STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AN EVOLVING ALLIANCE AGENDA

MARCH 2021 The United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney is dedicated The Perth USAsia Centre located at The University of Western Australia is a to the rigorous analysis of American foreign policy, economics, politics and non-partisan, not-for-profit institution strengthening relationships and strategic culture. The Centre is a national resource, that builds Australia’s awareness of thinking between Australia, the Indo-Pacific and the USA. The Centre is a lead- the dynamics shaping America — and critically — their implications for Australia. ing think tank focusing on geopolitical issues, policy development and building a strategic affairs community across government, business and academia. The United States Studies Centre is a joint venture of the University of Sydney and the American Australian Association. The Centre was established as a collaboration of the American Australian Associa- tion, the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and The University of Western Australia.

The Centre’s Foreign Policy and Defence Program receives funding support from the following partners: The Perth USAsia Centre receives its core operating funding from:

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Research conclusions are derived independently and authors represent their own view, not those of the United States Studies Centre or the Perth USAsia Centre. TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION by Simon Jackman 2 SECTION 3. How should the United States and Australia bolster 56 collective deterrence and defence? SECTION 1. How does the US domestic political landscape 6 enable or constrain increased US presence and attentiveness to Organise the alliance for collective defence 58 the Indo-Pacific? by Ashley Townshend and Brendan Thomas-Noone

US domestic politics and policy by Simon Jackman 8 Expand allied force posture initiatives in the Indo-Pacific 62 by Brendan Thomas-Noone The Biden agenda, Congress and Australian interests 18 by Bruce Wolpe Strengthen coordination on countering maritime coercion 66 by Ashley Townshend and Toby Warden SECTION 2. How should the United States and Australia 26 advance prosperity and resilience? Advance defence industrial base integration 70 by Brendan Thomas-Noone Strengthen the global and regional trade architectures 28 by Jeffrey Wilson SECTION 4. How should the United States and Australia 74 strengthen the economic and technological foundations of the Enhance health cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Pacific 32 allied and partner network? by Matilda Steward Leverage advanced manufacturing, critical technology 76 Re-engage the United States in global health security 36 coordination and allied supply chain networks by John Lee by Adam Kamradt-Scott Develop deterrence against Chinese economic coercion 80 Activate the Australia-US-Japan trilateral infrastructure 40 by Jeffrey Wilson partnership by Hayley Channer Avoid protectionism to maximise joint economic opportunities 84 Collaborate to combat misinformation and the threat of 44 by Stephen Kirchner domestic extremism by Elliott Brennan Build cyber capability and cooperation for an evolving threat 88 Strengthen Indo-Pacific vaccine partnerships 48 landscape by Jennifer S. Hunt by Adam Kamradt-Scott Endnotes and images 92 Find common areas of cooperation in bolstering resilience to 52 climate change by Simon Jackman and Jared Mondschein About the authors 105 INTRODUCTION Australia’s long-standing strategic relationship with the United States is transforming in response to the geostrategic change in the Indo-Pacific and a fractious debate in the United States about its role in the world. At the same time, technological change and economic interdependence have reshaped the nature of interstate competition, creating many new vectors of state power. For Australian policymakers and their American partners, creativity and dexterity are in great demand, with the US-Australia alliance growing in scope and deepening in strategic importance.

With a new administration in Washington committed to both the Indo-Pacific and the value of alliances — and 2021 marking the 70th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty — this volume advances an agenda for the alliance in this critical phase.

2 Three key developments are driving swift evolution in Infrastructure, energy, frontier technologies and higher Third, understanding the domestic US political and Australia’s alliance with the United States — far and away education are just some of the domains where a rapid policy environment must factor into any assessment Australia’s most important strategic relationship. shift in mindset is underway, with national security and of the alliance agenda, of how to advance Australian strategic considerations now much more salient or even national interests through the alliance. Despite deep First, strategic competition with an increasingly capa- paramount. As the COVID-19 pandemic vividly high- and bitter partisan acrimony in the United States, there ble, assertive and authoritarian China is now widely lights, points of national vulnerability and risk — and is much for Australians to welcome. The unified stance accepted as the single most pressing challenge for the conversely, resilience and strength — are being discov- on China’s coercive manoeuvres across party lines and United States and its allies. This change in the US strate- ered or created at a brisk pace. This re-emergence between countries is a critical alignment to tackle this gic mindset finds no meaningful partisan opposition in of economic tools of statecraft, or geoeconomics, is high stakes and pervasive issue. Washington and certainly not among relevant officials demanding creativity and dexterity from policymakers in the Biden administration. and moments of reckoning for democratic societies Second, rapid technological change and deepening and their leaders. economic interdependence have reshaped the nature of These developments are of profound significance for interstate competition since the Cold War, the last era of Australia and its alliance with the United States. Australia great power rivalry dominating international affairs. Since occupies the middle longitudes of the globe’s most then, long-standing, conventional vectors of state power STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH AN important geographic strategic arena, the Indo-Pacific. INCREASINGLY CAPABLE, ASSERTIVE have been transformed; examples include the develop- The Australia-US alliance has rapidly taken a regional AND AUTHORITARIAN CHINA IS NOW ment of stealth, autonomous systems and hypersonics focus and emphasis unseen since the Vietnam War. WIDELY ACCEPTED AS THE SINGLE MOST in the domain of conventional military capabilities or Australia is one of many countries that counts China as PRESSING CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED the way that technology has transformed intelligence STATES AND ITS ALLIES. THIS CHANGE IN its largest trading partner, but, and unusually for an econ- collection and analysis. THE US STRATEGIC MINDSET FINDS NO omy of its size, it has also maintained a highly concen- MEANINGFUL PARTISAN OPPOSITION International trade and cross-border investment flows trated mix of exports and destination markets. Accord- IN WASHINGTON AND CERTAINLY have always been vehicles for projecting and acquir- ingly, Australia has been, is, and will be, on the frontlines NOT AMONG RELEVANT OFFICIALS IN THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION. ing national power and influence but now have a level of geoeconomic competition. Unsurprisingly, this too is of strategic significance not seen in living memory. broadening and deepening the alliance agenda.

3 Across the US strategic affairs community, Australia’s credentials as an ally of substance are impeccable. Australia is rightly seen as on the “frontlines” with respect to the China challenge and being willing and able to respond credibly. Across nominees and appointees — their speeches and Senate testimony — and announcements about the tasking and resourcing of agencies, it is clear the Biden administration is prioritising the Indo-Pacific and the role and interests of allies and partners. We survey these developments in the chapters of this volume.

But we also identify a number of challenges to Australian national interests in the US domestic political and policy environment.

› The magnitude of the China challenge is accepted across party lines, but this must be backed by spending commitments and focus to translate aspiration and intent into policy, programs and facts-on-the-ground. (See Ashley Townshend and Brendan Thomas-Noone on page 58)

US Vice President Joe Biden delivering a speech to the United States Studies Centre and the Lowy Institute in Sydney on 20 July 2016. Photo: United States Studies Centre 4 › Protectionism, isolationism and scepticism › The US and Australian governments are chiefly › Geoeconomic threats to American primacy about multilateral arrangements are also focused on the immediate health challenges are prompting the Biden administration to important legacies of the Trump presidency, of COVID-19, particularly getting vaccines to explicitly connect domestic recovery to external supercharged by the COVID-19 pandemic’s their citizens, but there remain opportunities for strength, with reviews of supply chains and damage to the US domestic economy, to the building more resilient public health systems strategic, government-led investments to United States’ sense of its priorities and its in the Indo-Pacific. (See Matilda Steward on secure US technological supremacy. But any place in the world. (See Jeffrey Wilson on page 32 and Adam Kamradt-Scott on page 36) opportunities — and risks — for allies remain page 28 and Stephen Kirchner on page 84) unclear. (See Hayley Channer on page 40, John › Democratic resilience is no longer a concept solely Lee on page 76 and Jeffrey Wilson on page 80) › US defence budgets were under enormous associated with the developing world. From cyber strain and scrutiny before COVID-19, opening networks to domestic extremism, the internal focus Accordingly, a clear-eyed understanding of Australian up a gap between operational capabilities all democratic governments are undergoing is an national interests —­ advancing them and advocating for and strategic aspirations in the Indo-Pacific. opportunity for collaboration. (See Elliott Brennan them in these early months of the Biden administration — Countries that felt “out in the cold” in Trump’s on page 44 and Jennifer S. Hunt on page 88) is vital, central to the mission of the United States Studies Washington are vying for presence and Centre, the Perth USAsia Centre and the purpose of the › The Biden administration has promised to put influence with the Biden administration (e.g., chapters that follow. climate change considerations at the heart of NATO partners). Internal competition for its thinking about foreign policy and national Professor Simon Jackman resources inside the US Government will also risk security. This has prompted considerable Chief Executive Officer distraction from the Indo-Pacific. (See Brendan speculation about the implications for Australia, March 2021 Thomas-Noone on pages 62 and 70 and Ashley with its high carbon emissions per capita and Townshend and Toby Warden on page 66) reliance on fossil fuel exports. (See Simon Jackman and Jared Mondschein on page 52)

5 STATE OF THE UNITED STATES

6 SECTION 1. HOW DOES THE US DOMESTIC POLITICAL LANDSCAPE ENABLE OR CONSTRAIN INCREASED US PRESENCE AND ATTENTIVENESS TO THE INDO-PACIFIC? US DOMESTIC POLITICS AND POLICY PROFESSOR SIMON JACKMAN

8 For Australian national interests, one issue dominates surveys in 2019 and earlier years, utilising much of the › Seventy-two per cent of Americans describe assessments about US domestic politics. What is the same question wording so as to permit valid inferences China as unfriendly towards the United States or appetite of the United States for a return to global lead- about trends and change in American public opinion an enemy of the United States, up from 56 per ership? A range of subsidiary questions follow: on issues of relevance to Australian national interests. cent in 2019 (this item was not asked in October 2020). Trump voters moved 22 points on this › How quickly, and to what extent, will the Biden measure, from 70 per cent to 92 per cent, and administration operationalise the strategic Trump and the pandemic have Clinton/Biden voters moved 18 points, from a bare aspirations laid out over the 2020 campaign, hardened American views on China majority (53 per cent) in 2019 to 71 per cent in 2021. for a return to multilateralism, for assembling In Figure 1 we summarise responses on five propositions and leading a coalition of allies and partners in › Forty-three per cent of Americans believe the about China and its relationship with the United States, countering China’s assertiveness, for increased United States is in a Cold War with China, up comparing results from USSC surveys administered in presence and power in the Indo-Pacific and from 28 per cent from mid-2019, driven not July 2019, October 2020 and January 2021. American for the dollars and focus that this will entail? by change among supporters of Democratic opinions on China were not especially favourable in 2019 candidates, but largely by a doubling of the › What other policy priorities are and have generally become more negative since. Trump rate at which Trump voters report this belief competing with these issues and how voters, in particular, have moved even more decisively (from one-third in 2019 to two-thirds in 2021). much salience do they enjoy? towards negative views of China after the November 2020 election, no doubt driven by Trump’s insistence › In 2019 a slim majority (51 per cent) thought the › How robust is the bipartisan consensus around about the Chinese origins of COVID-19 and its contri- United States was too economically dependent the scale and urgency of the China challenge? bution to Trump losing the election. on China, rising to 65 per cent in our January Will deep partisan acrimony in the United States 2021 survey. The change is almost exclusively impede the Biden administration’s ambitious plans › As recently as July 2019, less than a majority driven by a hardening of opinion among Trump for wide-sweeping competition with China? of Americans held negative views about voters (54 per cent to 84 per cent), with little China’s relationship with the United States, To rigorously address these questions the United States movement among Clinton/Biden voters. with little partisan variation. By October 2020 Studies Centre (USSC) commissioned surveys of the and especially by January 2021, 69 per cent › A similar story holds for the proposition adult, citizen population of the United States, fielded of Americans described China’s influence “China has overtaken the United States as the in October 2020 before the November elections and on America as negative, a view shared by world’s technological leader.” There is little reinterviewing 1,186 respondents in late January 2021, 64 per cent of Biden voters in January movement on this item aside from Trump after Biden’s inauguration. These surveys build on USSC and by nine out of 10 Trump voters. voters, moving from 28 per cent agreement in 2019 to 42 per cent in January 2021.

9 Figure 1. American opinions about China have hardened, especially among Trump voters Percentage of respondents agreeing, by president vote. 2019, 2020 and 2021 surveys.

Overall, China’s influence on America is negative The United States and China are in a Cold War July 2019 October 2020 January 2021 July 2019 October 2020 January 2021

Trump voters 46 82 89 Trump voters 33 49 66

Other/non-voters 36 44 52 Other/non-voters 17 26 27

Democratic 45 52 64 Democratic 30 34 34 candidate voters candidate voters All 43 61 69 All 28 37 43

America is too economically dependent on China China has overtaken the United States as the world’s technological leader July 2019 October 2020 January 2021 July 2019 October 2020 January 2021

Trump voters 54 75 84 Trump voters 28 29 42

Other/non-voters 43 49 54 Other/non-voters 33 33 31

Democratic 54 62 56 Democratic 51 49 45 candidate voters candidate voters All 51 63 65 All 38 38 41

China is unfriendly or an enemy of the United States July 2019 January 2021

Trump voters 70 92 Clinton voters

Other/non-voters 40 44 Biden voters

Democratic 53 71 candidate voters All 56 72

10 The elite, Washington consensus on China is largely Figure 2. Isolationism has increased dramatically among Trump voters mirrored in mass opinion, save for the recent and Percentage of respondents agreeing, by president vote. 2019, 2020 and 2021 surveys. pronounced hardening of views among Trump support- ers. Only slim or near-majorities of Biden voters agree America would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems that “America is too economically dependent on China” in other parts of the world or that “China has overtaken the United States as the July 2019 October 2020 January 2021 world’s technological leader.” But these proportions are sufficiently large — and the issues sufficiently serious — Trump voters 33 37 59 to serve as a reservoir of political capital for the Biden Other/non-voters 31 34 41 Clinton voters administration’s policy of competition with China. Democratic 22 29 28 Biden voters candidate voters The risks of isolationism All 28 33 41

For decades researchers have measured isolationism in US public opinion with the proposition “America would The outcome of the November 2020 election appears to One of the defining characteristics of “Make American be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern have prompted a massive uptick in isolationism among Great Again,” “America First” and, more broadly, “Trump- ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.” Trump voters to 59 per cent, no doubt a reaction to ism,” is hostility to American engagement in multilateral- Across our three surveys we see an increase in isolation- Biden’s early actions in reversing some key Trump poli- ism, catalysing a resentment to globalisation and inter- ist views in US public opinion, but again with a distinctly cies, rejoining the Paris Climate Accord (Paris Agree- nationalism evident since the 1990s, ending the elite-led, partisan character. ment) and the World Health Organization (WHO), and bipartisan consensus around the virtues of US global In mid-2019 we observed that one-third of Trump voters promising to restore more conventional relations with leadership. This hostility clearly endures among Trump expressed isolationist views, comfortably ahead of the American allies and partners. Non-voters and support- voters, and indeed, at levels seldom seen in decades 22 per cent rate among Clinton voters. By October 2020, ers of minor parties and independents also moved of measuring isolationism. This will be a fault line both all groups reported an increase in isolationism: 29 per towards isolationism between October 2020 and between the Biden administration and its Republican cent among Biden voters and 37 per cent among Trump January 2021. Biden voters’ levels of isolationism are opponents, but also, critically, within the Republican voters. unmoved through the election period, further suggestive Party. of the political character of the reaction among Trump voters and non-voters.

11 Figure 3. China is rated as important by majorities of Democrats and Republicans, but climate change is even more important for Democrats It is widely accepted that Trump-led hostility towards Percentage of respondents rating foreign policy priority as “very” or “fairly” important, multilateralism, and other isolationist elements of the by 2020 presidential vote. January 2021 survey. Trumpian worldview, impeded the effectiveness of the Working with allies to stand up to China is very or fairly important Trump administration’s China policy. Accordingly, a key

issue for Australia is whether deeper US engagement and Trump voters 93 presence in the Indo-Pacific can steer clear of opposi- tion founded in isolationism and instead, more helpfully, Other/non-voters 68 be motivated by widely-shared, negative assessments of China’s ambitions and assertiveness. Biden voters 88

All 85 Competing American foreign policy priorities Dealing with global climate change is very or fairly important Survey respondents were asked to rate the importance 30 of three foreign policy priorities, “working with allies to Trump voters stand up to China,” “dealing with global climate change” Other/non-voters 64 and “promoting democracy in other nations.” Biden voters 97 There is little partisan disagreement about the impor- tance of “working with allies to stand up to China.” Over- All 68 all, 85 per cent of respondents saw this as a “very” or “fairly” important priority, with 93 per cent of Trump voters and 88 per cent of Biden voters making this Promoting democracy in other nations is very or fairly important assessment. Trump voters 61

Other/non-voters 53

Biden voters 78

All 67

12 But a stark partisan difference emerges on climate Table 1. Rank orderings of foreign policy priorities, by 2020 presidential vote change. Almost all (97 per cent) of Biden voters rating The rank in importance of working with allies to stand up to China, dealing with global climate change this as very or fairly important, compared with just 30 and promoting democracy in other nations per cent of Trump voters. Biden voters are also more likely than Trump voters to endorse democracy promo- Importance ranking All Biden Trump Other/ tion as a very or fairly important foreign policy goal, 78 voters voters non- per cent to 61 per cent. voters A closer analysis finds that while many Biden voters rate “working with allies to stand up to China” as important, it All equally important issues 22.8 27.7 11.2 29.5 is almost always subordinate or equal to climate change Climate most or equal most important issue 40.9 65.0 8.0 39.6 as a priority. Ninety-three per cent of Biden voters have climate change as their top or equal top foreign policy China most or equal most important issue 46.9 26.2 82.6 37.6 priority, one-third rate climate change as their single, top foreign policy priority and 28 per cent rate all three Democracy most or equal most important issue 18.2 13.3 23.7 19.6 priorities as equally important. Only three per cent of Biden voters state that “working with allies to stand up to Climate change least important issue 20.2 2.3 50.5 12.7 China” is unambiguously their top foreign policy prior- China least important issue 8.8 12.9 0.5 12.1 ity and 13 per cent rank this priority last, behind climate change and democracy promotion. Democracy least important issue 20.9 29.6 11.2 17.1

For Trump voters, the situation is starkly different, with 57 per cent stating that “working with allies to stand up to China” is unambiguously their top foreign policy priority and just two per cent identifying climate change as their single most important foreign policy priority. Fifty-one per cent of Trump voters rank climate change unambig- uously as their least important priority out of the three.

13 Survey respondents were also asked if the United States Bearing the costs of decoupling In the baseline condition of no price premium for buying ought to “reward countries who do more to stop climate from China? “not made in China,” overwhelming majorities report a change with more favourable trade deals and impose preference for buying not made in China: 88 per cent costs on those that do not” (see Figure 8 on page 54). A majority of Americans report that the United States is overall, every Trump voter and 84 per cent of Biden Seventy-two per cent of Biden voters agree with this too economically dependent on China. But are Amer- voters. Unsurprisingly, increasing costs diminishes proposition (32 per cent expressing strong agreement) icans willing to bear the costs that might accompany preference for the not made in China phone, but even and another 24 per cent are indifferent. Further analysis economic and technological decoupling from China? with a premium of $250 or more, at least two-thirds of of the implications of this particular finding appears on Americans report a preference for the phone not made We asked respondents if they would prefer to purchase pages 52-55. in China. Trump voters remain most adamant about a cell (mobile) phone made in China or a cell (mobile) preferring the phone not made in China across rising The message for Australian policymakers from this data phone not made in China, while randomly varying the cost differences, with around 90 per cent preferring the is clear. The Biden administration’s supporters want (hypothetical) extra cost of the phone not made in China phone not made in China despite a $250 or even $500 the campaign promise of a centrality of climate change “in order to reduce our reliance on Chinese made prod- price premium. Biden voters are the most responsive considerations to be realised, for climate change consid- ucts” (each respondent was randomly assigned to one to the increasing price premiums, but even at the $250 erations to not just be central, but arguably the single of the five price points shown in Figure 4. and $500 levels, a majority of Biden voters continue to most important driver of US foreign policy, and prefer- prefer the phone not made in China. ably, linked to decisions about trade deals. For Biden’s supporters, “working with allies to stand up to China” We concede the “cheap talk” nature of assessing willing- is, at most, part of an ensemble of foreign policy chal- ness-to-pay in surveys. Even so, we note: (1) preferences THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION AND lenges. CONGRESSIONAL DEMOCRATS WILL for the phone not made in China are high, under any circumstances; (2) a partisan gap is nonetheless apparent The Biden administration and Congressional Democrats FIND IT DIFFICULT TO IGNORE THIS LEVEL OF POLITICAL DEMAND FROM THEIR but grows larger as the price premium of the phone not will find it difficult to ignore this level of political demand SUPPORTERS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE made in China increases, suggesting that Biden support- from their supporters for climate change to infuse US TO INFUSE US FOREIGN POLICY. ers are most exposed to the costs of technological and foreign policy. economic decoupling from China.

14 Figure 4. Americans say they are willing to accept the higher costs of buying “not made in China” Bars indicate the percentages of respondents saying they would prefer to purchase a cell (mobile) phone not made in China (versus a phone made in China), given different levels of increased cost. January 2021 survey.

All Biden voters 100 These results do suggest partisan fault lines and limits to US domestic political support for decoupling. This 88 said, while it is a Democratic administration pursuing 85 84 81 decoupling, rank and file Democrats are likely to follow 75 78 78 the cues of their party’s leaders, tolerating any economic 73 burdens stemming from decoupling, especially if these 66 59 are offset by other elements of the Biden administration’s 50 53 “build back better” program. Moreover, Republicans are unlikely to use the economic costs of decoupling from China as a credible line of political attack against Demo- 25 crats, with Republican members of Congress among the most insistent advocates of decoupling.

Accordingly, we assess high levels of economic and 0 political tolerance for decoupling from China in Amer- Other/non-voters Trump voters ican public opinion and see little incentive for political 100 100 leaders in either party to mount opposing arguments. 95 95 88 89 83 75 82 73 67 62 50

25

0 Zero cost $50 $100 $250 $500 Zero cost $50 $100 $250 $500 difference difference

Experimental variable: higher cost of phone not made in China 15 Disunity and American democracy opment in American public opinion is “negative parti- First, we ask respondents if they would be “happy, sanship,” reporting negative evaluations of supporters unhappy, or if it wouldn’t matter” if an immediate family We conclude this introductory survey of the state of of the party one does not identify with. member said they intended to marry someone who is: US public opinion and politics, and its implications for (a) a Democrat; (b) a Republican; (c) transgendered; (d) a We assess two measures of negative partisanship in the alliance agenda, with an assessment of the depth of “born again” Christian. partisan animus in the United States. Being positively the United States, using comparable Australian data to disposed to one’s fellow partisans is to be expected, put the results in some perspective for an Australian Forty-four per cent of Trump voters would be unhappy almost a defining characteristic of identifying as a audience. if a family member married a Democrat. In contrast, 52 Democrat or a Republican. But a relatively novel devel- per cent of Biden voters would be unhappy if their family

Table 2. Negative partisanship in the United States is far more pronounced than in Australia

Median thermometer ratings of parties, by vote. January 2021 surveys.

US data Australian data 2020 Median rating Median rating Party 2019 Median rating Median rating Party vote of Republican of Democratic difference Vote of Coalition of Labor difference Party Party parties party

Biden 13 80 57 Labor 38 76 38

Trump 63 5 58 Coalition 80 46 34

Other/ 44 49 5 Greens 22 66 44 non-voter

Other/ 60 56 4 non-voter

16 member married a Republican. For Biden voters, this In-party ratings are essentially the same in both coun- The United States transitions from the Trump to Biden rate of unhappiness at the prospect of a family member tries, around the 80 mark on the zero to 100 cold-to- presidencies with partisan polarisation at extraordinarily marrying a Republican (52 per cent) exceeds the unhap- hot thermometer scale. An exception is the 63 median high levels; Australian audiences can only marvel at this piness rate reported if family members were to marry rating given by Trump voters to the Republican Party, a critical feature. Through this chapter, and throughout a transgendered person (19 per cent) or a “born again” reaction no doubt to criticism of Trump from Republican this volume, we identify instances where this partisan- Christian (39 per cent). leaders after the Capitol Hill insurrection on 6 January ship constrains or impedes policymaking — and equally, 2021, Trump’s subsequent impeachment and Trump’s note those rare instances of bipartisanship — and their Corresponding Australian data help put these results hostility towards Republican election officials in Georgia implications for Australian national interests. in context. Just 17 per cent of Coalition voters say they inter alia during the post-election period. would be unhappy if an immediate family member intended to marry a Labor supporter; conversely, 28 The key difference between the United States and per cent of Labor supporters and 32 per cent of Greens Australia are the ratings of out-parties. The median rating supporters say they would be unhappy if an immediate of the Democratic Party from Trump voters is just five; family member intended to marry a Coalition supporter. the Republican Party gets a median rating of 13 from These Australian rates of unhappiness at the prospect Biden voters. In Australia, the median out-party ratings THROUGH THIS CHAPTER, AND of partisan inter-marriage are at most half of the corre- are markedly higher: Labor voters give a median rating of THROUGHOUT THIS VOLUME, WE IDENTIFY sponding rates we observe in the US data. 38 to the Coalition parties, while Coalition voters give a INSTANCES WHERE THIS PARTISANSHIP median rating of 46 to the Labor Party (barely below the CONSTRAINS OR IMPEDES POLICYMAKING Second, survey respondents are asked to provide neutral rating of 50). This constitutes more compelling — AND EQUALLY, NOTE THOSE RARE “thermometer ratings” of partisan groups, on a zero-to- INSTANCES OF BIPARTISANSHIP — AND evidence of the depth of partisan animus in the United 100-point scale.0.1 Median ratings of major parties are THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIAN States and the contribution of negative partisanship to NATIONAL INTERESTS. reported in Table 2, broken down by who the respondent political polarisation in the United States. voted for in the most recent national election.

17 THE BIDEN AGENDA, CONGRESS AND AUSTRALIAN INTERESTS BRUCE WOLPE

18 Joe Biden proposed an expansive legislative agenda has an agenda with marked similarities to Obama’s: As Vice-President, Biden was central to the Obama throughout the 2020 presidential campaign, span- rebuilding an economy struck down by crisis, addressing administration’s protracted and ultimately self-defeat- ning racial justice and voting rights, green energy jobs an urgent health care reform agenda, securing progress ing negotiations with Congressional Republicans in 2009 programs, buttressing Obamacare and infrastruc- in the epic battle to combat global warming and a host and 2010. Democrats were unsatisfied with the policy ture. But sitting above all these issues is control of the of other compelling social priorities. compromises that resulted (on recession recovery, on pandemic and rebuilding the US economy. health care, on climate) and lost the House of Repre- But unlike Clinton and Obama, Democratic control of sentatives: policy pain and no political gain. Biden has President Biden simply must get his US$1.9 trillion COVID Congress is tenuous — just six seats in the House of no intention of being guilty of repeating that mistake. recovery package through Congress (and may well have Representatives and Vice President Harris the tiebreak- by the time this volume is published). There is a deep ing vote in the Senate — and at great risk in the 2022 This is why Biden is determined to go big and go early, to understanding ­— which Republicans recognise as much midterms (see Figure 5). Midterm elections typically get the vaccine and economic stimulus in place as soon as Democrats — that if Biden fails on this first hurdle, see the party of the president lose seats. As shown in as possible, and without Republican votes, if needs be. his presidency will be permanently damaged. In fact, Figure 6, the midterms of 1994 and 2010 resulted in failure to win congressional approval on the American huge gains for Republicans in House elections, ending Recovery Plan will mean that Biden will be unable to win unified Democrat control of the federal government and congressional approval of virtually all the other priority stalling the agendas of both Clinton and Obama. With measures listed above that he took to the election. dogged opposition to the last two Democratic presi- dents successful in those midterm elections, Congres- The key to understanding what Biden can accomplish BIDEN’S CALCULUS IS THAT IF HE FAILS sional Republicans have little incentive to support in Congress requires an appreciation of the politi- TO SECURE PASSAGE OF THE AMERICAN Biden’s policy proposals. The Capitol Hill insurrection RECOVERY PLAN OR MEET HIS AMBITIOUS cal dynamics that affected and ultimately overcame, on 6 January 2021 further dampened the already remote VACCINATION TARGETS (100 MILLION SHOTS Obama’s presidency. Indeed, the lessons from the 111th prospects of bipartisanship. IN THE FIRST 100 DAYS) HIS PRESIDENCY IS Congress — the first two years of President Obama’s LOST TOO, ALONG WITH ANY CHANCE OF first term — are the guideposts for Biden’s strategy and Biden’s calculus is that if he fails to secure passage of LEGISLATIVE SUCCESS ON RACIAL JUSTICE, approach in this 117th Congress.1.1 the American Recovery Plan or meet his ambitious CLIMATE CHANGE AND IMMIGRATION. vaccination targets (100 million shots in the first 100 Like Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, Biden days) his presidency is lost too, along with any chance comes to office as a Democratic president with his party of legislative success on racial justice, climate change in the majority in both houses of Congress. Biden also and immigration.

19 Figure 5. Democrats control Congress, but with razor-thin margins

House of Representatives Senate

President’s President’s President’s President’s party in minority party in majority party in minority party in majority

1936 1936 Republican The House of Representatives 1932 1940 president 1964 1964 Democratic In the 117th Congress that convened in January 2021, the 1976 1960 president House is comprised of 221 Democrats and 211 Republi- cans. While margins are immensely tighter than Obama 1940 1976 and Speaker Nancy Pelosi faced in 2009, the political 1948 1932 dynamics are the same: to be successful, Democrats will 1960 2008 have to find the balance on complex legislation within 1992 1944 the caucus to ensure that defections do not kill President Biden’s agenda — severely undercutting his presidency. 2008 1992 Speaker Pelosi and her leadership team have nearly no 1944 1948 cushion for error as the threshold between winning or 2016 2012 losing comes down to just a couple of Democrats.

2004 2004 This is all the more important given that the House will 2020 1984 be the driver of the Biden legislative program. The key 2000 1980 lessons of successful legislative management by the Democrats in the 111th Congress are no less applicable 1952 2016 to President Biden and Speaker Pelosi today. In particu- 1996 1952 lar, look for: 1956 2020 › Clear and consistent leadership from the 2012 2000 President on his agenda and legislation. 1980 1956 President Biden’s voice must be forceful, 1972 1996 consistent and steady in laying out and explaining what he wants Congress to do, giving 1968 1988 assurance to members in swing districts. 1984 1972 1988 1968

-100 0 100 200 -20 0 20 40 60

Seat margin of president’s party Seat margin of president’s party

20 Figure 6. Midterm elections typically see the party of the president lose House seats

Seats lost by Seats won by president’s party president’s party

1934 › Intensely effective working partnerships Republican 2002 between the president, the speaker and her president committee chairs. Key to Speaker Pelosi’s 1998 Democratic president success throughout her tenure is her exceptional 1986 ability to read the moods and dispositions 1962 of the members of the Democratic Caucus and to have those assessments guide chairs 1990 of the committees in crafting legislation. 1970

› A vigorous schedule of hearings to underscore 2014 the urgency of the legislative agenda. In both 1978 Obamacare and the energy and climate legislation 1954 in 2009, carefully constructed hearings showed the high degree of consensus of key interests 1982 and constituencies behind these major legislative 1950 reforms. The health insurance and pharmaceutical 2006 industries strongly supported the Affordable Care Act. Energy, chemical and manufacturing 2018 companies supported the cap-and-trade bill. 1942

These very visible shows of consensus paved 1966 the way to advance these landmark proposals. 1974

1958

1994

1946

2010

1938

-60 -40 -20 0

Change in Presidential Party’s House Seats at Midterm Elections

21 The Senate

The 50-50 tie in the Senate plus the tie-breaking vote of Kamala Harris gives the Democrats control of the Senate’s agenda, its calendar, committees and critically, which bills come up for votes on the Senate floor.

The biggest initial dividend of control of the Senate for President Biden is that the Democratic majority will generally approve his Cabinet nominees. The withdrawal of Nerra Tanden’s nomination as director of the Office of Management and Budget is the first real hiccough, highlighting the immense power of “red state” Demo- cratic Senators looking to distinguish themselves from their Democratic colleagues (e.g., Manchin from West Virginia).

EVEN IF THE HOUSE LEADERSHIP CAN FIND AGREEMENT AMONG ALL HOUSE DEMOCRATS ON THESE CONTENTIOUS ISSUES AMONG ALL THE FACTIONS IN THE PARTY, THE LION’S SHARE OF THE BIDEN LEGISLATIVE AGENDA IS DEAD ON ARRIVAL IN THE SENATE.

22 Key elements of Biden’s agenda will be subject to the Any realistic assessment of the current configuration Defence spending. In early January 2021, in the closing Senate’s supermajority requirement: 60 Senators are of Congress must recognise: (a) that there are not 10 days of the 116th Congress, both the House and Senate necessary to call debate to a close (to end a “filibuster”) Republican votes in the Senate willing to support virtu- overrode President Trump’s veto of the National Defense and move legislation to a majority vote on final passage. ally any element of the Biden agenda; (b) there are limits Authorization Act, which sets military spending levels Budget legislation is exempted from the filibuster’s to what can be legislated via the budget reconciliation and locks in US strategic priorities for the country’s supermajority requirement. Both political parties have process that circumvents the filibuster; (c) there is dwin- defence posture.1.2 This was the first time Congress had at times relied on packaging major policy programs into dling appetite for attacking the filibuster itself by enact- overridden a Trump veto. This spirit of bipartisan coop- the reconciliation process like the 2001 Bush Tax Cuts, ing changes to Senate rules or for overruling the Senate eration on defence will carry through the Biden presi- Obama’s 2010 Affordable Care Act and, most recently, parliamentarian’s determinations about what can be dency, with most Democrats joining most Republicans the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Biden’s COVID recovery legislated via reconciliation; and (d) even for majority to ensure steady commitment to overall US defence legislation will be considered this way, circumventing votes on the Senate floor, all 50 Democrats must vote policy, spending levels and weapons programs. Defence compromises with any Republican senators, but under- together, or have defections offset by Republicans cross- spending will be a major ongoing target of Democrats scoring the importance of holding Democratic sena- ing the aisle. on the left in both the House and Senate, but on these tors together. This will test Majority Leader Schumer’s issues, the centre will prevail. Accordingly, even if the House leadership can find agree- political and parliamentary skill, in particular, (a) dealing ment among all House Democrats on these contentious Foreign Policy. President Biden has entered office with- with the extraordinary negotiating power of “red state” issues among all the factions in the party — from the out the United States engaged in major wars overseas. Democratic Senators (who can credibly threaten to vote progressives on the left led by Representative Alexan- Biden’s much firmer stance on Russia and President against the legislation and hence can extract concessions dria Ocasio-Cortez to the moderates who won Trump Putin, the aim of restoring effective working relationships and amendments) and (b) using parliamentary proce- districts in the suburbs in 2018 and held them in 2020 with America’s allies in Europe and Asia, and Biden’s dures that keep the comprehensive COVID recovery — the lion’s share of the Biden legislative agenda is dead tougher position on human rights, from Saudi Arabia to package more or less intact, bringing an up-or-down on arrival in the Senate. Burma to China, will be strongly welcomed. The House vote that is much more costly for rebel Democrats to and Senate foreign relations committees will be active vote against. on legislation that will provide incentives and punish- Exceptions that prove the rule ment on human rights issues. There will, however, be several key exceptions of great relevance for Australia:

23 Appropriations and government funding. An enduring Trade. Leaders in Congress on trade will be sympathetic Climate change — a special case. Climate change and trend, even under the Trump presidency, was the ability to Australia’s long-standing fidelity to free trade norms global warming have already proven to be an issue that of the House and Senate to work through the govern- and policies and will pay special attention to China’s is directly affecting Australian politics. Biden’s commit- ment spending (supply) bills for all the government agen- economic coercion of Australia. There is little evidence ment to move aggressively on climate is a pillar of his cies and their operations. The Appropriations Commit- of Congressional support of the United States joining the overall agenda. His stance on climate was crucial to tees have been able in recent years to reach agreements CP-TPP, at least not until the US economy has meaning- winning the support of Senators Bernie Sanders and to keep the government operating. The longest govern- fully recovered from COVID. Elizabeth Warren for the Democratic nomination. In ment shutdown in American history, however, occurred office, Biden has affirmed reaching stringent carbon-re- Military posture. As discussed above on the defence under President Trump, who insisted, as a condition of ducing targets by 2050, and has moved aggressively1.5 spending issues, Congress will welcome continued signing legislation to maintain orderly funding of the through executive orders to reverse Trump policies that further deepening and coordination on the military alli- government, that Congress approve funding for the rolled back environmental regulations, ended carbon-in- ance and overall posture in the Asia Pacific, especially border wall with Mexico.1.3 Trump ultimately backed tensive projects such as the Keystone XL pipeline and with respect to China and its projection of sovereignty down on his demand and normal operations resumed. permit approvals that would have opened public lands and force. This was such a searing political experience that, with and off-shore tracts to oil and gas drilling. a president such as Biden — a creature of Congress — a Big Tech. Australia’s strong stance against the market These measures, especially the support for firm 2050 repeat of that confrontation is highly unlikely. abuses of big tech companies, especially Facebook and targets, have provoked political debate here on Austral- Google, has captured the attention of both members ia’s climate policy. Carbon pricing — a critical lever in real- of Congress who follow these issues closely and the Congress and Australian interests ising emissions targets — is an obvious threshold issue. administration officials and agencies who oversee anti- It is unclear whether the Biden administration would There are several major issues directly affecting Austral- trust and consumer protection issues.1.4 Conversely, welcome or propose legislation on carbon-pricing, but ian interests: there is little love for Big Tech in Congress nor any chance a sustained debate in the US Congress on carbon-pric- of Congress being sympathetic to any claims that social China. Leaders in Congress on China policy are highly ing, even if the legislative passage were to fail, would spill media giants have been treated unfairly by Australia. aware of Australia’s frontline status with respect to China over into Australian domestic politics. and Australia’s alliance credentials. As in the Trump administration, this bipartisan coalition will serve a valu- able role in helping ensure executive branch policy and actions are mindful of Australia’s interests.

24 In the interim, there is nothing the Australian Government This suggests that political spillovers into Australia on Australian national interests dovetail with Biden being can say or do that will slow down, delay or stop any climate and emissions will intensify only in so far as a successful in overseeing America’s recovery from action Biden and his climate advisors —­­ led by former Democratic-controlled Congress actively engages on the the COVID-19 pandemic. A prosperous, capable and Secretary of State John Kerry, who is fully seized of the issue. US policy proposals will also powerfully shape the self-confident United States is more likely to take on the climate issue — take to address climate change. terms of debate here on what Australian policy should burdens of global leadership and projecting power and be.1.6 Conversely, should Biden climate and emissions presence into the Indo-Pacific, of bearing the costs of On pages 52-55 we revisit this issue, assessing that while policy hit a political wall in Washington — with Congress competition with China. any material divergence in climate policy between the the key actor — the intensity of Australian debate may two countries will be an irritant, such differences will not But there are second-order effects at work too, tying not necessarily diminish, but the scope of climate policy in any way threaten the deep fundamental relationship Australian national interests to Biden’s domestic politi- options will likely be limited along similar lines. between the two countries. cal fortunes. American power and prestige abroad are in no small measure functions of the domestic standing We further assess that if Biden were to propose of the incumbent president. Early successes for Biden carbon-pricing legislation, Congressional enactment is will earn him political capital for pushing back against the unlikely. In 2009, the Waxman-Markey “cap-and-trade” AN ENGAGED AMERICA — LED BY A voices of protectionism, isolationism and unilateralism in program passed the House despite the defection of PRESIDENT NOT ONLY SUPPORTIVE OF the Congress. An engaged America — led by a President dozens of Democrats from energy-producing states THE RULES-BASED, INTERNATIONAL not only supportive of the rules-based, international because of the support of a crucial handful of Repub- ORDER BUT WITH THE POLITICAL order but with the political capital to drive the support- licans. The Waxman-Markey Bill was never brought CAPITAL TO DRIVE THE SUPPORTING ing policy and action from Congress — is a stronger and to a vote in the Senate and died. We doubt that in the POLICY AND ACTION FROM CONGRESS more effective alliance partner of Australia. current Congress carbon-pricing would even make it — IS A STRONGER AND MORE EFFECTIVE ALLIANCE PARTNER OF AUSTRALIA. out of the House of Representatives, let alone make it to the Senate floor.

25 STATE OF THE UNITED STATES

26 SECTION 2. HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA ADVANCE PROSPERITY AND RESILIENCE? STRENGTHEN THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL TRADE ARCHITECTURES DR JEFFREY WILSON

28 Context and background appointments to the World Trade Organization (WTO) be politically costly to wind back at home (particularly Appellate Body, rendering its dispute settlement and in the steel sector) and also function as bargaining chips Australia needs to facilitate US re-engagement with rule-enforcement functions ineffective. It aggravated for future negotiations with China. It is unlikely they will the rapidly evolving global and regional trade archi- allies and friends by imposing trade balancing agree- be unilaterally reduced in the near term.2.4 Biden’s “Buy tectures. ments under thinly-veiled threats of diplomatic coer- American” pledge2.5 is not strictly a trade policy but cion. Most significantly, it prosecuted a self-harming indicates that protectionism will remain a feature of US During the Trump administration, the United States with- bilateral trade war with China, which has demonstrably economic policy. Several selections to the Council of drew from several important trade institutions, while failed to either change the US-China trade balance or Economic Advisers have a record of trade scepticism, launching a series of costly — and ultimately ineffec- lever reform to China’s trade practices. suggesting liberalisation is unlikely to be on the imme- tive — trade wars. These policies have compromised diate agenda.2.6 Rejoining the TPP will also be a longer- the integrity of global trade institutions and weakened While the Biden administration has signalled an intent to term proposition, due to opposition within Congress at the benefits of regional trade agreements such as the change trade policy, mixed signals mean its new direc- home and complex negotiations with partners abroad. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). While the Biden admin- tion remains unclear. On the positive side, it has flagged istration has signalled a change in approach to trade a more multilateral approach to managing trade tensions Beyond the costs to the US economy itself, trade policy issues, countervailing domestic and international imper- with China, recognising that Trump’s bilateral trade war under the Trump administration has been harmful to atives mean the direction of its trade policy remains has failed.2.1 The selection of Katherine Tai — a veteran the global and regional trade architectures. The WTO’s unclear. Australia now has an opportunity to shape the trade lawyer with deep China expertise — as the next dispute settlement mechanism has been compromised trade policy outlook of the Biden administration in a way US Trade Representative telegraphs that substantive due to Appellate Body appointment vetoes and cannot that favours rule making, multilateralism, and greater issues (such as intellectual property) will now dominate enforce trade rules in a timely and effective manner.2.7 collaboration with allies and like-minded partners. the agenda.2.2 The United States has begun to re-engage The United States has disengaged from regional trade with the WTO by supporting the appointment of its next diplomacy, depriving these efforts of the political and The Biden administration Director-General and may remove the veto on Appellate economic heft that US leadership offers. Bilateral pres- Body appointments, restoring the global trade dispute sure on China has failed to achieve Trump’s objective The Biden administration inherits a ruinous set of trade settlement mechanism to normal function.2.3 of increasing US exports,2.8 and even then, a focus on policies from its predecessor. Trump’s first presidential trade balancing ignores the real trade policy challenges However, countervailing imperatives mean the Biden act was to withdraw from the TPP, greatly weakening an currently posed by China, such as intellectual property administration is also unlikely to fully recommit to trade institution that locked in a US-preferred model for trade protection and subsidies to state-owned enterprises. liberalisation. The Trump administration vetoed new liberalisation or rule making. Trump’s China tariffs will

29 Table 3. US trade diplomacy under the Trump administration

Target Year Action

Trans-Pacific January 2017 Withdrawal from Trans-Pacific Partnership, rendering entry-into-force numerically impossible Partnership partners

WTO members January 2017 — ongoing Systematic veto of Appellate Body nominations to force US-requested governance reforms; Appellate Body became inquorate on 10 December 2019

Canada and Mexico August 2017 — September 2018 Renegotiation of North American Free Trade Agreement under threat of termination

Korea January — September 2018 Renegotiation of Korea-US Free Trade Agreement under threat of termination

World March 2018 — ongoing Tariffs applied to solar panels, washing machines, steel and aluminium imports on national security grounds; Canada, China, the EU, India, Mexico, Turkey and Russia all impose retaliatory tariffs

China July 2018 — ongoing Escalating the application of tariffs to demand a bilateral trade agreement, rising to cover $550 billion of imports from China; China repeatedly retaliates, with tariffs imposed on $185 billion of exports from the United States

Turkey August 2018 — ongoing Removal of Turkey from US Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme; imposition of additional 25 per cent tariff on Turkish steel (enacted August 2018, withdrawn May 2019, reimposed October 2019)

Japan April — December 2019 Negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement favouring US agricultural exporters under threat of tariff imposition

European Union May 2019 — ongoing Imposition of retaliatory tariffs on $7.5 billion of EU exports in Airbus dispute; threatened imposition of 25 per cent tariff on automobiles to force a trade-balancing bilateral agreement

India June 2019 — ongoing Removal of India from the US Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme

Brazil and Argentina December 2019 Removal of exceptions from steel tariffs in retaliation for alleged currency manipulation

Source: Jeffrey Wilson, “Adapting Australia to an era of geoeconomic competition,” Perth USAsia Centre, January 2021, available at: https://perthusasia.edu.au/our-work/geoeconomics-report

30 Australian interests Policy recommendations

The absence of US trade leadership is a major chal- › Communicate the importance of a functioning WTO system and collaborate on WTO reform lenge for Australia. As a highly open economy, Australia efforts. Australia should clearly reiterate to its alliance partner the value of a rules-based and depends on a reliable and rules-based trade system. Its functional global trading system. It should also work with the United States to support constructive medium size means Australia lacks either the economic WTO reform efforts, particularly in terms of the smooth functioning of the dispute settlement or political heft to defend its trade interests bilaterally, mechanism. so multilateral institutions, such as the WTO globally › Begin preparatory work enabling the United States accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. and the TPP regionally, are of critical importance. US Domestic economic priorities in the United States mean its accession to the TPP will be a long-term disengagement — and at times, non-constructive inter- process. However, preparatory efforts should begin now to address key obstacles. Within the TPP ventions — threaten the reliability of these institutions. It group, Australia should lead discussions on how the (presently untested) accession mechanism will also deprives Australia of a powerful and like-minded operate. With other major TPP economies — such as Japan, Canada and Singapore — it should start partner to work within new trade negotiations. engaging the United States on key reform issues that need to be negotiated. Of key importance are US re-engagement with global and regional trade issues to do with the implementation of intellectual property provisions suspended as a result of the architectures is critical for Australia’s national interests. United States’ departure from the regional agreement in 2017. However, the extent of current US disengagement, and › Support confidence-building through US-Australian leadership in emerging trade platforms. competing domestic and international imperatives, Constructive US engagement in new multilateral trade platforms will help restore global confidence in means the direction and pace of trade policy recali- the United States as a trade policy leader. Australia and the United States could work together in areas bration under the Biden administration cannot be taken of shared priority. A useful starting point is the recently-launched e-commerce negotiations within for granted. Australia should engage the United States the WTO, which Australia co-convenes with Japan and Singapore.2.9 Establishing global e-commerce to encourage and shape patterns of re-engagement in rules will be essential in protecting the 21st-century industries of these economies and would also 2021 and beyond. signal to the world a more engaged and leadership-oriented US trade outlook.

31 ENHANCE HEALTH COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC MATILDA STEWARD

32 Context and background remit to confront a broader suite of health and devel- pandemics, including Biden’s chief of staff Ron Klain opment challenges emerging from the pandemic. This who oversaw the Obama administration’s response to Australia and the United States should build on exist- approach will be crucial for ensuring collective action the 2014 Ebola outbreak. Other picks for key positions ing commitments to strengthen health security in strengthens health systems holistically, rather than — including the Secretary of Homeland Security and Southeast Asia and the Pacific.These efforts must creating parallel infrastructure that operates solely in Ambassador to the United Nations — also played active focus on addressing the secondary impacts of the response to COVID-19 and generates limited long-term roles during the Ebola and Zika outbreaks.3.9 COVID-19 pandemic, which threaten to reverse fragile impact.3.6 gains made across broader health and development But translating this momentum into sustained attention indicators over recent decades. Despite early contain- and resources for the Indo-Pacific will be a considera- ment measures resulting in lower caseloads through- The Biden administration ble challenge. Securing funding for an expanded inter- national response will require ongoing congressional out Southeast Asia and the Pacific compared to other Engagement with multilateral institutions and stronger support in the face of significant challenges facing Amer- regions, progress in controlling the spread of the virus coordination with allies in meeting global health chal- ica’s own COVID-19 response and domestic economy and the ongoing capacity of national governments to lenges is a key priority for the new administration. 3.1 more broadly.3.10 These efforts will also require a recon- respond to outbreaks remains deeply uneven. Diver- President Biden has stressed the need to “restore US ceptualisation of American global health financing, which sion of material and human resources to address global leadership to fight [the COVID-19] pandemic” and has developed under a model of shared responsibility COVID-19 has placed further strain on already weak reversed former President Trump’s withdrawal from the that encourages recipient countries to increase their health systems, causing significant disruption to essen- World Health Organization on his first day in office.3.7 own investments in health systems strengthening along- tial services and stalling momentum towards univer- The White House roadmap for combating coronavirus 3.2 side donor contributions.3.11 Equally, achieving an explicit sal health coverage. An estimated 34.8 million infants includes ambitions for sustained domestic and inter- regional focus will require the introduction of specific throughout Southeast Asia have missed routine vaccina- national funding for global health security that extends 3.3 directives or initiatives led by senior figures within the tions as a result of the pandemic, with health experts beyond emergency funds for health and humanitar- US government. For instance, USAID’s Over the Horizon warning that efforts to control and eradicate malaria in ian assistance. The administration also intends to enact 3.4 Strategic Review — conducted to provide goals for the the Pacific are also at risk. institutional change, creating an office of Global Health agency’s medium- to long-term response to COVID-19 Security and Diplomacy at the State Department and The 2020 AUSMIN Global Health Security Statement — identified 14 focus countries that combined develop- re-establishing the Obama-era Directorate for Global established a foundation for bilateral cooperation in ment need, opportunity for impact, and US national Health Security and Biodefense within the National tackling COVID-19 throughout the region with its pledge security interests, none of which are in Southeast Asia Security Council.3.8 This heightened focus on America’s to strengthen and accelerate health security capacity or the Pacific.3.12 building.3.5 Australia and the Biden administration should contribution to health security has been underpinned recommit to this joint plan of activities with an expanded by personnel appointments with experience navigating

33 Table 4. The Australian Government’s COVID-19 development response: Partnerships for Recovery (published in May 2020)

Focus 2019-20: The swift initial response 2020-21: Investing in regional recovery

› Pacific and Timor-Leste › Our development investments have pivoted FY2020-21 budget: to COVID-19 priorities. All continuing › Southeast Asia › A$4 billion in Overseas Development Assistance aligned with Part- investments are addressing development nerships for Recovery › Global response challenges exacerbated by COVID-19. › Including $80m commitment to Gavi-COVAX Advance Market › Immediate distribution of PPE and other Commitment Priority action areas critical medical supplies. Additional targeted measures: › Health security › $280 million for the Indo-Pacific Response and Recovery Package. › $304.7m COVID-19 Response Package Pacific and Timor-Leste › Stability › Kept critical transport links open in › $23.2m Vaccine Access and Health Security Pacific, Timor-Leste and › Economic recovery our region amid global supply chain Southeast Asia with a cross-cutting focus on disruptions. › Response detailed in 27 tailored COVID-19 Development Response protecting the most vulnerable Plans

Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Infographic: Partnerships for Recovery.” Available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/development/infographic-partnerships-recovery

AUSTRALIA’S NEW PARTNERSHIPS FOR RECOVERY POLICY INCLUDES HEALTH SECURITY AS A CORE ACTION AREA, WHICH, COUPLED WITH AUSTRALIA’S RECENT COMMITMENT OF $500 MILLION TOWARDS THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF VACCINES THROUGHOUT THE REGION, FURTHERS THESE ONGOING HUMANITARIAN AND REPUTATIONAL EFFORTS.

34 Australian interests Pooling resources in pursuit of joint objectives will also Timor-Leste and Indonesia due to the presence of enable Australia to step up its engagement throughout pre-existing partnerships.3.17 As the largest source of Enhanced health cooperation with the United States the region. Despite recent statements by Prime Minis- bilateral COVID-19 aid to Southeast Asia — with major in Southeast Asia and the Pacific would help to ensure ter Morrison that “ASEAN’s centrality is at the core of contributions to the Philippines, Cambodia and Myan- a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific, a key Australian Australia’s vision for the Indo-Pacific,”3.16 Canberra’s mar — further collaboration with the United States can national interest. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, pivoted aid program focuses primarily on the Pacific, help Australia bridge this gap.3.18 Australia had taken significant steps towards raising its profile and commitment to strengthening regional health systems and resilience, namely through the 2017 Indo-Pacific Health Security Initiative and associated Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security.3.13 Australia’s new Policy recommendations Partnerships for Recovery policy includes health secu- Australia and the United States should: rity as a core action area, which, coupled with Australia’s recent commitment of $500 million towards the equi- › Partner to protect and restore essential health services in priority countries. These efforts could table distribution of vaccines throughout the region, focus on the delivery of routine immunisations that have been disrupted during the pandemic, or on a furthers these ongoing humanitarian and reputational specific infectious disease at risk of re-emergence. efforts.3.14 Such projects also align with broader regional › Commit to joint investments in digital health technologies. These would offer opportunities priorities, including ASEAN’s COVID-19 Comprehen- to support better care and disease surveillance and can act as an important tool for public sive Recovery Framework which focuses on enhancing communication during health emergencies. Financing should address the digital divide and ensure health systems and accelerating inclusive digital trans- equitable access for rural communities and women. Such investments would align with the goals formation.3.15 of the WHO 2020-2025 Global Strategy on Digital Health and present an avenue to operationalise the MOU between the United States Agency for International Development and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade from July 2020 supporting high-quality and sustainable development outcomes in partner countries through digital connectivity.3.19

› Deepen regional and bilateral engagement in the Pacific. Australia should express its support for bipartisan legislation currently before Congress that provides an expanded framework for US foreign policy in the Pacific islands. The Boosting Long-Term US Engagement (BLUE) Pacific Act proposes increased diplomatic and development presence, supports public health programs, and proposes funding of more than triple current levels of assistance. Importantly, the framework would integrate the US approach with other partners including Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Taiwan.3.20

35 RE-ENGAGE THE UNITED STATES IN GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR ADAM KAMRADT-SCOTT

36 Context and background retracted the Trump administration’s effort to withdraw the United States from the World Health Organiza- WORLD LEADERS AND GLOBAL HEALTH The recent change in presidential leadership provides 4.3 tion. The day after the inauguration, the administration EXPERTS HAVE POINTED TO THE a key opportunity for Australia to engage the United released its National Strategy for COVID-19 Response VACILLATION BETWEEN REPUBLICAN States in strengthening global and regional health and Pandemic Preparedness in which restoring US AND DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIONS security. Within weeks of President Biden taking office, leadership and advancing health security to be better ON MULTIPLE POLICY ISSUES LIKE THE several Trump administration policies relating to global prepared for future health threats was identified as one GLOBAL GAG RULE, AND MORE RECENTLY health were retracted or overturned. This notable 4.4 THE FORMER PRESIDENT’S ATTACK ON THE of seven priority goals. Coinciding with the strategy WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHICH change in direction has been described as the United document’s release, Dr Anthony Fauci confirmed to HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A PERCEPTION States returning to its former global leadership role, but the World Health Organization’s Executive Board that THE UNITED STATES IS UNRELIABLE. the reputational damage will take longer to repair. World the United States would join the COVAX initiative that leaders and global health experts have pointed to the seeks to provide two billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines vacillation between Republican and Democratic admin- to low and middle-income countries, increase techni- istrations on multiple policy issues like the global gag cal cooperation, and re-engage in multilateral efforts to 4.1 rule, and more recently the former president’s attack defeat COVID-19 and ensure enhanced preparedness.4.5 4.2 Australian interests on the World Health Organization, which have contrib- To assist in coordinating these efforts, the Biden admin- uted to a perception the United States is unreliable. This istration has re-instituted the National Security Council Australia’s interests are best served by seeing the United presents an opportunity for Australia to work closely Directorate on Global Health Security and Biodefense States re-engage with the global health community, but with the United States to repair the country’s standing and pledged to reinvigorate the Global Health Security it is unlikely the United States will return to the leader- in the global health community while simultaneously Agenda,4.6 both of which were initiatives of the former ship role it once assumed. There are two key reasons for strengthening regional and global health security. Obama administration but which had languished under this. First, for at least the initial 12-24 months of the Biden President Trump.4.7 Further measures, such as creating a administration, the government will be appropriately The Biden administration National Center for Epidemic Forecasting and Outbreak focused on containing the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 Analytics, advocating for the creation of a new United virus (commonly known as the coronavirus) throughout On assuming office, President Biden moved to revoke Nations facilitator for biological threats, and working the United States. This is likely to focus resources and several decisions of the former administration pertain- with multilateral partners including the G7, G20, ASEAN, attention on the United States’ domestic situation in the ing to global health. As pledged during the election and African Union to strengthen preparedness are also near term. Second, several other countries sought to fill campaign, on his first day in office, President Biden outlined in the National Strategy.4.8 the leadership vacuum created in global health govern-

37 Table 5. Status of the Biden administration’s proposed actions on global health and pandemic response (as of 4 February 2021)

Action Requires Administrative Status or Congressional Action?

Restore the National Security Council’s Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense Administrative 4

Rescind the Mexico City Policy Administrative 4

Restore funding to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Administrative 4

Release a National COVID-19 Response Strategy, including a strategy for international engagement Administrative 4

Restore funding to WHO and reverse Trump administration decision to withdraw from WHO membership Administrative 4

Support the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator and join COVAX Administrative/Congressional* 4

Create position of Coordinator of the COVID-19 Response and Counselor, reporting to the President Administrative 4

Develop a diplomatic outreach plan led by the State Department to enhance the US response to COVID-19, Administrative** 4 including through the provision of support to the most vulnerable communities

Provide US$11 billion to support “international health and humanitarian response,” including efforts to distribute Congressional Proposed countermeasures for COVID-19, build capacity required to fight COVID-19 and emerging biological threats

Ensure adequate, sustained US funding for global health security Congressional Proposed

Expand US diplomacy on global health and pandemic response, including elevating US support for the Administrative Proposed Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)

Call for the creation of permanent international catalytic financing mechanism for global health security and Administrative Proposed work with international financial institutions, including multilateral development banks, to promote support for combating COVID-19 and strengthening global health security

Call for creation of a permanent facilitator within the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General for Administrative Proposed response to high consequence biological events

Source: Jennifer Kates and Josh Michaud, “What Will Be the Contours of the Biden Administration’s Global Health Agenda?“ 9 February 2021. Available at: https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/ issue-brief/what-will-be-the-contours-of-the-biden-administrations-global-health-agenda/ *Depending on the details of the administration’s proposal to support the ACT-Accelerator and join COVAX, Congressional approval may be required. **The National Security Memorandum requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Representative of the United States to the United Nations, the Administrator of USAID, and the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to develop this plan within 14 days or as soon as possible. 38 ance by the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ poli- Policy recommendations cies, and now appear unwilling to cede that influence, viewing the United States as an “unreliable ally.”4.9 › Initiate ministerial discussions for a joint regional health security initiative involving the United States, Australia, Japan and India. Renewed interest in ‘The Quad’ multilateral arrangement provides Australia can play an important diplomatic role in a key opportunity to now strengthen regional health security, which reflects long-standing shared supporting the United States — including the endorse- interests by all four governments. Intra-regional vaccine production and distribution could provide an ment of its reliability as a trusted partner — where shared immediate area for collaboration while intergovernmental talks commence to identify new synergies interests exist. It can also actively seek out a number of and areas for cooperation in strengthening regional disease surveillance and response capacities.4.13 new opportunities to enhance US-Australia cooperation. Global health security is one such area. The Austral- › Further strengthen civil-military cooperation in health security in the Indo-Pacific region. As 4.14 ian Government’s regional health security initiative that documented in the 2019 AUSMIN statement on global health security, the US military Indo-Pacific witnessed the creation of the Department of Foreign Command and the Australian Defence Force have made good initial progress in strengthening civilian Affairs and Trade (DFAT)’s Indo-Pacific Centre for Health and military cooperation for health security. These efforts are only at a nascent stage though and can Security,4.10 the recently announced A$500 million be further expanded via providing technical assistance and training to other militaries in the region regional vaccine initiative,4.11 and efforts between the engaged in health assistance. These measures would create new opportunities for military-military US military and Australian Defence Force to strengthen cooperation while also serving to strengthen civil-military norms and enhance regional stability and civil-military health cooperation across the Indo-Pa- security. cific have provided a solid basis for further US-Australia › Strengthen and re-invigorate the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). The GHSA initiative was cooperation.4.12 Strengthening and building on these launched in 2014 under the Obama administration and offers a viable intergovernmental platform for existing initiatives, aligning development assistance to supporting countries in the Indo-Pacific region to strengthen their capacities in disease detection, prioritise strengthening health systems and workforces, surveillance and response.4.15 The GHSA, which languished under the former Trump administration, re-invigorating some of the health-related multilateral could be relaunched and repurposed to collaborate with other multilateral institutions such as the initiatives, and working constructively together to reform Asian Development Bank and World Bank to provide targeted development assistance for regional the World Health Organization offer a number of oppor- health system strengthening and workforce capacity building. The GHSA could also be used tunities to not only counter moves by other countries to constructively to develop consensus on key issues, such as reform of the World Health Organization increase their influence throughout the region but also and proposals to strengthen multilateral cooperation in global health security. demonstrate a re-engaged and responsive United States.

39 ACTIVATE THE AUSTRALIA-US-JAPAN TRILATERAL INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERSHIP HAYLEY CHANNER

40 Context and background Launched partly in response to China’s BRI, in November 2018 Australia, the United States and Japan announced WITH THE SMALL AND MEDIUM ECONOMIES Australia, the United States and Japan should acti- the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment OF THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION LOOKING TO vate trilateral mechanisms to support the private in the Indo-Pacific.5.1 The Trilateral Partnership aims to BUILD CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO MEET sector to take up infrastructure funding initiatives in provide regional governments with an alternative, trans- THE DEMANDS OF THEIR POPULATIONS the Indo-Pacific. Amidst the many upheavals of 2020, parent source of infrastructure funding and emphasises AND GROWTH, THERE IS A SMALL AND the value of infrastructure partnerships in the Indo-Pa- working with the private sector to improve outcomes FAST-CLOSING WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY cific to Australian foreign and security objectives has FOR AUSTRALIA, THE UNITED STATES AND relative to purely state-financed programs like the BRI. JAPAN TO CAPITALISE ON THIS MOMENT. fallen by the wayside. This issue matters because one In November 2019, the Trilateral Partnership announced of the most permanent ways in which China’s claims the Blue Dot Network (BDN) — an initiative to reduce the to regional leadership is being asserted is via the provi- risk for private investors by providing certification for sion of the Indo-Pacific’s underpinning infrastructure. government, private sector, and civil society infrastruc- China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is providing essen- 5.2 ture projects that met international quality standards. Chile will likely be continuing. Furthermore, other than tial transport and information connectivity to the region, While primarily a certification body, it can also provide BDN’s inaugural trilateral Steering Committee in Janu- however, BRI projects are not always transparent, nor access to US$60 billion in capital in loans or equity ary 2020 — which discussed a possible vision statement, do they meet global quality standards. through the US International Development Finance membership criteria, and responsibilities5.5 — the BDN Corporation (US-IDFC). However, specific mechanisms Australia, the United States and Japan all agree that to has yet to issue certification standards businesses can remain to be determined. provide regional partners with fair, open and ethical benchmark against more than a year later. financing alternatives — and to compete effectively with Despite efforts by the Trilateral Partnership, no public-pri- the BRI, they must leverage the resources of the private vate infrastructure projects have been cemented. The The Biden administration sector. Leveraging private sector capital and expertise first and only project under this trilateral framework — in our development agencies’ infrastructure program- an undersea fibre optic cable connecting Palau with As evidenced by the last two years, Australia’s, the United ming is critical to increasing our impact and strategic the Indo-Pacific — is being done in partnership with the States’ and Japan’s development agencies’ infrastruc- success. With the small and medium economies of the Palau Government rather than industry.5.3 The only other ture programming is not adequately structured to facil- region looking to build critical infrastructure to meet project on the horizon is an undersea cable connecting itate private sector take-up. In the case of the United the demands of their populations and growth, there Santiago with Sydney5.4 but again, progress is slow — States, not even a major restructure of its development is a small and fast-closing window of opportunity for discussions between Canberra, Washington and Tokyo agencies in 2018, whereby the Overseas Private Invest- 5.6 Australia, the United States and Japan to capitalise on for a project focused predominantly on Australia and ment Corporation was transformed into the US-IDFC, this moment. has addressed this issue.

41 Figure 7. Chinese investment and contracts in the Indo-Pacific, 2014-19 (US$ billions)

KOREA JAPAN $8.7 $8.5

PAKISTAN Although the US-IDFC possesses new development $46.1 finance tools specifically designed to support private- BANGLADESH sector-led projects such as small grants, loan guaran- INDIA tees, and equity investments, several factors including $23.2 VIETNAM $18.0 lacking communication and an inaccessible online inter- $7.9 OTHER ASEAN face are keeping business away.5.7 Following a meeting THAILAND $35.4 of the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership with Vietnam $9.5 CAMBODIA in October 2020,5.8 the US-IDFC has yet to make any $10.0 further public announcements regarding the progress SRI LANKA or future direction of this initiative.5.9 $6.5 PACIFIC ISLANDS MALAYSIA $4.2 $28.9 SINGAPORE $34.5

INDONESIA $32.7 PART OF THE DIFFICULTLY IS THAT AUSTRALIA, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN HAVE SEPARATE, NOT ALWAYS EQUAL, INFRASTRUCTURE PRIORITIES, AND THE WIDE RANGE OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS CAN SCATTER FOCUS, PREVENTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROJECT PIPELINE.

42 Source: https://perthusasia.edu.au/our-work/geoeconomics-report Australian interests Policy recommendations

Supporting strategic infrastructure projects remains one Australia, the United States and Japan collectively should: of the most tangible ways to promote growth, demon- › Discuss the potential for a trilateral infrastructure hub established in Southeast Asia, initially strate regional leadership, and further Australia’s national dedicated to one aspect of infrastructure provision to the region. A central hub that focused on interests. Australia can maximise its impact in this space one major project, for instance, internet connectivity, would help narrow focus. The three countries by working with like-minded partners and leveraging could then reach out to industry partners in the field and cultivate and leverage business expertise to private-sector investment. However, clearly, there have deliver similar projects to multiple countries over several years. A hub and single-area focus would been challenges to working trilaterally and getting the help catalyse the Trilateral Partnership reputation in the region as a credible alternative to the BRI. private sector on board. › Engage business via a regular Indo-Pacific infrastructure investment symposium to understand Part of the difficultly is that Australia, the United States industry needs and promote interest in public-private partnerships.5.10 When feasible, Australia and Japan have separate, not always equal, infrastruc- could propose an infrastructure symposium hosted in Southeast Asia bringing together Australian, US ture priorities, and the wide range of regional infrastruc- and Japanese governments and businesses. A symposium with latitude for private discussions could ture needs can scatter focus, preventing the establish- help government quickly understand where the roadblocks are for industry, including on regulatory ment of a project pipeline. In addition, to lift the BDN concerns, as well as share information regarding government priorities on a country and sectoral out of obscurity, some basic benchmarks must be set basis. and the commercial benefits to certification proactively pushed out to business. Further, a review of the US-IDFC › Clearly outline the BDN’s certification standards and procedures to access partner government to understand the positive and negative effects of the funding. In addition, the rewards of certification to business should be explicit — for instance, allowing restructure on attracting private investment could assist business to trumpet their prioritisation of environmental protection and sustainability as a responsible the United States to make adjustments as necessary, global citizen. The BDN could also be expanded to include base-level grants (non-repayable financial as well as help Australia and Japan decide if and how contribution provided under strict guidelines). they should implement similar changes within their own development agencies. › Evaluate and reform development programming in the infrastructure space, based on the priority of maximising private-sector engagement. Recalibrating the orientation of relevant agencies to the specific needs of the private sector will greatly augment their capacity to leverage involvement. An assessment of infrastructure programming in all three countries should be conducted to identify how to make these programs more business-friendly.

43 COLLABORATE TO COMBAT MISINFORMATION AND THE THREAT OF DOMESTIC EXTREMISM ELLIOTT BRENNAN

44 Context and background The Trump administration quickened truth decay. The leader of the world’s oldest and most renowned democ- Australia and the United States should support the THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC WAS AN racy was disinterested in upholding the institutions that ACCELERANT — BUT NOT THE ROOT CAUSE establishment of a regular track 1.5 dialogue between underpinned it. The COVID-19 pandemic then caused — FOR THE LINKED INFORMATION AND government, business, and civil society leaders on immense, health and financial hardship and contributed EXTREMISM CRISIS FACING THE WORLD the spread of violent extremism and its drivers. severe damage to social cohesion. Meanwhile, internet TODAY. TRADITIONAL NEWS SOURCES use soared in concert with prolonged lockdowns.6.5 HAVE BEEN FINANCIALLY SQUEEZED FOR The links between flawed information ecosystems YEARS WHILE THE INTERNET GIANTS and domestic extremism are now explicit and well-ac- With the above factors in place, the world was primed APPLYING THE BULK OF THE PRESSURE knowledged following the failed Capitol insurrection for the rapid scaling of misinformation within individu- HAVE SHIRKED ANY REAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONTENT THEY HOST AND on 6 January 2021. American security and intelligence als’ information ecosystems and far-right groups and PROMOTE, EVEN IN MANY CASES WHEN agencies will be dealing with an emboldened extreme 6.6 conspiratorial grifters were ready to exploit it. IT WAS CLEARLY EXTREMIST OR OUTRIGHT right-wing domestic terror threat for years to come as CONSPIRACY THEORIST CONTENT. a result of the belief among many that the presidential election was rigged.6.1 But both the explosion of violence The Biden administration and erosion of fact were a long time in the making and The scale of this challenge does not pale in comparison 6.2 long foretold. Australia is in a position to avoid the full to those like economic recovery, climate change or the Australia and the United States are in the process of fate of the United States in this regard. Working with rise of an authoritarian China. In fact, solving the United rewriting the online regulatory landscape. While American counterparts will be essential given that many States’ domestic security and information crises is crit- Australia is at the vanguard of some issues like media of the solutions strike through American jurisdictions, ical to each. like Silicon Valley.6.3 bargaining, the US Congress now has the resolve to regu- But like the other problems facing the Biden adminis- late the tech giants headquartered in its jurisdictions. The COVID-19 pandemic was an accelerant — but not the tration, these are intractable. The Republican Party is The Biden administration is likely to increase the scope root cause — for the linked information and extremism deeply divided. So long as conspiracy theories are flour- of anti-trust suits already filed against Google and Face- crisis facing the world today. Traditional news sources ishing within its ranks and giving those views legitimacy, book, embark on data privacy and algorithmic transpar- have been financially squeezed for years while the the Biden administration will struggle to truly amend ency pushes and look closely at Amazon’s market posi- internet giants applying the bulk of the pressure have the problem.6.7 tion, including through the lens of its labour practices. shirked any real responsibility for the content they host and promote, even in many cases when it was clearly extremist or outright conspiracy theorist content.6.4

45 There is bipartisan consensus that Section 230 of the US Communications Decency Act (1996)6.8 ­— which does not RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM NOW ACCOUNTS FOR AS MUCH AS 40 PER CENT OF THE consider internet platforms like Twitter and Facebook AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION’S CASELOAD IN AUSTRALIA, A to be publishers — needs to be made fit for purpose. DRAMATIC INCREASE FROM 2016 WHERE IT WAS ESTIMATED TO BE 10-15 PER CENT. Democrats broadly seek to impose more responsibil- EXTREME RIGHT GROUPS, INCLUDING NEO-NAZIS, ARE INCREASINGLY EMBRACING ENCRYPTED MESSAGING PLATFORMS TO ORGANISE IN SECRECY BUT HAVE ALSO ity on the bigger platforms, while Republicans accuse 6.9 HELD VERY PUBLIC GATHERINGS INDICATING THAT THEY ARE EMBOLDENED. them of excessive censorship. This bipolarity will belie efforts to truly reform the media landscape in a way that reflects the realities of the 21st century.6.10

While any regulatory measures will take time, the threat of violence partly born of broken information ecosys- tems remains pressing. The Biden administration is taking steps to seriously address the threat of far-right extremism from a national security perspective, includ- ing a comprehensive threat assessment of domestic extremism being undertaken by the Director of National Intelligence in cooperation with the FBI and the Depart- ment of Homeland Security.6.11 This marks a definitive step into the post-9/11 paradigm of domestic security. Australia is also in the process of exploring the scope of these problems in the form of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’s Inquiry into extremist movements and radicalism in Australia.6.12

46 Australian interests Policy recommendations

Damaged information systems and right-wing extrem- › Australia should support the establishment of a regular track 1.5 dialogue with the United States ism represent clear and present dangers for Australia. on countering violent extremism and its drivers. Australia and the United States have sound and Right-wing extremism now accounts for as much as long-standing intelligence-sharing arrangements through the Five Eyes collective and have also 40 per cent of the Australian Security Intelligence participated in sustained multilateral initiatives since 2001 through the United Nations and bodies like Organisation (ASIO)’s caseload in Australia, a dramatic the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on the matter of counterterrorism.6.18 There is also increase from 2016 where it was estimated to be 10-15 a strong history of official agreements between their respective counter-intelligence coordination per cent.6.13 Extreme right groups, including neo-Nazis, centres.6.19 But following multiple intelligence failures in the United States,6.20 and a rising threat in are increasingly embracing encrypted messaging plat- Australia,6.21 new foundations are needed. Both governments recognise this and are undertaking forms to organise in secrecy but have also held very independent internal reviews into the changing domestic security landscape. These efforts would public gatherings indicating that they are emboldened.6.14 be complemented by convening government leaders in coordination with business leaders at the In statements to parliamentary joint committees, both coalface, and civil society leaders and researchers who built an intimate knowledge of this emerging the Australian Federal Police and the New South Wales landscape before it presented itself fully as a threat to national security. Crime Commission have testified that COVID-19 has › Such a forum would help to sharpen both Australia and the United States’ existing participation in driven a rise in right-wing extremism online.6.15 And, of multilateral fora and would give necessary context allowing collegial and pragmatic discussions course, it was an Australian man in Christchurch who given Australia and the United States’ many shared values. conducted the deadliest explicitly extreme right-wing 6.16 terrorist attack in recent decades. › Australia already participates in a similar dialogue on counterterrorism with the European Union6.22 and has previously participated in track 1.5 dialogues with the United States on critical issues like With a high-profile vaccine roll out, the threat of social defence and cybersecurity. unrest, violence and terrorism at associated crowded places is real and demands vigilance. Attacks on 5G › The dialogue’s scope should include the role of big tech. Both the United States and Australia towers rolled out in the United Kingdom and even New are beginning a once-in-a-generation regulatory effort in this area and the new foundation must Zealand demonstrate the short leap from conspira- address the conditions that have let misinformation and conspiracy theories fester to the advantage 6.17 cy-fuelled extremism to violence and terrorism. of extremist recruiters.

47 STRENGTHEN INDO-PACIFIC VACCINE PARTNERSHIPS ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR ADAM KAMRADT-SCOTT

48 Context and background three years and will capitalise on the efforts undertaken by the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) and THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION’S Australia should actively engage the United States the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)’s JOINT DECISIONS TO JOIN COVAX to partner in making COVID-19 vaccines available Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security (CHS) prior to AND REVERSE THE PLANNED UNITED across the Indo-Pacific region, including via multi- the pandemic — to fast-track regulatory approval and STATES’ WITHDRAWAL FROM THE lateral initiatives. distribution of medical products. This framework will WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION HAS accelerate the availability of COVID-19 vaccines across ALREADY BEEN WELCOMED BY THE Several countries in the Indo-Pacific region are expe- INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A SIGN the region once they have received TGA approval.7.3 riencing high levels of SARS-CoV-2 (commonly known OF THE UNITED STATES’ WILLINGNESS as the coronavirus) transmission, which has contrib- In contrast, the United States has provided little detailed TO RE-ENGAGE IN MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO DEFEAT COVID-19. uted to significant demand for COVID-19 vaccines. In information to date on how it will directly support coun- response, China and Russia have actively engaged in tries throughout the Indo-Pacific region, nor how it will “vaccine diplomacy” to expand their influence and pres- work with key regional stakeholders and allies to contain ence in countries of strategic significance to Australia, and eliminate the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including fair, rapid 7.1 including Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. A well-co- and equitable distribution of currently available COVID- ordinated, whole-of-region approach to the distribution 19 vaccines. international commitments, President Biden announced and administration of COVID-19 vaccines will be critical at the G7 meeting in February 2021 the United States will to halting the ongoing transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 contribute US$4 billion towards the COVAX initiative,7.6 a virus, avoid duplication of effort, and ensure cost-ef- The Biden administration multinational arrangement aiming to provide COVID-19 vaccines to low and middle-income countries that might fectiveness of development assistance. A comprehen- The primary focus of the Biden administration through- otherwise lack timely access.7.7 Given the Trump admin- sive Indo-Pacific vaccination strategy will also aid global out 2021 is on containing and eliminating the spread of istration had declined to join COVAX, pledging instead economic recovery. the SARS-CoV-2 virus throughout the United States.7.4 an ‘America First’ vaccine policy,7.8 the Biden admin- As part of its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, On 14 January 2021, then President-Elect Biden released istration’s joint decisions to join COVAX and reverse Australia in November 2020 announced a Regional the “American Rescue Plan” which aims to secure an the planned United States’ withdrawal from the World Vaccine Access and Health Security Initiative, which additional US$1.9 trillion from Congress to launch a Health Organization has already been welcomed by the is designed to provide “safe, effective and affordable federal vaccination program, offer direct financial relief international community as a sign of the United States’ 7.2 COVID-19 vaccines for the Pacific and Southeast Asia.” to Americans, and provide community support for willingness to re-engage in multilateral approaches to The initiative entails a A$500 million commitment over struggling businesses and communities.7.5 In terms of defeat COVID-19.

49 What is the COVAX initiative? Yet while the Biden campaign released a series of foreign policy statements on restoring American leadership COVAX is a joint initiative between the World Health Organization, the Coalition for Epidemic Prepared- and working to improve relations with Central Amer- ness Innovation (CEPI) and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (a global public-private global health partnership). ica and Africa,7.11 no equivalent policy positions were The initiative aims to help facilitate the rapid development and manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines and outlined on the Biden team’s future engagement with ensure their equitable and fair distribution to all countries.7.9 COVAX has guaranteed it will purchase two the Indo-Pacific region or China specifically. This has led billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines and distribute them to countries so that they can vaccinate at least to widespread speculation on how President Biden will 20 per cent of their population. The initiative is particularly important for low-income countries that approach wider US engagement in the Indo-Pacific.7.12 would otherwise struggle to gain access to COVID-19 vaccines due to cost barriers, ‘vaccine nationalism,’ and supply issues due to limited production capacity. At least five vaccine manufacturers have currently signed supply agreements with COVAX, and it is expected COVAX will commence distributing vaccines Australian interests 7.10 in the first quarter of 2021. Australia has a number of intersecting interests regarding COVID-19 vaccines that will be best served by a more regionally engaged United States. Given the combined population size of Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands, Australia’s regional vaccine initiative will be insufficient to meet the region’s needs. New Zealand has pledged its excess COVID-19 vaccines to Pacific island countries for free,7.13 which will help prioritise Australia’s support for JOINT US-AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND Southeast Asian countries; but additional international VACCINE ARRANGEMENTS, IN ADDITION TO SUPPORT PROVIDED VIA THE COVAX contributions will be critical to containing the SARS- INITIATIVE, WILL ALSO POTENTIALLY CoV-2 virus throughout the region and reopening tour- HELP COUNTER SOME OF THE EFFORTS ism and trade. Joint US-Australia-New Zealand vaccine BY CHINA AND RUSSIA TO USE THEIR arrangements, in addition to support provided via the VACCINES TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE COVAX initiative, will also potentially help counter some IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. of the efforts by China and Russia to use their vaccines to increase their regional influence.

50 Specifically, China’s pledge to make its COVID-19 Policy recommendations vaccines a ‘global public good’ has been accompanied › by high-level diplomatic missions to promote its vaccines Establish a joint US-Australia-New Zealand COVID-19 vaccine taskforce to pool procurement to countries across the region and further abroad.7.14 and work with partners to coordinate vaccine distribution and administration across Southeast These vaccine diplomacy/soft power efforts have been Asia and the Pacific. Vaccine manufacturers have already been identified as elevating prices for recognised as an attempt to make “strategic inroads” into individual countries, which is best countered by multinational purchasing platforms. A US-Australia- New Zealand taskforce can work with countries in the region and international platforms like the the region,7.15 with some characterising China’s efforts COVAX initiative, and the World Health Organization’s South-East Asia and Western Pacific regional as building a “Health Silk Road” commensurate with the offices, to coordinate the purchase, delivery and administration of COVID vaccines. A joint taskforce Belt and Road Initiative.7.16 Yet concerns remain about the will also help prevent duplication of effort, ensure cost-effectiveness of development assistance, efficacy of some of China’s COVID vaccines,7.17 and infor- prevent wastage, and facilitate a more rapid distribution and administration across the region. mation is beginning to emerge of significant price vari- ation in advance purchase agreements between coun- › Enable additional financing options through multilateral institutions to increase manufacturing tries,7.18 raising the prospect that Indo-Pacific countries and vaccine availability. The COVAX initiative provides one of the most important platforms for might face having to vaccinate their populations twice distributing an initial supply of COVID vaccines to countries eligible to receive official development at considerable expense if current vaccines provide assistance, but the initiative remains significantly underfunded. In addition, COVAX will not meet insufficient protection. It is therefore in Australia’s short, countries’ full needs, necessitating additional measures. Enabling financing arrangements via the Asian medium and long-term interests that proven safe and Development Bank to support the construction of new manufacturing facilities, and the World Bank effective vaccines are made available, distributed and to support direct procurement from existing manufacturers will supplement the COVAX initiative. administered as soon as possible. The United States’ Helping countries gain access to proven safe and effective vaccines directly from manufacturers via support for an Indo-Pacific vaccine drive will be critical loans and financing arrangements will also circumvent indemnity problems associated with donated to ensuring that outcome. vaccines and place decision-making back in the hands of national governments.

› The United States and Australia lead an initiative in the World Trade Organization to waive intellectual property rights to rapidly upscale regionally-based manufacturing of approved, efficacious vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics. Intellectual property (IP) barriers on COVID vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics via the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) framework continue to impede rapid upscaling of critical medical products to contain the SARS-CoV-2 virus.7.19 This is despite the fact the TRIPS agreement permits countries to waive IP considerations in national emergencies.7.20 Australia, the United States, and other like- minded countries like Canada and the United Kingdom could work constructively to waive or partially waive existing IP protections, allowing for vaccine producers in India, Indonesia, Vietnam and South Korea amongst others, to commence manufacturing. This will be particularly important in advance of second-generation COVID vaccines to counter currently circulating and future variants. 51 FIND COMMON AREAS OF COOPERATION IN BOLSTERING RESILIENCE TO CLIMATE CHANGE PROFESSOR SIMON JACKMAN AND JARED MONDSCHEIN

52 Context and background But of special note is the way that the Biden admin- Many of Biden’s climate and energy policy aspirations istration intends for climate change considerations to are not controversial and are widely endorsed (if tacitly) Australia and the United States should co-invest in feature heavily in US foreign and trade policy, particu- throughout American society. Well before Biden’s the development of clean energy solutions. larly whether or not it will implement a campaign pledge campaign, leading multinational firms, many US states, of “carbon adjustment fees or quotas on carbon-in- and institutions in civil society had already committed The Biden administration is pursuing an ambitious tensive goods from countries that are failing to meet to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 — or earlier.8.6 climate agenda, its elements signalled well in advance their climate and environmental obligations.”8.4 Among From this perspective, the surprise is not so much the during the 2020 presidential election campaign. Austral- Biden’s first announcements after winning the election apparent boldness of Biden’s policies, but the trench- ian interest in this policy domain runs high, with several was the appointment of John Kerry as Special Presi- ant opposition of the Trump administration to climate commentators speculating that climate change policy dential Envoy for Climate and designating this position change policy. will become a pressure point between the Biden admin- 8.1 as a member of the National Security Council. Kerry’s istration and the Morrison government and hence, a Second, there is broad support for injecting climate seniority and status further underscore the importance rare but vivid instance of public disagreement in the change considerations into foreign policy, trade and of the Biden aspiration for the United States to lead inter- US-Australia relations. national security policy. As reported on page 12, survey national efforts on climate change. research by the United States Studies Centre finds that Within a month of taking office, the Biden administra- Two features of Biden’s proposals warrant elaboration. 68 per cent of Americans rate dealing with global climate tion rejoined the Paris Climate Accord, cancelled the change as a very or somewhat important goal of US Keystone pipeline and restored environmental regulation First, Biden’s proposals enjoy deep support among the foreign policy. and rule-making processes rolled back by the Trump Democratic rank-and-file, while being carefully tailored 8.2 administration. Biden also announced the intention to appeal to moderate and independent voters, or at More specifically, as shown in Figure 8, the same survey for the United States to have a “carbon pollution-free least not alienate those segments of the electorate. finds 46 per cent of Americans agree that the US Govern- electricity sector no later than 2035” and be “on a path” to During the presidential campaign, Biden insisted that ment should “reward countries who do more to stop 8.3 achieve net-zero emissions, economy-wide, by 2050. his climate change policy was more moderate than the climate change with more favourable trade deals, and These policy changes and aspirations give voice to the “Green New Deal” and that his administration would impose costs on those that do not.” Only 20 per cent of Biden campaign’s plan to spend around US$2 trillion on not oppose fracking though he simultaneously advo- Americans are opposed to an explicit link of preferen- “a clean energy revolution and environmental justice.” cated massive investments to steer the US economy to tial trading arrangements with climate change action. a low-carbon future.8.5 Nearly three-quarters of Biden voters agree with this proposition, highlighting the depth of political demand on climate change action in the Democratic base.

53 Figure 8. Biden supporters overwhelmingly want US trade policy linked to climate change Australian interests Percentages of respondents giving each indicated response, by 2020 presidential vote, January 2021 survey Climate Envoy John Kerry is still building his office Question asked: Should the United States reward countries who do more to stop climate change with more favourable and the details of the international-facing elements of trade deals and impose costs on those that do not? Biden’s climate policy remain a work in progress, as are any first-order implications for Australia. Trump voters 31 14 36 13 5 Strongly disagree Disagree In the first week of the Biden administration, a phone call Neither agree or disagree between Kerry and Australia’s Minister for Energy and Others 6 6 46 33 8 Agree Emissions Reduction Angus Taylor appeared to show Strongly Agree agreement around the importance of driving techno- Biden voters 2 24 40 32 logical solutions to climate change, flagging enhanced US-Australia coordination on research and development into low-carbon energy technologies.8.9 Yet in late Febru- All 13 7 34 28 18 ary 2021, Kerry noted to a public audience that “Australia has had some differences with us, we’ve not been able to get on the same page completely”8.10 — the closest the Biden administration has come to criticism of Australian Biden campaign promises about imposing costs on The Biden administration climate change policies.8.11 international climate laggards have thus far not trans- Domestic US politics will limit broader congressional lated into policy. Instead, the Biden administration has Carbon-based, border adjustment taxes remain an legislation on climate change (see page 24 for further focused on positive measures, stressing that a “zero unsettled subject of debate within the administration, details). But actions already undertaken by the US exec- emissions future offers remarkable opportunity for busi- albeit one getting increasingly more attention.8.12 At the utive branch span the “whole of government,” with prac- ness, for clean, green jobs, for economic growth”8.8 in moment, Australia may need to be more concerned tically every US federal department and agency — from an effort to “build back better” — linking climate change about the implementation of such a tax by the European Energy and Transportation to Treasury, Commerce and policy with popular initiatives such as investing in US Union, where the debate is more developed, and the the US Trade Representative — directed to commit to infrastructure and economic recovery from the COVID- likelihood of implementation may be as early as 2023.8.13 climate initiatives via executive orders issued by Presi- 19 pandemic. dent Biden.8.7

54 Australia will likely escape overt, first-order pressure Biden administration policies in the “technology-not-tax” The very same fossil fuel linkages to Asia may well be from the United States on climate change, for a number arena align with the Coalition’s preferred approach to repurposed to provide low- or no-carbon energy to of reasons. climate, emissions and energy policy8.16 and lie more Asian markets. Australia is uniquely situated to become a soundly in the small set of politically-viable climate clean energy superpower if it implements the right poli- › Americans well understand that Australia is change policies likely to pass the US Congress.8.17 cies and can be at the technological frontier in low-car- on the “front lines” with respect to China and bon energy production, transmission and storage.8.18 Beijing’s economic coercion — that China is Beyond the ever-increasing international and domes- Solidifying energy R&D ties with the United States would subjecting Australia to economic coercion — tic political pressure to do more on climate change, better facilitate such efforts. and that Australia’s US alliance credentials are Australia faces the long-term challenge that three of impeccable. Biden administration officials have its top destinations of Australian fossil fuels exports — already pledged to “stand shoulder to shoulder” Japan, Korea and China — have committed to net-zero with Australia on Chinese economic coercion.8.14 carbon emissions in the coming decades.

› The Australian alliance enjoys broad and deep support in the US Congress, with several of Australia’s strongest backers Policy recommendations in the US Congress themselves hostile to › Biden’s climate change agenda.8.15 Continue monitoring the development of internationally-oriented elements of US climate change policy and their connection to US security and strategic policy. Facing little room to move on › Until the United States makes credible climate change in the Congress — but pent-up political demands from its supporters for action — the commitments to lower emissions itself — such Biden administration will be attracted to the international policy arenas as venues for notching “wins” as a binding national policy like a carbon tax on climate. Australia has multiple strategic and commercial interests at stake, especially should energy and not merely aspirations or the uneven and emissions be part of any “grand bargain” between the United States and China. and uncoordinated mix of state and local › initiatives — Australia has a strong moral case. Establish a clean energy partnership focused on innovating new low and no-carbon solutions. The United States and Australia have overlapping interests in maximising investments into clean energy technology. They also have committed, or are seeking to commit, significant investments in clean energy. The challenge for the two countries is to calibrate the R&D portfolio and the potential sharing of intellectual property to minimise inefficiencies, taking advantage of the plethora of US capital and expertise in the area and the simultaneous abundance of Australian energy resources. Clean energy innovations could be considered as a part of a “skinny deal” Digital Trade Agreement that would act as an addition to the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement.

55 STATE OF THE UNITED STATES

56 SECTION 2.3. HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA BOLSTER COLLECTIVE DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE? ORGANISE THE ALLIANCE FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENCE ASHLEY TOWNSHEND AND BRENDAN THOMAS-NOONE

58 Context and background defence. Some regional precedents exist. In 1951, the US developing joint operational concepts. Hicks has also and Australian navies signed the Radford-Collins Agree- proposed co-developing and co-producing an auxiliary Australia and the United States should advance oper- ment to coordinate maritime security responsibilities supply ship to offset the costs and expand the capacity ational-level coordination within and beyond the in the Indo-Pacific — the only mechanism of its type in of the United States and its allies to sustain and resupply alliance to facilitate a collective approach to deter- the alliance which, while still in force, needs substan- forward-deployed forces during high-end conflict.9.9 rence and defence in the Indo-Pacific. It is now well tial updating.9.5 Later in the Cold War, the United States Pursuing new forms of defence networking with regional accepted in Washington and Canberra that the United and Japan pursued similar, if more comprehensive, militaries is also high on the Biden team’s agenda.9.10 States cannot uphold a favourable balance of power in approaches to dividing operational responsibilities for 9.1 This is likely to build on common operating platforms the region alone. China’s increasingly large and sophis- anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and maritime blockades like the P-8 maritime surveillance and ASW aircraft that ticated military is eroding the foundations of American in the Western Pacific.9.6 These are useful constructs for 9.2 is operated by the United States, Australia and India. power in the Western Pacific. While the Pentagon is the United States and Australia to consider when thinking As some incoming administration officials have under- working to find technological and operational offsets to about collective defence operations today. the problems China presents, it faces rising budgetary scored, common capabilities allow easier integration pressures, daunting modernisation challenges and a and data sharing, providing ripe opportunities for coor- 9.11 host of unrelated domestic and global commitments.9.3 The Biden administration dinated maritime patrols in the Indo-Pacific. Others highlight the need to find “complementarities” between Australia is heavily implicated by these trends. Canberra The Biden administration appears open to exploring US and allied forces, which could facilitate more effective has core interests in the preservation of a stable stra- new approaches to collective defence in the region with combined presence deployments and have potential to tegic order in the Indo-Pacific and a key role to play in militarily capable allies like Australia. Whether this trans- develop into standing maritime task forces.9.12 However, upholding this order alongside the United States and lates into action on sensitive issues — such as reading key as these proposals will require major changes to the other allies and partners. allies into US military planning at early stages of devel- way the US military has cooperated with partners for opment — is yet to be seen.9.7 President Biden’s Deputy Yet the US-Australia alliance lacks the tools to implement the past three decades, they will encounter significant Secretary of Defense, Kathleen Hicks, has, for instance, a strategy of collective defence. Despite a very high level bureaucratic and political hurdles in both Canberra and of military interoperability, Canberra and Washington written about the need for a “federated” approach to 9.8 Washington. have not developed processes for coordinating mili- Indo-Pacific defence policy. This would see the United tary strategy, undertaking combined contingency plan- States and key regional allies integrate military capa- ning or assigning roles and responsibilities for regional bilities into comprehensive security architectures to operations.9.4 Such measures are required to transform achieve common approaches to a range of strategic the alliance into a credible vehicle for deterrence and policy issues: from expanding defence value chains to

59 Figure 9. Major anti-submarine warfare exercises

involving Australia and the United States Misawa Surface ship participation JAPAN Submarine participation Yokosuka Aircraft participation CHINA Exercise SEA DRAGON Okinawa Last iteration: 2021

TAIWAN Participants: Australia, Canada, India, Japan, United States INDIA

Bay of Bengal South China Sea Guam (USA) Exercise MALABAR Andaman PHILIPPINES and Nicobar Last iteration: 2020 Islands (India) Exercise PACIFIC VANGUARD Participants: Australia, Last iteration: 2020 India, Japan, United States MALAYSIA Participants: Australia, Japan, Exercise LA PEROUSE SINGAPORE South Korea, United States Last iteration: 2019 Participants: Australia, PAPUA France, Japan, United States INDONESIA NEW GUINEA TIMOR-LESTE Darwin Cocos (Keeling) Islands RAAF Base Darwin (Australia) RAAF Base Tindal INDIAN OCEAN

Exercise OCEAN EXPLORER RAAF Base Townsville Last iteration: 2019 Participants: Australia, New Zealand, United States AUSTRALIA PACIFIC OCEAN Legend Access points for potential US and Perth RAAF Base Pearce Australian combined ASW patrols Exercise LUNGFISH RAAF Base Edinburgh Access points for potential wider allied Last iteration: 2019 and partner combined ASW patrols Participants: Australia, United States NEW ZEALAND

60 Sources: Department of Defence; Royal Australian Navy; Commander, US 7th Fleet; Commander, US Pacific Fleet9.13 Australian interests

Australia has a strategic interest in minimising these AS CHINA’S CAPACITY TO PROJECT POWER INTO AUSTRALIA’S NORTHERN hurdles, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. As APPROACHES INTENSIFIES, AND AS THE UNITED STATES’ INTEREST IN AUSTRALIA the United States’ unilateral ability to uphold the regional AS A STRATEGIC LOCATION AND REGIONAL MILITARY PARTNER GROWS, CANBERRA order declines, contributing to a coalition defence AND WASHINGTON WILL FIND THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS MORE CLOSELY ALIGNED THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE 70-YEAR HISTORY OF THE ALLIANCE. arrangement that preserves stability and halts Chinese military expansion is Canberra’s next best strategic policy option.9.14 This idea lies behind Australia’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the government’s emphasis on advancing both independent and allied capabilities to deter major powers and shape the regional strategic Policy recommendations environment.9.15 Building mechanisms for US-Australia Australia and the United States should organise the alliance for collective defence in an active but cautious military coordination on key region-wide tasks, such way, focusing on two immediate lines of effort: as ASW operations and theatre missile defence, are the building blocks of such a strategy — even if allied › Explore options for combined strategic and military planning centred around high-value integration is not desirable or possible across all capa- scenarios and maritime operations. For collective defence to function at an operational level, the US bilities and mission sets. This approach may also assist military must read-in, involve and collaborate with Australia — and other close allies — at the earliest Canberra to realise its long-standing goal of tethering possible stage of the planning process.9.16 This is an unrealised objective of the 2018 US National Washington more firmly to its immediate region. The Defense Strategy.9.17 Canberra and Washington should pursue this goal in a stepwise way, beginning reason for this is clear: As China’s capacity to project with contingency planning for Pacific and Southeast Asian scenarios that could involve a limited use power into Australia’s northern approaches intensi- of force by China. Both allies should also explore combined command structures for peacetime fies, and as the United States’ interest in Australia as a surveillance and ASW patrols between Cocos Islands, Northern Australia and Guam; broadening strategic location and regional military partner grows, these to include India and Japan, with access to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Japanese Canberra and Washington’s security needs in Austral- archipelago. ia’s Indo-Pacific neighbourhood are becoming more › Update and expand the 1951 Radford-Collins Agreement. Although this non-binding navy-to-navy closely aligned than at any time in the 70-year history arrangement worked to coordinate allied maritime responsibilities in the Cold War, it is too limited of the alliance. for today’s security environment.9.18 New operations and geographic settings should be explored to include the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and South Pacific, with a revised agreement accounting for recent force posture initiatives and offering a basis for new ones. A service-level agreement to coordinate — rather than integrate — national responsibilities on key maritime tasks may be a less politically sensitive way to progress towards combined operations. Ideally, any revised agreement should be expanded beyond the maritime domain to include air, land, space and cyber forces, either jointly or in separate service-level arrangements. 61 EXPAND ALLIED FORCE POSTURE INITIATIVES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC BRENDAN THOMAS-NOONE

62 Context and background military footprint that was “geographically distributed, will require new partners, access locations and regional operationally resilient and politically sustainable.”10.3 infrastructure, likely leading to a degree of bureaucratic Australia and the United States should launch a new Some significant realignments commenced and are still momentum as new initiatives are considered by US generation of Indo-Pacific posture initiatives. Draw- underway, but overall progress has been stilted, with US military services.10.7 ing on the 2020 Force Posture Working Group, the forces in the region operating from large concentrated There is general support for further resources in establishment of new facilities, operating locations and bases much as they were in 2011.10.4 sustainment hubs will enable a more forward Austral- Congress for a new slate of force posture changes in the ian Defence Force (ADF) posture. This would provide region. This is critical for any substantial realignment of options for a range of regional deterrence and defence The Biden administration US military forces considering the significant infrastruc- ture and logistic spending that may be required.10.8 The activities, and help sustain US military presence in the There is broad bipartisan recognition in the United States passage of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act Indo-Pacific. New US or allied posture initiatives in that its Indo-Pacific force posture is ill-equipped to meet by Congress — which established the Pacific Deterrence Australia and the region should focus on maintaining China’s military challenge. This includes members of Initiative (PDI) — in late 2020 is a positive step in this direc- and expanding operational access to Southeast Asia, Biden’s national security and defence teams, many of tion. The PDI, a US$2.2 billion account that is intended enabling enhanced capacity building and support for whom have supported ongoing efforts to redistribute to directly fund and upgrade the United States’ military vulnerable regional states, and underwriting deterrence US forces, reinvigorate existing initiatives and forge footprint in the Indo-Pacific, will be a central tool for the missions. new ones. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin supports Biden administration and an opportunity for allies.10.9 Realigning each country’s regional force posture has the continued redistribution of US forces across the been a major focus for Australia and the United States Indo-Pacific, including the major realignments initi- 10.5 over the past decade. Canberra has upgraded military ated under Obama’s rebalance. But American think- infrastructure and presence across northern Australia ing about allied force posture initiatives — and how US in an attempt to grow the capacity and capability of the infrastructure and access in the region can be lever- NEW AMERICAN OR ALLIED POSTURE INITIATIVES IN AUSTRALIA AND THE REGION ADF to surge forward in a conflict.10.1 Results have been aged to bolster allied reach and capacity — has been more limited. Some ideas have included Australia rotat- SHOULD FOCUS ON MAINTAINING AND mixed. While upgrades to military facilities above the 26° EXPANDING OPERATIONAL ACCESS TO South parallel have proceeded in the intervening years, ing naval assets to a standing maritime task force or SOUTHEAST ASIA, ENABLING ENHANCED the overall number of ADF personnel has declined.10.2 progressing the networking of exercise and test ranges CAPACITY BUILDING AND SUPPORT FOR 10.6 Similarly, the Obama administration’s “rebalance to to enable integration. The Biden administration has VULNERABLE REGIONAL STATES, AND Asia,” launched in 2011, has proceeded with a highly inherited a long-running Joint Force effort to develop UNDERWRITING DETERRENCE MISSIONS. questionable level of progress. Its aim was to achieve a new operational concepts for the Indo-Pacific, which

63 INDIA

1 US Enhanced Defense 2 Cooperation Agreement sites South China Manila Sea 1. Fort Magsaysay Guam (USA) PHILIPPINES 2. Basa Air Base 3. Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base 3 4 4. Antonio Bautista Air Base 5 5. Lumbia Air Base

Figure 10. Current and potential allied

force posture in the Indo-Pacific MALAYSIA PACIFIC OCEAN Legend SINGAPORE Existing force posture initiatives and enhanced air cooperation sites Manus Island Lombrum Naval Base US and Australian co-development of regional defence infrastructure PAPUA Possible locations for maritime force NEW GUINEA INDONESIA posture initiatives Possible locations for expanded HMAS Coonawarra Australian access arrangements Cocos (Keeling) Islands Darwin Harbour 1 2 3 US Force Posture Initiative and Enhanced (Australia) 4 5 Air Cooperation sites 6 7 1. RAAF Base Darwin 2. Robertson Barracks Close Training Area 3. Mount Bundey Training Area 4. Defence Establishment Berrimah 5. Kangaroo Flats Training Area 6. RAAF Base Tindal 7. Bradshaw Field Training Area

INDIAN OCEAN AUSTRALIA

RAAF Base Amberley

Fleet Base West

64 Sources: Department of Defence, US Department of State, The Australian10.10 Australian interests Policy recommendations

Australia has a significant interest in shaping and deliv- Using the recently established bilateral Force Posture Working Group, Australia and the United States should: ering new force posture initiatives that will both enable › Establish a US maritime or naval force posture initiative in Australia. With US Air Force and the objectives of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Marine initiatives well underway, a naval or maritime element would provide innumerable benefits improve the sustainability of US military presence in the and help sustain US military presence in the region. The US Navy faces a series of structural region. Canberra’s new strategic policy blueprint has challenges, including growing demands on an overworked fleet, budgetary pressure and an underscored the need for Australia to develop the ADF’s increasingly active and capable China.10.13 Options to alleviate some of these pressures could include ability to deliver deterrent effects, contribute to coalition developing a maintenance or rotational deployment capability in Western Australia or providing a operations and respond to grey zone activities in Austral- logistics hub for forward deployed lift assets and US Navy transports to enable more effective supply ia’s immediate region.10.11 This will require an expanded of dispersed forces.10.14 list of potential operating locations, bases and sustain- ment hubs in Southeast Asia, the Pacific and the north- › Explore combined force posture initiatives in Australia’s immediate region. As both allies realign east Indian Ocean. Canberra will need to strengthen their respective force postures, there may be advantages to combining resources by establishing existing relationships with nations in those areas as well select combined facilities. This is already being trialled through the redevelopment of a naval facility as leverage US access arrangements where mutually on Manus Island.10.15 While the United States and Australia have substantially different requirements beneficial. While Australia is already reorientating its and interests in how they structure forces in the region, there are key overlaps — such as developing domestic force posture, upgrading airfields, developing new operating locations that would facilitate greater Indian Ocean access or bolstering efforts aimed at new port facilities and expanding training ranges across easing logistics challenges. the northern part of the country and in territories like the Cocos Keeling Islands and Christmas Island, much › Facilitate greater Australian use of US operating locations across the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s more will be required to support Australia’s more active Defence Strategic Update calls for an ADF that is capable of executing independent deterrent effects strategic policy agenda.10.12 in Australia’s immediate region, countering grey zone coercion and joining wider coalition operations RAAF Base Amberley when required. This demands a more agile operational posture. In the future, elements of the ADF may need to move rapidly throughout the region, leading operations, contributing to coalition high- end deterrence missions and conducting independent manoeuvres in the same deployment.10.16 Greater access to US operating locations in Guam, the Philippines, Singapore and elsewhere would support the ADF in these tasks and help to augment Australia’s contribution to upholding the regional order.

65 STRENGTHEN COORDINATION ON COUNTERING MARITIME COERCION ASHLEY TOWNSHEND AND TOBY WARDEN

66 Context and background tance and information-sharing initiatives to illuminate countries to push back more effectively on grey zone China’s coercive activities.11.4 Such efforts should be activities.11.8 This could extend to widening the role of the Australia and the United States should strengthen expanded and improved through closer strategic coor- US Coast Guard to train and exercise with Indo-Pacific coordinated efforts to counter Chinese grey zone dination within the alliance. counterparts.11.9 activities in maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Over the past decade, China’s use of maritime coer- The second line of effort involves the provision of direct cion has undermined security, sovereignty and stability The Biden administration operational and intelligence support to partners on the frontline of Chinese coercion. Such measures are within Australia’s immediate region, and contributed to Biden’s national security team appears highly supportive intended to increase the stakes for Beijing should it seek the expansion of its strategic influence. These activities of this agenda. The National Security Council’s (NSC) to disrupt lawful maritime activities and help regional have intensified during COVID-19. Chinese naval and Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, Kurt Campbell, has states defend their maritime rights more effectively. coastguard vessels are intimidating their Southeast Asian advocated strengthening multinational thresholds and This could include an expansion of coordinated patrols equivalents, disrupting fishing ships and hydrocarbon penalties for low-level coercion.11.5 Similarly, US Deputy and presence activities by allied navies and coast- exploration platforms, and supporting maritime militias Secretary of Defense, Kathleen Hicks, has emphasised 11.1 guards in order to prevent coercion, assure partners in disputed waters. China’s geopolitical presence is also the need to reform coordination mechanisms and deci- and respond to maritime intimidation in real time;11.10 and growing, enabled by unilateral administrative arrange- sion-making processes to address grey zone maritime would involve improved efforts to foster shared maritime ments and the construction of dual-use infrastructure activities in concert with allies and partners; and has 11.2 domain awareness across the region.11.11 by state-owned firms. These activities are eroding the called for “strengthening collaborative planning” more regional strategic status quo without resorting to conflict broadly.11.6 and, underwritten by China’s expanding military reach, threaten to bring about a Chinese sphere of influence. Two main lines of effort have been proposed to opera- tionalise this collective approach — most of which align Washington and Canberra agree that a more with the Pentagon’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Security OVER THE PAST DECADE, CHINA’S forward-leaning approach is required to counter China’s Initiative (MSI) which seeks to build partner capacity, USE OF MARITIME COERCION HAS 11.3 maritime grey zone activities. Both have worked inde- enhance information-sharing and boost multinational UNDERMINED SECURITY, SOVEREIGNTY pendently, together and with like-minded partners to cooperation.11.7 The first focuses on military and mari- AND STABILITY WITHIN AUSTRALIA’S IMMEDIATE REGION, AND CONTRIBUTED help Southeast Asian and Pacific nations defend their time capacity building. This includes bolstering partner maritime rights and interests. This has included diplo- TO THE EXPANSION OF ITS STRATEGIC capabilities in anti-access/area denial systems, ISR plat- INFLUENCE. THESE ACTIVITIES HAVE matic solidarity, presence operations in support of state forms, maritime law enforcement, and maritime patrol INTENSIFIED DURING COVID-19. and non-state actors facing Chinese intimidation, and and interdiction, as a means of empowering regional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assis-

67 Table 6. Recent examples of Chinese maritime coercion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific

Date Description

December 2019 — January 2020 China deployed maritime militia ships, supported by the Chinese Coast Guard, to waters off the Natuna Islands, prompting Indonesia to dispatch fighter jets, warships and coast guard vessels to patrol the region

February 2020 People’s Liberation Army Navy ship aimed its weapon control system at a Philippine Navy ship in the Spratly Islands

February 2020 A Chinese state-owned company made significant progress expanding and upgrading Momote Airport, near Lombrum Naval Base

March 2020 China deployed a fleet of maritime militia ships to the Union Banks in the Spratly Islands

March 2020 China opened two new research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, which include defence silos and military-grade runways

April 2020 Chinese Coast Guard ship rammed and sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat near Woody Island

April 2020 A Chinese research ship, Haiyang Dizhi 8, accompanied by Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels, sought to intimidate the Malaysian-chartered drillship, West Capella, operating in Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone

April 2020 China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs announced the establishment of two administrative districts within Sansha City

November 2020 A Chinese company signed a memorandum of understanding with the Papua New Guinean Government to develop a comprehensive multi-functional fishery industrial park on Daru Island

January 2021 National People’s Congress adopted the Coast Guard Law allowing the Chinese Coast Guard to fire on foreign vessels

Sources: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, The New York Times, Radio Free Asia, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Reuters, The Interpreter, The Guardian11.12

68 Australian interests ership, Canberra has advanced a whole-of-government maritime domain awareness and counter-coercion approach to bolstering resilience; whereas US initiatives operations — a task that requires deeper ISR integration, Australia has a stake in all these initiatives. As the 2020 have often been led by the Pentagon and not always unmanned vehicles for persistent situational awareness Defence Strategic Update points out, grey zone activ- dovetailed with Australian efforts.11.16 Finally, the alliance and, potentially, the inclusion of information, electronic ities are targeting Australian interests in an open and has yet to deliver a genuinely combined approach to warfare and special operations forces.11.17 stable region and must be addressed through active efforts to shape the strategic environment and deter coercive actions.11.13 Yet, while Canberra and Washington have a shared understanding of the grey zone challenge, Policy recommendations their interests and threat perceptions are not entirely symmetrical.11.14 Australia and the United States should broaden and deepen their combined approach to countering maritime grey zone activities in the following ways: This has led to coordination problems. Above all, the alli- ance has not identified common red lines with regard to › Establish formal channels for coordinating counter grey zone activities in maritime Southeast Chinese grey zone tactics such as island-building, mari- Asia and the Pacific. Given the number of agencies involved in addressing this challenge, strong time intimidation or the use of paramilitary forces. This central leadership is needed from Canberra and Washington. Indeed, as the recent Pacific Fusion stems from divergent appetites for military, strategic and Centre issue has highlighted, even considered actions can create unhelpful duplication.11.18 A political risk. While hard to achieve, shared thresholds coordinating mechanism could identify strategic lines of effort, functional roles and responsibilities for action are crucial for increasing Beijing’s risk calcu- and, ideally, undertake planning for specific initiatives and operations bilaterally. It could be nested lus and assuring regional partners of allied support.11.15 within the new Indo-Pacific Coordination Mechanism or established between appropriate national Moreover, Australia and the United States do not prior- leads, such as the NSC and Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. A bilateral, or trilateral itise the policy tools for countering grey zone coercion including Japan, working group within the Maritime Security Initiative could help to streamline in exactly the same way. For instance, in the Pacific, regional capacity building, intelligence sharing and maritime domain awareness efforts. where Australia has important interests in regional lead- › Expand and improve the coordination of current efforts to support third parties through maritime presence operations. Enhanced multilateral maritime presence in close proximity to actual or potential Chinese intimidation of regional vessels is likely to have a deterrent effect. While the so-called West Capella standoff in April 2020 signalled US and Australian resolve to deliver this effect in an opportunistic way, future activities would benefit from pre-planning on red lines, protocols for action and greater information sharing.11.19 Given the asymmetry between Chinese maritime forces and smaller US and Australian fleets, coastguard and border force agencies have a role to play.11.20 This could be enabled by rotating or deploying or a US Coast Guard detachment to Australia to establish patterns for allied patrol operations.11.21 69 ADVANCE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE INTEGRATION BRENDAN THOMAS-NOONE

70 Context and background The Biden administration How this conflict between Biden’s domestic agenda and the requirements of allied strategic policy coordination Australia should pursue more innovative ways to The prospects for substantial defence industrial inte- will be resolved is uncertain. The president may be the advance defence industry integration with the United gration under the Biden administration are dim. Biden’s decisive factor. Importantly, it was during Biden’s chair- States, including by coordinating with Canada and campaign platform was clear: the Trump administration manship of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs the United Kingdom. A collective approach to defence had let too many foreign companies bid on US Govern- that the Australia-US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty industrial base integration between the United States and ment contracts, including those issued by the Pentagon, passed in 2008. Biden — and his staff director at the its close allies is essential to maintaining a conventional undercutting American manufacturing and industrial time, now Secretary of State Antony Blinken — raised military edge in the Indo-Pacific. China is on a path to jobs. Biden has already moved to fulfil his campaign concerns about the integrity of the treaty, questioning match — if not surpass — the combined R&D spending of promise, issuing an executive order strengthening the reliability of Australia’s export control regime and the the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia “Buy American” regulations during the first week of his risks of establishing a precedent that weakens America’s 12.1 12.4 and New Zealand by the mid-2020s. Harnessing new administration. The new order centralises much of the ITAR rules.12.7 Today, further defence industrial integration technologies, integrating them into allied defence forces decision-making power over waivers for the regulations may hinge on whether the president’s views and those of and ensuring their affordability for middle powers like within the White House, expands the list of products his closest advisors have changed over the past decade 12.5 Australia are critical steps to achieving a favourable covered and closes some well-known loopholes. or can be influenced in office. balance of power in the region.12.2 These domestic priorities are clearly at odds with the The US Congress recognised these challenges in 2017 spirit of further industrial integration with close allies. when it expanded America’s National Technology and Nevertheless, some senior Biden administration offi- Industrial Base (NTIB) to include Australia, the United cials have voiced support for the strategic logic of Kingdom and Canada. Its aim was to deepen connec- deeper integration. In her written response to ques- tions between allied defence and national security tions from Senators during her nomination process for HARNESSING NEW TECHNOLOGIES, industries, eventually creating a defence free trade Deputy Secretary of Defense, Kathleen Hicks stated INTEGRATING THEM INTO ALLIED zone.12.3 However, meaningful progress on implementing that the NTIB should be “leveraged wherever possible” DEFENCE FORCES AND ENSURING this framework has stalled. This is because Washington to strengthen defence relationships with allies. The NTIB THEIR AFFORDABILITY FOR MIDDLE POWERS LIKE AUSTRALIA ARE CRITICAL has failed to address core hurdles to further integra- would be part of the answer in encouraging competi- STEPS TO ACHIEVING A FAVOURABLE tion, such as its treatment of US allies under extraterri- tion within the US industrial base, she added, as well as BALANCE OF POWER IN THE REGION. torial export controls like the International Traffic in Arms fostering “collaboration, competition and innovation to Regulations (ITAR). ensure a healthy supply chain.”12.6

71 Slow progress on the National Figure 11. Trends in national research and development Technology and Industrial Base Five Eyes* China Australia has had recent success in pushing for further recognition of the importance of defence 1,200,000 industrial integration at the highest levels of US Actual Projected political and national security leadership. The joint 1,000,000 statement from AUSMIN 2020 noted the ongoing work of the AUS-US Defense Trade Working Group and promised to “help resolve defense trade issues 800,000 of mutual concern, including on export controls.”12.8 But progress in this area is increasingly measured 600,000 by the success of individual specialised or pilot projects, rather than the wholesale change orig- 400,000 inally envisioned by the NTIB framework. For instance, a recent Australia-US bilateral agree- National R&D in PPP 200,000 ment to work towards a prototype of a hypersonic weapon based on 15 years of joint research was

concluded through a specialised allied capability 0 9

program in the Pentagon.12.9 While positive, the

2011

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2016 2019

2027

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2020 200 growing number of these specific, tailored, projects are a sign that overall progress has stalled. * The Five Eyes countries are the United States, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand Source: R&D figures up to and including 2017 reflect total gross domestic expenditure on R&D. Figures are shown in purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars at current prices (as of 16 October 2019). Data retrieved from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Gross domestic expenditure on R&D by sector of performance and source of funds,” 16 October 2019, available at: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GERD_SOF#. R&D figures from 2018 to 2030 reflect a forecast using a version of the Exponential Smoothing (ETS) algorithm. The forecast is adjusted for seasonal variation. Included in this forecast are confidence intervals at a level of 95 per cent confidence.

72 Australian interests a credible level of interoperability with US forces.12.12 a collective approach to defence innovation will help This has become an even greater issue as systems like Australia maintain a regional military technological edge Australia has several overlapping interests in greater the F-35 fighter have failed to deliver on projected cost ­— a pillar of Australia’s defence strategy — by leveraging defence industrial integration with the United States. savings.12.13 A competitive defence market will assist US and other trusted allied investments in R&D, talent Canberra’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update prioritises cost-control and maximise defence investment. Finally, and intellectual property. the development of a robust domestic defence industry as a key pillar in ensuring the delivery and sustainment of Australia’s military modernisation efforts. Breaking down export barriers, facilitating better access to the US Policy recommendations defence market and ensuring more equitable rules for intellectual property and collaboration are critical to this Australia has driven some bilateral wins in forging the NTIB framework into a workable mechanism for agenda.12.10 If progress is not made, Australian companies individual projects. Moving forward, additional specialised projects and a reformulated collective approach will be increasingly deterred from collaborating with may be the most effective path towards further progress. Australia should: the United States owing to fears that their products and › intellectual property will be captured by its far-reaching Caucus with NTIB members Canada and the United Kingdom in lobbying Congress and State export controls. Allies will instead network with each Department officials. A joint strategy and diplomatic effort will leverage the combined weight of all other to avoid the US system, as evident in the recent three allies in Washington. Although Canberra, London and Ottawa do not share perfectly aligned agreement between Boeing Australia, the Australian defence industrial interests — and in some cases are direct competitors — their common interest in a Department of Defence and the United Kingdom on more equitable defence industrial relationship with the United States could be used to drive political- sharing design materials for the unmanned Air Power level changes. 12.11 Teaming System. Such activity deprives the United › Establish a combined Australia-US munitions manufacturing project in Australia. Munitions States of valuable innovation and niche technological present a significant opportunity, in terms of strategic need and industrial capacity, to quickly stand up capability. a demonstrable capability. Such an initiative would help bolster critical supply chains, build strategic 12.14 Australia also has an interest in managing the affordabil- resilience and fill gaps in America’s defence industrial base. ity of modern military systems. As new generations of › Utilise the NTIB to expand the range and depth of defence innovation challenges among its military equipment tend to rise in cost above inflation, members. In 2017, Australia co-hosted an urban environment defence technology challenge alongside it is burdensome for middle power allies to maintain Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand.12.15 Expanding such challenges to maritime, air and cyber environments, and linking them more directly to industry, would be a useful step towards building the case for further defence industrial integration.

73 STATE OF THE UNITED STATES

74 SECTION 3.4. HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ALLIED AND PARTNER NETWORK? LEVERAGE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING, CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY COORDINATION AND ALLIED SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORKS DR JOHN LEE

76 Context and background all identified the competition and rivalry with China as Policy is very much determined by personnel. In terms the most urgent and important external priority facing of key appointees at the top four levels, Biden has filled Australia must ensure that the Biden administration’s the administration and the country. This means the US the administration with experts who not only accept policies about domestic renewal are not inward- administration will want to ensure domestic economic the reality of strategic rivalry with China but recognise looking but based on an allied-centric approach and industrial policy are aligned with the objective of the that military, economic, financial, commercial and tech- to strengthen secure supply chains in strategic United States being able to compete with China from a nological tools must be integrated and harnessed to and critical sectors, and with respect to economic position of strength. compete successfully with China.13.1 cooperation more generally. There are currently advanced discussions inside the President Biden and his key Cabinet officials have The Biden administration Biden administration as to what a more integrated promised to focus on reinvesting in America, especially approach to China ought to be like. This includes poli- In these early days, President Biden is undertaking a putting resources towards upgrading national infrastruc- cies associated with the reorganisation of supply chains, review of all of Trump’s executive orders. So far, Biden ture and innovating capacity. Although rejecting Donald and more broadly, resetting the economic relationship has not lowered or removed the tariffs his predecessor Trump’s ‘America First’ rhetoric, there are fundamental with China. areas of continuity from the previous president when it placed on Chinese goods and services and has left alone comes to mindset. most of the Trump-era executive orders and regulatory changes that restricted Chinese inbound investment and For example, there is no longer blind faith in unfettered export of certain key technologies to China. globalisation, that US-based multinationals should be left unimpeded to conduct commercial affairs in markets This is a clear signal Biden seeks to maintain any inher- IN TERMS OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, such as China as they see fit, or that the unregulated ited leverage he has vis-à-vis Beijing. More than this, it BIDEN AND KEY OFFICIALS, SUCH AS activities of these firms in external markets are axiomat- is also evidence that the Biden administration accepts SECRETARY OF STATE ANTONY BLINKEN ically good for the American national interest. it is engaged in a long-term competitive dynamic with AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER JAKE China and that Chinese economic and technological SULLIVAN, HAVE ALL IDENTIFIED THE In short, US economic and industrial policy will increas- gain is often at the expense of the United States, and vice COMPETITION AND RIVALRY WITH CHINA ingly be guided by the political and strategic objectives AS THE MOST URGENT AND IMPORTANT versa. In other words, the dynamic has shifted from one EXTERNAL PRIORITY FACING THE of the US administration. In terms of strategic objectives, where economic interaction was perceived to be largely ADMINISTRATION AND THE COUNTRY. Biden and key officials, such as Secretary of State Antony complementary prior to Trump to the current one where Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, have it is increasingly perceived to be zero-sum.

77 The Biden administration’s thinking on China Australian interests

“Washington now faces its most dynamic and “US policymakers and analysts have mostly, and Australia is having its own internal policy discussion formidable competitor in modern history. rightly, discarded some of the more optimistic about reorganising, securing or diversifying supply Getting this challenge right will require doing assumptions that underpinned the four-decade- chains and markets regarding certain technologies away with the hopeful thinking that has long long strategy of diplomatic and economic or critical and strategic sectors. Given the diplomatic characterized the United States’ approach to engagement with China...The basic mistake of and economic tensions with China, there is a maturing China. The Trump administration’s first National engagement was to assume that it could bring conversation about decreasing Australia’s reliance on Security Strategy took a step in the right direc- about fundamental changes to China’s political China and making sure the sources of Australian pros- tion by interrogating past assumptions in US system, economy, and foreign policy...” perity and security are more resilient. In some instances, strategy.” it will involve developing a sovereign capability when Indo-Pacific Coordinator at the US National it was previously left to external entities to offer those Indo-Pacific Coordinator at the US National Security Council Kurt Campbell and US National capabilities to Australia. Security Council Kurt Campbell and Special Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, “How America Assistant to the US Secretary of Defense Lloyd can both challenge and coexist with China,” All of this will involve a greater role for government in Austin in “How American foreign policy got China Foreign Affairs, September/October 2019 wrong,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2018 economic, commercial, and industrial affairs, with impli- cations on project financing, public-private partnerships, investment rules, safeguard standards, export licensing, and a plethora of other legal and regulatory frameworks.

Regarding national resilience, there is a need in Australia to:

› Identify genuinely strategic and critical sectors and products;

› Assess Australia’s vulnerability with respect to these sectors and materials; and

78 › Decide on strategies based on a combination Enhancing Australia’s military capabilities and changing resilience. But as the world’s largest economy with unri- of diversification, access to safe and secure posture to reflect the primacy of regional challenges and valled innovative capacity and unmatched public and supply chains or tech ecosystems contained threats requires military, commercial, and technological private resources, there is often an instinctive tendency within friendly economies, joint ventures with collaboration with the US government, and partnerships for the United States to look mainly inward to advance allies and partners, and even self-sufficiency. with private firms from both countries. its own interests, capabilities and resilience. Doing that will only advance Chinese strategic, economic, political We have seen elements of these in the emerging 5G The United States has similar aims to Australia when and normative pre-eminence in the Indo-Pacific. ecosystem, which locks out Chinese partners such as it comes to building sovereign capability and national Huawei and the concerted effort to develop rare earth supplies outside China. We are also seeing these prin- ciples being applied to information and communica- tions technology infrastructure (such as fibre-optic Policy recommendations submarine cables) and in newer domains such as outer space, which is becoming increasingly important and › Replicate the government-to-government process leading up to 2020 AUSMIN to jointly identify contested. genuinely strategic and/or critical sectors and materials. Build on this policy conversation through the Quad mechanism. In this context, the United States remains indispen- sable. Diversification, creating commercially viable › Encourage the United States to apply the same methodology with Europe, including through a supply chains in certain sectors, and even self-suffi- more proactive G7 agenda. Efforts must also be made to encourage buy-in from economies such as ciency or indigenous capacity depend enormously on South Korea and Israel. US economic presence, involvement, markets, innova- › Adopt a ‘systems’-based approach based on creating secure and commercially viable economic, tion, expertise and finance. Setting industry and ethical technological and normative ecosystems relevant to these strategic/critical sectors based standards, such as in the use and protection of data, around allied and friendly economies. This ‘systems’-based approach is already apparent in the is generally the prerogative of those with a dominant long-standing military cooperation between Australia and the United States in which the capabilities, commercial presence. For this reason, Australia needs interoperability and geography of one country enhance the capabilities and security of the other allied well-regulated firms from advanced democracies such partner — where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. as the United States to expand their presence in regional markets. › Apply this mindset to thinking about reorganising supply chains for critical/strategic sectors. This would include harmonising relevant legal/regulatory trade and investment rules and establishing joint investment platforms and rules for public-private partnerships covering entities from both countries.

79 DEVELOP DETERRENCE AGAINST CHINESE ECONOMIC COERCION DR JEFFREY WILSON

80 Context and background metries mean the target lacks the capability to retali- These Chinese trade sanctions serve dual purposes: ate effectively. They also routinely target US allies and domestic pressure and international deterrence. Australia and the United States need to coordinate friends, clearly selected as a proxy for sanctions against Domestically in the target country, they cause pain their efforts — bilaterally, and with like-minded part- the United States itself. to important business sectors, in the expectation that ners — in responding to Chinese economic coercion. affected companies will pressure their government to Table 7. Targets of Chinese trade coercion, soften its stance toward China. Internationally to third In recent years, China has used trade sanctions to parties, they telegraph that criticising certain Chinese economically punish governments that contest its 2010-2020 policies will result in trade punishment, deterring further foreign policy manoeuvres. Several US allies, including opposition.14.1 Australia, have been subject to China’s punitive trade Target Year Affected sectors measures. Despite engaging in its own trade dispute with China, the Trump administration failed to respond Japan 2010 Rare earth minerals The Biden administration in support of affected allies and friends. As Australia Norway 2011 Salmon mounts a World Trade Organization (WTO) challenge Despite frequently targeting US allies and friends, the Trump administration failed to substantively act on to Chinese trade sanctions in 2021, coordination with Philippines 2012 Bananas and support from the Biden administration will be crit- Chinese trade coercion. This partially reflects its ‘Amer- ical in ensuring Australia’s success, and reassuring third Mongolia 2016 Minerals ica First’ stance and a general failure to support allies parties the United States will stand against Chinese trade during diplomatic crises. It also reflects the fact that the coercion. Taiwan 2016 Tourism and education Trump administration itself used coercive trade threats — in several cases, against the very same allies.14.2 Whatever In recent years, China has deployed the use of trade Korea 2017 Tourism, autos, retail the cause, US inaction during the Trump administration sanctions to coerce governments that contest its foreign left allies to fend for themselves in the face of Chinese Canada 2019 Canola, soy, pork, beef policy. This began in 2010 when it suspended rare earth economic coercion. It also sent a message to non-alli- minerals trade with Japan during a dispute over the Australia 2020 Barley, beef, coal, ance partners in the Indo-Pacific that the United States Senkaku Islands. In subsequent years, seven more education, tourism, would not intervene if they are affected in future, thereby countries have been subject to similar trade sanctions wine, cotton, timber, amplifying China’s deterrence effect. seafood, wool, wheat, (see Table 7). This tactic has been exclusively applied copper, sugar to small and medium economies, where size asym-

81 The Biden administration has emphasised the impor- tance of working with allies in response to Beijing but has so far said they are reviewing the Trump administration’s policies before engaging in a new policy direction.

Australian interests

In 2020, Australia became China’s newest target. Follow- ing the Australian Government’s call for an independ- ent international inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 in April, China applied an 80 per cent anti-dumping duty to barley exports, effectively ending the trade. In subse- quent months more trade bans were applied, utilis- ing both formal (anti-dumping) and informal (customs procedures) methods. By year-end, China had restricted the import of 13 different products and services from Australia.14.3 The affected industries exported $54 billion to China in 2019,14.4 a serious economic blow coming atop the dislocations of COVID.

However, Australia stands out for its defiance of Chinese trade sanctions. The Australian Government has refused to offer any mea culpa, and in December 2020 referred Chinese tariffs on barley to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The dispute will be heard as case “DS598” in 2021.14.5 Flagging a departure from the Trump era, incoming US National Security Advisor-designate, Jake

82 Sullivan, indicated the Biden administration will “stand Policy recommendations shoulder to shoulder” with Australia in the dispute.14.6 DS598 will prove a landmark test of China’s ability to › The United States should coordinate with and provide third-party support to Australia’s WTO use trade sanctions as a means of diplomatic coercion, dispute with China. Australia is the first country to challenge Chinese trade coercion at the WTO. But 14.7 as an Australian victory will enable retaliation through as an infrequent WTO litigator, Australia’s case would benefit from US support. This could include the WTO. Importantly, it also multilateralises a matter preparatory discussions between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Office of previously handled bilaterally, allowing Australia to pool the US Trade Representative as well as the United States directly participating in the DS598 process as resources with like-minded countries. a third party.

Coordination between Australia and the United States › The United States should review policies obstructing the normal functioning of the WTO Dispute would greatly aid efforts to deter, and defend against, Settlement Mechanism (DSM). Due to US appointment vetoes, the WTO Appellate Body is presently 14.8 Chinese economic coercion. Due to size differentials, inquorate. China may strategically use an appeal to the Appellate Body to indefinitely delay a middle powers such as Australia, Canada and Korea resolution to DS598. Restoring normal function to the DSM by removing US appointment vetoes, and cannot effectively respond to Chinese trade sanctions then promptly clearing an existing case backlog, will be essential to ensure a timely and successful alone. Collective responses provide the best defence resolution. against economic coercion. US involvement will be crit- › The United States and Australia should explore beyond-the-WTO “collective defence” ical to collective defence strategies. Its economic size — mechanisms with like-minded partners. A collective defence mechanism that responds more and thus scope for retaliation — is a powerful deterrent promptly than the WTO is needed to deter Chinese economic coercion. Some type of “economic to further Chinese action. US support for such efforts article five” mechanism involving the United States and its allies — similar but not identical to the will also provide reassurance to allies and partners when collective defence provisions of NATO — will be the most effective means to do so. Australia and contesting Chinese foreign policy. the United States should immediately consult with partners on the potential options with a view to establishing practical mechanisms in the medium term.

83 AVOID PROTECTIONISM TO MAXIMISE JOINT ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES DR STEPHEN KIRCHNER

84 Context and background eral negotiations in this space that avoid discriminatory still sceptical of free trade and trade agreements and is treatment of foreign commercial interests in pursuing well disposed to industry policy with a view to furthering Australia needs to work with the United States to domestic policy objectives. The content deals between domestic employment and economic recovery objec- ensure that Australia’s domestic policy objectives in Australian media and US tech companies defused a tives. areas such as manufacturing capability, supply chain potential irritant in the bilateral relationship. The focus of These protectionist instincts have received a boost from security and digital platform regulation maximise digital platform regulation should be minimising interna- concerns about national security and supply-chain resil- joint economic opportunities and promote tax and tional tax and investment uncertainty. This is more likely ience in the wake of the pandemic. Biden’s pre-election investment certainty on a bilateral and multilateral to be achieved by working through multilateral mecha- trade policy consisted of a commitment to the onshoring basis. Australia should work within the context of nisms and extending the digital commerce provisions of of production of critical and strategic goods — currently existing and prospective trade agreements and multi- existing and prospective bilateral and plurilateral trade the subject of a review. These concerns could become lateral negotiations to secure non-discriminatory agreements. approaches to these issues that reinforce the joint a fig-leaf for more traditional forms of protectionism. interest in a rules-based multilateral trading system. The Biden administration The US and Australian governments have both announced efforts to examine manufacturing capa- Trade will not be an urgent priority for the administration bility, the security of supply chains and critical goods. relative to domestic issues. An early indication will be whether it seeks renewal of Trade Promotion Authority THE FOCUS OF DIGITAL PLATFORM These efforts are potentially complementary and afford REGULATION SHOULD BE MINIMISING trading opportunities for Australia as a trusted ally and (TPA) from Congress when the current authority expires INTERNATIONAL TAX AND INVESTMENT supplier. However, these efforts need to be harmonised at the end of June 2021. If TPA is not sought or granted, UNCERTAINTY. THIS IS MORE LIKELY TO to minimise the potential for unilateral and discrimi- trade negotiations will be downgraded in the adminis- BE ACHIEVED BY WORKING THROUGH natory approaches that could undermine the bilateral tration’s first term. MULTILATERAL MECHANISMS AND EXTENDING THE DIGITAL COMMERCE economic relationship and the international trading There is growing public support for foreign trade in PROVISIONS OF EXISTING AND system. the United States and a partisan realignment around PROSPECTIVE BILATERAL AND PLURILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS. Similarly, the Australian Government’s taxation and trade and tariffs as a result of Trump’s failed embrace regulation of digital platforms should leverage multilat- of protectionism. However, the Democratic Congress is

85 Figure 12. American’s views of what foreign trade means for the United States The Biden administration is reviewing Trump’s tariffs, including the steel and aluminium tariffs from which What do you think foreign trade means for America? Do you see foreign trade more as an opportunity for economic growth through increased US exports Australia secured an exemption. The ‘phase one’ trade or a threat to the economy from foreign imports? deal with China is also under review. The purchasing % Opportunity for economic growth commitments made by China under the deal may have % Opportunity for economic growth been a factor in the imposition of Chinese anti-dumping % Threat to the economy duties on Australian barley.15.1 % Threat to the economy

79 72 74

54 57 THERE IS ALREADY COOPERATION BETWEEN 53 52 AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN 48 RELATION TO CRITICAL MINERALS AND THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE. BUT AN 44 INWARDLY FOCUSED AND PROTECTIONIST 38 41 35 35 US TRADE AND INDUSTRY POLICY HAS THE POTENTIAL TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST 23 21 AUSTRALIAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS 18 DIRECTLY, AS WELL AS WEIGH ON GLOBAL TRADE. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO HIGHLIGHT THE ECONOMIC 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2019 OPPORTUNITY IN JOINT APPROACHES THAT EXPAND RATHER THAN LIMIT TRADE. Source: Lydia Saad, “Americans’ Vanishing Fear of Foreign Trade” Gallup. 26 February 2020. Available at: https://news.gallup.com/poll/286730/americans-vanishing-fear-foreign-trade.aspx

86 Katherine Tai, President Biden’s nominee for US Trade highlight the economic opportunity in joint approaches istration, who noted concerns about due process and Representative, has indicated that climate change will that expand rather than limit trade. investor protection under the Australia-US Free Trade be a centrepiece of the administration’s trade policies Agreement,15.3 although competition policy is an explicit The US efforts to address climate change at an interna- in support of the goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. carve-out from the dispute resolution provisions of tional level, alongside those of the European Union, are the agreement. The content deals between Australian While the US Government has domestic anti-trust likely to weigh on carbon-intensive exports, including media and US tech firms have provided a temporary concerns about ‘big tech,’ the US Trade Representa- those from Australia, such as thermal coal. fix. However, the issue underscores the importance of tive can still be expected to champion the interests of The Australian Government’s proposed regulation and ensuring that domestic regulation is consistent with the US multinational corporations abroad where foreign taxation of digital platforms attracted attention from principles of non-discrimination and serves to promote governments enact measures that discriminate against the US Trade Representative under the Trump admin- international tax and investment certainty. US commercial and national interests.

Australian interests Policy recommendations There may be opportunities for Australia to capitalise on national security and supply chain concerns as a › Australia should work with the United States to ensure that they harmonise efforts to promote trusted ally and supplier in expanding the bilateral trade manufacturing capability and the security of supply chains and critical goods. This will maximise and investment relationship. There is already coopera- the joint economic opportunities available from these efforts and avoid unilateral measures that may tion between Australia and the United States in relation undermine rather than reinforce the bilateral economic relationship. to critical minerals15.2 and the defence industrial base. › But an inwardly focused and protectionist US trade and The Australian Government should seek to extend the digital commerce provisions of existing industry policy has the potential to discriminate against and prospective trade agreements and multilateral solutions to the regulation and taxation of Australian commercial interests directly, as well as weigh digital platforms that promote international tax and investment certainty. on global trade. The Australian Government needs to

87 BUILD CYBER CAPABILITY AND COOPERATION FOR AN EVOLVING THREAT LANDSCAPE DR JENNIFER S. HUNT

88 Context and background abled disinformation campaigns.16.4 Cyber scholar Herb Signals Directorate have been given a significant boost in Lin notes the difficulties of defence — while traditional funding. Alongside the government’s 2020 Cyber Secu- To deepen cooperation on cyber issues, Australia cybersecurity threats exploit the vulnerabilities of the rity Strategy, Canberra announced A$1.35 billion over 10 should restore critical bilateral and multilateral cyber system, these evolving attacks exploit its virtues, as years, in part for training and recruiting more than 500 efforts while also recognising that cyber-enabled cyber-enabled disinformation harnesses the openness cyber specialists.16.8 These domestic efforts have been disinformation is part of the expanding cyber threat and virality of social media to spread disinformation and paired with significant engagement on the international landscape. conspiracy theories to poison democratic function.16.5 front, but some bilateral efforts were abandoned under Whether for great power competition, private profit or the Trump administration. Australians and Americans consistently rank cyber pure entertainment, these tactics represent an evolving attacks in the top five of global threats.16.1 It is easy to strategic challenge to democracies and Australia is not see why. Recent cyberattacks in the United States have The Biden administration immune.16.6 The COVID-19 pandemic in particular has targeted critical infrastructure including government only heightened these challenges. In March 2020, the agencies, hospitals and utilities. In February 2021, a water Individual US states have focused on bolstering their Australian Cyber Security Centre issued an alert warn- treatment plant in Florida was hacked through remote cyber defences but the federal government and the ing of malicious websites masquerading as trustwor- access and the sodium hydroxide mix remotely changed United States more broadly have lost valuable time in thy authorities on coronavirus information, disinforma- to dangerous levels before being caught and reversed in countering the newest evolution of attacks due to the tion that could have undermined state responses to the real-time by the plant operator.16.2 In 2020, at least two Trump administration’s neglect of cyber issues. This pandemic.16.7 foreign governments breached the US Department of neglect included: the dismissal of the Cybersecurity Coordinator position at the White House, the shrinking Homeland Security and Treasury and exposed Fortune Australia invested significantly in cyber capacity and of the State Department’s cyber diplomacy wing, and 500 companies in what was described by some as the coordination under the Turnbull government including repeatedly ignored calls for bolstering electoral security. “Cyber Pearl Harbor” by inserting malicious code into a the introduction of a Special Advisor on Cyber Affairs 16.3 President Trump publicly sided with Vladimir Putin over popular software product. (within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet), US intelligence agencies’ assessment of hostile foreign a Cyber Ambassador (within the Department of Foreign Cyber is the connective tissue through critical state, interference in cyber and electoral matters.16.9 In one Affairs and Trade) and the Australian Cyber Security economic, social and strategic systems. Increasingly the of his last acts in office, President Trump dismissed the Centre (within the Australian Signals Directorate). Under soft underbelly, however, is democratic infrastructure. director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Secu- the Morrison government, cyber policymaking has As state conflicts expand to cyberspace, cyberattacks rity Agency at the Department of Homeland Security shifted to Home Affairs, the cyber diplomatic portfo- now target not just information systems, but electoral after the official confirmed Joe Biden’s win in the 2020 lio has expanded to include critical technologies and systems and even voters themselves through cyber-en- election.16.10 Australian Cyber Security operations in the Australian

89 The Biden cyber team The Biden administration must rebuild an atrophied state and fortify industrial capacity to counter diverse The Biden administration used its first month to signal the prioritisation of cyber issues on the national agenda attacks. President Biden has signalled the prioritisation through the appointment of officials with cyber experience across multiple departments. of cyber issues with a proposed US$10 billion funding package and the appointment of cybersecurity officials › Biden’s National Security Council includes five experienced cybersecurity officials including: in key leadership positions across multiple departments. › Anne Neuberger as Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology, a new Cybersecurity officials occupy five positions on the pres- position designed to elevate the subject internally ident’s National Security Council, with others in senior posts across the Department of Justice, Treasury, State › Senior Director for Cyber, Michael Sulmeyer and Homeland Security. This allows for crossover and › Homeland Security Advisor Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, her deputy, Russ Travers as Deputy prioritisation of cyber in diverse portfolios. Overseeing Homeland Security Advisor and Caitlin Durkovich as Senior Director for Resilience and Response coordination is the National Cyber Director, a position at the National Security Council. newly created by the 2021 Defense Authorization Act to improve US cyber defences through resilient networks, › In the White House’s Office of Management and Administration, David Recordon will become bolster offensive operations to impose costs on adver- Director of Technology. saries and coordinate with industry, the academy and close allies.16.11 › The Deputy Attorney General nominee, Lisa Monoca, also comes with cybersecurity portfolio experience. To reflect the evolving national security challenges in cyberspace, President Biden’s appointments also include disinformation and counterterrorism experts. Cyber increasingly sits at the nexus of growing domes- tic extremist activity, with online conspiracy theories about emails, servers and laptops leading to offline phys- ical violence. In 2019, the FBI warned against “conspir- acy-driven domestic terrorism” naming QAnon and conspiracies like Pizzagate.16.12 When Facebook16.13 finally shut down QAnon group pages in 2020, they found the

90 fastest online conspiracy group comprised one million Policy recommendations members across 15 countries including Australia.16.14 National security expert Peter Singer argues that the Beyond recognising cyber-enabled disinformation as a part of the cyber threat landscape to build both weaponisation of social media and the promulgation defensive capacity and social cybersecurity resilience, Australia and the United States should also: of extremist groups on Facebook has exacerbated chal- › Resume the Cyber Security Track 1.5 Dialogue16.21 in the 2021 Australia-US Ministerial lenges in nearly every policy area, from aiding terrorist Consultation16.22 inclusive of Australia’s inaugural Ambassador for Cyber Affairs and Critical recruitment to being a state tool of great-power compe- Technologies. These talks should be inclusive of Australia’s Ambassador for Cyber and Critical tition to damaging the vitality of democracy.16.15 Technologies, Dr Tobias Feakin. Australia’s cyber ambassador has been in close contact with America’s allies during Washington’s relative hiatus from multilateral cooperation and can provide Australian interests insight from extensive engagement on cyber issues with partner nations and the United Nations.16.23

Australia’s interests in the cyber realm similarly lie at › Coordinate with NATO’s efforts on collective defences to emerging cyber threats16.24 including the intersection of technical and disinformation chal- cyber disinformation operations and electoral interference. The cyber realm is included in lenges. ASIO has warned that far-right extremists are President Biden’s emphasis on building resilience in democracies. While working to deepen exploiting COVID-19 disinformation to recruit and radi- cyber cooperation between Five Eyes partners, Australia should also continue to engage closely calise Australians online.16.16 While cyberattacks are with multilateral efforts alongside the United States at the United Nations and NATO to strengthen generally measured in dollars, disinformation is meas- cyber norms and build collective responses to diverse cyberattacks that threaten state institutions, ured in lives.16.17 In 2020, separate reports by the Euro- industry and democratic function. This includes recognising cyber-enabled disinformation as a pean Commission16.18 and the US State Department16.19 threat alongside breaches and hacks and building defensive social cybersecurity accordingly.16.25 found that foreign actors, led by Beijing, Moscow and As countries like Finland16.26 have demonstrated, resilience against cyber-enabled disinformation Tehran had carried out targeted online disinformation campaigns does not merely require a technical or engineering solution. Often, the best solutions campaigns aimed at stoking confusion about the COVID- can be found in the social sciences16.27 and humanities.16.28 Research and educational links such as 19 pandemic. Australia’s distance does not provide international visiting fellowships,16.29 scholarships and targeted grants can be used to efficiently explore immunity to either a global pandemic or cyber-enabled the adaptation of allied efforts to counter disinformation to the Australian context. disinformation as evidenced by Australian lockdown protestors shouting “Arrest Bill Gates” and attacking 5G infrastructure.16.20

91 ENDNOTES

0.1 Respondents are instructed as follows “Ratings the Gillard Government’s carbon pricing legislation, Existential Crisis: How to Salvage Its Ability to Settle between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you the Clean Energy Act, was enacted in 2011. At that Trade Disputes” Peterson Institute for International feel favourable and warm toward the group. Ratings moment, therefore, Australia under Gillard was far Economics Policy Brief, December 2020, available between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you ahead of the United States under Obama. In 2013, at: https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/ don’t feel favourable toward the group and that you the Abbott government won election and formed wtos-existential-crisis-how-salvage-its-ability-settle- don’t care too much for them. You would rate the government and, consistent with its campaign trade-disputes group at 50 degrees if you don’t feel particularly platform, repealed the carbon tax legislation in 2.8 Chad P. Bown, “US-China phase one tracker: China’s warm or cold toward them.” 2014. It is the author’s view that if Waxman-Markey purchases of US goods as of December 2020,” 1.1 Further details appear in my account of that historic had become law in the United States, and if that Peterson Institute for International Economics, “PIEE Congress and Obama’s legislative agenda on Capitol legislation had worked to reduce carbon pollution Charts,” 8 February 2021, available at: https://www. Hill: Bryan W. Marshall and Bruce C. Wolpe, The without raising energy prices, the proposed repeal of piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-phase-one- Committee: A Study of Policy, Power, Politics and the carbon tax in Australia could have been defeated. tracker-chinas-purchases-us-goods Obama’s Historic Legislative Agenda on Capitol Hill. 2.1 Greenberg Traurig, “Biden Trade Policy,” The National 2.9 World Trade Organization, “Negotiations on University of Michigan Press. 2018 Edition Law Review, 17 November 2020, Available at: https:// e-commerce continue, eyeing a consolidated text by 1.2 Connor O’Brien, “Senate hands Trump his first veto www.natlawreview.com/article/biden-trade-policy the end of the year,” WTO News Item, 23 October override” POLITICO, 1 January 2021. Available at: 2.2 Edward Alden, “Can Katherine Tai Deliver on Biden’s 2020, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/ https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/01/senate- ‘Middle-Class’ Trade Agenda?” World Politics news_e/news20_e/ecom_26oct20_e.htm hands-trump-his-first-veto-override-453290 Review, 15 December 2020, available at: https:// 3.1 Cassey Lee, Siwage Dharma Negara and Maxensius 1.3 Andrew Restuccia, Burgess Everett, Heather Caygle, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29289/can- Tri Sambodo, “Southeast Asia dodged the worst of “Longest shutdown in history ends after Trump katherine-tai-deliver-on-biden-s-middle-class-trade- Covid-19, but the economic devastation may last for relents on wall” POLITICO, 25 January 2019. 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Available at: https://www.smh.com.au/ different tone?” East Asia Forum, 25 December on South-East Asia,” United Nations, July 2020, world/north-america/washington-can-wield-a-big- 2020, available at: https://www.eastasiaforum. available at: https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/ stick-and-has-facebook-s-authoritarian-antics-under- org/2020/12/25/biden-on-trade-same-policy- d8files/2020-07/SG-Policy-brief-COVID-19-and- the-microscope-20210222-p574lw.html different-tone/ South-East-Asia-30-July-2020.pdf. 1.5 New York Times Editorial Board, “The Task Ahead 2.5 Joe Biden campaign website, “Joe’s vision” available 3.2 World Health Organization, “Maintain essential health for Biden on Climate” The New York Times, 6 at: https://joebiden.com/joes-vision/ services during COVID-19 response: WHO,” 6 August 2020, available at: https://www.who.int/southeastasia/ February 2021. Available at: https://www.nytimes. 2.6 Simon Lester and Alfredo Carrillo Obregon, “The news/detail/06-08-2020-maintain-essential-health- com/2021/02/06/opinion/biden-climate-change- Trade Policy Views of Biden’s CEA Picks” The Cato services-during-covid-19-response-who. environment.html Institute Blog, 30 November 2020, available at: https:// 1.6 For a full discussion of the Waxman-Markey www.cato.org/blog/trade-policy-views-bidens-cea- 3.3 Tulip Mazumdar, “Stalled vaccine programmes legislation, see The Committee (University of picks ‘putting children’s lives at risk’,” BBC News, 4 June 2020, available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ Michigan Press, 2018), op. cit. note 1, at chapter 2. A 2.7 Jeffrey J. Schott and Euijin Jung, “The WTO’s year after Waxman-Markey was killed in the Senate, health-52911972.

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94 system-bulletin-january-27-2021 872d-2e9b265a7cf3 p56xbf.html 6.2 See for example: Jennifer Kavanaugh, Michael D. 6.8 Full text available online: https://www.law.cornell.edu/ 6.15 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement, Rich, “Truth Decay: An initial exploration of the uscode/text/47/230 Inquiry into criminal activity and enforcement during diminishing role of facts and analysis in American 6.9 Chris Griffith, “Capitol riot bumps up tech reform the COVID-19 pandemic. Submissions available public life,” RAND Corporation, February 2020. priority,” The Australian, 22 January 2021. online: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_ Available online: https://www.rand.org/pubs/ Available online: https://www.theaustralian.com. Business/Committees/Joint/Law_Enforcement/ research_reports/RR2314.html ; Seth G. Jones, au/business/technology/capitol-riot-bumps-up- COVID-19/Submissions Catrina Doxsee, Nicholas Harrington, “The Escalating priority-of-tackling-technology-policy/news-story/ 6.16 Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into the Terrorism Problem in the United States,” Center abadd1a610aa3e0a297d625270bcafa1 terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March for Strategic and International Studies, June 2020. 6.10 It could also leave the United States behind as the 2019. Available online: https://christchurchattack. Available online: https://www.csis.org/analysis/ European Commission progresses towards a Digital royalcommission.nz/ escalating-terrorism-problem-united-states Services Act which will rewrite the rules of how 6.17 James Pasley, “17 cell phone towers in New Zealand 6.3 The difficulties Australia has faced in its news American tech giants operate in one of their largest have been vandalised since lockdown, coinciding payment battle with Google is case in point. Trump- markets; Natasha Lomas, “Europe seizes on social with a boom in 5G conspiracy theories,” Business era trade officials lobbied the Australian government media’s purging of Trump to bang the drum for Insider, 20 May 2020. Available online: https://www. against the regulatory effort on the grounds that regulation,” Tech Crunch, 11 January 2021. Available businessinsider.com.au/17-cell-towers-have-been- it unfairly targeted American companies — an online: https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/11/europe- vandalized-in-new-zealand-since-lockdown-began- inescapable reality given the pre-eminence of seizes-on-social-medias-purging-of-trump-to-bang- 2020-5?r=US&IR=T American firms in the social media sector. See: Calla the-drum-for-regulation/ 6.18 For example, the APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force Wahlquist, “US attacks Australia’s ‘extraordinary’ plan 6.11 Reuters staff, “Biden orders assessment of domestic established in 2003: https://www.apec.org/Groups/ to make Google and Facebook pay for news,” The extremism risk, White House says,” Reuters, 23 SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and- Guardian, 19 January 2021. Available online: https:// January 2021. Available online: https://www.reuters. Technical-Cooperation/Working-Groups/Counter- www.theguardian.com/media/2021/jan/19/us-attacks- com/article/us-usa-biden-security-idUSKBN29R2EH Terrorism australias-extraordinary-plan-to-make-google-and- facebook-pay-for-news 6.12 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 6.19 The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet Security, “Inquiry into Extremist Movements and signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 6.4 Casey Newton, “How extremism came to Radicalism in Australia; Mostafa Rachwani, “’A threat Department of Defense in 2006 and have maintained thrive on YouTube,” The Verge, 3 April 2019. to Australia’: experts welcome inquiry’s focus on rise cooperation and collaboration through the country’s Available online: https://www.theverge.com/ of rightwing extremism,” The Guardian, 10 December respective counter terror coordination centres, interface/2019/4/3/18293293/youtube-extremism- 2021. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/ intelligence sharing arrangements, and joint military criticism-bloomberg australia-news/2020/dec/10/a-threat-to-australia- operations apparatus. 6.5 NCTA, “COVID-19: How Cable’s Internet Networks experts-welcome-inquirys-focus-on-rise-of- 6.20 Luke Broadwater, “Bipartisan Senate Inquiry on Are Performing,” site dashboard last accessed 19 rightwing-extremism Capitol Riot Will Begin With Scrutiny of Security February 2021. Available online: https://www.ncta. 6.13 Paul Karp, “ASIO reveals up to 40% of its counter- Failures,” The New York Times, 22 February com/COVIDdashboard terrorism cases involve far-right violent extremism,” 2021. Available online: https://www.nytimes. 6.6 Elliott Brennan, “Coronavirus and protest: How The Guardian, 22 September 2020. Available online: com/2021/02/22/us/politics/senate-hearing-capitol- COVID-19 has changed the face of American https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/ riot.html activism,” The United States Studies Centre, 26 May sep/22/asio-reveals-up-to-40-of-its-counter- 6.21 Daniel Hurst, “Head of Australia’s extremism inquiry 2020. Available online: https://www.ussc.edu.au/ terrorism-cases-involve-far-right-violent-extremism vows to take rising far-right threat seriously,” The analysis/coronavirus-protest-how-covid-19-has- 6.14 Nick McKenzie, Joel Tozer, “Neo-Nazis go bush: Guardian, 5 February 2021. Available online: https:// changed-the-face-of-american-activism Grampians gathering highlights rise of Australia’s far www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/feb/05/ 6.7 James Politi, “Mitch McConnell says conspiracy right,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January 2021. head-of-australias-extremism-inquiry-vows-to-take- theories are a ‘cancer’ on Republican Party,” Available online: https://www.smh.com.au/politics/ rising-far-right-threat-seriously Financial Times, 2 February 2021. Available online: federal/neo-nazis-go-bush-grampians-gathering- 6.22 6th ASPI-KAS Australia-Europe Counter Terrorism https://www.ft.com/content/d7a97f9f-4040-452a- highlights-rise-of-australia-s-far-right-20210127-

95 Dialogue 2020, available online: https://www.kas. promising-covid-19-vaccine-candidates-plans-global- Brazil, sparking concerns” CNN, 14 January 2021, de/en/web/australien/veranstaltungen/detail/-/ rollout-starting-q1-2021 available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/13/asia/ content/6th-aspi-kas-australia-europe-counter- 7.8 Emily Rauhala and Yasmeen Abutaleb, “U.S. sinovac-covid-vaccine-efficacy-intl-hnk/index.html terrorism-dialogue-2020 says it won’t join WHO-linked effort to develop, 7.18 Gabriel Pabico Lalu, “Duterte vouches for Galvez: 7.1 Ian C Sayson and Claire Jiao, “Indonesia to Start distribute coronavirus vaccine” The Washington Why focus on alleged corruption in vaccine pricing?” Inoculations: Southeast Asia Vaccine Tracker” Post, 2 September 2020, available at: https://www. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 January 2021, available Bloomberg News, 8 January 2021, available at: https:// washingtonpost.com/world/coronavirus-vaccine- at: https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1385309/duterte- www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-08/ trump/2020/09/01/b44b42be-e965-11ea-bf44- vouches-for-galvez-says-he-doesnt-get-why-critics- indonesia-to-start-inoculations-southeast-asia- 0d31c85838a5_story.html are-occupied-with-corruption vaccine-tracker 7.9 Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, “COVAX,” available at: 7.19 Under the TRIPS agreement, there are provisions to 7.2 The Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security, “Regional https://www.gavi.org/covax-facility permit IP protections to be waived for public health Vaccine Access and Health Security Initiative,” The 7.10 Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, “COVAX announces emergencies. Enactment of these provisions would Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, new agreement, plans for first deliveries” Media permit other vaccine manufacturers to commence available at: https://indopacifichealthsecurity.dfat.gov. Release, 22 January 2021, available at: https://www. producing generic versions of COVID-19 vaccines, au/vaccine-access gavi.org/news/media-room/covax-announces-new- thereby increasing global supply. 7.3 The Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security, “Six agreement-plans-first-deliveries 7.20 World Trade Organization, “Uruguay Round countries partner on Regulatory Strengthening 7.11 Joe Biden campaign website, “Joe’s vision” available Agreement — TRIPS,” available at: https://www.wto. Program,” The Australian Department of at: https://joebiden.com/joes-vision/ org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_03_e.htm Foreign Affairs and Trade, available at: https:// 7.12 C. Raja Mohan, “A New Pivot to Asia” Foreign Policy, 8.1 Peter Hannam and Mike Foley, “‘Breathtaking’: what indopacifichealthsecurity.dfat.gov.au/six-countries- 15 January 2021, available at: https://foreignpolicy. Joe Biden’s sweeping climate plan means for Scott partner-regulatory-strengthening-program com/2021/01/15/biden-china-asia-allies-strategy-pivot Morrison,” The Guardian, 30 January 2021. Available 7.4 Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar and Bill Barrow, “Biden at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/ 7.13 The New Zealand Government, “NZ ready to provide unveils $1.9T plan to stem COVID-19 and steady jan/30/breathtaking-what-joe-bidens-sweeping- $75m for Pacific and global COVID-19 vaccination economy” The Associated Press, 15 January 2021, climate-plan-means-for-scott-morrison; “US under support,” 17 December 2020, available at: https:// available at: https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden- Biden to test Morrison government’s do-little covid19.govt.nz/updates-and-resources/latest- coronavirus-action-plan-3d8d5841bb9098a81ad9452 climate stance” The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 updates/nz-ready-to-provide-75m-for-pacific-and- fb2619024 January 2021. Available at: https://www.smh.com. global-covid-19-vaccination-support/ 7.5 Erica Werner and Jeff Stein, “Biden unveils au/environment/climate-change/us-under-biden-to- 7.14 Liu Caiyu, “Making vaccines a global public good $1.9 trillion economic and health-care relief test-morrison-government-s-do-little-climate-stance- best response to nationalism: expert” Global package” The Washington Post, 15 January 2021, 20210122-p56w2a.html; Daniel Hurst, “Joe Biden if Times, 5 December 2020, available at: https://www. available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/us- president will push allies like Australia to do more on globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213083.shtml policy/2021/01/14/biden-stimulus-covid-relief/ climate, adviser says” The Guardian, 7 September 7.15 Kim Beng Phar and Clementine Bizot, “The Jury 2020. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us- 7.6 Emily Rauhala, “Biden to reengage with World Is Still Out on Beijing’s ‘Vaccine Diplomacy’” The news/2020/sep/07/joe-biden-if-president-will-push- Health Organization, will join global vaccine effort” Diplomat, 20 January 2021, available at: https:// allies-like-australia-to-do-more-on-climate-adviser- The Washington Post, 21 January 2021, available thediplomat.com/2021/01/the-jury-is-still-out-on- says at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/biden- beijings-vaccine-diplomacy/ administration-who-covax/2021/01/20/3ddc25ce- 8.2 Coral Davenport and Lisa Friedman, “The Battle 5a8c-11eb-aaad-93988621dd28_story.html 7.16 Jacob Mardell, “China’s vaccine diplomacy assumes Lines Are Forming in Biden’s Climate Push” New York geopolitical importance,” Mercator Institute For Times, 2 February 2021. Available at: www.nytimes. 7.7 The World Health Organization, “COVAX Announces China Studies, 24 November 2020, available at: com/2021/01/26/climate/biden-climate-change.html additional deals to access promising COVID-19 https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/chinas-vaccine- vaccine candidates; plans global rollout starting 8.3 “Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at diplomacy-assumes-geopolitical-importance Q1 2021” WHO News release, 18 December 2020, Home and Abroad,” The White House, January available at: https://www.who.int/news/item/18-12- 7.17 Nectar Gan and Tatiana Arias, “Chinese Covid-19 27, 2021. Available at: https://www.whitehouse. 2020-covax-announces-additional-deals-to-access- vaccine far less effective than initially claimed in gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/27/

96 executive-order-on-tackling-the-climate-crisis-at- agreement at COP25,” News.com.au. 17 December politics, culture, society and technology. home-and-abroad/ 2019. Available at: https://www.news.com.au/ 8.18 Adam Morton, “Ross Garnaut: three policies will 8.4 “The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution & technology/environment/climate-change/australia-is- set Australia on a path to 100% renewable energy” Environmental Justice,” Available at: https://joebiden. among-a-number-of-countries-being-blamed-for- The Guardian. November 6, 2019 https://www. com/climate-plan/ blocking-climate-agreement-at-cop25/news-story/73 theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/nov/06/ross- 0cb3aa0db89c0ce495482e3cbf02fa 8.5 Jim Orchard, “Can compromise candidate Biden garnaut-three-policies-will-set-australia-on-a-path- compromise on climate change?” United States 8.12 Theophilos Argitis, Kait Bolongaro and Derek Decloet, to-100-renewable-energy Studies Centre, 3 July 2020. Available at: https://www. “Biden-Trudeau Climate Plan May Target Polluting 9.1 See: US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific ussc.edu.au/analysis/can-compromise-candidate- Trade Rivals,” Bloomberg News, February 25, 2021. Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and biden-compromise-on-climate-change Available at: https://au.finance.yahoo.com/news/ Promoting a Networked Region,” June 2019, available biden-trudeau-climate-plan-may-190215599.html 8.6 “Commitments to Net Zero Double in Less Than a at: https://media.defense. gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/- Year” UN Climate Press Release, 21 September 2020. 8.13 Rob Harris and Anthony Galloway, “‘New 1/-1/1/ DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO- PACIFIC- Available at: https://unfccc.int/news/commitments-to- protectionism’: Australia to fight Boris Johnson’s STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF; Elbridge A. Colby, net-zero-double-in-less-than-a-year green tariff bid” Sydney Morning Herald, 11 February “Testimony before the House Armed Services 2021. Available at: https://www.smh.com.au/politics/ Committee Hearing on the Role of Allies and Partners 8.7 “Executive Order on Protecting Public Health and federal/new-protectionism-australia-to-fight-boris- in U.S. Military Strategy and Operations,” House the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle johnson-s-green-tariff-bid-20210210-p5714j.html Committee on Armed Services, 23 September 2020, the Climate Crisis” White House Executive Order, available at: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/ 20 January 2021. Available at: www.whitehouse. 8.14 US National Security Advisor-designate Jake Sullivan AS00/20200923/110884/HHRG-116-AS00-Wstate- gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/ on 3 December 2020. Available at: https://twitter.com/ ColbyE-20200923.pdf; Frances Adamson, “ANU executive-order-protecting-public-health-and- jakejsullivan/status/1334173397035741189?lang=en National Security College 10th Anniversary Lecture environment-and-restoring-science-to-tackle- 8.15 e.g., “Cotton speaks about the Green New Deal on Series,” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 25 climate-crisis/ the Senate floor,” 28 March 2019. https://www.cotton. November 2020, available at: https://www.dfat.gov. senate.gov/news/speeches/cotton-speaks-about-the- 8.8 “John Kerry Remarks at World Economic Forum, au/news/speech/anu-national-security-college-10th- green-new-deal-on-the-senate-floor Davos,” January 27, 2021. Available at: https://www. anniversary-lecture-series state.gov/remarks-at-world-economic-forum- 8.16 Jennifer Hewett, “Scott Morrison doubles down 9.2 Eric Edelman, Gary Roughead, Christine Fox, davos-2021/ on climate change,” Australian Financial Review, 29 Kathleen Hicks, Jack Keane, Andrew Krepinevich, January 2020. Available at: https://www.afr.com/ 8.9 Phillip Coorey, “Angus Taylor talks emissions with Jon Kyl, Thomas Mahnken, Michael McCord, politics/federal/scott-morrison-doubles-down-on- John Kerry,” Australian Financial Review, 25 January Michael Morell, Anne Patterson and Robert climate-change-20200129-p53vwc 2021. 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V. and policy developments in the United States; the https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/biden- 9.3 Ashley Townshend, Brendan Thomas-Noone and attentiveness to likely Biden administration policy ramps-up-climate-diplomacy-amid-differences-with- Matilda Steward, “Averting Crisis: American Strategy, on climate change is itself testament to the fact canberra-20210224-p575hi Military Spending and Collective Defence in the that Australian public opinion is powerfully shaped 8.11 Presumably, Kerry was referring to Australia’s stance Indo-Pacific,” United States Studies Centre, August by American and international public opinion on at the 2019 UN Climate Change conference, where 2019, available at: https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/ these issues. Australian policy settings are quite it advocated for using emissions reductions beyond averting-crisis-american-strategy-military-spending- likely to be shaped not by any statements by Biden its Kyoto targets to count towards Australia’s Paris and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific, p. 8-26, administration officials directed at the Australian emissions targets. See “Australia is among a number 42-60; United States Studies Centre at the University government, but through the intense interest of of countries being blamed for blocking climate of Sydney, “Red book/Blue book: An Australian Australians in the United States, but especially in

97 guide to the next US administration,” October 2020, 2016, available at: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/ mil/Media/News/Display/Article/1767117/uss-santa- available at: https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/red- files/transcripts/March%2031%202016_Hearing%20 fe-arrives-in-stirling-australia/; Glenn Slaughter, book-blue-book-an-australian-guide-to-the-next-us- Transcript_0.pdf “Multinational exercise Sea Dragon concludes in administration, p. 10-13. 9.9 Kathleen Hicks, Mark Cancian, Andrew Metrick and Guam,” Commander, US Pacific Fleet, 28 January 9.4 Ashley Townshend, “Response to Michael Wesley’s John Schaus, “Landing Together: Pacific Amphibious 2021, available at: https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news. ‘Beijing Calling’,” Australian Foreign Affairs, available Development and Implications for the U.S. Fleet,” aspx/130798; Department of Defence, “Royal at: https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/ Center for Strategic and International Studies, Australian Navy joins regional partners for Exercise correspondence/2020/09/response-to-michael- June 2016, available at: https://csis-website-prod. Pacific Vanguard,” Australian Government, 12 wesleys-beijing-calling/ashley-townshend; Ashley s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160629_ September 2020, available at: https://www.minister. Townshend and David Santoro, “Operationalising LandingTogether_Interim_Web.pdf defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/media-releases/ royal-australian-navy-joins-regional-partners- Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” United States 9.10 Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How America exercise-pacific Studies Centre, April 2020, available at: https:// Can Shore Up Asian Order,” Foreign Affairs, 12 united- states-studies-centre.s3.amazonaws. January 2021, available at: https://www.foreignaffairs. 9.14 Townshend et al., “Averting Crisis,” p. 61-72. com/ uploads/7ee/92c/264/7ee92c264a982 com/articles/united-states/2021-01-12/how-america- 9.15 Department of Defence, “2020 Defence Strategic a3add23fc544d82c8e8712ba346/ Operationalising- can-shore-asian-order Update,” Australian Government, 2020, available at: deterrence-in- the-Indo-Pacific.pdf, p. 21. 9.11 Cara Abercrombie, “Translating defence trade into https://www.defence.gov.au/ StrategicUpdate-2020/ 9.5 See: Stephan Frühling, “Is ANZUS Really an Alliance? cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” East Asia Forum, 20 docs/2020_Defence_ Strategic_Update.pdf; The Aligning the US and Australia,” Global Politics and May 2018, available at: https://www.eastasiaforum. Hon Linda Reynolds, “Keynote Address, Hudson Strategy, Vol. 60, No. 5 (September 2018), p. 199-218; org/2018/05/20/translating-defence-trade-into- Institute, Washington DC,” Department of Defence, Andrew Brown, “The History of the Radford-Collins cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/ 2 November 2019, available at: https://www.minister. Agreement,” Naval Historical Society of Australia, defence. gov.au/minister/lreynolds/speeches/ 9.12 Lindsey Ford, “Sustaining the Future of Indo-Pacific June 2008, available at: https://www.navyhistory.org. keynote-address-hudson-institute-washington-dc-0 Defense Strategy,” Center for a New American au/the-history-of-the-radford-collins-agreement/3/. Security, 28 September 2020, available at: https:// 9.16 Townshend and Santoro, “Operationalising 9.6 W. Bruce Weinrod, “Pooling and Sharing: The www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/sustaining- Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” p. 21. Effort to Enhance Allied Defense Capabilities,” in A the-future-of-indo-pacific-defense-strategy 9.17 Colby, “Testimony before the House Armed Services Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense 9.13 Department of Defence, “Australia joins Exercise Committee Hearing on the Role of Allies and Partners Capabilities of Key U.S. Allies and Security Partners, MALABAR 2020,” Australian Government, 3 in U.S. Military Strategy and Operations.” ed. Gary J. Schmitt (Carlisle: United States Army War November 2020, available at: https://www.minister. 9.18 Frühling, “Is ANZUS Really an Alliance? Aligning the College Press, 2015), p. 289; Narushige Michishita, defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/media-releases/ US and Australia,” p. 214. Peter M. Swartz and David F. Winkler, “Lessons of the australia-joins-exercise-malabar-2020; Department Cold War in the Pacific: U.S. Maritime Strategy, Crisis 10.1 Department of Defence, “Australian Defence Force of Defence, “First Maritime Exercise conducted by Prevention, and Japan’s Role,” The Wilson Center, Posture Review,” Australian Government, 30 March Australian, French, Japanese and US ships in the May 2016, available at: https://www. wilsoncenter.org/ 2012, available at: https://www.defence.gov.au/ Indian Ocean,” Australian Government, 17 May 2019, sites/default/files/lessons_ of_the_cold_war_in_the_ Publications/Reviews/ADFPosture/Final.asp available at: https://news.defence.gov.au/media/ pacific_0.pdf, p. 7. 10.2 John Coyne, “Strong and Free? The future security of media-releases/first-maritime-exercise-conducted- Australia’s north,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 9.7 General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., “From the Chairman: australian-french-japanese-and-us-ships; Des Paroz August 2019, available at: https://s3-ap-southeast-2. Allies and Partners Are Our Strategic Center of and Kieren Whiteley, “OCEAN EXPLORER 2019 amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-08/SR%20143%20 Gravity,” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 87 (October 2017), showcases Anti-Submarine Warfare capability,” Navy Strong%20and%20free.pdf?NKaFaCyyQ96lB_ available at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/ Daily, 2 March 2019, available at: https://news.navy. Y6OG1QrXB_3vKlKXQ8 Article/1325218/from-the-chairman-allies-and- gov.au/en/Mar2019/Fleet/5078/OCEAN-EXPLORER- partners-are-our-strategic-center-of-gravity/, p. 4-5. 2019-showcases-Anti-Submarine-Warfare-capability. 10.3 Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks and Mark Cancian, 9.8 United States-China Economic and Security Review htm#.YDwzlS0RpQK; Commander, US 7th Fleet, “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence Commission, “Hearing: China and the U.S. Rebalance “USS Santa Fe Arrives in Stirling, Australia,” 25 and Partnerships,” Center for Strategic and to Asia,” US Government Publishing Office, 31 March February 2019, available at: https://www.c7f.navy. International Studies, January 2016, available at:

98 https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs- public/ fight in contested maritime environment, coming fuel reserve,” The Australian, 30 July 2020, available legacy_files/files/publication/160119_ Green_ to Hawaii,” Marine Corps Times, 14 May 2020, at: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/ AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf, p. 3. available at: https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/ ausmin-talks-darwin-key-to-countering-china-in- 10.4 Mira Rapp-Hooper, Patrick M. Cronin, Harry Krejsa news/your-marine-corps/2020/05/14/new-marine- secret-defence-framework-with-us/news-story/585ef and Hannah Suh, “Counterbalance: Red Teaming littoral-regiment-designed-to-fight-in-contested- 848e59603cdb1537393a6732a73 the Rebalance in the Asia-Pacific,” Center for a New maritime-environment-coming-to-hawaii/; Kevin Eyer 10.11 Department of Defence, “2020 Defence Strategic American Security, 14 November 2016, available and Steve McJessy, “Operationalizing Distributed Update.” Maritime Operations,” Center for International at: https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ 10.12 Ewen Levick, “Contract awarded for Cocos/Keeling Maritime Security, 5 March 2019, available at: https:// counterbalance-red-teaming-the-rebalance-in-the- runway upgrades,” Australian Defence Magazine, cimsec.org/operationalizing-distributed-maritime- asia-pacific 4 February 2020, available at: https://www. operations/; Greg Jennett, “US plans to restore Navy’s 10.5 Lloyd J. Austin III, “Nomination--Austin III,” United australiandefence.com.au/defence/air/contract- 1st Fleet in rebuff to China in South China Sea,”ABC States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 19 awarded-for-cocos/keeling-runway-upgrades News, 3 December 2020, available at: https://www. January 2021, available at: https://www.armed- abc.net.au/news/2020-12-03/us-plans-to-restore- 10.13 Brendan Thomas-Noone, “The US Navy is Chasing services.senate.gov/hearings/21-01-19-nomination navys-1st-fleet/12946076 the Impossible,” The Strategist, 27 August 2020, 10.6 Ford, “Sustaining the Future of Indo-Pacific Defense available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-us- 10.8 Townshend et al., “Averting Crisis.” Strategy”; Admiral Philip S. Davidson, “Statement of navy-is-chasing-the-impossible/ 10.9 United States Studies Centre at the University of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy Commander, 10.14 Jonathan Earley, “Aiding our ally...some options Sydney, “Red book/Blue book: An Australian guide to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed for Australia,” Australian Journal of Defence and the next US administration,” p. 11. Services Committee on US Indo-Pacific Command Strategic Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2020), p. 47-63. Posture,” US Senate, 11 February 2019, available at: 10.10 Department of Defence, “United States Force 10.15 Stephen Dziedzic, “US to partner with Australia, https://www.armed-services.senate. gov/imo/media/ Posture Initiatives,” Australian Government, available Papua New Guinea on Manus Island naval base,” doc/Davidson_02-12-19.pdf. at: https://www.defence.gov.au/Initiatives/USFPI/ ABC News, 17 November 2018, available at: https:// Infrastructure/Default.asp; Department of Defence, 10.7 For instance, the US Air Force has expanded its www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-17/us-to-partner- “USAF B-1B Lancers to train with Royal Australian experiments in temporary basing in the region, with-australia-and-png-on-manus-island-naval- Air Force,” Australian Government, 23 November including for the first time landing two F-22 Raptors base/10507658 supported by a supply aircraft in Palau in November 2017, available at: https://www.minister.defence. 10.16 A good example of this future type of operation last year. The US Marine Corps continues to run gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-releases/ which would require more flexible access to US exercises in new logistics and operating methods usaf-b-1b-lancers-train-royal-australian-air-force; facilities is the RAAF and RAN deployments of joint with its recently established Littoral Combat Team Department of Defence, “Arrival of the 5th rotation task groups to Guam in July 2020. After drilling with based in Hawaii, with new locations in Japan, Guam of US Marines in Darwin,” Australian Government, US and Australian forces, the RAN task group also and elsewhere being considered. Most importantly, 13 April 2016, available at: https://news.defence.gov. went on to conduct a patrol in the South China Sea. the Navy is continuing to develop its Distributed au/media/media-releases/arrival-5th-rotation-us- Adam Thorn, “Growlers and Hornets Join US Drills in Maritime Operations concept, which envisions marines-darwin; US Department of State, “2016 Joint Guam,” Australian Aviation, 24 July 2020, available at: a dissemination of offensive power throughout Statement of the United States-Philippines Ministerial https://australianaviation.com.au/2020/07/growlers- the fleet, as well as more realistic exercises and Dialogue,” US Government Publishing Office, 12 July and-hornets-join-us-drills-in-guam/ new operational locations, including potentially in 2016, available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ the Indian Ocean. See: Kelley J. Stewart, “C-130J prs/ps/2016/01/251503.htm; Richard Ferguson and 11.1 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Implications of the Recent Super Hercules refuels F-22 Raptors Using Aerial Amos Aikman, “US military to spend $300m on Philippines-China Naval Stand-off,” Center for Bulk Fuel Delivery System,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Darwin infrastructure upgrade,” The Australian, 31 Strategic and International Studies, 7 May 2020, Command, 25 November 2020, available at: https:// July 2019, available at: https://www.theaustralian. available at: https://amti.csis.org/implications-of- www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/ com.au/nation/defence/us-military-to-spend-300m- the-recent-philippines-china-naval-stand-off/; Asia Article/2428065/c-130j-super-hercules-refuels-f-22- on-darwin-infrastructure-upgrade/news-story/ Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Update: Chinese raptors-using-aerial-bulk-fuel-delivery-syst/; Shawn c61faf17bdb886ebf0a0e707a21404f7; Ben Packham Survey Ship Escalates Three-Way Standoff,” Center Snow, “New Marine Littoral Regiment, designed to and Cameron Stewart, “AUSMIN talks: Secret defence for Strategic and International Studies, 30 April 2020, plan with US to counter China; Darwin to get strategic available at: https://amti.csis.org/chinese-survey-ship-

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100 coast guard to fire on foreign vessels if needed,” Blake Herzinger, “US plans in the Pacific islands could Workers,” US Government Publishing Office, 25 Reuters, 22 January 2021, available at: https://www. undermine Australia’s efforts,” The Strategist, 12 June January 2021, available at: https://www.whitehouse. reuters.com/article/us-china-coastguard-law- 2019, available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/25/ idUSKBN29R1ER; Thomas Shughart, “A Chinese-built us-plans-in-the-pacific-islands-could-undermine- executive-order-on-ensuring-the-future-is-made-in- airport next door to a key Australia-US naval base?” australias-efforts/; Department of Foreign Affairs all-of-america-by-all-of-americas-workers/ The Interpreter, 7 August 2020, available at: https:// and Trade, “Australia to support new Pacific Fusion 12.5 Andrea Shalal, Alexandra Alper and Timothy Aeppel, www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinese-built- Centre,” Australian Government, 5 September 2018, “Biden signs ‘Buy American’ order, pledges to renew airport-next-door-australia-us-funded-navy-port; available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/news/ U.S. manufacturing,” Reuters, 25 January 2021, Aaron Smith, “Chinese fishing plant in Torres Strait Pages/australia-to-support-new-pacific-fusion-centre available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa- raises alarm for Australian industry and islanders,” 11.19 Euan Graham, “U.S. Naval Standoff With China biden-idUSKBN29U0Z3; Richard A. 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101 at: https://twitter.com/BoeingAustralia/ duty measures on barley from Australia,” available 16.2 Pinellas Sheriff Dept, “Treatment Plant Intrusion status/1270158691120054274 at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ Press Conference” Oldsmar, Florida, 8 February 12.12 Thomas-Noone, “Ebbing opportunity: Australia and cases_e/ds598_e.htm 2021. Accessed via YouTube: https://www. the US National Technology and Industrial Base,” p. 14.6 Matthew Knott, “Biden adviser says US stands youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M&ab_ 10-13. ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with Australia” The Sydney channel=PinellasSheriff. Carlie, Porterfield. “Hacker Tried to Raise Chemicals in Drinking Water to 12.13 Anthony Capaccio, “F-35 Costs Drop for Building Jets Morning Herald, 3 December 2020, available at: Dangerous Levels at Florida Treatment Plant” Forbes, But Rise for Operating Them,” Bloomberg, 29 May https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/ 8 February 2021. Available at: https://www.forbes. 2020, available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ biden-adviser-says-us-stands-shoulder-to-shoulder- com/sites/carlieporterfield/2021/02/08/hacker-tried- articles/2020-05-29/f-35-costs-drop-for-building- with-australia-20201203-p56k3p.html to-raise-chemicals-in-drinking-water-to-dangerous- jets-but-rise-for-operating-them 14.7 In the last decade, Australia has only raised two WTO levels-at-florida-treatment-plant/?sh=6db2df021f21 12.14 Thomas-Noone, “Ebbing opportunity: Australia and disputes. By contrast, the US has raised twenty- 16.3 Isabellea Jibilian, “Here’s a simple explanation of how the US National Technology and Industrial Base.” seven. See WTO, Dispute Settlement Statistics, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ the massive SolarWinds hack happened and why it’s 12.15 Department of Defence, “The Technical Cooperation dispustats_e.htm such a big deal” Business Insider, MSN, 24 December Program Contested Urban Environment Strategic 2020. Available at: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/ 14.8 “It’s the end of the World Trade Organization as Challenge — CUE Adelaide 2017,” Australian politics/here-s-a-simple-explanation-of-how-the- we know it” The Economist, 28 November 2019, Government, 2017, available at: https://www.dst. massive-solarwinds-hack-happened-and-why-it-s- available at: https://www.economist.com/finance- defence.gov.au/cue17 such-a-big-deal/ar-BB1cd5qB and-economics/2019/11/28/its-the-end-of-the-world- 13.1 See Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “How trade-organisation-as-we-know-it 16.4 In five volumes and thousands of pages released in American Foreign Policy Got China Wrong,” Foreign 2019, the US Senate Intelligence Committee reported 15.1 Stephen Kirchner, The US is central to this China Affairs, March/April 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs. on Russia’s multi-prong cyberattacks including trade quarrel, Canberra Times, 25 May 2020. com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning; Kurt hacking officials’ emails, breaching state electoral M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan, “How American Can 15.2 David Uren, Rare earths: Is there a case for rolls, and micro-targeting voters through social media Both Challenge and Coexist With China,” Foreign government intervention? United States Studies campaigns to bolster conspiracy theories and disrupt Affairs, September/October 2019, https://www. Centre, 25 May 2019. fact-based democratic debate. Senate Intelligence foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/competition-with- 15.3 United States Comments on Australia’s Draft Treasury Report on Russian Interference in the 2016 Election china-without-catastrophe Laws Amendment (News Media and Digital Platforms Vol 1-5, available at: https://www.intelligence. 14.1 Jeffrey Wilson, “China’s trade sanctions on Mandatory Bargaining Code) Bill 2009, 15 January senate.gov/publications/report-select-committee- Australia. What’s the logic?” The Canberra Times, 24 2021. intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active- December 2020 https://www.canberratimes.com.au/ 16.1 Jacob Poushter and Christine Huang, “Climate measures story/7063597/another-day-another-trade-sanction- Change Still Seen as the Top Global Threat, but 16.5 Herb Lin, “Cyber Operations v. Information but-whats-the-logic/ Cyberattacks a Rising Concern” Pew Research Operations” 11th International Conference on Cyber 14.2 Under threat of trade sanctions, the Trump Center, 10 February 2019. Available at: https://www. Conflict (Cycon), Tallinn, Estonia. May 2019. Available Administration coerced Japan, Korea and Canada pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/10/climate-change- at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KyCDvEzq25s into signing new ‘trade balancing’ type trade still-seen-as-the-top-global-threat-but-cyberattacks- 16.6 See for example, the national security implications agreements. Jeffrey Wilson (2021), Adapting Australia a-rising-concern/. As noted by security researcher of public health conspiracy theories spread from to an era of geoconomic competition, p. 15. Brian Krebs, there are “few known incidents of online networks to traditional media in Jennifer Hunt, 14.3 Wilson, p. 18 malicious hackers” disrupting “complex systems” “The COVID-19 Pandemic v Post Truth” Global Health like this. Brian Krebs, “What’s most interesting about 14.4 Jeffrey Wilson, “Adapting Australia to an era of Security Network, 1 September 2020. https://www. the Florida water system hack? That we heard about geoeconomic competition” Perth USAsia Centre, ghsn.org/Policy-Reports it at all.” Krebs on Security blog. 10 February 2021. January 2021, available at: https://perthusasia.edu.au/ 16.7 Brandon Kirk Williams, “An Opportunity for Available at: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/02/ our-work/geoeconomics-report Strengthening US-Australia Cyber Cooperation” whats-most-interesting-about-the-florida-water- Lawfare, 16 September 2020. https://www. 14.5 World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, system-hack-that-we-heard-about-it-at-all/ “DS598: China — Anti-dumping and countervailing lawfareblog.com/opportunity-strengthening-us-

102 australian-cyber-cooperation www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-12/asio-briefing- org/research/tallinn-manual/ 16.8 Australia Cyber Security Strategy 2020. Available: warns-far-right-is-exploiting-coronavirus/12344472 16.25 In Jan 2017, the Obama administration declared https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/ 16.17 Jennifer Hunt, “The COVID-19 Pandemic v Post electoral systems as critical national infrastructure, news/australias-cyber-security-strategy-2020 Truth” Global Health Security Network, 1 September a move that freed up federal expertise and funds 16.9 Scott Horsley and Miles Parks, “Trump’s Refusal to 2020. Available at: https://www.ghsn.org/Policy- for states. The announcement was made the same Back US Intel over Russia at Putin Summit Sparks Reports day that the declassified US Intelligence report Bipartisan Ire” NPR, 15 July 2018. https://www.npr. 16.18 European Commission, “Coronavirus: EU Strengthens was released which concluded that President org/2018/07/16/628973563/trump-putin-to-meet-after- action to tackle disinformation” Press Release, Putin “ordered” an influence campaign in 2016 new-charges-over-russias-2016-election-interference 10 June 2020. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/ aimed at the US Presidential election, including “obtaining access to multiple US state or local 16.10 Kaitlan Collins and Paul LeBlanc, “Trump fires director commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1006 electoral boards.” Tami Abdollah, “US Designates of Homeland Security agency who had rejected 16.19 US State Department, GEC Special Report: Election Infrastructure as Critical” AP News, 7 President’s election conspiracy theories” CNN, 18 Russia’s Pillars of Disinformation and Propaganda. January 2017. Available at: https://apnews.com/ November 2020. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/11/17/ Washington DC, August 2020. 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Available at: https:// 16.20 Cameron Wilson, “Why are Australian Chanting news and disinformation amongst 35 countries. warontherocks.com/2021/01/a-lower-bar-for-the- ‘Arrest Bill Gates’ at Protests?” Buzzfeed News, 11 May Media Literacy Index 2019 available at https://osis. cyber-czar/ 2020. https://www.buzzfeed.com/cameronwilson/ bg/?p=3356&lang=en 16.12 Jana Winter, “Exclusive: FBI document warns lockdown-protest-australia-bill-gates-conspiracy- 16.27 Social sciences research in psychology, political conspiracy theories are a new domestic terrorism theories science and communication studies can also help threat” Yahoo News, 2 August 2019. Available at: 16.21 Track 1.5 U.S.-Australia Cyber Security Dialogue, support the design of counter-messaging strategies https://news.yahoo.com/fbi-documents-conspiracy- Centre for Strategic and International Studies, to fight disinformation in cyberspace. See, National theories-terrorism-160000507.html 2016. Available at: https://www.csis.org/programs/ Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. strategic-technologies-program/cybersecurity-and- 16.13 According to Facebook’s own reports, there were “A Decadal Survey of the Social and Behavioral governance/other-projects-cybersecurity-2 more than 1000 QAnon group pages, with more than Sciences: A Research Agenda for Advancing 1 million members, 64% of whom arrived there after 16.22 The Cyber 1.5 track was held in 2016 and 2018, Intelligence Analysis” (Washington, DC: The National Facebook’s recommendation to join. See, Ari Sen but the 2020 Ministerial notes appear not to focus Academies Press, 2019). Available at: https://doi. and Brandy Zadrozny, “QAnon groups have millions on (or mention) cyber, though it does discuss org/10.17226/25335. of members on Facebook, documents show” CNBC, disinformation. 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Available at: on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, Award is available for US Scholars to conduct https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/11/ Australia is a member of both. International Security research at UK institution, but not yet Australia or vice qanon-facebook-groups-growing-conspiracy-theory. and Cyberspace at the UN, DFAT 2021. Available versa. Available at: https://awards.cies.org/content/ at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/ 16.15 Peter W. Singer and Emerson T Brooking, Like War: fulbright-cyber-security-scholar-award The weaponization of social media. Boston: Mariner themes/cyber-affairs/international-security-and- Books, 2018. cyberspace 16.16 Mario Christodoulou, ‘ASIO briefing warns that the 16.24 The most recent example is the Tallin Manual 2.0 far right is exploiting coronavirus to recruit new (2017) which analyses how existing international law members’ ABC, 12 June 2020. Available at: https:// applies to cyberspace. Available at: https://ccdcoe.

103 IMAGES

Page 4. US Vice President Joe Biden delivered a speech Page 44. Pro-Trump protesters gather in front of the US Page 66. A Royal Australian Air Force C-27J Spartan on the US-Australia alliance with an introduction by USSC Capitol Building on 6 January 2021. Trump supporters aircraft provided aerial surveillance as part of the ongoing Chief Executive Officer Professor Simon Jackman (seated), gathered to protest the confirmation of President-elect Joe Australian Operation Solania, in support of the Pacific Island Sydney, July 2016. Photo: United States Studies Centre Biden’s Electoral College victory over President Trump in the Forum Fisheries Agency’s coordinated regional maritime Page 8. Capitol Building, Washington DC. Photo: Getty 2020 election. Photo: Getty Images surveillance and patrol operations. Photo: Department of Images Page 46. An armed police officer patrols the area outside Defence Page 18. The United States Capitol in Washington, DC is the the Al Noor mosque following the death of 49 worshippers Page 70. Boeing Australia completed the engine run on its home of the US Congress. Getty Images who were shot by an Australian right-wing extremist in first Loyal Wingman unmanned aircraft as part of ground Christchurch, New Zealand, March 2019. Photo: Getty testing and preparations for first flight, September 2020. Page 22. Inside the Capitol building dome, Washington, DC. Images Photo: Boeing Getty Images Page 48. A health worker prepares a syringe dose of the Page 76. Huawei flagship store in Shanghai, February 2021. Page 28. A payload of rolled-up steel. Photo: Getty Images AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine. Photo: Getty Images Photo: Getty Images Page 32. A Royal Australian Air Force C-17A Globemaster Page 52. Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden Page 80. A Chinese worker looks on as a cargo ship is III at RAAF Base Amberley delivered humanitarian aid to speaks about climate change in Wilmington, Delaware, loaded at a port in Qingdao, China, July 2017. Photo: Getty Port Villa in support of the disaster relief efforts of the September 2020. Photo: Getty Images Images Government of Vanuatu, April 2020. Photo: Department of Defence Page 58. Members of the Royal Australian Air Force, US Page 82. Farmhand Hugh Stocks releasing barley into a Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Indian Navy auger to transfer to storage in a grain hopper after being Page 36. US President Joe Biden speaks on COVID-19 and the Royal Canadian Air Force pose for a photo at the harvested on a farm near Inverleigh, some 100kms west of response at the White House, January 2021. Photo: Getty conclusion of Exercise Sea Dragon, Andersen Air Force Melbourne, December 2020. Photo: Getty Images Images Base, Guam, January 2021. Photo: US Navy Page 84. The Bremen Express cargo ship prepares to dock Page 40. An Australia-Japan-United States trilateral meeting Page 62. MV-22 Ospreys and KC-130J Hercules are parked at Port Miami. Photo: Getty Images on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Brisbane, November during Marine Rotational Force — Darwin trans-Pacific flight, 2014. Photo: Getty Images Page 88. Cybersecurity. Photo: Getty Images Cassidy International Airport, Kiribati, September 2019. Photo: US Marine Corps

104 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Elliott Brennan is a Research Associate at the United States Associate Professor Adam Kamradt-Scott is a Non- Brendan Thomas-Noone is a Research Fellow in the Studies Centre (USSC). His work spans the breadth of the resident Fellow at the USSC and an Associate Professor Foreign Policy and Defence Program at the USSC where Centre but has focused on progressive politics in the United in Global Health Security and International Relations he works on national security and technology issues, US States and youth mobilisation. at the University of Sydney. His research explores how defence and foreign policy, and Indo-Pacific security. governments and multilateral organisations cooperate when Hayley Channer is a Senior Policy Fellow at the Perth adverse health events such as disease outbreaks, epidemics Ashley Townshend is the USSC’s Director of Foreign USAsia Centre. She previously worked for the Department and pandemics occur. Policy and Defence. He works on international security and of Defence producing strategic policy guidance on defence strategic affairs with a focus on the Indo-Pacific, including capabilities and international engagement with the United Dr Stephen Kirchner is the USSC’s Director of Trade and regional alliances and partnerships, maritime security, States and Japan. Investment. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Fraser Institute defence policy, and US, Chinese, and Australian strategy. in Canada, where he has contributed to research projects Dr Jennifer S. Hunt is a Non-resident Fellow at the USSC comparing public policies in Australia, Canada and New Toby Warden is a Research Associate in the Foreign Policy as well as a Lecturer in Security Studies at Macquarie Zealand. and Defence Program at the USSC. He was previously a University. She has published on comparative national Research Assistant in the University of Sydney’s Centre for security policy of cyber and energy issues in the United Dr John Lee is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the USSC. International Security Studies. States, Australia and the Arab Gulf. He is also a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington DC. From 2016-2018, he was senior Dr Jeffrey Wilson is the Research Director at the Perth Professor Simon Jackman commenced as USSC CEO in adviser to Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. USAsia Centre. He has particular expertise in the politics April 2016. Between 1996 and 2016, he was a Professor of of trade agreements, regional economic institutions and Political Science and Statistics at Stanford University. His Jared Mondschein is a Senior Research Fellow at the Australia’s economic ties with Asia. teaching and research centres on public opinion, election USSC. His research focuses on the US-Australian trade campaigns, political participation and electoral systems with and investment relationship as well as innovation and Bruce Wolpe is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the USSC. special emphasis on American and Australian politics. entrepreneurship. He worked with the Democrats in Congress during President Barack Obama’s first term, and on the staff of Prime Minister Matilda Steward is an Honorary Associate at the USSC. Julia Gillard. He has also served as the former PM’s chief of She was previously a Research Associate in the Foreign staff. Policy and Defence Program and tutor in US and Australian politics.

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