object of contention: namely, the coincidence of migration with political liberalization. Stated otherwise, the mere presence of inter-provincial migration to a minority region does not automatically lead to conflict. However, if socio-economically and politically advantaged migrants relocate to a region, and if those movements occur while a country is undergoing significant political liberalization, then inter-provincial migration magnifies group tensions and is likely to turn into SoS conflict. These conditions are also magnified if the host region is a secessionist region dependent on natural resource exploitation. How are these conditions related? Does one have greater explanatory and predictive power than the other? Do they provide a more accurate explanation and prediction of SoS conflict when taken together than as stand-alone explanations or predictions? The empirical testing provided in Part B answers those questions, but first I justify the use of my qualitative cross-country and cross-region research design given the noteworthy limitations of demographic and conflict quantitative data.

CHAPTER THREE - METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Having identified the conditions on which this thesis is predicated, the question is how best to test them. A possible method would be to rely on cross-national statistical correlations using multiple regressions, which would involve tabulating correlations based on a list of SoS conflicts and statistical figures for in-migration. But as the first part of this chapter illustrates, several factors impede state-level, data-driven studies, namely the paucity and inconsistencies of demographic data and the fact that most SoS conflict occurs at the local and not the national level. For these reasons, in the second part of this chapter I argue that a comparative cross-national and sub-state analysis using case studies drawing evidence from both statistical reports and extensive fieldwork offers more sensitivity to the limitations of existing data on migration, ethnicity, and SoS conflicts. In the third part of this chapter, I explain the selection of China and Indonesia and of the three minority provinces in China (Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Inner Mongolia) and in Indonesia (Papua, Kepri, and Lampung). The fourth section concludes with a brief review of the process of data collection.

3. 1 Politicization, paucity and inconsistencies of demographic data Socio-demographic data is mostly drawn from national census or local registration systems, such as the hukou (household registration system) in China. Since local governments in China remain chiefly under the realms of the national Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and national governments around the world have a near monopoly on the collection of census data, national governments control the process of demographic data collection from beginning to end. That is, they decide whether to count, when to count, who to count, how to count, what results are published, and when. These are highly political decisions, as group size translates into political power (Leuprecht 2003: 104). As a result, census taking becomes much more than just counting people, and creative methods of ‘demographic engineering’ are often adopted to ‘win the census’ (Horowitz 1985: 194-6; Bookman 1998; 2002b: 28-41; McGarry 1998). The politicization of data has powerful implications when it comes to counting migrants, especially because the definition of migrant varies across countries and from one census to another. In the 2000 Chinese census, a migrant is defined as a person five years or older who, on November 1st 2000, resided in a sub-county level unit different from the one in which he/she lived on November 1st 1995, and who may or may not have moved his/her hukou to the place of enumeration (Fan 2005: 298). That is, to qualify as a migrant, an individual must have moved

35 36 from his/her place of residence, whether or not it was also his/her place of birth. In contrast, in the 2000 Indonesian census, a migrant is defined as someone who, at the time of the census in June 2000, resided in a province/district other than that of his/her birth (BPS Indonesia 2000). This information is further divided by length of residency in the new location (i.e. less/more than five years). As the definition of migrant differs between countries, finding a measure that aptly captures the proportion of non-indigenous people at the district/county level has also proven daunting. One option is to use data on the number of in-migrants in each district/county that is part of the decadal censuses carried out in Indonesia and in China, allowing for the detection of changes in the number of migrants over time and across different districts. However, the exact measurements appear to vary across censuses, which significantly impedes their comparability. For example, in the 1990 Chinese census, migrants were defined as having lived for more than one year in a county-level unit different from the one in which they lived five years ago. Ten years later, both the temporal and spatial criteria for defining migration had been changed to include people who had been living for at least six months in a different sub-county level unit than they were five years ago. As a result of these changes in census definition, the censuses documented a substantial increase in intra-provincial migrants in China—from 24 million in 1990 to 91 million in 2000 (Fan 2005: 298). Changes in census categories may also affect the counting of a country’s religious or ethnic groups, which are sometimes used as a proxy to count migrants (e.g., Forsberg 2010). In post- independence Indonesia, for instance, censuses did not report on ethnic groups and estimates had to be extrapolated from limited Dutch accounts dating from 1930. The 2000 census corrected this problem, but data on ethnic composition were highly controversial25 and claims that “no one used data on Indonesian ethnic groups anyway”26 almost led to the cancellation of the question on suku or ethnic group in the 2010 census. Though this outcome was avoided, data on ethnic groups in Indonesia have yet to be released in February 2014, more than two years after all other socio- economic and religious data were made available electronically. Additions, deletions, and alterations of China’s census categories have also skewed statistical results and made it difficult to plot accurate demographic trends. According to China’s census data, the number of Mongols

25 For instance, claims were made that the census attempted to ‘eradicate' the Dayaks in West Kalimantan by classifying them under the 'other' category together with several other ethnic groups. See Tirtosudarmo (2005: 65).

26 Personal communication, Aris Ananta, November 2010

37 in Inner Mongolia grew at a rate surpassing their physical ability to reproduce. Closer examination has led scholars to estimate that anywhere from one-third to over half of this startling population growth rate was due to changes in minzu/ethnic identification (Jirimutu 1998:99; Burjgin and Bilik 2003: 56). Children of ethnically mixed couples who had hitherto been classified as Han Chinese and who qualified as Mongolian due to having a Mongol parent changed en masse their ethnic identification to benefit from the newly installed socio-economic policies favoring minority groups in China. Debates over the very concept of shaoshu minzu (see Ma 2007) and whether it should continue to be used to allocate socio-economic benefits indicate that future changes may also drastically alter the way minority groups are accounted for in the census. Checking the veracity of census data on migration and ethnicity is also difficult. Numerous groups have expressed important disclaimers when it comes to Chinese official statistics, especially those regarding migration to regions deemed sensitive like Tibet or Xinjiang (Tibet Support Group UK 1995; Society for Threatened Peoples 2010; HRIC 2007). The nature of migration itself makes keeping track of it all the more problematic. Migrants sometimes move under their government’s radar, their movements may be spatially limited, and their return to their province of origin may hide the fact that they had moved in the first place. Census data only provides a snapshot of the state of migration to a given region at one particular point in time (i.e., at the time of data collection); census data do not offer a frame-by-frame caption of the demographic transformations of a region in the time between two censuses. Were data to be collected at a different time, for instance at the height of the harvest season or on a more frequent basis, the snapshot would be entirely different. Thus, a region may appear to be experiencing significant demographic transformations thanks to the presence of seasonal workers and throngs of tourists (Fisher 2008a) or army and military workers (Toops 2004: 242-9). Because these substantial ‘non-local’ groups are not included in the census, the census may erroneously appear to under-report demographic transformations. For these reasons, it is difficult to conduct a year- by-year assessment of regional demographic transformations. Since most demographic data are compiled by the state, census data often provide ethnic and migration data that are aggregated at the country or, at best, provincial-level. This leads to two problems. First, such a large level of analysis fails to capture demographic dynamics and transformations occurring at a smaller level. For instance, Indonesian data on migration have historically defined migrants as persons who have moved across a provincial border. As an exhaustive comparative study of rural-urban migration in China and Indonesia shows, this definition misses much of the important intra-provincial movement between the countryside and

38 nearby towns and cities (Meng et al. 2010: 11). Various types of small-scale migratory movements alter a region’s demographic balance, and their prospects for ethnic and SoS conflict remain unexplored due to inadequacies of state-level and provincial-level data in uncovering and investigating them. The second limitation is that state-level data are far from optimal for investigating conflicts between indigenous populations and migrants, considering that internal conflicts are highly localized (see Forsberg, 2010; Kaufmann, 2011b; Varshney et al., 2004; Buhaug and Gates 2002). Why, for instance, would the proportion of migrants to the total population of a country make a specific region more prone to conflict? As reported by Forsberg (2010: 9-11), discrepancies between theoretical explanations and the data employed—i.e., using national or provincial statistics to investigate a phenomenon occurring at a smaller unit of analysis—may lead to incorrect inferences. Although state-level quantitative analysis based on government publications and data may provide crucial, often generalizable, insight into the way migration affects conflict in many contexts, the discussion above shows that they also have important limitations, especially when dealing with topics as sensitive as ethnicity, migration, and conflict.

3.2 Research design Considering the aforementioned limitations of state-level quantitative studies, the most appropriate method—and the one that shows the necessary sensitivity to the limitations of the existing data on migration, ethnicity, and conflict—is a comparative analysis of sub-state case studies conducted alongside a cross-national comparison of SoS conflicts drawing evidence from both statistical reports and extensive fieldwork. The comparative method is particularly appropriate for investigating the impact of migration on SoS conflict when the cases compared are complex and involve numerous variables. Unlike the statistical method, with a small number of cases the comparative approach limits the range of possible conclusions (Lijphart 1971). Thorough investigation of a few cases facilitates the discovery of background variables, multi-level relations between many variables, and functional equivalent. Mill’s (1843) comparative methods allow for inductive identification of potential independent and dependent variables, and to establish the relationship between them. The selection of two large Asian countries as the main comparative units was inspired by the Method of Difference or MSSD. However, given that I purposefully selected provinces within these two countries where SoS conflict are both present and absent, Mills’ method of agreement (or MDSD) is particularly well-suited as it discerns factors that are present on all occasions where

39 SoS conflict happens (see Przeworksi and Teune 1970). An important limitation of this approach, however, is that it fails to see cases where the independent variable failed to result in the dependent variable and thus weakens causations (see Geddes 1990). By definition, controlled comparisons, i.e., the comparison of carefully selected cases, limits overgeneralization by focusing on specific processes under differing conditions. For this reason, controlled comparison does not lend itself to answering many of the precise empirical questions with a reasonable degree of certainty; for instance, controlled comparison is ill-suited to pinpoint the exact proportion at which migrant population starts to have a detrimental impact on a host region’s political stability. The comparative method cannot and does not intend to provide such information. However, it is ideally suited to discerning patterns about the relationship between migration and SoS conflicts.

3. 3 Case selection For findings to have general validity, the comparative method depends on an informed choice of cases. My case studies were selected based on three criteria. First, sufficient and reliable demographic data for all cases must be available. Second, cases must show variation on the dependent variable (i.e., purposive sampling) and must not solely represent high conflict regions. This methodological approach is motivated by the need to integrate “negative cases”, “non- conflict regions”, and “low intensity conflict” in the study of conflict and violence (see Strauss 2012; Barron and Madden 2004; Tajima 2004). Besides, ‘hard’ cases in which conflict was expected but failed to materialize pose a formidable counter-factual challenge and should be actively sought out. Finally, cases must possess enough socio-economic and political similarities to make the comparison valid (i.e. Mills’ MSSD). Variations across cases could be attributed to different levels of economic development, for instance. My linguistic abilities also influenced the selection of cases, as I had gained a conversational level in Mandarin over the years and was learning bahasa Indonesia. With this in mind, I narrowed the pool of cases to eight: two country level cases (Indonesia and China), three Chinese minority provinces (Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Inner Mongolia), and three Indonesian minority provinces (Papua, Kepri and Lampung). As Leuprecht notes, a drawback to the comparative method is an intrinsic semblance of arbitrariness (2003: 118); a few words on each of the eight cases selected dispels this notion. With its long history of migration, ethnic diversity and the propensity of SoS conflict in the region, Asia is an excellent place to study the relationships between migration and conflict. China and Indonesia were selected for this cross-national and sub-national study because of data

40 availability: ie. both countries conducted a decadal population census in 1990, 2000, and 2010 that took stock of migration and ethnic groups at the provincial and district levels, facilitating comparisons. Moreover, there are striking similarities between the two countries with respect to the high proportion of internal migrants. A major research project comparing rural to urban migration in China and Indonesia estimates that about two-thirds of the rural labor force of the two countries will migrate to urban areas over the course of the next two decades –the sheer size and speed of this urbanization process qualifying as among the largest population movements ever (Meng et al. 2010:2). However, the study’s narrow focus on rural-urban migration leaves unexamined migration to Chinese and Indonesian minority regions as it typically involves rural- rural or urban-rural migration. Albeit smaller in size than the colossal rural-urban movements, migration to minority regions deserves to be better examined given its close relations to Chinese and Indonesian programs of economic development and national integration (Côté 2014). China and Indonesia have both directly and indirectly encouraged migration to their minority regions over roughly the same period of time. Although some migration into ethnic homelands occurred prior to Indonesian independence and the Communist takeover in China, the 'golden age' of organized mass migration spanned from the 1950s to 1970s for China, and from the 1960s to 1980s in Indonesia, with spontaneous migration increasing in magnitude from that point on in both countries. Another similarity facilitating cross-country comparisons between China and Indonesia is the diverse ethnic composition of their population. There are over 300 ethnic groups in Indonesia, the largest of which is the Javanese with 41.71% of the population (BPS Indonesia 2000) whereas in China, there are 56 recognized minzu, and the largest group consists of the Han Chinese at 91.6% of the population (China Ethnic Statistical Yearbook 2004: 487). The predominance of one ethnic group in China and Indonesia is also felt in the ethnic composition of their respective migrant populations. Indeed, 90% to 95% of internal migrants in China are members of the dominant Han Chinese ethnic group, which is roughly equivalent to their proportion of the population (Iredale et. Al 2001). In Indonesia, the majority of internal migrants were, until the mid-1990s, from the dominant ethnie—i.e. Javanese—or, at the very least, originated from the central islands—i.e. Sundanese, Madurese or Javanese. While other ethnic groups have repeatedly relocated in the past, they now surpass Javanese migrants in numbers (Tirtosudarmo 2001). Yet, the two countries differ on the nature of their political systems and on recent political developments. Thanks to this state-level difference, the selection of Indonesia and China allows for an investigation and comparison of how migration is connected to conflict in an authoritarian state and in a democratizing state. Why have SoS conflicts grown in frequency in

41 Indonesia in the last 10 to 15 years but have been mitigated in China? Does this mean that no migrant-related tensions exist in China? Are the same type of migrants being attacked in China and in Indonesia? Can political regime and political liberalization offer a tenable explanation? To verify if conditions less than adequately tailored for cross-countries comparison, such as the HI condition, affect SoS conflict, I have selected three sub-national political entities within each country. Sub-national comparisons are particularly useful for ‘controlling’ certain domestic variables (Snyder 2001) and for exploration of why province-wide migration-related conflict erupts in some regions (namely Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Papua) and in specific districts (e.g., Xilinguole in Inner Mongolia), while other regions with large migrant populations have remained relatively quiet (e.g., Kepri). Three Chinese provinces—Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Qinghai— were selected, for they are three peripheral provinces with substantial minority populations,27 a history of massive internal migration and demographic change (see Chapter Four), autonomous arrangements,28 recent economic development, and yet different levels of conflict. In the case of Indonesia, the three provinces selected—Papua, Kepri, and Lampung—also have large minority populations and substantial demographic change related to in-migration (see Chapter Five) and different levels of conflict between migrant and local populations. Why has migration contributed to conflict in Papua, Xinjiang, and Qinghai, but not nearly as much in Inner Mongolia, Kepri and Lampung? Could these ‘hard’ cases provide a counterfactual on the role of HIs in increasing the risks of SoS conflict? Comparing these two countries and six sub-national cases allows me to unequivocally demonstrate that migration does not always lead to open conflict in host regions, though it often results in increased group tensions. In addition, this method allows me to establish the conditions increasing the probability that migration into a minority region results in SoS conflict in different political and socio-economic contexts. The patterns emerging from this study also help me understand conditions and mechanisms linking migration to conflict, who are targeted by such attacks, how deadly they are, and at what administrative level conflicts take place. 3.4 Data collection

27 According to the 2010 population census, the minority population in Xinjiang (most of which are Uyghurs) accounted for 59.5% of the population; in Qinghai, minority populations (most of which are Tibetans) accounted for nearly 46.9% of the population, and in Inner Mongolia, minority population (the largest group being Mongols) accounted for 20.5% (Chinese population census 2010).

28 Both Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia are autonomous regions. Although not an autonomous region per se, autonomous prefectures and counties in Qinghai account for 98.9% of the province's land areas. For this reason, Goodman labels these regions “non self-governing areas of self-government” (2004: 23).

42 Given the aforemention difficulties in acquiring and analyzing statistical data on demography and conflict, and the difficulties in conducting fieldwork in some of my case studies, quantitative and qualitative research methods were iterated in an attempt to innovate a research method capable of examining politically sensitive issues within a sometimes tighly controlled field setting characterized by occupation and repressed political dissent. Quantitative data on migration was obtained from a variety of official sources. Information on migration in Indonesia was collected from various Indonesian national censuses, provincial yearbooks and scholarly works on internal migration in Indonesia (e.g., Tirtosudarmo 2001, 2006, 2009; Pain and Benoit 1989). The data collected includes the total number of lifetime and recent migrants per province and district,29 their respective proportion of a province’s total population, and the population growth rate per province. Data on Chinese migration was collected using various Chinese census data and national and provincial statistical yearbooks. As noted earlier, there are important limitations of governmental-issued data on migration in China (Chan 1999; Hansen 2005; Iredale et al. 2001). However, the substantial growth of socio-economic work on ethnicity and internal migration in recent years and the (albeit limited) liberalization process underway in China has resulted in the increasing publication of data and information on the subject, and the methods used to analyze this information is gaining in complexity (see for instance Iredale et al. 2001: 2003; Liu 1990). Other quantitative data, such as measures of group differentials, were also collected with the help of the Indonesian and Chinese population censuses, national publications (e.g., Chinese Statistical Yearbook, China’s Ethnic Statistical Yearbook, and China’s Population and Employment Statistical Yearbook, Indonesian Population Poject 2000-2025, Estimates of Demographic Parameters 2005, Trends of Selected Socio-economic Indicators of Indonesia) and various provincial statistical yearbooks. In the case of China, such measures include the urbanization rate by ethnic group and per migration status, education attainment by ethnic group and migration status, and job occupation by ethnic group and migration status. In the case of Indonesia, the socio-economic measures collected include unemployment rate, poverty rate, and under 15 education rate for the total provincial or district population. Unfortunately, that measures were not broken down by ethnic group or migration status impedes the use of these data. Quantitative data on conflict were obtained when available and analyzed with a necessary critical eye given the aforementioned flaws. Quantitative data on violent collective conflict in

29 Respectively, someone who, at the time of the census, resides in a province other than that of his/her birth and someone residing in a province different than the one he/she was residing in five years prior to census-taking.

43 Indonesia was obtained from the two UNSFIR databases cited earlier (see Chapter 2.1). Information on the dependent variable was also collected from the main English newspapers in Indonesia (e.g., the Jakarta Post) and various Indonesian NGOs and diaspora publications (e.g., Free West Papua, Walhi/Friends of the Earth International, etc.). Reliable, state-wide statistics on conflict in China were nearly impossible to obtain. Studies show that authoritarian or semi- democratic states do not fully report conflicts, especially ethnic or religious conflicts, since they often run counter to a state’s discourse on ‘ethnic harmony’ and ‘national unity’ (Hoddie 2006). These limitations severely hamper the ability of researchers to create exhaustive databases taking stock of internal conflicts in various countries—a difficulty I also encountered, explaining why, aside from the simple bivariate analysis conducted earlier, I relied mostly on qualitative data for this empirical analysis. Nevertheless, I collected information on conflict in China from diaspora organizations such as Radio Free Asia, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, and the World Uyghur Congress. If national newspapers are likely to under-report ethnic violence and killings (Hoddie 2006; Varshney 2009), diaspora publications are likely to be guilty of the opposite—i.e., of over-reporting ethnic violence to attract international attention to their cause. I included both sources of information in an attempt to balance these biases. Whenever possible, I also subjected findings to the ‘test of local knowledge’ (see Varshney et al. 2004) by asking local respondents about such events. Given the political sensitivity of the issues researched and the geographical scope of the regions studied, the qualitative methods of this study were somewhat eclectic. Whereas formal surveys are routinely used by researchers in Indonesia (e.g. Meng et. al 2010) and in coastal regions in China (e.g. Gustafsson and Shi 2006), they are significantly more difficult to conduct in thightly controlled Chinese minority regions.30 I opted to conduct ethnographic work instead. A variety of field sites was sampled, each with much less depth than would be normally accorded by purely ethnographic methods. This method was taken partly given the time constraints, partly to avoid spending too much time in each community –which could have attracted undue attention to my respondents or my hosts- and partly out of the very nature of my multi-sites comparative study. The fieldwork included nine months spent in Indonesia and China between October 2010

30 Recently, an American researcher who conducted surveys in several Chinese provinces on nationalism in China saw all of its Xinjiang surveys confiscated by university authorities, which did not happen in any of its other research locations (personal communication with James D. Rae, March 30th, 2014).

44 and September 2011. In Indonesia, the fieldwork was conducted in two of my case studies: Lampung and Kepri (including Riau, its former ‘home province), along with Jakarta where I had my institutional affiliation at the Research Center for Society and Culture, Indonesian Institute of Science (PNB-LIPI). As many researchers before me (e.g. Upton 2009), I was unable to secure a research visa to conduct fieldwork in Papua.31 Urban areas visited during my Indonesian fieldwork included Pekanbaru, Duri, Batam, Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Uban in Riau/Kepri; and Bandar Lampung, Pringsewu, Gedong Tataan, and Menggala in Lampung. The urban areas were chosen because of their importance as regional centres for local government administration, education, business and for migratory movements in general. Whenever possible, I also visited rural areas including transmigrant sites in Riau and in Lampung. In China, fieldwork was also conducted in two of my case studies: Inner Mongolia and Qinghai. I was unable to secure institutional affiliation to conduct research in Xinjiang, though I was able to visit the province in June of 2009, shortly before the summer riots that made the province all but inaccessible for researchers and journalists. I also spent some time in Beijing, both for logistics purposes, freedom of movement, and because I had my institutional affiliation at the Ethnic Minority Study Center of China at Minzu University. During my Chinese fieldwork, urban areas visited included Xining, Tongren and Guide in Qinghai; and Hohhot and Ulanhot32 in Inner Mongolia. While I did not conduct formal interviews in Xinjiang, I nevertheless spent three weeks in Urumqi, Korla, Aksu, Hotan, Yecheng and Kashgar. Fieldwork entailed informal and unstructured interviews, conversations, participant observation and general living experience within households in several of these settings, mostly in urban areas. Interviewee selection was determined through snowball sampling: the politicized nature of the research precluded both representative sampling as well as extended ethnographic contacts. My local research assistants conducted most of these interviews, though when the respondents felt comfortable answering in English I conducted the interviews myself.33 Over the

31 I was told by RISTEK that my research permit was still pending/i.e. had been rejected because of my inclusion of the Papua case. Were I to decide not to go there, I could obtain the research visa for Lampung, Riau, Kepulauan Riau and Jakarta immediately, which I opted to do instead.

32 I was originally planning to go to Xilinhot as I resumed my Chinese fieldwork. But being the center of the Mongol protests in May-June 2011, foreigners were reportedly not allowed in the region. I waited until the protests died down, but even then, I was ‘strongly discouraged’ from going to Xilinhot, and had to settle for visiting Ulanhot, IMAR’s former capital, another Mongol city with large migrant populations.

33 I had a total of six research assistants (three in Indonesia, three in China). All but one were ‘natives’ of the fieldwork locations and all spoke both the national language and the local dialect. Two were male, four were

45 course of my fieldwork, a total of 108 interviews were conducted for a total of 155 people interviewed (see Table 3.1 for a tabulation of fieldwork interviews and Appendix 1 at the end for a full list of interviews). The targeted interviewees were members of the broader local population whose home had experienced significant demographic and ethnic changes. This group, labelled as “local people” included farmers, pensioners, and civil servants among others. I also interviewed local public personalities or “elites” who have a wealth of knowledge but are considerably more constrained than foreign researchers in the dissemination of their findings. This group includes government officials, local scholars and heads of NGOs. In higher-risk contexts in which interviews could have put my participants in danger (e.g., Xinjiang), I interviewed members of the diaspora population, such as the head of the World Uyghur Congress. In April 2010, I also participated in an EU conference on the situation in Xinjiang attended by several leading Uyghur figures, including Rebiyah Kadeer. Finally, to gain the perspectives of migrants, I interviewed 23 people who migrated of their own volition or as part of a Chinese or Indonesian government program.

Table 3.1 Tabulations of fieldwork interviews # Interviews #people interviewed # Locals #Elites #Migrants Riau 16 25 10 9 6 Kepri 21 36 16 13 7 Lampung 23 34 11 17 6 Jakarta 9 13 - 13 - Total INDONESIA 69 108 37 52 19 Qinghai 17 22 20 2 - Inner Mongolia 17 20 9 7 4 Beijing 3 3 - 3 - Xinjiang 2 2 - 2 - Total CHINA 39 49 29 14 4 TOTAL 108 155 66 66 23

3.5 Conclusion Limitations are inherent in any method. The statistical method is well suited for confirming/refuting hypotheses and for offering insights that can typically be generalized to other cases. Since the statistical method relies on data that are often incomplete and inconsistent, it is best to combine this method with another method that offers more sensitivity to the limitations of existing data on migration, ethnicity, and conflict. The comparative method, based on fieldwork

female. Two had a PhDs, two had Master’s Degrees, one had a Bachelor’s Degree, and the other was completing her Bachelor’s Degree.

46 in eight crucial case studies, is particularly well suited to discerning the patterns and mechanisms through which migration is related to conflicts. Part B of this dissertation is devoted to identifying such patterns and mechanisms. Chapters Four to Six examine in greater detail the conditions under which migration is translated into increased group tensions and SoS conflicts over a much longer period, going as far back as the 18-19th century— something a quantitative analysis would not have been able to accomplish. The first two chapters adopt a comparative sub-state analysis of Chinese and Indonesian case studies, drawing evidence from both statistical reports and extensive fieldwork. Covering the Chinese and Indonesian cases respectively, Chapter Four and Five emphasize the mechanisms through which objective and/or subjective socio-economic and political asymmetries are transformed into grievances, and how such grievances trigger violent actions targeting migrants through a process of group mobilization. Finally, Chapter Six provides a state-level comparison of migration and SoS conflict in authoritarian China and democratizing Indonesia.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPACT OF HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES ON SOS CONFLICT IN CHINA

Chapter Four explores the role of socio-economic and political horizontal inequalities (HIs) in contributing to migration-related tensions and SoS conflict in three Chinese regions: Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Inner Mongolia. As made clear, internal migration does not always or directly lead to conflict; it does so when a non-local group appears to benefit more than the local population. Regions with high disparities in employment—both in the private sector and in the civil service— and economic resources between inter-provincial migrants and natives and between Han and minority groups are more likely to experience SoS conflict. As these two binaries often coalesce— i.e., Han are migrants and natives are minorities—group disparities are exacerbated. The migration of Han Chinese, China’s dominant ethnicity, to minority regions has been particularly impactful as this migration has solidified the socio-economic and political gap between migrants and locals and motivated SoS conflict where disparities are particularly stark. In the first section of this chapter, I assess the socio-economic and political HIs present in Xinjiang and tease out their relations to SoS conflict. I then provide similar assessments of Qinghai and Inner Mongolia in the two following sections. Various dimensions of socio-economic HIs are measured with the help of official Chinese data, including ethnic/migrant job segregation, income differentials, ethnic and regional unemployment rates, and ethnic/migrant educational disparities. The effects of spatial and institutional disparities on socio-economic HIs are also assessed. Political HIs have been affected by China’s various policies on regional ethnic autonomy that have been in place since 1949. Articles 113-116 of the 1982 Constitution specify the political components of autonomy, namely that the head of the autonomous regions must belong to the ethnic minority community that exercises autonomy in that region (i.e., the titular ethnic group), and that the People’s Congress of autonomous regions may adopt laws appropriate to its region, provided it gains approval from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.34 I conclude this chapter with a comparative analysis of the three case studies, arguing that Inner Mongolia experienced comparatively fewer and more localized SoS conflicts than Xinjiang or Qinghai given its smaller and inconsistent socio-economic and political HIs between Han

34 The decision to declare an area “autonomous” depends on a variety of factors, including its level of economic development, historical background, and, especially, its demography, i.e., the presence of compact communities of one or more minority group. For more on the autonomy system in China, please see Friberg (2005), Ghai (2000a, 2000b); Mackerras (2003), McCarthy (2001) and Phan (1996).

47 48 migrants and local Mongols. And I also unearth the mechanisms transforming HIs into grievances and ultimately nativist mobilization against migrants. Before going further, a few important notes on migration within the PRC. Since its creation, man-made restrictions on population movements in China have resulted in three types of migrants: permanent migrants with residency rights (i.e., hukou migrants or jihua qianyi, ‘planned migration’), migrants without hukou residency rights (non-hukou migrants), and temporary migrants; the latter two groups make up the ‘floating’ population. Some of these migrants relocated mostly of their own volition—i.e., they are spontaneous migrants— whereas other were part of official state migration programs—i.e., they are organized migrants. Both types were closely associated with the state’s development programs. In the late 20th century, programs of national economic development were launched all over the developing world in an effort to promote economic growth and create economic opportunities, and China was no exception with its Opening Door policies. Thanks to these programs and to better and more developed transportation systems, urbanization rates have skyrocketed. China added nearly 207 million residents to its urban population between 2000 and 2010 (NBSC 2011)—a trend many Chinese researchers predict will continue to grow as rapidly, if not more rapidly, for another 20 to 30 years (see Huang and Zhan 2005). In turn, urban population growth has led to increasingly uneven rates of economic growth between urban and rural regions, most of which are located in remote regions near international borders. To solve the problem of uneven economic development, recent national development programs have attempted to divert resources from the centre into frontier regions, like China’s xibu da kaifa or ‘Develop the West Program.’ The latter, launched in November 1999, attracted not only a significant amount of money,35 but also millions of economic migrants who have since temporarily or permanently relocated to the provinces included in the program, many of which have high proportions of minority population and are rich in natural resources.36 Though such

35 Nearly 1 trillion yuan or 125 billion US dollars was invested in infrastructure in northwestern China (China Daily 2009a). 36 The Develop the West Program includes 12 provinces and autonomous areas: Tibet (96.3% minority populations), Xinjiang (62.4%), Qinghai (42.1%), Guangxi (39.2%), Guizhou (34.7%), Yunnan (33.5%), Ningxia (33.3%), Inner Mongolia (19.4%), Gansu (8.3%), Sichuan and Chongquing (4.6%), and Shaanxi (4.5%) (percentages taken from Iredale et al. 2003: 10).

49 large-scale population movements were the unplanned, though not unforeseen,37 by-products of an economic program aimed at eliminating regional disparities and trickling down growth in non- coastal areas, migration fed into the program’s political and social objectives of ensuring national stability and nation-building (Goodman 2004a; Holbig 2004; Lai 2002). Organized state-migration—i.e., that occurring mostly under the aegis of the state—has also been closely associated with larger national programs of economic development and, importantly, programs of national integration. The Chinese Communist state has repeatedly organized the relocation of its population across provincial borders in an attempt to resolve several socioeconomic and political conundrums at once: from relieving coastal cities burdened by overpopulation, to buttressing military security in crucial frontier regions (McMillen 1981), to relocating industries to the interior (Naughton 1988), and promoting socialist progress and political stability through cadre transfer and youth rustication policies (see Li 1989; Lary 1999). Population movements have also been an important component of national integration, as they extended state control over non-Han areas, making minority regions at once “modern and Chinese” (Rohlf 2003). Organized Han migrants became the backbone of the state’s economic policies in minority regions, for once Han migration was organized it set in motion larger flows of spontaneous migrants (Lary 1999). The Jianshe Bingtuan or Production and Construction Corps (PCC or bingtuan), best known for its work in Xinjiang but also present in other minority regions,38 is the ultimate example. Formed in 1954 as a paramilitary organization of cashiered soldiers, convicts, and volunteers, the PCC is practically a world unto itself. It operates parallel to provincial authorities, reporting directly to Beijing. In Xinjiang alone, the 174 bingtuan farming complexes encompass 2.56 million people,39 97% of them Han Chinese (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009: sections 4-12). The Xinjiang PCC has built whole cities and hundreds of farms and factories producing between 15% to one-third of China’s yearly cotton output (Eickholm 1999; Mozur 2007). However, the mandate of the PCC is not only economic; since the fall of the Soviet Union, its political role has changed from guarding China’s borders to aiding the army and

37 Li Dezhu, former minister of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, recognized that the Develop the West program would attract people from the eastern and coastal economies to the interior in large numbers. But this, he said, was not an official policy (Goodman 2003). 38 For instance, there were about 40 bingtuan in Inner Mongolia, initially located near Xilinguole, where they helped settle nomads and turn grasslands into agricultural fields (interview PhD candidate, Hohhot, August 27, 2011). In the 1990s, many of the people associated with the Inner Mongolian bingtuan returned home to Inner China (interview Professor Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot, August 16, 2010).

39 Roughly one in seven residents of Xinjiang are in the Bingtuan (Mozur 2007)

50 civil authorities in quelling local dissent in Xinjiang. Wang Lixiong, a Beijing writer known for his provocative analysis of western China, describes the bingtuan as an “autonomous Han province” within Xinjiang. Given the local government’s lack of jurisdiction over them—a major source of alienation—“solving the Xinjiang problem is inseparable from solving the bingtuan problem” (The Economist 2013). A newer type of state-sponsored (intra-provincial) migration is shengtai yimin (ecological migrants) whose goal is to permanently resettle the large segment of the herding populations of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia into new towns. There are two rationales for this policy: one is environmental—herders are said to play a role in deforestation/degrazing processes—and one is developmental—to facilitate the implementation of the 2007 policy mandating nine years of compulsory education. In 2007, 61,899 herders from Sanjiangyuan (the meeting point of the Yellow, Yangtze, and Mekong rivers in Qinghai) were expected to be resettled—a number that was expected to increase to 100,000 by 2010 (Foggin 2008: 29). In Inner Mongolia, environment resettlement policies started earlier, in 2001, and involved 450,000 people (Sarjiati 2006). Nomads involved in the resettlement program would sell their land and livestock to the government that, in exchange, built houses for them in the city, typically in the same prefecture. However, since they now live in urban, usually Mandarin-speaking areas, it is difficult for them to find appropriate work. Once the government stipend runs out due to the higher cost of living in urban areas, many nomads return to the grasslands to work on (part of) their land or rent land from rich local and migrant families. This situation occurred in Qinghai as well.40

4.1 Xinjiang Xinjiang, the largest administrative unit in China, represents nearly one-sixth of China’s total landmass. It consists of 14 prefectural units (including 5 autonomous prefectures) and 89 counties (including 6 autonomous counties and 6 county-level cities that do not belong to any prefectures and are de facto administered by the XPCC). The demographic change experienced by Xinjiang in the 20th century is “unparalleled in the modern history of Central Asia” (Forbes 1986: 234). Migration to Xinjiang, a region historically inhabited by the Uyghurs,41 a Muslim, Turkic-

40 Interview local student, Qinghai Normal University, Xining, June 23, 2011.

41 Official Chinese histories of Xinjiang deny that the Uyghurs are the sole original inhabitants, entrenching instead the idea that Xinjiang belongs to 13 minzu (Bovingdon 2002:51; Clarke 2007). However, substantial scholarship supports Uyghur historical predominance over the region (Dillon 2004). There are substantial religious, linguistic, socio-economic, and geographic differences among the Uyghurs who have traditionally defined their identity not so much by virtue of belonging to a cohesive group of Uyghurs, but rather through the very specific oasis cities from

51 speaking people, began as a timid encroachment during the Han dynasty, intensifying until the official annexation of Xinjiang as a province of the Qing Empire in 1884 (Toops 2004:243-4; Wang 1998).42 Early Chinese migrants were channeled mostly to rural areas in the sparsely populated east and north of Xinjiang, where they did not interact as much with the local Uyghur population (Millward and Perdue 2004: 59). After the incorporation of the region into the PRC ‘geo-body’, state policies like yimin shibian or ‘moving people to strengthen the frontier’ encouraged the resettlement of millions of Han inter-provincial migrants. These organized migrants were of varied ages and education levels and included groups as diverse as demobilized military troops, prisoners, and administrative, professional, and technical personnel assigned to key government jobs (Dillon 2004: 75; Wang 1998: 37). Between 1949 and 1957, 68% of all migrants to Xinjiang were organized migrants (Ji and Gao, cited in Layne and Liang 2009). The last major movement of migrants to be fully organized and overseen by the CCP occurred in 1964. Thereafter, most migrants were ‘drifters’ (mangliu) from the neighbouring provinces of Gansu, Henan, Sichuan, and Xian who lacked official authorization (i.e., non-hukou migrants) and who worked in one of the region’s several bingtuan (Toops 2004: 257; Wang 1998: 38). The XPCC played a decisive role in consolidating the CCP’s power in Xinjiang and facilitating Han resettlement post-1955. With recruiting offices in several localities overwhelmed by overpopulation and unemployment in eastern China, XPCC membership increased from more than 300,000 in 1957 (McMillen 1981:76) to 2.56 million in 2009 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009: sections 4-12). Available statistics attest to the impact of these early organized migratory movements on population growth in Xinjiang. From 1953 to 1984 alone, Xinjiang was at the receiving end of a net migration estimated at over 3 million (Yuan 1990: 61). Contrary to Pannell and Ma’s prediction in 1997 that “the periods of great migration,

which each family traces its origins. According to Rudelson, each of Xinjiang’s major oases constituted a kind of microculture, self-governing on a daily basis and with its own distinctive economy and social features (1997), which probably retarded the development of a region-based identity (Starr 2004: 12) and explains why Uyghur nationalism is relatively ‘new’ (Dillon 2004: 21-24).

42 There is significant scholarly debate over exactly how long Xinjiang has been under Chinese control. A 2003 White Paper on the history and development of Xinjiang claims that the region has been an “inseparable part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation since the Han dynasty” (Information Office PRC 2003). According to Millward and Perdue (2004), Dillon (2004), and Clarke (2007), genuine Chinese control, rather than influence of tributary relationships over the entire territory of Xinjiang, dates from the mid/late 18th century, though prescription against Han peasant migration to Xinjiang existed at the time (Clarke 2007: 265). Even after Xinjiang was officially re- incorporated into the Chinese geo-body in 1884 after a series of internal rebellions, the region experienced two short-lived independent periods as the ‘East Turkestan Republic’ (ETR) from November 1933 to February 1934, and from the summer of 1945 until late 1949, which ended with the CCP’s occupation of Xinjiang (see Millward 2004: 5, Benson 1990).

52 especially of Han migrants to Xinjiang, are over” (1997: 213, 220), population flows to Xinjiang did not abate with the relaxation of the hukou system and favourable economic and trading opportunities provided by the Develop the West policies. According to the latest statistics available, 41.12% of Xinjiang’s temporary—i.e., non-hukou—migrants came from outside the province, 61% of them originating from the provinces of Henan, Xian, and Gansu (Xinjiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2012:7-1). In 2004, Wang Lequan, Xinjiang’s First Party Secretary and member of the Politburo, admitted that as many as 1 million migrants come to Xinjiang each year for seasonal work (Mozur 2008). The railroad ministry boasted on its website that “there is a special army going to the west” when referring to the 109 trains carrying 210,000 people from central China to Urumqi (Demick and Pierson 2009). Similar large scale movements of thousands of Han migrants from Chongqing city to Urumqi were also recorded by the official Xinjiang Metropolitan Daily News after the Chinese New Year festival in 2013 (Lipes 2013c). Some of these migrants are absorbed in the low-paid construction or agricultural sectors, although many are lured by the prospects of employment in Xinjiang’s large oil, coal and natural gas industries –which respectively account for 30%, 40% and 35% of the state’s total production (Human Rights Watch 2009:9). Organized and spontaneous migration from eastern and southern China has affected Xinjiang’s demographics in numerous ways, shifting its population concentration north. Until 1949, 25% of its population lived in the north (i.e. Bortala, Tacheng, Altai, Urumqi, Karamay), 4% lived in the east (i.e. Turfan and Hami) and the rest (70%) lived in the south (Yuan 1990:65). Today, 48.52% of the population live in the north, 5.48% in the east, and only 46% in the south (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2011: 34-35). Migration-induced population growth transformed previously barren lands into highly industrial zones and fostered Xinjiang’s urbanization. Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital and one of the main destinations for migrants, saw its share of the total population increase from 6.2% in 1958 (Yuan 1990: 68-9) to 14.27% in 2010. Inter-provincial migration has also contributed significantly to Xinjiang’s staggering fivefold increase in population from 1949 to 2010. Most importantly, inter-provincial migration drastically transformed the autonomous region’s ethnic makeup, as nearly all inter-provincial migrants to Xinjiang are Han Chinese (Wang 1998, pp. 38-9). A 2009 study estimates that 94% of inter- provincial migrants to Urumqi are Han, and 74% of intra-provincial migrants aree Han (Layne and Liang 2009). Throughout the entire region, Han account for 95% of in-migrants, and Hui Chinese migrants 4.1% (Iredale et al. 2001:176). As a result, the demographic share of the Han Chinese quickly increased from a meager 6.1% of Xinjiang’s permanent population in 1953 to

53 40.48% in 2010. Over the same period, the Uyghur population dropped from 74.7% to 45.84% (see Table 4.1.1). The remaining 13.68% of the population is made up of one of Xinjiang’s 45 other minzu, notably the Kazak, Hui, Mongols, and Kyrgyz. These demographic transformations are substantial, and considering that Chinese population censuses for province-level units do not account for unofficial migrants and military personnel—including the more than 2.5 million Han Chinese working for the XPCC and an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 military and military-related personnel (Dillon 2009a: 206; Bachman 2004: 180)—it is probable that the Han share of the population has continued to increase in recent decades, though perhaps at a slower pace.

Table 4.1.1 Ethnic composition of Xinjiang’s population, 1953-2010 (%) 1953 1964 1982 1990 2000 2010 Han 6.1 32.9 40.4 37.6 40.6 40.48 Uyghurs 74.7 54 45.8 47.5 43.6 45.84 Others 19.2 13.1 13.8 14.9 15.8 13.67 Data 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990, 2000 and 2010 Xinjiang population censuses

Decades of large-scale migration have diluted Uyghur concentration in Xinjiang; they now represent the majority of the population in only four out of fourteen prefecture-like units, and in 34 out of 89 counties, nearly all of them in southern Xinjiang (see Table 4.1.2 and Figure 4.1). Han Chinese, on the other hand, constitute the majority ethnic group in seven prefectures and 38 counties, most of which are along the Xinjiang-Lanzhou railway in northeastern Xinjiang and in cities, oil producing regions, and county-level cities administered by the XPCC—i.e., in exactly the same prefectures in which migrants are the most numerically important, indicating a wide overlap between Xinjiang’s Han and migrant populations.

Table 4.1.2 Ethnic and migrant population of Xinjiang’s prefectures and cities, 2010 Han Uyghurs Inter-provincial migrants (born in a different province) Urumqi 74.91 12.46 22.05 Karamay 81.65 11.47 19.51 Turpan 25.02 68.96 7.52 Hami 69.35 17.77 11.93 Aksu 22.89 75.90 5.89 Kashi 8.00 90.64 1.56 Hotan 3.59 96.22 0.90 Tachen 65.73 3.15 6.68

54 Altai 38.55 1.44 3.37 Kizilsu 6.78 64.68 1.38 Bayinguole 59.29 31.83 13.49 Bortala 64.96 13.32 9.42 Changji 71.81 4.45 9.82 Ili 35.22 26.88 4.02 County-level cities (e.g. 81.31 14.11 16.98 Shihezi) XINJIANG 40.48 45.84 8.21 Data 2010 Xinjiang population census, 7-7 place of residence and place of birth

Figure 4.1 Map of Xinjiang

http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=23013&lang=en

4.1.1 HIs in Xinjiang Despite the difficulties in conducting fieldwork and interviews in Xinjiang, there is substantial secondary and primary data corroborating the claim that considerable economic disparities exist between locals and migrants in Xinjiang, and that Han migration in particular worsens Uyghurs’ socio-economic opportunities and constitutes a major source of tension in the region. Large economic disparities exist between Han migrants and local Uyghurs in Xinjiang, reflected in the low participation of Uyghurs in several sectors of the economy, their lower income, and higher unemployment rates. Recent statistics indicate that Han Chinese are better included in all of the most lucrative occupations and industries in Xinjiang (see Table 4.1.3). They

55 represent the overwhelming majority of those involved in the secondary and tertiary sectors, having a near monopoly in scientific research, production, and transportation of power and oil, mining, and construction. Only 37% of Xinjiang’s Han are involved in primary sector occupations, which are by far the most poorly paid positions, as opposed to 80% of Uyghurs.

Table 4.1.3 Average wage of staff and workers by sector and ethnic composition of main industries in Xinjiang

Average wage Han (%) Uyghurs (%) (yuan) Total population 27753 40.58 45.21 Farming, fishing, animal husbandry and 16944 25.13 59.87 forestry Mining and quarrying 42765 75.83 14.36 Production and distribution of power 38268 70.83 18.98 and oil Construction 25319 89.54 7.3 Transportation 41549 72.31 18.24 Banking and insurance 50568 75.33 14.44 Real estate 21644 85.17 8.1 Scientific research 32684 82.2 10.75 Education and Culture 29884 41.66 40.26 Government agencies 31811 53.6 30.98

Data Xinjiang 2000 Population Census Assembly L2-1 Population by sex and industry and nationality; Data Xinjiang 2000 Population Census Assembly 3-29 Average money wage of staff and workers by sector and by Prefecture

There are few studies on ethnic income disparities at the national level due to the dearth of reliable statistics on average income by nationality group in China. One notable exception is Gustafsson and Shi (2003), who found that the national minority-majority gap in average per capita income in China almost doubled as a result of the policies favouring coastal provinces, reaching 35.9% in 1995. Looking specifically at China’s western provinces, Borooah, Gustafsson, and Shi (2006) note that the probability of being poor was five to seven points higher for ethnic minorities than for the Han majority. One can also gain insights on income disparities at the provincial level by looking at official data on average wages by occupation in Xinjiang. Considering that a relatively low percentage of Han are involved in agriculture, the lowest paid occupation in Xinjiang, while sectors with a majority of Han workers are those with the highest wages, one can safely presume that Han migrants’ income is, on average, substantially higher than that of local Uyghurs in Xinjiang (see Table 4.1.3). A survey conducted in Urumqi corroborates

56 the presence of Han-Uyghur earning differentials. After controlling for education and other factors, data analyses show that there is no income differentials between Uyghur and Han workers in the state sector, but outside of it, Uyghurs earned 52% less than Han workers (Zang 2011: 154- 5). According to official provincial statistics, Uyghurs have a lower unemployment rate than Han Chinese, at 1.6% and 2.74% respectively (see Table 4.1.4). One should approach these figures cautiously, however, as Chinese statistics on unemployment are notoriously overly conservative.43 Besides, since those figures only report on those with full household registration in urban areas, they exclude the large group of unemployed minorities living in rural areas and also fail to reflect Han temporary migrants seeking work. Ilham Tohti—a leading Uyghur economist who has since disappeared from public view and has been under house arrest— estimates that 1.5 million Uyghur workers, or the equivalent of half the adult males, are unemployed in Xinjiang (Hoshur 2009). To get a different picture of the state of unemployment in Xinjiang, one can also look at the slightly less controversial prefectural and city-wide statistics on unemployment. Table 4.1.5 indicates that higher unemployment rates correlate with larger concentrations of Uyghur or minority populations: unemployment rates are lowest in Karamay and Shihezi and highest in Kashgar, Ili, and Kizilsu.

Table 4.1.4 Ethnic composition of unemployment in Xinjiang (%) Han Uyghur Unemployment rate per ethnic group 2.74 1.60

Data Xinjiang 2000 Population Census Assembly L2-3 Unemployed population by sex and nationality

Table 4.1.5 Registered unemployment rate in urban areas in Xinjiang’s prefectures and cities (2010) Unemployment rate (%) Urumqi 3.72 Karamay 1.48 Turpan 2.86 Hami 3.24 Aksu 3.53 Kashi 3.96 Hotan 3.20

43 Official figures on the national unemployment rate have been kept below 4.5%, which is significantly lower than figures of between 8% and 30% produced by academics and other institutions that track unemployment (HRIC 2007: footnote 153, p.38).

57 Tachen 1.96 Altai 2.95 Kizilsu 4.07 Bayinguole 2.85 Bortala 3.64 Changji 3.37 Ili 3.97 County- 1.69 level cities

Data Xinjiang Economic and Social Development Report 2011

Economic disparities and ethnic job segregation between Han Chinese and Uyghurs residing in Xinjiang are also reinforced by migratory trends. In their 2009 article on Uyghur and Han attitudes to employment opportunities in Xinjiang, Hopper and Webber found that 76.3% of Uyghurs but only 48.6% of Han Chinese believed that the employment situation was worse than 10 years previously. When asked the reason for such worsening conditions, many cited the rising number of job seekers and 85% of Uyghurs specified Han in-migrants as the problem (Hopper and Webber 2009: 192). Unsurprisingly, 84% of Uyghurs surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that “there are too many Han Chinese in Urumqi” (2009: 188). Admittedly, not all Han Chinese are migrants, but nearly all inter-provincial migrants to Xinjiang are Han Chinese. Besides, considering that many hukou migrants decide to stay in their receiving region once their tenure was over,44 one can also deduce that a significant proportion of locally born Han Chinese in minority regions are second or third generation migrants. An analysis contrasting inter-provincial migrants to Xinjiang and Xinjiang’s total population reveals that inter-provincial migrants are twice as likely to be involved in sales and service and nearly three times more likely to work in production and transportation than the rest of the population (see Table 4.1.6). In contrast, migrants were nearly twice less likely to be involved in the primary sector.

Table 4.1.6 Percentage of inter-provincial migrants in various occupations in Xinjiang (%)

Inter- Entire provincial population migrants Xinjiang Government 1.08 2.29

44 For instance, of the 1.5 million ‘volunteers’ who relocated to Xinjiang between 1958-1978, 1.1 million stayed permanently (Banister 2001: 271). As those volunteers were of child-bearing age, one can estimate that, together with their offspring, they represent nearly twice that number today. Many organized migrants were also ‘cheated’ by the government and were simply not allowed to return to their home region once their assignment ended (Skype interview leader WUC, September 30, 2011).

58 Professional/Technical 2.25 8.16 Clerical 1.36 3.86 Sales and Services 21.88 10.57 Agriculture 35.36 61.09 Production 37.93 13.90

Data: Xinjiang 2000 Population Census Assembly, L1-3 Employed population by sex and occupation; L7-7-2 Population by current residence, emigration place, and occupation (inter- region)

The economic gaps between the Han and minorities and between migrants and locals do not solely exist at the individual or group level; they are also compounded by spatial and institutional disparities. China is notorious for its urban-biased model of economic development. As Fan explains: In pre-reform China, labor allocation was highly centralized and controlled by the state. The system of ‘unified state assignment’ (tongyi fenpei) assigned school graduates to specific sectors, occupations, and regions according to the state’s development blueprints. Likewise, workers were transferred to new jobs according to the state’s plan of labor allocation (2002: 106).

The hukou system, which records an individual’s registration classification (‘nonagricultural’ or ‘agricultural’) and registration location (city, village, etc.) was key in this model’s operations. The hukou system divided Chinese citizens into two unequal tiers: the privileged urban citizens who were granted various subsidized benefits and the underprivileged rural residents (Cheng and Selden 1994). Even more relevant here, it also divided Chinese migrants into two unequal tiers: those whose hukou was transferred to their destination (permanent migrants), and those who retained their original hukou (temporary migrants). The former were sponsored by the state, typically relocating due to job transfer or job assignment, and were given urban citizenship and all of its advantages. The latter relocated outside of state plans and were essentially on their own and inferior.45 Studies comparing employment opportunities between hukou and non-hukou migrants have confirmed the presence of a social hierarchy based on differential access to institutional resources. Hukou migrants are ‘at the top of the pile’: their greater access to institutional resources and government channels privilege them in the labour market. The net result is that hukou

45 The institutional basis of labour market segmentation was also seen in the former USSR, where individuals aged 16 and over had to obtain a residence permit (propiska). Just like in China, residence registration was interwoven with government guarantees and distribution of social services, such as state-subsidized housing, education, and health care (Buckley 1995; Mitchnek and Plane 1995).

59 migrants have the most prestigious occupations; they are the most competitive in the labor market and are more likely to succeed in new sectors. Temporary migrants, on the other hand, are dislocated from institutional resources, which relegates them to peripheral occupations and leave them few options other than relying on informal income sources (Fan 2002; Pieke 1999:11; Iredale et al. 2001: 248). Urban “natives” (bendiren) are located somewhere between the two, passed over for jobs by hukou migrants but preferred to non-hukou outsiders (wailaren). Displacement from work and business opportunities by new Han migrants has been a major source of discontent among long-term residents regardless of their ethnicity (i.e., both minzu and long-time Han residents) (Sautman 1998).46 Today, the state development model continues to exhibit pro-urban tendencies (Yang 1998). Total fixed investments are channeled mostly to the secondary and tertiary sectors. Because non-primary sectors are most prevalent in urban areas, inequalities in government investment within various sectors of the economy are translated into spatial economic inequalities. Among these, the urban-rural income ratio, which stood at 2.79 nation-wide in 2000, is a leading cause of regional inequality in China (Chang 2002). Minority provinces are particularly affected by regional inequality, with Xinjiang having the fourth highest urban-rural income ratio at 3.6 (Chen 2002: 408). Strikingly, 258 of the 592 counties designated by the government as ‘poverty-stricken’ were ethnic autonomous counties, including 27 in Xinjiang (HRIC 2007: 18).47 Considering that most internal migrants to minority regions settle in cities and are involved in the secondary and tertiary sectors, cities and prefectures with a higher proportion of migrants often coincide with higher levels of state investment and, ultimately, with a higher GDP per capita than prefectures with small migrant populations. In the past decades, Xinjiang’s economy has developed rapidly, spurred by a combination of massive subsidies from Beijing,48 revenues from natural resources, and rapid urbanization. Yet,

46 Recently, Howell and Fan have investigated Han and Uyghur temporary migrants to Urumqi. They find that “self-initiated Han migrants are not necessarily in a more privileged or competitive position than Uyghur migrants who are younger and more educated” (2011:120). It is possible that these contrasting conclusions were reached because Urumqi attracted soon to be well-educated Uyghur migrants due to the presence of higher education institutions in the capital, which somehow skewed the investigation.

47 In order to target aid to the poorest, in 1985 the Chinese government has defined the standard for key poverty- stricken counties as those with a yearly net income of less than 150 yuan per peasant. The standard has been adjusted over the years in accordance with economic development and the constant improvement in economic conditions nationwide (State Council 1994 cited in Cao 2010: 980, footnote 3).

48The central government heavily subsidizes Xinjiang. In 1993, the state paid for 57% of regional spending (Sautman 2000: 261)

60 this prosperity has benefited some groups more than others, and spatial and income disparities are particularly acute in Xinjiang. A number of studies have confirmed the presence of a significant statistical correlation between areas of Han majority and high GDP per capita and, conversely, areas with a large percentage of minorities are correlated with low GDP per capita (ADB 2003; Wiemer 2004:177-8; Bachman 2004).49 Of the 25 counties in southern Xinjiang in which minorities account for more than 90% of the total population, 20 were designated as poverty- stricken (Cao 2010: 971). Cao indicates that the concentration of minorities was the primary factor explaining the increase in urban-rural income inequality in Xinjiang, with each increase of 1% in minority population resulting in an increase of approximately 0.74% in income gap (Cao 2010: 974-75). The government’s 2009 White Paper indicates that such trends have not yet abated, with the urban-rural gap standing at 3.2. The per capita net income of farmers (predominantly Uyghurs) was only 3,503 yuan compared to a per capita disposable income of 11,432 yuan among urban residents (predominantly ethnic Han) (Information Office PRC 2009). Economic disparities between Han and minorities, migrants and locals, and urban and rural people are heavily affected by regional disparities in government spending patterns. In recent years, government investments in rural areas and in the primary sector have decreased considerably because of urban-biased policies. In 2001, only 7.7% of total fixed asset investment was allocated to the primary sector in Xinjiang, despite this sector’s contribution of 60% of the region’s total employment (Cao 2010: 975). Nearly 66% of Xinjiang’s total investments in fixed assets in 2011 have been allocated to northern Xinjiang where most Han Chinese reside (see Table 4.1.7). In contrast, Hotan prefecture—with a population that is 96% Uyghur and that accounts for 9.23% of Xinjiang’s total population—only received 2.47% of the region’s total investment in 2011. A similar correlation also emerges in the proportion of migrants per region, GDP per capita, and total investments. The three cities with the highest number of lifetime migrants, Karamay, Urumqi, and Shihezi, are also those with the highest GDP per capita and net investment per capita, whereas the three prefectures with the lowest number of migrants, Hotan, Kashi and Kizilsu, have the lowest GDP per capita.

Table 4.1.7 Economic characteristics of Xinjiang’s prefectures and cities Uyghurs Han (%) Migrants GDP % GDP % GDP % Total (%) (%) per Primary Secondar Tertiary investment

49Given the strength of the correlation between the large concentration of Han Chinese and high GDP per capita, Bachman even surmised that such a relationship may, in fact, be causal in nature (2004: 167).

61 capita industry y industry industry (10,000 (yuan) (2009) (2009) (2009) yuan) (2009) Urumqi 12.46 74.91 22.05 38249 1.53 42.93 55.54 6,900,569 Karamay 11.47 81.65 19.51 87000 0.66 86.68 12.67 1,934,056 Turpan 68.96 25.02 7.52 25741 13.13 62.5 24.37 943,186 Hami 17.77 69.35 11.93 23055 15.44 39.41 45.14 1,492,069 Aksu 75.90 22.89 5.89 13098 34.19 28.41 37.4 1,816,968 Kashi 90.64 8.00 1.56 7085 40.57 17.19 42.24 3,017,657 Hotan 96.22 3.59 0.90 4583 35.85 16.34 47.78 843,432 Tachen 3.15 65.73 6.68 20784 36.3 34.09 29.6 1,878,818 Altai 1.44 38.55 3.37 19903 23.62 40.5 35.88 1,123,135 Kizilsu 64.68 6.78 1.38 6183 22.83 19.59 57.58 318,417 Bayinguole 31.83 59.29 13.49 39467 16.0 63.9 20.1 3,102,994 Bortala 13.32 64.96 9.42 21130 30.11 18.44 51.45 679,162 Changji 4.45 71.81 9.82 28520 29.78 39.4 30.82 2,988,210 Ili 26.88 35.22 4.02 16221 28.8 34.86 35.94 6,020,137 County- 14.11 81.31 16.98 34421 6.64 51.15 42.21 1,023,823 level cities

Data Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2010 GDP per capita and share of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors from 19-1 Gross Domestic Product by Prefecture, Autonomous Prefecture and City

Formal and informal structural barriers limit Uyghurs’ ability to compete with Han migrants in several occupations and industries. For instance, exclusion of Uyghurs from the booming tourist industries is sometimes attributed to their lack of social connection (guanxi), strict residency and travel rules,50 and their refusal to adopt behaviours deemed necessary to conduct business in China, like smoking, drinking, and bribing.51 The ability of Uyghurs to speak Mandarin, the national language, was a key factor in determining their occupation status (Ji 1990). Several studies have also indicated that education inequalities exacerbate occupational differences by ethnicity, thus exacerbating economic HIs, in China (Fisher 2004; Hannum and Xie 1998:329; Layne and Liang 2009). In China, education data is collected per ethnic group per province, regardless of whether the individuals surveyed were born in that province. As we know from

50 It is particularly challenging for Uyghurs to obtain a passport. In 2009, they had to pay a 25,000 yuan deposit (personal communication with local Uyghur, Kashgar, June 9th, 2009), a policy that is partly shaped by the government’s fears that Uyghurs who travel abroad might become radicalized and return as terrorists. Even within China, Uyghurs are often restricted from lodging in guest-houses and hotels in densely populated urban centres in the east of China (STP 2010:9)

51 Personal communication with local Uyghur, Kashgar, June 9th, 2009. I also observed that Uyghurs were limited in their abilities to partake in tourism as customers. In Kizil Thousand Buddha Cave near Kuqa, I saw Uyghur tourists being denied access to the site.

62 previous studies that minorities are not particularly mobile (Iredale et al. 2001), minorities are assumed to be born in the same region as they resided at the time of the 2000 census. Since education data for inter-provincial migrants is also provided per province, the education level of all Han Chinese residing in any given province can be distinguished from the education level of in-coming Han migrants to a given province. This way, whether population movements increased or decreased the educational and occupational gaps between ethnic groups can be verified. HIs in education between the Han and Uyghur populations are substantial in Xinjiang (see Table 4.1.8). The Han high school completion rate is nearly three times that of Uyghurs (13.20% vs. 4.31%). Han also have a lower percentage of illiteracy (6.67% vs. 11.67%) and more than twice the rate of post-secondary education (15.63% vs. 6.25%). However, if we focus exclusively on the educational attainment of inter-provincial migrants to Xinjiang, which, it is important to reiterate, is 95% Han, we find that this group is not better educated than the average Han or Uyghur residing in the province. In fact, inter-provincial migrants are nearly five times less likely to have higher education than the general Han population (3.49% vs. 15.63%). Today’s inter- provincial migrants to Xinjiang, many of whom are temporary, non-hukou migrants, are thus less educated than earlier waves of planned migration to the region, a trend that is likely to slowly lessen social HIs between migrants and locals in Xinjiang.

Table 4.1.8 Population over 6 years of age per ethnic group, migration status, and education in Xinjiang, Qinghai and Inner Mongolia (%)

Xinjiang Han Inter- Uyghurs provincial migrants Less than 6.76 9.59 11.67 primary school education Primary school 27.79 37.87 53.19 education Middle school 36.62 41.37 24.57 education High school 13.20 7.67 4.31 education Post-secondary 15.63 3.49 6.25 education

Data Xinjiang 2000 Population Census Assembly 2-2 Population of different nationalities aged 6 and over by sec and education attainment; L7-6-2 Population by current residence, type of

63 emigration place and education (inter-region)

State policies have also clearly influenced the ability of locals to compete in certain industries. Since the late 1970s, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been required to ensure that at least 60% of their employees are from the local minority groups (Shan and Weng 2010:59). However, many local SOEs have since gone bankrupt, and nearly 844,000 people working in Xinjiang’s urban state sector have lost their jobs (Wiemer 2004: 178). Minority employees, especially the Uyghurs and the Hui, were so affected by the layoffs that Jiang Zemin had to personally call for fewer layoffs of minorities (Sautman 2000: 250). Since then, the private sector has employed an increasingly large number of people and now accounts for one-fifth of Xinjiang’s total GDP (Hopper and Webber 2009: 179). However, minorities are especially under-represented in the private sector. Numerous studies have confirmed companies’ clear preference for Han workers (Becquelin 2000; 2004; Wiemer 2004; CECC 2009b; 2009c; 2005; 2006), which emphasizes the point that “Uyghurs need not apply” (Gilley 2001). Han Chinese are particularly embedded within native-place networks, relying on these networks to find jobs. In their research on recruitment practices in the construction sector in Xinjiang, Hopper and Webber find that ‘hometown friends’ is the most common criterion for hiring, despite employer claims that hiring is based on “certificates” and “examinations” (2009: 190). In the railroad and oil industries, some of the highest paid sectors in Xinjiang, minorities are not hired because the costs of training are high (Sautman 2000: 259). In 2000, the Washington Post stated that: “[The oil] industry is now almost completely run by Han. The China National Petroleum Co. has brought most of its workers [to Xinjiang] from other parts of China, all but bypassing the provincial Xinjiang Petroleum Bureau in carrying out exploration” (Pomfret 2000).52 There has been little improvement a decade later, as the Congressional Executive Commission on China documents that all 50 jobs advertised by the Xinjiang PetroChina Pipe Engineering Co. in August 2011 were exclusively reserved for Han Chinese (CECC 2010). Regional marginalization and exploitation are also highlighted by the fact that many of the large companies that invested in resource exploitation in Xinjiang, (e.g., PetroChina and Sinopec) are exempt from paying income tax to the Xinjiang government, as they are registered in Beijing and their oil and gas pipeline subsidiaries are registered in Shanghai (Shan and Weng 2010: 61). Government policies tried to address Uyghur unemployment and marginalization from the

52 Confirmed in personal communication with a Uyghur émigré leader (phone interview leader WUC, September 30, 2011).

64 most lucrative economic sectors, but to no avail. An “Opinion on Employment Promotion” issued by the regional government and the Party Committee in October 2009 calls for enterprises registered in Xinjiang and enterprises contracted to work there to recruit no fewer than 50% of their workers from among the local population (CECC 2011). However, as in earlier affirmative action policies for local minorities, the abundance of cheap Han migrant labour in Xinjiang made it particularly easy for companies and employment agencies to collude and discriminate against minorities. Quoting a Uyghur pipeline worker employed by a Han boss:

The government said they will use Uyghurs. At least 30% of the workers in physical labour in all of Xinjiang must be ethnic minorities. But that hasn’t happened. They still use the Han. The Han boss will ask for a copy of a Uyghur’s identity card and say that he will give the Uyghur a contract and then disappear. The Han boss will then show that copy of the card to the authorities to show that he has 30% Uyghur workers (cited in Webber and Hopper 2009: 191).

Employment discrimination against Uyghurs has continued despite numerous domestic laws preventing this practice. Article 4 of the Chinese Constitute, Articles 9 and 22 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, Articles 12 and 14 of the Labour Law, and Articles 3 and 28 of the Employment Promotion Law clearly state that ethnic minorities should receive equal opportunity in the job market (CECC 2009b; 2009c; UHRP 2012: 5-6). Recent postings in the civil service, in SOEs, and in the private sector indicate that hiring practices continue to discriminate against Uyghurs and other groups by reserving positions exclusively for Han Chinese (CECC 2011). Government officials and Han migrants have often denied that such cases represent ethnic discrimination, arguing that Uyghurs are passed over for jobs due to their lack of fluency in Mandarin or because of their lower education level (e.g., Lorenz 2009). However, the fact that some postings explicitly specify the required language (Mandarin), the level of education (college graduate), and the required ethnicity (Han) shows that ethnicity was not a proxy for perceived language ability or education, but an independent factor in job recruitment. Preferential policies have had little impact on those seeking jobs as ‘ordinary workers’ or clerks who are the hardest hit by unemployment (Sautman 1998: 96; Jacobs 2010). Even for Uyghur college graduates, these policies failed to halt Xinjiang’s unimpressive unemployment record. Employment among college graduates remains an important problem in Xinjiang, with only 22.1% of the province’s graduates signing an employment contract in 2009 compared to 33% nationwide (CECC 2009c). Uyghurs are offered jobs, just not in Xinjiang. According to PRC statistics, about 100,000 Uyghurs—most of them young Uyghur women (UHRP 2008:2)—took on jobs as migrant workers

65 in the cities of Shanghai, Tianjin, and Beijing and in the provinces of Zhejiang and Shandong (Xinhua 2007). Qualified as “forced migrants” by Uyghur activists, the so-called “labour export program” has now allegedly transferred as many as 300,000 women to work in areas outside of Xinjiang (Biggs 2009). Some workers volunteered to join, attracted by wages two or three times what they could earn at home picking cotton and benefits such as training on manufacturing equipment, Mandarin language classes, and free medical check-ups. However, claims that officials threatened families who refused to send one of their children with a fine of 2000 yuan suggest coercion or an involuntary aspect of this type of migration. Nur Bekri, Chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government, quickly denied such claims: “The job offers are accepted on the principle of free will. Local labor departments consult the parents of young people wanting to do migrant jobs” (China Daily 2009c). Since this program has resumed, coastal host regions have struggled to provide services to minority migrants. An official at the Chinese Commission of Ethnic Affairs who conducted research on minority migrants moving to Zhejiang, Shanghai and Guangdong stated: Developed economic areas are not ready to provide services for minority migrants. Many public services are often unaware or do not know how to handle migrants' ethnic specific claims. The ethnic element in migration is rarely taken into consideration. […] In case of a dispute, it is very easy for migrants from the same province to mobilize and face the opposite faction as a group. If tensions arise and local people ask the local government for the migrants to move out, officials may abide by their wish and try to persuade migrants to move back home by paying for their fare home. This does not happen very frequently. More often than not, local governments prefer to provide 'positive reinforcement' like extra training or services to migrants. But I have never heard of local governments in minority regions turning migrants away (interview, official Chinese Commission of Ethnic Affairs, Beijing, September 3rd, 2011).

To minimize tension, the local government in Guangdong now requires public service officials (e.g., female police officers, translators, cooks, etc.) from the ‘home region’ to move with minority migrant workers. These public servants are responsible for the wellbeing of migrant workers, dealing for instance with housing and dietary concerns. Remarkably, no such ‘integration program’ exists for Han Chinese relocating to Xinjiang. Citing concerns about employment pressures on the region’s stability and economic development, a 2011 regional report outlines plans for another program to train unemployed college graduates from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) to work in areas of “Inner China” matched with localities within the XUAR (CECC 2011). Ethnic minority graduates were to constitute no less than 80% of the participants. But this program, along with the program transferring young Uyghur women to factories in eastern China, failed to address barriers to

66 employment within Xinjiang due to job recruiting practices that reserve positions for Han. The lack of Uyghur participation and voice during the much-touted 2011 China-Eurasia Expo suggests that new policies are doing little to fix the economic exclusion of Uyghurs (Chan, M. 2011). As pointed out by a Uyghur leader: The process of relocating Uyghur workers to factories outside of Xinjiang, which runs parallel to the process of placing of Han-run factories in Xinjiang, inadvertently provides the space and the justification for more Han migrants to come in. This contributes to resentment, tensions, and ultimately violence in Xinjiang (Phone interview, leader WUC, September 30, 2011).

The decline in economic opportunities also coincides with a decline in social HIs in Xinjiang. A study published just before the 2009 disturbances establishes that “in life expectancy, infant mortality, maternal mortality and morbidity Uyghur people are much worse off than Han” (Schuster 2009: 433). Since 1984, the Xinjiang Education Commission has gradually reduced Uyghur-language instruction at all levels. Educational policies dubbed “bilingual” by the XUAR government have emphasized Mandarin Chinese as the language of instruction and have relegated minority languages to language arts classes, from kindergarten (CECC 2008) to university (Dwyer 2005: 39-40). According to official statistics from 2008, 600,000 ethnic minority students receive class instruction through Mandarin-focused bilingual education, an increase of 125,000 students over the previous year (CECC 2009a). The higher demand for bilingual teachers should have boded well for ethnic minority teachers, but the 2007 and 2008 CECC Annual Reports indicate that it, in fact, negatively affected their career prospects, as these teachers had to meet Mandarin language skill requirements if their primary teaching language is an ethnic minority language. Monolingual Mandarin-speaking teachers were not required to learn ethnic minority languages (CECC 2007, 2008, 2009a). Making matters worse for Uyghurs, the lack of instruction in their local language contributed to high drop-out rates among Uyghurs and their continued marginalization in the workplace and the political apparatus (HRIC 2007: 28). Indeed, Uyghurs are entirely absent from the central organs of power (e.g. Politburo and the Standing Committee). Along with other non-Han people, they also constitute a negligeable proportion of other organs of state power like the military forces or the CCP. With Han Chinese constituting 98.6% of the military population, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is basically a Han Chinese force, as is the People’s Armed Police, which is also used to control dissent in border regions (Banister 2001: 295).53 Minorities in China are also under-represented in the CCP; only

53The Chinese government has clearly tried to change this perception, at least in Xinjiang, and has explicitly appealed to potential minzu recruits in recent years. According to a 2011 article from Xinhua, the Party newspaper,

67 6.1% of its members were minorities in 2002 (China Today). If Uyghurs are absent from national politics, they are also severely under-represented in the regional government apparatus. Provincial politics in China is a two-system affair with the provincial and prefectural CCP Secretaries shadowing the work of the provincial and prefectural governors. This double structure is present throughout the political spectrum, with Han Chinese officials commonly being given high positions in the name of facilitation—they “transfer, help and lead’ ethnic minorities (see HRIC 2007: 15). But Uyghurs’ political marginalization is also attributed to their rocky integration into the PRC. Substantial segments of the local minority population fought against the PLA during the 1940s and the early years of the PRC. For instance, in 1942, local authorities in Xinjiang purged the region of pro-communist elements, including several CCP members and even Mao’s brother (Clarke 2007: footnote 8, p. 273). Such revolts made the new Communist leaders wary of the loyalty of local elites, leading them to appoint carefully selected elites from elsewhere in China.54 Consistent Han migration to the province has facilitated the replacement of Uyghur political leaders in exile with Han cadres more closely aligned with the CCP (Heberer 1989; Wang 1998). Key departments and organs, including the head of Xinjiang’s public security bureau and Xinjiang’s chief of police, remain Han Chinese. All but one of the regional secretaries of the CCP were Han Chinese born outside of Xinjiang, and two of the nine governors were Han Chinese, despite the fact that the Chinese Constitution technically reserves this position for a member of the titular ethnic group. The exclusion of Uyghurs from higher political offices is also apparent at the prefectural level where, at the time of my stay in June 2009, all 14 secretaries of the CCP were Han Chinese. Although 6 out of 14 prefectures had Uyghur governors, prefectures where the Uyghur constituted the largest minority group but not the titular ethnic group—e.g., Bayinguole Mongol AP, which represents 2/5th of Xinjiang’s territory—did not have a Uyghur governor, which says something about the true extent of Uyghur autonomy and power in ‘their’ region.55 Uyghurs and other minority groups are somewhat better represented at lower levels of government in Xinjiang. Minority deputies

there are 10 ‘ethnic companies’ in the army in Xinjiang (Xinhua, 2011). Another government source also mentioned the presence of a 20% minzu quota for PLA officers in Xinjiang (Huizi, 2007). More recently, 20 Uyghur women joined the PLA navy, “a significant move because few men from Uygur community are known to join the military as compared to the majority Hans” (Dasgupta 2013).

54Except for the Hui Chinese, few minorities had served in the Red Army or were living in ‘Inner China’ (Schwartz 1963: 64). Many cadres or specialists were thus selected from a more reliable pool of candidates, many of whom hailed from Henan, Mao Zedong’s province of birth. 55 Phone interview with WUC leader, February 17th, 2014.

68 constitute a bare majority of deputies (51.1%) in the Tenth People’s Political Consultative Conferences of Xinjiang and in the People’s Congress of Xinjiang (66%).56 However, in both cases the share of minority deputies dropped from an all-time high of 85.5% and 84.5% respectively (Xinjiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2011, 18-27; 18-28). As Han inter-provincial migration to Xinjiang increases, jobs for Uyghurs in the civil service decrease. Iredale et al. find that 41% of all employees in the provincial government, the Xinjiang chapter of the CCP, and social security sector were minorities (2001: 169), nearly 20% less than the proportion of minorities in the population. Table 4.1.3 revealed earlier that despite representing nearly 46% of the population, Uyghurs only consist of 31% government agencies’ employees. Moreover, because township cadres and other lower level officials are usually called upon to announce and enforce the CCP’s most unpopular policies (e.g., fines for derogating from the family planning policy, failure to provide the compulsory grain requirement, etc.), it all but guarantees that those officials will not develop a local power base (Beller-Hann 1997: 103-4). As keenly pointed out by Bovingdon: “Recruitment policies have in a sense dovetailed neatly with the policy on immigration. The Party has clearly hoped that the more Han there are in the province, the less difficult it will be to justify Han predominance in government” (2004b: 131).

4.1.2 HIs and SoS conflict in Xinjiang As the previous section illustrated, large-scale inter-provincial migration to Xinjiang generated or intensified socio-economic and political assymetries between Han and Uyghurs. These objective disparities were transformed into grievances through of process of group comparison where Uyghurs were depicted as Xinjiang’s rightful owners yet victims of migration, whereas Han migrants were the temporary sojourners who ruthlessly exploited the region’s resources. These ‘injustice frames’ were then used as a mobilizing tool for Uyghur natives to join anti-migration mobilization and protests. Many of the earliest nativist mobilization against migration took place in Xinjiang’s urban areas such as Urumqi (Ramzy 2009). In 1985, an estimated 2000 minority students from various institutions of higher learning demonstrated against the “private” (i.e. spontaneous) in-migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang (Millward 2004:8). Three years later, some

56Unfortunately, this percentage is not broken down by minzu, which may gloss over the over- or under- representation of specific minority groups in political bodies in China. That is, it would be possible that ‘model’ minorities such as the Koreans or the Hui Chinese be favored instead of their more dissident Tibetan, Uyghur, or Mongol colleagues for minzu-reserved positions. Besides, since a fully assimilated Bai or Manchu serving in Urumqi would count as a minzu cadre, it inflates figures to prove a high degree of indigenous control (Bovingdon 2004a: footnote 55, p.-54).

69 300 students participated in a pro-democracy march, shouting “Drive out the Han” (Millward 2004: 8). Opposition to Chinese migration was also behind the April 1990 attacks on government buildings all across the Kashgar area (Millward 2004:15), the 1997 attacks against police officers in Yining, and the violence in Hotan in late summer 1999 (Millward 2004 16-9). As these incidents indicate, that Xinjiang possesses one of the strongest sub-state nationalist and secessionist movement in China clearly colours the politics of migration in the province and explains why opposition to Han migration is often displayed through attacks on official state symbols, such as police offices and XPCC, which are likewise the targets of secessionist attacks.57 Indeed, all of the aforementioned protests encompassed demands for migration controls into a larger set of nationalist claims. Sub-state nationalism often arises in an effort to preserve and protect a sub-state ‘nation’ or national culture from erosion by the centre. When sub-state nationalism promotes secession, it aims at increasing local power while eroding the power of the national state in the region in question. In this context, the Uyghurs perceive migration from outside Xinjiang as an threat to their homeland and an extension of state power and control, aimed at sustaining the (often oppressive) relationship with the centre. Any state symbols become an appropriate target for the expression of dissatisfaction with large-scale inter- provincial migration. In the eyes of Uyghurs, government buildings and police cars embody the repressive Chinese state while also representing the organs that facilitate population movements and protect migrants once they relocate in Xinjiang. After a brief lull in the early 2000s, the events of 2009 marked a significant recrudescence in Uyghur activities. Based on several foreign and Chinese accounts, the Urumqi riots began on 5 July 2009, when a peaceful protest involving Uyghur youth -apparently prompted by an earlier brawl in a southern Chinese toy factory that left two Uyghurs dead- spiralled out of control, with shops and vehicles burned and (mostly Han) passers-by attacked. Hundreds of Han Chinese took to the streets and retaliated by smashing Uyghur shops and stalls. Weeks later, Chinese newspapers reported that nearly 500 Han Chinese living in southern Xinjiang had been attacked by Uyghurs

57 Scores of international Uyghur organizations with secessionist goals have been established since the early 1980s. The most radical of these groups are the ETIM (established in 1993, restored in 1997), the East Turkestan Liberation Organization or ETLO (established in 1996), the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (URFET), and Uyghur Liberation Organization (ULO), representing only a small, albeit very vocal, minority. The most important and far- reaching of these organizations is the East Turkestan National Center (ETNC) created in 1998 by 40 leaders and some 300 representatives of Uyghur communities from 18 countries. The ETNC was later joined by the World Uyghur Youth Congress to form the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) on April 16th, 2004. Aimed at ‘promoting the rights of Uyghur people to use peaceful, nonviolent and democratic means to determine the political future of East Turkestan’ (see WUC ‘introducing the World Uyghur Congress’), the WUC is the closest thing to an embryonic de facto government in exile Uyghurs have ever had.

70 carrying hypodermic syringes, leading to nearly 10,000 Han protesting over public safety and asking the central government for greater protection (Branigan 2009). The latest official figures put the death toll from the protests at 197 people, the majority of them Han, and more than 1,600 injured (HRW 2009: 4). However, Uyghur groups continue to question the official death toll, Xinjiang University estimating it closer to 400 whilst the WUC puts it at approximately 800 (UNPO 2009). The central government reacted with leniency towards Han demonstrators, arresting mostly, if not only, Uyghur perpetrators (BBC 2009b). These events also represent a new development in SoS conflict in Xinjiang. Not only were the 2009 riots simultaneously framed as pro-secession and anti-migration, but instead of targeting official state symbols, Uyghurs expressed their opposition to internal migration by directly attacking Han migrants and items symbolizing their comparative advantage, such as their cars, shops, and businesses (Smith Findley 2011:79-80). The 2013 string of violent incidents as Xinjiang was about to mark the fourth anniversary of the 2009 disturbances (e.g., Mudie 2013b; Mudie 2013c) confirms this trend, as the incident in Hotan prefecture, in which five Uyghurs armed with knives assaulted Han Chinese dam workers (Lipes 2013b), and the attacks against Han brick workers in Turpan prefecture triggered by the destruction of land by brick kilns (Vandenbrink 2013a) both specifically targeted Han migrants. Why are Han migrants increasingly targeted by Uyghur attacks? After all, the proportion of Han Chinese in Xinjiang has remained more or less stable since 1982 when state-sponsored population movements started to subside. Official statistics reveal that, from 2000 to 2010, the number of external registrants in Xinjiang barely increased from 7.64% to 8.21%, although these numbers do not account for the substantial influx of temporary migrants mentioned earlier (Toops 2004, 23; Xinjiang 2010 Population Census, 7-7). The XPCC, which absorbed a large proportion of Han migrants, even experienced negative migratory rates in 2008 and 2009 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2010: 97). However, a closer look at the population of regiment farms run by the XPCC shows that what first appears as a province-wide decline in migration is in fact a redistribution of migrants across the province. Between 2006 and 2009, the XPCC’s historical stronghold of Shihezi experienced a noticeable decline in population (-8,400 people), as did Bayangol (-6,500), Tacheng (-6,000), and Changji (-15,000). However, this decline was nearly matched by a modest increase in population in XPCC farms located further south in Hotan (4,200), Kashgar (2,000), and Ili (7,900) (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2010:98-100; 2007:94-6). According to the leader of the WUC, the recent movements of Han migrants away from their traditional sites of resettlement in northern Xinjiang and into southern prefectures in the heart of the Uyghur’s

71 homeland is a key factor explaining why inter-provincial migration has recently grown in contention in Xinjiang, and secessionist activities are increasingly expressed through attacks on Han migrants: Until 1990, Han migrants relocated to big cities like Urumqi and Ghulja. But lately, the CCP has been giving lands to migrants that are located in southern Xinjiang’s countryside [where Uyghurs reside and also earn a living from agriculture]. There is no alternative to farming for Uyghurs. There may be oil industries, but no more than 5% of their employees are Uyghurs. Farmers are heavily taxed, so many Uyghurs are forced to sell their lands. Many Uyghur farmers went to Beijing to raise this issue, but no one listened. So Uyghurs attack migrants because they destroyed their daily lives. (phone interview, leader WUC, February 17th, 2014)

For many Uyghurs critical of large-scale migration to their region, the inclusion of unofficial state representatives/symbols (e.g., Han migrants) among their targets was a logical extension given that they are often hard to tell apart from official state representatives like police officers. Reports that non-uniform police officers were among the Han demonstrators,58 and that “some [Han Chinese protestors] wore white helmets… exactly [the] same as police special forces… it is not difficult to see that there is Chinese army among the Chinese demonstrators” (UNPO 2009: 17) contributed to the widespread feeling among Uyghurs that no Han Chinese could be trusted. The fact that large-scale internal migration to Xinjiang has only truly gained momentum over the last 50 years reinforces the assumption that migrants are another state apparatus of control in those regions. Han migrants are active participants in the CCP’s (often unpopular) policies: they are those who migrated to the region, failed to learn the local language, discriminated against Uyghurs, and depleted the region of its natural resources. Via the XPCC and their large representation in political organs, Han migrants also prevent any serious resistance to Beijing’s control and manage everyday life and politics, even going so far as to force Xinjiang’s residents to switch to ‘Beijing time,’ even though the sun rises two hours later in Urumqi (Lorenz 2009). For many Uyghurs with limited contact with Beijing, Han migrants have become the colonizing state, explaining why Uyghur opposition to the Chinese State and secessionist activities are now increasingly expressed through attacks on Han migrants. “They [Han workers] are part of the tools of colonization and they are siding with the army and the police all the time” (Lipes 2013b). Besides, Han migrants are a more strategic target than the Chinese security forces, given that, as a Uyghur man astutely pointed out, “the difference in power of arms between the two sides is incomparable. You can’t do anything to the armed police with a knife” (Lipes 2012).

58 Phone interview with leader WUC, February 17th, 2014

72 These new trends may indicate a more durable shift in the target of SoS conflict, though it is too early to tell. Han Chinese migration to Xinjiang and the stark socio-economic group disparities it generated and exacerbated have severely affected group relations in Xinjiang. As Bovingdon writes: Current realities reinforce the suspicion that the economically bright future of Xinjiang will be directed by Hans, channel disproportionately rewards to the Han population, bind Xinjiang more tightly to the PRC, and lure even greater numbers of immigrants into the province, drowning Uyghur dreams in a sea of Han (Bovingdon 2002: 56).

The multi-layered socio-economic and political HIs associated with large Han migration pushed many Uyghurs to demand genuine autonomy for Xinjiang, if not its outright secession from China (Wang 1998: 59). The role of disparities in fuelling grievances is such that, according to Mackerras, some Uyghurs even wish for the economic gap between Han migrants and Uyghurs to grow so that there would be sufficient grounds for rebellion against both the Han Chinese and China as a whole (2001:300). In Xinjiang, Han migrants do not just represent the Chinese state; they are the state. If opposition to inter-provincial migration in Xinjiang was initially channeled into attacks on agents and symbols of the Chinese state, now opposition to the Chinese state is redirected towards Han migrants. Most SoS conflicts in Xinjiang are therefore related to both political HIs (namely, differentials in opportunities in the civil service and representation in the government) and socio-economic HIs (notably, Uyghur exclusion from the most lucrative sectors of the economy) that occur in the poor, Uyghur populated southern half of the region, especially in the rural areas of Aksu, Kashgar and Hotan prefectures (Wang 1998:59; Dillon 2004:168; The Economist 2013).

4.2. Qinghai Initially a Tibetan/Mongolian region, Qinghai province was created on January 1st, 1928 and is the largest province and the fourth largest administrative unit in the PRC. It is divided into 8 prefectural level units (including six autonomous prefectures), 43 counties (including 7 autonomous counties), and 429 townships (including 30 autonomous townships), making over 98.9% of its territory ‘autonomous’. Qinghai, which is historically a Tibetan59 region, has always

59There are substantial differences among the Tibetan populations in China. Tibetans in Qinghai and southern Gansu are part of the Amdo subgroup and those in western Sichuan and eastern Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) are part of the Kham subgroup. Tibetans in Qinghai have long regarded themselves as both socially and

73 been ethnically plural. Han Chinese migrants started settling in Qinghai in the late 14th and early 15th century,60 and proximity to the Muslim centres of Gansu and Ningxia meant that Hui Chinese moved into Qinghai as early as the Tang Dynasty (Goodman and Cooke, forthcoming). After the communist takeover, Qinghai’s combination of low population density and vast natural resources motivated government officials to increase its population to ten million with the help of internal migrants from Inner China. The first large waves of organized migrants came during the Great Leap Forward (1956-9) when more than 749,000 Han migrants—representing one-third of Qinghai’s population at the time—moved to the province (Goodman 2004b:386).61 More waves of organized migration followed in 1960-3 and in 1964-83, when approximately 570,000 and 360,000 people migrated to Qinghai respectively (Goodman and Cooke forthcoming). At the time, most migrants were state-sanctioned or hukou migrants who came with their families to develop and industrialize the province. As a result, migrants to urban areas of Qinghai—including migrants working in the public service, those engaged in industrial enterprises relocated from other provinces, and those engaged in activities related to resource exploitation— far exceeded the number of migrants moving to rural areas. This urban bias is ongoing, as university graduates from eastern China continue to flock to Qinghai to find jobs and earn ‘points’ to secure their chance of a future political career.62 If these movements were somewhat ‘voluntary’,63 a substantial part of the state-organized migration to Qinghai was also coerced, –e.g. the laogai prison system in Western Qinghai earned the province the nickname of ‘China’s Siberia’- which explains why once state power was relaxed in the early 1980s, 124,151 people moved out of the province, contributing to its first ever negative migratory rate (Qinghai Statistical Yearbook 2009: 77).

politically separate from those in Central Tibet (see Barnett 1993: 290), a view that is not necessarily shared in Lhasa or by exiled Tibetans (see Shakya 1999). Within Qinghai, Tibetans regard themselves as almost inherently divided by class, settlement, clan, and level of integration into Chinese culture (Goodman 2004b: 385).

60 Interview with Professor Keith Dede, Lewis Clark University, Xining, June 23, 2011.

61However, if one takes into account out-migration, which was as steep as 570,000 between 1960-63 (Goodman 2004b:387), the scale of total migration decreases significantly. Chinese sources estimate net migration from 1956- 1985 to be closer to 533,000 (Sangjiejia 1998 cited in Goodman and Cooke forthcoming).

62 Interview with researcher at Qinghai Academy of Social Science, Xining, June 20th, 2011.

63Rohlf correctly questions the significance of ‘voluntary’ migration in a context in which one needs the approval of authorities to relocate and in which the state provides substantial financial compensation to those who move (2007: 434).

74 As in Xinjiang, the Opening Door policies and the Develop the West Program generated a host of economic opportunities in Qinghai, as the province’s economy relies on secondary industries, including iron and steel located near its capital city of Xining and oil and natural gas from the Qaidam Basin.64 Recent economic programs act as important pull factors for non- organized or non-hukou migrants with limited education to return for work in the business sector. The yearly number of in-migrants nearly quadrupled from 7,687 in 1998 to 27,365 in 2008, though net migration remained negative over that period as out-migration surpassed in-migration (Qinghai Statistical Yearbook 2011: 77). The discrepancy between the household registered population and the population at year-end—which nears 300-400,000 people according to the latest statistics available—is nevertheless indicative of the augmentation of temporary or non- hukou migration in Qinghai in recent years (Qinghai provincial population statistics 2010). Migration in Qinghai is increasingly becoming an intra-provincial rather than an inter-provincial phenomenon. In 1987, 68.1% of all migration in Qinghai was intra-provincial (Liang 2001, table 2), whereas in 2010, intra-provincial migration accounted for 73.88% of non-hukou migration. More than half of the inter-provincial migrants to Qinghai hail from Gansu, Henan, or Xian province (Qinghai Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2012: 7-1). The 2010 census reveals that at 5.6 million people, Qinghai’s population is still far from the 10 million mark, although decades of intra-provincial and inter-provincial migration have nearly doubled its population and drastically altered its ethnic makeup (see Table 4.2.1). Tibetans formed the majority of the population until the turn of the 20th century,65 after which their proportion slowly declined. When the CCP came to power, the Han Chinese and the Tibetans both represented approximately 30% of the population, with the Hui forming another 20% (Goodman and Cooke forthcoming). The remaining 20% of the population was made up of the other 50 minzu who are officially residing in Qinghai.66 From 1953 to 1962, Han Chinese went from just short of a majority to making up more than 60% of Qinghai’s population. Their share of the total population has since declined to 53%, with Tibetans at 24.4%, and Hui at 14.8% according to the latest statistics available. However, these province-wide statistics conceal the fact that ethnic groups in Qinghai are highly concentrated. Nearly 81% of the Han and 75.8% of the Hui

64 These notably include the development of a natural gas pipeline from Sebei to Xining, a large-scale potassic fertilizer plant in the Qaidam basin, an expressway from Xining to Lanzhou (in Gansu province), and a railway from Golmud-Xining-Lhasa (in Tibet). See Goodman (2004b: 392).

65 Interview with Professor Keith Dede, Lewis Clark University, Xining, June 23rd, 2011.

66 Interview with a researcher from the Qinghai Academy of Social Science, Xining, June 20, 2011.

75 populations reside in the Northeast corner of Qinghai—in the transportation hub of Xining and Haidong (see Table 4.2.2, and Figure 4.2). Elsewhere in the province Tibetans are the largest ethnic group, representing the majority of the population in five of Qinghai’s eight prefectures and 21 of its 43 counties.

Table 4.2.1 Ethnic composition of Qinghai’s population, 1953-2010 (%)

1953 1964 1982 1990 2000 2010 Han 49.05 61.35 60.58 57.9 54.49 53.02 Tibetan 29.44 18.7 19.35 20.26 21.89 24.44 Others 21.51 19.95 20.07 21.84 23.62 22.54

Data from 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990, 2000, 2010 population censuses

Table 4.2.2 Ethnic and migrant populations in Qinghai’s prefectures and cities, 2010 (%)

Han Tibetan Inter-provincial Migrants Hainan 24.84 66.3 2.34 Haidong 55.72 9.48 1.37 Huangnan 6.08 68.55 2.12 Haixi 66.0 10.93 15.16 Haibei 35.88 24.36 2.46 Yushu 3.08 96.49 3.11 Guoluo 6.57 91.96 3.58 Xining 74.03 5.5 8.34 QINGHAI 53.02 24.44 5.66

Data from 2010 Qinghai population census, 1-4

Figure 4.2 Map of Qinghai

http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=17639&lang=en

4.2.1 HIs in Qinghai Recent statistics indicate that Han Chinese are better included in all of the most lucrative occupations and industries in Qinghai (see Table 4.2.3). As in Xinjiang, Han Chinese represent the overwhelming majority working in the secondary and tertiary sectors, having a near monopoly in scientific research, banking, and insurance, the most profitable sectors in Qinghai. In contrast, only 63% of Qinghai’s Han—as opposed to 89% of Tibetans—work in the primary sector. Ethnic job segregation is especially obvious as Tibetans are excluded from nearly all occupations outside the primary sector except education and culture. However, one cannot necessarily deduce from the table above that Han workers have significantly higher wages than the local population, as is the case for Xinjiang. Indeed, both Tibetans and Han Chinese are heavily involved in the primary sector in Qinghai –which is incidentally not the lowest paid sector in Qinghai, a distinction that goes to the construction sector operated by Han Chinese from Sichuan.67 Still, the two highest paid sectors in Qinghai are services to households (not shown in the table) and scientific research—two sectors that are not related to the exploitation of the region’s natural resources but in which Han Chinese predominate nevertheless.

Table 4.2.3 Average wages of workers and ethnic composition of the main industries in

67 Interview with Keith Dede, Lewis Clark University, Xining, June 23, 2011.

77 Qinghai

Average wages Han (%) Tibetan

(yuan) (%) Total population 30983 54.49 21.89

Farming, fishing, animal 22502 48.59 25.62 husbandry and forestry Mining and quarrying 35273 78.01 3.86 Production and distribution of 36495 82.76 7.04 power and oil Construction 19100 85.03 1.97 Transportation 34830 77.07 3.88 Banking and insurance 39749 85.02 6.43 Real estate 24397 87.28 1.77 Scientific research 44824 88.91 5.08 Education and Culture 37160 66.58 19.89 Government agencies 35116 56.74 29.62

Data Qinghai 2000 Population Census Assembly L2-1 Population by sex and industry and nationality; Data Qinghai 2000 Population Census Assembly3-29 Average money wage of staff and workers by sector and by Prefectures.

The official unemployment rate for Tibetans is lower than that of Han Chinese residing in Qinghai (see Table 4.2.4), although these figures should be approached cautiously. Spatial distribution of unemployment reveals that disparities in unemployment are not as wide, nor do they have as many ethnic undertones, as in Xinjiang. Unemployment rates vary by only 1% among Qinghai’s prefectures, from 3% in Guoluo to 4.2% in Yushu, both with a Tibetan majority (see Table 4.2.5).

Table 4.2.4 Ethnic composition of unemployment in Qinghai (%) Han Tibetans Unemployment rate per ethnic group 1.98 1.32

Data Qinghai 2000 Population Census Assembly L2-3 Unemployed population by sex and nationality

Table 4.2.5 Registered unemployment rate in urban areas of Qinghai’s prefectures and cities (2010)

Unemployment rate (%) Hainan 3.5

78 Haidong 3.64 Huangnan 3.5 Haixi 3.07 Haibei 3.57 Yushu 4.2 Guoluo 3 Xining 4.13

Data Qinghai Economic and Social Development Report 2011

Economic HIs and ethnic job segregation between Han Chinese and Tibetans are also reinforced by migratory trends. In Qinghai, the occupational disparity gap between inter- provincial migrants and the rest of the population was particularly large as inter-provincial migrants were six times more likely to be involved in sales and services, and three times more likely to be involved in production. However, migrants were nearly nine times less less likely to be involved in agriculture (see Table 4.2.6). Qinghai is also unique in that the socio-economic gap between migrants and locals extends to positions typically occupied by local elites, like government positions. The juxtaposition of such trends with Qinghai’s current ethnic division of labour makes Han migrants appear all the more advantaged compared to the local Tibetan population.

Table 4.2.6 Percentage of inter-provincial migrants involved in various occupations in Qinghai (%)

Qinghai Inter- Entire provincial population migrants Qinghai Government 3.43 1.43 Professional/Technical 7.8 6.7 Clerical 3.25 2.89 Sales and Services 46.07 7.56 Agriculture 8.59 72.17 Production 30.30 9.22

Data Qinghai 2000 Population Census Assembly, L1-3 Employed population by sex and occupation; L7-7-2 Population by current residence, emigration place and occupation (inter- region)

Disparities in educational attainment between Han migrants and local Tibetans help explain the latter’s exclusion from the most lucrative economic sectors. A staggering 54.33% of

79 Tibetans residing in Qinghai do not complete primary education, as opposed to 13.75% of Han Chinese (see Table 4.2.7). This gap in educational attainment continues at higher levels of education, as Han Chinese are four times more likely to complete middle school (32.54% vs. 8.76%), five times more likely to complete high school (11.73% vs. 2.25%), and twice as likely to attain a post-secondary education (9.45% vs. 4.52%) than the local Tibetan population. A comparison in educational attainment between inter-provincial migrants to Qinghai and Qinghai’s Han population shows that the former are clearly better educated, suggesting that the already significant education disparity between Han migrants and local Tibetans is likely to persist if not intensify.

Table 4.2.7 Population over 6 years of age per ethnic group, migration status, and education in Qinghai (%)

Han Inter- Tibetans provincial migrants Less than primary 13.75 11.73 54.33 school education Primary school 32.53 24.91 30.12 education Middle school 32.54 38.71 8.76 education High school education 11.73 13.42 2.25 Post-secondary 9.45 11.23 4.52 education

Data Qinghai 2000 Population Census Assembly 2-2 Population of different nationalities aged 6 and over by sec and education attainment; L7-6-2 Population by current residence, type of emigration place and education (inter-region)

Socio-economic group disparities between migrants and locals in Qinghai are reinforced by regional disparities in investment and the prevalence of migrants in prefectures with the highest GDP per capita. Haixi prefecture, with its large reserves of natural resources, has by far the most migrants in Qinghai; incidentally, its GDP per capita is also more than three times the regional average and it has attracted nearly seven times more investment per capita than any other prefecture in Qinghai (see Table 4.2.8). At the other hand of the spectrum, Yushu prefecture, with the highest concentration of Tibetans and one of the lowest proportions of migrants, ranks last in GDP per capita and has the lowest net investment per capita in Qinghai. It is unsurprising that 12

80 ethnic autonomous counties in Qinghai were designated as ‘poverty-stricken’ by the government (HRIC 2007:18).

Table 4.2.8 Economic characteristics of Qinghai’s prefectures and cities Tibetan Han (%) Migrant GDP/capit primary secondary tertiary Total (%) s (%) a (2010) sector sector (%) sector investment (%) (%) in fixed assets (RMB billion) Hainan 66.3 24.84 2.34 18,543 26 46 28 8.36 Haidong 9.48 55.72 1.37 15,671 18.4 44.3 37.3 16.28 Huangna 68.55 6.08 2.12 18,615 29.8 36.7 33.5 3.19 n Haixi 10.93 66.0 15.16 97,747 2.8 81.2 16 36.07 Haibei 24.36 35.88 2.46 27,393 15.2 59 25.8 5.33 Yushu 96.46 3.08 3.11 9,639 42.8 35.1 22.1 4.8 Guoluo 91.96 6.57 3.58 14,381 18.6 48.68 32.72 2.46 Xining 5.5 74.03 8.34 34,743 3.56 53.36 43.08 52.8

Data Qinghai Economic and Social Development Report 2011

The lack of ethnic representation in the political apex is even more apparent in Qinghai than in Xinjiang. Even if autonomous counties and prefectures account for 98.9% of Qinghai’s total area, the province is not autonomous per se, meaning that there is no requirement for the governor of the province to belong a minority group, nor are there policies favouring the hiring of local minorities at the provincial level. A compilation of local political figures in Qinghai reveals that since 1949 Han Chinese born outside of Qinghai have occupied all top-level government positions, including the Secretaries of the Qinghai Communist Party and provincial governors. Likewise, the proportion of minority deputies in the People’s Congress of Qinghai and in the People’s Political Consultative Conference of Qinghai is less than their proportion of the provincial population (42.4% and 40.5%, versus 46%, respectively), limiting their ability to pass regulations protecting their lifestyle or modes of production (Qinghai Provincial Bureau of Statistics. Qinghai Statistical Yearbook 2012, 20-2, 20-3). However, since the 1980s locals have started filling lower-level political positions. As of June 2011, two of eight prefectural Secretaries of the CCP were Tibetans, and seven prefectural governors of eight were originally from Qinghai: five Tibetans, one Mongol, and one Han. Han migrants have also dominated lower level positions in the civil service ever since its

81 inclusion in the PRC.68 The first wave of migrants who settled in Qinghai in the mid-20th century monopolized some of the best jobs in the civil service, and today, their children have priority for job assignments.69 The situation has somewhat improved since the 1980s, at least in low-level governmental positions, attributable both to the job vacuum that resulted from the out-migration of several Han civil servants in the early 1980s70 and to improving education levels among local people.71 As shown in Table 4.2.3, nearly 30% of employees in government agencies are Tibetans, which is higher than their share of Qinghai’s population. Although this is good news, one should remember that Tibetan populations are heavily concentrated in Qinghai’s southwest, and their over-representation in political appointments in the capital may be counteracted by their under- representation in prefectures where they constitute the largest ethnic group. The fact that Han inter-provincial migrants are better represented in government agencies than the average population also damper our enthusiasm as to the future of Tibetan inclusion into the political apparatus given that remnants of the old monopoly remain. As local Tibetan and Han migrant candidates write the same civil servant exam, lower proficiency in Mandarin and lower education levels of locals compared to migrants continue to set the odds against them.72 To address this problem, the government has now added two questions worth approximately 15 points to the civil service exam designed to level the field for Tibetans,73 but since the state is no longer the sole employer, most high paying jobs in the private sector remain outside the reach of local job seekers.

4.2.2 HIs and SoS in Qinghai Inter-provincial migration fuels Tibetans’ dwindling economic and political opportunities and has contributed to conflicts targeting migrants and their properties in Qinghai, especially in its semi- urban (e.g. Tongren) and rural regions with a limited history of large-scale migration and where

68 Interview with local Tibetan, Tongren, June 26, 2011

69 Interview with scholar at Qinghai Academy of Social Sciences, Xining, June 20, 2011.

70 A cadre recall policy was implemented, transferring large groups of cadres out of the region in 1979 (2,200 cadres), 1981 (1,000 cadres), and 1985 (900 cadres) (Yasheng 1995: footnote 6, p.201). Unlike in Tibet, the cadre recall policy was not implemented to limit ethnic tension in the region. It instead hinged on family circumstances or the health of returnees (Yasheng 1995: footnote 14, p.202).

71 Interview with a scholar at Qinghai Academy of Social Sciences, Xining, June 20, 2011.

72 Interview with a local Tibetan, Xining, June 26, 2011

73 Interviews with local Tibetans, Xining, June 17, 2011; local Tibetan, Xining, June 27, 2011.

82 herding is still practiced. With few alternatives for employment outside the primary sector, Tibetans are particularly dependent on their (grass)lands and its resources for their economic subsistence. The promises of short-term financial gains have pushed many Tibetans into temporarily leasing their lands to the government or to Han migrants who, from May to July every year, participate in the lucrative trade of caterpillar fungus. They also often sell their lands or livestock to cover expenses associated with large Tibetan celebrations, such as a boy’s third birthday, weddings, or funerals.74 Though these practices provide nomadic Tibetans with much needed cash, it also destroys the ecosystem of their lands. The constant flow of people from Inner China who resettle in Qinghai’s urban areas has also been a major factor in urban sprawl and Tibetan land loss. As migration to cities such as Tongren and Xining increased, local governments needed to purchase (mostly Tibetan-owned) land adjacent to urban areas to keep up with the growing population.75 However, land leasing or land buying did not always go smoothly. Allegations that the Chinese authorities have been seizing Tibetan lands and using them for re- development projects or giving them to new Chinese migrants have sparked several land disputes in Yushu and Haibei (Ponnudurai 2013b; Finney 2011a). Tibetans from three nomadic villages in Hainan prefecture were told to “give up 60% of their land and get rid of 54% of their animals within this year […] to cater to over 30,000 Chinese migrants”—a number that was expected to swell to 100,000 after the construction of additional hydroelectric projects in the area (Ponnudurai 2012a). Local people in Qinghai have also criticized the extraction and transportation of resources out of migrant-operated mines on the grounds that these processes pollute the environment, disrupt sites of spiritual significance, and extract local wealth (Vandenbrink 2013b). Road blockages by local protestors are becoming so common that companies are now trying to bypass roads and rely on airplanes to transport natural resources out of the site of extraction without the awareness of locals.76 The 2010 Yushu earthquake was linked to the unrestricted mining activities under two sacred mountains in the region by Qinghai Xinyu Mining Company and its Fujian-born executives. Miners became targets of retaliatory attacks by locals (Mudie 2010; Finney 2012a). As opposed to the situation in Inner Mongolia, where many of the main sites of natural extraction

74 Interview with local Tibetan, Tongren, June 24, 2011.

75 Interviews with local Tibetans, Tongren, June 27 and 28, 2011.

76 Interview local Tibetan, Tongren, June 26, 2011.

83 are deep in ‘minority territory’, most of Qinghai’s gold mining and gas and oil exploitation takes place in Haixi Prefecture, where there are few Tibetan settlements. The lack of congruence between resource exploitation sites and minority settlements may explain why natural resource exploitation has so far not been a major problem in Qinghai. Besides, the fact that one can make as much money working in the education sector or in the government as in the mining industry makes the latter far less appealing than in other minority regions like Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. Instead, the main source of migration-related tensions in Qinghai comes from hukou or planned migrants who take limited job opportunities available to young Tibetans, especially in the civil service, which is the most popular occupation for Tibetans outside the primary sector. Hukou migrants also fail to learn Tibetan and contribute to inflation.77 As a local respondent from Tongren summarized: I am personally not welcoming migrants who are organized by the government, as nothing good comes from their migration. They just want to exploit our resources, they don’t want to help or teach us anything. They all aim to change our mentality and our lifestyle […] There’s more job competition. […] I personally welcome [spontaneous] migrants. They are not harmful to the locals (interview with local Tibetan, Tongren, June 27, 2011).

The editor-in-chief of a Tibetan newspaper confirms this distinction: We don’t like organized migrants because they just get the good jobs, but we are ok with spontaneous migrants because they bring goods here from Inner China and they bring new skills to the local people (interview with local Tibetan, Tongren, June 28th, 2011).

Migrants who come as part of a state-sponsored programs appear to be moving ‘with the state on their side’, thus further intensifying economic and political HIs between migrants and locals. As mentioned, planned migrants from the 1950s monopolized some of the best jobs in the civil service and their children are now receiving priority for job assignments. According to a researcher at the Qinghai Academy of Social Science, local Tibetans have a wrongful sense of entitlement, a feeling that “they should be doing the [civil service] job as it is their province”.78

77Qinghai’s rising inflation, perhaps most apparent in the housing system, is also blamed on inter-provincial migrants as they contribute to the rising demand for apartments and are able to afford the subsequent higher prices given their [presumed] greater wealth and savings (interviews with Hui migrants, Xining, June 25, 2011; local Tibetan Tongren, June 26, 2011; Han local, Tongren, June 26; local Tibetan Guide, July 1st, 2011). Han merchants are also blamed for contributing to inflation by setting the price of goods unnecessarily high (Finney 2011b). Local people have, at times, protested against inflation, “beating up migrants or breaking things, but this has only increased the price of goods” (interview with a local Tibetan from Yushu, Tongren, June 27, 2011).

78 Interview with a scholar at Qinghai Academy of Social Sciences, Xining, June 20, 2011.

84 But unlike Uyghurs and Mongols, Tibetans at the middle or upper end of the labor hierarchy do not benefit from preferential hiring policies in the civil service, as they are not the titular ethnic group at the provincial level. The city of Tongren in Huangnan Prefecture is a perfect example of how greater job competition for local elites following inter-provincial migration has contributed to SoS conflict in Qinghai. The city, with its large population of unemployed local youth with university degrees, has been the scene of constant protests since 2008.79 In October 2010, a two-day student protest shook Tongren after the provincial government proposed the elimination of bilingual education in all of Qinghai’s autonomous prefectures. Such a policy would effectively impose Chinese as the language of instruction for all subjects at all levels of education. Thousands of participants, most of whom were students and monks, carried banners reading “Equality among Nationalities” and “Expand the Use of the Tibetan Language” (Ponnudurai 2010). Retired Tibetan government officials supported the protesters, writing letters in favour of genuine bilingual education to the provincial government.80 The protests quickly spread to neighbouring counties and prefectures, and even made it all the way to Beijing, where some 400 Tibetan students from Beijing National Minorities (Minda) University protested outside university buildings. Other minority students, including Uyghurs and Kazakhs, briefly joined the protesters, as they also feared the end of genuine bilingual education in their regions; ultimately, the Dean of the University requested that they stop the protest.81 For local Qinghai people, the latest language policy was seen as an effort to limit the power of educated young people in Qinghai, a region whose Tibetan population was considered comparatively well-educated and multilingual compared to the Tibetan populations in Sichuan, Gansu, and TAR.82 These language protests were closely connected to inter-provincial migration,

79Several local respondents proudly explained that the now famous 2008 Tibetan unrest that spread through all Tibetan areas began in Tongren. According to the recollections of several respondents, several (Han) police officers circled the city in their vehicles with their sirens on around the time of the Chinese New Year. Upset by this unnecessary show of power, local Tibetans fought with Han police officers, resulting in the destruction of several police cars. Many Tibetans were arrested and later ‘disappeared’. As protests spread to other Tibetan areas, monks from Tongren’s monastery participated and were later arrested. Ever since these incidents, the army station just outside of Tongren that had previously housed a modest (approximately 200) contingent of soldiers was expanded (+10,000 soldiers). Locals have been forbidden from gathering or dancing in public spaces, there has been heavy police surveillance in the streets, and access to the Internet has been closely monitored—i.e., a valid Chinese ID card is now necessary to check email at an internet café (see also Jackson-Han 2008).

80 Interview with local Tibetan, Xining, June 23, 2011.

81 Interview with local Tibetan, Tongren, June 24, 2011; Lipes 2010a; Ponnudurai and Finney 2010.

82 Interview with Gerard Roche, Qinghai University, Xining, June 23 2011.

85 because “the more Chinese people, the less Tibetan culture, and the less we can exert our autonomous rights”.83 Along with state policies encouraging large-scale Han migration to Qinghai, the latest education reform was understood as another attempt by the state to speed up the ongoing process of “monks and lay people in the Tibetan region being Sinicized from a young age” (Woeser, 2010). Unlike the protests in Inner Mongolia, these protests had a political undertone and were influenced by the greater Tibetan sub-state nationalist discourse. They were about real autonomy: establishing policies of ethnic representation, access to bilingual education and documents translated into Tibetan, etc., just like in other Chinese autonomous regions.84 Insufficient Tibetan representation in provincial political bodies due to the lack of genuine autonomy has also prevented them from protecting their culture and implementing local hiring. Tibetan support for bilingual education and the Tibetan language in general was anticipated, given the cultural significance for Tibetans. However, support for bilingual education was also highly strategic given that Tibetan Studies is the most common university program for young Tibetans.85 If the Tibetan language becomes obsolete, then graduates of the Tibetology program will soon be unemployed for there will be no need for teachers of Tibetan language86— a situation akin to that of thousands of Uyghur teachers who lost their jobs given their inability to speak Mandarin (Lipes 2011). Tibetans graduating from Qinghai’s Teachers College are no longer guaranteed employment, as teaching positions in the province have been significantly reduced from 1,000 to 400.87 Key cohorts of local Tibetans (especially young graduates) are excluded from key growth sectors in the economy, such as privileged sectors of public employment in education, culture, and scientific research, which are among the best paid in Qinghai. Their exclusion stands in sharp contrast to the norm in China, where public employment has played an important role in creating employment opportunities for an increasingly educated population, thereby mediating at least some of the potential dislocations brought on by rapid change in the country (see Fisher 2011). As pointed out by the Tibetan scholar:

83 Interview with local Tibetan, Tongren, June 28, 2011.

84 Interview with local Tibetan, Tongren, June 28, 2011.

85 Tibetan students attending Minda University in Beijing are almost exclusively studying ‘Tibetology’.

86 Interview with local Tibetan, Xining, June 23, 2011.

87 Interview with Gerald Roche, Qinghai University, Xining, June 23, 2011.

86 Exclusions experienced at the middle or upper end of the labor hierarchy (such as among staff and workers) are important from the perspective of conflict given that such exclusions are very politically sensitive, even if they are not necessarily reflected as increasing poverty. Moreover, the fact that these exclusionary experiences operate along educational, linguistic or cultural modes of disadvantage provides the basis for strong cross-clan perceptions and expressions of grievances. (Fisher 2011: conclusion)

Shortly after I conducted my fieldwork in the region, the city of Tongren and the province as a whole were also engulfed in a wave of protests and self-immolation in the fall of 2012. A total of 113 Tibetans set themselves ablaze to challenge Chinese rule in Tibetan areas and to call for the return from exile of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader (Ponnudurai 2012b: 2012c). These individual protests strategically coincided with the CCP’s 18th Party Congress in Beijing, which was about to endorse a once-in-a-decade leadership change. Instead of showing lenience, Chinese authorities tightened restrictions on the movement of Tibetans from Qinghai to Lhasa88 and the security presence was strengthened near Tongren, with several trucks staffed with police officers and government officials stationed at intersections throughout the town (Ponnudurai 2012b). A list of 13 unlawful behaviours, including filming self-immolations, urging protection of the environment or the Tibetan language, and conducting religious ceremonies if these carry overtones of support for Tibetan independence, has been disseminated in all towns and villages of Tongren (Finney 2013). According Lobsang Sangay, the head of the Tibetan government in exile, these latest protests underscore the “political repression, economic marginalization, environmental destruction and cultural assimilation of the Tibetan people” (Finney 2012c). Inter-provincial migrants from Inner China embody all four of those grievances. Their increasing presence, alongside the socio-economic exclusion experienced by young Tibetan graduates in Qinghai, have pushed many to demand greater autonomy for Qinghai and the Greater Tibetan Areas, if not their outright secession from China.89 For these reasons, migration-related conflict in Qinghai must be

88For example, if a Tibetan wishes to travel from Golog to neighbouring Lhasa, he or she has to produce a resident permit issued by the authorities and then apply for travel permission from county and provincial authorities. If the applicant has a clean record showing no political involvement, permission to travel can be approved within two weeks, although restrictions are more stringent on monks who also need to obtain a clearance certificate from the police (Finney 2012a).

89As an integral part of the Greater Tibetan Area, Qinghai is, by definition, included in Tibetan demands for independence and greater autonomy. The nationalist and secessionist movement in Greater Tibet has been well reviewed elsewhere (see Ardley 2004), but suffice to say that, from my interviews, it also appears to enjoy substantial local support in Qinghai.

87 understood through the prism of both sub-state nationalism and, to a lesser extent, unsustainable resource exploitation. Most SoS conflict in Qinghai occurs in semi-urban areas with large Tibetan concentrations and involves unemployed Tibetan graduates who feel unfairly excluded from jobs in the civil service that more often than not go to Han migrants. Comparing their socio-economic and political prospects to those of migrant people’s, local Tibetans become increasingly aggrieved and start to voice their discontent vis-à-vis migration. Isolated incidents involving few individuals also occur between local Tibetans and spontaneous economic migrants—both Han and Hui—who are presumed to have unfairly benefited from Qinghai’s economic development (see Fisher 2005, 2008b).

4.3 Inner Mongolia Covering 1,183,000 km2, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was created on May 1st, 1947 and is the third largest administrative unit in China after Xinjiang and Tibet.90 Today, Inner Mongolia is divided into 12 prefecture level divisions, 101 county-level divisions (including 49 banners91 and 3 autonomous banners) and 1,425 township-level divisions (including 18 ethnic townships and 1 ethnic sumu). Since the late Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), migrants from south of the Great Wall have poured into Mongol territory, attracted by its fertile lands and vast reservoir of coal, natural gas, oil, and rare earth elements. Early Qing policies kept Inner Mongolia closed to Han migration in an attempt to prevent Mongols and Hans from forming an alliance to topple the Manchu-led Qing Dynasty.92 Widespread famines forced the government to re-open access to Inner Mongolia to temporary “hunger migrants” from Northeast China. Permanent migration to Inner Mongolia fully resumed at the turn of the 20th century, after the Qing Dynasty was forced to pay significant war indemnities to foreign powers. Due to the policies of “strengthening the frontiers” (yimin shibian) and “exploring the Mongolian lands” (kaikameng di), nearly 1 million

90 Inner Mongolia’s territory has fluctuated over the years. According to Bulag (2004: 90-1) and Jankowiak (1988:272), expansion was meant to include areas with a significant Han population (e.g., Suiyan, which was included in 1953), thereby diminishing the overall proportion of Mongols in Inner Mongolia.

91Until the late 1990s, most of Inner Mongolia's prefectural regions were known as Leagues and county-level divisions were known as Banners, a usage retained from Mongol divisions of the Qing Dynasty. Since then, numerous leagues have been converted into prefecture-level cities, although 3 Leagues (Alxa, Hinggan, and Xilingol) and several banners remain.

92 Interview with economics professor, Inner Mongolia Normal University, Hohhot, August 16, 2011.

88 Han farmers from nearby provinces, e.g., Shandong, Shanxi, and Hebei, were allowed to migrate to the south/southeast part of Inner Mongolia to exploit the lands and increase tax revenues.93 From 1947 onwards, planned or “policy” migrants (zhongce yimin) came as part of the “defend the borders” (zhibian) program to develop ethnic regions. Though some of those migrants were involved in agriculture—notably the tens of thousands of Han migrants who relocated near Xilingol and Bayinnu’er as part of Inner Mongolia’s Construction Armies (Jianshe Bingtuan) that helped settle nomads and turned the grasslands into agricultural fields94—post-1947 migration was mainly channelled to industrial urban sites. The transfer of large- and medium-sized factories from China’s coastal areas and the presence of Soviet-funded plants requiring staff played a major role in the relocation of skilled (jiang) migrants to Inner Mongolia. Together, these policies brought an estimated 3.4 million migrants to Inner Mongolia between 1950 and 1960 (Bulag 2004:92-3).95 Inter-provincial migration to Inner Mongolia decreased following the introduction of more advantageous liberal economic policies elsewhere in China.96 However, many respondents mentioned an increase in the flow of spontaneous economic migrants working in mines, trade, and electronic plants in Alxa, Ordos, and Xilingol following the introduction of the Develop the West Program. Most of these migrants are non-hukou migrants, with 82.1% migrating from within the autonomous region and 17.9% migrating from a different province, mainly Hebei, Shanxi, and Heilongjiang (IM Bureau of Statistics 2012:7-1). Even in the midst of a moderate economic boom, net migration was estimated at -0.01% in Inner Mongolia 2010 (Fisher 2012:12). Still, centuries of planned and unplanned migration to Inner Mongolia have drastically affected the ethnic makeup of the province. Mongol populations97 first started to decline after

93 Interviews with retired professor, Inner Mongolia Academy of Social Science, Hohhot, August 18, 2011; interview with sociology professor, Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot, August 16, 2011.

94 Interview with PhD candidate, Inner Mongolia Normal University, Hohhot, August 27, 2011.

95 As for Qinghai, out-migration often surpassed in-migration. Nearly 700,000 migrants moved out during the Great famine of 1961-2 (Banister 2001: 282).

96 Interview with Head of Population Office, Hohhot, August 17, 2011.

97There are different Mongolian tribes, including the Horchin, Harchin, Chahar, and Barga (Han 2011, footnote 6 page 56) and different ethno-linguistic groups including the Khalka, Dorbet, and Dariganga (Riskianingrum et al 2006) in Inner Mongolia. An indication that distinctions and factions between east and west Mongols exist and that they are politically significant is that IMAR Chairmanship typically alternates between the two. Unfortunately, no statistics exists on these groups, misleading us to assume Mongol homogeneity. For the purpose of this work, I refer to ‘Mongols’ as an all-inclusive term encompassing all such tribes and ethno-linguistic groups for lack of more detailed intra-ethnic statistics.

89 1790 due to natural reasons and wars. Mongol preponderance declined even more quickly after 1947, as internal migrants were Han Chinese in a proportion of 10:1 (Iredale et al 2001: 118). Despite the sparse population data available during the Qing and Republican Era, the Chinese to Mongol population ratio was presumed to be nearly equal in the early 1900s (Bulag 2004:87), increasing to 6:1 in 1953, allegedly peaking at 12:1 in 1968 (Hyer and Heaton 1968:117). Their numbers started to decline in the 1980s, as the region’s minority populations grew in number following the process of ethnic re-identification98 and their exception from the one-child policy. Today, the 2010 census puts the provincial population at 24,706,321, 79.53% of whom are Han Chinese, 17.1% Mongol, and 3.36% belonging to one of the other 47 minzu, including Manchu and Hui (see Table 4.3.1). All 12 prefectures of Inner Mongolia now have a Han Chinese majority (see Table 4.3.2), and a more detailed analysis reveals that 11 out of 101 counties have a Mongol majority.99 As for Xinjiang and Qinghai, local Mongols and Han migrants are not spread out evenly across the province. Over 70% of Mongols are concentrated in less than 18% of Inner Mongolia’s eastern territory (i.e., in Chifeng, Hinggan, and Tongliao), whereas Alxa, Ordos, and Wuhai have five, four, and three times the regional average proportion of inter-provincial migrant populations (see Figure 4.3). Considering that migrants’ descendants are not included in these figures, one could expect the full demographic extent of centuries of migration to Inner Mongolia to be much more significant than what these figures indicate.

Table 4.3.1 Ethnic composition of Inner Mongolia population, 1953-2010 (%) 1953 1964 1982 1990 2000 2010 Han 83.93 89.99 84.45 80.58 79.2 79.54 Mongol 14.56 11.22 12.92 15.75 16.9 17.8 Others 1.18 1.78 2.63 3.67 3.8 3.66

Data from 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990, 2000, 2010 Chinese censuses

98Studies suggest that one- to two-thirds of minority population growth was due to the process of ethnic re- identification—i.e., the large numbers of offspring from ethnically mixed marriages who officially changed their ethnic identity in the early 1980s to qualify for the benefits granted to Chinese national minorities (e.g., lower university entry requirements, priority hiring, etc.). See Burgjin and Bilik (2003: 56). Anecdotal evidence collected during fieldwork corroborates the instrumental use of ethnic re-identification to improve one’s socio-economic standing/future.

99As reported by Jankowiak, there were 22 counties with a Mongol majority in 1962 but there remained only 1 in 1982 (1988: 278-9). Ethnic re-identification and the redrawing of several counties’ borders may explain the slight increase in Mongol majority counties since then.

Table 4.3.2 Ethnic and migrant populations per prefecture and city in Inner Mongolia, 2010 (%) Han (2010) Mongol (2010) Migrants (2010) Alxa 74.55 19.29 25.2 Bayannur 93.93 4.52 7.3 Chifeng 77.29 19.11 1.44 Ordos 90.1 9.11 21.13 Hulunbuer 82.3 9.02 6.27 Tongliao 50.7 45.91 1.47 Xilingol 66.32 30.13 6.01 Baotou 94.3 3.21 7.8 Hohhot 87.16 9.98 5.93 Wuhai 93.21 3.55 14.92 Wulanchabu 96.26 2.90 1.47 Hinggan 54.2 41.27 2.21 TOTAL 79.53 17.1 5.84

Data from 2010 Inner Mongolia population census

Figure 4.3 Map of Inner Mongolia

http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=22473&lang=en

4.3.1 HIs in Inner Mongolia Compared to Xinjiang and Qinghai, economic disparities between Han migrants and local Mongols are significantly slimmer. Most of Inner Mongolia’s Han (60%) work in the primary

91 sector, as opposed to 72.6% of Mongols (see Table 4.3.3 for a comparative summary of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Qinghai). Mongols are well represented in government and party jobs and in education and culture, where they represent more than their proportion of the total population (23% vs 18%). They are also well included in some of the most lucrative sectors in China, such as scientific research and banking. As a result, the assumption that Han migrants have higher incomes than local Mongols appears to be without basis in Inner Mongolia.

Table 4.3.3 Average salaries of workers and ethnic composition of the main industries in Inner Mongolia, and ethnic composition of main industries in Qinghai and Xinjiang

Industries Inner Mongolia Xinjiang Qinghai Han Mongol Average Han Uyghurs Han Tibetan money wages (yuan) Total population 79.2 16.96 26114 40.58 45.21 54.49 21.89 Farming, fishing, animal 78.39 19.18 13192 25.13 59.87 48.59 25.62 husbandry and forestry Mining and quarrying 89.16 7.21 32246 75.83 14.36 78.01 3.86 Production and distribution 85.51 10.29 41241 70.83 18.98 82.76 7.04 of power and oil Construction 91.22 6.11 17730 89.54 7.3 85.03 1.97 Transportation 86.63 9.15 31320 72.31 18.24 77.07 3.88 Banking and insurance 77.8 17.28 37404 75.33 14.44 85.02 6.43 Real estate 86.32 8.35 20651 85.17 8.1 87.28 1.77 Scientific research 82.29 12.43 31094 82.2 10.75 88.91 5.08 Education and Culture 72.91 22.67 30566 41.66 40.26 66.58 19.89 Government agencies 72.53 22.69 30101 53.6 30.98 56.74 29.62

Data Xinjiang 2000 Population Census Assembly L2-1 Population by sex and industry and nationality Data Qinghai 2000 Population Census Assembly L2-1 Population by sex and industry and nationality Data Inner Mongolia 2000 Population Census Assembly L2-1 Population by sex and industry and nationality; Data Inner Mongolia 2008 5-11 Average wages of all staff and workers being on duty by sector

Official statistics indicate that Mongols have a lower unemployment rate than Han Chinese in Inner Mongolia (see Table 4.3.4). Unlike Qinghai and Xinjiang, geographic disparities in unemployment do not appear to be correlated with ethnicity. The prefectures with the lowest and highest unemployment rates both have large Han populations (see Table 4.3.5), suggesting that greater job opportunities and possibilities for upward social mobility exist for Mongols than for Uyghurs or Tibetans.

Table 4.3.4 Ethnic composition of unemployment in Inner Mongolia (%)

Han Mongol

92 Unemployment rate per ethnic group 2.31 1.98

Data Inner Mongolia 2000 Population Census Assembly L2-3 Unemployed population by sex and nationality

Table 4.3.5 Registered unemployment rate in urban areas of Inner Mongolia’s prefectures and cities (2010)

Unemployment rate (%) Alxa 3.82 Bayannur 3.9 Chifeng 4.17 Ordos 2.21 Hulunbuer 4.1 Tongliao 3.89 Xilingol 3.42 Baotou 3.87 Hohhot 3.7 Wuhai 4.3 Wulanchabu 4.2 Xinggan 4.1

Data Inner Mongolia Economic and Social Development Report 2011

The comparatively small economic HIs existing between the Han Chinese and Mongols in Inner Mongolia are nevertheless reinforced by migratory trends, as inter-provincial migrants are more than twice as likely to be involved in sales and services or production than the rest of the population in Inner Mongolia (see Table 4.3.6 for a comparative summary of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Qinghai).

Table 4.3.6 Percentage of inter-provincial migrants involved in various occupations in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Qinghai (%)

Inner Mongolia Xinjiang Qinghai Inter- Entire Inner Inter- Entire Inter-provincial Entire population provincial Mongolia provincial population migrants Qinghai migrants population migrants Xinjiang Government 2.14 2.29 1.08 2.29 3.43 1.43 Professional/Technical 4.16 7.00 2.25 8.16 7.8 6.7 Clerical 2.56 3.73 1.36 3.86 3.25 2.89 Sales and Services 26.28 10.22 21.88 10.57 46.07 7.56 Agriculture 27.31 61.61 35.36 61.09 8.59 72.17 Production 37.33 15.07 37.93 13.90 30.30 9.22

Data Xinjiang 2000 Population Census Assembly, L1-3 Employed population by sex and occupation; L7-7-2 Population by current residence, emigration place and occupation (inter-region); Data Qinghai 2000 Population

93 Census Assembly, L1-3 Employed population by sex and occupation; L7-7-2 Population by current residence, emigration place and occupation (inter-region); Data Inner Mongolia 2000 Population Census Assembly, L1-3 Employed population by sex and occupation; L7-7-2 Population by current residence, emigration place and occupation (inter-region)

The limited economic disparities between Han Chinese and Mongols are probably kept to a minimum due to the latter’s comparatively high education level. In contrast to the stark social inequalities between Han and Tibetans/Uyghurs, there is little evidence of HIs in education between Mongols and Han Chinese in Inner Mongolia. As a group, Han Chinese in Inner Mongolia have a higher percentage of illiteracy than Mongols (10.81% vs. 6.92%), and a slightly lower rate of post-secondary education (7.21% vs. 8.2%) (see Table 4.3.7 for a comparative summary). Compared to other minority groups, the greater literacy of Mongols is particularly noticeable; for instance, Mongols are nearly five times more likely to have completed secondary school than Uyghurs and Tibetans, with a completion rate of 13.76% versus 6.25% and 4.52% respectively. Comparing inter-provincial migrants to Inner Mongolia to Inner Mongolia’s total Han population reveals nearly identical educational attainment between the two groups, suggesting that no educational gap will emerge between local Mongols and inter-provincial Han migrants in the near future.

Table 4.3.7 Population over 6 years of age per ethnic group, migration status and education in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Qinghai (%)

Inner Mongolia Xinjiang Qinghai Han Inter-prov Mongols Han Inter-prov Uyghur Han Inter-prov Tibetans migrants migrants s migrants Less than primary 10.81 10.79 6.92 6.76 9.59 11.67 13.75 11.73 54.33 school education Primary school 27.85 31.37 34.57 27.79 37.87 53.19 32.53 24.91 30.12 education Middle school 39.25 41.02 36.54 36.62 41.37 24.57 32.54 38.71 8.76 education High school 14.87 8.16 13.76 13.20 7.67 4.31 11.73 13.42 2.25 education Post-secondary 7.21 8.66 8.2 15.63 3.49 6.25 9.45 11.23 4.52 education

Data Xinjiang 2000 Population Census Assembly 2-2 Population of different nationalities aged 6 and over by sec and education attainment; L7-6-2 Population by current residence, type of emigration place and education (inter- region); Data Qinghai 2000 Population Census Assembly 2-2 Population of different nationalities aged 6 and over by sec and education attainment; L7-6-2 Population by current residence, type of emigration place and education (inter-region); Data Inner Mongolia 2000 Population Census Assembly 2-3 Population of different nationalities aged 6 and over by sec and education attainment; L7-6-2 Population by current residence, type of emigration place and education (inter-region)

94 In Inner Mongolia, prefectures with a strong secondary sector, such as Ordos and Alxa, enjoy some of Inner Mongolia’s highest GDPs per capita and the highest net investment per capita (see Table 4.3.8). These prefectures also attract some of the largest numbers of inter-provincial migrants. Unlike Xinjiang and Qinghai, the distinction between rich/migrant and poor/local prefectures was not as noticeable in Inner Mongolia. There may be many migrants in Alxa and in Ordos, but there are also fairly large Mongol populations. Xilingol and Tongliao, the two prefecture-like units with the largest Mongol populations rank 6th and 7th respectively out of 12 in GDP per capita. From these figures, it appears that if prefectures with large migration populations benefit economically, so do prefectures with a large Mongol population.

Table 4.3.8 Economic characteristics of Inner Mongolia’s prefectures and cities

% Tibetan % migrant GDP per % GDP % GDP % GDP Total capita (yuan) primary secondary tertiary investment sector sector sector fixed assets (RMB billion) Alxa 19.29 25.2 168,094 3 82 15 19.62 Bayannur 4.52 7.3 43,000 19.3 57.6 23.1 63.36 Chifeng 19.11 1.44 31,121 15.7 53.6 30.7 111.51 Ordos 9.11 21.13 168,094 2.6 60.1 37.3 224.34 Hulunbuer 9.02 6.27 45,090 18.7 44.5 36.8 80.43 Tongliao 45.91 1.47 45,275 14.4 61.2 24.4 105.42 Xilingol 30.13 6.01 67,506 10.3 66.6 23.1 51.03 Baotou 3.21 7.8 112,372 2.7 55.4 41.9 216.06 Hohhot 9.98 5.93 74,772 5 36.3 58.7 103.17 Wuhai 3.55 14.92 89,521 0.9 73.1 26 28.69 Wulanchabu 2.90 1.47 32,246 16.2 53.8 30 46.2 Hinggan 41.27 2.21 18,778 31.5 36.5 32 33.19

Data Inner Mongolia Economic and Social Development Report 2011

In contrast to the substantial political HIs in Xinjiang and Qinghai, Mongols in Inner Mongolia are generally well represented in all levels of the Chinese political system despite representing less than 20% of the population. Unlike Qinghai’s Tibetans who do not enjoy autonomy at the provincial level, Mongols are more politically included in all spheres of power and compete less with Han migrants over political appointments thanks to the autonomous rights granted by the Chinese constitution. And unlike Xinjiang’s Uyghurs, the longer history of collaboration and cultural proximity with the Han Chinese have eased Mongol inclusion into the state apparatus. Indeed, Mongols’ long history of interaction with Han Chinese south of the Great

95 Wall is reflected today by their higher rate of household heterogeneity.100 Mongols governed China proper during the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), and that former glory has meant that they have traditionally been held in higher regard than many other ‘backward’ minority groups (Iredale et al., 2001: 134). In the early years of the PRC, the policy of ethnic representation was successfully applied and Mongols represented nearly 80% of CCP members, including high-ranking officials and regional government administrators (Riskianingrum et al., 2006).101 As prescribed by the autonomous law, Mongols have frequently been chosen as Inner Mongolia Chairs and as governors of prefectures. Ulanhu, a former Inner Mongolia Chairman and Secretary of the CCP, was even an alternate member of the Politburo—the highest rank ever achieved by a member of a minority group. I was unable to find the proportion of minority deputies in the People’s Congress and the People’s Political Consultative Conferences of Inner Mongolia; but several local scholars confirm that Mongols/minorities were no longer the majority of deputies in either congress.102 A survey of political figures at the prefectural level as of August 2011 indicates that ten Inner Mongolia Chairs out of twelve and six governors out of twelve were Mongols.103 It is interesting to note that where the governor of an Inner Mongolia prefecture was a Mongol, a Han Chinese representative occupied the post of Prefecture Secretary and vice versa. Though it is impossible to verify whether this practice was applied in the past, the state’s appointment of a combination of local and migrant candidates shows a certain local sensitivity and concern for local ethnic representation. Even in prefectures where Mongols represent a minuscule percentage of the population, like in Ulanqab (2.90% Mongols) or Baotou (3.21% Mongols), a Mongol was chosen as governor. As a titular ethnic group with historical ties to China, Mongols have been somewhat more successful than other minzu in implementing ethnic-preferential policies (youhui zhengce) and the

100 11.72% of households in IMAR are constituted of two or more minzu, compared to 6.15% in Qinghai and 1.74% in Xinjiang (IMAR, Qinghai and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbooks, 2000, 5-3)

101 However, the same source mentions that as migration increased and the Cultural Revolution ran its repressive course, this share dropped quickly, to 60% in the mid-1950s and to 50% in the mid-1960s (Riskianingrum et al., 2006). 102 Interview with Sociology Professor, IMU, Hohhot, August 16, 2011; interview Economic Professor IMNU, Hohhot, August 16, 2011.

103Although, according to a Professor at Inner Mongolia University, these Mongols were typically ‘Hanicized’ Mongols who could no longer speak Mongolian (interview with Professor Inner Mongolia University, August 16, 2011).

96 guarantee of minimum ethnic representation in governmental offices.104 Data from the 2000 census reveals that Mongols are over-represented in government agencies –i.e. 24%, as compared to 18%, their proportion of the population.105 Although several respondents pointed out the continued preponderance of Han Chinese in the civil service,106 Mongol elites face few obstacles to social upward mobility. In fact, not one respondent mentioned competition over white collars jobs as a notable source of grievance.107 Of course, Mongols’ greater political representation and inclusion in the civil service should not be confused for political power in China. In Inner Mongolia, as is the case in Xinjiang and Qinghai, the position of Chair of the CCP and chief of the Inner Mongolia Public Security Bureau are firmly in Han Chinese hands. Because minority political participation is often relegated to enforcing policy rather than formulating it, it is difficult to assess the impact such limited, and at times, figurative representation of minorities in governmental bodies has had on regional decision-making. A prominent Mongol scholar concluded his interview with the following caveat: Inner Mongolia should be autonomous, but really it is not. Civil servants should be Mongols but they are often not. It is called Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region but it is not so in practice. Although there are some laws and regulations, people do not follow them. I don’t believe we are an autonomous region, because local people do not decide the directions they want to take. Shanghai and Guangdong have greater power to issue clear regulations protecting their local dialects, despite not being autonomous regions like Xinjiang, Tibet or Inner Mongolia (interview, Sociology Professor, IMU, Hohhot, August 16, 2011).

Despite these important limitations, this section shows that Mongols are still arguably better included in the civil service and the provincial political apparatus than are Uyghurs or Tibetans, though less so than the Han Chinese.

104 Interview with Professor Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot, August 16th, 2011.

105 See Xinjiang, IMAR and Qinghai 2000 Population Censuses Assembly L2-2 Population by Sex and Occupation and by Nationality.

106 Interview with retired professor Inner Mongolia Academy of Social Science, Hohhot, August 18, 2011; interview with Sociology Professor IMU, Hohhot, August 16, 2011.

107 While conducting a media analysis of recent protests in IMAR, I only found one report of a protest organized by 400 Mongolian normal school graduates who had failed to secure a teaching job despite having signed an agreement with their municipality’s education bureau (SMHRIC 2011c).

4.3.2 HIs and SoS conflict in Inner Mongolia As the previous section demonstrated, Mongols are well educated, better integrated into the political apparatus, and generally better included in several of the most lucrative and prestigious sectors of the economy than the Uyghurs or the Tibetans. The smaller socio-economic and political HIs between Han migrants and local Mongols have accordingly restricted SoS conflicts in the region. Still, migration, especially that associated with resource extraction companies, has contributed to economic disparities in resource access in Inner Mongolia given its damaging effects on the grasslands (the heartland of Mongol culture) and on Mongolian nomadic lifestyles as a whole. For these reasons, migration-related conflicts are more prevalent in the countryside near mines and natural resource extraction sites, and tend to pit local nomads against mining companies and their migrant employees. The Mongols were historically a nomadic people whose subsistence depended heavily on their land and resources.108 It is unsurprising that factors affecting the quality and quantity of their lands, like privatization and migration, were a great source of concern. Shortly after the communist takeover, all lands were nationalized in China, including the Mongolian grasslands. As migration increased in the late 1950s, Mongols could not claim ownership of the grassland they had herded for generations, and many had to move out to make room for the bingtuan and their migrants.109 Recently, cases of “illegal leasing” of lands by local government officials to large corporations have inflamed local Mongols and led to conflict in Alxa, Tongliao, Xilingol, and Chifeng (Mudie 2012b; 2012a; Vandenbrink 2012; Mudie 2013a). Mongols’ actions have also contributed to the deterioration of grasslands. Short-sightedness and the pursuit of profit pushed local people to lease or sell their lands to migrants, who “did not give much thought to the long- term protection of the environment”.110

108 Interview with Professor Agricultural Studies, Institute of Mongolian Studies, IMU, Hohhot, August 20, 2011.

109 Interview with Sociology Professor IMU, Hohhot, August 16, 2011. With the replacement of state-run farms and communes by the household responsibility system and collective contracts in the 1980s, communities were slowly allocated lands. Today, herders collectively own grasslands as per the grasslands law in Inner Mongolian Autonomous Law –i.e., grasslands are not state-owned like in Qinghai and Xinjiang. But lands have recently been re-classified as ‘forests’ if growth is taller than 30 centimeters, and governments own all forests. Local herders have been known to cut the grass to ensure they retain their collective ownership (interview, researcher, Beijing Institute, Beijing, September 8, 2011)

110 Interview with local MA student, Hohhot, August 18, 2011; interview with local researcher IMU, Hohhot, August 22, 2011.

98 Migration’s most important role in land loss and degradation was through the agencies of companies exploiting natural resources, notably mines. Discussing the reasons why Chinese and Mongol villages in Xilinguole do not interact much, a local student admits: The relationship between locals and old migrants used to be ok, but recently, it has gotten worse becase of the increase in migration due to mining. […] Chinese and Mongol villages do not interact much due to their different lifestyles [i.e. Chinese villages are pastoral while Mongol villages are nomadic]. But another reason is that local people see them as an invasion because it is their grasslands. They are not very happy about it (interview with local student, Hohhot, August 20th, 2011).

Making matters worse is that most of the mining in Inner Mongolia is open-cast or strip mining, which is particularly damaging, destroying the surface ecosystem over a wide area and releasing pollutants.111 Throughout China, mines were formerly owned and operated by the government, but since the Develop the West program, many have been taken over by Inner Chinese migrants.112 A research project funded by the Ford Foundation shows that most mine workers in Xilingol and Hulunbuier are from Inner China—more specifically, from the same hometown as the mine owners.113 From the perspective of local people, migration came to be entangled with natural resource exploitation, economic disparities, and loss of economic opportunities, as Han migrants own and operate these industries, deplete regional natural resources, and leave behind contaminated materials that destroy the grasslands. In the words of a male Mongol from Tongliao: “When Chinese people come to the Mongol area, after one or two years they become very rich, but local Mongols are still very poor. This is a big problem here” (cited by Vandenbrink 2012). The conflict between local Mongols and Han migrants on May 10th, 2011 in Xilingol, Inner Mongolia illustrates the thorny relationship between resource extraction companies, migrants, local people, and the local government.114 The incident started when a local herder prevented a truck from Liaoning Chencheng Industry and Trade Group, a mining company run by a man from Liaoning, from passing onto his pastureland and destroying it. The herder was hit by a Han Chinese coal truck driver, dragged for 140 feet, and killed. The government acted quickly,

111 In contrast, the mining in Shaanxi and Shanxi is underground through the digging of pits; this is a less environmentally destructive form of mining.

112 Interview with local Tibetan, Tongren, June 26, 2011.

113 The findings of this research project were not published after the CCP intervened. Interview with professor of Agricultural Studies, IMU, Hohhot, August 20, 2011.

114 The description of the May 10th, 2011 conflict is pieced together from interviews with several local respondents.

99 providing compensation to the family, upgrading environmental rules, and dismissing the local Communist Party chief. The truck driver was tried, found guilty of murder, and later sentenced to death. A second driver was also sentenced for life in prison for his involvement in the standoff. These compensations did not satisfy the local people, and the herder’s death sparked protests throughout the province. Despite reports of martial law, hundreds of high school students and herders marched to Xilinhot government headquarters to protest the herder's death and to express their deep and widespread anger over the continuing exploitation of the region’s grasslands by migrants. On May 27th, 2011 more than 40 Mongol herders and students were arrested after a clash with hundreds of police. Upon hearing that a similar protest was planned in Hohhot on May 30th, 2011, riot troops and police were preventively deployed in many areas three days early, blocking several streets and squares, banning traffic in downtown Hohhot, and barricading thousands of students and professors at Hohhot’s Minzu University into university buildings.115 All excavations were halted in Xilingol for several months to allow tensions to cool. The roots of this protest, which was by far the largest Mongol protest since 1980, were not the usual culprits of “separatism, extremism and terrorism”. It did not have anything to do with autonomy and independence (Zhong 2011).116 Even the Global Times, with strong ties to the ruling Communist Party, agreed that these were not politically driven demonstrations (Mudie 2011a). It was caused instead “by the long unresolved issues regarding the exploitation of Inner Mongolia’s natural resources and the ecological degradation it incurs on the grasslands”.117 As Temtselt Shobshuud, the exiled rights activist and chair of the Inner Mongolian People’s Party, explains: “We Mongols are a nomadic people; a people of the grasslands. If you spoil our grasslands and deprive us of them… then you are cutting off our roots and razing our ancestral tombs” (Mudie 2011b).

115 Interview with local researcher, IMU, Hohhot, August 27, 2011. Radio Free Asia also reported on the lock-in (Mudie 2011a).

116 Compared to the other Chinese regions investigated, sub-state nationalism and secessionism is weaker in Inner Mongolia. The only true attempt at splitting the region from China to merge with Mongolia came from the Inner Mongolia People’s Party (or Neirendang) during the Cultural Revolution. Severe anti-Neirandang protests followed, leading to the killing of anywhere between 16,222 people (Han 2011: 58) to 100,000 (Jankowiak 1988: 276). According to Bulag, the very creation of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region—the first autonomous region in the PRC—shows the extent to which the CCP needed Mongol support during the Civil War (2004: 90). Though there are organizations promoting Inner Mongolia greater autonomy, most notably the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (SMHRIC), their lack of prominent leadership, local chapters, and strong Mongol religious identity, the factional fights between Western and Eastern Mongols, its high geostrategic importance due to the presence of a nuclear centre in the region, Inner Mongolia’s proximity to Beijing, and its historical connection to the central dynastic powers in China impeded Mongol resistance to Chinese rule (Han 2011: 66-67).

117 Interview with local researcher, IMU, Hohhot, August 27, 2011.

100 As those perpetrating the aforementioned actions are typically Han Chinese, it did not take long for Mongolian activists to start incorporating the Chinese state and its official (e.g., security forces) and unofficial (e.g., Han migrants) agents into their grievances. After a “Chinese millionaire” grabbed herders’ lands in Chifeng prefecture and hired 200 Chinese to kill livestock and beat local resisters, a popular online appeal emerged, rallying Mongols to protest in solidarity: After the death of Mr. Mergen that ignited the large scale protests in May, this is another serious case in which again Mongolian herders risked their lives for defending their lands. We have been impoverished; we have lost our lands to the Chinese migrants; we have been plundered of our natural resources; our livestock are perishing; many of us have become homeless on our own lands. We are treated with no dignity. We must stand up to defend our human rights rather than being silently killed by the Chinese army. (SMHRIC 2011c)

Tellingly, the initial incident in Xilinguole occurred near private mines, the most problematic type of mine according to the local people. Most mining companies have to pay taxes to the local government. However, because they often fail to follow regulations or have all the necessary documentation,118 this leaves room for bribes and creates a “chain of interests” between local officials and mine owners.119 It is perhaps no coincidence that several officials in Xilinguole were involved in a bribe scandal just a few months before the May 2011 incident took place. In December 2010, Liu Zhuozhi, who famously promoted extensive mining in Inner Mongolia, was fired from his positions as government head, Party Chief of Xilingol League, and Vice Chair of Inner Mongolia, and was later expelled from the party and sentenced to life imprisonment for taking more than 8.17 million yuan in bribes between 2002-2010 (Vandenbrink 2011; Whats on Dalian 2012). If government officials benefited from having mining companies under their jurisdiction, either officially, through tax revenues, or unofficially through bribes, the same could not be said of local communities who derived meager benefits from their presence.120 State sedentarization programs combined with mining developments have either spoiled or taken the grasslands away from Mongols. The latest state sedentarization program, China’s 12th Five Year Plan, aims at resettling the remaining nomad population of 1.157 million people, spread through Inner

118 Interview with PhD candidate, IMNU, Hohhot, August 27, 2011.

119 Interview with retired professor, IM Academy of Social Science, Hohhot, August 18, 2011.

120 Interviews with local student, IMU, Hohhot, August 26 2011; interview with local researcher IMU, Hohhot, August 27, 2011.

101 Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, by 2015 (Mudie 2012a).121 Hundreds of coal mines have opened in recent years in Inner Mongolia. In 2010, the region became the largest coal producer in China, with an annual output exceeding 700 million tons—greater than the combined output of Australia and South Africa in 2009. In the Xilingol area, where coal production represents more than one- quarter of Inner Mongolia’s total production, coal production rose by nearly 50% last year, and is expected to reach 200 million tons by 2015 (Chan, J. 2011). In principle, some of that money should have been channeled to the local people living near mining companies. In Ordos, for instance, local herders are entitled to money every three years from natural gas companies whose gas pipes and trucks pass through their grasslands.122 Similar programs of financial compensation and local hiring123 by mining and oil companies exist throughout Inner Mongolia. However, a study of the Golden Ratio124 in Xilinguole and Hulunbuier suggests that GDP growth in those regions has not translated into a growth in income per capita.125 More often than not, ‘local- friendly’ policies are never fully implemented, or are often dropped after changes in management.126 As most companies bring in workers from the same hometown as the mine owners,127 job prospects for local young people are dim; it is nearly impossible for them to compete with well-connected migrants for these positions. This grim outlook led the South Mongolian Human Rights Information Center to conclude that: “The original inhabitants of the grasslands… have given up their lands and lifestyle and in exchange, for the most part, have been given a life of poverty” (SMHRIC 2011a).

121 Several local studies have highlighted the negative impact state sedentarization programs have had on Mongols’ grasslands (e.g., interview with local researcher IMU, Hohhot, August 27, 2011)—a conclusion that is somewhat ironic given that it was the disappearance of the grasslands in the first place that prompted the local and central governments to institute the nomad settlement program.

122 Interview with local student, IMU, Hohhot, August 26, 2011.

123Initially, large state-owned companies would have a 15-20% local hiring target (interview with Mongol researcher Beijing Institute, Beijing, September 8, 2011). New state-issued guidelines issued in July 2011 to address Mongol anger at miners in the region also require mining companies to include herders in their development plans (Vandenbrink 2011). It is important to note that few local people may actually be interested in these jobs, considering the difficult working conditions in mining (interview with local researcher, IMU, Hohhot, August 27, 2011)

124The ratio of income growth for GDP growth. In the West, the Golden Ratio is usually close to 70% but in IMAR, the research found that it was closer to 10%.

125 Interview with professor, Agricultural Studies, IMU, Hohhot, August 20, 2011.

126 Interview with local researcher, IMU, Hohhot, August 27, 2011.

127 Interview with professor, Agricultural Studies IMU, Hohhot, August 20, 2011.

102 As this section illustrates, migration-related conflict in Inner Mongolia must be understood through the prism of unsustainable resource exploitation and grassland degradation. Clashes between locals and migrants do not occur because of a lack of political representation or obstacles to upward social mobility, nor do they typically involve Mongol elites or originate in urban areas. SoS conflict in Inner Mongolia is instead related to decreasing economic opportunities for Mongol nomads in the countryside, near sites of natural resource extraction. This explains why SoS conflicts in Inner Mongolia are comparatively few and far between, and why they are heavily concentrated in a handful of prefectures and counties with pastoral Mongol populations and large resource extraction companies (i.e., Xilingol, Chifeng, and Tongliao). Nearly all reported conflicts took place in the countryside, where local people do not welcome migrants. In the countryside, if someone sells lands to a migrant, his neighbours will say: “why didn’t you sell your land to a local person?” Locals don’t like migrants because they don’t respect the place and they don’t care about its purity. They have a different way of thinking. We have a saying back home: “in the first year, migrants are like grandsons; they listen to the locals. In the second year, they are like friends, and we are equal. But in the third year, they are like grandfathers, they try to control us.” (interview with local students, Hohhot, August 26th, 2011)

4.4 Conclusion This chapter underscores the socio-economic and political inequalities between Han Chinese and titular minority groups, and between inter-provincial migrants and natives in Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Inner Mongolia. As these groups often converge group disparities are exacerbated. The empirical evidence presented confirms the presence of multifaceted HIs between Han migrants and local populations in the three provinces investigated, though to varying degrees. I contend that regions with the largest socio-economic and political HIs are more likely to experience SoS conflicts. Despite economic disparities in resource access due to the degradation of their grasslands—disparities that are not intensified by differentials in educational attainment— local Mongols experience next to no disparities in job competition and political inclusion compared to Han migrants. Given these smaller socio-economic and political HIs, violent SoS conflict occurs less frequently in Inner Mongolia, and when such conflicts take place they are concentrated in a handful of resource-rich prefectures (e.g., Xilingol and Alxa). At the other end of the spectrum, with large economic discrepancies coalescing with substantial differentials in political representation and inclusion in the civil service, Xinjiang and Qinghai represent a ‘perfect storm’, offering a more fertile ground for migration-related conflict. SoS conflicts are, as a result, more frequent and larger in size in these regions.

103 As this chapter highlights, migration to the provincial capitals (i.e. Urumqi, Xining and Hohhot) have rarely resulted in SoS clashes; a conclusion that corroborates Toft’s finding that urbanites (many of whom are recent migrants) can difficulty make legitimate claims over the land they occupy, making them more likely to flee than fight in the event of a crisis (2003: 25). Instead, it is the recent population inflows of Han migrants onto the countryside and grasslands –i.e. the ‘heartland’ of minority cultures and economy-, that led to conflicts between migrants and locals. Kashgar and Aksu in Xinjiang; Yushu in Qinghai; and Xilingol and Alxa in Inner Mongolia are all prefectures with large minority populations and recent population influxes brought about by the development of natural resources. In such instances, the coincidence of a large number of ‘Sons’ and their historical attachment and economic reliance on their ‘Soil’ provide a powerful narrative of othering to justify attacks against migrants who, staying for only a short-stay and without a continued historical presence in the region, are lacking the symbolic capital to lay claims over SoS territories and their resources. Moreover, the perception that migrants are benefiting disproportionately from their relocation while local populations are further marginalized –a perception that was corroborated by empirical evidence- strengthens the boundaries between migrants and locals. In view of that, objective and subjective socio-economic and political inequalities are transformed into grievances through group comparison driven by collective fears of demographic, cultural and economic decline. Local leaders then frame migrants’ economic and political dominance as an injust invasion and an attack on locals’ –i.e. the rightful ‘owners’- traditional lifestyle and culture, which facilitates nativist mobilization and violence against Han migrants. The scale and intensity of the conflict is also affected by the socio-economic identity of those most affected by migration-induced HIs. When HIs and exclusion are experienced by those at the lower end of the labour hierarchy (e.g., through land deterioration or lack of employment alternatives) and by local elites (e.g., through barriers to joining the civil service), large-scale group tensions are most likely to transform into SoS conflict, as in the case of Xinjiang. When only one of these groups sees its opportunities shrinking as a result of migration, as in the case in Qinghai and Inner Mongolia, then SoS conflict is less likely to occur, and when it does occur it takes place sporadically and on a smaller scale. Interestingly, the two “high conflict” cases are also two regions with a strong, longstanding sub-state nationalist movement promoting secession from China. Is large-scale migration into sub-nationalist and/or secessionist regions intrinsically different from migration to other regions? Does migration make it more likely that such regions will experience SoS conflict? As I

104 show in this chapter, large-scale migration into regions with sub-state nationalist movements are particularly prone to generating and magnifying socio-economic and political HIs, which in turn result in SoS conflict. Indeed, mass migration from outside the nationalist or secessionist region is seen as an extension of state power and control—as something alien. Tension is compounded when migrants come from the country’s political core or dominant ethnie. Han Chinese are unequivocally China’s dominant ethnicity. Representing 91.51% of the country’s population, they officially represent the largest ethnic group in all provinces save the autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. The 55 other officially recognized ethnic groups are comparatively much smaller; only 12 of them number more than 1 million people.128 As this chapter articulates, Han Chinese control, by and large, the economic, political, and social levers of the country, including in Xinjiang where they are a demographic minority. Han Chinese also represent the ‘default’ ethnic group to which all other groups are—oftentimes negatively—compared (see Smith 2002; Gladney 1994; 2004). Given their nationally and locally dominant character, large-scale migration of Han Chinese from ‘Inner China’ into Tibetan regions and Xinjiang is seen differently from that of other non-politically and economically dominant ethnic groups. The presence of stark, mutually-reinforcing HIs between locals and migrants may, in turn, push local elites down a more nationalist/jingoist road. Both Xinjiang and Qinghai were officially incorporated into the Chinese ‘geo-body’ relatively recently. In both cases, the integration was violent and challenged by many local elites. Unsure of where local loyalties laid, political leaders in Beijing appointed non-locals to the top economic and political positions and throughout the civil service. With few prospects of employment in the government or civil service, local elites often promoted alternative political visions that, if successful, would provide them with top local political positions. Greater autonomy and secession from their respective countries were two such alternative realities. Paradoxically, that very same discourse had the unforeseen effect of making the central government send even more migrants to the restive regions in an effort to better integrate them. The fact that large-scale internal migration to Xinjiang and Qinghai only truly gained momentum in the last 50 years or so reinforces the assumption that migration to these regions is a consequence of the territory’s incorporation into China. The presence of secessionist/sub-state nationalist movements clearly colours the politics of migration in these

128 According to the 2010 census, the Zhuang totalled nearly 16.9 million, followed by the Hui at 10.59, the Manchu at 10.39, the Uyghur at 10.07, the Miao at 9.43, the Yi at 8.71, the Tujia at 8.35, the Tibetan at 6.28, the Mongols at 5.98, the Dong at 2.88, the Buyei at 2.87, and the Yao at 2.8 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010: 1-6).

105 regions transforming migrants into agents of the “colonizing” state, in contrast to Inner Mongolia where the nationalist movement is much fainter. Moreover, the presence of a sub-state nationalist discourse facilitates the inclusion of otherwise isolated migration-related grievances into a larger nationalist agenda. For these reasons, national minorities residing in secessionist regions, such as the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the Tibetans in Qinghai, are thus experiencing what Brown calls a “double whammy” of HIs, becoming socio-economically and politically disadvantaged vis-à-vis the dominant migrant community residing in their own regions, while the latter simultaneously experiences relative economic decline to the rest of the country (2008:253). Although both spatial and ethnic dimensions of HIs contribute to conflict dynamics, the local, everyday experience of HIs between migrants and locals uniquely fuels SoS conflict. The sense of relative deprivation experienced by a marginalized ethnic periphery vis-à-vis a distant and unvisited capital region, for instance, may be of much less political importance than inequalities relative to local residents who are seen as “representative” of the dominant ethnic group, even if these latter inequalities are less severe. (Brown 2008: 262)

In response to this marginalization, sub-state nationalism arises or is strengthened due to a belief that the “political and economic controls of their region [are] being seized by outsiders, and that migrants [are] representatives and key beneficiaries of this process” (Smith and Bouvier 2006:210). This results in a vicious circle wherein migration to a secessionist region fuels local marginalization, which then fuels the nationalist identity and agenda, which then impels the State to send more dominant group migrants to secure the region, the effects of which we know. Are these findings specific to China or are they applicable to another more democratic context? I now turn my attention to the role of HIs in generating or exacerbating SoS conflict in various minority regions in Indonesia.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE IMPACT OF HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES ON SOS CONFLICT IN INDONESIA

Chapter Five explores how multi-faceted HIs contribute to migration-related tensions in three Indonesian provinces with substantial minority populations: Kepri, Papua, and Lampung. These cases confirm, once again, that internal migration does not always or directly lead to conflict in the region of resettlement. The migration of a group that is socio-economically and politically dominant compared to the local population is a critical element in determining the likelihood that large-scale migration will become a lethal process, as migration in this context solidifies group disparities and facilitate nativist mobilization against migrants. In this chapter, I show that Indonesian regions are more likely to experience SoS conflict if there are large disparities vis-à- vis jobs—both in the private sector and the civil service—and economic resources between inter- provincial migrants and natives. As opposed to China, where ‘dominant migrants’ are unquestionably Han Chinese, advantaged migrants are not necessarily members of the largest ethnic group in Indonesia (i.e., Javanese); they may also be Balinese, BBM (Bugis, Banjarese, and Makassarese), Minang, or Batak. In the first section of this chapter, I assess the socio-economic and political HIs present in Kepri and tease out their relation to SoS conflict. I then assess Papua and Lampung, two other provinces with a long history of inter-provincial migration, in the following two sections. Various dimensions of socio-economic HIs are measured with the help of official Indonesian data, including division of labour, differentials in GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and educational attainment per region. As opposed to China, where population censuses record socio-economic indicators by ethnic group and migratory status, the Indonesian population censuses only publish economic indicators by regency and municipality. Consequently, one can only confirm or deny the presence of spatial economic disparities rather than group HIs. Although not ideal, this nevertheless allows me to speculate on the nature of the relationship between migration and economic HIs as I compare economic indicators for regencies with large migrant populations to those with smaller migrant populations. Political HIs—i.e., political representation and inclusion in the civil service—were affected by Indonesia’s democratization process, which resumed in 1998.129 I conclude this chapter by unearthing the mechanisms linking migration to conflicts in the three case studies. I contend that Kepri experienced the fewest incidents of SoS conflict given

129 The impact of Indonesia’s political transformations on internal migratory trends and SoS conflict are further discussed in Chapter Six.

106 107 its comparatively lower levels of socio-economic and political HI between locals and migrants, whereas Papua experienced the most violent SoS conflict given its higher levels of socio- economic and political HI between locals and migrants. Lampung is located somewhere between the two extremes, as it experienced localized migration-related violence associated with group disparities in resource access, but those were usually peacefully resolved thanks to comparatively smaller political HIs between migrants and locals and the presence of well-established local mechanisms of conflict resolution that effectively transformed ‘migrants’ into ‘locals’. Before delving into specific regional migration trends, a few words are needed about migratory movements in Indonesia as a whole. Like China, Indonesia has a long history of spontaneous and organized migratory movements within its borders. Organized state migration is closely associated with national programs of economic development and, importantly, to programs of national integration. The transmigration program in Indonesia—arguably the world’s largest contemporary program of organized population movement—is a case in point. An offshoot of the Dutch kolonisasie program, the transmigrasi program relocated over 1.15 million families of poor farmers from the centre islands (Java, Madura, Bali) to the margins (notably Sumatra, Kalimantan, East Timor, and Papua) from 1969-2000 (Tirtosudarmo 2001: 212). Nearly all transmigrants were granted land titles, housing, livestock, transportation, and livelihood subsidies in an effort to convince them to resettle.130 The program was meant to address several pressing socio-economic issues at once, including increasing participants’ living standards, promoting regional development, distributing the population more evenly across the archipelago, and making better use of natural and human resources. However, this program also had an implicit political agenda, for it provided the government with the means to control its population, protect its international borders and strengthen national security,131 promote political stability through the relocation of unwanted or problematic people (Tirtosudarmo 2001: 203), and implicitly promote “deliberate community building in the name of development and progress” (Hoey 2003: 110). Transmigrants, most of whom were Javanese, were expected to reproduce their social and

130 There were three types of inter-provincial transmigrants. In decreasing order of government assistance, they are: 1) general transmigrants (transmigrasi umum); 2) assisted spontaneous transmigrants (transmigrasi swakarsa berbantuan); and 3) self-supporting spontaneous transmigrants. 'Local transmigrants' (transmigrasi lokal) are intra- provincial migrants. 131 Following the loss of two islands to Malaysia, the Indonesian government has planned to resettle people from high-density regions to uninhabited islands near international borders, focusing in particular on Kepulauan Riau (Interview with public servant, Ministry of Employment, Tanjung Pinang, December 12, 2010; Kurniawan 2003). Otten (1986: 192-5) also suggests that sites of transmigration in Papua were selected to protect the border with Papua New Guinea and to counter separatist sentiments.

108 economic structures in their new locations in hopes that ‘modern’ Javanese practices would diffuse and replace ‘backward’ local systems (see Elmhirst 1999). According to the Director General of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, 88 of the 500 Indonesian regencies were established due to transmigration. “Could you imagine if there had been no transmigration in Indonesia? Our country would be less and less integrated. We would have been split off like the USSR or Czechoslovakia.”132 Figure 5.1 shows the demographic weight of transmigrants in Indonesia at the height of the transmigration program in the 1970s to early 1980s. The map understates the true demographic impact of transmigration, since it does not account for earlier transmigration movements, such as those to Lampung.

Figure 5.1 Transmigration 1970-1985 as proportion of the 1980 provincial population

From Robert Cribb, Digital Atlas of Indonesian History (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), reproduced with permission

Indonesia’s transmigration program was subject to important national and international criticisms, notably regarding its environmental impact (see the Secrett 1986) and lack of concern for local communities (see Colchester 1986a, 1986b). It consumed between 30% and 40% of the entire economic development budget of the outer islands while failing to alleviate poverty and population pressure in Java, its two initial goals (Adhiati and Bobsien 2001). According to the Director General of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, many of these criticisms can be explained by “gaps in application”. Shortly after Act #15/1997 was passed, which better anticipated the impact of globalization and the role of the private sector while broadening citizen

132 Interview with Director, Ministry of Transmigration, Jakarta, February 1st, 2011.

109 participation, Indonesia went through the political upheaval of Reformasi. As a result, the transmigration policies that were implemented up to 2009 followed Act# 3/1972 and were insufficiently adapted to the new economic and political realities of late 20th century Indonesia. Had the intended act been correctly implemented on time, transmigration’s negative consequences could have been drastically curbed if not completely eradicated.133 Since the late 1980s, the transmigration program has only been a shadow of its former self. Though the office still exists, it operates differently, openly encouraging migrants to relocate without government assistance.134 When the government realized that word of mouth and social networks were enough to convince potential migrants to relocate, it started promoting migration outside of government programs or without direct government assistance. The transmigration director’s irritation at our characterization of the government’s program as “sending” people, suggesting instead “facilitating the movements of people”, illustrates the program’s new approach. Yet, the Ministry of Transmigration, as with other Ministries, “only regulates things that are legal”135 and remain short of tracking and taking responsibility for all migrants, some of whom are essentially illegal migrants or forest squatters who relocate to protected locations such as National Parks and Reserves. By encouraging the movements of people while veiling their effect on the local region and communities, local scholars and NGOs worry that the ‘new’ transmigration program may keep its old Java-centric attitudes and neglect local interests.136 Many spontaneous population movements are also associated, directly or indirectly, with state policies. It is well known that transmigrants have acted as catalysts for more spontaneous migration, setting in motion a process of chain migration. For every officially sponsored migrant, it is estimated that ten migrants relocated without state assistance (Aditjondro 1986, cited in Bertrand 2004: 95). The fact that spontaneous migrants outnumber transmigrants should not come as a surprise, as the number of families relocated by the state was limited by the national budget. The development of transportation systems crisscrossing the archipelago has also facilitated the relocation of spontaneous economic migrants and contributed to rising urbanization rates. From 2005 to 2010 alone, Indonesia has added over 40 million people to its urban population (BPS Indonesia 2011). In an attempt to address the increasingly uneven rates of economic growth

133 Interview, Director Ministry of Transmigration, Jakarta, February 1st, 2011.

134 Interview, Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, Jakarta, January 5, 2011.

135 Interview, Officials of Transmigration Ministry, Jakarta, February 1st, 2011.

136 Interview, Tri Nuke, Jakarta, February 5, 2011; Adhiati and Bobsien 2001.

110 between urban and rural regions near international borders, the Indonesian State implemented development programs such as the ‘Go East’ program (see Bolderson 1990). Centuries of organized and spontaneous inter-provincial migration have significantly transformed Indonesia’s demographic makeup. As shown in Figure 5.2, peripheral (minority populated) islands have the largest proportion of inter-provincial migrants in Indonesia. The latest census corroborates this trend, with Kepri, Papua, and East Kalimantan having the largest share of in-migrant population (BPS 2010).

Figure 5.2 Inter-provincial migrants in Indonesia as a percentage of the population of each province, 2000

From Robert Cribb, Digital Atlas of Indonesian History (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), reproduced with permission

5.1 Kepri A September 24th 2002 decree established Kepri as a province separate from Riau to be effective as of July 2004. Scholars have argued that part of the motive for the creation of Kepri province was to create a real center of Malay culture in Indonesia – i.e., Malays in Kepri have genealogical affinities with the Malay royalty and are considered more “pure” than Malays in the “old” Riau province who overlapped with migrant populations (Faucher 2005). Today, Kepri consists of five regencies/kabupaten and two cities/kota. These administrative units are further divided into 59 districts/kecamatan and 351 villages/kelurahan. Since the colonial period, Kepri has attracted a considerable number of Bugis traders and warriors and Chinese traders and coolies. Today, Kepri

111 constitutes one of Indonesia’s critical entry and exit points where legal and illegal migrants wanting to go abroad temporarily reside until they determine their next move, and to where illegal Indonesian migrants in Malaysia and Singapore are deported (see Lyons and Ford 2007). The creation of the SIJORI growth triangle in 1989 between Singapore, Johor (Malaysia), and Riau Islands (Indonesia), which was later expanded to the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), has transformed Kepri’s economic playing field, facilitating the relocation of Singaporean labour-intensive industries to neighboring Batam and Tanjung Uban, and boosting Singaporean investments in the region. As a result, electronic and garment industries, resource- extraction companies, and shipyards have multiplied and are now operating alongside McDermott, a massive offshore engineering and fabrication company and the first company to settle in Batam. When the economic crisis hit Jakarta in full force and Kepri became a separate province, the flow of internal migrants further intensified. At its peak, uncontrolled migrants were estimated at 4,000/day, fuelling Batam’s record-breaking population growth of 13% to 14% per annum (Jakarta Post, 2001c). Most of Kepri’s spontaneous migrants settle in Batam. While some migrants have already been hired by subcontractors in their provinces of origin, others arrive without promise of employment. A 1,000 to 2,000 strong transmigration settlement also exists in Natuna regency following the loss of two small islands to Malaysia.137 As a result of these important migratory inflows, Kepri now has the highest percentage of inter-provincial migrants in Indonesia (47.71%). Since migrants originate from “Sabang (Aceh) to Merauke (Papua)”, migration severely transformed Kepri’s ethnic composition. Kepri’s original population consists of Orang Melayu (Malays) and Orang Laut (nomadic fishermen) (Wee 1985). Early Bugis and Chinese migrants have integrated to such an extent that they are now largely considered native to Kepri as well.138 The 2005 intercensal population survey revealed that most migrants to Kepri come from North Sumatra (Batak), East and Central Java (Javanese), and West Sumatra (Minang) (2005:70), and resettle in the cities of Batam and Tanjung Pinang and in Bintan regency (see Table 5.1.1). Such large influxes of non-Malay people decrease the relative proportion of native Malays in the province to 35.59% (see Table 5.1.2).139 If the

137 Interview with public servant, Ministry of Employment, Tanjung Pinang, December 12, 2010

138 A study by Ananta found that 85% of Chinese residing in Kepri were non-migrants (2006:64).

139 But as revealed in our interviews, who is “Malay” is not entirely clear, as it does not depend solely on heredity. A Malay is someone who “do[es] Malay culture, use[s] Malay language, and is a Muslim”. The connection between Malay and Muslim seemed particularly strong to a point where converting to Islam was sometimes referred to as “becoming Malay” (Interview, Chairman Rukun Khasanah Warisan Batam, Batam, December 13th, 2010).

112 decline is most apparent in Batam, where Malays only constitute 17.61% of the population (on par with the Minang or the Batak), the picture differs in the rest of the outlying islands of the archipelago where Malays continue to represent the largest ethnic group (see Figure 5.3).

Table 5.1.1 Migrant population in Kepri’s regencies and cities, 2010 (%)

Regencies and cities Lifetime Recent migrants migrants KEPRI 53.29 15.84 Karimun 28.43 5.38 Bintan 47.02 12.74 Natuna 19.63 8.08 Lingga 11.57 3.53 Kepulauan Anambas 8.58 3.37 Batam 68.77 21.95 Tanjung Pinang 48.77 11.11

From BPS 2010

Table 5.1.2 Ethnic population in Kepri’s regencies and cities, 2000 (%)

Regencies and cities Malay Javanese Minang Chinese Batak KEPRI 35.59 22.24 9.25 9.29 8.08 Riau islands 40.39 22.14 6.27 12.74 3.51 Natuna 85.27 6.34 0.70 2.52 0.50 Batam 17.61 26.78 14.97 6.28 14.97 Karimun 50.39 17.94 2.30 13.76 2.30

From: Suryadinata et al (2003: 148)

Figure 5.3 Map of Kepri

113

From Robert Cribb, Digital Atlas of Indonesian History (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), reproduced with permission

5.1.1 HIs in Kepri Economic disparities exist between migrant-populated and native-populated regencies in Kepri. Recent statistics indicate that Kepri’s regencies and districts with a large proportion of migrants are those in which people are least involved in agricultural activities (e.g., fisheries, plantations, animal production, rice cultivation, etc.) and most involved in manufacturing, trade/retail, and public service industries (see Table 5.1.3). In contrast, in the three regencies with the fewest lifetime migrants and the highest proportion of native people (Natuna, Lingga, and Kepulauan Anambas), 40% to 50% of the labour force is involved in agricultural activities. Qualitative evidence collected during fieldwork confirms that geographical economic disparities in occupation translate into group differentials in industry inclusion between migrants and native Malays. Very few migrants are involved in fishing, a sector that is nearly entirely dominated by locals.140 On the other hand, migrants are better included—if not monopolize—the most lucrative occupations and industries at the provincial level. Factory workers are typically Javanese, whereas traders tend to be Minang and Batak.141 Still, alternatives to jobs in the primary sector—e.g., jobs in trade and the public service—exist in all regencies.

140 Interview, Malay pensioner, Tanjung Uban, December 15th, 2010.

141 For example, for every new project, McDermott must allegedly hire 4000 workers from Java. Interview with Professors UIB, Batam, December 13th, 2010.

114 Table 5.1.3 Population of Kepri by industry (%) (2010)

Regency Agriculture Mining Manufacture Construction Retail Transport Education Public & service trade Karimun 31.79 4.25 2.71 12.02 15.16 5.25 5.88 13.07 Bintan 27.17 3.96 18.79 8.41 11.16 4.09 4.1 8.59 Natuna 40.94 - 3.36 7.31 11.98 2.41 8.97 18.61 Lingga 47.17 2.21 7.21 5.18 10.98 3.21 7.74 12.2 Kep 51.34 4.9 1.13 4.84 10.44 1.71 6.05 14.93 Anambas Batam 3.77 - 41.44 8.15 15.61 5.93 2.47 9.76 Tanjung 4.64 1.03 4.42 11.34 23.71 10.01 5.02 22.77 Pinang KEPRI 13.11 1.42 27.91 8.68 15.56 5.78 3.78 11.87

Note: Highlighted in gray are regencies and municipalities with nearly one-third of its population as lifetime migrants.

Source: BPS 2010, Kepri, Population age 15 and over by region and main industries

The concentration of manufacturing, trading, and higher education centers in Kepri’s urban areas results in stark spatial disparities in local wealth. Once we exclude Natuna and Anambas’s revenues from oil and gas, a correlation emerges between regencies with a large migrant population and higher GRP per capita (see Table 5.1.4).

Table 5.1.4 Kepri’s Gross Regional Product per capita (2009)

Regencies/ GRP per capita (2009) (1000s Municipalities IDR) Karimun 18,269 Bintan 29,051 Natuna 57,525 (14,570) Anambas 68,995 (16,388) Lingga 10,732 Batam 46,267 Tanjung Pinang 24,882 KEPRI 39,753 (36747)

Notes: Highlighted in gray are regencies and municipalities with nearly one-third of its population as lifetime migrants. The number in bracket represents the GRP per capita excluding oil and gas. Source: Produk Domestik Regional Bruto Kabupaten/Kota di Indonesia 2006-2010 (2011), table 142, p.74

Inequalities in educational attainment exacerbate geographical economic disparities in Indonesia (Berkeens 2007; Digdowiseiso 2009; Al-Samarrai 2013). In Kepri, there is a correlation between native-populated regencies and lower educational attainment. Lingga and Anambas, two

115 regencies whose non-migrant populations represent nearly 90% of the population, have lower rates of primary school completion and lower rates of post-secondary school attendance (see Table 5.1.5). In contrast, the cities of Batam and Tanjung Pinang both have a higher than average rate of post-secondary school completion.

Table 5.1.5 Kepri’s population 5 year of age and over by education attainment (2010) (%)

Regencies/ Less than Primary Junior High Senior High Post- Municipalities primary school school school secondary school school Karimun 30.45 33.62 15.45 15.45 5.02 Bintan 30.98 23.52 15.66 22.26 7.58 Natuna 30.91 33.24 14.26 14.81 6.78 Lingga 44.64 31.84 10.06 8.85 4.62 Kep Anambas 42.51 34.12 9.29 9.26 4.82 Batam 19.27 12.41 14.59 38.49 15.23 Tanjung 21.74 21.15 17.87 27.20 12.04 Pinang KEPRI 24.33 19.46 14.79 29.66 11.75

Note: Highlighted in gray are regencies and municipalities with nearly one-third of its population as lifetime migrants. Source: BPS, Sensus penduduk Kepri 2010, population five years of age and over by region and education attainment.

The question remains: are geographical economic disparities translated into socio- economic HIs between migrants and locals in Kepri? The absence of quantitative data on the inclusion of migrants and locals in various industries has, until now, prevented us from confirming the presence of local/migrant job segregation in Indonesia in general and in Kepri in particular. Ananta has conducted the most extensive quantitative analysis on the subject based on the raw dataset from the 2000 census. The author found that 85% of Malays and 85% of Chinese living in Kepri were non-migrants; in contrast, Javanese, Minang, and Batak were migrants to Kepri in proportions of 66%, 77%, and 80%, respectively (2006: 64). The distinction between migrants and non-migrants proved relevant in numerous fields, including educational attainment and sectoral employment. Educational attainment varied substantially from one ethnic group/migration status to another in Kepri. Over 40% of Chinese and Malays (two non-migrant groups) did not complete primary school, compared to approximately 20% to 25% of the Batak, Javanese, and Minang (migrant) populations. The gap continues in higher education, where 14% of Chinese and 17% of Malay students completed senior high school, as opposed to 39% of Javanese, 51% of Minang and 65% of Batak students (Ananta 2006:65). Unsurprisingly, migrants’

116 higher education facilitated their inclusion in industries associated with high productivity and high earnings; for instance, 40% Bataks, 32% Minang, and 24% Javanese were involved in manufacturing, compared to 12% Malay and 7% Chinese. Likewise, 35% of employed Malays worked in the primary sector, which is typically associated with low productivity and low earnings, compared to 1.54% Minang, 1.72% Batak and 10% Javanese (Ananta 2006:65). Analyzing unemployment is another way of assessing the labour market. The presence of a large proportion of unemployed young men has often been suggested as conducive to conflict (see e.g. Goldstone 1990). High local unemployment rates may be associated with SoS conflict as local people may feel unfairly passed over for jobs. Alternatively, high unemployment rates within the migrant population may also be associated with SoS conflict as local people feel that unemployed migrants are financially burdening the province and contributing to criminality. One must consider census data by regency/municipality that record economic activities during the week prior to census-taking (i.e., late June 2010) to examine the unemployment rate in Kepri. As apparent in Table 5.1.6, there is no obvious correlation between native-populated or migrant- populated regencies and high unemployment. However, it is important to reiterate that statistics on unemployment are notoriously flawed in Indonesia and elsewhere.

Table 5.1.6 Kepri’s unemployment rate (2010)

Regency/ Population “looking for work” Municipality and “ready to work” (%) Karimun 6.73 Bintan 5.36 Natuna 7.11 Anambas 4.18 Lingga 8.41 Batam 7.41 Tanjung Pinang 5.03 KEPRI 6.89 Note: Highlighted in grey are regencies and municipalities with nearly one-third of its population lifetime migrants. Source: Sensus penduduk 2010 Population 15 years and over by region and last week activity

But Ananta presents an alternative view of unemployment in Indonesia. He argues that unemployment rate is not positively correlated with poverty in Indonesia: only those who can afford to be unemployed are unemployed (2005). In other words, a group’s greater unemployment rate would be a positive indication of its financial security. In his study of Kepri for instance, Malays had the highest unemployment rate of all ethnic groups (6.97%), whereas Javanese and

117 Chinese had the lowest rates at 4.11% and 4.38% respectively (Ananta 2006:66). This suggests that Malays may be purposefully fastidious when it comes to job offers, thanks to the presence of local safety nets that lower the financial burden of unemployment, and to preferential hiring policies in the civil service that make job outlooks promising. Qualitative evidence obtained during fieldwork supports this argument; numerous respondents mentioned that, despite the recent introduction of pro-local hiring policies in large private companies like McDermott, few Malays are interested in industry jobs, because such jobs require “long-term perspective” as opposed to traditional occupations that result in immediate payoffs (e.g., fishing).142 Many former fishermen prefer to wait for more popular jobs in the civil service.143 Prior to 1998, Javanese and Sundanese representatives held most high-level political positions in Indonesia, even outside the island of Java. Most governors during the Suharto era were first or second generation migrants to the region where they held office. Riau province, the home of Kepri until 2004, only had one local Malay governor in the 40+ years covered by that period, and most regents were also non-locally born Javanese. Since the democratization process resumed in 1998, Kepri has seen a localization of elected political representatives and civil service workers. All nominated and elected governors have been “putra daerah” or locally born candidates. A review of Kepri’s elected local officers at the time of fieldwork in November 2010 shows that the regencies of Karimun, Bintan, and Natuna all have locally born bupati (mayor) and wakil (vice-mayor). Even migrant-dominated Batam elected Ahmad Dahlan—a local Malay. The prevalence of putra daerah in the civil service is also striking in Kepri given that an impetus for Kepri’s existence was the creation of a home for Malays. This vision, most prevalent in the Malay-dominated areas of Natuna, Anambas, Karimun, and Lingga, promoted the hiring of 70% to 80% of Malays/locals in the civil service, even when local candidates only had a high school education.144 Similar proposals were suggested in the private sector to encourage local hiring,145 and university scholarships were implemented for “hinterland” people, most of whom are Malays/Orang Laut, to mitigate social inequalities and promote the socio-economic mobility

142 Interview with professors, UIB, Batam, December 13th, 2010.

143 Interview with civil servant, Tanjung Pinang, December 1st, 2013; Interview with Chairman Rukun Khasanah Warisan Batam, Batam, December 13th, 2010

144 Interview with local Malay dance teacher, Tanjung Uban, December 16th, 2010

145 Interview with local law student, Batam, December 13, 2010

118 of disadvantaged groups.146 Together, these policies have contributed to the greater inclusion of local Malay in the political apparatus since 2005.147

5.1.2 HIs and SoS in Kepri With its large and sudden influxes of inter-provincial migrants, Kepri should also have been a fertile ground for SoS conflict. Yet, there have been comparatively few instances of migration- related conflict in the new province, and the few that occurred, rather than pitting the native Malays against inter-provincial migrants, typically pitted migrant groups against one another, or international migrants against native Indonesians. How did Kepri manage to repress violent tensions against its large inter-provincial migrant populations? Nearly all respondents agreed that migration had an overall positive impact on the region, especially in regards to Kepri’s economic growth and development. As one respondent reported, “Before people came here, before they developed this island, Batam was only a village”.148 Though land disputes occur,149 they are not nearly as common as in Lampung and Papua given that Kepri’s Malays do not rely on agriculture for subsistence or social status. Lands in Kepri, especially in the Malay-dominated regencies in the outskirts of the province, remain largely in the hands of the local population150 as opposed to heavily migrant populated Batam, where land is owned by the government and leased for a 30-year period.151 While land disputes are rarely an outlet for SoS dynamics to unfold, rapid urbanization and industrialization of Kepri’s main islands have resulted in stiffer competition over blue- and white-collar jobs, which fuelled migration-related tensions. There is near consensus that such competition is tilted in favour of migrants. Government officials and migrants attribute the greater

146 Interview with faculty members UIB, Batam, December 13th, 2010

147 Interview with Chairman Rukun Khasanah Warisan Batam, Batam, December 13th, 2010

148 Interview with local radio broadcaster, Batam, December 12th, 2010

149 Interview with Head of Ministry of City Planning, Batam, December 13, 2010; Interview with local law student, Batam, December 13th, 2010

150 Interview with Chairman Lembaga Adat Melayu, Tanjung Uban, December 15th, 2010

151 Interview with NGO worker, Batam, December 12, 2010

119 competition to the greater skills/higher education of the migrant population,152 but this conclusion is vigorously denied by local Malays: Migrants are also unskilled, just like the locals. But if a company’s human resource manager is from outside Kepri, he will hire migrants from his own area even if those workers do not match the hiring requirements. […] In some cases, managers from outside Kepri will place local workers in lower positions and give them lower wages as well. At the end, it creates jealousy for local people, who blame it on migrants, who then feel they are not welcome by the locals (local Malays, Tanjung Uban, December 16th, 2010).

Though dissatisfaction over job competition and economic welfare was reported throughout the archipelago, quantitative and qualitative evidence reveals few violent clashes between local Malays and inter-provincial migrants in Kepri between 1998 and 2010. Most violent incidents were between migrant groups. The July 1999 clash between Batak and Flores migrants over transportation routes is arguably the most famous incident. After a Flores driver took over a route located on Batak turf, he was tortured and left for dead. Soon after, his community sought revenge and violence erupted in nearby neighbourhoods, killing 21 people and injuring a dozen (Yeo, 1999). A peace treaty was signed on July 29th 1999 in front of thousands of witnesses and local officials; pigs, cows, and goats were slaughtered to commemorate the event. Although they were not among the warring parties, Malay community leaders were asked to mediate between different migrant populations, “because they are the owners of the place”.153 Violence targeting international migrants has also taken place in Tanjung Ucang (Batam) where an Indian supervisor’s controversial comment that “all Indonesian workers are stupid” sparked a riot at PT Drydock World Graha in April 2010. Thousands of Indonesian workers torched company cars and buildings in protest, injuring four Indian workers in the process (Fadli 2010). Although local Malays did not physically clash with migrant communities, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the unending flow of inter-provincial migrants in daily conversations. Uncontrolled migration to the island was blamed for the establishment of 50,000 squatter houses, high crime rates, and frequent ethnic riots (see Jakarta Post 2001c). To curtail these negative impacts, Malays occasionally asked their local governments to deport migrants who cause problems and many supported the (short-lived) 2001 anti-migration decree.154 The 2001 bylaw

152 Interviews with South Sumatra migrant, Tanjung Pinang, December 10th, 2010; interview with government official, BPS Kepri, Tanjung Uban, December 15th, 2010.

153 Interview with Chairman Rukun Khasanah Warisan Batam, Batam, December 13th, 2010

154 Interview with local law student, Batam, December 13th, 2010

120 had initially succeeded in reducing migration, turning away an estimated 100 migrants daily (Yuliandini 2001); however, enforcing the decree resulted in confusion and controversy. Though unsuccessful and based on a utilitarian logic to limiting unemployment and homelessness, the migration ban ultimately contributed to the creation of a societal divide between the local Malays who supported the anti-migration bill and the migrants who did not. It also provided local political elites with a new polarized discourse that pitted ‘us/local/Malay’ against ‘them/migrants/non- Malay’. Since local democratic elections resumed in Kepri in 2005, SoS rhetoric has been used to promote Kepri as a “home for Malays”.155 A pair of candidates running for Governor/vice- governor—Nyat, a Muslim Malay, and Soerya, a Catholic Javanese—explicitly played the “local/Malay” card during their campaign, arguing that Kepri should be governed by a putra daerah in an effort to differentiate themselves from Ismeth, the governor-elect, a Javanese with widespread support from the migrant populations.156 Ismeth tried to curtail his lack of nativism by choosing HM Sani, a local Malay from Karimun, as his running mate. Despite sharing the ticket with a local, Ismeth took no chance and constantly appealed to the Malay votes by reminding people that he was “part Malay” on his wife's side.157 The strategy was successful, as the Ismeth-Sani ticket won with 60% of the votes (see Choi 2007). Kepri’s second gubernatorial elections on June 12th, 2010 were also tainted with similar SoS narratives, as HM Sani and Soerya successfully ran together on a platform of “Kepri for Malays” and received an unexpected boost when Huzrin Hood, former unofficial leader of Kepri's secessionist movement, declared his support for the ticket (Fadli 2010). The resurgence of ethnic and place-based identity discourses is also evident in local executive elections and in legislative contests. In Batam’s 2006 mayoral elections, entrenched and well-resourced local officials deliberately emphasized their nativism and courted the backing of some of the island’s main cultural and regional organizations (Choi 2009:85). When prompted about Kepri’s legislative elections, one respondent claimed that: If I wanted to be [elected] in the legislative, I would enter a paguyuban because they have huge amount of members. I am from West Java, and the West Java Paguyuban has about 33,000. That’s a lot of voters (interview with NGO, Yayasan Setara Kita, Batam, December 16th, 2010).

155Recall that the very creation of Kepri was partially motivated by a desire to create a “center for [pure] Malays”.

156 In fact, Soerya believed he would make a better governor than Nyat Kadir, but since he was not a putra daerah, he realized that his chances of winning would be minimal (Ananta 2006:54-55).

157 Interview with Chairman Rukun Khasanah Warisan Batam, Batam, December 13th, 2010.

121 The greater economic competition, unemployment, and crime rates resulting from recent population movements to Kepri—particularly to Batam—have fuelled underlying tensions between inter-provincial migrants and local Malays in the archipelago. Yet, unlike other minority regions in Indonesia (or Xinjiang or Qinghai for that matter), such tensions were often avoided due to the widespread feeling that migrants have contributed to Kepri’s development more than to its exploitation. Local people’s successes in obtaining coveted civil service positions following the creation of Kepri as a separate province, along with their apparent indifference to being passed over for industrial jobs, have also prevented the putra daerah discourse from being used as a tool of exclusion vis-à-vis migrants. This illustrates how, by having greater—if still somewhat limited—power over who gets in, and who gets what (jobs), native Malays were able to address migration-related economic concerns like local marginalization and job discrimination, and to begin to redress socio-economic inequalities between locals and migrants. Needless to say, much work remains in that respect, even in Kepri. Migrants continue to dominate legislative politics158, whereas affirmative action policies are rarely enforced in the private sector including in the tourism industries.159 Kepri also represents an unusual case, as Batam, the island that experienced the highest migration-induced population growth, is a somewhat recently developed island that was relatively empty until recently.160 Lacking a large and vibrant native population to call Batam its homeland, it may have been easier for the few Malays residing there to adjust to large population influxes.161 Considering that inter-provincial migration to Kepri shows no signs of abating, the question remains whether further influxes of migrants will overwhelm mechanisms for social control that have so far kept isolated and largely non-violent SoS incidents from turning into widespread unrest. Still, the province of Kepri provides a revealing example of how effective political representation may work to redress socio-economic HIs between migrants and locals, ultimately limiting incidences of SoS conflict.

5.2 Papua

158 Interview with Head of Ministry of City Planning, Batam, December 13th, 2011.

159 Interview with migrant teachers, Tanjung Pinang, December 10th, 2010

160 Batam’s population in the early 1970s was smaller than that of Bintan’s –Kepri’s other main island—with 6,000 people (Otorita Batam. Nd:6.) compared to 111,091 (Lyons and Ford 2007: 5).

161 Interview with local radio broadcaster, Batam, December 12th, 2010; interview with Professors BIU, Batam, December 13th, 2010.

122 While the rest of Indonesia was fighting for independence, Papua’s geographical isolation at the easternmost part of Indonesia kept it under Dutch control as a separate self-governing province after the Second World War. The Dutch eventually relinquished control over the colony and the western half of the island of New Guinea was officially (re)incorporated into Indonesia after the 1969 Act of Free choice (see Drooglever 2010). In 2001, ‘Special Autonomy status’ was granted to Papua, which created an important division of powers between the central and regional authorities. Defense, foreign affairs, religion, the administration of justice, and monetary and fiscal policy remained core duties of the central government, while public services such as education, health care, and infrastructure fell under regional control (Papua Special Autonomy Law: article 4). Under the new laws, Papua kept a larger portion of taxes collected from the exploitation of its natural resources, including 80% of forestry, fisheries, and general mining and 70% of oil and gas, the remainder going to the central government (Papua Special Autonomy Law: article 34). Since then, Papua has been increasingly fragmented into smaller administrative units: it was split into two separate provinces—Papua and Papua Barat—in 2003, and its total number of regencies increased from 14 to 40 between 2000 and 2010. These units are further divided into 385 districts and 3,565 villages.162 Bans on international and internal population movements to Papua were implemented shortly after its integration into the Indonesian Republic. In 1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio pledged that West Irian as it was then known would not be colonized by the Javanese and there would be no transmigration to the territory from other provinces of Indonesia (Saltford 2000:155). However, restrictions on internal migration to Papua proved to be short-lived, especially considering that Indonesian civil servants from Java started moving to Papua during the mid- 1960s (McGibbon 2004: 13-14). Restrictions on free movement into Papua were officially lifted following the 1969 Act of Free Choice, and the decision had an immediate effect, as migration to Papua doubled from 5,000 in 1971 to 10,000 in 1972 (McGibbons 2004:20). The province became a major transmigration target region in 1977, with plans to bring approximately 20,000 households or about 100,000 people within five years (Manning and Rumbiak 1989:98). The Fourth Five- Year Plan (1984-1989) raised that target to approximately 138,000 households or 700,000 persons; had it been successful, this plan would have resulted in a 50% increase in the total provincial population due to transmigration alone (Ibid). In reality, studies suggest that more than 200,000 transmigrants relocated to Papua between 1964-2000 (see Upton 2009: 300-3007;

162 The initial plan proposed by Megawati was to divide the western half of New Guinea into three provinces: Irian Tengah, Papua, and Papua Barat. The former was dropped after public outcry (Mietzner 2007:7).

123 McGibbon 2004:23), most of whom settled in Sorong, Manokwari, Merauke, and other lowland regions close to towns (Manning and Rumbiak 1989: 100; see also Figure 5.4). Initially, transmigrants were poor farmers from Java, but the Fourth Five-Year Plan moved away from the "almost exclusive dependence on Javanese (and Balinese) to include a considerable number of transmigrants from eastern Indonesia" (Manning and Rumbiak 1989:99).

Figure 5.4 Transmigration in Papua, 1984

From Robert Cribb, Digital Atlas of Indonesian History (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), reproduced with permission

While transmigration to Papua has been dramatically scaled back since 1998, there are few signs that spontaneous migration to Papua has slowed. Of the two types of migration, McGibbon argues that spontaneous transmigration had the greatest demographic impact in Papua, as “for every transmigrant that relocated to the province from 1970 to 2000, nearly three unsponsored migrants also relocated there” (2004:23). Increased sea and air communication links—including the introduction in 1985 of the Umsini regular passenger liner service from Java through eastern Indonesia to Sorong and Jayapura—and relatively high wages encouraged the inflow of immigrant labour from Indonesia’s center islands to Papua (Manning and Rumbiak 1989: 89). Suharto’s national economic strategies also promoted migration to the resource-rich, labour- starved Indonesian periphery. Thanks to the large influxes of organized and spontaneous population movements to Papua, the number of inter-provincial migrants to the region increased from 4% of the total population in 1971 to 35% in 2000 (BPS 2000), and migrants are to expected become the majority by 2020 (Elmslie 2010). Considering that this number only represents first-generation migrants,

124 one could expect the total number of migrants to Papua to be even higher.163 Internal migration contributes to Papua’s regional diversity, as Papua is the only province where inter-provincial migrants outnumber intra-provincial migrants (Upton 2009:315). Inter-provincial migrants hail from Java (38%), Sulawesi (25%), and Ambon and Kai islands (7%) (McGibbons 2004: 35). Two- third are Muslim (Upton 2009:259), and most are of Asian descent. Non-migrants (i.e., “local”) populations in Papua consist of 312 tribes, for a total indigenous population of less than 1.5 million (McGibbons 2004: 31). The largest tribes are the Lani and Dani/Ndani, inhabiting Papua's densely populated hinterlands, and the Biaks, who inhabit the coastal regions. Most locals are Melanesian, and 75.5% are Christians (Suryadinata et al 2003: 161). Today, people born outside their district of residence represent over 50% of the population in the urban and resource exploitation centers of Mimika (59.87%), Jayapura (54.81%), Keerom (53.83%), Kota Sorong (52%), and Nabire (51.15%) (see Table 5.2.1). These regencies and cities are also those with the highest proportions of Javanese and BBM and the lowest proportions of native Papuans (see Figure 5.5 and Table 5.2.2). In contrast, Papuans are concentrated in the highlands, including in Puncak Jaya, Paniai, Jayawijaya, and Yapen Waropen.

Table 5.2.1 Migrant population of Papua, 2010 (%)

Regencies and cities Lifetime migrants Recent migrants PAPUA 21.20 4.97 Merauke 39.31 5 Jayawijaya 10.34 2.55 Jayapura 32.04 7.99 Nabire 51.15 8.31 Kep. Yapen 19.69 4 Biak Numfor 20.58 4.08 Paniai 3.64 1.5 Puncak Jaya 7.30 5.93 Mimika 59.87 8.91 Boven Digoel 32.37 12.10 Mappi 8.20 2.76 Asmat 8.95 3.69 Yahukimo 2.13 1.46 Pegunungan Bintang 3.57 1.51 Tolikara 1.22 0.82 Sarmi 31.80 14.50 Keerom 53.83 6.99 Waropen 23.06 7.47

163 According to Upton, there would be approximately 350,000 second-generation migrants in Papua (2009: 462).

125 Supiori 14.92 5.41 Mamneramo Raya 8.02 7.77 Nduga 0.96 0.83 Lanny Jaya 0.42 0.24 Mamberamo Tengah 0.68 0.69 Yalimo 1.77 1.79 Puncak 5.95 5.60 Dogiyai 0.85 3.96 Intan Jaya 0.83 0.95 Deiyai 3.21 2.73 Kota Jayapura 54.81 12.87

PAPUA BARAT 38.30 10.46 Fakfak 33.88 6.26 Kaimana 39.18 11.58 Teluk Wondama 36.71 25.40 Teluk Bintuni 47.15 20.51 Manokwari 36.33 10.52 Sorong Selatan 16.80 4.46 Sorong 41.73 5.09 Raja Ampat 25.58 11.47 Tambrauw 10.17 2.76 Maybrat 2.29 4.88 Kota Sorong 52.34 11.09

From BPS Papua 2010

Figure 5.5 Map of Papua and Papua Barat

126

From ICG Papua (2012:29)

Table 5.2.2 Ethnic population of Papua, 2000 (%)

Regencies and cities Papuans Javanese BBM PAPUA 65.41 13.12 5.98 Merauke 57.85 23.03 4.42 Jayawijaya 95.10 0.80 0.46 Jayapura 57.88 20.02 4.64 Nabire 60.96 17.38 7.86 Paniai 94.39 0.21 0.28 Puncak Jaya 93.4 0.18 0.2 Fak-Fak 54.57 7.28 8.88 Mimika 39.85 21.37 11.37 Sorong 59.76 22.46 3.25 Manokwari 63.42 18.91 4.79

127 Yapen Waropen 81.16 5.08 3.65 Biak Numfor 76.64 6.75 4.97 Kota Jayapura 33.21 19.26 17.76 Kota Sorong 28.39 14.19 18.33

From: BPS Provinsi Papua, Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, p.3

5.2.1 HIs in Papua Recent statistics attest to the stark socio-economic disparities between migrant-populated and Papuan-populated regencies in Papua. As Table 5.2.3 shows, regencies and municipalities with large proportions of migrants are those where the fewest people are involved in agricultural activities (e.g., fisheries, plantations, animal production, rice cultivation, etc.), and most people are involved in manufacturing, trade/retail, and public service industries. In turn, regencies with less than 3% lifetime migrants—all of which are located in Papua’s hinterlands—are also those where over 95% of the labour force is involved in agriculture and few alternatives exist outside the poorly-paid primary sector. Secondary empirical evidence confirms that geographical economic disparities also translate into economic HIs between migrants and locals in Papua. Javanese migrants typically hold government offices or are involved in transmigration projects. Recent spontaneous migrants to Papua, many of whom are BBM from South and Southeast Sulawesi, work in market stalls in the highlands and in Merauke. Migrants from Maluku are employed as public servants (Lautenback 1999:211 cited in Upton 2009: 236) or are involved in transport (Manning and Rumbiak 1989:90). Overall, migrants hold more than 90% of the lucrative jobs in urban trading (Upton 2009b).

Table 5.2.3 Population of Papua by industry (%) (2010)

Regency/ Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Construction Trade Transport Education Public municipality & retail service Merauke 58.46 - 1.2 3.94 10.99 2.61 3.63 13.92 Jayawijaya 86.48 - - 1.32 3.12 1.53 1.69 3.92 Jayapura 46.14 1.88 1.45 3.54 11.51 8.89 3.67 17.35 Nabire 41.18 7.21 1.59 4.46 14.03 8.05 3.43 14.36 Kep. Yapen 51.44 - 3.55 4.55 11.53 6.28 4.65 13.07 Biak 43.53 - 1.95 4.64 12.81 6.51 4.24 18.17 Numfor Paniai 92.66 - - - 1.55 - - 2.68 Puncak Jaya 95.26 ------2.14 Mimika 31.09 16.18 - 6.52 12.92 11.59 2.88 9.86 Boven 68.23 - 8.52 2.16 6.68 1.26 2.24 8.11 Digoel Mappi 81.66 - - 1.70 5.71 1.69 1.54 5.52

128 Asmat 83.98 - - - 5.35 - 1.42 6.52 Yahukino 95.87 ------1.31 Pegunungan 92.59 - - - 1.01 - - 3.45 Bintang Tolikara 97.03 ------1.2 Sarmi 58.63 - 1.25 6.26 10.14 5.33 2.86 11.83 Keerom 67.32 - 2.20 3.08 6.93 4.7 4.83 7.89 Waropen 59.59 - - 2.86 9.91 4.49 3.38 12.83 Supiori 51.50 - - 2.25 3.40 1.56 4.51 13.27 Mamneramo 84.91 - - 1.00 3.42 - 1.25 7.69 Raya Nduga 99.69 ------Lanny Jaya 99.56 ------Mamneramo 99.19 ------Tengah Yalimo 95.89 ------1.37 Puncak 98.31 ------Dogiyai 96.47 ------1.30 Intan Jaya 97.33 ------1.17 Deiyai 96.20 - - - - - 1.00 1.21 Kota 11.81 - 1.32 7.5 20.65 10.31 4.47 30.36 Jayapura PAPUA 75.22 1.26 0.70 2.17 5.61 2.88 1.79 7.36

Fak-fak 44.54 - - 7.10 10.19 6.48 5.15 19.34 Kaimana 53.80 - - 6.91 9.94 6.28 3.28 15.07 Teluk 46.54 1.03 2.16 7.42 11.31 4.57 3.28 19.74 Wondama Teluk 44.08 2.95 5.33 7.09 10.89 6.03 3.73 16.02 Bintuni Manokwari 52.02 - 1.07 6.14 11.86 6.35 3.73 13.34 Sorong 68.02 1.18 1.09 3.4 5.52 4.61 3.39 8.67 Selatan Maybrat 55.75 1.85 8.17 6.75 7.85 4.42 4.17 7.56 Sorong 71.91 - - 3.27 5.58 1.1 3.03 10.55 Tambrauw 92.45 - - - 1.78 - 1.41 2.02 Raja Ampat 79.60 - - 1.84 1.08 2.65 3.14 9.17 Kota Sorong 13.98 3.51 2.67 8.65 20.5 11.87 4.40 24.11 PAPUA 47.08 1.44 2.27 6.36 11.57 6.59 3.86 15.27 BARAT

Note: Highlighted in grey are regencies and municipalities with nearly one-third of its population lifetime migrants. Source: BPS 2010, Papua and West Papua, Population age 15 and over by region and main industries The concentration of manufacturing, trading, and higher education centers in Papua’s urban and coastal areas has led to stark spatial disparities in local wealth. Mimika—home of the Freeport mines and the regency with the most lifetime migrant in the Papuan region—has more than ten times the average GRP per capita in Papua (see Table 5.2.4). If one excludes this anomalous data point from the Papuan average and looks solely at GRP per capita without oil and gas, the correlation between large migrant populations and higher than average GRP per capita (i.e., greater than 10,900) is nearly perfect. All regencies and municipalities in which migrants

129 make up at least one-third of the population have higher than regional average GRP per capita. The only two regencies without large migrant populations that also have higher than average GRP per capita are the coastal regency of Sarmi (neighbouring the urban migrant center of Jayapura) and the island of Supiori, both among the least populated regencies in Papua.

Table 5.2.4 Papua’s Gross Regional Product per capita (2009)

Regencies/ GRP/per capita (2009) Municipalities (1000s IDR) Merauke 16,144 Jayawijaya 5,146 Mamberamo Tengah 2,816 Yalimo 2,134 Lanny Jaya 1,674 Nduga 1,512 Jayapura 14,783 Nabire 12,864 Dogiyai 5,365 KEp. Yapen 8,165 Biak Numfor 10,919 Supiori 21,484 Paniai 3,271 Puncak Jaya 5,706 Puncak 4,135 Mimika 302,869 Boven Digoel 25,340 Mappi 8,254 Asmat 6,969 Yahukimo 1,960 Pegunungan Bintang 7,713 Tolikara 3,742 Sarmi 19,139 Mamneramo Raya 10,567 Keerom 14,895 Waropen 9,703 Kota Jayapura 27,191 PAPUA 28,770

Fak-fak 19,416 Kaimana 16,883 Teluk Wondama 13,862 Teluk Bintuni 23,323 (21,447) Manokwari 14,438 Sorong Selatan 9,358 Maybrat 5,020 Sorong 81,804 (17,113) Tambrauw 5,362 Raja Ampat 25,420 (11,943)

130

Kota Sorong 14,706 PAPUA BARAT 29,625 (18,012)

Notes: Highlighted in grey are regencies and municipalities with nearly one-third of its population lifetime migrants.. The number in bracket represents the GRP per capita excluding oil and gas. Source: Produk Domestik Regional Bruto Kabupaten/Kota di Indonesia 2006-2010 (2011), table 164, 165. P.184&189

According to official data, economic disparities between migrant-populated and Papuan regencies did not make certain regencies more likely to experience unemployment (see Table 5.2.5). Again, it is important to reiterate that statistics on unemployment are notoriously flawed in Indonesia and elsewhere: the fact that no unemployment was recorded in some of Papua’s regencies is cause for scepticism. A preliminary exploration of the socio-economic characteristics of recent migrants to Papua’s capital city of Jayapura sheds light on the state of unemployment in the province (BPS Provinsi Papua 2000). The study reveals that 7.29% of migrants to Jayapura were unemployed in 2000, compared to 5.19% of the non-migrant population (2000:14). As per Ananta’s explanation, migrants’ higher unemployment rate compared to the non-migrant population may actually indicate their “choosiness” or greater financial security—a situation that differs from that of Kepri, where the local population had the highest unemployment rate/greater financial security.

Table 5.2.5 Papua’s unemployment rate (2010) Population “looking Regency/ for work” or “desire Municipality to work” (%) Merauke 6.44 Jayawijaya 1.43 Mamberamo Tengah 0 Yalimo 0.04 Lanny Jaya 0.01 Nduga 0.01 Jayapura 8.00 Nabire 2.18 Dogiyai 0.04 Kep. Yapen 6.19 Biak Numfor 8.14 Supiori 13.53 Paniai 0.16 Puncak Jaya 1.56 Puncak 0.13 Mimika 1.12 Boven Digoel 3.93 Mappi 4.68

131 Asmat 1.82 Yahukimo 0.14 Pegunungan Bintang 0.2 Tolikara 0.19 Sarmi 8.61 Mamneramo Raya 0.72 Keerom 3.04 Waropen 3.46 Kota Jayapura 9.89 PAPUA 3.16

Fak-fak 9.97 Kaimana 6.02 Teluk Wondama 4.68 Teluk Bintuni 9.48 Manokwari 6.70 Sorong Selatan 3.41 Maybrat 1.97 Sorong 1.54 Tambrauw 0.14 Raja Ampat 3.07 Kota Sorong 13.25 PAPUA BARAT 7.67

Note: In grey are regencies and municipalities with nearly one-third of its population lifetime migrants. Source: Sensus penduduk 2010 Population 15 years and over by region and last week activity

Papuans’ lower educational level was often cited as a main factor preventing their inclusion into the most profitable economic sectors. As shown in Table 5.2.6, the majority of the population in Papuan-populated regencies failed to complete primary, and less than 5% completed senior high school. In contrast, regencies and municipalities with large migrant populations are also those with lower illiteracy rates and higher rates of high school completion and post- secondary education.

Table 5.2.6 Papua’s population 5 years of age and over by education attainment (2010) (%)

Regency/ Less primary Primary Junior High Senior High Post- Municipality school school School School secondary school Merauke 32.57 28.15 15.53 16.62 7.13 Jayawijaya 62.25 12.03 11.01 9.31 5.4 Jayapura 27.48 19.37 18.33 24.9 9.9 Nabire 33.34 19.73 18.0 19.87 9.07 Kep. Yapen 35.37 21.33 17.27 17.21 8.83 Biak Numfor 29.34 22.68 17.38 20.10 10.49

132 Paniai 77.0 6.83 8.16 5.84 2.17 Puncak Jaya 78.49 8.54 7.13 3.79 2.05 Mimika 30.09 17.99 15.40 21.23 15.28 Boven Digoel 42.08 22.11 14.0 14.36 7.45 Mappi 53.56 30.29 7.94 5.36 2.84 Asmat 66.81 19.78 6.29 4.77 2.36 Yahukimo 82.03 10.46 4.18 2.06 1.27 Pegunungan 78.36 10.75 4.81 3.72 2.36 Bintang Tolikara 80.56 8.05 6.12 3.97 1.31 Sarmi 38.83 24.55 16.24 14.28 6.11 Keerom 39.37 23.01 15.14 16.87 5.61 Waropen 37.02 27.7 14.11 13.66 7.51 Supiori 41.88 26.27 14.4 12.4 5.04 Mamneramo Raya 65.75 18.23 7.08 5.83 3.12 Nduga 95.68 2.87 1.03 0.29 0.14 Lanny Jaya 74.69 11.86 8.60 3.72 1.13 Mamreramo 73.11 13.05 8.66 4.11 1.07 Tengah Yalimo 75.51 10.62 6.98 4.38 2.51 Puncak 87.23 5.68 4.36 1.81 0.92 Dogiyai 76.72 9.62 7.69 4.15 1.83 Intan Jaya 83.80 7.59 4.52 2.51 1.59 Deiyai 78.78 7.71 6.91 5.05 1.65 Kota Jayapura 20.63 13.64 16.19 32.00 17.54 PAPUA 55.69 15.07 11.06 12.02 6.14

Fak-fak 29.01 24.13 18.09 19.8 8.96 Kaimana 34.49 23.33 18.48 16.21 7.48 Teluk Wondama 37.81 26.4 14.24 13.23 8.32 Teluk Bintuni 35.5 23.5 16.72 16.2 8.32 Manokwari 35.04 19.81 15.77 19.61 9.78 Sorong Selatan 43.61 25.67 13.13 10.64 6.96 Maybrat 36.73 24.18 17.26 14.27 7.56 Sorong 33.90 31.8 16.24 12.04 6.01 Tambrauw 65.81 16.94 8.36 6.65 2.23 Raja Ampat 33.92 18.41 18.81 15.19 13.49 Kota Sorong 22.50 16.83 18.5 27.19 14.99 PAPUA BARAT 32.14 21.38 16.96 19.24 10.29 Note: Highlighted in light grey are regencies and municipalities with nearly one-third of its population lifetime migrants. Highlighted in dark grey are regencies and municipalities with 90% of their populations being non-migrants. Source: BPS Sensus Penduduk Papua 2010

A problem with using regencies as the unit of analysis is that it prevents us from exploring HIs between groups—notably, between migrants and locals—within said regency. Viddyatama (2008) calculates the average years of schooling per province and compares these to the average

133 years of schooling of migrants coming into that province (see Table 5.2.7).164 In all instances, he finds that migrants are better educated than the local population. Outside the Javanese urban centers that attract highly educated migrants, Papua and Kalimantan attract the most educated migrants in Indonesia, contributing to the educational gap between migrants and the rest of the population on these islands. This gap is particularly pronounced in Papua, given that the total population had the fourth fewest years of schooling in both 1990 and 2000. The 2000 BPS Papua study confirms the presence of an educational gap between migrants to Jayapura and the city’s population: 42.94% of migrants to Jayapura had completed senior high school, as opposed to 35.63% of Jayapura’s total population or Papua’s average of 13.36%, and 7.42% have a college degree compared to the city average of 6.08% and the provincial average of 1.26% (BPS Provinsi Papua 2000:9; 17).

Table 5.2.7 Average years of education of migrants, 1990 and 2000 1985-1990 1990-2000 Total Migrant Total Migrant population population population population Aceh 4.63 7.47 5.95 7.56 North 5.05 7.57 6.14 7.37 Sumatra West 4.69 6.87 5.57 7.47 Sumatra Riau 4.29 6.87 5.95 8.15 Jambi 4.04 6.63 5.26 6.75 South 4.02 6.49 5.26 6.31 Sumatra Bengkulu 4.25 6.90 5.46 7.18 Lampung 3.72 6.63 5.08 6.46 Jakarta 7.13 7.93 8.37 8.85 West Java 4.15 8.01 5.48 8.33 Central 3.74 6.99 5.02 7.52 Java Yogyakarta 5.14 9.34 6.58 10.57 East Java 3.81 8.00 5.14 7.95 Bali 4.44 8.63 5.88 8.71 West Nusa 3.03 8.78 3.90 6.74 Tenggara East Nusa 3.19 8.6 4.04 6.44 Tenggara West 2.92 8.22 4.27 6.87 Kalimantan Central 4.36 6.74 5.43 6.25 Kalimantan

164 Data were not available for Kepri given that the province was only officially created in 2004.

134 South 4.09 7.04 5.08 7.12 Kalimantan East 4.99 7.63 6.33 7.78 Kalimantan North 4.86 8.29 6.02 8.13 Sulawesi Central 4.40 6.95 5.27 6.14 Sulawesi South 4.08 7.73 4.90 7.83 Sulawesi Southeast 4.10 7.15 4.90 5.37 Sulawesi Maluku 4.72 7.62 5.59 6.87 Papua 3.44 7.95 4.28 7.23

Source: Vidyattama (2008:257) Note: The numbers in the table represent the average years of schooling for people above ten years of age.

Prior to 1998, inter-provincial migrants occupied almost all of the political positions of power in Papua. No local Papuan had ever been nominated as governor, and by 1986 only four bupati out of nine were local Papuans (Manning and Rumbiak 1989: 9). Migrants’ monopolization of political power in Papua started to decline in the post-Suharto era. The Special Autonomy Law was a key development in this respect, as it required that the provincial governor be a “person originating from the Melanesian race group, comprising native ethnic groups in Papua province and/or person accepted and acknowledged as native Papuans by the Papuan adat community (Papua Special Autonomy Law 2001: articles 1t and 12)165 ”—i.e., someone from the native ethnic group. Decree No.14/2009 issued by the Papua People’s Council (MRP) also tried to limit candidacy in regional elections to indigenous Papuans. As the head of one of Jayapura’s theological schools claims, the decree was intended to protect the political rights of native Papuans in the context of high migration levels: “If the rights of Papuans are not protected, especially their political rights, then one day those rights will be lost as [indigenous Papuans] are marginalized due to the influx of newcomers” (Neles Tebay, cited in Somba 2010). The decree was later overruled by the Papua General Elections Commission (KPUD), which deemed it “excessive”, especially given that the last non-Papuan bupati had lost his position in 2007 in Puncak Jaya (Chauvel 2008), and that the majority of candidates running in the 2010 local elections were indigenous Papuans anyway. This overruling of one of MRP’s bills, clearly within the rights

165 As Mietzner points out, the formulation itself constituted a compromise between one Papuan faction that proposed to reserve the governorship to Papuans only, while the other argued that long-term immigrants should not be excluded (2007:5).

135 granted by Article 21 of Papua’s Special Autonomy Laws, suggests that the Papua People’s Council—the “cultural representative of Papuan natives” with “a certain authority in protecting the rights of Papua natives” (Papua Special Autonomy Law: article 1)—may not have as much power as previously thought. Last but not least, Papua’s bureaucracy did not achieve a “local overhaul” as Kepri’s bureaucracy did. Following the exodus of educated Papuans abroad in the early 1960s, a large number of Indonesian civil servants, many of whom were Javanese, moved in to occupy these positions. This de-Papuanization of the bureaucracy also conveniently addressed Jakarta’s suspicions regarding Papuans’ loyalty to the state (McGibbon 2004: 14). The lack of Papuans in the civil service continued well into the 1980s, as “migrants retained a substantial share of senior positions within the civil service, especially as representatives of central government departments and key administrators, the bupati, and senior staff” (Manning and Rumbiak 1989: 91). Even as local people’s education levels started to improve, indigenous Papuans struggled to gain employment in the civil service (Munro 2011). The Special Autonomy Law attempted to address the problem by giving native Papuans “priority in employments in all fields of work” (Papua Special Autonomy Law: article 62), but stopped short of truly including (coastal and hinterland) putra daerah. An anthropologist who conducted research in Papua’s hinterlands in 2009 obtained a list of names and positions of successful government recruits in Wamena. From this list, she concludes that only 41% of recruits or 112/275 belonged to one of the three main indigenous groups of the central highlands (Cenderawasih Pos, 22 June 2009, cited in Munro 2011). Non- indigenous recruits outnumbered local recruits in all employment fields except “nurse in training”, which requires the least education. The limited inclusion of Papuans was even more marked at the provincial government level, where out of a total of 173 new recruits in 2009, only 3 originated from the central highlands (Cenderawasih Pos, 22 June 2009, cited in Munro 2011).

5.2.2 HIs and SoS conflict in Papua Recent studies conducted by the National Violence Monitoring System and the Violent Conflict in Indonesia Study (ViCIS) reveal that Papua has the highest levels of violent conflict in Indonesia (ICG 2012:1). From 2004 to 2008, there were 3,348 violent incidents resulting in 348 deaths (WB 2010:6). Some of these incidents are related to Papua’s low-lying secessionist movement, but most are group clashes associated with identity issues or smaller-scale ‘popular justice’ assaults (WB 2010:7-8). An element that is often overlooked is that many such incidents target migrants and their properties, giving these conflicts a SoS dimension. It is no coincidence that together, the

136 two districts (Kota Jayapura and Mimika) that have experienced just over half of all conflict- related deaths reported by ViCIS between 2004 and 2008 (WB 2010:7) are also the districts with the highest proportions of lifetime migrants in all of Papua (see Table 5.2.1). Large, consistent socio-economic, political, and cultural HIs between local Papuans and migrant populations explain why SoS conflicts are especially common in Papua, more so than in other provinces with large population influxes from elsewhere in the archipelago. As this section demonstrates, subjective and objective socio-economic and political assymetries were a major source of discontent as locals compared themselves with the better off migrants. Local elites were then able to frame these grievances as ‘unjust’, facilitating nativist mobilization and violence against migrants. Violence between migrant and indigenous Papuans has persisted since the 1970s when large population inflows resumed (McGibbon 2004:27). That early inter-provincial migrants to Papua were closely associated with Indonesian security forces contributes to the negative view of migrants and explains why a substantial number of SoS attacks target government symbols (see Upton 2009:283). Today, Papua has the highest number of military personnel in Indonesia, most of them from Java.166 For the indigenous people, migrants are not merely economic beings trying their luck in another region of Indonesia; they are political agents embodying the Indonesian state and who are complicit in Papua’s ongoing marginalization and repression—a situation reminiscent of that in Xinjiang. As explained by Tirtosudarmo: [the conflict in] Papua is easy to understand. There is an armed struggle. There is a group of people who want their own country, or separate community, and you can easily see how migration can become problematic as migrants are perceived as something from the center, from the government, or something alien. They are perceived as creating problems. (interview Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, LIPI, Jakarta, January 5th, 2011)

Attacks on government properties and (migrant) employees are often couched in terms of sub-state nationalism and secessionism.167 Given their sensitivity, attacks on migrant workers are often met with a large military response, as was the case in Manokwari in 2001 (Upton 2009: 166). This, in turn, furthered the impression among Papuans that migration/Indonesian State/security forces are one and the same. The 2009 series of low-level armed attacks

166 Interview with Tri Nuke, LIPI, Jakarta, February 5th, 2011.

167 For more information on the rise and motivations of Papuan nationalism and secessionism, see Chauvel 2005 and Muhammad 2013.

137 orchestrated in the central highland regency of Puncak Jaya show that non-Papuans (non-civilians and civilians alike) can become targets of the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or Free Papua Movement) and other pro-independence organizations such as the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB). Buchtar Tabuni, KNPB’s head, delivered a controversial speech in March 2012 in which he explicitly called on “illegal persons” (i.e., migrants from elsewhere in Indonesia) to “go home… before we kick you out using the ways of the Papuan people as quickly as possible. Don’t mess around—I’m tired of carrying these banners and megaphone”.168 Threats against migrants and “Papua abu-abu” (literally, grey Papuans), or Papuans whose true sympathies were in doubt, were reiterated in June of 2012 in letters signed by the KNPB circulated in Jayapura (ICG 2012:6). If the inclusion of civilians on the list of potential SoS targets was driven by the attempt to create unrest among migrants and add to the bargaining power of Papuan pro-independence organizations (Widjojo 2010:443), this change in tactics may indicate a larger and more persistent shift from attacks on government targets to SoS conflict with (migrant) civilians. As opposed to large, politically oriented attacks on government and security apparatus and personnel, smaller clashes between indigenous Papuans and migrants have typically been rooted in economic grievances, specifically in perceived inequalities and unfair treatment. By the late 1980s, Manning and Rumbiak reported that the government had become increasingly alarmed about outbreaks of violence between immigrants and indigenous populations arising from the inability of the local population to compete with immigrants (1989:91). A few years later, in 1994, a survey conducted by Bandiyono and Suharto showed that economic disparities between Papuans and migrants (both real and perceived) were the leading cause of psychological stress for Papuans and contributed to feelings that they were second-class citizens in their own land (cited in Upton 2009:449). Locals’ feelings of resentment towards the domination of migrants in both government and private occupations were made obvious in daily conversations, where migrants were pejoratively called “straight haired”, while indigenous Papuans referred to as “curly haired” (Tirtosudarmo 1997: 324). As demonstrated earlier, socio-economic and political HIs between natives and migrants are especially deep and reinforced in Papua. When Papua was (re)-integrated into the Indonesian Republic, low education levels prompted the inflow of better-educated Javanese and Maluku civil servants. These migrant workers put policies in place that promoted the interests of the ‘center’

168 The full video is available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Pu4BJDBsmM [accessed December 10, 2013].

138 (i.e. Jakarta) and furthered (purposefully or not) the demographic, socio-economic, political, and cultural marginalization of Papuans, who were then passed over for jobs due to unsatisfactory educational levels or language skills. Chief among these policies was transmigrasi, a program blamed for local marginalization through land loss and loss of income from traditional hunting activities. In 1985, Papuan representatives to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Population (WGIP) emphasized the devastating effect of the transmigration programme that forcibly occupied lands owned by Papuan ancestors (CWIS 1985). As Manning and Rumbiak argue, acceptance of transmigration settlements by the local population depended in part on the ability to successfully include indigenous people as local transmigrants in the new sites, which explains why 25% of translok places were reserved for local residents as opposed to 10% elsewhere in Indonesia (1989:102). Lack of familiarity with Javanese (the lingua franca in many sites) and the need to adopt new farming activities have worked against local inclusion into state-sponsored transmigration projects and further contributed to Papuan–migrant tensions (Manning and Rumbiak 1989: 102-3). Yet, it is not transmigrants who are most targeted by Papuans in times of social conflict, but the spontaneous BBM migrants from South and Southeast Sulawesi (see Upton 2009:309). As elsewhere in Indonesia, spontaneous migrants to Papua are generally considered economically and socially better off than transmigrants, who are also better off than the indigenous populations. Considering that inequalities are the greatest between spontaneous migrants and locals, these migrants became the prime targets of local attacks. Markets—the symbol of rich migrant entrepreneurs—were routinely burned down at the turn of the century in Entrop, Sentani, and Wamena, the latest incident killing 30 people and forcing hundreds of migrants to flee the region (McGibbon 2004:27). Compared to the gradual increase in Javanese migrants, BBM migration to Papua was sudden and intense. In the early 1980s, there were 31,000 migrants from South Sulawesi living in Papua; by 2000 this number had ballooned to 100,000 (McGibbon 2004: 24). This sudden influx of migrants involved in petty trade and construction positioned them in direct competition with Papuans, and thanks to their keen entrepreneurial skills and contacts, they were often victorious. Many Papuan leaders expressed concerns about the influx of BBM who, according to popular stereotypes, “are aggressive traders who do not adapt to the local culture and used ‘deceptive means’ in their commercial transactions with the locals” (Aditjondro 1986:71-2 cited in Upton 2009:285). As seen in China, migrants are often depicted in bipolar terms: either they are “good” and adapt to the local culture and contribute to the development of their new province of residence;

139 or they are “bad” and contribute to the region’s exploitation and local marginalization. Migrants who dominate the economic and political realms would be, by definition, “bad” migrants whose presence would result in increased group tensions and conflicts. Spontaneous migrants associated with resource extraction in Papua have been particularly resented for their negative impact on the local communities given the temporary nature of their stay and the fact that their jobs involve extracting Papua’s resources for the benefit of foreign (or Jakarta-based) companies. The presence of both US Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold Inc., operating since the 1960s in Fak Fak, and Mimika’s Grasberg mine that resumed operations in 1989 resulted in a considerable increase of inter-provincial migrants looking for employment. In both cases, mining activities have contributed to higher than average regional output (see Table 5.2.4). However, a study by Tadjoeddin, Suharyo, and Mishra (2001) shows that there is very low correlation between regional prosperity and community welfare measured in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) per district in Indonesia. Fak Fak’s per capita output is 16 times higher than the national average, but its HDI is 5% below the national average (Tadjoeddin, Suharyo and Mishra 2001:292). Such welfare gaps have become a source of conflict for indigenous people in Indonesia (and in China) who believe they are the primary heirs of all resources available in the region and that they are denied the benefits of the prosperity of their regions. Attempts to address inequality between locals and migrants in general, and spontaneous migrants in particular, include policies of positive discrimination in the public and the private sectors for Papuans and restrictions on population movements from other islands in Indonesia, but such initiatives have had limited success. As elsewhere in Indonesia, the introduction of electoral politics in local government has facilitated the ethnicization and localization of political leadership. The law requiring Papua’s governor to be a native ethnic Papuan has encouraged Papuan candidates in the 2006 and 2013 gubernatorial elections to compete against one another for the top positions by resorting to SoS rhetoric, crystallizing the distinction between coastal and hinterland Papuans. Coastal Papuans have traditionally enjoyed significantly better educational opportunities, enabling them to occupy key positions in the bureaucracy and the private sector (Mietzner 2009:267). In the 2006 elections, a highlander candidate, Lukas Enembe, campaigned on a promise to end the near monopoly of coastal Papuans in political jobs. His campaign message was simple: it was time for a candidate from the interior to assume the governorship. This message resonated with ethnic highlanders and provided Enembe with a numerically important base. Though he lost the 2006 elections to Suebu, a coastal Papuan with better name recognition,

140 Enembe successfully ran again on the same platform in the February 14th, 2013 gubernatorial elections despite the presence of several highlander candidates (Somba and Witular 2013). Although migrants to Papua are ineligible to run for governorship, they nevertheless represent a significant voting block that candidates in local electoral races find difficult to ignore. Complicating matters is that Papuans and migrants have diametrically opposed interests: the former want candidates to halt migration and implement economic policies favouring Papuans, whereas the latter want candidates to guarantee their personal safety and that of their investments. One of the 2006 gubernatorial candidates who proposed drastic measures to curb immigration misjudged the importance of the migrant votes and saw his campaign collapse quickly (Mietzner 2007:9). Restrictions on population movements from elsewhere in the archipelago have been suggested on several occasions, most recently by participants in a 2009 workshop on sustainable development in Papua. Participants called on the local government to issue a special ordinance (perdasus) to restrict the “ships carrying thousands of people from outside Papua seeking work here”, and a provincial ordinance (perdasi) to regulate the employment of civil servants in Papua so “that native Papuans can be accommodated better” (Somba 2009). The Governor’s office has already issued provincial ordinance No. 15/2008, stipulating that Papua should issue separate identity cards for its native Papuan and newcomer residents, and another regulation stipulating that any newcomer who remains unemployed for an extended period should return to his or her place of origin. However, implementing such regulations has proven difficult for local officials who fear being regarded as “discriminatory” (Somba 2009), and migrant communities have long been a lucrative source of bribes for government officials. For instance, after gold was discovered in Paniai in 2003, the local government specifically banned outsiders from engaging in mining in the area. Many miners and entrepreneurs nonetheless overcame this obstacle by taking advantage of mining permits issued by the bupati (governor) of the nearby regency of Nabire in 2005, even though the site was outside its jurisdiction (ICG 2012:11). As in Inner Mongolia, banning migrants would thus mean ending additional sources of revenue for local governments. Greater socio-economic and political disparities between migrants and locals explain why Papua has experienced more SoS conflict than Kepri and most other target provinces for inter- provincial migration. The combination of sub-state nationalism and heavy resource exploitation— both of which resulted in a greater influx of people—led to a reduction in opportunities for the minority ‘masses’ (through land degradation) and local elites (through barriers to joining the civil service). Although the 2001 Autonomy Law grants a Papuan People’s Council to protect Papuan

141 values and culture, the special body continues to be undermined legally and politically. As a World Bank report on recent violence in Papua concludes: “The presence of such high level of routine violent conflict in an environment with significant tensions surrounding separatist, anti- migrant, tribal and resource extraction issues highlight the risks of escalation” (WB 2010:6).

5.3 Lampung A former regency of South Sumatra, the province of Lampung was created on March 18th 1964. Since then, Lampung’s administrative divisions have expanded from three regencies and one city in 1996 to 13 regencies and two cities. These units are further divided into 204 kecamatan/districts and 2,365 kelurahan/desa/villages.169 Given its proximity to Java and its location on the southernmost tip of the island of Sumatra, Lampung has a long history of organized and spontaneous inter-provincial movements. As early as 1905, migrants relocated from the heavily populated Kedu region in Java to Bagelen/Gedung Tataan in Lampung as part of the Dutch’s kolonisatie program (Pain and Benoit 1989:83). By the end of 1940, just before the Dutch Indies entered WWII, over 200,000 Indonesian settlers were relocated throughout Indonesia under Kolonisatie, with nearly 70% (or 140,000) settling in Lampung, especially in the town of Metro, Kolonisatie’s largest project (Pain and Benoit 1989:89). After the war, the newly independent Indonesian government established 24 kolonisatie-inspired transmigration projects in Lampung that covered 252,000 hectares (Pain and Benoit 1989: 317). Most transmigrants to Lampung originated from Java, Bali, and Lombok and relocated to plains formerly occupied by forests and marshes, away from the locals. Every transmigran umum (general transmigrant) was given two hectares for farming and ¼ hectare for their government-provided house, along with a certificate for their land and food for one year. In contrast, transmigran swakarsa (assisted spontaneous transmigrants) had to buy the land themselves.170 In 1978-9, the dramatic increase in population density in Pringswesu, Lampung Tengah, and other main target areas for transmigration triggered another type of transmigration— transmigrasi lokal or translok—that relocated transmigrant descendants to other transmigrant sites in Lampung, typically to Lampung Utara (see Figure 5.6).171 Together, these three types of

169 The most recent district is the kabupaten of West Pesisir, created out of Lampung Barat in October 2012 (Jakarta Post October 22, 2012).

170 Interview with officials, Disnakertrans, Bandar Lampung, January 7th, 2011.

171 Between 1980 and 1986, Lampung Utara experienced a population growth of almost 500,000 due to the relocation of transmigrants and translok to the kabupaten (Pain and Benoit 1989: 133).

142 transmigrants recreated Java’s countryside with its economic sector, social structures, and architecture in Lampung, thus earning Lampung the nickname of ‘North Java’ or ‘Little Java’.

Figure 5.6 Transmigration settlements in southern Sumatra, 1990

From Robert Cribb, Digital Atlas of Indonesian History (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), reproduced with permission

Though Lampung is most famous for being one of Indonesia’s main transmigration target areas (daerah tujuan), migrants also spontaneously moved to Lampung. By 1931, the Sundanese, Javanese, and Madurese populations of Lampung had already reached 131,000 or 32% of the provincial population. Considering that the population of the kolonisatie’s centers of Gedung Tataan, and Wonosobo only came to 37,000, one can conclude that nearly 94,000 migrants had already come spontaneously from Java. An exhaustive study conducted in 1986 estimates that spontaneous migrants and their descendants represented 2,870,000 or 60.65% of Lampung’s population while transmigrants and their descendants were estimated at 1,201,000 or 25.38%. The other 13.97% or 661,000 people were considered “autochtonous” people (Pain and Benoit 1989: 168). Spontaneous migrants outnumbered transmigrants in all regencies, representing approximately 80% of all migrants to Lampung (Ibid: 168-171). Before independence, most spontaneous migrants came from South Sumatra, but after 1950 they came from Java, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra. Spontaneous migration peaked at more than 24,000 migrants per year in the 1970s, decreasing abruptly in the 1980s due to land shortage and limited job opportunities outside the agricultural sector. To this day, Lampung remains unindustrialized, and 55.51% of Lampung’s population is involved in agriculture, especially in rice paddies and rubber,

143 coffee, pepper, cassava, sugar, and palm oil plantations (BPS Provinsi Lampung 2009). Despite ceasing to be a target area for transmigration since 2002172 and having limited economic opportunities to attract more spontaneous migrants, Lampung still has the 11th highest proportion of lifetime migrants (19.24%) among Indonesia’s provinces as per the latest census (BPS 2010), which shows the long-term demographic impact of migration in the region. Migration’s impacts on Lampung’s demography are manifold. From 1945 to 1980, the population increased by an average of 5.77% per year, and more than half of this rate is attributable to migration (Pain and Benoit 1989:133). Aside from changes in population density and in the geographical distribution of the population, migration also drastically affected Lampung’s ethnic composition. Records show that in 1920, Lampungese173 were the dominant group, at approximately 64% of the population. Six decades later, in 1986, the Lampungese represented 16% of the population. They were the majority in only 6 kecamatan located in marginal areas in West Lampung, and had totally disappeared (i.e., comprising less than 5% of the population) in 29 kecamatan (Pain and Benoit 1989: 122-3). The Javanese, on the other hand, constituted the absolute majority of the population in 44 out of 67 kecamatan and represented 68% of the provincial population (Pain and Benoit 1989: 120-1). The latest census figures indicate that the Javanese represent 61.9% of the provincial population and the Lampungese represent 11.9% (see Table 5.3.2). Regencies with the largest proportions of non-Lampungese largely coincide with those with larger proportions of lifetime migrants (e.g., Tulangbawang, Metro, and Mesuji) (see Table 5.3.1). Javanese, Batak, Minang, and Sundanese migrants are spread out over

172 Interview with official, Department of Transmigration, Lampung Province, Bandar Lampung, January 14th, 2011. In fact, Lampung is now a ‘sending’ region for transmigration (interview with officials, Disnakertrans, Jakarta, January 7th, 2011).

173 Defining who the Lampungese are is a complex matter. The Lampungese are the people who resided on the Southern tip of Sumatra prior to the big migration waves from Java. Although accounts diverge, it is believed that Lampungese are originally of Malay descent and settled in the 14th and 15th centuries, before Islam arrived, in what is today Lampung province. Some settled on the mountainous West Coast while others settled in the swamp area of the south, facing the Java sea. Since then, the Lampungese have been divided into two groups, the Sai Batin (formerly Peminggir and then Pessisir) and the Pepadun, hence their motto: “Sai Bumi Ruwa Jurai” or one origin separated into two. Several elements differentiate the two groups, notably succession/transfer of power, cultural traditions, settlement areas, and dialects (interviews with leader, Lembaga Pengembangan Masyarakat Adat Lampung Abung, Bandar Lampung, January 11, 2011; local Professor Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 12, 2011; former leader Lampung Sai, Bandar Lampung, January 20th, 2011). To be a ‘true Lampungese’, one must abide by the four principles of Pi’il Pensenggiri (pride/no backing down); Nemui Nyimah (welcome); Negah Nyapur (to socialize); and Sakai Sambayan (to help each other) (interview with Professors, Islamic University of Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 18th, 2011).

144 most of Lampung, whereas Balinese are located mostly in the south of the province and Chinese Indonesian migrants reside principally in urban areas (see Figure 5.7).

Table 5.3.1 Migrant population in Lampung, 2010 (%)

Regencies and cities Lifetime migrants Recent migrants LAMPUNG 29.41 3.16 Lampung Barat 30.23 3.45 Tanggamus 14.57 1.53 Lampung Selatan 27.86 3.4 Lampung Timur 26.56 1.74 Lampung Tengah 26.42 1.85 Lampung Utara 25.28 2.17 Way Kanan 37.55 3.36 Tulangbawang 56.02 6.89 Pesawaran 18.40 2.09 Pringsewu 15.13 2.30 Mesuji 61.11 4.48 Tulangbawang Barat 48.03 3.54 Kota Bandar 31.77 5.60 Lampung Kota Metro 34.29 8.30

From BPS Lampung 2010

Table 5.3.2 Ethnic population in Lampung, 2000 (%)

Regencies and cities Lampungese Javanese Sundanese LAMPUNG 11.88 61.89 8.78 Lampung Barat 28.03 32.94 15.47 Tanggamus 13.84 60.00 13.03 Lampung Selatan 11.50 59.24 13.03 Lampung Timur 7.83 78.30 3.51 Lampung Tengah 6.00 78.60 5.14 Lampung Utara 18.62 48.16 9.92 Way Kanan 12.60 60.00 5.40 Tulangbawang 8.60 72.81 4.10 Bandar Lampung 14.19 38.39 11.77 Metro 8.54 71.90 2.82

From: BPS 2000, Tabel 06, p.41

Figure 5.7 Map of Lampung

145

From Robert Cribb, Digital Atlas of Indonesian History (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), reproduced with permission

5.3.1 HIs in Lampung Unlike in Kepri and Papua, the economic disparities between migrant-populated and native- populated regencies in Lampung were quite small, possibly because inter-provincial migrants to Lampung were closely associated with the agricultural sector and were spread out nearly evenly over the territory (see Table 5.3.3). However, qualitative evidence collected during fieldwork suggests that migrant groups are better included, and in some cases monopolize, the most lucrative occupations and industries at the provincial level in Lampung. Javanese, Sundanese, and Balinese work in rubber plantations; Bantenese are involved in security; Bataks are business owners; and Minang and Chinese are involved in trading.174 An economic hierarchy exists with local Lampungese at the bottom and inter-provincial migrants at the top, with the latter further sub- divided into two, as transmigrants are generally poorer than spontaneous migrants in Lampung.175 Economic differentials between migrants predate their relocation to Lampung. As an official from

174 Information collected from several interviews including with migrant poet, Bandar Lampung, January 13th 2011; Professors Islamic University Lampung, January 18th, 2011.

175 Interview with leader, Lampung Sai, Bandar Lampung, January 13th, 2011.

146 the Ministry of Transmigration explains, “transmigration is a program for the poor, whereas spontaneous migrants already have some wealth accumulated and have more skills”.176 Spontaneous migrants’ comparative wealth allowed them to buy land from Lampungese landowners who now plant clove, coffee, chocolate, and pepper trees, or work as fishermen to make ends meet.

Table 5.3.3 Population of Lampung by industries (%) (2010) Regency/ Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Construction Retail Transport Education Public Municipality & trade service Lampung 81.02 - - - 7.21 1.54 2.92 4.29 Barat Tangamus 75.16 - 1.51 1.4 8.99 3.0 2.93 5.03 Lampung 56.04 - 6.33 5.92 12.14 4.67 2.97 8.2 Selatan Pesawaran 67.84 - 5.81 2.15 11.67 2.05 2.93 4.86 Lampung 69.18 - 5.42 2.06 10.68 2.43 2.97 4.97 Timur Lampung 67.19 - 2.97 2.5 10.40 2.59 3.96 7.54 Tengah Lampung 80.28 - 1.52 1.43 6.6 1.55 2.76 4.02 Utara Way Kanan 78.58 - 7.34 1.83 10.74 2.45 2.55 5.39 Tulangbawa 66.51 - 4.24 3.18 9.92 3.02 2.9 7.46 ng Pringsewu 49.50 - 10.58 3.74 15.54 3.11 4.55 9.07 Mesuji 79.41 - 2.48 1.37 8.1 1.7 2.17 2.89 Tulangbawa 73.34 - 3.07 2.04 10.19 1.88 3.0 4.53 ng Barat Bandar 5.47 - 6.24 9.48 26.92 8.83 5.6 24.87 Lampung Metro 16.43 - 5.39 7.75 25.28 5.2 9.16 21.08 LAMPUNG 61.48 - 4.79 3.27 12.28 3.26 3.4 7.84 Note: Highlighted in grey are regencies and municipalities with nearly one-third of its population lifetime migrants Source: BPS 2010, Lampung, Population age 15 and over by region and main industries

No economic disparities are apparent in Lampung’s geographical differentials in Gross Regional Product per capita or unemployment rates. As opposed to Papua and Kepri, Lampung’s GRP per capita also appears unrelated to the proportion of migrants in a given prefecture (see Table 5.3.4). For instance, migrant-populated Tulangbawang has the second highest GRP per capita in Lampung, but Way Kanan, another regency with a large migrant population, is one of the poorest regions in Lampung based on its GRP per capita. Census data on unemployment also

176 Interview with officials, Disnakertrans, Jakarta, January 7th, 2011.

147 reveals no obvious correlation between migrant-populated regencies and unemployment (see Table 5.3.5).

Table 5.3.4 Lampung’s Gross Regional Product per capita (2009) Regencies/ GRP per capita (2009) (1000s Municipalities IDR) Lampung Barat 6,143 Tangamus 7,486 Lampung Selatan 9,880 Pesawaran 10,542 Lampung Timur 9,477 Lampung Tengah 11,748 Lampung Utara 11,401 Way Kanan 6,360 Tulangbawang 12,116 Bandar Lampung 19,630 Metro 7,113 LAMPUNG 11,671

Note: In grey are regencies and municipalities with nearly one-third of its population lifetime migrants. Source: Produk Domestik Regional Bruto Kabupaten/Kota di Indonesia 2006-2010 (2011), table 140, p.64

Table 5.3.5 Lampung’s unemployment rate (2010)

Regency/ Population “looking for work” Municipality or “desire to work” (%) Lampung Barat 4.04 Tangamus 7.30 Lampung Selatan 8.47 Pesawaran 7.54 Lampung Timur 5.57 Lampung Tengah 5.41 Lampung Utara 8.19 Way Kanan 5.27 Tulangbawang 8.04 Pringsewu 6.50 Mesuji 5.03 Tulangbawang Barat 6.42 Bandar Lampung 8.12 Metro 7.06 LAMPUNG 6.72

Note: In grey are regencies and municipalities with nearly one-third of its population lifetime migrants. Source: Sensus penduduk 2010 Population 15 years and over by region and last week activity

148 Lower education levels among Lampungese are also cited as a factor contributing to their economic exclusion. Unlike Kepri and Papua, an analysis of Lampung’s education level per regency reveals no correlation between migrant-population regencies and higher rates of educational attainment, again attributable to the spread of inter-provincial migrants over the entire province (see Table 5.3.6). Viddyatama’s earlier comparison of migrants’ average years of schooling with that of the total provincial population is more revealing (see Table 5.2.7). According to his estimates, Lampung’s total population averaged a low 5.08 years of schooling in 2000, but unlike Papua, migrants to Lampung were comparatively less educated, averaging only 6.46 years of schooling—the sixth lowest average of all migrants in Indonesia. The smaller difference in education opportunities between Lampung’s local and non-local populations has accordingly limited social HIs from becoming a source of local grievances.

Table 5.3.6 Lampung population 5 years of age and over by education attainment (2010) (%)

Regencies/ Less than Primary Junior High Senior High Post- Municipalities Primary school School School secondary School school school Lampung Barat 25.33 40.77 19.34 11.64 2.92 Tangamus 31.51 35.79 18.84 10.76 3.11 Lampung Selatan 29.13 34.59 19.81 12.26 4.23 Lampung Timur 28.39 33.83 21.85 12.84 3.08 Lampung Tengah 27.70 34.82 21.24 12.40 3.84 Lampung Utara 27.13 33.58 19.36 14.94 4.98 Way Kanan 28.12 40.69 19.28 9.55 2.35 Tulangbawang 29.39 34.24 19.45 13.46 3.46 Pesawaran 27.73 35.77 21.00 12.22 3.29 Pringsewu 27.05 32.93 20.96 13.06 5.99 Mesuji 31.08 44.25 16.85 6.01 1.8 Tulangbawang 28.18 38.57 19.71 10.24 3.29 Barat Bandar Lampung 19.58 19.87 17.82 29.24 13.5 Metro 20.22 19.76 18.91 28.62 12.48 LAMPUNG 27.14 33.53 19.90 14.45 4.97

Note: In grey are regencies and municipalities with nearly one-third of its population lifetime migrants. Source: BPS, Sensus penduduk Lampung 2010, population five years of age and over by region and education attainment.

149 Prior to 1998, Lampung only had one local governor and most bupati and wakil were also non-locally born Javanese.177 From 1998 onwards, Lampung experienced a “localization” of its political offices, as did all Indonesian provinces. A review of Lampung’s walikotas and bupatis as of November 2010 shows that a locally-born Lampungese had been elected in seven of Lampung’s eleven regencies—a proportion that would be even higher if one were to include the two bupatis who had “become Lampungese”.178 This meant that Lampungese were elected in regencies where they represented less than 10% of the population, such as Tulangbawang. Yet, many of my respondents astutely point out that, in order for a Lampungese to be elected as bupati, he/she has to team up with a non-Lampungese, typically a Javanese, in order to “control the vote of the migrants”.179 Alternatively, in the four instances in which a non-Lampungese was elected bupati, a Lampungese was chosen as his deputy-vice. Local people are also increasingly absorbed into Lampung’s bureaucracy and civil service. Even though there is no space to fill in your “suku/ethnicity” on the civil service application,180 this does not mean that hiring in the civil service is blind to a candidate’s ethnicity and origins. Indeed, when a bupati is Lampungese, heads of office are rumoured to be mostly Lampungese. Today, thanks to co-ethnic favouritism and Lampungese “eagerness to be civil servants” (an eagerness that has often pushed Lampungese to sell their lands to pay for bribes to become civil servants181) many civil servants in Lampung are now Lampungese.182 Pro-Lampungese hiring policies are relatively new in the civil service, however. As a (migrant) professor who got hired at Universitas Lampung in the late 1980s recalls: There were three tests to be hired at Universitas Lampung: one in writing, one in teaching, and an interview with the rector. I remember that after the second test, there were no more Marga [communal Lampungese] names. A colleague of mine, he is Marga, but he did not mention his Marga, and he passed. So yeah, that’s interesting. Interview Anthropology Professor, Universitas Lampung, January 17th, 2011.

177 Interview with Anthropology Professor Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung January 17th, 2011; Professors Universitas Islamic Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 18th, 2011

178 More on this process in Chapter 5.3.3.

179 Interview with journalist, Lampung Post, Bandar Lampung, January 12th, 2011. A respondent reported a variant of this local/Javanese combination occurring under Suharto, saying that local Lampungese with Javanese wives are more likely to secure jobs in higher positions (interview Anthropology Professor Lampung University, Bandar Lampung, January 17, 2011). 180 Interview with Dean, Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 16th, 2011

181 Interview with Anthropology Professor, Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 17th, 2011.

182 Interview with journalists, Lampung Post, January 12th, 2011.

150

5.3.2 HIs and SoS conflict in Lampung As a prime target for transmigration and with a long history of spontaneous population movements, Lampung should have been a prime site for SoS conflict. But while conflicts pitting Lampungese against both transmigrants and spontaneous migrants have, on occasion, taken place, these are generally fewer and smaller in scale than those in Papua. Smaller—but nevertheless real—socio-economic and political HIs between migrants and locals explain why this is the case. Incidentally, HIs explain why most SoS conflicts emerge via land disputes, though some are also triggered by criminal elements. Socio-economic HIs between migrants and Lampungese exist, but they are relatively small. Migrants to Lampung are among the least educated of all migrants to Indonesia (see Table 5.2.7) and they also have little capital at their disposition. In the words of a Lampungese leader: “The migrants who come here, they are not investors, they don’t bring money and technology. They exploit the land, and do that very fast.”183 For the Lampungese interviewed, migrant-local socio-economic inequalities felt very real. Inequalities were most noted in education, as migrants in general were better educated than the local population (see Table 5.2.7). However, our analysis of spatial economic indicators fails to reveal a correlation between migration-populated regencies and greater economic development in Lampung. This level of analysis may be misleading in the case of Lampung, because migrants are not spatially concentrated in a handful of regencies as they are in Papua (i.e., Mimika, Kota Jayapura, Keerom, Kota Sorong, and Nabire) or Kepri (i.e., Batam), making it more difficult to speculate that the lack of regional economic inequalities means that there are no economic inequalities between migrants and Lampungese. Indeed, migrants tend to seize most of the (limited) non-agricultural jobs in non-urban settings, such as working in PTHIM, a rubber factory, or Bumeor, a cassava factory.184 Some of these disparities are derived from New Order policies that favoured transmigration sites over local villages including, for the instance, the building of facilities and infrastructure in close proximity to transmigrant villages.185 As spontaneous migrants also

183 Interview with leader Bunga Mayang, Bandar Lampung, January 20th, 2011.

184 Interview with leader Lampung Sai, Bandar Lampung, January 13th, 2011; interview with local village leaders, Menggala, January 19th, 2011.

185 Interview with Sociology Professor, Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 14th, 2011; interview with leader Lampung Sai, Bandar Lampung, January 13th, 2011; and interview with Professors, Islamic University of Lampung, January 18th, 2011.

151 relocated near transmigrant villages, this may explain why the education levels of second and third generation migrants remained higher than that of the locals, and why spontaneous migrants were more successful in finding factory jobs. Recent projects specifically designed to develop Lampungese villages, such as Anshori Djauzal’s ‘Empowerment of people-based economy in the old villages” or Tiuh Toho have started to address this issue.186 The most prominent source of migrant-local inequalities has been migrants’ (both spontaneous and organized) possession of highly prized land certificates, which explains why migration-related conflict is often associated with land conflict. Lampung’s native communities traditionally controlled the land through institutions called margas—informal administrative units based on the main Lampungese families—that decided on the use of land among other social functions. In the event that two households belonging to the same Lampungese family were separated by one kilometer, all land between the two houses would be considered ‘family’ land, even if it were technically unoccupied. The control of margas was severely challenged by the Dutch Domain Verklaren law that transformed any land that was shown not to have an owner into state land.187 Unable to hold onto their lands due to the lack of official documentation and uncertain land borders, many Lampungese resorted to selling their land to the Transmigration Office or private companies.188 Pressure to maintain social status by hosting buffalo feasts or bribing officials for positions as civil servants also prompted Lampungese to opt for quick and often lower-than-market price payoffs.189 According to the indigenous communities, lands sold to migrants could be reclaimed by the marga at any time, and migrants would have to vacate the land (Tajima 2004:11). Today, non-locals increasingly own marga/Lampungese lands, contributing to the prevalence of violent land disputes in Lampung between 1998 and 2010. According to the government, which also purchased vast tracts of lands from margas for its transmigration program, indigenous communities lost their claims to lands by accepting payments (see Noveria 2002). The absence of a sharing principle between farmers (who abide by traditional (adat) laws) and companies (that follow the laws of the State) adds to existing communal tensions (Saroso

186 Interview with leader Banga Mayang, Bandar Lampung, January 20th 2011; Interview with Professors, Islamic University of Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 18th, 2011; Jakarta Post 2002b.

187 Interview with Sociology Professor, Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 14th, 2011

188 Interview with leader Bunga Mayang, Bandar Lampung, January 20th, 2011.

189 Interview with Anthropology Professor, Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 17th, 2011

152 2002d). The situation has recently improved as the selling process has been clarified: all adult members of a family must now sign the contract, there must be a witness (e.g., the head of the kampong/village), and parties must sign a letter saying they understand land ownership principles (i.e., selling the land and all the plants/trees/resources on it).190 Still, there were 350 ongoing land disputes in Lampung in 2002 alone (Saroso 2002a), the second highest number of land disputes in Indonesia after Nusa Tenggara Timur.191 Conflict in Lampung is also geographically concentrated, with Tulangbawang/Tulangbawang Barat—the regencies with the second and third highest proportions of migrants—having the largest share of conflict.192 Despite experiencing a handful of protests in front of the governor’s office, Bandar Lampung has been relatively peaceful, as has Lampung Barat, the province with the largest proportion of Lampungese.193 As several respondents explained, land conflict routinely becomes tainted with SoS dynamics.194 During the New Order Era, Lampungese were forced to sell/lease their lands for less than market value to migrants or factories well connected to Suharto. Now that leases have expired and/or the state no longer represses dissent as it did during the Suharto era, locals are reclaiming their lands. Migrants, who now occupy the lands and possess the necessary certificates, resist and clashes ensue. In other cases, misunderstandings have taken place over the nature of the purchase; for instance, a Lampungese may believe that he has only sold his land, but not the jati trees/resources on it, to the migrant buyer. Alternatively, in some cases in which Lampungese lands were sold to factories, local people are now requesting a part of the factory’s profits. Refusing these terms, factories hire security personnel (typically Bantenese migrants) who then use force and terrorize locals. Such SoS conflicts have unravelled in Lampung Utara (Saroso 2002a) and in Tulangbawang between Bunga Mayang (Lampungese) and Sweet Indo Lampung

190 Interview with local village head, Pringsewu, January 16th, 2011; interview with migrant, Pringsewu, January 16th, 2011.

191 Interview with Sociology Professor, Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 14th, 2011

192 Interview with Sociology Professor, Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 14th, 2011; and interview with local Professor, Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 12th, 2011. Our review of the Jakarta Post from 1998-2010 confirmed this: 12/44 conflicts occurred in Tulangbawang/Tulangbawang Barat, 8/44 in Lampung Utara, 7/44 in Lampung Tengah, and 5/44 each in Lampung Selatan and Lampung Timur (data available from author upon request).

193 The fact that 73% of the land in Lampung Barat is a National Park, which cannot be cultivated or cleared, has clearly limited the region’s ability to serve as a target area for transmigrasi and translok (interview with local journalist, Bandar Lampung, January 12th, 2011).

194 Interview with leader Majelis Puyimbang Adat Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 11th, 2011 and Sociology Professor, Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 14th, 2011.

153 and PT Bangun Nusa Indah Lampung, two migrant-owned companies (Saroso 2002b, 2002c; Jakarta Post 2000b). Poor communities often use arson to protest against the acquisition of communal (marga) land by companies that may or may not have acted in accordance with Indonesian law. The November 2006 clash in Lampung Selatan between “old” transmigrants from Bali and Java and “recent” transmigrants from Aceh was also associated with unclear land titles (Saroso 2006). Finally, migration-related land conflict may also involve ‘Registers’, i.e., land classified by the State as national parks/forests, protecting it from clearing or cultivation. Conflicts erupted in late 2010 in Mesuji’s Register 45 as police officers tried to evict several hundred farmers, many of whom were spontaneous migrants, to keep the Registers unoccupied.195 The above examples demonstrate the complexities of land problems resulting from the number of players/actors involved, misunderstandings about the selling process, and the lack of accurate information on land ownership. These examples also illustrate how migration and inequalities between Lampungese and migrants play a critical role in many of Lampung’s land conflict dynamics. With greater access to land certificates and, in the case of spontaneous migrants, greater financial resources to purchase land, migrants often have the upper hand in land conflicts, solidifying socio-economic inequalities between migrants and locals. Additionally, the frequent siding of the police and private security forces with migrants and factory owners and the fact that security guards/police officers are often (Bantenese or Javanese) migrants themselves contribute to inequalities between migrants and locals and fuell local grievances, echoing Fearon and Laitin’s argument about the role of security forces in SoS conflict (2011). Land-related inequalities between migrants and locals have at times motivated violence targeting migrants, in particular, robberies and attacks against ‘better off’ spontaneous migrants, reminiscent of the situation in Qinghai (see Chapter 4.2.2). Many respondents offered the following step-by-step explanation of this type of violence: a Lampungese person steals something from a well-off Javanese person (e.g., a motorcycle, money, or livestock); the Javanese migrant kills or injures the Lampungese aggressor; the Lampungese community retaliates by attacking the Javanese village; inter-village clashes ensue. Interestingly, all such accounts positioned the Lampungese person as the initiator and the migrants as those mobilizing in defense, regardless of whether the events were related by a Lampungese person, a government official, or a migrant. These types of SoS clashes took place, for instance, in February 2000 in Lampung Tengah after a group of migrants living in Seputih Mataram village attacked a Terbanggi Besar

195 Interview with General Manager, Lampung Post, Bandar Lampung, January 12th, 2011

154 village in retaliation for robberies targeting migrant people (Jakarta Post 2000a). Instead of rectifying HIs between migrants and locals, such criminal attacks often contributed to Lampungese economic marginalization as the prevalence of robberies and arson targeting migrants and their properties limited the development of many Lampungese villages and markets. As a respondent pointed out, Lampungese villagers in Menggala have to go to the market in Unidua, a Javanese transmigrant area, to buy or sell their products, severely impeding profits. The Lampungese city of Gunung Sugih is also comparatively less developed than Bandar Jaya, a smaller Javanese area.196 Socio-economic inequalities between local Lampungese and migrants have also motivated the creation of several Lampungese socio-cultural and political organizations, and contributed to Lampungese minority consciousness and the rise of SoS discourses in political contests. I think in 5-6 years, [migration] will be a timebomb just like in East Indonesia, because the Lampungese feel a lot of social jealousy in regards to the economy and the land. It’s all about land ownership. One of the signs is that Lampung Sai exist: there is now a consciousness of Lampungese minority status. People say: “We are Lampungese, we live in our place, but we don’t have land anymore”. (Interview Pepadun/Lampungese leader, Bandar Lampung, January 15th, 2011)

Lampung Sai (Lampung Unity) is an organization created during the New Order. Its original socio-cultural objectives were to serve as an umbrella organization for all Lampungese and people who like Lampung, as opposed to MPAL or Majelist Punyumbang Adat Lampung, which has flaunted its political colours from the start and whose membership is restricted to Lampungese. Lampung Sai’s first political foray was its public support of Nurdin Muhayat for governor of Lampung in 1997. The appointment of Oemarsono, a Javanese candidate, by the central authorities deeply upset locals and led to months of anti-Javanese protests in Lampung (Saroso 2007). Since this first political attempt, Lampung Sai has played a key role in many local and provincial electoral races, including the elections of ZP, the current (Lampungese) governor (Saroso 2005b).197 Recent political debates and slogans in Lampung, including those of the current

196 Interview with Anthropology Professor, Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 17th, 2011.

197Other paguyuban or groups based on ethnic identity have also turned into electoral tools for political parties in hopes of garnering support for their candidates. For instance, the June 2005 elections in Bandar Lampung were declared the “most aggressive” in terms of mobilizing ethnic-based organizations, as the brunt of the competition took place between candidates backed by Paku Banten (the organization for Bantenese and Sundanese people comprising over 100,000 members and that was arguably behind the re-election of Oemarsono) and those backed by Lampung Sai, which also had well over 100,000 members (Saroso 2005a).

155 governor and his running mate, also clearly refer to candidates’ ethnicity (Lampungese vs. Javanese), place of origin (local/putra daerah or jurat asli vs. migrant/jurat pendatang), and source of grievances (e.g., land issues).198 Yet, given that Lampungese only represent 12% of the province’s total population, this strategy is only one of the tools to win elections. As was the case in Kepri, other factors such as money and clientelism are more important in explaining voting behaviours in Lampung.199 Still, the prevalence of other factors did not prevent non-local candidates from highlighting their identities/affiliations. For instance, Lukman, a Javanese candidate facing a Lampungese candidate in the 2005 elections in the city of Metro, relied on “Java issues” to get elected, capitalizing on the idea that Javanese workers lose out on promotions and political positions at the hands of Lampungese (Saroso 2005b). These examples suggest that the localization and ethnicization of politics is likely and successful where significant HIs exist. While Lampungese leaders are instrumental in transforming land grievances into a political SoS discourse, they are also particularly involved in solving or preventing isolated incidents (including migration-related incidents) from occurring or degenerating into full-fledged communal conflicts. Since Reformasi, “mawori”, or “Angkat Saudara” (i.e., adopting others as brothers and sisters) has been repeatedly used as tools of conflict resolution and conflict prevention. A mawori can be performed for 3 reasons: for marriage, to settle conflict, and to forge friendship. For marriage, a mawori is used to allow a non-Lampungese to marry a Lampungese. For conflict resolution, local leaders invite high-level government officials to a ceremony where both warring parties sit together, dine over a feast of buffalo, and swear over the Qu’ran to respect a peace agreement. A mawori may also be used for criminal activities as an alternative to police involvement. For friendship, a mawori occurs when Lampungese give non-locals a “Lampung name” to make them “one of their own”. Both parties then pledge to defend each other. Since 2008, all bupati and governors have been given a Lampung name to preserve Lampung culture and, arguably, to appeal to the putra daerah.200 Prior to that, Oemarsono, the Javanese governor

198 Interview with journalist, Bandar Lampung, January 12th, 2011. Whether or not this strategy works remains unproven, as no respondent admitted to voting for a candidate based on ethnicity.

199 Interview with leader Bunga Mayang, Bandar Lampung, January 20th, 2011; interview with Professors, Islamic University Lampung, January 18th, 2011. For a discussion on the precedence of clientelism over ethnicity in local politics in Indonesia, see Aspinall (2011). One respondent highlighted the ‘family dynasties’ in the Lampung political landscape. One of the sons of Lampung’s current governor (who is also the son of Lampung’s only other local governor) is the bupati of South Lampung, and another of his sons ran in 2011 to be Pringsewu’s bupati. Another Lampungese father and son combination is the bupati of Pesawaran and Tulangbawang (interview migrant poet, Bandar Lampung, January 13th, 2011).

200 Interview with leader Lampung Sai, Bandar Lampung, January 13th, 2011.

156 in office from 1998 to 2003, had been ‘Lampungized’ through a ceremony. Maworis have been instrumental in promoting inter-group interactions and decreasing group differences. As a prominent Lampungese figure explains: To be leader of Lampung, one must be putra daerah, but putra daerah does not only mean Lampungese. It is not easy to define who is Lampungese and who is not because of all the mawori that were conducted. You can be Lampungese through blood or ritual. So people may say they are Lampungese, but genetically, they may be Javanese. (Interview Lampung Sai leader, Bandar Lampung, January 13th, 2011)

Mawori also highlights the changing and relative nature of ‘nativism’. Thanks to this process, individuals who were not born in Lampung –and thus do not fulfil the basic requirement to be ‘locals’- are transformed into local people. Mawori also play a key role in preventing large-scale communal conflict and lessening the impact of putra daerah politics in Lampung.201 As the same respondent continues: There are still ethnic conflicts in Lampung, but the different villages who conduct a mawori now have village heads who are brothers, even if one if Javanese. One example is Nenmah Dati (a Javanese village) and Tanjung Ratu (a Lampungese village) in Central Lampung. Since they had a mawori, it solved the problem [of Javanese-Lampungese conflicts] (interview Lampung Sai leader, Bandar Lampung, January 13th, 2011).

Unlike in Papua, where SoS dynamics are clearly displayed in many violent incidents, SoS dynamics are more subdued in Lampung’s several small-scale conflicts. Economic disparities in land access are the main drivers of conflict, and these issues become intertwined with SoS rhetoric when it generates or intensifies migrants’ dominance over locals. For Lampungese, loss of land is not only a loss of revenue, but also a loss of pride. For a people for whom pride is so deeply ingrained philosophically, this is no small challenge. Socio-economic disparities between migrants and locals have, at times, resulted in violent criminal acts targeting ‘better off’ migrants, most of whom are spontaneous migrants. They have also resulted in a newly found minority consciousness in the Lampungese community, the creation of socio-cultural and political organizations for Lampungese, and in the pervasive use of SoS discourse in political contests in an effort to address those inequalities. Fortunately, a well-entrenched local mechanism of conflict resolution has prevented small land conflicts from turning into large, deadly conflicts pitting migrant against local communities.

201 Interviews with leader Majelis Punyimbang Adat Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 11th, 2011; interview with leader Lembaga Pengembangan Masyarakat Adat Lampung Abung, January 11th, 2011; Jakarta Post 2002a.

157

5.4 Conclusion In this chapter, I underscore the socio-economic and political inequalities between inter-provincial migrants from various ethnic groups and local minority groups in Kepri, Papua, and Lampung. Empirical evidence confirms the presence of multifaceted HIs between migrants and local populations in the three provinces investigated, though to varying degrees. I show that regions experiencing the largest socio-economic and political HIs are more likely to experience SoS conflicts. Despite some economic HIs resulting from migrants’ greater job inclusion in the private sector, local Malays are overall better educated than the other minority groups investigated, and are comparatively well integrated into Kepri’s regional political apparatus. As socio-economic and political HIs are relatively small and barely affect local elites, violent SoS conflict rarely takes place in Kepri. At the other end of the spectrum, with large socio- economic discrepancies coalescing with substantial differentials in political representation and inclusion in the civil service, the autonomous province of Papua represents a more fertile ground for migration-related conflict, as people at both ends of the labor hierarchy experience HIs and exclusion. Finally, Lampung is located somewhere between these two extremes, as it experiences some localized migration-related violence associated with group disparities in resource access, but those are usually peacefully resolved thanks to comparatively smaller political HIs between migrants and locals and the presence of well-established local mechanisms of conflict resolution. These cases confirm that a sudden surge in mass migration to a minority region does not automatically result in SoS conflict. The migration of a group that is socio-economically and/or politically dominant vis-à-vis the local population is a critical element in determining whether large-scale migration turns into a lethal process, as it solidifies group disparities. As local people feel increasingly alienated in their homeland as a result of the continuing flow of economically and politically dominant migrants, local leaders have tapped into ‘injustice frames’ that portrays migrants as exploiters of resources that are not theirs to take. Objective but also subjective socio- economic and political inequalities between migrants and locals magnified grievances and facilitated nativist mobilization against better-off migrants. Unlike in China, where nearly all of the dominant migrants are simultaneously part of the country’s dominant ethnicity (Han Chinese), dominant migrants in Indonesia come from a variety of ethnic groups including Javanese, Bataks, Balinese, Minang, BBM, and Madurese. In fact, whether or not the Javanese constitute Indonesia’s dominant ethnicity remains an object of contention. A number of scholars maintain that the Indonesian nation is conceived through a

158 Javanese imaginary, where political power rests largely with the Javanese elite and where Indonesia’s traditions are seen through a Javanese lens (see e.g., Guiness 1994; Widodo 1995). However, according to Pemberton (1994), this simplified idea of “Java” does not refer to an actual, essentialized, and objective Javanese culture: it represents an idealized and imagined notion of “Javanese” culture and practices. Regardless of one’s position on this debate, the fact remains that individuals who self-identify as “Javanese” dominated Indonesian political culture during the Suharto era, and arguably thereafter, despite being short of a demographic majority and representing only 40% of the country’s population. Javanese cultural hegemony and Javanisation—i.e., the extension of Javanese beliefs, values and modes of living into areas inhabited by non-Javanese cultural groups—have, in turn, shaped most policy decisions in accordance with Javanese sensibilities (Schiller and Martin-Schiller 1997). The dominance of an ethnically diverse country by one particular group was seen by some as internal colonialism (Errington 1997), and was especially contentious in regions like Papua that had little contact with the country’s core until recently. However, that the Javanese do not embody the State/central powers to the same extent as the Han Chinese may explain why Javanese migrants to Indonesia’s peripheries are not resented as much as Han Chinese migrants in China’s border regions. For instance, Papua’s and Kepri’s political arena, including civil servants, are typically dominated by people from Maluku and West Sumatra respectively, rather than from Java. The Indonesian cases also illustrate how migration-related grievances and conflicts are embedded in other forms of contestation, including sub-state nationalist/secessionist conflicts and resource conflicts. Like Xinjiang and Qinghai, Papua’s official incorporation into the Indonesian Republic is relatively recent, and has been heavily challenged by local elites. Uncertain to maintain local people’s loyalty, political leaders in Jakarta appointed non-locals to the top economic and political positions and throughout the civil service. Convinced that outsiders were seizing the political and economic controls of their region and that migrants were representatives and key beneficiaries of this process, local elites intensified their demands for Papua’s autonomy and secession. By doing so, they generated a vicious circle wherein migration to the secessionist region fuels local marginalization, which then fuels nationalist identity and agendas, which then impels the State to send more migrants to better tame the recalcitrant province. Provinces do not require large sub-state nationalist/secessionist movements to experience SoS conflict: the presence of small SoS conflicts in Lampung province dispels this notion. Instead, this chapter demonstrates how sub-state nationalist and SoS dynamics are often embedded in one another. Papua’s secessionist/sub-state nationalist movements colour the politics of migration in the

159 province, transforming civilians into genuine agents of the colonizing State according to native Papuans, while migration related grievances fuel sub-state nationalist/secessionist demands. If migration or secessionism can definitively exist without the other, their coincidence greatly magnify the possibility for SoS conflicts. The “high conflict” province of Papua also illustrates that resource exploitation is often intertwined with sub-state nationalism and secessionism. In a convincing political economy explanation of four secessionist conflicts (Aceh, Papua, Riau and Kalimantan) in Indonesia, Tadjoeddin (2011) argues that the management of natural resource rents by the central government was a key driver for secessionist sentiments in Indonesia. Local grievances originated from the belief that the wealth of these resource-rich regions was incommensurate with the general welfare of population, particularly for those who were locally born. Although these regions were rich in natural resources, they were poor in local technical expertise thanks to the population’s comparatively low education levels. As better educated migrants accompany the exploitation of mines or the removal of forests, either as owners of companies exploiting natural resources or as workers or security guards hired by such companies, they are identified by locals as agents of the state with whom they have longstanding grievances. Migrants flow into these regions while railways, trucks, and pipelines transport natural resources out, thereby contributing to the deterioration of regional lands and resources and fuelling local grievances. But on its own, natural resource exploitation is not sufficient to result in conflict: it promotes violence only when an appropriate collective action frame exists—i.e., when nationalist political entrepreneurs transform unfocused resentments about natural resources into grievances that mandate violence. The combination of extensive natural resource exploitation with local grievances due to marginalization and the wider secessionist context make natural resource extraction so contentious. As Aspinall explains, It is important to think of grievances about natural resources not so much as pristine starting points of conflict, divorced from the wider systems of meaning in which they are embedded, but arenas in which wider contestations over identity and belonging are played out (2007:968-9).

The same can be said of grievances about migration, which are also arenas in which wider contestations about identity, belonging, and resource distribution are played out. Resource degradation following extensive mining has left Papuans scrambling for livelihoods, whereas land deterioration pits Lampungese against Balinese and Javanese migrants. In the latter instance, the changing relative inter-group position between locals and migrants (i.e.,

160 the fact that a migrant group suddenly surpasses the local group in the unofficial ethnic hierarchy) appears to matter more than widening inter-group HIs, though the two are probably related. Indeed, Lampungese used to consider themselves economically (and morally) superior to migrant groups. This is no longer the case, in part given migrants’ exploitation of local resources that negatively affect local livelihoods. Strong economic HIs between migrants and locals are the object of much local resentment, group tensions, and conflict in Papua—a region heavily dependent on its secondary sector. There have been some attempts at improving economic opportunities for locals following the exploitation of ‘their’ natural resources, but those policies remain few and far between.202 To this day, when resource exploitation takes place near high- density minority settlements like Mimika in Papua, locals often experience a decline in economic opportunities, and SoS conflict is likely to occur in those regencies or near the site of extraction. The last two chapters explore sub-national variations in SoS conflict in China and Indonesia. However, as our assessment of China illustrates, it is not sufficient that locals resent migrants’ advantageous socio-economic and political position for SoS conflicts to take place. Favorable institutional factors must be present for locals to organize and mobilize against mass inter-provincial migration. Besides, as my interviews reveal, SoS conflicts have recently become more common in both China and Indonesia. What accounts for variations in SoS conflict over time in Indonesia or China? Chapter Six presents a cross-country examination and explores the role of political regime and political liberalization in governing migratory flows and the tendency of locals to mobilize or resist migrants in authoritarian China and democratizing Indonesia. I show that, despite their different political regimes, China and Indonesia are more alike than meet the eyes when it comes to SoS conflict. The presence of a national discourse condoning –if not encouraging- inter-provincial migration, along with (unofficial or official) State support for some migrants largely deter local mobilization against migration.

202 As shown by Tadjoeddin, the four resource-rich provinces have recorded the highest incremental increases in their local government revenue due to fiscal decentralization, which took effect in January 2001 (2011:327).

CHAPTER SIX: THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS ON MIGRATION AND SOS CONFLICTS IN CHINA AND INDONESIA

As the last two chapters demonstrate, disparities in political representation and job opportunities between migrants and locals are key in explaining why violent SoS conflict occurs in some minority regions but not in others. Yet, differences between groups are not entirely intrinsic; they are constantly created or recreated by exogenous factors such as elections or the implementation of economic policies that shift previously established mechanisms of resource distribution from migrants to natives, or vice versa. Even when migration-related tensions and grievances exist, local people do not always act on them and mobilize against migration. A favorable political context is necessary for migration-related tensions to transform into SoS conflicts.

Chapter Six explores the two-sided impact of institutional factors on migration and SoS conflicts in authoritarian China and democratizing Indonesia. I show that political regimes and political liberalization, two state-level variables, influence SoS conflict as they affect both the broader context within which migration takes place and the very HIs at the core of SoS conflicts. In authoritarian China, the state’s repressive powers, its control over the media, and its generally positive stance towards internal migration have stifled anti-migration mobilization and limited SoS incidents. However, small windows of political liberalization have occasionally given locals the opportunity to mobilize and display their dissatisfaction with internal migration, especially vis-à-vis non-hukou migrants who, though with a socio-economic advantage over local populations, do not benefit from the protection of the State. In Indonesia, the political overhaul of the late 1990s mitigated State repression, facilitated local mobilization against migration, and disrupted previously established mechanisms of resource distribution by shifting the balance of power between migrants and locals in favour of the latter. As a result, the period immediately following the introduction of democratic reforms was ripe with SoS conflicts targeting dominant migrants who came outside of State migration projects and whose ethnic or religious identity differs from that of the local population.

6.1 Institutional factors, migration, and SoS conflict in China States with extended political authority and capacity have always been more successful at moving people—sometimes against their will—than less powerful states. With limited room for debate, control over the media, and full access to extensive financial and material resources, authoritarian states like the PRC are particularly well positioned to use organized population movements to

162 163 promote their national interests and to limit sympathy for and participation in anti-migration movements.203 It would be difficult to imagine relocating 1.3 million people over a mere 17 years, as the Chinese state did in the Three Gorge Relocation Project (Wee 2012), in a more democratic setting that allows for the expression of dissenting opinions. Since the Reform Era, organized or forced population movements and other explicit use of population movements for political or social objectives have diminished due to the greater liberalization occurring in China. The Chinese state has lost many of the repressive tools it has used to forcefully relocate migrants over long distances (Liu 1991; Chan 1999), just as it has lost the ability to control and/or restrict spontaneous migration (Fan 2005). Though China is still far from being considered ‘democratic’ or even democratizing, any lessening of its control or power has contributed to increased population movements throughout the country. During the Cultural Revolution, when formal State power was arguably low, many people without hukou were able to move into Inner Mongolia.204 As the hukou system was relaxed and state repression lessened in the 1980s, people who had previously been coerced into relocating to border regions were able to move back to their home province with relative impunity. In 1980 alone, 124,151 people moved out of Qinghai, contributing to its first negative net migratory rate since 1952 (Qinghai Statistical Yearbook 2011: 77). Inner Mongolia also experienced negative net migration after 1979 (Inner Mongolia Statistical Yearbook 2009: 101). Programs of economic liberalization later remedied this out-migration by generating new waves of inter-provincial and inter-county spontaneous migrants throughout the country. In total, spontaneous migrants increased nearly fourfold between 1990 and 2000, from 22.4 million to 86.3 million (Sun and Fan 2011). Another indication that spontaneous, non-hukou migration has augmented since the late 1980s is that the total provincial population at year-end is no longer the same as the household registered population. In Qinghai, for instance, the gap between the two numbers reached between 300,000 to 400,000 people in the early 2000s (Qinghai provincial population statistics 2008). If a state’s political regime affects population movements, then a natural extension of this argument is that it also influences migrant-local conflicts. The overwhelming majority of local respondents in Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang indicate their unhappiness, disagreement,

203 Besides China, several non-democratic regimes have also, at one point or another, used settlements and internal migration into minority regions to meet social, economic, and political goals. These include, among others: 19th century Germany (McGarry 1998), the former USSR (Martin 2001), Sri Lanka (Kearney and Miller 1987), and Suharto’s Indonesia (Hoey 2003).

204 Interview with Professor, Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot, August 16, 2011.

164 and concerns over inter-provincial migration to their region. In the provinces surveyed, there is a general feeling that migration has “grown” into an issue in the last decades. Before the 1950s, local people had “allowed” poor Han and Hui migrants to move and work for them on their lands.205 As Han migrants’ numbers continued to rise with the implementation of State relocation programs, local people slowly started to grasp the extent of the ongoing demographic transformation.206 Excluded from political offices and various economic opportunities, resentment and grievances vis-à-vis migrants grew. Yet, local discontent rarely resulted in attacks towards migrants. When SoS conflicts arise in China, they are usually isolated, small-scale disputes concentrated in a handful of prefectures. A brief review of Chinese and émigré newspapers reveals that recent conflicts in Xinjiang were almost entirely concentrated in Hotan and Kashgar prefectures (Bovingdon 2010). In Qinghai, the prefectures of Huangnan and Yushu reported the highest instances of migration-related conflict, both based on my interviews and according to Radio Free Asia (Finley 2012). Finally, in Inner Mongolia, Xilinguole was by far the most tumultuous prefecture and the site of the most recent migrant-related incident where the death of a local herdsman by a Han migrant coal truck driver triggered weeks of local upheavals in the spring of 2011. In the three Chinese provinces, SoS conflict can most accurately be characterized as pogroms or small riots involving 5-10 locals targeting migrants and their properties. The few instances and the isolated, small-scale nature of SoS conflicts in the country can be attributed to China’s authoritarian regime. The heavy-handedness of the state when it comes to public expression of dissent, especially in secessionist minority regions, makes the potential cost of public dissidence particularly high. Several Tibetan and Uyghur respondents claim that they could not voice their dislike of migration or else they would be sent to prison for life or risk the death penalty.207 When visiting Xinjiang in June 2009, a Uyghur man approached us as we were walking in a park in Kuqa. He started to say something, then pointed to a man who was approaching, said “cadre” and quickly left. Close monitoring of minorities by plain-clothes officials, uniformed patrols, and CCTV cameras is cited as a factor impeding participant recruitment in several other minorities studies in China (HRW 2009; HRIC 2007). Earlier attempts at criticizing Chinese policies in minority regions—all of which are brutally repressed—also serve

205 Interview with researcher, Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot, August 27th, 2011; interview with local Tibetan, Xining, June 26th, 2011

206 Interview with local Mongol, Hohhot, August 20th, 2011; interview with local teacher, Xinggan, August 24th, 2011.

207 Interview with local Tibetan, Xining, June 23rd, 2011; personal conversation with Uyghurs, June 2009.

165 as a strong deterrent. The violent repression and purge that went on, unpunished, in Inner Mongolia during the Cultural Revolution that killed between 16,222 and 100,000, and injured and/or resulted in jail sentences for several hundreds of thousands (Jankowiak 1988; Bilik 1998; Han 2011) has a powerful deterring effect for Mongol people. In Qinghai, several respondents recalled with distress the 2008 protest in Tongren that pitted local Tibetans against Han police officers, ending with several arrests and disappearances. The protest resulted in the injection of several thousand new soldiers to the small military station outside of the city, the prohibition of gathering or dancing in public spaces, and the close monitoring of Internet cafes. Finally, following the clash of July 2009, a swift Chinese government crackdown on Uyghur organizations brought thousands of military forces to Xinjiang, instituted the world’s longest-running Internet blackout, and shut down other communication networks, stymieing Uyghur mobilization. In all of these instances, particular attention was given to preventing the message of protesters from spreading (to other Uyghurs/Tibetans/Mongols) abroad, and to other minority groups in China. Protest leaders were prevented from travelling to other areas of the country, and calls for collective actions were quickly suppressed (Schiavenza 2013; Becquelin 2011). While in Beijing from July to August 2009, I was unable to access Twitter or Facebook and YouTube access was unreliable. Fanfou.com, the Chinese version of Twitter, offered no results when searching keywords like ‘Xinjiang’ or ‘Urumqi’. On other Chinese news sites such as sina.com, sohu.com, or 163.com, an official version of the incident in Xinjiang was posted, but Internet users were prevented from leaving comments (Hogg 2009). The strict monitoring of Xinjiang’s communication networks was made obvious by the sentencing of four Uyghurs—three web managers and a journalist—accused of endangering state security after closed trials in July 2010 (Jacobs 2010). Discussions of separatism or any other topic that “undermines national unity, incites ethnic separatism or harms social stability” were banned in a 2009 bill passed by the Xinjiang’s standing committee (AFP 2009). Tight media control and high levels of State repression rendered local mobilization against migration especially difficult. As the message cannot spread quickly, most migration-related clashes in China are very localized, typically occurring within one SUMU/township (Yuniarto 2006: 22-23). Even if an anti-migration demonstration were to take place, it would probably not be reported in the state-owned media, as censorship of sensitive topics such as “non-harmonious” group relations is prevalent. A journalist at Qinghai’s Tibetan television channel revealed, for instance, that coverage of monks, even of their non-religious or controversial works (e.g. self-

166 immolation or protest participation) is not allowed.208 Instead, barrages of uplifting slogans and posters are displayed at busy traffic points, praising China’s happy kaleidoscope of 56 ethnicities (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1 Street poster of Xinjiang’s ethnic groups

Photo credit: author (Urumqi, May 2009) Losely translated, this poster reads: “We should enforce the integration of different minzu. We need to keep our country united. We want to have a harmonious place”.

If the PRC’s repressive regime along with its control of the media limited locals’ ability to mobilize against migrants, so did the central government’s discourse on internal migration. In China, migrants are seen as an integral part of the country’s economic development and as engines of local economic growth. In the past, Party leaders have emphasized the glory of “rusticates’” (migrants’) actions, awarding them medals, hosting morale-boosting parties for families during the spring festival (White 1979: 493-502), and stressing the critical role of migrants in countering Soviet design in the region (Bovingdon 2004). In minority regions, the ‘advanced position’ of the Han Chinese and their civilizing or developing mission have been especially highlighted. Government officials continue to rely on the political legitimization of resettlement used during the Maoist period while arguing in favour of more incoming Han migrants (Hansen 1999:35). Blinded by the development potential of Han resettlement in minority regions, Chinese authorities vigorously deny charges that Han migration threatens indigenous cultures in minority regions. Following unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet in the late 2000s, officials from the State Ethnic Affairs Commission declared, “There is no such thing as problems being created by Han migration to

208 Interview with local Tibetan, Xining, June 23rd, 2011.

167 Tibet or other minority regions” (AFP 2009). So long as migration is juxtaposed with provincial economic growth, the central government sees no reason to stop the mass influx of inter-provincial migrants to minority regions. But not all migrants are positively portrayed in State discourses. China’s ‘floating population’ (i.e., non-hukou migrants) is often depicted in unflattering terms, as untrained/unskilled, uncivilized, with little knowledge of local laws and hygiene, and as potential criminals (see Ping 2003:12).209 As a result, local attitudes towards internal migration in China vary tremendously based on whether migrants are part of one of the state’s organized programs (i.e. ‘zhibian’ migrants, most of whom are also hukou migrants) or have moved of their own volition (‘yimin’ or non-hukou migrants). Recent non-hukou migrants are those most targeted in the few SoS conflicts occurring in Chinese minority provinces. The majority of these incidents represent small “attacks of opportunity” by a handful of individuals rather than large organized group actions. For instance, non-hukou migrants who moved to Qinghai in the wake of the 2010 Yushu earthquake are often victims of attacks against their person, their homes, and their properties by local thieves. As Han migrants seldom retaliate or report these attacks to local authorities, such attacks continue unpunished.210 Conflicts between local Tibetans and Hui spontaneous migrants have also been reported in Qinghai, many triggered by the (re)building of Mosques without Tibetan/local approval or over the theft of motorcycles. Such attacks are perpetrated by young Tibetans vowing to “kick Hui out of [their] lands”, resulting in the destruction of several Hui properties.211 The decision to target spontaneous Han/Hui migrants rather than all internal migrants is highly pragmatic: to criticize and attack organized/hukou migrants would be more politically suspect given the role of the State in organizing these movements and the constant praise organized migrants have received over the years in official discourses. How much State support migrants have affects whether they are victims of local SoS attacks. Whether migrants are capable of retaliation is another connected factor explaining the selection of SoS targets. Indeed, examples of internal migrants rebelling or mobilizing against local communities are highly uncommon. Migrants’ lack of involvement in civil wars and ethnic conflict is attributed to their greater

209 A similar prejudice against spontaneous migrants exists in Indonesia, as reflected by a group of respondents stating the (unfounded) claim that “99% of Riau’s prison populations are migrants” (Interviews with local Malays, December 2, 2010).

210 Interview with local Tibetan teacher, June 27, 2011.

211 Interview with local Tibetan, Xining, June 24th, 2011.

168 mobility, lack of a (rural) geographic base, and strong cross-borders networks (Laitin 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2011); all of which limit their ability to mobilize. Their relative “peacefulness” in SoS conflicts has been corroborated in all my research locations and was even acknowledged by the local population. But as I demonstrated elsewhere, migrants who are members of a country’s dominant ethnicity have the necessary resources and opportunities to mobilize against the local population given their close connection to and protection from the State (Côté 2011). For these reasons, incidents involving state-organized (Han) migrants—e.g., members of bingtuan, state officials, etc.—are almost unheard of in Inner Mongolia and Qinghai. The situation differs in Xinjiang, where its sub-nationalist movement makes Han migrants appear to be State agents and, thus, potential targets of SoS attacks. The fact that control over internal migration falls squarely under the authority of the Chinese central government also restricts locals’ ability to voice their dissatisfaction with migration. Provincial authorities have little influence when it comes to limiting population movements. There are reports that local authorities in coastal provinces occasionally pay the return fares for (minority) migrants after they clash with the local population, but local governments in minority regions do not appear to have the option of turning migrants away.212 Instead, local attempts at curbing Han migration to minority regions are quickly denounced as anti-socialist, manifestations of local nationalism, or worse, as “national splittism” (Bulag 2002: 214). If they cannot stop Han migration, provincial and local authorities may encourage migration to their region, as the Secretary of Inner Mongolia did when he introduced new economic policies that explicitly favoured inter-provincial migration.213 This places local politicians in a difficult position. On one hand, capital inflows have been shown to accompany Chinese population movements. For instance, a study conducted by local scholars at the Institute of Mongolian Studies, Inner Mongolia University, shows that the GDP of four Mongol banners grew rapidly from 1988 to 2009 following the development of mineral deposits by extracting companies employing migrant workers (Inner Mongolia University 2009). As the central government evaluates local governments based on their GDP growth,214 encouraging inter-provincial migration boosts a province’s standing and the credentials of ambitious local politicians.215

212 Interview with official, Chinese Commission of Ethnic Affairs, September 3, 2011.

213 Interview with local Mongol, Hohhot, August 28th, 2011.

214 Interview with Retired Professor, Inner Mongolia Academy of Social Science, Hohhot, August 18th, 2011.

215 Interview with Professor, Minzu University, Beijing, September 8, 2011.

169 However, as local people rarely support migration-friendly policies given that they heighten group competition, such policies oftentimes end up generating strong local opposition. The influence of institutional factors is also at play in the recent increase in “mass incidents”, particularly Han-minorities and migration-related conflict, in China since 1978. In 2010 alone, China saw 180,000 protests, riots, or ‘mass incidents’,216 up from the 2004 Ministry of Public Security estimates of 74,000 “mass incidents” and 87,000 “public order disturbances” (HRIC 2007: notes 10 and 263). Although resentment of State policies started long before this time, political and military repression kept the voicing of opposition in check (Bovingdon 2004b: 143). The timid liberalizing policies initiated during the Reform Era represented a turning point in China. Culturally, China’s minzu were encouraged to practice their religions and speak their languages. The relaxation of the hukou system introduced in 1984 facilitated the movements of non-hukou people towards minority regions and urban areas. Finally, Deng Xiaoping’s economic liberalization policies and his greater restraint in relying on the military for matters of domestic security represented a clear break from the turbulent and highly repressive years of the Cultural Revolution, slowly opening spaces for public dissent. Local people were occasionally able to use these small windows of liberalization to contest the presence of inter-provincial migrants in their homelands, as illustrated by the light-handedness of the government vis-à-vis the “last hurrah” of the Mongol people (Jankowiak 1988). In 1980-1, non-hukou migrants to Xilingol in Inner Mongolia were deported to their hometowns following a provincial decree.217 The central government countered this local decree by issuing Article No.28 that essentially promoted Han migration to Inner Mongolia as a contributor to development. The decree sparked a 50-day gathering of nearly 3,000 people in the capital, Hohhot, demanding a stop to Han immigration.218 Though their demands were not met, the regional government showed “notable patience and unusual restraint” towards this first instance of minority and Mongol mobilization in PRC’s history (Jankowiak 1988: 282). In 1979, protests initiated by Han migrants who, after being dispatched to the borders during the Cultural Revolution, found out that their residence permits had been permanently transferred to Xinjiang, were similarly met with

216 A euphemism used by officials for protests, riots, and petitions involving more than 100 people and resulting in “serious consequences” (Orlik 2011). How many of these incidents occurred in minority regions is unknown.

217 Interview with Professor, Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot, August 16th, 2011.

218A research project spearheaded by Indonesian scholars claims that the number gathered was much higher, at 100,000 people (Yuniarto 2006: 23).

170 unanticipated leniency. Despite this massive defiance of the central authorities, Beijing drew up a schedule to respond to most of the demands in due course (see Millward 2004:7; Bovingdon 2004: 23-5). However, protests are not always tolerated in China, as there are substantial provincial variations in state repression. The Chinese State has notoriously been firmer with minority groups possessing strong, mobilized diaspora than with smaller, less mobilized minority groups. In less volatile southwestern China, minority ethnic cultures have not only been tolerated, they have been promoted for tourism and economic development (see Oakes 2000; McCarthy 2004). In contrast, migration-related protests occurring in minority provinces with a strong secessionist movement like Xinjiang and the Tibetan regions have traditionally been quickly suppressed. The Campaign to Strike Severely at Serious Criminal Offence (‘Strike Hard’ for short), instituted in 1996 following a wave of protests in Xinjiang, includes harsh controls on religious activity, restrictions on movement, denial of passports, use of torture to extract confessions, and the detention of individuals suspected of supporting separatists and members of their families (Dillon 2009b; Starr 2004: 15). In a visit to Kuqa’s old Uyghur neighbourhood, I noticed door signs on several houses stating “This is a peaceful family, nobody in this family did something illegal” (see Figure 6.2). The government granted these signs to deserving households, but could take them away were any members of the household suspected to support the “three forces of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism”. Recently, the events of 9/11 have allowed the Chinese state to connect dissenting groups to the global war on (Islamic) terrorism, which has, in turn, justified crackdowns in Xinjiang in the eyes of the international community and garnered international support for such actions (Gladney 2004: 250-252).

Figure 6.2 “State loyalty sign” in Kuqa’s Uyghur neighbourhood

171

Photo credit: author (Kuqa June 2009)

The Chinese state’s discourse and control over the migratory process, its lack of interest in curbing the flows of migrants from Inner China, and the provincial government’s complicity in the relocation processes make local people feel increasingly helpless in controlling or stopping migratory movements. Given the risks of state repression, locals who dislike migration refrain from expressing their discontent aloud for fear of severe punishment. In Qinghai, local educated people have been most critical of migration while people with lower education “fail to grasp the danger of migration and just accept it rather than fight”.219 As mentioned by a retired Tibetan hydroelectrician: Locals dislike migrants in their heart, but they have no right to say so. It’s our land, but in a few years, it will be Chinese. Of course, that creates a lot of tension, but we keep it inside. We have no right to say anything about it or we will go to prison. (interview with Tibetan pensioner, Tongren, June 28th, 2011)

Another Tibetan respondent agrees: There is no conflict as we don’t have the right to say anything about it. We keep it inside, in our heart. In daily life, there are lots of thieves from Inner China. They steal thangkas, statues and other religious goods. Local people think they come here to take our resources. We think our land is a treasure, so we dislike them [migrants], but only in our heart. (interview with local Tibetan, Tongren, June 28th, 2011)

Locals’ helplessness vis-à-vis migration has even pushed some to resort to criminal acts against migrants. Indeed, according to a Tibetan teacher in Yushu:

219 Interview with local Tibetan, Xining, June 23rd, 2011.

172 Locals don’t like migrants, they don’t want them to be living there, but they cannot change anything. If they beat up migrants or destroy their properties, nothing good will come out of it. It will only increase the price of goods. (interview with Tibetan teacher, Tongren, June 27th, 2011)

The situation is similar in Inner Mongolia, where locals’ inability to control internal migration was once again highlighted. According to a Professor in Minority Economics at the Inner Mongolia Normal University: “I don’t want to use the word “interactions” between locals and migrants because the relationship is truly unilateral. Mongols have to accept accept accept, they have no other choice”.220 Herders were most vocal in their critics of migration, given its depleting impact on natural resources.221 Recently, some of those critiques have been co-opted by local leaders advocating for migration restrictions in the two aforementioned regions. However, instead of highlighting the negative political and economic consequences of migration for the receiving regions, critics have increasingly played the environmental degradation card—an ironic turn of events given China’s poor environmental record. This anti-migration discourse based on an ecological argument has grown in frontier regions, as the fragile ecosystems of the Mongolian grasslands and the water-starved regions of Inner China are particularly sensitive to changes in population pressures.222 Unrestricted Han migration to these regions was blamed for deforestation, irrigation problems, and sandification, among other things, all of which hamper regional economic development.223 Whether combining environmental and economic arguments will prove useful in curtailing migratory movements in these regions remains to be seen. This section highlights the curvilinear relationship between China’s repressive authoritarian system and anti-migration mobilization in the country. The CCP’s use of extreme repression until the late 1970s was matched by an apparent vacuum of SoS mobilization in the country. The recent increase in Han-local conflicts in China since 1978 is attributed to political transformations, more specifically to timid liberalizing tendencies in regards to state repression, population control, and economic development that provide small opportunities for local

220 Interview with Professor, Inner Mongolia Normal University, Hohhot, August 16, 2011.

221 Interview with researcher Inner Mongolia University, August 27th, 2011.

222 Interview with Professor Minzu University, Beijing, August 9th, 2011.

223 Interview with researcher, Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot, August 27th, 2011. Goodman also mentioned that, starting in 1986, migration regulations have been introduced in Qinghai in recognition of the dangers of trying to populate an environment that cannot sustain influxes of population. Personal communication with author, January 2013.

173 mobilization, most notably against non-hukou migrants. From the local population’s perspective, nativist violence has been one of the few available –though highly risky- measures to gain some control over migration as attacks on Han migrants were expected to reduce their numbers. Despite these political transformations, the country clearly remains authoritarian: the central government continues to oversee population movements and very little public dissent vis-à-vis migration is tolerated, especially in regions with a strong secessionist movement. Even if China’s political control and repression were to loosen, the presence of a larger discourse on migration that condones migration for national and local developmental purposes would severely limit the extent to which people could protest migration to their homelands by discriminating against migrants.

6.2. Institutional factors, migration, and SoS conflicts in Indonesia The Indonesian government organized large-scale population movements both as an authoritarian (1945-1998) and a democratic State (1998-today). Even when it had authoritarian tools at its disposal to organize population movements—e.g., limited room for debate, control over the media, and access to extensive financial resources—relocating large numbers of people was challenging. The Indonesian transmigration office faced continuous difficulties in meeting relocation targets and only during Repelita III (1979-1984) did it successfully do so (Fearnside 1997: 555). Reports of difficult living conditions in transmigration sites, along with the state’s occasional failure to provide suitable land and housing dissuaded potential migrants from relocating. The Central Kalimantan Mega Project is a case in point. Launched in 1995, this 1 million hectare peat land project swallowed an estimated US $500 million but was cancelled as peat forests were stripped, drained, and rendered unusable, creating ideal conditions for forest fires and bringing disaster for the local Dayak inhabitants and transmigrants alike (Adhiati and Bobsien 2001). After the introduction of democratic reforms in 1998, the Indonesian government faced even greater hurdles in organizing large-scale population movements. Its decentralized political system meant that it neither had sufficient financial resources to fully fund the relocation of potential migrants nor the necessary power to force migrants to relocate against their will. For these reasons, post-Suharto Indonesia opted to indirectly influence population movements, not by forcefully moving people to a new location, but by providing them with added socio-economic benefits were they to decide to relocate. For instance, several Indonesian respondents who relocated voluntarily in the last few decades indicated that the low price of land and access to better education and health care for their children were key factors in their decision to relocate

174 near a transmigration site.224 This new ‘hands off’ approach to internal migration gives post- Suharto Indonesia much less control over migration than had the Suharto administration. Today, democratizing Indonesia struggles to keep track of spontaneous migrants, as it is unable to anticipate how many people will relocate or where they will choose to go. Until 2000, the Javanese urban areas of Jakarta and Banten had attracted the most migrants, but in 2010 the province of Kepulauan Riau in Sumatra had the highest number of in-migrants (BPS Indonesia 2000, 2010). The scale of organized population movements decreased following the introduction of democratizing reforms in Indonesia in the late 1990s. Two years after the fall of Suharto, Indonesia’s transmigration program was halted. The office still exists, but it mainly caters to the needs of people who have previously relocated rather than recruiting new migrants. It also shifted its focus from agriculture to urbanization. The new Transmigration Act #29/2009 sets as its main goal the dispersion of economic strength throughout the archipelago, something that can allegedly be achieved through the creation of new urban areas or ‘growth poles’ (KTM—Kota Terpadu Mandiri or integrated independent city, also called KPB—Kotawasan Prepotan Baru or new urban areas in the newest act). Unlike previous transmigration sites that “neglected the original community” and merely “took the local people and moved them to the new settlement—i.e. ‘community development exitu’”, the new paradigm ensures that all areas surrounding the transmigration locations develop. This way, the new act “disperses the strength of the nation throughout the country, while reducing social jealousy and inter-regional discrepancies”.225 Indonesia’s political regime and its recent political liberalization have thus influenced both the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors at the core of migratory processes. By extension, we can expect that the deep-seated political liberalization Indonesia has undergone since 1998—and here, political liberalization is broadly defined as including direct local elections, decentralization, local autonomy, and pemekaran (the divisions of existing regions into further administrative units)— to impact locals’ tendency to mobilize and resist migrants or to target them and their possessions. Indeed, the Reform period in Indonesia coincided with a surge of conflict across the archipelago. SoS conflicts were reported in several Indonesian provinces, including Papua (McGibbons 2004; Upton 2009; Widjojo 2010); Central and West Kalimantan (Djalal 2001; Loveband and Young 2006); Maluku (Human Rights Watch 1999; Cohen 2000); Central Sulawesi (Rhodes 2001; Acciaioli 2001; Aragon 2001); North Maluku (Smith 2000); Lampung (Saroso and Susanto,

224 Interview with migrants, Duri, December 7th, 2010.

225 Interview with Director, Ministry of Transmigration, Jakarta, February 1st 2011.

175 2012); Riau (Hardjono, 2009); and North Sulawesi (Noveria 2002). They covered both extremes of the spectrum: from isolated, small-scale incidents involving a handful of locals and migrants to large-scale riots shaking an entire province and ultimately resulting in its splitting into two (i.e., North Maluku and Maluku). Qualitative evidence obtained from interviews in Jakarta, Riau, Lampung, and Kepulauan Riau indicates that domestic conflicts in general and SoS conflict in particular have become more frequent in Indonesia since the late 1990s.226 One of the few existing databases on violent collective conflicts in Indonesia corroborates this finding, reporting only ten incidents with no fatalities in 1990 versus 722 incidents and 2,585 casualties in 2000 (Varshney et al. 2004: 21-23). Although SoS conflicts were not explicitly surveyed in this database, the increase in resource-based conflict (i.e., economic conflicts) and identity-based conflict (i.e., ethnic and religious conflicts), both included in our general conceptualization of migration-related conflict, are good indicators that they have probably increased as well. Even when SoS conflicts did not materialize, migration-related tensions often resulted in local mobilization and demonstrations against internal migration in a number of provinces. In Madura, local Madurese resented and protested against the relocation, albeit temporary, of their fellow Madurese who had been internally displaced from conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan (Smith 2005). Papuans called on their local government to issue a special ordinance on employment and population controls to limit in-migration (Somba 2009), and protests over migration also spread to the newest Indonesian province of Kepulauan Riau. With an estimated 4,000 unregistered migrants arriving every day in Batam (Jakarta Post 2001c), the province became the first and, to this day, sole region where provincial authorities have actively tried to curtain migration from other islands of Indonesia. Bylaw No. 02/2001, which took effect in the fall of 2001, intended to limit internal migration by verifying migrants’ documents (e.g., police certificates of good behaviour, letters of sponsorship/job offers from a company in Batam, or Batam identification) on the ferry bringing them to Kepri, or risk penalties of 5 million Indonesian Rupiah and six months in jail (Jakarta Post 2001c). As the Chairman of the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA), and future Governor of Kepri, explained, the Bill did not aim to “close” the island but rather to “control it for the benefit of the people”, adding that the Chinese government had done the same with the special economic zone of Shenzhen (Yuliandini 2001). The bill had some initial success in reducing migration, but enforcing the decree resulted in

226 This is not to say that the Old and New Orders were peaceful, as evidence shows that they were not (Varshney et al. 2004: 24-25).

176 confusion and controversy and led to attacks on Batam’s population office by youth from all over Indonesia who wanted to revoke the bill, citing Chapter 27 of the 1945 Constitution guaranteeing freedom to travel in the country (Fadli 2002b; Fadli 2009). Many respondents attributed this increase in local anti-migration mobilization and SoS conflicts to the fall of Suharto’s regime and the lifting of repressive measures that had prevented expressions of communal dissatisfaction until then. To borrow Van Klinken’s expression, the “structure of opportunities and threats” changed radically on May 21st, 1998, the day Suharto resigned (2005:89). The threats of the military and the Mobile Brigade diminished and greater freedom of expression and freedom of the press provided opportunities for people to voice their anger or discontent with government policies. The press could finally report on dissenting opinions, “sensitive” topics, and popular demonstrations, including those against migration programs. Public discussion of issues surrounding SARA—Suku, Agama, Ras, and Antargolongan, or ethnicity, religion, race, and group relations—that were banned during the Suharto administration given their sensitivity were suddenly covered by the media and studied by local scholars.227 These political transformations created a “euphoria of democracy, of openness”228 that facilitated local mobilization and the expression of dissent towards state policies. Yet, one should not exaggerate the role of repression and freedom of expression, as SoS conflicts did not occur everywhere once repression was lifted or once democratic rights were granted. SoS conflicts were not “waiting to happen” in Indonesia, as several provinces with substantial migrant populations (e.g., Kepri, North and West Sumatra, Bengkulu, East Kalimantan, among others) have remained largely peaceful following the lifting of Suharto’s repression. Still, the most important impact of political liberalization on SoS conflict was its impact on the HIs undergirding the conflicts. Until 1998, migrants—most of whom are Javanese and Sundanese—held most positions of economic and political power in minority regions across Indonesia (see Chapter Five). Clause 33(j) of the Democratic Transition Law No.22/1999 essentially transferred power from migrants to the local population by explicitly stating that office holders should “know and be known” by local people (i.e., putra daerah clause). As shown in Chapter Five, this clause contributed to the rise of locally-born people occupying positions of

227 Communication with local scholars, LIPI, Jakarta, October 22, 2010.

228 Interview with Tri Nuke, Jakarta, February 5, 2011.

177 local political power over the entire archipelago.229 The putra daerah clause also facilitated locals’ inclusion in the public sector, as they benefited from unwritten policies of local hiring. In Lampung for instance, if a bupati was Lampungese, the heads of offices were likely to be Lampungese as well.230 But this informal policy did not apply to the more lucrative jobs in the private sector. In Riau, only 2.5% of Chevron’s and 9% of RAPP’s workforce were local Malay.231 A RAPP officer justified the company’s recruitment policies by saying: If a migrant and a local person have the same competency, then the company will prioritize the local person. However, the company will not fire existing employees just because they aren’t local people. The context of the Republic of Indonesia should take precedence over local particularities (Interview with Director RAPP, Pekanbaru, December 4th, 2010).

Despite these limits, the newfound precedence of Lampung/Riau/Papua locals in job competition and political contests corrected the previous political system’s pro-migrants biases, thereby effectively changing the balance of power between putra daerah and migrants in minority regions. Once greater rewards were endowed to ‘natives’ and SoS, the boundaries between migrants and locals were strengthened and such identities became politicized. As a Professor in Economics at Riau Universitas Islam Melayu explained:

In Indonesia, local politics are affected by central politics. As regards to migration, the distinction between locals and migrants become a political commodity that has the potential to be used to get power. In the past, such as 1970s elections, the divisions took place between Islamic and non-Islamic party, and Islamic and non-Islamic figure. Now the trend is different. A study I conducted in 2006 showed that nowadays, people don’t care about whether a candidate is an Islamic candidate. They want to know if a candidate is local or not. This has a lot of traction in politics now. (interview with Professor, Riau State Islamic University, Pekanbaru, December 1st, 2010)

This new political lingo ensconced in the “locality” would not have been adopted by local political candidates had it not resonated with the local people. Over the years, state redistribution policies have solidified group distinctions between locals and migrants. Inter-provincial migrants —especially Javanese transmigrants—were largely seen as the beneficiaries of socio-economic development programs in the receiving regions, which include land titles, housing, and food

229 Interestingly, this politicization of ethnicity and ‘Sons of the Soil’ discourse is completely absent on Java Island—barring Banten—perhaps because the Javanese are the undisputed majority or dominant ethnic group there.

230 Interview with second-generation migrant, Pringsewu, January 16th, 2011; interview with Professors, Islamic University Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 18th, 2011.

231 Interview with Malay leader, Pekanbaru, November 30th, 2010.

178 subsidies. In addition, state facilities and roads were built closest to transmigration villages, essentially discriminating against non-transmigrant villages.232 Since the late 1970s, transmigration sites have also included local transmigrants—i.e., intra-provincial transmigrants from a different district. Since local transmigrants have also benefited from the same socio- economic benefits as other transmigrants (and denied to the local population), place of birth came to matter more than ethnic group in access and entitlement to socio-economic resources. Residing alongside local communities, spontaneous migrants are an even greater source of tension than transmigrants who live in separate settlements. According to local people, economic competition is tilted in the spontaneous migrants’ favour because of “insider information”, as recruitment takes place in the migrants’ provinces of origin. The area of Muka Kuning in Batam embodies this phenomenon, as nearly all of its 100,000 workers are migrants recruited by the employment departments of their provinces of origin.233 The fact that company managers, who are usually migrants themselves, prefer to hire workers from their own region is also a source of tension in local communities. Local people complained about these situations, claiming that migrant villages benefited most from state development programs and that migrants had an unfair advantage when competing with local people over scarce socio-economic resources, for they had moved “with the state on their side”.234 With the implicit or explicit support of the State, scholars expected local populations to be particularly resentful of Javanese transmigrants.235 An extensive 1989 study of inter-provincial migration to Lampung concluded that tensions were most likely to arise “between traditional societies and great projects (i.e., transmigration projects) imposed from outside by an authority over which the local system has no power” (Pain and Benoit 1989: 393). Tensions existing between local people and transmigrants prior to 1998 were kept from erupting, as “they were part of a nation-wide government policy and as such, the local communities had no choice but to apply these policies and facilitate the integration of transmigrants”.236 Were Suharto’s

232 Interview with Professors, Islamic University of Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 18th, 2011; interview with Lampung leader, Bandar Lampung, January 15th, 2011.

233 Interview with local NGO, Batam, December 13th, 2010.

234 Interview with Malay leader, Pekanbaru, November 30, 2010.

235 Interview with Mita Noveria, Jakarta, January 7, 2011.

236 Interview with local NGO, Jakarta, January 30th, 2011.

179 Indonesia to lose some of its authoritarian powers, critics of organized migration schemes expected conflicts to emerge between local people and transmigrants. This overly negative assessment of both transmigration and Javanese migration is challenged by empirical evidence. Generally, since 1998, violence has taken place in urban areas and transmigrants are, as a group, largely absent from such fighting.237 My interviews in Indonesia corroborate the absence of conflict between transmigrants and locals outside of a few selected provinces such as Lampung and Flores. In these provinces, the agricultural sector—and thus, proof of land ownership, one of the few advantages of transmigrants over local populations—was particularly important. Spontaneous migrants are most vulnerable to SoS conflict, given that they do not enjoy the same implicit protection from the State as transmigrants. Falling under the authority of the Local Transmigration Office, transmigrants are required to follow certain official guidelines. However, spontaneous migrants largely operate under the radar, between the cracks of the system. As one local Lampungese summarized, governing issues are rendered more complex with spontaneous migrants, as they think “it is Indonesia, it is my country. I can do anything I want with the land”.238 Besides, years of planning and scores of studies were conducted in order to find the most appropriate locations for transmigration sites, to educate migrants, and to explicitly gear resources towards development,239 whereas less/no planning went into spontaneous migration, leading to the relocation of migrants to forbidden areas such as National Parks and Reserves in Riau and Lampung. When a (real or imagined) edge in access to and distribution of economic goods coincides with different religious identities, sub-groups of spontaneous migrants are particularly likely to be targeted in SoS conflicts. For instance, in Riau most of the targeted migrants are (Christian) Batak traders and farmers from North Sumatra. Their presumed ability to quickly amass wealth and obtain land certificates have been a cause of social jealousy and concern for local people who feel Bataks do not contribute to the long-term development of the province, sending remittances and residual incomes and moving back “home” once their good fortune is over. Many local respondents also claimed that the government, local police, and law officers side in favour of the migrant population because of their financial status.240 The widespread employment of Bataks as

237 Interview with Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, Jakarta, January 5, 2011.

238 Interview with former leader Lampung Sai, Bandar Lampung, January 13th, 2011.

239 Interview with officials Transmigration Office, Jakarta, February 1st, 2011. Naturally, this should not come to mean that transmigration always occurred smoothly. 240 Interview with local Malays, Pekanbaru, December 2nd, 2010.

180 security guards by large oil companies failed to soothe local resentment, as they became the face of such companies when conflict arose with locals over land use or the exploitation of natural resources.241 This happened, for instance, in Riau, where Sakai indigenous people, despite having been granted official ownership of their lands since 1940, suffered continual intimidation at the hands of (typically Batak) security personnel of PT Arara Abadi, a pulp and paper company (Jakarta Post 2008). Migrants’ lack of cultural adaption, sometimes due to their different religious customs, have also been the cause of small-scale conflicts between Bataks and local Malays, such as that occurring over the sale of alcohol in lapos or vending stalls over the Ramadhan.242 As a result, group disputes that had initially little to do with migration, ethnicity, and religion per se became intertwined with these identities as conflict unfolded. Horizontal inequalities intertwined with the cultural distance between migrants and locals also explains why several of Lampung’s SoS conflicts target the Balinese transmigrants who were relocated to Lampung Tengah and Lampung Selatan following the eruption of Mount Agung in 1963.243 Lampung is a particularly poor province: the majority of its population is involved in agriculture (BPS Lampung 2009) and the province had one of the lowest GRPs and GRPs/capita in Indonesia in 2008 (BPS Lampung 2009: 132-4). However, unlike elsewhere in Indonesia, migrants who relocated to Lampung were also quite poor and with little education (see Chapter 5.3). In this context, farmers who were part of the transmigration scheme were on a similar socio- economic footing as the (equally) poor local farmers. More so than other transmigrant groups, Balinese were said to possess a “strong attitude with regards to the ownership of the land”.244 They started buying their co-villagers’ lands at a premium price, which resulted in the creation of Balinese-only villages (Jong 2012b). With their piece of land intact, they had relative success in

241 Despite constituting less than 4% of the provincial population (BPS Riau 2000), Bataks represented nearly 20% of Chevron’s labour force (interview with Malay leader, Pekanbaru, November 30th, 2010). An RAPP official justified this presumed ethnic bias by mentioning that most employees of RAPP used to be employees of Indorayen (now called Toba Pulp Lestaru), which operated in North Tapanuli (North Sumatra) (interview with director RAPP, Pekanbaru, December 4th, 2010).

242 Interview with Director RAPP, December 4th, 2010. Respondents often mentioned that “migrants have to adapt to the new environment/live here, not just work here/keep their old ways”. Similar protests also took place in Bengkalis where vigilante mobs torched the Chinese-owned shops and buildings that rioters believed to be associated with gambling and prostitution (Jakarta Post 2001b). It is well know that Chinese Indonesians have often been the targets of collective violence in Indonesia (see e.g., Purdey 2006).

243 According to Indonesian Parishada Hindu Council (PHDI), Balinese unofficially migrated to Lampung well before the volcanic eruption (Jong 2012a).

244 Interview with Lampungese leader, Bandar Lampung, January 20th, 2011.

181 farming and appeared better off than local people, thus stirring jealousy. The presence of “cultural irritants”—e.g., the construction of Hindu pura (temples) and the wearing of “revealing” traditional clothing by Balinese transmigrants—added to the tension and explained why Balinese but not necessarily Javanese transmigrants were targeted. A few years ago, violence between Lampungese and Balinese transmigrants claimed 14 lives and forced hundreds to evacuate from Lampung after four Balinese youths were accused of harassing local girls and failing to respect local customs (Saroso and Susanto, 2012). Pangikhan Naga Bringsang, a respected local Lampung leader, suggested that the recent conflict between Balinese and Lampungese villages may evolve into a wider clash. “We as natives of Lampung won’t stand still and let our brothers fight a battle alone” (Jong 2012b). A local teaching called pi’il, a philosophy that places great emphasis on ethnic pride and self-esteem, also motivated local involvement in the clash according to Pangikhan.245 A village chief involved in the attack agreed with this portrayal of the situation, claiming that the attack also involved people from from surrounding villages who were “bonded by a similar birthright [and] fed up with the Balinese” (Jong 2012b). This latest chapter of recurring violence led to native residents asking for the expulsion of all Balinese descendants out of the district, “possibly to Kalimantan Island or South Sumatra province” (Saroso and Susanto, 2012). Compared to the people of Sumatra (including Malays and Lampungese) who are culturally more similar to the people of the core islands (i.e., Java, Madura, Bali), the lifestyle and local customs of Eastern Indonesian people shock Javanese migrants. Cultural differences are often amplified by the appalling portrayal of Papuans by Indonesian elites and media outlets. Papuans are routinely depicted as “Papua bodoh—stupid Papuans; backwards Papuans, especially highlanders; ungrateful Papuans, treacherous wild terrorist and ‘secessionist’ Papuans… aliens in a word” (King 2004:33). Indonesian political leaders often contribute to the problem by propagating such negative perceptions. As stated in a 2006 Jakarta Post editorial: “There is a common tendency in this country, particularly among the political elite and the decision makers, to treat Papuans as uneducated and stupid, simple tribespeople who are ungrateful for the services provided by the government” (Jakarta Post 2006). Finally, migrants to Papua also perpetrate the negative stereotypes of Papuans by telling their families back home about the “hot temper” of Papuans whose “high incidence of HIV/AIDS is due to them having

245 For more on this philosophy, see footnote 174.

182 sex in the woods”.246 Such negative representations affect group interactions in Papua: migrants see few reasons to integrate/respect the “backward” culture of the host region, whereas indigenous Papuans resent migrants for denigrating the culture of the group that is “hosting” them.

Overall, the introduction of local direct elections in Indonesia affected the balance of power between migrants and locals in different, though mutually reinforcing, ways. On one hand, democratic reforms promoted the inclusion and representation of locals/putra daerah in both the political and economic realms. The end of the repressive Suharto era also facilitated large-scale local mobilizations against migration that at times became full-blown conflicts targeting (mostly spontaneous) migrants who were culturally distant from the local populations. On the other hand, Indonesia’s new democratic setting also meant that the continuous flow of inter-provincial migrants to minority regions could potentially be translated into additional political power for migrants were they to be elected. Given the availability of a discourse promoting the selection of putra daerah candidates and the prospects of migrants regaining their former political ascendancy, local candidates were able to tap into these fears of demographic decline and economic and political marginalization and transform them into a polarizing political discourse pitting the ‘haves’ (migrants) against the ‘have nots’ (locals). Gubernatorial candidates in Kepri, for instance, were able to capitalize on the momentum provided by the anti-migration bill to pitch a vision of Kepri as a “home/motherland” for Malays, despite representing only 35.6% of the provincial population. Recent political debates and slogans in Lampung, including public statements by the current governor and his running mate, have also clearly referred to candidates’ ethnicity (e.g., Lampungese vs. Javanese), place of origin (e.g., local/putra daerah or jurat asli vs. migrant/jurat pendatang), and sources of grievance (e.g., land issues).247 This is not to say that “locality” was necessarily the decisive factor in voters’ minds. In fact, according to a Kompas survey (Kompas February 14th, 2005), most Indonesian voters regard a candidate’s education (83%) and leadership experience (85%) as the most important factors in casting their votes in elections of local government heads, with “locality” being comparatively less important (45%). Although putra daerah politics had considerable traction in the years immediately following the demise of Suharto as one of the mechanisms rectifying the abuses of

246 This story was reported to me by my local assistant who had a family member working as a teacher in Papua for some time. 247 Interview with journalist, Bandar Lampung, January 12th, 2011

183 a system that largely favoured migrant candidates,248 voters are more pragmatic today, basing their vote on what a candidate can bring them, be it the ability to go for Hajj, monetary rewards, or food.249 Nevertheless, the fact that candidates still feel the need to pander to voters’ identities and origins speaks to the continuous power of putra daerah politics in Indonesia. Aside from the introduction of direct local elections, decentralization, local autonomy, and pemekaran significantly altered the previous balance of power between groups at the national and local levels. Following the implementation of democratic transition law No. 22/1999 and regional autonomy measures in 2001, regencies and cities have become key administrative units responsible for providing government services. The decentralization law No. 25/1999 (and its revisions in 2004) resulted in a greater share of the income derived from natural resources remaining in the regencies and cities. Seven years after the 2001 economic decentralization laws were passed, local government revenues were, on average, ten times greater than prior to decentralization (Tadjoeddin 2011: 328). Suddenly endowed with greater political and economic spoils, local political positions of power have become hotly contested. Competition over political and economic spoils also resulted in the parceling of the country into increasingly smaller administrative units. According to a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Science, competition over natural resources in the context of local autonomy and decentralization explains 90% of the cases of pemerakan.250 From a staunchly unitary country that initially consisted of 11 provinces (and made claims over West New Guinea/Irian Jaya) (see Figure 6.3), there were, as of February 2014, 34 provinces including 5 with autonomous arrangements (see Figure 6.4). Political parceling also occurred at lower administrative levels, as the province of Lampung illustrates. Until 1996, Lampung consisted of three kabupaten and one kota (see Figure 6.5). Six additional kabupaten were created during otonomi daerah (see Figure 6.6), followed by four more in November 2008, and one more in October 2012. While these changes were designed to strengthen public service, the fact that the boundaries of the new political units largely match those of Lampung Margas—i.e., traditional families—has made people believe that it was instead a tactic employed by Lampungese political candidates to garner the support of their co-ethnics, to reinforce Marga (ethnic) identity, and create “little

248 Interview with leader, Bunga Mayang, Bandar Lampung, January 20th, 2011.

249 Interview with Professors, Islamic University Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 18th, 2011

250 Interview with Tri Nuke, Jakarta, February 5, 2011.

184 kingdoms”.251

Figure 6.3 Map of Indonesia (1950-1955)

From Robert Cribb, Digital Atlas of Indonesian History (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), reproduced with permission

Figure 6.4 Map of Indonesia (2007)

From Robert Cribb, Digital Atlas of Indonesian History (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), reproduced with permission

Figure 6.5 Lampung administrative units (1999)

251 Interview with Sociology Professor, Bandar Lampung University, Bandar Lampung, January 17, 2011.

185

From Robert Cribb, Digital Atlas of Indonesian History (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), reproduced with permission

Figure 6.6 Lampung administrative units (2007)

From Robert Cribb, Digital Atlas of Indonesian History (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), reproduced with permission

These steps towards political liberalization—i.e., direct local elections, decentralization,

186 otonomi daerah, and pemekaran—facilitated local mobilization against migrants and contributed to the proliferation of SoS conflict in Indonesia, as they affected the previously established balance of power in minority regions. Yet, SoS conflicts do not erupt everywhere, nor are they daily occurrences in Indonesia. A noteworthy restricting factor is the national discourse on migration and citizenship. For the contemporary Indonesian government, all 500 ethnic groups are citizens of Indonesia, equal under the law. No one group can make territorial or indigenous claims over the lands, as Indonesia’s territory, stretching from “Sabang (Aceh) to Merauke (Papua)”, belongs to all Indonesians.252 Increased mobility, mixed marriages, and economic activities have made indigenous groups’ claims of exclusivity over a particular territory appear irrelevant (Suryodiningrat 2005). Besides, Indonesian citizens who moved through organized transmigration programs or spontaneously are considered, both by the state and by themselves, as key agents of development and legitimate occupants of the space, with the same rights as non- migrants. The scores of youths who, in 2002, ransacked the population control office in Batam and staged a demonstration demanding the lifting of the bylaw, cited Chapter 27 of the Constitution that guarantees Indonesians freedom to travel in the country. The argument that the bylaw “violated human rights” since “Batam residents are not banned from entering other areas of the country” was also cited by business people who had a harder time recruiting workers from outside Kepri (Fadli 2009). A byproduct of this national discourse on migration is that, even in today’s increasingly democratic context, critiques of both organized and spontaneous migration to minority areas are largely considered “unconstitutional”.253 These critiques may be heard in private conversations in warung kopi or coffee shops, gossiping on walkie-talkies, or on social media, but they remain muted.254 In Kepri, where migrants are often blamed for high crime rates and frequent ethnic riots,255 local people have been known to ask the provincial government to deport “troublemakers” and erect banners to show their support for Batam’s migration ban (Fadli 2002b). Some public

252 This expression was repeated ad nauseam, by nearly all migrants and government officials, though not by the local population.

253 Interview with Professor, Riau State Islamic University, Pekanbaru, December 1, 2010. In contrast, critiques of rural to urban migration have started to emerge in the national media (see Jakarta Post 2007).

254 Interview with local Malay, Duri, December 8th, 2010; interview with Sociology Professor, Universitas Lampung, Bandar Lampung, January 14th, 2011.

255 The most violent collective conflicts taking place in Kepri occurred in July 1999 and February 2002 and involved competition over the control of transportation routes and parking lots by two migrant communities: Batak and Flores (see Jakarta Post 1999a, 1999b; Fadli 2002a).

187 figures in Riau have expressed the widely heard claim that “migrants need to live here and not just work here”.256 Upon hearing this threat, migrants routinely retorted that, were the local people not welcome them, they would all leave the region, leaving Kepri and Kepri people bankrupt.257 However, apart from Kepri, no local government has successfully implemented anti-migration policies. More often than not, local anti-migration sentiments are expressed implicitly within the putra daerah discourse and demands for affirmative action/local hiring in multinational companies. The request of the Congress of Riau that 40% of the workforce in the private sector be local258 and the 2000 regulation that civil servants speak Lampungese on Friday represent two such implicit critiques of inter-provincial migration. It is unsurprising that the Indonesian state has continued to treat migration as unproblematic, despite evidence pointing to growing tensions in all regions investigated. As one of my respondents indicates, “The situation in Riau [between migrants and locals] is analog to a dry leaf which will be burned when there is fire. It should thus be kept on guard”.259 At the individual level, inter-provincial migration was not expected to cause problems. Since migrants were moving from Indonesia to Indonesia, no cultural adaption was anticipated on behalf of the migrants. Unsurprisingly, an unwillingness to adapt to the local culture raised the ire of the local indigenous populations. Despite local government regulations strengthening local customs in architecture, dress, ceremonies, etc., migrants were said to “keep their original culture in their hearts”260 rather than to “respect the local cultural where [they] lived”. A discussion between three local Malays is revealing in this respect: A: - In Riau, there are the native people and the migrants. The migrants were born here, grew up here, and even their fathers were born in Riau, but they will not say that they are Riau people.

D: -Later, when they have positions in the government, their heart won’t be there, because they were never taught that they were Riau people. […]

A: - If they considered themselves Riau people, they would take care of this place. To these people, I say: you should respect the culture and habit of the place where you live. (interview with local Malays, Pekanbaru, December 2nd, 2010).

256 Interview with local Malay, Pekanbaru, November 30th, 2010.

257 Interview with local NGO, Batam, December 13, 2010.

258 Interview with leader, Lembaga Adat Melayu Riau, Pekanbaru, December 1st, 2010.

259 Interview with Professor, State Islamic University, Pekanbaru, December 1st, 2010. 260 Interview with member, Lembaga Adat Melayu Riau, Pekanbaru, December 4th, 2010.

188

Instances of migrants learning the local language (e.g., Malay, Lampungese) were few and far between, and bahasa Indonesia, the national language, is now the most commonly spoken language in Riau and Lampung. Though not a direct cause of migration-related conflicts, migrants’ lack of integration into local cultures was an additional offense to local people whose pride had already been assailed by migrants’ greater economic success. Once combined with noticeable socio-economic and political inequalities, it swiftly added fuel to the fire. To conclude, the democratic transition Indonesia has embarked upon since 1998 has significantly affected population movements within the archipelago and local populations’ stance vis-à-vis migrants. The lessening of State repression and greater freedom of expression facilitated local mobilization against migration, which resulted in an increase in open SoS conflicts when migrants were presumed to have an economic or political edge over local populations. More important still is how democratic reforms disrupted the balance of power and the mechanisms of resource distribution between migrants and locals that were established during the Suharto era. Policies favoring local people/putra daerah in political contests and job opportunities, decentralization, and pemerakan have shifted power away from migrants and towards locals, effectively lessening the HIs at the core of SoS conflict. Though it is too early to tell, it is possible that the salience of putra daerah discourse in the late 1990s to early 2000s and the recent escalation of SoS conflicts are the unfortunate outcome of turmoil immediately following the end of the New Order (see Aspinall 2011). SoS conflicts may subside as new mechanisms for resource distribution emerge and Indonesian democracy consolidates, but this outcome is uncertain. Besides, the Indonesian constitution’s recognition that all ethnic groups are “indigenous” (asli or pribumi) to Indonesia261—regardless of whether they are indigenous to their current place of residence—limits locals’ ability to resist inter-provincial migration. Still, migration-related tensions should not be expected to completely abate anytime soon. Indeed, Aspinall concedes that, “where awareness of indigenous status has become politicized and overlaid with a sense of grievances about encroachments by migrants and with a sense of political entitlement”, ethnic politics, an identity politics in general, are likely to be more lasting and consequential (see Aspinall 2011: 310).

6.3 Conclusion

261 With the exception of foreign nationals and Chinese Indonesians (see Bertrand 2004: 59-71).

189

The greater political context has a significant bearing on migration in general and on local mobilization against internal migration in particular. In this chapter, I demonstrate that the impact of migration in minority regions in China and Indonesia is mitigated by those countries’ respective political regimes and transformations of State power. The repressive nature of the authoritarian Chinese state does not allow much space for an anti-migration discourse, nor does it allow anti- migration demonstrations or the public expression of such sentiments. For these reasons, instances of SoS conflict are relatively rare and concentrated in a handful of provinces. Where SoS conflicts do occur, they typically target the most vulnerable non-hukou migrants. In contrast, Indonesia has limited democratic space in which people can explicitly (through anti-migration demonstrations and attacks on migrants’ properties) or implicitly (through demands for affirmative action) express their discontent with inter-provincial migration. For this reason, SoS conflicts are comparatively more frequent and target spontaneous migrants with a presumed advantage over local people and with a different religious or ethnic identity. But China and Indonesia are more alike than meets the eye. Both countries experienced a rise in indigenous consciousness following the large influx of inter-provincial migrants to its far- flung minority regions. Interactions with migrants made local people deeply aware of their cultural and socio-economic differences, and the fact that such encounters occurred on “their [deteriorating] turf” solidified their expectations that they, as the host communities, should benefit the most from population movements rather than the migrants themselves. In addition, in both cases, the State’s construction of migration makes it nearly impossible to admit that migration could negatively affect the receiving communities. Both countries possess a national discourse that makes migration an integral part of the State’s developmental project and portrays migrants (many of whom belong to the largest ethnic group in the country) as the legitimate owners and developers of all national lands—a position that contrasts sharply with indigenous discourses stressing local people’s ownership of regional lands and resources. Such a discourse also explains why, in both countries, SoS conflict typically targets the same sub-group of migrants: that is, spontaneous migrants without state protection. Even if the State were to acknowledge a potential negative impact, it could hardly halt spontaneous and/or organized internal migratory movements given that it relies so extensively on them to level regional inequalities, develop the “margins,” and secure national borders. Ironically, states’ reliance on migrants as the ultimate economic equalizers bringing growth to less-developed minority regions could not have been more misguided, for migration often had the opposite effect of swelling group disparities and fuelling

190 SoS conflict (see Côté 2014). States’ inability to, and lack of interest in, making a credible commitment to restrict all future migration also explains why SoS conflicts last longer than other types of conflicts (Fearon and Laitin 2011: 208) and why they continuously emerge in new places and over time.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

Since the start of this research project, inter-provincial migration to Asian minority regions have remained highly contentious; yet, they only resulted in widespread violent outbursts against migrants and their properties in some of the cases reviewed. In Indonesia, large-scale SoS conflicts continue to plague Papua while smaller clashes between locals and dominant migrants happen elsewhere in the archipelago, notably in Lampung. In China, resentment towards better- off Han migrants continues to build, and recent attacks on Han civilians are part of a larger response to ethnic relations in southern Xinjiang and in southern Qinghai. According to a staff member of Maralbeshi county government in an interview by Radio Free Asia: “It’s all about migration problems. Many Uyghurs have lost their farmland and most of the farmland is controlled by the Chinese immigrants. Whenever they hear about immigrants, the locals get irritated. This is the situation” (Lipes 2010b).

The “situation” is indeed complex, for it encompasses a wide array of issues, from indigeneity, homeland and Sons of the Soil, to group inequalities, sub-state nationalism, and resource distribution. Discussions among locals pertaining to internal and inter-provincial migrants are often coloured by the aforementioned contexts; migrants are judged on the basis of their perceived impact on the local community rather than treated and/or appreciated on their own merits as individuals. For these reasons, internal migration in Xinjiang and in the other minority regions investigated in this study is more contentious than the central government and migrants themselves suggest, and is likely to remain a source of tension for years to come. Empirical evidence suggests that we should not expect a drop in the number of migrants seeking better opportunities outside of their area of residence any time soon. As states increasingly lose their ability to organize large population movements, the overwhelming majority of future migrants will likely be spontaneous migrants seeking better opportunities for themselves and their families. Considering that such migrants are particularly vulnerable to SoS attacks given their lack of state protection, this does not bode well for minority regions hosting increasingly large migrant populations. Yet, large-scale internal migration does not always result in violent SoS conflict. Were that the case, every locality in China and Indonesia would explode in violence given that they all experience some degree of internal population movements. Even if one focuses solely on migration to minority regions—i.e., a type of migration that combines ‘traditional’ migration motivators of social progress and political stability with matters of national security and resource

191 192 control—large-scale migration neither automatically nor directly leads to SoS conflict. For every case of mass migration that resulted in open conflict, there are counterexamples wherein a reasonable degree of group harmony has been achieved. Under what conditions does internal migration lead to SoS conflicts?

Using quantitative and qualitative methods, I dispel the notion that clashes between indigenous populations and migrants automatically arise from large-scale inter-provincial migration to minority regions. Building on the literature on dominant ethnicity and HIs and relying on a qualitative sub-state analysis of three Chinese (Xinjiang, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia) and three Indonesian (Papua, Kepri, Lampung) minority regions, I argue that multi-faceted and mutually reinforcing HIs between migrants and locals belonging to different ethnic groups is a key condition explaining why some minority regions erupt in SoS conflicts while others remain relatively quiet. Chapters Four and Five provide the corroborating empirical evidence. Whenever there are large, consistent HIs between migrants and locals over competition for economic resources and political representation, tensions and conflict are likely to erupt over migration. The specific type of inequality most relevant to a particular case depends on a society’s political system and the nature of its economy. In sub-state nationalist regions like Papua, Xinjiang, and, to a lesser degree, Qinghai, large political HIs most affect the propensity for SoS conflict. In regions well-endowed with natural resources such as Inner Mongolia, economic HIs over the control of such resources is the most important source of group tension and conflict. However, it is the coalescing of various mutually-reinforcing HIs simultaneously that render the situation most explosive. For instance, economic disparities between migrants and locals that did not coincide with differentials in political representation generate few SoS conflicts in Inner Mongolia and Kepri. When economic disparities are present alongside group discrepancies in education and political inclusion, they provide a fertile ground for SoS conflict, as the examples of Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Papua illustrate. Besides, when HIs and exclusion are experienced both at the lower end of the labour hierarchy (e.g., through land deterioration or lack of employment alternatives) and for local elites (e.g., through barriers to joining the civil service), large-scale group tensions are most likely to transform into SoS conflict, as in the cases of Xinjiang and Papua. When those who migrate are “dominant migrants” who derive their socio-economic and political advantages vis-à-vis locals from state support, their belonging to the dominant ethnic group, and natural proclivities, migration-related tensions and conflicts become all the more likely

193 as they generate or magnify group disparities between migrants and locals. This distinction between the migration of “dominant migrants” and that of any other socio-economic or ethnic group has, until now, eluded scholarly migration discussions. Unlike most migration literature, which portrays migrants as poor and marginalized people, migrants to minority regions often enjoy greater political inclusion, cultural recognition, and greater access to economic and social resources than the local people. In China, Han Chinese migrants whose dominance is evident in the socio-economic and political realms are most resented given their connection to China’s dominant ethnicity and the Chinese State. While a source of tension, the connection of Han Chinese to the state apparatus has nevertheless protected them from attacks by disgruntled locals who fear the State’s retaliatory power. To a lesser degree, Hui Chinese migrants also fit the “dominant migrants” category, as they have closer ties to the CCP and better access to well- developed economic networks than the local populations. However, their lack of state protection leaves them most vulnerable to SoS attacks. In Indonesia, dominant migrants are also a key source of SoS tension and conflicts. Their higher education level, better political representation, and greater access to economic resources (e.g., land titles, jobs, etc.) solidify their socio-economic advantages while fuelling local grievances. However, unlike China, “dominant migrants” in Indonesia’s minority regions come from a wider range of ethnic groups, including Javanese (Indonesia’s dominant ethnicity), Bataks, Balinese, Madurese, Minang, and BBM.

The concept of “nativism” is always relative, as the example of inter-provincial migrants being “Lampungized” and essentially becoming “locals” illustrates. Moreover, the local ethnic group sometimes considers migrants who relocated to Chinese and Indonesian minority regions in the 19th and early 20th centuries to be “native”. Yet, if those “older” migrants eventually gain an unfair advantage over the local ethnic group when it comes to resource access and distribution, chances are they will suddenly be relegated to the “migrant” category. The plasticity of the concept makes it attractive for political entrepreneurs in rapidly changing situations in which the “other” is constantly another group, as was the case in Indonesia at the turn of the century. This suggests a cognitive view of SoS conflict, where the objective reality and its perception are equally important in determining the future course of action.

Differences between groups are not entirely intrinsic and are constantly created or recreated by exogenous factors such as elections and the implementation of new economic policies that shift the previously agreed upon distribution of resources from migrants to natives, or vice versa. Chapter Six illustrates how institutional factors, particularly political regime and

194 political liberalization, affect internal migratory patterns, local people’s abilities to organize or mobilize against migrants, and ultimately the frequency and intensity of SoS conflict in democratizing Indonesia and authoritarian China. Alongside HIs, I argue that the new political and economic spoils made available by a country’s political liberalization influence the likelihood of SoS conflict. Naturally, this condition is better captured in Indonesia than in China, which has at best experienced limited liberalization since the early 1980s. The case of Kepri shows, however, that it is only when large HIs are present that political liberalization conditions the effects of migration. Table 7.1 succinctly summarizes my research findings.

Table 7.1 Summary of Research Findings

Group relations Outcome Are large-scale, Is there political multifaceted HIs liberalization? present? CHINA Xinjiang: Occasional SoS Yes: large socio- Limited: Local Uyghurs vs conflict in rural economic and political continuing (Han) migrants and urban areas HIs for both elites and widespread masses repression

Qinghai: Occasional SoS Yes: large –and growing- Limited: Local Tibetans vs conflict in rural socio-economic and continuing (Han) migrants and semi-urban political HIs, especially widespread areas for elites repression

Inner Mongolia Infrequent and Limited: some economic Limited: Local Mongols vs localized SoS HIs for masses, almost continuing (Han) migrants conflict in rural none for elites repression areas

INDONESIA Papua Frequent and Yes: large socio- Yes: limited Local Papuans vs large SoS conflict economic and political decline in (Javanese and BBM) migrants in rural and urban HIs for both elites and state areas masses repression + changed balance of power between migrants and locals

195 Lampung Occasional but Limited: medium socio- Yes: decline Local Lampungese vs small SoS economic HIs for masses in state (Javanese and Balinese) migrants conflict in rural only repression + areas changed balance of power between migrants and locals

Kepri No SoS conflict Very limited: small Yes: decline Local Malays vs political and economic in state (Javanese and Batak) migrants HIs for masses, almost repression + none for elites changed balance of power between migrants and locals

Are the two conditions valid outside the six selected cases? In China, minority migration to the coastal provinces—a subset of rural-to-urban migration—is starting to attract due academic and governmental attention. However, its opposite—the dynamics specific to migration to minority regions—remains under-explored given that comparatively few Han migrants relocate there. Most minority regions are, in fact, sending regions rather than receiving regions when it comes to migration. Guangxi, another autonomous minority region, had a negative net migration of nearly 1.5 million people between 1995 and 2000, whereas other provinces with large minority populations (e.g., Sichuan, Guizhou, and Gansu) are notorious for their out-migration (Fan 2005:300). The western provinces of Yunnan and Ningxia could provide an interesting point of comparison. The highly ethnically diverse province of Yunnan has recently started to attract coastal Han migrants to develop its industries. As opposed to Xinjiang, where the Uyghur population represents the largest minority group by far, Yunnan’s minority population is split among many small groups, the largest of which is the Yi representing 11% of the population. Such a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity prevents the development of a titular ethnic group in Yunnan and limits genuine “Sons of the Soil” claims. Finally, though the autonomous region of Ningxia has enjoyed a positive rate of in-migration, anecdotal evidence suggests that its titular Hui Muslim population is socio-economically, politically, and culturally akin to the dominant Han Chinese, as previously noted for Xinjiang (see Gladney 2004). Indeed, in China’s informal socio-spatial hierarchy, the Hui Chinese are arguably “closer to the center than any other Muslim groups in

196 China” (Friedrichs, forthcoming: 1). Thanks to their high level of assimilation, linguistic advantage and their overall accommodating (non-secessionist) stance vis-à-vis the Chinese state, they were considered a “relatively economically and culturally advanced minzu” in a 1978 PRC’s nationality register (Cooke 2008:405). It is thus difficult to apply the “dominant migrant” thesis outside of the provinces reviewed, for even if Han migrants relocate to other Chinese minority provinces and often enjoy notable benefits (see Hansen 2005), the sheer size of the migrant population may be insufficient to alert the local population to a shift in the balance of power towards the migrant population. In a comparative study of Southeast Asia secessionism, Brown (2008) argues that the socio-economic HIs between native Acenese and Javanese migrants, which are relatively higher than those of its neighbouring province of North Sumatra, fomented the region’s renewed violent secessionist challenge. Reminiscent of the Chinese and Indonesian cases investigated earlier, Brown explains: The relative poverty of Aceh as a province—i.e. its spatial horizontal inequalities—manifested itself in low education rates, which resulted in the in- migration of a substantial number of educated non-Acehnese to staff the higher ranks of the economy, particularly associated with the oil and gas industry. This in- migration in turn exacerbated local ethnic horizontal inequalities between Acehnese and Javanese, migrants and non-migrants (2008:265).

The argument that ethnically or religiously-different spontaneous migrant with a socio-economic or political advantage over the local population are most targeted by SoS conflicts applies elsewhere in Indonesia as well. In provinces with a Christian majority or large Christian local population, spontaneous and dominant migrants who belong to a different religious group — typically Muslim—were also the main targets of SoS conflicts. In West and Central Kalimantan, Madurese migrants are targeted due to their ability in accumulating wealth, dominating transportation, controlling the economy and buying land.262 East Kalimantan would provide a good test of the dominant migrant hypothesis. With the influx of skilled migrants to work in its large hydrocarbon industry, the province provides an interesting counterfactual, as there are few reports of SoS conflict—especially compared to neighbouring Central and West Kalimantan. Still, it is important to note that, like Batam and Lampung, migrant ethnic groups in East Kalimantan already represent the largest ethnic groups,263 unlike elsewhere on the island of Borneo where there is a greater concentration of one local ethnic group. Perhaps either the ethnic group native

262 Interview with Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, Jakarta, January 5th 2011. 263 The Javanese represent 29.55% and Buginese 18.26%. See Suryadinata et al. (2003: 24-25).

197 to the region or the migrant population need to reach a certain demographic threshold for socio- economic dominant migrants to be targeted by locals. Quantitative studies using prefecture/regency-level data from the Chinese and Indonesian population censuses are required to answer this question. However, before a quantitative assessment of migration and SoS conflict can be completed, one must first overcome an important obstacle: the collection of reliable and exhaustive information on SoS conflict. In Indonesia, the newly created National Violence Monitoring System and the Violent Conflict in Indonesia Study (ViCIS) are two promising sources of conflict data using provincial and national newspapers. Unfortunately, exhaustive and reliable conflict databases are still unavailable in China, hampering any such quantitative project for the time being. Aside from China and Indonesia, the presence of “dominant migrants” also appears to be a source of conflict in other Asian secessionist regions. An upcoming special issue of Asian Ethnicity that explores “second-order minorities”—i.e., minorities within minorities—in Sri Lanka and the Moro region of the Philippines corroborates that HIs between migrants and local group is an important source of grievance and conflict (see Barter, forthcoming). Changes to group entitlements and power are also involved in SoS conflicts in non-secessionist contexts. A comparative project on elections and SoS conflict in Africa and Asia reveals, for instance, that a “shifting balance of power towards migrants” was a key factor contributing to the outbreak of SoS violence during elections in Ivory Coast, whereas the absence of conflict in Ghana was attributed to autochtons conserving land titles over incoming migrants (Côté and Mitchell, under review). Given the prevalence of SoS conflict around the world and recent migration trends increasing the likelihood that such conflict will endure in the future, it is surprising that this particular type of conflict dynamics has received so little academic attention. By developing our understanding of the migration/conflict nexus in various minority regions of China and Indonesia, this project sheds much-needed light on SoS dynamics and contributes to several bodies of literature. Migration and other demographic factors have rarely been taken into account for their role in intrastate conflict. The literature on political demography has fortunately started addressing this problem, though it has typically focused on the role of international migration in conflict. Considering that internal migration is by far more common than migration crossing international borders, it is important to rectify this bias. In this dissertation, I challenge the view occasionally expressed in the literature on political demography that migration is directly and causally related to conflict, and show that multi-faceted HIs and political liberalization make certain regions more likely to experience SoS conflict than others. Moreover, unlike most scholarship on ethnic or SoS

198 conflict, which focuses exclusively on cases characterized by relatively high levels of violence, this analysis includes variations on the dependent variables by examining cases in which migration has given rise to varying degrees of violence. This project also contributes to the literature and policies on migration by moving away from a purely economic approach to migration that fails to take into consideration migrants’ identities. As this dissertation demonstrates, China and Indonesia have both failed to address the political dimensions of migration to border minority regions. This failure has repeatedly led to conflict between local populations and migrants in those regions (Côté 2014). Both governments have also failed to take into account the ethnic element in migration. All migrants are not created equal—some derive more socio-economic and political benefits than others from economic programs of development, their connection to the state and their inclusion in the dominant national ethnicity. Finally, this research project also contributes to the extensive literature on national minorities. Instead of focusing on the relationship between the state and local minority people, the emphasis of this dissertation is on the closest thing to the state many local people residing in peripheral minority regions interact with: the internal migrants. As a result, I shed a light on a different set of interactions and dynamics –one that is presumably more equal that than between state-society. With the proliferation of conflict between migrants and locals in China and Indonesia, both states now find themselves unexpectedly confronted with the unintended consequences of their actions. This study should thus serve as a cautionary tale for countries wishing to establish majority settlements and encourage internal migration into minority regions as tools to secure far- flung territories and populations. Incidentally, this study sides with the growing literature that views population movements and settlements as potential obstacles to political stability and peace (McGarry 1998; Lustick 1997). Finally, this dissertation confirms the needs to equally distribute among migrant and local populations the socio-economic and political benefits of development programs. The native populations that are best integrated economically and politically at the local and national levels and have the most control over inter-provincial migratory flows are the least likely to resent migrants’ dominance and to target them or their properties. In so doing, migrants would go from being “unsettling” to being “supporting”.

199

APPENDIX 1- ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON INTERVIEWS Interview Riau (November 26th-December 9th, 2010)

Date Place Type Affiliation Location Duration of Number interview recording264 of Respondents 1 November Pekanbaru Elite Former Riau In 55:23 1 28th governor respondent’s home 2 November Pekanbaru Elite Economic In 1:07:50 1 29th Professor respondent’s Universitas Riau office 3 November Pekanbaru Local Leader of Pusat In 1:11:15 1 30th Kebudayan respondent’s Riau/Riau office Cultural Center 4 November Pekanbaru Local worker In 21:20 2 30th respondent’s home 5 December Pekanbaru Local Member of In 24:54 1 1st Lembaga Adat respondent’s Melayu Riau office 6 December Pekanbaru Elite Chairman of the In 35:04 1 1st board of respondent’s Lembaga Adat office Melayu Riau 7 December Pekanbaru Elite Economic At 50:49 2 1st Professor Universitas Universitas Islam Melayu Islam Melayu (UIM) 8 December Pekanbaru Elite Professor (UIM) At University 18:34 1 1st Islam Melayu 9 December Pekanbaru Local Member of In 32:01 1 2nd Institusi Rakyat respondent’s Independen home Indonesia & Forum Nusa Tenggara 10 December Pekanbaru Local Members of In one of 1:46:08 3 2nd Lembaga Adat respondents’ Melayu & Askar home Melayu Riau 11 December Pekanbaru Elite Badan In 40:23 1 2nd Penelitian dan respondent’s Pengembangan office Provisi Riau, Kepala Badan/Head of Research and Development

264 The duration refers to the length of the recordings of the interview. In some instances, especially in Qinghai, respondents asked not to be recorded and I only took notes. In such instances, the cell is left empty.

200 Board, Riau province 12 December Pekanbaru Elite Chairman of In 35:49 1 4th Lembaga Adat respondent’s Melayu Riau home 13 December Pekanbaru Elite Official at Riau In home of 11:55 1 4th Pulp respondents #13 14 December Duri Migrant Transmigrants In home of 1:16:24 6 7th one of respondents 15 December Duri Local Civil servant In 34:13 1 7th (primary school respondent’s teacher home 16 December Pekanbaru Local Civil servant In my hotel 22:00 1 8th (teacher) room

Interview Kepri (December 10th-17th, 2010)

Date Place Type Affiliation Location Duration Number of interview of respondents recording 1 December Tanjung Local Civil servant (teacher) In restaurant 9:27 1 10th Pinang 2 December Tanjung Migrant Business owner In restaurant 24:35 1 10th Pinang 3 December Tanjung Migrant College teachers In restaurant 41:52 3 10th Pinang 4 December Tanjung Local Civil servant (head At school 11:48 1 11th Pinang high school) 5 December Tanjung Migrant Civil servants At school 25:40 2 11th Pinang (teachers) 6 December Tanjung Local Civil servant In 30:10 1 11th Pinang (Ministry of Social respondent’s Affairs) home 7 December Tanjung Local Civil servant (teacher) In my hotel 15:12 1 11th Pinang room 8 December Batam Elite Civil servant In 22:08 1 12th (Ministry of respondent’s Employment) home 9 December Batam Migrant NGO worker In restaurant (notes) 1 12th 10 December Batam Local Radio broadcaster In my hotel 26:04 1 12th lobby 11 December Batam Elite Head of Ministry of In (notes) 2 13th City Planning, Kepri respondent’s province office 12 December Batam Elite Professors and rectors At University 1:01:46 9 13th at Universitas Internasional Batam (UIB) 13 December Batam Local Law student at UIB At University 28:01 1 13th 14 December Batam Elite NGO worker In 52:17 1 13th respondent’s office

201 15 December Batam Local McDermott’s In one of 1:05:02 2 13th employees & respondent’s chairman of Rukun home Khasanah Warisan Batam 16 December Bintan Local Chairman of local In (notes) 1 15th branch of Lembaga respondent’s Adat Melayu home 17 December Bintan Local Pensioner In 18:36 1 15th respondent’s home 18 December Bintan Local Workers In restaurant 40:25 3 15th 19 December Bintan Local Civil servant (Badan In (notes) 1 15th Pusat Statistik, Kepri respondent’s Province) home 20 December Bintan Local Stays at home In 47:50 1 16th respondent’s home 21 December Bintan Local Teaches Malay dance In 50:47 1 16th and culture respondent’s home

Interviews Lampung (January 10-20th)

Date Place Type Affiliation Location of Duration Number of interview of respondents recording 1 January (Jakarta) Elite Dinakertrans/Transmigrantion Disnakertrans 1:31:05 3 7th office offices 2 January Bandar Local Local leader of Lampung In 1:21:11 1 11th Lampung Adat respondent’s home 3 January Bandar Elite Professor In 1:25:31 1 12th Lampung respondent’s office 4 January Bandar Local Journalist In 53:40 1 12th Lampung respondent’s office 5 January Bandar Migrant General manager provincial In 47:50 1 12th Lampung newspaper respondent’s office 6 January Bandar Elite Unofficial leader Lampung In 1:48:06 1 13th Lampung Sai respondent’s home 7 January Bandar Local Poet In restaurant 1:03:47 1 13th Lampung 8 January Bandar Elite Civil servant (Ministry of In 47:32 1 14th Lampung Transmigration) respondent’s office 9 January Bandar Elite Sociology professor at In UL 1:40:45 1 14th Lampung Universitas Lampung (UL) 10 January Bandar Local poet In restaurant 44:34 1 14th Lampung 11 January Bandar Elite Leader of Pubian/Professor at In 1:09:00 1 15th Lampung Universitas Lampung respondent’s office

202 12 January Bandar Elite Dean Lampung University In my hotel 39:54 1 16th Lampung 13 January Pringsewu Migrant Spontaneous migrants In 23:50 2 16th respondents’ home 14 January Pringsewu Local Village leader In 53:55 1 16th respondent’s home 15 January Pringsewu Migrant Spontaneous migrants In 45:21 1 16th respondent’s home 16 January Pringsewu Local Former village leader In 27:59 1 16th respondent’s home 17 January Bandar Elite Anthropology Professor In UL 59:50 1 17th Lampung Universitas Lampung (UL) 18 January Bandar Elite Professors at Islamic In ILU 1:31:12 7 18th Lampung Lampung University (ILU) 19 January Bandar Local Business owner In 24:49 1 18th Lampung respondent’s business 20 January Menggala Local Village leader In one of 43:03 2 19th respondent’s home 21 January Menggala Local Village leader In 22:07 1 19th respondent’s home 22 January Menggala Migrant Transmigrants In 39:26 2 19th respondent’s home 23 January Bandar Local Leader of Bunga Mayang; In 1:24:45 1 20th Lampung formerly with Lampung Sai respondent’s home

Interview Jakarta (October 19th, 2010- February 6th, 2011)

Date Place Type Name/Affiliation Location of Duration of Number of interview recording respondents 1 January Jakarta Elite Population researchers at In (notes) 4 4th LIPI respondents’ office 2 January Jakarta Elite Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, In 1:07:51 1 5th researcher LIPI respondent’s office 3 January Jakarta Elite Mita Noveria, researcher at In 38:40 1 7th LIPI respondent’s office 4 January Jakarta Elite Brian Haley, NGO director In 48:07 1 25th at Search for Common respondent’s Ground office 5 January Jakarta Elite NGO (Migrant Care) In 17:11 1 28th respondent’s office 6 January Jakarta Elite NGO (ICMC) In 1:00:14 1 30th respondent’s office

203 7 February Jakarta Elite Harry Heriawah Saleh, In 41:23 1 1st Director General, Ministry respondent’s of Manpower and office Transmigration 8 February Jakarta Elite Direktur Partisipasi In 33:26 2 1st Masyarakat Ditjen respondents’ Pembinaan Pembangunan office Transmigrasi 9 February Jakarta Elite Tri Nuke, researcher LIPI In 47:13 1 5th respondent’s office

Interviews Qinghai (June 19th-July 1st, 2011)

Date Place Type Affiliation Location of Duration of Number of interview recording respondents 1 June Xining Elite Researcher, Qinghai Respondent’s 1:06:00 1 20th Academy of Social office Science 2 June Xining Local pensioner In park (notes) 2 20th 3 June Xining Local Munk In park (notes) 1 21st 4 June Xining Local Business owner In business (notes) 1 22nd 5 June Xining Local Worker in NGO In restaurant (notes) 1 22nd promoting women’s education 6 June Xining Local Professor and 2 students In restaurant (notes) 3 23rd from Qinghai Normal University 7 June Xining Elite Keith Dede, Professor at In home of (notes) 1 23rd Lewis Clark University respondent #6 8 June Xining Local Tv broadcaster In restaurant (notes) 1 23rd 9 June Xining Local MA student In restaurant (notes) 1 24th 10 June Xining Local Business owner In business (notes) 1 25th 11 June Tongren Local Civil servant (teacher) In my research (notes) 1 26th assistant’s home 12 June Tongren Local Civil servant (teacher) In my research (notes) 1 27th assistant’s home 13 June Tongren Local Self-employed In my research (notes) 1 27th assistant’s home 14 June Tongren Local Civil servant In my research (notes) 1 27th assistant’s home 15 June Tongren Local Munk In monastery (notes) 1 27th 16 June Tongren Local Retired hydroelectrician In respondent’s (notes) 1 28th home 17 June Tongren Local Editor-in-chief Tibetan In respondent’s (notes) 1 28th newspaper home 16 June Tongren Local Driver In restaurant (notes) 1 30th 17 July Guide Local Student In my hotel room (notes) 1 1st

204

Interviews Inner Mongolia (August 15th-28th, 2011)

Date Place Type Affiliation Location of Duration Number of interview of respondents recording 1 August Hohhot Elite Sociology Professor, Inner In 1:33:37 1 16th Mongolia University respondent’s home 2 August Hohhot Elite Minority economic In office 1:04:00 1 16th Professor, Inner Mongolia Normal University 3 August Hohhot Elite Minority economic In office 44:32 1 17th Professor, Inner Mongolia Normal University 4 August Hohhot Elite Anthropology Professor at In restaurant 1:14:25 2 17th Party School and director of Demography Institute at the Inner Mongolia Academy of Social Science 5 August Hohhot Elite Retired Professor Inner In 1:09:01 1 18th Mongolia Academy of respondent’s Social Science home 6 August Hohhot Local student In park (notes) 1 18th 7 August Hohhot Migrant student In park (notes) 1 19th 8 August Hohhot Elite Professor, Center for In office 45:03 1 20th Mongolian Studies of Inner Mongolia University 9 August Hohhot Local student In restaurant (notes) 1 20th 10 August Ulanhot Local Student In restaurant (notes) 1 24th 11 August Ulanhot Local Civil servant (vice- In restaurant (notes) 1 24th principal middle school) 12 August Ulanhot Local Civil servant (teacher) In restaurant (notes) 1 24th 13 August Hohhot Local students In my hotel (notes) 2 26th room 14 August Hohhot Migrant students In my hotel (notes) 2 27th room 15 August Alxa Local Researcher IMU In my hotel (notes) 1 27th room 16 August Hohhot Local PhD candidate In my hotel 1:37:00 1 27th room 17 August Hohhot Migrant Cab driver In office (notes) 1 28th

Interviews Beijing

Date Place Type Affiliation Location of Duration of Number of Interview recording respondents

205 1 August 9th Beijing Elite Professor at Ethnic In (notes) 1 Minority Study Center respondent’s of China office 2 September Beijing Elite Researcher at Chinese In restaurant (notes) 1 3rd Commission of Ethnic Affairs 3 September Beijing Elite Researcher at Beijing In restaurant (notes) 1 8th Center

Interviews Xinjiang

Date Place Type Affiliation Location of Duration of Number of interview recording respondents 1 September (Skype) Elite Leader World (Skype) 1:00:00 1 30th, 2011 Uyghur Congress 2 February 17th, (Skype) Elite Leader World (Skype) 1:20:00 1 2014 Uyghur Congress

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