State of the United States an Evolving Alliance Agenda
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STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AN EVOLVING ALLIANCE AGENDA MARCH 2021 The United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney is dedicated The Perth USAsia Centre located at The University of Western Australia is a to the rigorous analysis of American foreign policy, economics, politics and non-partisan, not-for-profit institution strengthening relationships and strategic culture. The Centre is a national resource, that builds Australia’s awareness of thinking between Australia, the Indo-Pacific and the USA. The Centre is a lead- the dynamics shaping America — and critically — their implications for Australia. ing think tank focusing on geopolitical issues, policy development and building a strategic affairs community across government, business and academia. The United States Studies Centre is a joint venture of the University of Sydney and the American Australian Association. The Centre was established as a collaboration of the American Australian Associa- tion, the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and The University of Western Australia. The Centre’s Foreign Policy and Defence Program receives funding support from the following partners: The Perth USAsia Centre receives its core operating funding from: Founding corporate partner: Corporate partnerships provide funding that underpins the Centre’s activities. We are proudly supported by: Research conclusions are derived independently and authors represent their own view, not those of the United States Studies Centre or the Perth USAsia Centre. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION by Simon Jackman 2 SECTION 3. How should the United States and Australia bolster 56 collective deterrence and defence? SECTION 1. How does the US domestic political landscape 6 enable or constrain increased US presence and attentiveness to Organise the alliance for collective defence 58 the Indo-Pacific? by Ashley Townshend and Brendan Thomas-Noone US domestic politics and policy by Simon Jackman 8 Expand allied force posture initiatives in the Indo-Pacific 62 by Brendan Thomas-Noone The Biden agenda, Congress and Australian interests 18 by Bruce Wolpe Strengthen coordination on countering maritime coercion 66 by Ashley Townshend and Toby Warden SECTION 2. How should the United States and Australia 26 advance prosperity and resilience? Advance defence industrial base integration 70 by Brendan Thomas-Noone Strengthen the global and regional trade architectures 28 by Jeffrey Wilson SECTION 4. How should the United States and Australia 74 strengthen the economic and technological foundations of the Enhance health cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Pacific 32 allied and partner network? by Matilda Steward Leverage advanced manufacturing, critical technology 76 Re-engage the United States in global health security 36 coordination and allied supply chain networks by John Lee by Adam Kamradt-Scott Develop deterrence against Chinese economic coercion 80 Activate the Australia-US-Japan trilateral infrastructure 40 by Jeffrey Wilson partnership by Hayley Channer Avoid protectionism to maximise joint economic opportunities 84 Collaborate to combat misinformation and the threat of 44 by Stephen Kirchner domestic extremism by Elliott Brennan Build cyber capability and cooperation for an evolving threat 88 Strengthen Indo-Pacific vaccine partnerships 48 landscape by Jennifer S. Hunt by Adam Kamradt-Scott Endnotes and images 92 Find common areas of cooperation in bolstering resilience to 52 climate change by Simon Jackman and Jared Mondschein About the authors 105 INTRODUCTION Australia’s long-standing strategic relationship with the United States is transforming in response to the geostrategic change in the Indo-Pacific and a fractious debate in the United States about its role in the world. At the same time, technological change and economic interdependence have reshaped the nature of interstate competition, creating many new vectors of state power. For Australian policymakers and their American partners, creativity and dexterity are in great demand, with the US-Australia alliance growing in scope and deepening in strategic importance. With a new administration in Washington committed to both the Indo-Pacific and the value of alliances — and 2021 marking the 70th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty — this volume advances an agenda for the alliance in this critical phase. 2 Three key developments are driving swift evolution in Infrastructure, energy, frontier technologies and higher Third, understanding the domestic US political and Australia’s alliance with the United States — far and away education are just some of the domains where a rapid policy environment must factor into any assessment Australia’s most important strategic relationship. shift in mindset is underway, with national security and of the alliance agenda, of how to advance Australian strategic considerations now much more salient or even national interests through the alliance. Despite deep First, strategic competition with an increasingly capa- paramount. As the COVID-19 pandemic vividly high- and bitter partisan acrimony in the United States, there ble, assertive and authoritarian China is now widely lights, points of national vulnerability and risk — and is much for Australians to welcome. The unified stance accepted as the single most pressing challenge for the conversely, resilience and strength — are being discov- on China’s coercive manoeuvres across party lines and United States and its allies. This change in the US strate- ered or created at a brisk pace. This re-emergence between countries is a critical alignment to tackle this gic mindset finds no meaningful partisan opposition in of economic tools of statecraft, or geoeconomics, is high stakes and pervasive issue. Washington and certainly not among relevant officials demanding creativity and dexterity from policymakers in the Biden administration. and moments of reckoning for democratic societies Second, rapid technological change and deepening and their leaders. economic interdependence have reshaped the nature of These developments are of profound significance for interstate competition since the Cold War, the last era of Australia and its alliance with the United States. Australia great power rivalry dominating international affairs. Since occupies the middle longitudes of the globe’s most then, long-standing, conventional vectors of state power STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH AN important geographic strategic arena, the Indo-Pacific. INCREASINGLY CAPABLE, ASSERTIVE have been transformed; examples include the develop- The Australia-US alliance has rapidly taken a regional AND AUTHORITARIAN CHINA IS NOW ment of stealth, autonomous systems and hypersonics focus and emphasis unseen since the Vietnam War. WIDELY ACCEPTED AS THE SINGLE MOST in the domain of conventional military capabilities or Australia is one of many countries that counts China as PRESSING CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED the way that technology has transformed intelligence STATES AND ITS ALLIES. THIS CHANGE IN its largest trading partner, but, and unusually for an econ- collection and analysis. THE US STRATEGIC MINDSET FINDS NO omy of its size, it has also maintained a highly concen- MEANINGFUL PARTISAN OPPOSITION International trade and cross-border investment flows trated mix of exports and destination markets. Accord- IN WASHINGTON AND CERTAINLY have always been vehicles for projecting and acquir- ingly, Australia has been, is, and will be, on the frontlines NOT AMONG RELEVANT OFFICIALS IN THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION. ing national power and influence but now have a level of geoeconomic competition. Unsurprisingly, this too is of strategic significance not seen in living memory. broadening and deepening the alliance agenda. 3 Across the US strategic affairs community, Australia’s credentials as an ally of substance are impeccable. Australia is rightly seen as on the “frontlines” with respect to the China challenge and being willing and able to respond credibly. Across nominees and appointees — their speeches and Senate testimony — and announcements about the tasking and resourcing of agencies, it is clear the Biden administration is prioritising the Indo-Pacific and the role and interests of allies and partners. We survey these developments in the chapters of this volume. But we also identify a number of challenges to Australian national interests in the US domestic political and policy environment. › The magnitude of the China challenge is accepted across party lines, but this must be backed by spending commitments and focus to translate aspiration and intent into policy, programs and facts-on-the-ground. (See Ashley Townshend and Brendan Thomas-Noone on page 58) US Vice President Joe Biden delivering a speech to the United States Studies Centre and the Lowy Institute in Sydney on 20 July 2016. Photo: United States Studies Centre 4 › Protectionism, isolationism and scepticism › The US and Australian governments are chiefly › Geoeconomic threats to American primacy about multilateral arrangements are also focused on the immediate health challenges are prompting the Biden administration to important legacies of the Trump presidency, of COVID-19, particularly getting vaccines to explicitly connect domestic recovery to external supercharged by the COVID-19 pandemic’s their citizens, but there remain opportunities for strength, with reviews of supply chains and damage to the US domestic economy, to the building more resilient public health systems strategic, government-led investments to United States’ sense