Report on Report on RISKRISK ANALYSISANALYSIS
PROJECTS & DEVELOPMENT INDIA LIMITED (A Govt. of India Undertaking) PO: Sindri - 828122, Dist: Dhanbad (Jharkhand) List ‘A’ - Accredited EIA Consultant Organization by QCI-NABET Serial No. 123 as on 11.07.2017
PDIL JOB NO.: 9720 July, 2017 9720-QRA-IOCL HALDIA REFINERY- 4 PROJECTS & DEVELOPMENT INDIA LTD. BS-VI PHASE-1 DOCUMENT NO. REV SHEET 1 OF 1
RISK ANALYSIS
FOR BS-VI FUEL QUALITY UPGRADATION - PHASE-1 AT INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. HALDIA REFINERY
OF
M/s INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED
4 July, 2017 FINAL REPORT BVH DKC AKS 3 July, 2017 DRAFT REPORT BVH DKC AKS 2 May, 2017 DRAFT REPORT BVH DKC AKS 1 Feb, 2017 DRAFT REPORT BVH DKC AKS 0 Dec, 2016 DRAFT REPORT BVH DKC AKS REV DATE PURPOSE PREPARED REVIEWED APPROVED FORM NO. F 02-0000-0021 F1 REV 2 All rights reserved 9720-QRA for IOC 1 RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY FOR BS-VI FUEL Haldia Refinery QUALITY UPGRADATION AT IOC, HALDIA DOCUMENT NO. REV REFINERY SHEET 1 OF 10
TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page Description No. No. Introduction 1 1.0 1.1 Objective of the Study 2 1.2 Scope of Work 3 2.0 2.1 General 4 2.2 Project Location 5 2.3 Climate & Meteorology 6 2.3.1 Temperature, Humidity and Rainfall 6 2.3.2 Wind Speed & Wind Direction 7 2.3.3 Pasquill Stability 8 3.0 3.0 Risk Assessment 10 3.1 Definitions 10 3.2 Process of Risk Management 10 3.3 Hazard Identification 10 3.3.1 Hazards related to Flammable Hydrocarbons 11 3.3.2 Hazards associated with Toxic/Carcinogenic materials 13 3.3.3 Potential Major Hazards 14 3.3.4 Modes of Failure 14 3.3.5 Selected Failure Cases 15 3.4 Consequence Analysis 20 3.4.1 Modeling Software 20 3.4.2 Discharge Rate 20 3.4.3 Dispersion Modeling 21 3.4.4 The Consequence Event Tree 21 3.4.5 Vapor Cloud Explosions and Flash Fires 22 3.4.6 Pool Fires, Jet Fires, Fireballs and BLEVEs 23 3.4.7 Toxic Hazards 24 3.4.8 Release Quantity 24 3.4.9 Duration of Release 25 3.4.10 Damage Criteria 25 3.5 Consequence analysis of selected failure Cases 28
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Clause Unit Equipment/Line Failure Case Fig/Dwg No. Page No. 3.5.1 DHDT Cold feed inlet to Leak Hole dia. 10mm dia. hole: Fig 28 fresh feed 10mm and 25mm no: 1 (Page No.A5), Coalescer drum 2(Page No.A6). (201-V-01) line 25 mm dia. hole: Fig no:3 (Pg no.A7), 4(Pg no.A8).
3.5.2 Feed Surge drum Hole dia. 10mm and 10mm dia. hole: Fig 30 (201-V-02) to 25mm no: 5 (Pg no.A9), 6 HHPS feed (Pg no.A10). exchanger line 25 mm dia. hole: Fig no:7(Pg no.A11), 8(Pg no.A12). 3.5.3 Reactor (201-R- 25% gasket failure Fig no. 9 (Pg 31 01) outlet line no.A13), 10(Pg no.A14) 3.5.4 RGC Instrument Instrument tubing Fig no: 11(Pg 33 tubing full bore failure no.A15), 12(Pg no.A16). 3.5.5 Stripper (201-C- Hole dia. 10mm and 25 mm dia. hole: Fig 35 02) outlet line 25mm no: 13 (Pg no.A17). 3.5.6 Naptha feed Drum Catastrophic Fig no.: 36 surge drum (201- failure 14(Pg no.A18) V-18) & 15(Pg no.A19). 3.5.7 Sweet gas knock Drum Catastrophic Fig no.: 38 out drum (201-V- failure 16(Pg no.A20) & 20) 17(Pg no.A21). 3.5.8 Diesel product a. Hole 10 mm & 25 a. 10mm dia. hole: 39 Coalescer o/l line mm Fig no: to hydro treated b. 20% Cross 18(Pg no.A22) & diesel b/l Sectional Area 19(Pg no.A23). (CSA) failure line 25 mm dia. hole: Fig rupture no: 20(Pg no.A24) & 21(Pg no.A25). b. Fig no: 22(Pg no.A26) & 23(Pg no.A27).
3.5.9 ARU Flashed vapor a. Hole 10 mm & 25 b. Fig no.: 41 from flash drum mm, b. Full bore 24(Pg no.A28), line to SRU failure 25(Pg no.A29) incinerator line 3.5.10 Amine Hole dia. 10 mm & 10mm dia. hole: Fig 43 regenerator 25 mm no: 26(Pg no.A30) reflux drum to 25 mm dia. hole: SRU Line failure Fig no: 27(Pg no.A31).
3.5.11 Drum 208-V-02 Catastrophic failure Fig no: 44 28(Pg no.A32).
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Clause Unit Equipment/Line Failure Case Fig/Dwg No. Page No. 3.5.12 HGU- Sour Naphtha Hole dia. 10mm and 25 mm dia. hole: 46 II feed to super 25mm Fig no: heater line 29(Pg no.A33). & 30(Pg no.A34). 3.5.13 Pump (92-P- a. Discharge a. Fig no.: 47 01A/B) line flange 31(Pg no.A35) & 25% gasket 32(Pg no.A36). failure b. Fig no.: b. Pump 33(Pg no.A37) & mechanical 34(Pg no.A38). seal failure 3.5.14 Super heated a. Hole 10 mm & 25 a. 25mm dia. hole- 50 sweet Naphtha mm Fig no.: feed to b. 20% CSA failure 35(Pg no.A39) & Desulphuriser line rupture 36(Pg no.A40). line b. Fig no.: 37(Pg no.A41) & 38(Pg no.A42). 3.5.15 Process gas from a. Hole dia. 25mm a. 25mm dia. hole- 52 Boiler to HTS b. 25% line flange Fig no.: Reactor gasket failure 39(Pg no.A43) & 40(Pg no.A44). b. Fig no.: 41(Pg no.A45) & 42(Pg no.A46). 3.5.16 Feed to PSA Unit a. Hole 10 mm & 25 a. 25mm dia. hole- 54 mm Fig no.: b. 20% CSA failure 43(Pg no.A47) & line rupture 44(Pg no.A48). b. Fig no.: 45(Pg no.A49) & 46(Pg no.A50). 3.5.17 Prime Pump 87-P- a. Hole 25mm a. 25mm dia. hole- 56 G 01A/B line to b. Pump discharge Fig no.: FCC Feed line line 25% flange 47(Pg no.A51) & gasket failure 48(Pg no.A52). b. Fig no.: 49(Pg no.A53) & 50(Pg no.A54). 3.5.18 SHU Reactor O/L a. Hole dia. 10 mm b. Fig no.: 59 line b.20% CSA failure 51(Pg no.A55) & line rupture 52(Pg no.A56). 3.5.19 FCC Gasoline a. Hole dia. 25 mm a. 25mm dia. hole- 60 Splitter outlet b. Full bore failure Fig no.: Line failure 53(Pg no.A57) & 54(Pg no.A58). b. Fig no.: 55(Pg no.A59) & 56(Pg no.A60). 3.5.20 Reflux drum (87- Drum Catastrophic Fig no.: 62 B-02) failure failure 57(Pg no.A61) & 58(Pg no.A62). 9720-QRA for IOC 1 RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY FOR BS-VI FUEL Haldia Refinery QUALITY UPGRADATION AT IOC, HALDIA DOCUMENT NO. REV REFINERY SHEET 4 OF 10
Clause Unit Equipment/Line Failure Case Fig/Dwg No. Page No. 3.5.21 SWS Sour Gas from Leak: Hole dia. 10 10mm dia. hole: 64 Stripper (207- mm & 25 mm Fig no: CC-01) overhead 59(Pg no.A63). to H2SO4 plant 25 mm dia. hole: Line failure Fig no: 60(Pg no.A64). 3.5.22 Stripper (207- Line rupture Fig no.: 65 CC-01) to Pump 61(Pg no.A65) (207-PA-2A/B) Line failure 3.5.23 SA ARU gas a. Hole 10 mm & 25 10mm dia. hole: Fig 66 Plant incoming line to mm b. 20% CSA no: 62(Pg no.A66). SA plant failure line rupture 25 mm dia. hole: Fig no: 63(Pg no.A67). 20%CSA failure Fig no.: 68 (Pg.A72) 3.5.24 SWS gas a. Hole 10 mm & 25 10mm dia. hole: 68 incoming line to mm Fig no: 64(A68). SA plant b. 20% CSA failure 25 mm dia. hole: line rupture Fig no: 65(A69). 20%CSA failure Fig no.: 67 (Pg.A71) 3.5.25 Fuel gas a. Hole 10 mm & 25 25 mm dia. hole: 69 incoming line to mm Fig no: 66(A70). SA plant b. Full bore rupture Full bore failure Jet fire: Fig no.: 69 (Pg.A73) UVCE Fig no.: 70 (Pg.A74)
3.6 Frequency Estimation 71 3.6.1 Parts Count 71 3.6.2 Event Tree Analysis 71 3.6.3 Immediate Ignition 72 3.6.4 Delayed Ignition 72 3.6.5 Explosion and Flash fire 73 3.6.6 Materials those are both Flammable and Toxic 73 3.7 Risk Analysis 75 3.7.1 Individual Risk 75 3.7.2 Societal Risk 76 3.7.3 Risk Criteria 76 3.8 Risk Results 79 3.8.1 Individual Risk results 79 9720-QRA for IOC 1 RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY FOR BS-VI FUEL Haldia Refinery QUALITY UPGRADATION AT IOC, HALDIA DOCUMENT NO. REV REFINERY SHEET 5 OF 10
3.8.2 Societal Risk results 79 3.9 Conclusion and Recommendation 79 3.9.1 Recommendations 80 4.0 Disaster Management Plan 86 4.1 Definitions 86 4.2 Objectives of DMP 89 4.3 Priority Of Handling Emergencies 89 4.4 Content of DMP 90 4.5 Classification Of Emergencies 90 4.6 Implementation 92 4.7 Pre-Emergency Planning 92 4.8 Emergency Mitigation Measures 96 4.9 Emergency Preparedness Measures 103 4.10 Emergency Organizations And Responsibilities 106 4.11 Declaration Of On-Site And Off-Site Emergencies 114 4.12 Medical Facilities 118
LIST OF TABLES Table Page Description No. No. 2.1 Design Capacities of new & revamped facilities under BS-VI Fuel 4 quality up gradation 2.2 Proposed Utilities 4 2.3 Climatological Normal Data – Temperature, Humidity & Rainfall 6 2.4 Meteorological Normal Data - Wind Flow Pattern 7 2.5 Pasquill stability classes 9 2.6 Selected Wind speed and Stability Classes 9 3.1 Hazardous Properties of Hydrogen 11 3.2 Hazardous Properties of Naphtha 12 3.3 Toxic effects of Hydrogen Sulfide 13 3.4 Toxic effects of Ammonia 14 3.5 General Mechanism of Loss of Containment 15 3.6 Selected Failure Scenarios for Process facilities 16 3.7 Damage Due to Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity 26 3.8 Damage Effects of Blast Overpressure 27 9720-QRA for IOC 1 RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY FOR BS-VI FUEL Haldia Refinery QUALITY UPGRADATION AT IOC, HALDIA DOCUMENT NO. REV REFINERY SHEET 6 OF 10
Table Page Description No. No. 3.9 Physiological Effect of Thermal Dose Level 27
Table Clause Unit Equipment/Line Failure Hazard Page No. No. Case distances due No. to 3.10 3.5.1 Cold feed inlet Leak Hole Thermal 29 to fresh feed dia. 10mm radiation due Coalescer drum and 25mm to Jet fire 3.11 3.5.1 (201-V-01) line UVCE due to 29 Overpressure 3.12 3.5.2 Feed Surge Hole dia. Thermal 30 drum (201-V-02) 10mm and Radiation Due DHDT to HHPS feed 25mm to Jet Fire 3.13 3.5.2 exchanger line UVCE due to 31 Overpressure 3.14 3.5.3 Reactor (201-R- 25% gasket Thermal 32 01) outlet line failure Radiation due to Jet Fire 3.15 3.5.3 LFL 32 Concentration 3.16 3.5.3 UVCE due to 33 Overpressure 3.17 3.5.4 RGC Instrument Instrument Thermal 34 tubing tubing full Radiation due bore failure to Jet Fire 3.18 3.5.4 UVCE due to 34 Overpressure 3.19 3.5.5 Stripper (201-C- Hole dia. Thermal 35 02) outlet line 10mm and Radiation Due 25mm to Jet Fire 3.20 3.5.5 UVCE due to 36 Overpressure 3.21 3.5.6 Fire Ball 37 Details due to DHDT BLEVE in Naptha feed Drum Drum 3.22 3.5.6 surge drum Catastrophic Thermal 37 (201-V-18) failure Radiation due to Fireball 3.23 3.5.6 UVCE due to 37 Overpressure 3.24 3.5.7 Fire Ball 38 Details due to Sweet gas Drum BLEVE in knock out drum Catastrophic Drum 3.25 3.5.7 (201-V-20) failure Thermal 39 Radiation due to Fireball 9720-QRA for IOC 1 RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY FOR BS-VI FUEL Haldia Refinery QUALITY UPGRADATION AT IOC, HALDIA DOCUMENT NO. REV REFINERY SHEET 7 OF 10
Table Clause Unit Equipment/Line Failure Hazard Page No. No. Case distances due No. to 3.26 3.5.7 UVCE due to 39 Overpressure 3.27 3.5.8 Diesel product a. Hole 10 Thermal 40 Coalescer o/l mm & 25 Radiation due line to hydro mm to Jet Fire 3.28 3.5.8 treated diesel b/l b. 20% UVCE due to 40 Cross Overpressure Sectional Area (CSA) failure line rupture 3.29 3.5.9 Flashed vapor a. Hole 10 Thermal 42 from flash drum mm & 25 Radiation due line to SRU mm, b. Full to Jet Fire 3.30 3.5.9 incinerator line bore failure UVCE due to 42 Overpressure 3.31 3.5.10 Amine Hole dia. 10 Toxic 44 ARU regenerator mm & 25 Distances to reflux drum to mm H2S release SRU Line failure 3.32 3.5.11 Drum 208-V-02 Catastrophic Downwind 45 failure Distance (m) To GLC of H2S 3.33 3.5.12 Sour Naphtha Hole dia. Thermal 46 feed to super 10mm and Radiation Due heater line 25mm to Jet Fire 3.5.12 UVCE due to 46 3.34 Overpressure 3.35 3.5.13.a Pump (92-P- Discharge Thermal 47 01A/B) line flange Radiation due 25% gasket to Jet Fire 3.36 3.5.13.a failure LFL 48 Concentration 3.37 3.5.13.a UVCE due to 48 Overpressure 3.38 3.5.13.b HGU- Pump (92-P- Pump Thermal 49 II 01A/B) mechanical Radiation Due seal failure to Jet Fire 3.39 3.5.13.b UVCE due to 50 Overpressure 3.40 3.5.14 Super heated a. Hole 10 Thermal 50 sweet Naphtha mm & 25 Radiation Due feed to mm to Jet Fire 3.41 3.5.14 Desulphuriser b. 20% CSA UVCE due to 51 line failure line Overpressure rupture 3.42 3.5.15 Process gas a. Hole dia. Thermal 52 from Boiler to 25mm Radiation due HTS Reactor to Jet Fire 9720-QRA for IOC 1 RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY FOR BS-VI FUEL Haldia Refinery QUALITY UPGRADATION AT IOC, HALDIA DOCUMENT NO. REV REFINERY SHEET 8 OF 10
Table Clause Unit Equipment/Line Failure Hazard Page No. No. Case distances due No. to 3.43 3.5.15 b. 25% line LFL 53 flange Concentration 3.44 3.5.15 gasket UVCE due to 54 failure Overpressure 3.45 3.5.16 Feed to PSA a. Hole 10 Thermal 55 Unit mm & 25 Radiation Due mm to Jet Fire 3.46 3.5.16 b. 20% CSA UVCE due to 55 failure line Overpressure rupture 3.47 3.5.17 Pump 87-P- a. Hole Thermal 57 01A/B line to 25mm Radiation due FCC Feed line b. Pump to Jet Fire 3.48 3.5.17 discharge LFL 58 line 25% Concentration 3.49 3.5.17 flange UVCE due to 58 gasket Overpressure failure 3.50 3.5.18 SHU Reactor a. Hole dia. Thermal 59 O/L line 10 mm Radiation Due b.20% CSA to Jet Fire 3.51 3.5.18 failure line UVCE due to 60 Prime rupture Overpressure 3.52 3.5.19 G FCC Gasoline a. Hole dia. Thermal 61 Splitter outlet 25 mm Radiation Due Line failure b. Full bore to Jet Fire 3.53 3.5.19 failure UVCE due to 61 Overpressure 3.54 3.5.20 Reflux drum (87- Drum Fire Ball 63 B-02) failure Catastrophic Details due to failure BLEVE 3.55 3.5.20 Thermal 63 Radiation due to Fireball 3.56 3.5.20 UVCE due to 63 Overpressure 3.57 3.5.21 SWS Sour Gas from Leak: Hole Toxic 65 Stripper (207- dia. 10 mm distances to CC-01) & 25 mm H2S release overhead to H2SO4 plant Line failure 3.58 3.5.22 Stripper (207- Line rupture Downwind 66 CC-01) to Pump distance (m) to (207-PA-2A/B) GLC of Line failure Ammonia 3.59 3.5.23 ARU gas Leak: Hole Toxic 67 incoming line dia. 10 mm, distances to SA failure to SA 25 mm & H S release Plant 2 plant 20% CSA failure 9720-QRA for IOC 1 RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY FOR BS-VI FUEL Haldia Refinery QUALITY UPGRADATION AT IOC, HALDIA DOCUMENT NO. REV REFINERY SHEET 9 OF 10
Table Clause Unit Equipment/Line Failure Hazard Page No. No. Case distances due No. to 3.60 3.5.24 SWS gas Leak: Hole Toxic 69 incoming line dia. 10 mm, distances to failure to SA 25 mm & H2S release plant 20% CSA failure 3.61 3.5.25 Fuel gas Leak: Hole Thermal 70 incoming line dia. 10 mm, Radiation Due failure to SA 25 mm & full to Jet Fire plant bore failure 3.62 3.5.25 Fuel gas Leak: Hole UVCE due to 70 incoming line dia. 10 mm, Overpressure failure to SA 25 mm & full plant bore failure 3.63 Detection and Isolation time 72 3.64 Probability of Ignition of Release 72 3.65 Failure frequency data 75 4.1 Probable Disaster scenarios with Emergency Level 91 4.2 Code of practices for Implementation of various activities 92 4.3 Hazards to Haldia Refinery 92 4.4 Selected failure cases for the RA study 94 4.5 Types of Work Permit Systems 100 4.6 Detection equipment available in the refinery 100 4.7 List of Portable Fire Extinguishers 101 4.8 Address & Location of other Fire services shall be contacted during 103 a disaster 4.9 Disaster Drills and Frequency 104 4.10 Strength of Medical staff 119
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LIST OF FIGURES Fig Description Page No. No. 3.1 Generalized Event Tree for Consequences in the Safeti 22 Program 3.2 Event tree for Continuous Liquid Release 73 3.3 Event tree for Continuous Gas Release 74 3.4 Event Tree for Instantaneous Liquid Release 74 3.5 Individual Risk Criteria 77 3.6 UK Societal Risk Criteria 78 4.1 Individual Risk 93 4.2 Organization Chart of Haldia Refinery 109 4.3 Communication Chart 116 4.4 Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan 117
ATTACHMENTS
S. No. Description Sheet
Annexure – 1A: Iso Risk Contour of 1 x 10-6 for proposed 1.0 A1 units of IOCL Haldia Refinery Annexure – 1B: Iso Risk Contour of 1 x 10-6 for proposed 2.0 A2 units of IOCL Haldia Refinery 3.0 Annexure – 1C: F-N Curve A3
4.0 Annexure – 2 : Layout the IOC Haldia Refinery A4 Fig 1 to 66 Damage Contours for selected failure scenarios A5 to A74 5.0 MSDS for all products
Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
INTRODUCTION
1.0 INTRODUCTION Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL) is India’s largest public corporation in terms of revenue and is one of the five Maharatna status companies in India. The Indian Oil group of companies owns and operated 10 of India’s 22 refineries with a combined capacity of 65.7 million metric tonnes per annum (MMTPA).
Haldia Refinery is located on the bank of river Hoogly at Haldia in East Mednipur district of the state West Bengal. The refinery was commissioned in 1975. Since then, the refinery has gone through several capacity expansion and product upgradation projects enabling it to operate at 8.0MMPTA capacity with production of BS-III and BS-IV quality fuels along with API Grade-II LOBS at present.
Refinery is spread over in an area of 500 acres, consisting of three blocks of process units called the Fuel Oil Block, the Lube Oil Block, the OHCU Block and the additional Secondary Processing Block. The Oil Movement & Storage (OM&S) and utility sections cater to the storage and movement of crude oil and products along with provision of generating and distributing steam, power, air and other utilities.
Petroleum Products from this refinery are supplied mainly to eastern India through two product pipelines, namely Haldia-Mourigram-Rajband pipeline (HMRPL), and Haldia-Barauni pipeline (HBPL) as well as through barges, tank wagons and tank trucks. Products like MS, HSD and Bitumen are exported from this refinery. Haldia Refinery is the only coastal refinery of the corporation and the lone lube flagship among Indian Oil Refineries, apart from being the sole producer of Jute Batching Oil.
As per the road map from Auto Fuel Quality Vision and Policy 2025 (AFVP-2025) report, BS-V quality fuels are to be introduced in the entire country by 01st April 2020 and BS-VI quality fuels are to be introduced in the entire country by 01st April 2024. It is to be noted that, as per AFVP-2025 report, auto fuels specifications to meet BS-V and BS-VI emission standards remains same. Only vehicle manufacturers need to upgrade their design and technology to meet the stringent emission norms. Accordingly, IOCL requires manufacturing 100% BS-VI compliant auto fuels by 1st April 2020. To meet this requirement in all the refineries, IOCL refineries are expected to upgrade their existing processing scheme and augment MS/Diesel treatment block. This may also call for modifying the blending streams and scheme. The objective involves producing products
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INTRODUCTION
meeting required specifications at the lowest possible cost, at current level of operations.
The current Fuel Upgradation is aimed at identification of facilities required for production of BS-VI Grade Fuels. In the view of ongoing Distillate Yield improvement project ‘DYIP’, the base case is adopted as production of 100% BS- IV Grade Fuels post implementation of DYIP.
Haldia Refinery can produce 100% Gasoline and Diesel conforming to BS-IV specifications post DYIP implementation which is considered as base case. However with the objective of meeting the guidelines established in Auto Fuel Policy 2025 wherein it would be required to manufacture 100 % BS-VI fuels, for conforming to the mandate as described above by 2020 as envisaged by Govt. of India.
Haldia refinery is constrained in production of MS primarily because of incommensurate MS upgradation capacity as compared with Naphtha production in the refinery. IOCL desires to minimize Naphtha production and maximize BS- VI Gasoline production at Haldia Refinery. BS-VI Diesel production is targeted to be kept at similar levels as in base case post installation of DYIP while exploring options for upgrading. The production of LOBS is maintained at the similar levels as per the base case operation. Hydrogen Unit and Sulphur block capacities shall be analyzed with production of BS-VI quality fuels.
1.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY In view of up-gradation to BS-VI grade fuels, the capacities of units are increasing from the existing capacities. For the above said expansion of IOCL refinery, a detailed Risk Assessment (RA) study is to be carried out to identify and quantify all potential failures modes that may lead to hazardous consequences and to evaluate their frequencies and extent. Typical hazardous consequences include fire, explosion and toxic releases. The QRA study includes the following steps: Study of the plant facilities and systems Identification of failure cases within the process. Evaluate process hazards emanating from the identified potential accident scenarios. Determination of risk to employees from modification of process units.
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INTRODUCTION
Determination of Societal risk from plant operations Identification of cost effective risk reduction measures. M/S IOCL has retained M/S PDIL, Sindri for carrying out the above study to conduct a Quantitative Risk Assessment study of their Haldia Refinery in the state of West Bengal. PDIL is a QCI-NABET Accredited EIA Consultant Organisation listed in List-A at Sl. No. - 123 as on 11.07.2017.
1.2 SCOPE OF WORK The study addresses the hazards that can be realized due to operations associated with the following facilities under Haldia Refinery: 1. Diesel Hydrotreating Unit 2. Amine Regeneration Unit 3. Revamp of HGU-II 4. Prime G+ quality revamp. 5. Sour Water Stripping Unit. 6. Sulphuric Acid Plant
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PROJECT DESCRIPTION
2.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
2.1 GENERAL Haldia refinery was initially designed for a capacity of 2.5 million metric tonnes per annum (MMTPA) and was subsequently modernized and debottlenecked for capacity augmentation and improvement of product pattern. The refinery now has two Crude Distillation Units with processing level of 7.5 MMTPA. Recently IOCL has proposed for expansion of Refinery capacity from 7.5 MMTPA to 8.0 MMTPA by revamping existing CDU-1 and VDU with some modifications in the existing units.
Design Capacities of new & revamped facilities under BS-VI Fuel quality up gradation Phase-1 Project are as follows: Table 2.1 Design Capacities of new & revamped facilities under BS-VI Fuel quality up gradation S.No. Unit/Facility name Capacity
1. Diesel Hydrotreating Unit 1200 TMTPA
2. Amine Regeneration Unit 200 TPH
3. Sour water Stripping Unit 100 TPH
4. Revamp of HGU-II Min. 90 TMTPA
5. Prime G Quality Revamp
6. Sulphuric Acid 375 MTPD
Table 2.2 Proposed Utilities S. No Utility name Capacity
1. Cooling tower 3 X 4000 m3/h
2. Instrument air + Plant air 3800 Nm3/h
3. Nitrogen plant 1100 Nm3/h
4. Flare (Hydrocarbon & acid) 60” / 12” headers
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PROJECT DESCRIPTION
2.2 PROJECT LOCATION
IOCL Refinery is located at Haldia, district Purba Medinipur in the state of West Bengal. Its geographical coordinates are Latitude 22°03’ 18.80’’N to 22°02’ 01.60’’N and Longitude 88°06’55.45’’E to 88°05’54.81’’E with mean sea level 8m.
The site is well connected by roads and railways. It is approachable from the Kolkata-Haldia National Highways (NH-41 starts at Haldia near the Haldia refinery and meets NH-6 linking Kolkata to Mumbai at Mecheda). It is also connected with Howrah through Panskura-Haldia branch (69 km.) of the South-Eastern Railways. Panskura-Durgachak Road is another road, which connects Haldia to Main South-Eastern Railway line at Panskura. Haldia is about 130 km from Kolkata by road (Through NH-41 and NH-6). Haldia is also connected with Kolkata through the shortest route of Diamond Harbour Road and regular ferry services operating from Raichak to Kukrahati over the Hooghly River.
Nearaest Railway station is Durgachak which is about 5km away from the project site. Hoogly River is within 1 km distance from the project site and Haldi River is about 10 km away from the project site. The nearest airport “Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose” Airport, Kolkata located about 140km (by road) from the project site. The layout of Haldia Refinery is presented in Annexure II.
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Daily maximum and minimum temperatures of the proposed project were presented in the Table 2.3. Ulberia Meteorological Station has been selected which is nearest Met station of IMD (Indian Meteorological Department) to the proposed project.
The climate of Haldia is a typical moderate one with winter temperatures ranging from 120C to 180C. Winters are cool and pleasant and it is also the festival time for inhabitants here with the Haldia Utsav taking place during the same time. Summers can be hot and humid with temperatures going up to 350C. Rainfall is moderate, and the rainy months are between June and September. More than 74% of the rainfall is received in between June to September through south - west monsoon. Annual average rainfall as per Ulberia IMD station, which is the nearest from Haldia, is about 1618.1 mm. Higher rainfall is due to cyclones which cause major precipitations in the area. Climatological normal data of Ulberia IMD observatory are available for comparatively longer period of time. Climatological normal data for this observatory have been presented through Tables – 2.3 to 2.4
Table – 2.3
Climatological Normal Data – Temperature, Humidity & Rainfall
Temperature °C Relative Rainfall Humidity, % Month Daily Daily Monthly No. of Max. Min. Total, mm rainy days I 85 January 25.7 12.7 11.3 0.9 II 63 I 81 February 28.6 15.9 23.7 1.5 II 58 I 80 March 33.0 20.7 33.9 2.1 II 58 I 80 April 35.0 24.1 52.8 3.6 II 70 I 80 May 35.0 25.4 126.1 6.4 II 74 I 84 June 33.7 26.2 242.6 11.7 II 79 I 88 July 32.2 26.0 343.8 15.0 II 84 I 88 August 31.8 26.1 332.5 15.8 II 84
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I 88 September 32.0 25.8 307.5 12.1 II 83 I 84 October 31.8 23.9 97.5 5.5 II 78 I 83 November 29.3 18.6 33.4 1.4 II 71 I 84 December 26.6 13.8 13.0 0.6 II 66 Annual I 84 Total or II 31.2 21.6 1618.1 76.7 Mean 72 Source: Climatological Normal Table for Ulberia, India (IMD Publication-1970-2000).
2.3.2 Wind Speed & Wind Direction
Climatological normal data on wind flow pattern for Ulberia Observatory have been presented in Table – 2.4. During monsoon season (June to September) dominant wind direction is SE and wind speed has been reported in the range of 4.3 to 6.2 kmph. The highest monthly mean wind speed of 7.7 kmph has been reported during the month of May. The lowest mean wind speed of 2.6 Kmph is reported in the month of December. Table – 2.4 Meteorological Normal Data - Wind Flow Pattern Percentage no. of days of wind blowing from* Mean Wind Speed Month Day/ N NE E SE S SW W NW CALM kmph Night I 13 24 2 3 1 4 3 17 33 2.7 JAN II 7 11 2 5 1 3 4 10 57
I 8 26 2 8 3 11 2 12 28 3.6 FEB II 6 16 3 14 5 7 3 9 37
I 6 13 2 15 11 27 3 8 15 4.6 MAR II 2 9 3 30 13 13 2 3 25
I 1 6 2 26 18 35 2 3 7 7.1 APR II 1 3 2 46 18 20 1 1 8
I 1 6 5 32 17 29 2 2 6 7.7 MAY II 0 3 3 50 16 19 1 2 6
I 1 9 6 34 12 24 1 2 11 6.2 JUN II 0 6 4 48 10 17 1 2 12
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Percentage no. of days of wind blowing from* Mean Wind Speed Month Day/ N NE E SE S SW W NW CALM kmph Night I 0 8 4 23 15 30 2 2 16 5.6 JUL II 0 5 3 37 13 23 0 1 18 I 1 16 7 24 7 18 2 3 22 4.6 AUG II 1 7 5 37 8 13 2 2 25
I 2 12 7 19 8 20 3 4 25 4.3 SEP II 1 7 5 31 7 10 2 3 34
I 6 23 3 9 3 13 3 12 28 3.3 OCT II 5 12 2 12 4 5 3 8 49
I 15 29 1 2 1 4 2 20 26 2.9 NOV II 8 14 1 2 1 2 3 10 59
I 14 20 1 1 1 4 3 22 34 2.6 DEC II 5 8 1 1 0 3 4 7 71
Annual I 6 16 4 16 8 18 2 9 21 Total or 4.7 Mean II 3 8 3 26 8 11 2 5 34
Source: IMD Observatory at Ulberia (IMD Publication).
2.3.3 Pasquill Stability One of the most important characteristics of atmosphere is its stability. Stability of atmosphere is its tendency to resist vertical motion or to suppress existing turbulence. This tendency directly influences the ability of atmosphere to disperse pollutants released from the facilities. In most dispersion scenarios, the relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the ground, varying in thickness from a few meters to a few thousand meters. Turbulence induced by buoyancy forces in the atmosphere is closely related to the vertical temperature gradient. Temperature normally decreases with increasing height in the atmosphere. The rate at which the temperature of air decreases with height is called Environmental Lapse Rate (ELR). It varies from time to time and place to place. The atmosphere is considered to be stable, neutral or unstable according to ELR is less than, equal to or greater than Dry Adiabatic Lapse Rate (DALR), which is a constant value of 0.98°C/100 meters.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 8 of 120 Risk Analysis study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation & New Catalytic Dewaxing Unit at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery PROJECT DESCRIPTION Pasquill stability parameter, based on Pasquill – Gifford categorization, is a meteorological parameter, which describes the stability of atmosphere, i.e., the degree of convective turbulence. Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from `A' (extremely unstable) to `F' (stable). Wind speeds, intensity of solar radiation (daytime insulation) and night time sky cover have been identified as prime factors defining these stability categories. The following table indicates the Pasquill stability classes.
Table 2.5 Pasquillqy stability classes
The selected wind speed and stability classes for the study are as follows:
Table 2.6: Selected Wind speed and Stability Classes
S.No Wind Speed Stability Class
1. 2 B
2. 3 B-C
3. 3 D
4. 5 D
5. 2 F
All the damage contours for failure scenarios are presented for Wind speed 3m/s and Stability class B-C which is considered as moderate climate for Haldia Site.
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3.0 RISK ASSESSMENT
3.1 DEFINITIONS A hazard is defined as “a physical situation with a potential for human injury, damage to property, damage to the environment or some combination of these. A major hazard is described as an imprecise term for a large scale chemical hazard, especially one which may be realized through an acute event”. Risk Assessment is described as “a process of collecting, organizing, analyzing, interpreting, communicating and implementing information in order to identify the probable frequency, magnitude and nature of any major incident which could occur at a major hazard installation and the measures needed to be taken to remove, reduce or control potential causes of such incidents”.
3.2 PROCESS OF RISK MANAGEMENT Risk management has become widely used as a technique to aid decision making. Five specific elements are involved: Hazard Identification: to determine the incident scenarios, hazards and hazardous events, their causes and mechanisms. Consequence Analysis: to determine the extent of the consequences of identified hazardous events. Frequency Estimation: to determine the frequency of occurrence of identified hazardous events and the various consequences. Risk Summation: to determine the risk levels. Risk Assessment: to identify if the risk is tolerable/intolerable and to identify risk reduction or mitigation measures and prioritize these using techniques such as risk ranking and cost-benefit analysis.
3.3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION The first stage in risk assessment is to identify the potential incidents that could lead to the release of a hazardous material from its normal containment and result in a major accident. This is achieved by a systematic review of the facilities to determine where a release of a hazardous material could occur from various parts of the installation. The major hazards are generally one of three types: flammable, reactive and or toxic.
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In our study, Refinery complex handles a number of hazardous materials like Hydrogen, Naphtha, Methane, Propane and other hydrocarbons which have a potential to cause fire and explosion hazards. The toxic chemicals like Ammonia and Hydrogen sulfide are also being handled in the Refinery and considered in our study. This chapter describes in brief the hazards associated with these materials. Flammable hazards may manifest as high thermal radiation from fires and overpressures following explosions that may cause direct damage, building collapse, etc. Flammable hazards are present throughout the facility and associated pipelines. Fires may occur if flammable materials are released to the atmosphere and ignition takes place.
3.3.1 Hazards related to Flammable Hydrocarbons a. Hydrogen
Hydrogen (H2) is a gas lighter than air at normal temperature and pressure. It is highly flammable and explosive. It has the widest range of flammable concentrations in air among all common gaseous fuels. This flammable range of Hydrogen varies from 4% by volume (lower flammable limit) to 75% by volume (upper flammable limit). Hydrogen flame (or fire) is nearly invisible even though the flame temperature is higher than that of hydrocarbon fires and hence poses greater hazards to persons in the vicinity. Constant exposure of certain types of ferritic steels to hydrogen results in the embrittlement of the metals. Leakage can be caused by such embrittlement in pipes, welds, and metal gaskets. In terms of toxicity, hydrogen is a simple asphyxiant. Exposure to high concentrations may exclude an adequate supply of oxygen to the lungs. No significant effect to human through dermal absorption and ingestion is reported. Refer to Table 3.1 for properties of Hydrogen. Table 3.1 Hazardous Properties of Hydrogen S.No Property Value
1. LFL (% v/v) 4.12
2. UFL (% v/v) 74.2 3. Auto Ignition Temperature (°C) 500
4. Heat of combustion (Kcal/Kg) 28700
5. Normal Boiling point (°C) -252
6. Flash point (°C) N.A
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b. Naphtha and Other Heavier Hydrocarbon The major hazards from these types of hydrocarbons are fire and radiation. Any spillage or loss of containment of heavier hydrocarbons may create a highly flammable pool of liquid around the source of release. If it is released at temperatures higher than the normal boiling point it can flash significantly and would lead to high entrainment of gas phase in the liquid phase. High entrainment of gas phase in the liquid phase can lead to jet fires. On the other hand negligible flashing i.e. release at temperatures near boiling points would lead to formation of pools and then pool fire. Spillage of comparatively lighter hydrocarbons like Naphtha may result in formation of vapor cloud. Flash fire/ explosion can occur in case of ignition. Refer to Table 3.2 for properties of Naphtha. Table 3.2 Hazardous Properties of Naphtha S.No Property Value
1. LFL (% v/v) 0.8
2. UFL (% v/v) 5
3. Auto Ignition Temperature (°C) 228
4. Heat of combustion (Kcal/Kg) 10100
5. Normal Boiling point (°C) 130-155
6. Flash point (°C) 38-42 c. Propane Propane is a gas at ordinary temperature and pressure. It can be easily liquefied by applying pressure & cooling. It is extremely flammable and may cause explosion. Boiling Point : - 42 °C Auto-ignition Temperature : 432 °C Flash Point : - 101.1 °C (Pensky-Martin Closed Cup) Explosive Limit : 2 - 9.5 % The product is a “Hazardous Chemical” as defined by OSHA Hazard communication Standard. Toxicological Hazard of Propane Effects of inhalation : Suffocation Hazard (Asphyxiant) At low oxygen concentrations, unconsciousness and death may occur in seconds without warning. Skin contact of liquid Propane may cause frostbite.
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3.3.2 Hazard Associated with Toxic/Carcinogenic materials
a. Hydrogen Sulfide [H2S] Hydrogen sulfide is a colorless, flammable, extremely hazardous gas with a “rotten egg” smell. It is heavier than air and may travel along the ground. In addition, hydrogen sulfide is a highly flammable gas and gas/air mixtures can be explosive. It may travel to sources of ignition and flash back. If ignited, the gas burns to produce toxic vapors and gases, such as Sulfur Dioxide.
Health effects of H2S exposure: Hydrogen sulfide is both an irritant and a chemical asphyxiant with effects on both oxygen utilization and the central nervous system. Its health effects can vary depending on the level and duration of exposure. Low concentrations irritate the eyes, nose, throat and respiratory system (e.g., burning/ tearing of eyes, cough, shortness of breath). High concentrations can cause shock, convulsions, inability to breathe, extremely rapid unconsciousness, coma and death. About 800 ppm is the lethal concentration for 50% of humans for 5 minutes (LC50). Concentration over 1000 ppm can cause immediate collapse with loss of breathing, even after inhalation of a single breath. Table 3.3 Toxic effects of Hydrogen Sulfide S. No Threshold Limits Concentration (ppm)
1. Odor Threshold 0.0047
2. Threshold Limit Value(TLV) 10
3. Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL) 15 (15 Minutes) 4. Immediately Dangerous to Life and 100 Health (IDLH) level (for 30 min exposure)
b. Ammonia [NH3] Ammonia is likely to be present in sour gas produced from Sour water stripper unit (SWSU). The hazard associated with ammonia is both toxic and flammable hazards. Toxic hazards being more pronounced. Vapors of ammonia may cause severe eye or throat irritation and permanent injury may result. Contact with the liquid freezes skin and produces a caustic burn. Table 3.4 indicates the toxic properties of ammonia.
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Table 3.4 Toxic effects of Ammonia S. No Threshold Limits Concentration (ppm)
1. Threshold Limit Value(TLV) 25
2. Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL) 35 (15 Minutes) 3. Immediately Dangerous to Life and 300 Health (IDLH) level (for 30 min exposure)
3.3.3 Potential Major Hazards There are a number of hazards that are present at the proposed/revamp units of IOCL Haldia Refinery site that may result in injury to people or a fatality in more serious cases. Some hazards may even give rise to multiple fatalities. The Refinery handles hazardous gases and liquids, which are highly inflammable, explosive and toxic in nature. The hazards involved in the plant are: Small hole, cracks or instrument tapping failure in piping and vessels. Flange gasket leaks in piping. “Guillotine-Breakage” of pipe-work Leaks from pump mechanical seals Catastrophic rupture of pressure vessel. Lack of experience level of personnel involved and their capacity to cope up with emergency situation. Apart from the above, accidents due to mal-operation, negligence and sabotage are also not ruled out. 3.3.4 Modes of Failure There are various potential sources of large/small leakages, which may release hydrocarbon to the surrounding atmosphere. This leakage may be in the form of a small hole, gasket failure in a flanged joint, a guillotine failure of a pipeline or any other source of leakage. In the pipeline, it may be due to failure of welded joint or corrosion, wrong opening of the valves / blinds, pipeline bursting due to excess pressure and other causes. Some typical modes of failure and their possible causes are discussed in the Table No.3.5.
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Table - 3.5 General Mechanism of Loss of Containment Sl. Loss of Probable Cause Remarks No. Containment 1] Weld failure Incorrect use of welding Welding to be done by certified material and weld welder with proper quality of procedure. welding rod under strict Lack of inspection during inspection with stage wise welding. checking and acceptance after Incorrect use of design final radiography. Proper code to code. be followed for welding. 2] Pipe over stress Error in stress analysis, Pipe stress may also cause weld causing fracture improper pipe material. failure unless there exist a Inappropriate design code combination of causes. and incorrect supports Stress analysis of piping and lack of inspection during proper support selection to be erection. done during design. During erection, strict inspection to be ensured. 3] Over Incorrect setting of SRV & Careful attention is needed for pressurization of pop off valve pressures. selection of SRV/Pop off valve pipe causing Incorrect SRV/Pop off size. rupture valve size. Setting of SRVs and pop off valves to be checked before installation as well as at regular intervals. 4] Failure of pipe H2S and water corrosion. Proper care should be taken due to corrosion against internal as well as or erosion. external corrosion & monitoring of condition of pipeline to be done regularly. 5] Leaking valve to Gland failure, packing Leakage to be rectified at atmosphere failure, spindle/plug cock shortest possible time. flow out. 6] External causes Earthquake, sabotage, etc. 7] Overpressure - Inadequate relief. Failure to be rectified - Fire impingement. immediately and other suitable action to be taken. 8] Pipeline failure - Error in calculation of due to low minimum temperature. temperature - Wrong material brittle fracture selection. - System not designed for low temperature etc.
3.3.5 Selected Failure Cases A list of failure cases was prepared based on process knowledge, engineering judgment, experience, past incidents associated with such facilities and considering the general mechanisms for loss of containment. The cases have been identified for the consequence analysis is based on the following: Cases with high chance of occurrence but having low consequence:
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Example of such failure cases includes two-bolt gasket leak for flanges, seal failure for pumps, sample connection failure, instrument tapping failure etc. The consequence results will provide enough data for planning routine safety exercises as well as to prepare an effective Disaster Management Plan. This will emphasize the area where operator's vigilance is essential. Cases with low chance of occurrence but having high consequence. (The example includes catastrophic failure of lines, process pressure vessels, etc.) This approach ensures at least one representative case of all possible types of accidental failure events, is considered for the consequence analysis. Moreover, the list below includes at least one accidental case comprising of release of different sorts of highly hazardous materials handled in the refinery. Although the list does not give complete failure incidents considering all equipments, units, but the consequence of a similar incident considered in the list below could be used to foresee the consequence of that particular accident. Table 3.6 Selected Failure Scenarios for Process facilities S. Unit Line/Equipment Failure Case Failure Consequence Damage No Mode Contours Fig No. (Annexure Page No.)
1. Cold feed inlet Hole 10 mm Credible Jet fire, UVCE 10mm dia. hole: to fresh feed & Fig no: 1 (Page Coalescer No.A5), 2(Page 25 mm drum (201-V- No.A6). 01) line 25 mm dia. hole: Fig no:3 (A7), 4(A8).
2. Feed Surge Hole 10 mm Credible Jet fire, UVCE 10mm dia. hole: DHDT drum (201-V- & Fig no: 5 (A9), 6 02) to HHPS (A10). 25 mm feed 25 mm dia. hole: exchanger line Fig no:7(A11), 8(A12).
3. Reactor (201- 25% gasket Credible Jet fire, UVCE Fig no. 9 (A13), R-01) outlet failure 10(A14) line
4. RGC Instrument Non- Jet fire, UVCE Fig no: 11(A15), Instrument tubing full Credible 12(A16).
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S. Unit Line/Equipment Failure Case Failure Consequence Damage No Mode Contours Fig No. (Annexure Page No.)
tubing bore failure
5. Stripper (201- Hole 10 mm Credible Jet fire, UVCE 25 mm dia. hole: C-02) outlet & Fig no: 13 (A17). line 25 mm
6. Naptha feed Drum Non- Fire ball Fig no.: 14(A18) & surge drum Catastrophic Credible 15(A19). (201-V-18) failure
7. Sweet gas Drum Non- Fire ball Fig no.: 16(A20) & knock out Catastrophic Credible 17(A21). drum 201-V-20 failure
8. Diesel product a. Hole 10 a. Jet fire, UVCE a. 10mm dia. hole: coalescer o/l mm & 25 mm Credible Fig no: 18(A22) & line to hyrdo 19(A23). b. 20% b. Non- treated diesel Credible b/l Cross 25 mm dia. hole: Sectional Fig no: 20(A24) & Area (CSA) 21(A25). failure line rupture b. Fig no: 22(A26) & 23(A27).
9. Flashed vapor a. Hole 10 a. Jet fire, UVCE b. Fig no.: from flash mm & 25 mm Credible 24(A28), 25(A29) drum line to b. Full bore b. Non- SRU failure Credible incinerator line
10. Amine Hole 10 mm Credible Jet fire, UVCE, 10mm dia. hole: regenerator & 25 mm Fig no: 26(A30) ARU reflux drum to 25 mm dia. hole: SRU Line Fig no: 27(A31). failure
11. Drum 208-V- Drum Non- Jet fire, UVCE, Fig no: 28(A32). 02 Catastrophic Credible Fire ball failure
12. Sour Naphtha Hole 10 mm Credible Jet fire, UVCE, 25 mm dia. hole: HGU-II feed to super & 25 mm Fig no: 29(A33). & heater line 30(A34).
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S. Unit Line/Equipment Failure Case Failure Consequence Damage No Mode Contours Fig No. (Annexure Page No.)
13. Pump (92-P- a. Discharge Credible Jet fire, UVCE, a. Fig no.: 31(A35) 01A/B) line flange & 32(A36). 25% gasket b. Fig no.: 33(A37) failure. & 34(A38). b. Pump mechanical seal failure
14. Super heated a. Hole 10 a. Jet fire, UVCE a. 25mm dia. hole- sweet Naphtha mm & 25 mm Credible Fig no.: 35(A39) & feed to 36(A40). b. 20% CSA b. Non- Desulphuriser Credible b. Fig no.: 37(A41) line failure line rupture & 38(A42).
15. Process gas a. Hole Credible Jet fire, UVCE, a. 25mm dia. hole- from Boiler to 25mm Fig no.: 39(A43) & HTS Reactor 40(A44). b. 25% line flange gasket b. Fig no.: 41(A45) failure & 42(A46).
16. Feed to PSA a. Hole 10 a. Jet fire, UVCE a. 25mm dia. hole- Unit mm & 25 mm Credible Fig no.: 43(A47) & 44(A48). b. 20% CSA b. Non- failure line Credible b. Fig no.: 45(A49) rupture & 46(A50).
17. Prime G Pump 87-P- a. Hole Credible Jet fire, UVCE, a. 25mm dia. hole- 01A/B line to 25mm Fig no.: 47(A51) & FCC Feed line 48(A52). b. Pump discharge b. Fig no.: 49(A53) line 25% & 50(A54). flange gasket failure
18. SHU Reactor a. Hole 10 a. Jet fire, UVCE b. Fig no.: 51(A55) O/L line mm Credible & 52(A56). b. 20% CSA b. Non- failure line Credible rupture
19. FCC Gasoline a. Hole a. Jet fire, UVCE a. 25mm dia. hole- Splitter outlet 25mm Credible Fig no.: 53(A57) & Line failure 54(A58). b. Full bore b. Non- b. Fig no.: 55(A59)
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S. Unit Line/Equipment Failure Case Failure Consequence Damage No Mode Contours Fig No. (Annexure Page No.)
failure Credible & 56(A60).
20. Reflux drum Drum Non- Jet fire, UVCE, Fig no.: 57(A61) & 87-B-02 failure Catastrophic Credible Fire ball 58(A62). failure
21. Stripper (207- a. Hole 10 Credible Toxic Release 10mm dia. hole: CC-01) mm & 25 mm Fig no: 59(A63). overhead to 25 mm dia. hole: H2SO4 plant Fig no: 60(A64). Line failure. SWS Unit 22. Stripper (207- Line Rupture Non- Toxic Release Fig no.: 61(A65) CC-01) to Credible Pump (207- PA-02A/B) Line failure
23. ARU gas a. Hole 10 a.Credible Toxic Release 10mm dia. hole: incoming line mm & 25 mm Fig no: 62(A66). b. non to SA plant b. 20% CSA credible 25 mm dia. hole: failure line Fig no: 63(A67). rupture 20%CSA failure Fig no.: 68 (Pg.A72) 24. SWS gas a. Hole 10 a.Credible Toxic Release 10mm dia. hole: incoming line mm & 25 mm Fig no: 64(A68). to SA plant b. non b. 20% CSA credible 25 mm dia. hole: Sulphuric failure line Fig no: 65(A69). Acid rupture Plant 20%CSA failure Fig no.: 67 (Pg.A71)
25. Fuel gas a. Hole 10 a.Credible Jet fire, UVCE 25 mm dia. hole: incoming line mm & 25 mm Fig no: 66(A70). b. non to SA plant b. Full bore credible Full bore failure rupture Jet fire: Fig no.: 69 (Pg.A73) UVCE Fig no.: 70 (Pg.A74)
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3.4 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Consequence Analysis modeling refers to the calculation or estimation of numerical values (or graphical representations of these) that describe the credible physical outcomes of loss of containment scenarios involving flammable, explosive and toxic materials with respect to their potential impact on people, assets, or safety functions. Computer models are used to predict the physical behavior of hazardous incidents. The model uses below mentioned techniques to assess the consequences of identified scenarios: Modeling of discharge rates when holes develop in process equipment/pipe work. Modeling of the size & shape of the flammable/toxic gas clouds from releases in the atmosphere. Modeling of the flame and radiation field of the releases that are ignited and burn as jet fire, pool fire and flash fire. Modeling of the explosion fields of releases which are ignited away from the point of release The different consequences (Flash fire, pool fire, jet fire and Explosion effects) of loss of containment accidents depend on the sequence of events & properties of material released leading to the either toxic vapor dispersion, fire or explosion or both. 3.4.1 Modeling Software A site specific consequence analysis of the accidental release scenarios was conducted using the commercially available Process Hazards Analysis Software Tool (PHAST) consequence modeling software, version 6.7. M/S DNV’s Software is responsible for the development of a number of established, world leading, hazard and risk modeling software tools. These commercially available software tools include the consequence modeling package PHAST, the risk analysis tools SAFETI /PHAST RISK. 3.4.2 Discharge Rate The initial rate of release through a leak depends mainly on the pressure inside the equipment, size of the hole and phase of the release (liquid, gas or two- phase). The release rate decreases with time as the equipment depressurizes. This reduction depends mainly on the inventory and the action taken to isolate the leak and blow-down the equipment.
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3.4.3 Dispersion Modeling The PHAST Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) was used to assess the impacts of the releases, the downwind dispersion distance, the concentration profile and the width of flammable releases. Dispersion models use an average time to calculate the maximum concentration and the plume width. The values used in this QRA are detailed below and consistent with the PHAST default parameters. A short averaging time is usually used for flammable gas dispersion effects since the peak concentration is more important, and a longer averaging time is usually used for toxic dispersion effects since the long-term concentration is more important. All flammable dispersion models used an averaging time of 18.75 seconds (Phast default) All toxic dispersion models used an averaging time of 600 seconds (Phast default) Releases of gas into the open air form clouds whose dispersion is governed by the wind, by turbulence around the site, the density of the gas and initial momentum of the release. In case of flammable materials the sizes of these gas clouds above their Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) are important in determining whether the release will ignite. In this study, the results of dispersion modeling for flammable materials are presented LFL quantity. 3.4.4 The Consequence Event Tree Each accidental release scenario in the QRA involves the potential for ignition or no ignition. If ignited, a range of fire and/or explosion consequences could occur. For each release modeled in the QRA, a range of potential outcomes is assessed, each with its own probability of occurrence, and include: Jet Fire Pool Fire Flash Fire Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) Vapor Cloud Explosion
Toxic (streams with H2S and Ammonia) The ultimate consequence resulting from an accidental release is determined by the following factors: The duration of the release (continuous or instantaneous); The phase after release (vapor/liquid/two-phase); The time of ignition (immediate or delayed); and,
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The level of obstruction in the area of the vapor cloud. The generalized event tree shown in Figure 3.1, illustrates the potential outcomes of an accidental release of a flammable material.
Figure 3.1 Generalized Event Tree for Consequences in the Safeti Program
3.4.5 Vapor Cloud Explosions and Flash Fires
Upon ignition, a flammable vapor cloud may lead to a Vapor Cloud Explosion or Flash Fire. Both events are characterized by the combustion of the flammable
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vapors, and a single release scenario may result in either consequence depending on the location of the cloud when it is ignited.
A Flash Fire is the combustion of a gas/air mixture that produces relatively short term thermal hazards with negligible overpressure (blast wave). Generally, a vapor cloud that is ignited outside of an obstructed region will result in a Flash Fire.
A vapor cloud explosion results from the rapid combustion of a fuel/air mixture with the flame speed approaching sonic velocity, and producing a blast wave. The explosion potential of a flammable hydrocarbon depends on its combustion energy and the energy of the ignition source. In addition, the fraction of the combustion energy converted to explosive energy depends on the nature of the chemical.
Turbulence is required for the flame front to accelerate to speeds required to produce a blast overpressure. In the absence of turbulence, the flame front will burn in a laminar or near-laminar condition, resulting in no appreciable overpressure. This is called a flash fire. Flame turbulence is typically formed by the interaction between the flame front and obstacles such as process structures and equipment. The blast effects produced by vapor cloud explosions vary greatly and are primarily dependent on flame speed. Highly reactive materials (such as ethylene oxide) are much more likely to lead to a vapor cloud than low reactively materials (such as methane).
3.4.6 Pool Fires, Jet Fires, Fireballs and BLEVEs
Pool Fire: The fire hazards examined in this study include pool fires, jet fires and fireballs, where impacts to people are the result of thermal radiation generated by the fire. Thermal radiation emanates from the visible portions of the flame. The actual radiation received by a person depends on the distance from the flame surface, location (indoors vs. outdoors), building construction as well as other atmospheric conditions, with sheltering reducing the magnitude of the thermal radiation hazard.
Upon ignition, a spilled flammable liquid will burn in the form of a large turbulent diffusion flame. The size of the flame will depend on the spill surface and the thermo-chemical properties of the hazardous material. If the spill is confined, the confined area will determine the pool size which will then dictate the size of the fire. If the spill is unconfined, the pool dimensions will depend on the amount of
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liquid released (liquid volume), burning rate of the liquid and the terrain surface characteristics.
A jet fire can result when the material released is a gas or high-pressure liquid that ignites immediately. The size of the jet flame depends primarily on the release rate of the gas or high pressure liquid. The thermo-chemical properties of the substance are also taken into consideration in determining the size of the jet flame.
A fireball or Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) can occur from a sudden release of a large mass of pressurized liquid to the atmosphere. A primary cause is an external fire impinging on the shell of a pressurized vessel above the liquid level, weakening the shell and resulting in a sudden rupture.
3.4.7 Toxic Hazards The extent of the toxic hazard ranges will be sensitive to the composition of the
feed to each unit in terms of the proportion of H2S that applies, where: The greatest toxicity will apply to the Amine Treatment, Sour Water Stripper and Sulphur Recovery units, each of which will include some process streams
that contain close to 100% H2S. These will have potentially significant hazard ranges, although it should be noted that the pressure of these units is low, which limits the maximum effects. Toxic impacts will depend on the combination of the exposure duration and the toxic concentration. The aim of the toxic risk study is to determine whether the operators in the plant, people occupied buildings and the public are likely to be affected by toxic
substances. Toxic gas cloud e.g. H2S, Ammonia was undertaken to the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health concentration (IDLH) limit to determine the extent of the toxic hazard created as the result of loss of containment of a toxic substance.
3.4.8 Release Quantity Release Quantity or release rate refers to the quantity of (or the rate at which) a hazardous chemical is released in the event of an accident. The quantity (or rate) is the single most important parameter in determining the dispersion hazard distances. In general, larger quantities lead to larger dispersion distances. However, the dispersion distance does not increase linearly with quantity or release rate. In fact, an increase in release quantity by a factor of 100 (for
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example, from 100 gallons to 10,000 gallons) may lead to an increase in the dispersion hazard distance by a factor of 20. For gaseous and high-vapor- pressure liquid releases, the vapor release rate will be the same as the discharge rate. However, for non-flashing liquids, the vapor release rate is governed by the evaporation rate of the liquid and will always be less than the liquid release rate. Release rate in our study is mentioned for every failure scenario as kg/s.
3.4.9 Duration of Release It is dependent on the release mode. Simple dispersion models use one of the two extreme cases, i.e., continuous release or instantaneous release. In the case of instantaneous release, the duration of release is very short (e.g., pressurized storage tank rupture) and the total quantity of the chemical released during the accident contributes to the dispersion hazard. Further, the dispersion takes place in longitudinal (along wind), and lateral (across wind) and vertical directions. In the case of a continuous release, the release lasts a relatively long time and the release rate (or evaporation rate) is the most important parameter. The dispersion model used in this study is encoded in PHAST and takes into account the actual duration of release. The discharge duration in this study is taken as 3 minutes for continuous release scenarios as it is considered that it would take plant personnel about 3 minutes to detect and isolate the leak.
3.4.10 Damage Criteria The damage effects are different for different types of failure scenarios. The physical effects of ignition of hydrocarbon vapors, e.g. blast wave, thermal radiation due to release of hydrocarbons from the containment are discussed below: (i) Hydrocarbon vapors released accidentally will normally spread out in the direction of the wind. If it comes into contact with an ignition source before being dispersed below the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL), a flash fire is likely to occur and the flame may travel back to the source of leak. Any person caught in the flash fire is likely to suffer from severe burn injury. Therefore, in consequence analysis, the distance to LFL value is usually taken to indicate the area, which may be affected by flash fires. Any other combustible material within the flash fire is likely to catch fire and may cause secondary fires. In the area close to the source of leakage of hydrocarbon there is a possibility of Oxygen depletion since the vapors are heavier than air. A minimum of 19.5% Oxygen in air is considered essential for human lives.
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(ii) Thermal radiation due to pool fire, jet flame may cause various degrees of burn on human bodies. Also its effects on inanimate objects like equipment, piping, building and other objects need to be evaluated. The damage effects with respect to thermal radiation intensity are elaborated in Table-3.7. In case of transient fires total thermal dose level (total incident energy) is used to estimate threshold damage level. Thermal Radiation Damage due to various levels of incident thermal radiation, overpressure and thermal dose level has been given in Table 3.7, 3.8 & 3.9. All the damage contours for selected failure scenarios are enclosed with report.
Table-3.7 Damage Due to Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity Incident Thermal Casualty Radiation Type of damage Probability Intensity, kW/m2
37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to 1.00 process equipment
32 Maximum allowable radiation 1.00 intensity on thermally protected and pressurized storage tank
12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted 0.50 ignition of wood, melting of plastic tubing etc.
8 Maximum allowable radiation -- intensity on thermally unprotected and pressurized storage tanks
4.5 1st degree burn 0.00
1.6 Will cause no discomfort to long 0.00 exposure
0.7 Equivalent to solar radiation 0.00
The hazard distances to the 37.5 kW/m2, 12.5 kW/m2 and 4 kW/m2 radiation levels are selected based on their effect on population; buildings and equipment were modeled using PHAST.
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Over Pressure Table-3.8 Damage Effects of Blast Overpressure Blast Casualty Probability Overpressure. Damage Type (Bar)
0.30 Major damage to structures (assumed fatal 0.25 to the people inside structure) 0.17 Eardrum rupture 0.10 0.10 Repairable Damage 0.10 0.03 Glass Breakage 0.00 0.01 Crack of Windows 0.00
The hazard distances to the 0.3 bar, 0.03 bar and 0.01 bar overpressure levels are selected based on their effects on population; buildings and equipment were modeled using PHAST iii) In the event of dispersion of hydrocarbon vapors into atmosphere, the cloud comes into contact with an ignition source between its upper and lower flammability limit, an explosion may occur. The resultant blast wave may have damaging effect on the equipment, buildings, structures etc. The collapse of buildings & structures may cause injury or fatality. Damage effect of blast overpressures are illustrated in the Table 3.8. iv) In the case of fireball from storage/pressure vessels, the effect will be similar to that of thermal radiation. Those who are located within fireball distance are likely to suffer fatal burn injury. Those who are beyond fireball diameter will be subjected to different levels of thermal radiation, which has been mentioned earlier in Table-3.7. In case of transient fires like fire ball, doses of thermal radiation (total incident energy) are also used to estimate threshold damage levels on human bodies. Table 3.9 shows the damage effects due to various dose levels. Table-3.9 Physiological Effect of Thermal Dose Level Dose Threshold Effect (kJ/m2) 375 Third degree burn 250 Second degree burn 125 First degree burn 65 Threshold of pain, no reddening or blistering of skin is caused
1st Degree Burn Involves only epidermis. Sunburn is an example. Blisters may occur.
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Dose Threshold Effect (kJ/m2) 2nd Degree Whole epidermis along with some portion of dermis Burn is affected.
3rd Degree Burn Involves whole of epidermis and dermis. Sub- cutaneous tissues may also be affected.
Toxic Hazard The inhalation of toxic gases can give rise to effects, which range in severity from mild irritation of the respiratory tract to death. Lethal effects of inhalation depend on the concentration of the gas to which people are exposed and on the duration of exposure. Mostly this dependence is nonlinear and as the concentration increases, the time required to produce a specific injury decreases rapidly. The hazard distances to Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health concentration (IDLH) limit is selected to determine the extent of the toxic hazard created as the result of loss of containment of a toxic substance. 3.5 Consequence Analysis of the Selected failure Cases The consequence analysis of the selected failure case as under Table 3.6 has been performed in PHAST and the consequence results are reported in tabular form for all weather conditions as in Table 2.7 of Chapter 2. The consequence contours for the worst case weather condition (Wind Speed: 3m/s, Stability: Moderately unstable B-C) are attached in Annexure-II (Figures A5 to A65). Consequences arising out of all failure scenarios have been included for risk analysis. Consequences of different failure scenarios are detailed below:
3.5.1 Unit: DHDT Line/Equipment: Cold feed inlet to fresh feed Coalescer drum (201-V-01) line. Failure Case: Hole dia. 10mm and 25mm Stream Composition: C6 and + Heavier = 15000 kg/hr Temperature = 40 °C Pressure = 5 bar In case of 10 & 25 mm dia. holes in pipework, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 10 & 25 mm dia. hole in the line are given in table 3.10.
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Table 3.10 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Jet Fire Sl. Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind Thermal speed & stability classes of Radiation Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 1.26 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 21 20 20 18 21 2] 12.5 26 24 24 22 26 3] 4.5 33 32 32 30 34 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate:7.88 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 48 45 45 41 48 2] 12.5 58 55 55 51 59 3] 4.5 75 73 73 69 77 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 1 & 3 It is evident from the above table that the hazard distances for 1% lethality i.e. for a thermal radiation level of 12.5 kW/m2 may extend upto a distance of 26m for 10mm & 59 m for 25mm dia. holes respectively. Equipments may get damaged due to 25 mm hole in pipeline.
Table 3.11 Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to LFL Sl. Stability Speed overpressure of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 10 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 58 66 88 33 2] 3 B-C 47 54 74 27 3] 3 D 48 55 76 30 4] 5 D 36 42 59 20 5] 2 F 62 74 106 40 25 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 154 180 247 96 2] 3 B-C 132 154 214 86 3] 3 D 143 167 231 90 4] 5 D 109 128 180 70 5] 2 F 149 179 259 91 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 2 & 4 It is also evident from the above table that maximum damage due to overpressure level of 0.3 Bar due to release of hydrocarbon may be caused upto a distance of 62m & 154m due to creation of 10mm & 25mm dia. holes respectively. Equipment, structures, buildings, walls may be collapsed for objects upto these distances.
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3.5.2 Unit: DHDT Line/Equipment: Feed Surge drum (201-V-02) to HHPS feed exchanger line Failure Case: Hole dia. 10mm and 25mm Stream Composition: Material – kg/hr Hydrogen - 8603.4 Hydrogen Sulphide - 11.9 Ammonia - 19 Methane - 4519.4 Ethane - 1472.9 Propane - 746.9 n-Butane - 119.4 n-Pentane - 34.1 n-Hexane - 150700 Temperature = 161°C Pressure = 131.9 bar In case of 10 & 25 mm dia. holes in pipework, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 10 & 25 mm dia. hole in the line are given in table 3.12. Table 3.12 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Jet Fire Sl. Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at Radiation wind speed & stability classes of Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 1.69 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 13.6 14 13.9 14.4 13.7 2] 12.5 17.2 17.5 17.4 17.6 17.1 3] 4.5 21.3 21.4 21.4 21.2 21.2 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate:10.18 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 34 35 35 36 34 2] 12.5 43 44 44 45 43 3] 4.5 55 56 56 55 56 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 5 & 7 It is evident from the above table that the hazard distances for 1% lethality i.e. for a thermal radiation level of 12.5 kW/m2 may extend upto a distance of 17.6 m and 45m for 10mm & 25mm dia. holes respectively. Equipments may get damaged due to 25 mm hole in pipeline.
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Table 3.13 Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to LFL Sl. Stability Speed overpressure of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 10 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 24 27 37 13 2] 3 B-C 23 27 37 12 3] 3 D 34 37 47 13 4] 5 D 23 27 36 11 5] 2 F 34 38 48 13 25 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 91 101 130 42 2] 3 B-C 91 101 130 43 3] 3 D 101 112 141 43 4] 5 D 100 111 140 42 5] 2 F 92 104 136 44 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 6 & 8
It is also evident from the above table that maximum damage due to overpressure level of 0.3 Bar due to release of hydrocarbon may be caused upto a distance of 34m & 101m due to creation of 10mm & 25mm dia. holes respectively. Equipment, structures, buildings, walls may be collapsed for objects upto these distances.
3.5.3 Unit: DHDT Line/Equipment: Reactor (201-R-01) outlet line Failure Case: 25% gasket failure Stream Composition: Material – kg/hr Hydrogen - 13328.3 Hydrogen Sulphide - 3030 Ammonia - 152 Methane - 11461.5 Ethane - 4099.6 Propane - 2351.1 n-Butane - 491.7 n-Pentane - 230.2 n-Hexane - 150862 Temperature = 391.9°C Pressure = 113.9 bar
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Gasket failure is one of the foreseeable scenarios, which is considered here. Gasket failure of flange joint may be full gasket or partial. Experience shows that gasket failures are mostly partial and segment between two bolt holes mainly fails. This is true for spiral wound metallic gasket normally used in such services. Use of CAF gasket may be discouraged, as full segment rupture may be possible. The spilling propane may form a Jet Fire and may result in:
a) Jet fire, if the released hydrocarbon forms a jet and finds an ignition source. b) Evaporation, vapor cloud formation and safe dispersion beyond its LFL. c) UVCE, if the vapor cloud finds a source of ignition between its flammability limits. Hazard distances for partial failure of gaskets have been calculated and are presented in the Table-3.14 & 3.15.
Table – 3.14 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation due to Jet Fire for Gasket Failure Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at Sl. Radiation wind speed & stability classes of No. Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F 25% Gasket failure (Release rate: 9.62 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 33.5 34.5 34.2 35.7 13.3 2] 12.5 42.5 43.4 43.3 44.2 16.5 3] 4.5 54.5 55.0 55.0 54.9 32.0 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 9 From the above tables no. 3.14 it is seen that 1st degree burn i.e. Radiation level of 4.5 kW/m2 for partial failure of gasket may extent upto 55 meters. The jet may impinge any pipeline or equipment, which may fall within its path in the direction of the flame.
Table - 3.15 Hazard Distance to LFL Concentration for Gasket Failure Sl. Wind Speed Stability Class Distances (m) No. (m/sec) (Release Rate: 9.62 kg/s, Release Duration: 180 s) 01. 2 B 37.8 02. 3 B-C 37.9 03. 3 D 38.6 04. 5 D 37.2 05. 2 F 38.5 Table – 3.15 shows that the hazard distance with respect to LFL concentration remains within 38.6 meter from the source of leakage and shall be confined to the factory premises. Present available data of gasket /flange failure rate is about 1x10-7per running year which is considered as low rate of frequency. The consequence due to
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gasket failure may be considered as foreseeable or credible. Automatic gas detector/heat detector may be considered to mitigate the hazard.
If the evaporating vapor cloud comes in contact with an ignition source between its flammability ranges, the unconfined vapor cloud explosion shall result. The hazard distances for over pressures of 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar and 0.03 bar are given below:
Table - 3.16 Hazard Distances to Overpressure due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE) Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar 1] 2 B 60.7 71.4 100.4 2] 3 B-C 60.6 71.3 100.0 3] 3 D 60.9 71.8 101.2 4] 5 D 60.5 71.1 99.5 5] 2 F 61.7 73.5 105.1 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 10
It is also evident from the above table that the maximum distance to 0.3 bar overpressure (heavy damage) extends upto 61.7m.
3.5.4 Unit: DHDT Line/Equipment: RGC Instrument tubing Failure Case: Instrument tubing full bore failure Stream Composition: Material – kg/hr Hydrogen - 13112.2 Hydrogen Sulphide - 30 Ammonia - 47.9 Methane - 11024.5 Ethane - 3703.3 Propane - 1878 n-Butane - 300 n-Pentane - 85.6 n-Hexane - 1759 Temperature = 86.4°C Pressure = 132.6 bar
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1] The out-coming liquid in form of jet may catch fire in presence of any source of ignition resulting in jet fire. 2] The out-flow liquid does not catch fire but evaporates forming a vapor cloud and disperse safely to beyond its LFL. 3] The evaporating vapor cloud may come in contact with an ignition source between its flammability limit resulting in flash fire and vapor cloud explosion. i] Jet Fire - The hazard distances to different thermal radiation levels due to jet fire are given in Table-3.17.
Table-3.17 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation due to Jet Fire for LPG Pump Discharge Line Full Bore Failure Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at Sl. Radiation wind speed & stability classes of No. Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F Full bore rupture (Release rate: 4.39 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 27.5 28.9 28.8 31.0 27.6 2] 12.5 35.5 36.6 36.5 38.1 35.6 3] 4.5 46.2 46.8 46.7 47 46.6 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 11 It is evident that in case of jet fire due to full-bore failure, 37.5 kW/m2 thermal radiation will reach upto a maximum distance of 31 m and probably will damage the nearby pipelines & equipments in case of full bore failure in pump discharge line.
This scenario states that the dispersing vapor cloud comes in contact with an ignition source resulting in vapor cloud explosion. The hazard distances to over pressures of 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar as well as LFL distances are presented below in Table-3.18 for wind speed and stability class of 2B, 3 B-C, 3D , 5D (day condition) and 2F (night condition).
Table-3.18 Hazard Distances due to Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to LFL Sl. Stability Speed overpressure of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m Full bore rupture 1] 2 B 63 75.8 110.6 41.2 2] 3 B-C 62.6 75.3 109.3 40.8 3] 3 D 63.0 76.0 111.0 42.2 4] 5 D 62.3 74.8 108.1 41.2 5] 2 F 64.0 78.0 115.8 43.7 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 12
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From the above table, it is evident that the hazard distance to heavy damage i.e. for over pressure of 0.3 bar may extend up to a max. distance of 64 m and this will damage all the pipelines and tanks as well as the structure around it. Hence, there should be no ignition source in the terminal.
3.5.5 Unit: DHDT Line/Equipment: Stripper (201-C-02) outlet line Failure Case: Hole dia. 10mm and 25mm Stream Composition: C6 + and heavier = 141276.5 kg/hr Temperature = 240°C Pressure = 8.2 bar In case of 10 & 25 mm dia. holes in pipework, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 10 & 25 mm dia. hole in the line are given in Table 3.19. Table 3.19 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Jet Fire Thermal Distances from radius of the pool (m) at wind speed & Sl. Radiation stability classes of No. Intensity 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F kW/m2 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.18 kg/sec) Not Reached Not Not Not Not 1] 37.5 (NR) Reached Reached Reached Reached Not Not Not Not 2] 12.5 Not Reached Reached Reached Reached Reached 3] 4.5 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.2 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 1.13 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 14.2 14.6 14.5 15.0 14.2 3] 4.5 18 18.2 18.1 18.2 18 It is evident from the above table that the hazard distances for a thermal radiation level of 4.5 KW/m2 may extend upto a distance of 6.3m and 18.2m for 10mm & 25mm dia. holes respectively. Equipments may get damaged due to 25 mm hole in pipeline. However no ignition source is there.
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Table 3.20 Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Sl. Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Stability No Speed of Class . (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 10 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B NR NR NR 3.2 2] 3 B-C NR NR NR 3.19 3] 3 D NR NR NR 3.25 4] 5 D NR NR NR 3.01 5] 2 F NR NR NR 3.3 25 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 12.5 15.1 22 7.8 2] 3 B-C 12.5 15.0 21.8 7.5 3] 3 D 12.5 15.1 21.9 7.7 4] 5 D 12.4 14.8 21.4 7.3 5] 2 F 12.7 15.4 22.7 8 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 13
It is also evident from the above table that maximum damage due to overpressure level of 0.3 Bar due to release of hydrocarbon may be caused upto a distance of 12.7m due to creation of 25mm dia. hole. Equipment, structures, buildings, walls may be collapsed for objects upto these distances.
3.5.6 Unit: DHDT Line/Equipment: Naptha feed surge drum (201-V-18) Failure Case: Drum Catastrophic failure Stream Composition: C6 + and heavier = 11847.7 kg/hr Temperature = 40°C Pressure = 7.8 bar For consequence analysis of the drum, capacity per hour processed has been considered. As the drum come under pressurized vessels category, its failure frequency is 3.0x10-6 per year. In the event of heat received by the drum e.g. by flame impingement or from fire in the vicinity, the liquid inside the drum shall start boiling and the pressure inside the drum shall start building up. If the safety valve provided on the drum does not work properly or if it has not been designed properly the phenomenon of Fire ball or BLEVE may arise. The vessel shall rupture and the immediate ignition of the expanding fuel/air mixture may lead to intense combustion resulting in fireballs. In case of catastrophic rupture filled hydrocarbons will release into atmosphere and may get ignited if finds a suitable source of ignition/fire. After ignition, it will
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form fireball or BLEVE. Hence, fireball radius and duration has been calculated for capacity of drum.
Table - 3.21 Fire Ball Details due to BLEVE in Drum Sl. No. Description Value 01. Fire ball radius (m) 11.8 m 02. Duration of fire ball, sec. 2.4 Sec 03 Flame Emissive power 146.99 kW/m2 04 Fireball Lift off height 23.59m
Thermal radiation of the fireball has been calculated & presented in table below. Table-3.22 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation due to Fireball for Catastrophic Rupture of Drum Thermal Distances (m) from radius of the rupture at Sl. Radiation wind speed & stability classes of No. Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 166.8 170.8 171.6 170.0 181.7 3] 4.5 334.8 341.5 342.8 340.1 360.0 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 14
It is evident that in case of fireball due to catastrophic rupture, 4.5 kW/m2 thermal radiations will reach upto a maximum distance of 360 m and probably will damage the nearby equipments and structures. Overpressure is also created due to fireball. Overpressure distances due to fireball (0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar) are given in Table 3.23. Table 3.23 Hazard Distances to Overpressure due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 1] 2 B 232.6 280.9 430.7 154 2] 3 B-C 220.8 266 414 147 3] 3 D 223 270 419 148 4] 5 D 208 250 398 141 5] 2 F 220 270 417 139 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 15
It will be evident from table that overpressure of 0.3 bar created due to BLEVE will reach up to 232.6 m. This may damage the equipments, structures & pipelines within this distance.
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3.5.7 Unit: DHDT Line/Equipment: Sweet gas knock out drum (201-V-20) Failure Case: Drum Catastrophic failure Stream Composition: Material – kg/hr Hydrogen - 93.8 Methane – 237.8 Ethane – 385.9 Propane – 503.2 n-Butane – 156.8 n-Pentane - 72 n-Hexane – 2.9 Temperature = 45°C Pressure = 6.5 bar For consequence analysis of the drum, capacity per hour processed has been considered. As the drum come under pressurized vessels category, its failure frequency is 3.0x10-6 per year. In the event of heat received by the drum e.g. by flame impingement or from fire in the vicinity, the liquid inside the drum shall start boiling and the pressure inside the drum shall start building up. If the safety valve provided on the drum does not work properly or if it has not been designed properly the phenomenon of Fire ball or BLEVE may arise. The vessel shall rupture and the immediate ignition of the expanding fuel/air mixture may lead to intense combustion resulting in fireballs. In case of catastrophic rupture filled hydrocarbons will release into atmosphere and may get ignited if finds a suitable source of ignition/fire. After ignition, it will form fireball or BLEVE. Hence, fireball radius and duration has been calculated for capacity of drum.
Table - 3.24 Fire Ball Details due to BLEVE in Drum Sl. No. Description Value
01. Fire ball radius (m) 36.91 m
02. Duration of fire ball, sec. 5.97 sec
03 Flame Emissive power 223.05 kW/m2
04 Fireball Lift off height 73.82 m
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Thermal radiation of the fireball has been calculated & presented in table below. Table-3.25 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation due to Fireball for Catastrophic Rupture of Drum Sl. Distances (m) from radius of the rupture at Thermal wind speed & stability classes of Radiation Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F 1] 37.5 16.4 19.7 20.3 19.1 27 2] 12.5 100.6 102.6 103.0 102.2 108 3] 4.5 197.2 200.0 201.3 200 210 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 16 It is evident that in case of fireball due to catastrophic rupture, 4.5 kW/m2 thermal radiations will reach upto a maximum distance of 210 m and probably will damage the nearby equipments and structures. Overpressure is also created due to fireball. Overpressure distances due to fireball (0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar) are given in table 3.26. Table 3.26 Hazard Distances to Overpressure due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 1] 2 B 83 137 280 26 2] 3 B-C 85 141 290 29 3] 3 D 87 143 296 29 4] 5 D 88 174 304 37 5] 2 F 84 139 286 26 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 17
It will be evident from table that overpressure of 0.3 bar created due to BLEVE will reach up to 88 m. This may damage the equipments, structures & pipelines within this distance.
3.5.8 Unit: DHDT Line/Equipment: Diesel product coalescer o/l line to hyrdo treated diesel b/l Failure Case: a. Hole 10 mm & 25 mm b. 20% Cross Sectional Area (CSA) failure line rupture Stream Composition: Material – kg/hr n-Hexane – 141277 Temperature = 40°C Pressure = 9.2 bar
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RISK ANALYSIS
In case of 10 & 25 mm dia. holes and 20% CSA failure of pipeline, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 10 & 25 mm dia. hole and 20% CSA failure of pipeline in the line are given in Table 3.27. Table-3.27 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation due to Jet Fire Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind speed & Sl. Radiation stability classes of No. Intensity 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F kW/m2 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 1.71 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 24 22 22 20 24 2] 12.5 29 37 27 25 29 3] 4.5 37 36 36 34 38 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 10.72 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 54 50 50 46 54 2] 12.5 65 62 62 58 66 3] 4.5 85 82 82 78 86 20% CSA failure (Release rate: 28.76 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 73 69 68 64 71 2] 12.5 90 85 85 80 88 3] 4.5 116 112 111 107 114 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 18, 20, 22 It is evident that in case of jet fire due to 10mm, 25mm hole dia. & 25% CSA rupture , 4.5 kW/m2 thermal radiations will reach upto a maximum distance of 38m, 86 & 116m respectively. It will probably damage the nearby equipments. If the jet does not get ignited, HC vapors will form and spread downwind under the influence of wind. The vapors may come in contact with any ignition source within flammability limit and unconfined vapour cloud explosion may occur. Overpressure distances due to UVCE (0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar) are given in table 3.28. Table- 3.28 Hazard Distances to Overpressure due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 10 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 68 77 99 35 2] 3 B-C 58 65 86 30 3] 3 D 58 66 88 33 4] 5 D 47 54 72 24 5] 2 F 72 84 116 44
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 40 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 25 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 176 203 274 110 2] 3 B-C 164 188 253 97 3] 3 D 165 191 260 103 4] 5 D 131 152 210 82 5] 2 F 198 236 337 120 20% CSA failure 1] 2 B 156 176 237 100 2] 3 B-C 143 166 227 90 3] 3 D 153 176 267 34 4] 5 D 120 140 195 75 5] 2 F 157 188 279 103 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 19, 21, 23 It will be evident from table 3.28 that overpressure of 0.3 bar created due to UVCE for 10mm, 25mm hole dia. & 25% CSA failure will reach upto 72m, 198m & 157m respectively. This may damage the pipelines and other equipments.
3.5.9 Unit: ARU Line/Equipment: Flashed vapor from flash drum line to SRU incinerator line Failure Case: a. Hole 10 mm & 25 mm b. Full bore failure Stream Composition: Material – wt. % Hydrogen Sulphide – 0.016 Hydrogen – 1.811 Methane – 3.379 Ethane – 1.74 Propylene – 21.971 Propane – 22.717 n-Butane – 21.694 n-Pentane – 0.9 Temperature = 40°C Pressure = 0.3 bar In case of 10 & 25 mm dia. holes and full bore failure of pipeline, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 10 & 25 mm dia. hole and full bore failure of pipeline in the line are given in Table 3.29.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 41 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Table-3.29 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation due to Jet Fire Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind speed & Sl. Radiation stability classes of No. Intensity 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F kW/m2 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.016 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 NR NR NR NR NR 3] 4.5 NR NR NR NR NR 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.101 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 NR NR NR NR NR 3] 4.5 5.7 6.1 6.08 6.6 5.6 Full bore failure (Release rate: 0.327 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 8.4 9.6 9.6 NR 8.4 3] 4.5 11.2 11.3 11.3 11.8 11.2 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 24 It is evident that in case of jet fire due to 25mm hole dia. & full bore rupture, 4.5 kW/m2 thermal radiations will reach upto a maximum distance of 6.6m, & 11.8m respectively. No significant effect. If the jet does not get ignited, HC vapors will form and spread downwind under the influence of wind. The vapors may come in contact with any ignition source within flammability limit and unconfined vapor cloud explosion may occur. Overpressure distances due to UVCE (0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar) are given in table 3.30. Table- 3.30 Hazard Distances to Overpressure due to UVCE Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 10 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B NR NR NR 1.5 2] 3 B-C NR NR NR 1.45 3] 3 D NR NR NR 1.48 4] 5 D NR NR NR 1.35 5] 2 F NR NR NR 1.51 25 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B NR NR NR 3.4 2] 3 B-C NR NR NR 3.3 3] 3 D NR NR NR 3.4 4] 5 D NR NR NR 3.0 5] 2 F NR NR NR 3.5 Full bore failure 1] 2 B 12.4 14.8 21.2 6.5
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 42 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 2] 3 B-C 12.2 14.5 20.73 6.1 3] 3 D 12.3 14.7 21.0 6.3 4] 5 D NR NR NR 5.4 5] 2 F 12.6 15.2 22.3 6.9 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 25 It will be evident from table that overpressure of 0.3 bar created due to UVCE for full-bore failure will reach upto 12.6m. Hence no significant effect found.
3.5.10 Unit: ARU Line/Equipment: Amine regenerator reflux drum to SRU Line failure Failure Case: Hole dia. 10 mm & 25 mm Material – wt. % Hydrogen Sulphide – 97.59 Temperature = 55°C Pressure = 0.9 bar In case of 10 & 25 mm dia. holes in pipework, the toxic gas will come out and spread in the downwind direction causing health effects to personnel working nearby area.
The Immediate Danger to Life or Health (IDLH) of H2S is 100 ppm. In case of humans, it has been reported that 50 to 100 ppm causes mild conjunctivitis and respiratory irritation after 1 hour; 500 to 700 ppm may be dangerous in 0.5 to 1 hour; 700 to 1,000 ppm results in rapid unconsciousness, cessation of respiration, and deathand 1,000 to 2,000 ppm results in unconsciousness, cessation of respiration, and death in a few minutes [Yant 1930]. The toxic dose is calculated using Mixer Probit method and presented as follows.Probit equation for Lethal Toxicity equation is used to calculate the centerline concentration (ppm) at exposure time 15min. the Lethal Concentration
LC50, LC20, LC10 are calculated with Probit to percentage value.
n Probit equation -> P = a + b ln (C x te) Where P = Probit function a, b and n are constants C = Concentration (ppm)
te = exposure time, min
Toxic dose of H2S for 10 & 25 mm dia. hole in the line are given in Table 3.31.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 43 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Table 3.31 Toxic Distances to H2S release Downwind distances (m) for Max. concentration of Wind LC50 LC20 LC10 IDLH speed (m/s) / (705 ppm) (589.5 ppm) (533 ppm) (100 ppm) Stability Distance Distance Class Distance Area Area Distance Area Area (m) (m) (m2) (m) (m2) (m2) (m) (m2) 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate:0.166 kg/sec) 2B 104 764 112 938 115 1040 172 3879
3 B-C 87 468 93 570 95 630 150 2443
3D 101 639 110 787 113 875 204 4074
5D 66 259 71 314 74 348 142 1756
2F 126 1592 137 1993 142 2246 456 25629 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.026 kg/sec) 2B 22 23 29 42 32 56 60 392
3 B-C 14 7 19 17 21 23 41 210
3D 20 15 26 31 28 41 61 356
5D - - 11 3 13 6 37 150
2F 44 124 50 180 53 215 144 2055 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 26 & 27 It is evident from the above table that the downwind distance to lethal
concentration of 589.5ppm LC20 goes to a maximum distances of 1993m& 180m for 25mm and 10mm dia. hole respectively.
3.5.11 Unit: ARU Line/Equipment: Amine regenerator reflux drum to SRU Line failure Failure Case: Drum (208-V-02) Catastrophic failure Material – wt. % Hydrogen Sulphide – 97.59 Temperature = 55°C Pressure = 0.9 bar
In case of catastrophic failure of drum, the processing capacity of drum i.e., 4648
kg/hr is considered. The toxic gas Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) will evaporate and disperse in downwind direction.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 44 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Probit equation for Lethal Toxicity equation is used to calculate the centerline
concentration (ppm) at exposure time 15min. the Lethal Concentration LC50, LC20, LC10 are calculated with Probit to percentage value.
n Probit equation -> P = a + b ln (C x te) Where P = Probit function a, b and n are constants C = Concentration (ppm)
te = exposure time, min
In this study H2S, a toxic gas is released into atmosphere from ARU unit in case of catastrophic failure of drum with carrying capacity 4648 kg/hr.
Dispersion modeling of H2S vapor has been done for wind speed of 2 m/sec, 3 m/sec and 5 m/sec and stability class of B, B-C, D & F. Downwind distances for
GLC level of LC50, LC20, LC10 and distances to IDLH i.e. 100 ppm for release of H2S have been mentioned.
Table- 3.32 Downwind Distance (m) To GLC of H2S Due To Catastrophic Failure of Drum Downwind distances (m) for Max. concentration of Wind LC50 LC20 LC10 IDLH speed (m/s) / (705 ppm) (589.5 ppm) (533 ppm) (100 ppm) Stability Distance Area Distance Area Area Distance Area Class Distance (m) (m) (m2) (m) (m2) (m2) (m) (m2)
Catastrophic Failure Of Drum 2B 869 4.6 x 104 932 5.3 x104 965 5.8 x 104 1922 23. x 106
3 B-C 942 4.3 x 104 1018 5 x 105 1059 5.5 x 104 2059 2.2 x 106
3D 733 2.2 x 104 836 2.6 x 104 881 2.8 x 104 2321 1 x 106
5D 914 2 x 105 1015 2.4 x 104 1069 2.6 x 104 2593 1 x 106
2F 922 4.2 x 104 1096 5.2 x 104 1200 5.9 x 104 4900 3.4 x 106
Damage contours as in Fig no.: 28 It is evident from the above table that the downwind distance to 100 ppm of IDLH goes to a maximum distances of 4900m, which is outside boundary of the factory.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 45 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
3.5.12 Unit: HGU-II Line/Equipment: Sour Naphtha feed to super heater line Failure Case: Hole dia. 10mm and 25mm Material – kmol/hr Hydrogen – 171.7 n-Hexane – 354.8 Temperature = 270°C Pressure = 29.8 bar In case of 10 & 25 mm dia. holes in pipework, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 10 & 25 mm dia. hole in the line are given in Table 3.33. Table 3.33 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Jet Fire Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind Sl. Radiation speed & stability classes of No. Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.497 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.3 3] 4.5 10.7 10.6 10.6 10.4 10.6 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 3.1 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 18.8 19.2 19.1 19.7 18.6 2] 12.5 23.2 23.6 23.5 23.8 23.1 3] 4.5 28.8 29.0 29.0 28.8 28.8 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 29 It is evident from the above table that the hazard distances for 1% lethality i.e. for a thermal radiation level of 12.5 KW/m2 may extend upto a distance of 8.4 m for 10mm & 23.8 m for 25mm dia. holes respectively. Equipments may get damaged due to 25 mm hole in pipeline.
Table 3.34 Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 10 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B NR NR NR 5.1 2] 3 B-C NR NR NR 5.0 3] 3 D NR NR NR 5.1 4] 5 D NR NR NR 4.7 5] 2 F NR NR NR 5.2
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 46 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 25 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 34.1 38.2 49.3 13.5 2] 3 B-C 34.0 38.1 49.1 13.2 3] 3 D 34.1 38.3 49.5 13.5 4] 5 D 23.9 27.8 34.4 12.2 5] 2 F 34.3 38.8 50.6 14 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 30 It is also evident from the above table that maximum damage due to overpressure level of 0.3 Bar due to release of hydrocarbon may be caused upto a distance of 34.3m due to creation of 25mm dia. hole. Equipment, structures, buildings, walls may be collapsed for objects upto these distances.
3.5.13 Unit: HGU-II Line/Equipment: Pump (92-P-01A/B) Failure Case: a. Discharge line flange 25% gasket failure. Material – kmol/hr Hydrogen – 171.7 n-Hexane – 354.8 Temperature = 40°C Pressure = 36.5 bar
a. Hazard distances for partial failure of gaskets have been calculated and are presented in the Table-3.35 & 3.36.
Table – 3.35 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation due to Jet Fire for Gasket Failure Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind Sl. Radiation speed & stability classes of No. Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F 25% Gasket failure (Release rate: 6.4 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 26.8 29.2 29.2 36.6 27.0 2] 12.5 35.5 34.7 34.7 38.8 35.7 3] 4.5 47.1 41.4 41.3 42.3 47.5 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 31
From the above table it is seen that 1st degree burn i.e. Radiation level of 4.5 kW/m2 for partial failure of gasket may extent upto 47.5 meters. The jet may impinge any pipeline or equipment, which may fall within its path in the direction of the flame.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 47 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Table – 3.36 Hazard Distance to LFL Concentration for Gasket Failure Sl. Wind Speed Stability Class Distances (m) No. (m/sec) (Release Rate: 6.4 kg/s, Release Duration: 180 s) 01. 2 B 56.3 02. 3 B-C 56.3 03. 3 D 56.8 04. 5 D 53.5 05. 2 F 63.0 Table – 3.36 shows that the hazard distance with respect to LFL concentration remains within 63 meter from the source of leakage and shall be confined to the factory premises. Present available data of gasket /flange failure rate is about 1x10-7per running year which is considered as low rate of frequency. The consequence due to gasket failure may be considered as foreseeable or credible. Automatic gas detector/heat detector may be considered to mitigate the hazard.
If the evaporating vapor cloud comes in contact with an ignition source between its flammability ranges, the unconfined vapor cloud explosion shall result. The hazard distances for over pressures of 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar and 0.03 bar are given below:
Table – 3.37: Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to UVCE Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar 1] 2 B 133 147 182 2] 3 B-C 123 136 171 3] 3 D 133 147 183 4] 5 D 103 115 150 5] 2 F 156 172 216 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 32
It is also evident from the above table that the maximum distance to 0.3 bar overpressure (heavy damage) extends upto 156m.
b. Pump (92-P-01A/B) mechanical seal failure Stream composition Material – kmol/hr Hydrogen – 171.7 n-Hexane – 354.8 Temperature = 40°C Pressure = 36.5 bar
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 48 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
The frequency of failure of mechanical seal of centrifugal pumps specially handling light and heavy hydrocarbons is quite high and poses risk due to formation of vapor cloud. Failure of seals releases considerable quantity of hydrocarbons into atmosphere and creates a hazardous zone. Present thinking is to adopt double mechanical seal for light and heavy hydrocarbons. This helps in reducing their frequency of hydrocarbon releases to atmosphere but still contribute to a great extent to the overall risk of the plant. The failure frequency of mechanical seal of pump may be considered as 5 x 10-5/yr. However, the type of seal, single or double, does not affect their release rate or the hazard distances. Hazard distances have been calculated for the pump (92- P-01A/B) mechanical seal failure. A shaft diameter of 55 mm and a seal gap of 2 mm have been assumed for release rate calculation. The spilled HCs will disperse and may result in: a) Dispersion b) Jet Fire c) Vapor Cloud Explosion
The hazard distances with respect to the above consequences are given in Table-3.38 & 3.39 given below:
Release rate - 12.61 kg/sec Table 3.38 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Jet Fire Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind Sl. Radiation speed & stability classes of No. Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F Pump Mech. seal failure (Release rate: 12.61 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 36 40 40 49 36 2] 12.5 48 48 48 53 48 3] 4.5 64 58 58 59 64 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 33
It is evident from the above table that the hazard distances for a thermal radiation level of 4.5 KW/m2 may extend upto a distance of 64m for.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 49 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Table 3.39 Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m Pump Mech. seal failure 1] 2 B 272 219 200 88 2] 3 B-C 179 199 251 93 3] 3 D 190 210 263 91 4] 5 D 159 178 228 86 5] 2 F 234 258 234 95 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 34
It is also evident from the above table that maximum damage due to overpressure level of 0.3 Bar due to release of hydrocarbon may be caused upto a distance of 272m due to failure of pump mechanical seal. Equipment, structures, buildings, walls may be collapsed for objects upto these distances.
3.5.14 Unit: HGU-II Line/Equipment: Super heated sweet Naphtha feed to Desulphuriser line Failure Case: a. Hole 10 mm & 25 mm b. 20% CSA failure line rupture Stream composition Material – kmol/hr Hydrogen – 175.382 n-Hexane – 29989.7 Temperature = 390°C Pressure = 35.3 bar In case of 10 & 25 mm dia. holes and 20% CSA failure of pipeline, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 10 & 25 mm dia. hole and 20% CSA failure of pipeline in the line are given in Table 3.40. Table-3.40 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Jet Fire Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind speed & Sl. Radiation stability classes of No. Intensity 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F kW/m2 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 056 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 9 9 9 9 9 3] 4.5 11 11 11 11 11
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 50 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
25 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 3.55 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 20 20.4 20 20.9 19.8 2] 12.5 25 25.1 25 25.3 24.6 3] 4.5 31 31.0 30.9 30.8 30.8 20% CSA failure (Release rate: 34.1 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 56 58 57 61 56 2] 12.5 73 74 74 76 74 3] 4.5 96 97 97 96 97 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 35, 37.
It is evident that in case of jet fire due to 10mm, 25mm hole dia. & 20% CSA rupture , 4.5 kW/m2 thermal radiations will reach upto a maximum distance of 11m, 31 & 97m respectively. It will probably damage the nearby equipments. If the jet does not get ignited, HC vapors will form and spread downwind under the influence of wind. The vapors may come in contact with any ignition source within flammability limit and unconfined vapour cloud explosion may occur. Overpressure distances due to UVCE (0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar) are given in Table 3.41. Table- 3.41 Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 10 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B NR NR NR 5.0 2] 3 B-C NR NR NR 4.9 3] 3 D NR NR NR 5.0 4] 5 D NR NR NR 4.6 5] 2 F NR NR NR 5.1 25 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 24.2 28.5 40 13.5 2] 3 B-C 24 28 40 13.1 3] 3 D 34 38 50 13.4 4] 5 D 24 28 39 12.3 5] 2 F 34 39 51 13.8 20% CSA failure 1] 2 B 106 121 163 54.6 2] 3 B-C 106 121 163 55.2 3] 3 D 106 122 165 55.4 4] 5 D 106 121 163 55 5] 2 F 107 124 171 55.8 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 36, 38.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 51 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
It will be evident from table that overpressure of 0.3 bar created due to UVCE for 25mm hole dia. & 20% CSA failure will reach upto 34m & 107m respectively. This may damage the pipelines and other equipments.
3.5.15 Unit: HGU-II Line/Equipment: Process gas from Boiler to HTS Reactor Failure Case: a. Hole dia. 25mm b. 25% line flange gasket failure Stream composition Material – kmol/hr Hydrogen – 8538.86 Methane – 4236.9 Temperature = 343°C Pressure = 23.8 bar In case of 25 mm dia. hole in pipework, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 25 mm dia. hole in the line are given in Table 3.42. Gasket failure is one of the foreseeable scenarios, which is considered here. Gasket failure of flange joint may be full gasket or partial. Experience shows that gasket failures are mostly partial and segment between two bolt holes mainly fails. This is true for spiral wound metallic gasket normally used in such services. Use of CAF gasket may be discouraged, as full segment rupture may be possible. The spilling propane may form a Jet Fire and may result in: a) Jet fire, if the released hydrocarbon forms a jet and finds an ignition source. b) Evaporation, vapor cloud formation and safe dispersion beyond its LFL. c) UVCE, if the vapor cloud finds a source of ignition between its flammability limits. Hazard distances for 25mm dia. hole and partial failure of gaskets have been calculated and are presented in the Table-3.42, 3.43 & 3.44. Table – 3.42 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation due to Jet Fire for 25mm dia. hole and Gasket Failure Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind Sl. Radiation speed & stability classes of No. Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F 25mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.89 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 12.5 13 12.8 13.3 12.4 3] 4.5 16 16 16.2 16.4 16
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RISK ANALYSIS
Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind Sl. Radiation speed & stability classes of No. Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F 25% Gasket failure (Release rate: 2.0 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 18.8 19.4 19.3 20.2 18.7 3] 4.5 24.3 24.8 24.7 25.1 24.3 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 39, 41
From the above table, it is seen that 1st degree burn i.e. Radiation level of 4.5 kW/m2 for partial failure of gasket may extent upto 16.4 meters and 25.1m for 25mm dia. hole and 25% gasket failure respectively. The jet may impinge any pipeline or equipment, which may fall within its path in the direction of the flame.
Table – 3.43 Hazard Distance to LFL Concentration for 25mm dia. hole and Gasket Failure Wind Sl. Stability Speed LFL Distances (m) No. Class (m/sec) 25% 25mm dia. Release Duration: 180 s Gasket hole failure 01. 2 B 11.6 19 02. 3 B-C 11.0 18.5 03. 3 D 11.5 19.1 04. 5 D 10.0 17.4 05. 2 F 12.3 20
Table – 3.43 shows that the hazard distance with respect to LFL concentration remains within 12.3m & 20m for meter 25mm dia. hole and 25% gasket failure respectively from the source of leakage and shall be confined to the factory premises.
Present available data of gasket /flange failure rate is about 1x10-7per running year which is considered as low rate of frequency. The consequence due to gasket failure may be considered as foreseeable or credible. Automatic gas detector/heat detector may be considered to mitigate the hazard.
If the evaporating vapor cloud comes in contact with an ignition source between its flammability ranges, the unconfined vapor cloud explosion shall result. The hazard distances for over pressures of 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar and 0.03 bar are given below:
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 53 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Table – 3.44 Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar 25mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 23 25.8 33.7 2] 3 B-C 22.8 25.6 33.3 3] 3 D 23 25.8 33.7 4] 5 D 22.7 35.4 32.7 5] 2 F 23.1 26.3 34.8 25% Gasket failure 1] 2 B 34.6 39.3 51.8 2] 3 B-C 34.5 39.1 51.4 3] 3 D 34.6 39.3 52.0 4] 5 D 34.3 38.7 50.5 5] 2 F 35.0 40.1 53.7 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 40, 42 It is also evident from the above table that the maximum distance to 0.3 bar overpressure (heavy damage) extends upto 23.1m & 35m for 25mm dia. hole and 25% gasket failure respectively.
3.5.16 Unit: HGU-II Line/Equipment: Feed to PSA Unit Failure Case: a. Hole 10 mm & 25 mm b. 20% CSA failure line rupture Stream composition Material – kmol/hr Hydrogen – 10699.5 Methane – 4236.9 Temperature = 40°C Pressure = 21.2 bar In case of 10 & 25 mm dia. holes and 20% CSA failure of pipeline, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 10 & 25 mm dia. hole and 20% CSA failure of pipeline in the line are given in Table 3.45
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 54 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Table-3.45 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Jet Fire Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind speed & Sl. Radiation stability classes of No. Intensity 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F kW/m2 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.11 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 NR NR NR NR NR 3] 4.5 7.0 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.0 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.7 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 15 16 16 17.1 15.2 3] 4.5 20 20.3 20.3 20.7 19.8 20% CSA failure (Release rate: 28.92 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 61 64 64 69 62 2] 12.5 82 85 85 87 83 3] 4.5 114 115 115 112 117 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 43, 45. It is evident that in case of jet fire due to 10mm, 25mm hole dia. & 20% CSA rupture , 4.5 kW/m2 thermal radiations will reach upto a maximum distance of 7.2m, 20.7m & 117m respectively. It will probably damage the nearby equipments. If the jet does not get ignited, HC vapors will form and spread downwind under the influence of wind. The vapors may come in contact with any ignition source within flammability limit and unconfined vapour cloud explosion may occur. Overpressure distances due to UVCE (0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar) are given in Table 3.46. Table- 3.46 Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to LFL Sl. Stability Speed overpressure of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 10 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 12.4 14.8 21.3 8.6 2] 3 B-C 12.2 14.5 20.7 8 3] 3 D 12.3 14.7 21.1 8.3 4] 5 D 12.1 14.2 20 7 5] 2 F 16.7 15.3 22.6 9.4 25 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 26 32 49 21.4 2] 3 B-C 36 42 58 21.4 3] 3 D 36 42 59 21.8 4] 5 D 36 41 57 21 5] 2 F 37 43 61 22.5
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 55 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Wind Max. Distance (m) to LFL Sl. Stability Speed overpressure of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 20% CSA failure 1] 2 B 143 176 265 87 2] 3 B-C 142 174 260 87 3] 3 D 153 186 275 92 4] 5 D 151 182 265 88 5] 2 F 154 189 281 89 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 44, 46
It will be evident from table that overpressure of 0.3 bar created due to UVCE for 10mm, 25mm hole dia. & 20% CSA failure will reach upto 16.7m, 37m & 154m respectively. This may damage the pipelines and other equipments.
3.5.17 Unit: Prime G Line/Equipment: Pump 87-P-01A/B line to FCC Feed line Failure Case: a. Hole 25mm a. Stream composition Material – kg/hr Hydrogen – 8.58765 Methane – 0.320 n-Butane – 16.27 1-Butene – 30.8591 n-Pentane – 1659.46 Temperature = 37°C Pressure = 36 bar b. Pump discharge line 25% flange gasket failure a. Stream composition Material – kg/hr Hydrogen – 8.58765 Methane – 0.320 n-Butane – 16.27 1-Butene – 30.8591 n-Pentane – 1659.46 Temperature = 40°C Pressure = 38.7 bar
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 56 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
In case of 25 mm dia. holes in pipework, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 25 mm dia. hole in the line are given in Table 3.47. Gasket failure is one of the foreseeable scenarios, which is considered here. Gasket failure of flange joint may be full gasket or partial. Experience shows that gasket failures are mostly partial and segment between two bolt holes mainly fails. This is true for spiral wound metallic gasket normally used in such services. Use of CAF gasket may be discouraged, as full segment rupture may be possible. The spilling propane may form a Jet Fire and may result in: a) Jet fire, if the released hydrocarbon forms a jet and finds an ignition source. b) Evaporation, vapor cloud formation and safe dispersion beyond its LFL. c) UVCE, if the vapor cloud finds a source of ignition between its flammability limits. Hazard distances for 25mm dia. hole and partial failure of gaskets have been calculated and are presented in the Table-3.47, 3.48 & 3.49
Table – 3.47: Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation due to Jet Fire for 25mm dia. hole and 25% Gasket Failure Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind Sl. Radiation speed & stability classes of No. Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F 25mm dia. hole (Release rate: 19.64 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 43.5 52.3 52.1 61.0 44.0 2] 12.5 57.0 60.1 60.0 65.5 57.7 3] 4.5 75.3 72.6 72.6 73.7 76.7 25% Gasket failure (Release rate: 6.6 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 27 30 30 37 27 2] 12.5 36 35 35 40 36 3] 4.5 48 42 42 43 48 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 47, 49
From the above table, it is seen that 1st degree burn i.e. Radiation level of 4.5 kW/m2 for 25 mm dia. hole and partial failure of gasket may extent upto 76.7m and 48m respectively. The jet may impinge any pipeline or equipment, which may fall within its path in the direction of the flame.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 57 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Table – 3.48 Hazard Distance to LFL Concentration for 25mm dia. hole and Gasket Failure Wind Sl. Stability Speed LFL Distances (m) No. Class (m/sec) 25mm dia. 25% Gasket Release Duration: 180 s hole failure 01. 2 B 109.5 52 02. 3 B-C 114 51 03. 3 D 111 52 04. 5 D 108 49 05. 2 F 114 58 From the above table it shows that the hazard distance with respect to LFL concentration remains within 114m & 58m for 25mm dia. hole and 25% gasket failure respectively from the source of leakage and shall be confined to the factory premises. Present available data of gasket /flange failure rate is about 1x10-7per running year which is considered as low rate of frequency. The consequence due to gasket failure may be considered as foreseeable or credible. Automatic gas detector/heat detector may be considered to mitigate the hazard.
If the evaporating vapor cloud comes in contact with an ignition source between its flammability ranges, the unconfined vapor cloud explosion shall result. The hazard distances for over pressures of 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar and 0.03 bar are given below:
Table – 3.49 Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar 25mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 244 269 335 2] 3 B-C 214 238 303 3] 3 D 225 250 316 4] 5 D 194 217 281 5] 2 F 280 310 391 25% Gasket failure 1] 2 B 133 146 180 2] 3 B-C 122 135 169 3] 3 D 123 136 170 4] 5 D 102 114 147 5] 2 F 155 171 212 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 48, 50
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 58 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
It is also evident from the above table that the maximum distance to 0.3 bar overpressure (heavy damage) extends upto 280m & 155m for 25mm dia. hole and 25% gasket failure respectively.
3.5.18 Unit: Prime G Line/Equipment: SHU Reactor O/L line Failure Case: a. Hole dia. 10 mm b. 20% CSA failure line rupture Stream composition Material – kg/hr Hydrogen – 5.825 Methane – 0.641 n-Butane – 23.24 1-Butene – 38.71 n-Pentane – 1803.76 Temperature = 212°C Pressure = 28 bar
In case of 10 mm dia. hole and 20% CSA failure of pipeline, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 10 mm dia. hole and 20% CSA failure of pipeline in the line are given in Table 3.50. Table-3.50 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Jet Fire Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind speed & Sl. Radiation stability classes of No. Intensity 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F kW/m2 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.54 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 9.1 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.0 3] 4.5 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.6 11.6 20% CSA failure (Release rate: 32.7 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 55.2 56.7 56.5 59.5 55.2 2] 12.5 71.9 73.2 73.1 74.7 72.4 3] 4.5 94.8 95.7 95.7 95.2 96.6 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 51
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 59 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
It is evident that in case of jet fire due to 10mm hole dia. & 20% CSA rupture, 4.5 kW/m2 thermal radiation will reach upto a maximum distance of 11.7m, & 96.6m respectively. It will probably damage the nearby equipments. If the jet does not get ignited, HC vapors will form and spread downwind under the influence of wind. The vapors may come in contact with any ignition source within flammability limit and unconfined vapor cloud explosion may occur. Overpressure distances due to UVCE (0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar) are given in Table 3.51. Table- 3.51 Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 10 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B NR NR NR 5.3 2] 3 B-C NR NR NR 5.1 3] 3 D NR NR NR 5.2 4] 5 D NR NR NR 4.8 5] 2 F NR NR NR 5.3 20% CSA failure 1] 2 B 135.8 151.6 194.1 58.8 2] 3 B-C 145.8 161.6 204.0 60.0 3] 3 D 146.1 162.2 208.8 59.8 4] 5 D 145.8 161.8 205.5 60.0 5] 2 F 137.5 155.1 202.3 61.0 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 52
It will be evident from table that overpressure of 0.3 bar created due to UVCE for 20% CSA failure will reach upto 146.1m respectively. This may damage the pipelines and other equipments.
3.5.19 Unit: Prime G Line/Equipment: FCC Gasoline Splitter outlet Line failure Failure Case: a. Hole dia. 25 mm b. Full bore failure Stream composition Material – kg/hr Hydrogen – 8.728 Methane – 2.566 n-Butane – 639.35 1-Butene – 1122.15
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 60 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
n-Pentane – 1450.94 Temperature = 101°C Pressure = 6.7 bar In case of 25 mm dia. hole and full bore failure of pipeline, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 25 mm dia. hole and full bore failure of pipeline in the line are given in Table 3.52. Table-3.52 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Jet Fire Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind speed & Sl. Radiation stability classes of No. Intensity 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F kW/m2 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.925 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 12.7 13.0 13.0 13.4 12.7 3] 4.5 16.2 16.4 16.3 16.4 16.1 Full bore failure (Release rate: 7.93 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 30.1 31.3 31.2 33.0 30.0 2] 12.5 38.5 39.4 39.4 40.6 38.6 3] 4.5 49.7 50.3 50.2 50.2 50.1 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 53, 55 It is evident that in case of jet fire due to 25mm hole dia. & full bore rupture, 4.5 kW/m2 thermal radiations will reach upto a maximum distance of 16.4m, & 50.3m respectively. If the jet does not get ignited, HC vapors will form and spread downwind under the influence of wind. The vapors may come in contact with any ignition source within flammability limit and unconfined vapor cloud explosion may occur. Overpressure distances due to UVCE (0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar) are given in Table 3.53. Table- 3.53 Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 25 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B 12.3 14.7 21.0 7.4 2] 3 B-C 12.3 14.6 20.9 7.2 3] 3 D 12.3 14.7 21.0 7.3 4] 5 D 12.2 14.4 20.5 6.6 5] 2 F 12.5 15.0 21.7 7.6 Full bore failure
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 61 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
1] 2 B 67.8 75.6 95.7 27.5 2] 3 B-C 67.7 75.5 96.5 27.4 3] 3 D 68.0 76.0 97.3 27.7 4] 5 D 77.6 85.3 105.9 26.5 5] 2 F 78.4 87.0 109.8 28.3 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 54, 56 It will be evident from table that overpressure of 0.3 bar created due to UVCE for full-bore failure will reach upto 78.4m.
3.5.20 Unit: Prime G Line/Equipment: Reflux drum (87-B-02) failure Failure Case: Drum Catastrophic failure Stream composition Material – kg/hr Hydrogen – 8.728 Methane – 2.566 n-Butane – 639.35 1-Butene – 1122.15 n-Pentane – 1450.94 Temperature = 55°C Pressure = 6.2 bar For consequence analysis of the drum capacity per hour processed has been considered. As the drum come under pressurized vessels category, its failure frequency is 3.0x10-6 per year. In the event of heat received by the drum e.g. by flame impingement or from fire in the vicinity, the liquid inside the drum shall start boiling and the pressure inside the drum shall start building up. If the safety valve provided on the drum does not work properly or if it has not been designed properly the phenomenon of Fire ball or BLEVE may arise. The vessel shall rupture and the immediate ignition of the expanding fuel/air mixture may lead to intense combustion resulting in fireballs.
In case of catastrophic rupture filled hydrocarbons will release into atmosphere and may get ignited if finds a suitable source of ignition/fire. After ignition, it will form fireball or BLEVE. Hence, fireball radius and duration has been calculated for capacity of drum 22,605kg/hr.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 62 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Table - 3.54 Fire Ball Details due to BLEVE in Drum Sl. No. Description Value 01. Fire ball radius (m) 23.2m 02. Duration of fire ball, sec. 4.12sec 03 Flame Emissive power 168.88 kW/m2 04 Fireball Lift off height 46.4m
Thermal radiation of the fireball has been calculated & presented in table below. Table-3.55 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation due to Fireball for Catastrophic Rupture of Drum Thermal Distances (m) from radius of the rupture at Sl. Radiation wind speed & stability classes of No. Intensity kW/m2 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F 1] 37.5 28.8 39.7 41.5 37.7 60.7 2] 12.5 224 229.4 230.5 228.3 244.2 3] 4.5 437.4 446.6 448.5 444.8 472.3 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 57
It is evident that in case of fireball due to catastrophic rupture, 4.5 kW/m2 thermal radiation will reach upto a maximum distance of 472.3 m and probably will damage the nearby equipments and structures. Overpressure is also created due to fireball. Overpressure distances due to fireball (0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar) are given in Table 3.56. Table 3.56 Hazard Distances to Overpressure due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 1] 2 B 182 305 649 55 2] 3 B-C 187 341 657 66 3] 3 D 190 321 673 68 4] 5 D 198 324 679 95 5] 2 F 188 317 663 63 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 58
It will be evident from table that overpressure of 0.3 bar created due to BLEVE will reach up to 198 m. This may damage the equipments, structures & pipelines within this distance.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 63 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
3.5.21 Unit: Sour Water Stripping Unit - SWS
Line/Equipment: Sour Gas from Stripper (207-CC-01) overhead to H2SO4 plant Line failure Failure Case - Leak: Hole dia. 10 mm & 25 mm Stream composition Material – wt. % H2S – 50.59 NH3 – 25.32 Temperature = 90°C Pressure = 1 bar In case of 10, 25 mm dia. holes leak and line rupture in pipework, the toxic gas will come out and spread in the downwind direction causing health effects to personnel working nearby area.
The Immediate Danger to Life or Health (IDLH) of H2S is 100 ppm. In case of humans, it has been reported that 50 to 100 ppm causes mild conjunctivitis and respiratory irritation after 1 hour; 500 to 700 ppm may be dangerous in 0.5 to 1 hour; 700 to 1,000 ppm results in rapid unconsciousness, cessation of respiration, and deathand 1,000 to 2,000 ppm results in unconsciousness, cessation of respiration, and death in a few minutes [Yant 1930]. The toxic dose is calculated using Mixer Probit method and presented as follows.Probit equation for Lethal Toxicity equation is used to calculate the centerline concentration (ppm) at exposure time 15min. the Lethal Concentration
LC50, LC20, LC10 are calculated with Probit to percentage value.
n Probit equation -> P = a + b ln (C x te) Where P = Probit function a, b and n are constants C = Concentration (ppm)
te = exposure time, min
Toxic dose of H2S for 10 & 25 mm dia. holes leak in the line are given in Table 3.57.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 64 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Table 3.57
Toxic Distances to H2S release
Wind Downwind distances (m) for Max. concentration of speed LC50 LC20 LC10 IDLH (m/s) / (705 ppm) (589.5 ppm) (533 ppm) (100 ppm) Stability Distance Area Distance Area Distance Area Distance Area Class (m) (m2) (m) (m2) (m) (m2) (m) (m2) 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate:0.023kg/sec) 2B 95 506 103 618 108 686 170 2491 3 B-C 89 430 95 515 98 564 156 2032 3D 106 529 115 638 119 711 214 2909 5D 68 274 74 329 77 362 152 1744 2F 80 429 88 510 92 561 194 2424 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.147kg/sec) 2B 23 28 29 47 32 60 61 386 3 B-C 17 12 22 24 23 32 45 233 3D 22 22 28 39 30 50 66 378 5D 10 1 13 7 15 11 41 178 2F 34 73 40 100 43 118 97 688 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 59 & 60 It is evident from the above table that the downwind distance to lethal concentration of 589.5ppm LC20 goes to a maximum distances of 638m & 100m for 25mm and 10mm dia. hole respectively.
3.5.22 Unit: Sour Water Stripping Unit – SWS Line/Equipment: Stripper (207-CC-01) to Pump (207-PA-02A/B) Line failure Failure Case: Line rupture Stream composition Material – wt. % H2S – 5.76 NH3 – 7.95 Temperature = 90°C Pressure = 1 bar
In case of rupture of pipeline the toxic gas Ammonia (NH3) will evaporate and disperse in downwind direction.
Probit equation for Lethal Toxicity equation is used to calculate the maximum
concentration (ppm) at exposure time of 15min. the Lethal Concentration LC50,
LC20, LC10 are calculated with Probit to percentage value.
n Probit equation -> P = a + b ln (C x te) Where P = Probit function
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RISK ANALYSIS
a, b and n are constants C = Concentration (ppm)
te = exposure time, min
Dispersion modeling of NH3 gas has been done for wind speed of 2 m/sec, 3 m/sec and 5 m/sec and stability class of B, B-C, D & F. Downwind distances for
GLC level of LC50, LC20, LC10 and distances to IDLH i.e. 300 ppm for release of
NH3 have been mentioned.
Table- 3.58 Downwind Distance (m) to GLC of Ammonia due to Line rupture
Wind Downwind distances (m) for Max. concentration of Ammonia speed LC50 LC20 LC10 IDLH (m/s) / (12177 ppm) (8001ppm) (6421 ppm) (300 ppm) Stability Distance Area Distance Area Distance Area Distance Area Class (m) (m2) (m) (m2) (m) (m2) (m) (m2) Line rupture 2B - - 22 20 27 41 139 1820 3 B-C - - 21 18 28 39 149 1814 3D - - 23 22 29 44 161 1857 5D - - 19 13 26 32 157 1686 2F 14 1 24 29 28 49 117 1184 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 61 It is evident from the above table that the downwind distance to 300 ppm of IDLH goes to a maximum distances of 1857m.
3.5.23 Unit: Sulphuric Acid Plant Line/Equipment: ARU gas incoming line failure to SA plant Failure Case - Leak: Leak: Hole dia. 10 mm, 25 mm & 20% of Cross Sectional Area (CSA) failure (Line rupture) Stream composition Material – wt. %
H2S – 93.67% Temperature = 56°C Pressure = 0.8 bar In case of 10, 25 mm dia. holes leak and line rupture in pipework, the toxic gas will come out and spread in the downwind direction causing health effects to personnel working nearby area.
The Immediate Danger to Life or Health (IDLH) of H2S is 100 ppm. In case of humans, it has been reported that 50 to 100 ppm causes mild conjunctivitis and respiratory irritation after 1 hour; 500 to 700 ppm may be dangerous in 0.5 to 1 hour;
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 66 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
700 to 1,000 ppm results in rapid unconsciousness, cessation of respiration, and death and 1,000 to 2,000 ppm results in unconsciousness, cessation of respiration, and death in a few minutes [Yant 1930]. The toxic dose is calculated using Mixer Probit method and presented as follows. Probit equation for Lethal Toxicity equation is used to calculate the centerline
concentration (ppm) at exposure time 15min. the Lethal Concentration LC50, LC20,
LC10 are calculated with Probit to percentage value.
n Probit equation -> P = a + b ln (C x te) Where P = Probit function a, b and n are constants C = Concentration (ppm)
te = exposure time, min
Toxic dose of H2S for 10 & 25 mm dia. hole in the line are given in Table 3.59. Table 3.59
Toxic Distances to H2S release
Wind Downwind distances (m) for Max. concentration of speed LC50 LC20 LC10 IDLH (m/s) / (705 ppm) (589.5 ppm) (533 ppm) (100 ppm) Stability Distance Area Distance Area Distance Area Distance Area Class (m) (m2) (m) (m2) (m) (m2) (m) (m2) 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate:0.024 kg/sec) 2B 20 18 26 37 29 47 56 350 3 B-C 13 5 17 14 19 19 39 186 3D 18 12 23 26 25 34 57 320 5D - - 10 1 11 4 35 136 2F 42 109 49 160 52 192 140 1832 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.152 kg/sec) 2B 101 685 109 841 112 935 169 3546 3 B-C 83 419 89 509 92 564 143 2198 3D 98 578 106 707 109 787 199 3713 5D 62 229 66 279 68 309 136 1598 2F 125 1474 137 1837 142 2061 464 20763 20% CSA failure 2B 279 7765 290 8921 295 9623 456 35591 3 B-C 241 5079 252 5779 260 6252 422 23094 3D 284 6768 296 7787 308 8462 626 40517 5D 216 3195 229 3739 236 4071 487 20136 2F 389 20885 512 26281 427 29735 1485 331116 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 62, 63 & 68 It is evident from the above table that the downwind distance to lethal concentration of 705ppm LC50 goes to a maximum distances of 42m, 125m & 389m for 10mm, 25mm dia. hole and 20% CSA rupture of line respectively.
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RISK ANALYSIS
3.5.24 Unit: Sulphuric Acid Plant Line/Equipment: SWS gas incoming line failure to SA plant Failure Case - Leak: Hole dia. 10 mm, 25 mm & 20% of Cross Sectional Area (CSA) failure (Line rupture)
Stream composition Material – wt. % H2S – 50.61 NH3 – 25.32 Temperature = 90°C Pressure = 0.8 bar In case of 10, 25 mm dia. holes leak and line rupture in pipework, the toxic gas will come out and spread in the downwind direction causing health effects to personnel working nearby area.
The Immediate Danger to Life or Health (IDLH) of H2S is 100 ppm. In case of humans, it has been reported that 50 to 100 ppm causes mild conjunctivitis and respiratory irritation after 1 hour; 500 to 700 ppm may be dangerous in 0.5 to 1 hour; 700 to 1,000 ppm results in rapid unconsciousness, cessation of respiration, and death and 1,000 to 2,000 ppm results in unconsciousness, cessation of respiration, and death in a few minutes [Yant 1930]. The toxic dose is calculated using Mixer Probit method and presented as follows. Probit equation for Lethal Toxicity equation is used to calculate the centerline
concentration (ppm) at exposure time 15min. the Lethal Concentration LC50, LC20,
LC10 are calculated with Probit to percentage value.
n Probit equation -> P = a + b ln (C x te) Where P = Probit function a, b and n are constants C = Concentration (ppm)
te = exposure time, min
Toxic dose of H2S for 10, 25 mm dia. hole leak and line rupture in the line are given in Table 3.60.
Projects & Development India Ltd., Sindri Page 68 of 120 Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
RISK ANALYSIS
Table 3.60
Toxic Distances to H2S release
Wind Downwind distances (m) for Max. concentration of speed LC50 LC20 LC10 IDLH (m/s) / (705 ppm) (589.5 ppm) (533 ppm) (100 ppm) Stability Distance Area Distance Area Distance Area Distance Area Class (m) (m2) (m) (m2) (m) (m2) (m) (m2) 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.133 kg/sec) 2B 95 489 102 594 107 659 167 2374 3 B-C 81 368 88 441 91 486 141 1765 3D 100 479 109 579 113 639 202 2693 5D 60 215 65 261 67 288 135 1433 2F 87 458 95 549 101 607 204 2538 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.0213 kg/sec) 2B 19 17 24 32 28 42 54 313 3 B-C 13 5 17 14 19 19 39 179 3D 17 11 23 24 25 33 57 298 5D - - 10 2 12 5 36 138 2F 33 64 39 92 43 110 100 702 20% CSA failure 2B 185 2580 201 3085 209 3389 365 13851 3 B-C 217 2870 230 3341 237 3619 409 14453 3D 231 2887 246 3380 257 3688 519 17409 5D 224 2592 235 2973 241 3196 16463 504 2F 137 1556 151 1820 164 2028 314 8409 Damage contours as in Fig no.: 64, 65 & 67 It is evident from the above table that the downwind distance to lethal concentration of 589.5ppm LC20 goes to a maximum distances of 39m, 109m & 231m for 10mm, 25mm dia. hole and 20% CSA rupture of line respectively.
3.5.25 Unit: Sulphuric Acid Plant Line/Equipment: Fuel gas incoming line failure to SA plant Failure Case - Leak: Hole dia. 10 mm, 25 mm & Full bore rupture Stream composition Material: wt% Methane: 93 C2+: 5 Temperature = 40°C Pressure = 3.5 bar In case of 10mm, 25 mm dia. hole and full bore rupture, the liquid will come out as jet and if the jet gets ignited due to the presence of any ignition source, jet fire may occur. Thermal radiation distances for 10mm and 25mm dia. hole of pipeline in the line are given in Table 3.61.
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Table-3.61 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Jet Fire Thermal Distances from radius of the jet (m) at wind speed & Sl. Radiation stability classes of No. Intensity 2B 3 B-C 3D 5D 2F kW/m2 10 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.0495 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 NR NR NR NR NR 3] 4.5 NR NR NR NR NR 25 mm dia. hole (Release rate: 0.316 kg/sec) 1] 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 2] 12.5 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.6 6.8 3] 4.5 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.7 8.8 Full bore rupture 1] 37.5 38 38 38 38 38 2] 12.5 30 30 30 31 30 3] 4.5 24 25 24 25 24 NR: Not Reached Damage contours as in Fig no.: 66 & 69 (25mm dia. hole and full bore rupture) It is evident that in case of jet fire due to 25mm hole dia. and full bore., 4.5 kW/m2 thermal radiations will reach upto a maximum distance of 8.9m and 38m respectively. If the jet does not get ignited, HC vapors will form and spread downwind under the influence of wind. The vapors may come in contact with any ignition source within flammability limit and unconfined vapor cloud explosion may occur. Overpressure distances due to UVCE (0.3 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.03 bar) are given in Table 3.62. Table- 3.62 Hazard Distances to Overpressure Due to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 10 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B NR NR NR 1.87 2] 3 B-C NR NR NR 1.84 3] 3 D NR NR NR 1.87 4] 5 D NR NR NR 1.76 5] 2 F NR NR NR 1.88 25 mm dia. hole 1] 2 B NR NR NR 4.5 2] 3 B-C NR NR NR 4.4 3] 3 D NR NR NR 4.47
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Wind Max. Distance (m) to overpressure LFL Sl. Stability Speed of No. Class (m/sec) 0.3 Bar 0.1 Bar 0.03 Bar m 4] 5 D NR NR NR 4.1 5] 2 F NR NR NR 4.6 Full bore Failure 1] 2 B 45 51 66 19 2] 3 B-C 45 51 66 19 3] 3 D 46 51 66 19 4] 5 D 45 51 65 18 5] 2 F 46 52 28 20 NR: Not Reached Damage contours as in Fig no.: 70 (full bore rupture) It is also evident from the above table that the maximum distance to 0.3 bar overpressure (heavy damage) extends upto 46m for full bore failure. All the damage contours (Fig no.: 1 to 70) for selected failure scenarios are enclosed with report for Wind speed 3m/s and Stability Class B/C.
3.6 FREQUENCY ESTIMATION An important component of risk analysis is the estimation of the likelihood or frequency of each failure case or release scenario. None of the events considered in this analysis are common and major catastrophic events are very rare. Leak frequencies were developed using a parts count, and event tree analysis was used to evaluate likelihood of success or failure of release mitigation safeguards onsite, specifically the potential for detection and isolation of leaks. Assuming that all releases occur at normal operating conditions provides overly conservative inputs to a QRA study. 3.6.1 Parts Count The frequency of a leak from each node was estimated using a parts count of the equipment in the node. The parts count is a tally of the various pieces of equipment contained in each node. The parts count is combined with the LOC frequencies provided in the TNO Purple Book to determine the likelihood of each release scenario. 3.6.2 Event Tree Analysis Event tree analysis is used for evaluating the likelihood of release of a hazardous material given the defined plant safeguards in place. The event tree analysis in this QRA determines the likelihood of mitigation working (HC detection and shutdown) or failing to operate on demand. Detection and isolation of an accidental release requires time to complete. Detection and isolation times for the QRA were developed using the detection
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and isolation times provided in the TNO Purple Book. Table 3.63 provides the detection and isolation times used in the study. Table 3.63 Detection and Isolation time Blocking Type Time to Detect and Failure on Demand Isolate Mitigated 3 min 0.01 per demand HC Detection and Shutdown from Control Room Unmitigated 30 min* N/A *30 minutes of outflow is the maximum duration defined for the QRA
In this analysis initial event is usually placed on the left and the branches are drawn to the right, each branch representing a different sequence of events and terminating in an outcome. Each branch of the event tree represents a particular scenario. The tree is a means of estimating the frequency of the outcome for that scenario. For example, for a flammable release, a typical series of models are gas dispersion, ignition, jet fire, pool fire and explosion.
3.6.3 Immediate Ignition The probability of ignition is derived from F.P. Lees and reported in Table 3.64 Table 3.64 Probability of Ignition of Release S.No Release rate Gas Liquid 1. Minor (<1 kg/s) 0.01 0.01 2. Major (1-50 kg/s) 0.07 0.03 3. Massive (>50kg/s) 0.30 0.08 This is the probability that the release ignites immediately, at the release point, before the cloud has begun to disperse and to reach ignition sources away from the release point. 3.6.4 Delayed Ignition The immediate ignition outcomes are defined to occur with precisely the probability defined by the event tree probabilities. On the other hand the delayed ignition outcomes occur at a frequency calculated by available ignition sources which are fired heater, ignition due to vehicle movement, general ignition (canteen, smoking booth), high tension line etc. The outcome of the delayed ignition of released hydrocarbon results in flash fire or explosion. An un-ignited release will normally disperse with little or no consequence (unless the gas is
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toxic), whereas a fire or explosion can potentially escalate to endanger the whole installation. 3.6.5 Explosion and Flash Fire The ignition of a free gas cloud may result in both explosion and flash-fire upon ignition. This is modeled as two separate events: as a pure flash fire and a pure explosion. The fraction that is modeled as an explosion has been considered as 0.42.
3.6.6 Materials those are both Flammable and Toxic In reality the risk to personnel for a given event could be the result of toxic or flammable effects or combination of the two depending on the properties of the materials being released. Common examples of such flammable and toxic materials include hydrogen sulfide and hydrogen with lighter hydrocarbon (recycle gas section of hydro-treater). In such scenario, non-ignition probability shall be used to define the frequency of a subsequent toxic calculation.
Fig 3.2: Event tree for Continuous Liquid Release
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Fig 3.3: Event tree for Continuous Gas Release
Fig 3.4: Event Tree for Instantaneous Liquid Release
The literature data as indicated with Table 3.65: Failure Frequency Data has been referred to and failure frequency has been analyzed for applicability and use in the present QRA study.
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Table 3.65 Failure Frequency Data
S. No Failure Scenario Failure frequency rate per yr 1 10 mm leak 3.3 x 10-6 2 25 mm leak 7 x 10-7 3 25% gasket failure 1 x 10-7 4 Instrument tubing full bore failure 1 x 10-6 5 drum catastrophic failure 3 x 10-6 6 20% CSA failure line rupture 4 x 10-7 7 Full bore failure of line 5 x 10-7 8 Pump 92-P-01A/B Mech seal failure 5 x 10-5
3.7 Risk Analysis The final and most significant step in the process is the assessment of the meaning and significance of the calculated risk levels. Risk assessment is a process by which the results of a risk evaluation are used to make judgements, either through relative risk ranking of risk reduction strategies or through comparison with established risk targets (criteria). The risks of the proposed new units in IOCL Haldia Refinery may be expressed from two perspectives: (1) the risk to individuals and (2) the risk to groups of people. These are referred to, respectively, as individual and societal risk.
3.7.1 Individual Risk Individual risk is defined as the risk to a single person/ individual to a hazard. The hazard can be a single incident, or a collection of incidents (e.g., the release scenarios developed for the proposed new units). Individual risk is widely defined as the risk of fatality (or serious injury) experienced by an individual, noting that the acceptability of individual risks should be based on that experienced by the most exposed (i.e. ‘worst-case’) individual. The most widely-used criteria for individual risks are: A maximum tolerable individual risk for workers of 10-3 per year (1 in 1000 years). A maximum tolerable individual risk for members of the public of 10-4 per year (i.e. 1 in 10,000 years). The acceptable criterion, for both workers and public, corresponding to the level below which individual risks can be treated as effectively negligible, is 10-6 per year (i.e. 1 in 1,000,000 years)
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Between these criteria the risks are in the ‘ALARP’ or tolerability region. In this region the risks are acceptable only if demonstrated to be As Low As Reasonably Practicable. The individual risk results can be expressed as a likelihood (e.g., fatalities per year), or expressed as a recurrence period (e.g., 1 fatality in X years). While all injuries are of concern, effect models for predicting degrees of injury often include additional uncertainties; thus, risk analysts often estimate the risk of fatal injury (death) as a less equivocal measure. The calculation of individual risk is made with the understanding that the contributions of all incident outcome cases (i.e., event sequences) are additive. For example, the total individual risk to an individual working at a facility is the sum of the risks from all potentially harmful incidents considered separately.
3.7.2 Societal Risk The societal risk is defined as the risk to a group of people to a hazard. The hazard can be a single incident, or a collection of incidents. Thus societal risk evaluated the scale of the incident in terms of the number of people that could be impacted from the hazard(s). Societal risk is expressed as the cumulative risk to a group(s) of people who might be affected by accidental release events. The calculation uses the same consequence and frequency results as the individual risk calculation, but uses information about the number, geographical distribution, building construction and occupancy levels of the population to determine the level of risk. Societal risk is expressed using an F-N curve, which is the most common method of depicting societal risk results. The F-N curve indicates the expected frequency (F) of release scenarios occurring which result in the number of N or more fatalities. The x-axis of the F-N curve represents the number of fatalities, N. The number of fatalities is depicted on a logarithmic axis with a minimum value of 1. The y-axis of the F-N curve represents the cumulative frequency of the release scenarios with the number of fatalities equal to N or more.
3.7.3 Risk Criteria A risk analysis provides measures of the risk resulting from a particular facility or activity. However, the assessment of the acceptability (or otherwise) of that risk is left to the judgement and experience of the people undertaking and/or using the
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risk analysis work. The normal approach adopted is to relate the risk measures obtained to acceptable risk criteria. A quantitative risk analysis produces only numbers, which in themselves provide no inherent use. It is the assessment of those numbers that allows conclusions to be drawn and recommendations to be developed. The assessment phase of a study is therefore of prime importance in providing value from a risk assessment study. 3.7.3.1 Individual Risk Acceptability Criteria The individual risk levels for the onsite populations can be classified as follows: Unacceptable ( 1 fatality in 1,000 years) Level where further risk assessment or risk mitigation is required. Broadly Acceptable ( 1 fatality in 1 million years) Level where further risk reduction is not required. Tolerable (1 fatality between 1,000 and 1 million years) Level where further, prudent risk reduction should be considered. Region is typically referred as the As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) zone.
Fig 3.5: Individual Risk Criteria
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ALARP principle is basically represented by the above risk triangle with high risk (indicated by red color) on the top and low risk (green color) at the bottom. And medium risk is located somewhere in the middle. When a risk is reduced by mitigations or measures, the degree of risk is decreased from high to low. Risks above the Upper Tolerability Limit is intolerable which risk reduction is a must. Between the Upper and the Lower Tolerability Limit, the risk is only tolerable if it is ALARP, which means that all reasonably practicable risk reduction measures have to be identified and implemented. Lastly, below the Lower Tolerability Limit, risk is broadly tolerable or acceptable. ALARP is a point at which a risk is reduced so low that further risk reduction measure is not required. This demonstrates by the risk reduction cost (money, time or effort) is grossly disproportionate to the risk reduction gained. Or another word, ALARP is simply a balancing of risk reduction and the cost of achieving it. 3.7.3.2 Societal risk acceptability criteria A formal risk criterion is used at all for societal risk; the criterion most commonly used is the FN curve. Like other forms of risk criterion, the FN curve may be cast in the form of a single criterion curve or of two criterion curves dividing the space in to three regions – where the risk is unacceptable, where it is negligible and where it requires further assessment. The latter approach corresponds to application to societal risk of the ALARP principle. Risk criteria for the UK have been considered for the present study and it is represented in Figure 3.6.
Fig 3.6: UK Societal Risk Criteria
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3.8 Risk Results 3.8.1 Individual Risk Results Annexure – 1A & 1B illustrates the individual risk contour for the proposed/modifications of units in IOCL Haldia Refinery. As shown, the risk contour illustrating the risk of 1 fatality in 1 million years i.e., 1 x 10-6 is mostly maintained within the site boundary (red colored). Therefore, the individual risk is in the acceptable risk level for public impacts. In Annexure 1A, the Iso risk contour of 1 x 10-6 Risk level is plotted based on the consequence analysis and assumptions made on probability of ignition sources and population in the plant during Day and Night conditions. In Annexure 1B, the Iso risk contour of 1 x 10-6 Risk level is plotted based on the consequence analysis and assumptions made on probability of ignition sources and population (nearby Admin, Canteen etc.,) in the plant during Day and Night conditions.
3.8.2 Societal Risk Results The F-N diagram, illustrates the societal risk for the proposed/modifications of units in IOCL Haldia Refinery which is attached as Annexure – 1C. It is evident from the above diagram the frequency per year 1x10-6 is in As Low As Reasonably Practicable- ALARP or tolerability region. Where further, prudent risk reduction should be considered.
3.9 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION Iso-risk contours have been plotted by PHAST Risk Micro software, Version-6.70 (Latest) of M/s DNV Technica, which is shown in Annexure 1A & 1B. Iso-risk contour have been plotted by considering existing facilities and other allied facilities. It may be inferred from the Iso-risk contours that acceptable limit of individual risk of 1.0x10-6 per year remains mainly confined within the plant premises. It is also observed from FN curve (Annexure-1C) that Societal Risk is in ALARP or tolerable range.
Hence, it may be concluded that with the normal operation, plant may be considered safe from environmental risk point of view.
Fire Fighting facilities including Hydrants, monitors and Sprinklers systems Foam systems, Fire water pumps, ESD system, Interlocking system, Gas Monitoring system have been installed in the plant. Personal Protective equipments are also
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being used. Following all safe operations procedures further reduces the frequency of incidents in the plant. All the above systems should be maintained in good working order at all times. Awareness programs should be done for the people residing in nearby location of all types of emergency situations which may happen in the Plant with consultation with civic bodies. 3.9.1 Recommendations The emergency response procedures for the facility should be common to the IOC Refinery facilities and those of the adjacent industrial facilities. If practical the emergency response / plan should be developed for the site / complex as a whole, based on understanding of the risks to and from each of the different plants / units / facilities. The emphasis on risk reduction should be on preventive measures, i.e. to minimize the potential for leaks to occur. This would chiefly be achieved through appropriate design (to recognized standards) and through effective inspection, testing and maintenance plans / procedures. Rapid isolation of significant leaks will not eliminate the risks but will help to minimize the hazards and, particularly, the ignition probability (by limiting the total mass of flammable vapor released). For isolation to be effective, first requires detection to occur and hence best practice fire and gas detection systems, with associated shutdown systems and procedures, shall be important mitigation measures. No future land-use is anticipated close to the refinery that might increase the exposed population, particularly within the contours. The limits of the residential areas should be clearly defined, accounting for any potential for future land-use development / expansion of the populated areas. Consideration should be given to the potential to prevent any development from occurring close to the refinery. Routine checks to be done to ensure and prevent the presence of ignition sources in the immediate vicinity of the refinery (near boundaries). Clearly defined escape routes shall be developed for each individual plots and section of the refinery taking into account the impairment of escape by hazardous releases and sign boards be erected in places to guide personnel in case of an emergency. All the fire detection and firefighting arrangements near facilities should be kept in good working condition.
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In order to reduce the frequency of failures and consequent risk, codes, rules and standards framed should be strictly followed. Safety valves located on the storage vessels and other places must be tested regularly. The block valves before safety valve must always be kept in open condition when safety valves are in position. It is preferable to provide chain and lock to ensure that the valves provided upstream of Safety Valves are open. In order to further reduce the probability of failure of catastrophic rupture of vessels and equipments, critical equipments shall be identified and inspection methodologies to be finalized for continuous monitoring during operation and shutdown maintenance. Vehicular traffic as well as entry of personnel inside the plant area must be restricted. The vehicles entering the refinery should be fitted with spark arrestors. Use of naked light or hot work must be restricted to the areas designated for the purpose. The sprinkler system and remote operated valves must be checked regularly for timely actuation of the safety system as being done. The DG sets must be periodically tested on load to ensure that they remain always in operating condition. Training of all the employees and security personnel for firefighting and use of safety apparatus must be conducted regularly. Mock drills for emergency should be conducted at regular intervals of 6 months (as per MSIHC rule) keeping liaison with local administration and fire-fighting facilities available in the area. Windsocks shall be considered in the plant at higher elevation to ensure visibility from all directions. This will assist people to escape in upwind or cross wind direction from flammable/ toxic releases. Safety Audits being done as per norms and recommendations of OISD and points must be regularly complied. Inspection and testing of the major equipments and pipelines e.g. pumps, compressor connecting lines, pipeworks, etc. should be done at regular intervals for ensuring their health and condition monitoring. The use of PPEs should be strictly followed. Mutual aid arrangement available with fire services and nearby Industries, to be strengthened by regular meetings.
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Gas detectors provided at vulnerable places like Storage Vessel areas, pump and compressor house, etc should be checked regularly and calibrated periodically. High-level alarm & trips, interlocks and instruments provided at facilities should be checked at regular intervals. Fire Water Pumps should be checked regularly.
Safety Measures for Acid Storage tanks Sulfuric Acid can be handled safely if the proper precautionary measures are observed. Although sulfuric acid is not flammable, it should not be stored near organic materials, nitrates, carbides, chlorates or metal powders. Contact between high concentrations of sulfuric acid and these materials may cause ignition. The most common material used for sulfuric acid (>70%) storage tanks is carbon steel. It is relatively inexpensive and offers good corrosion resistance. If iron contamination is a problem, 304 or 316 stainless steel is acceptable. For more aggressive environments, Alloy 20 may be an economical choice. For small tanks with Sulfuric acid concentrations below95%, high-density, cross linked polyethylene (HDXPE) may be suitable. Mitigation of Spill: The spill should be contained with diking to keep it out of waterways. Dry dirt, clay, sand or limestone are usually acceptable materials for diking. Once the spill is contained, it should be slowly diluted with water (fine spray) to a concentration of about 15%. It can then be neutralized using alkalis, such as caustic soda, soda ash, baking soda, lime, or limestone. Dispose of acid residue: Sulfuric acid residue is considered a "hazardous waste" due to the acidic nature, and should be disposed in a secure landfill designated for "hazardous wastes. If the pH of the residue can be adjusted to between 2 and 12 (by mixing in alkalis, such as caustic soda, soda ash, baking soda, lime or limestone) the residue can usually be treated as a non-hazardous waste. Inspect piping: In general, piping is formally externally inspected visually every five years, and ultrasonic thickness tested biennially. Again, actual plant experience may dictate an increase or decrease in this schedule. Extra attention shall be paid to elbows, tees, valves and any other places in the piping where flow disturbances (and
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erosion/corrosion) could occur. Use API 570, Class II piping standards for guidance. For most maintenance work on acid lines, the lines are drained then blown with dry air or nitrogen to remove as much liquid acid as possible. The maintenance worker(s) then break into the line wearing a full acid suit. Appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) is used throughout the entire job to make sure the worker is not exposed to the acid. THE PIPELINE IS NOT FLUSHED WITH WATER UNLESS IT IS TO BE DISMANTLED. Weak sulfuric acid is very corrosive to most metals and will significantly shorten the expected life of the piping. Clean an acid tank: Sulfuric acid tanks are usually only cleaned when the tanks are due for the internal inspection (every 5-6 years) or when the iron sulfate builds-up in the tank enough to cause quality problems with the product. Inspection of an acid storage tank: There are three types of inspections normally done on a sulfuric acid tank. The first is an external "walk-around" inspection. Every year someone should "walk-around" the tank, looking for signs of sulfate leakage or other metal deterioration, making sure the insulation (if so equipped) is weather-tight, observing the overflow/vent line to make sure it is not plugged, looking at the tank foundation/supports. A more thorough external tank inspection would include an ultrasonic thickness test. Areas around welds and nozzles should be carefully reviewed An internal tank inspection is the most thorough. It involves emptying and cleaning the tank. Someone (preferably an API-certified inspector) then enters the tank and visually inspect the internal welds and tank surfaces. Ultrasonic thickness testing shall be done on the floor and any other questionable areas at this time. Ensure to follow all OSHA guidelines when entering the tank. General guidance for tank inspections is as follows: An annual external "walk-around" inspection. A biennial ultrasonic thickness test. Every 5-6 years empty and clean the tank, and internally inspect the tank. These inspection frequencies can be increased or decreased, based on actual findings when the tanks are inspected. Be sure to document all inspections and keep copies in the tank files.
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Vent: Sulfuric acid storage tanks must always have an open vent for normal breathing and to prevent dangerous pressure build-up due to hydrogen. Hydrogen gas may be produced from the action of acid on the steel tank and cause increased pressure and danger of explosion from potential sparks or flames. The vent line should be flush with the inner surface at the highest point of the tank to ensure all hydrogen is purged, in order to minimize the danger of explosion. Metal catwalks should be provided for working on top of tanks as hidden weak spots may have developed from internal corrosion. Never walk on the tank skin and always use the catwalk. If dripping is noticed from a line suspended above, don't look up. Step well away before investigating.
Storage and Handling of Petroleum products: General Precautions: Petroleum storage tanks shall be located in dyked enclosures. Each dyke shall have roads all around for access for normal operation and maintenance as well as for emergency handling. Vapor space of not less than 5% of its capacity shall be kept in each container and 3% in each tank truck in respect of petroleum Class A&B products. Similarly minimum 3% vapor space shall be kept in containers and 2% vapor space in tank trucks in respect of petroleum Class C. All Maintenance/ Inspection jobs shall be carried out in line with OISD Standard; OISD-STD-105 on "Work Permit System". Precautions against Fire and Explosion: Keep all SOURCES OF IGNITION away from petroleum products and their vapors. Sources of ignition include but are not limited to: Matches, lighters and cigarettes, etc. Any flame or spark. Any non-flameproof electrical equipment, including switches, hand torches, electric radiators, vacuum cleaners, power tools and 2 way radios and cellphones. Welding sets, their leads, connections and hand-pieces. Gas welding torches and gas igniters.
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Motor vehicles and all internal combustion engines. Must be turned off when being filled with no sources of ignition brought within 3 meters of a vehicle being filled Tools which can cause a spark if dropped, etc. Grinders
Keep all oxidizers (HTH and O2 cylinders) away from fuels. Do not carry out any hot work (e.g. welding, gas cutting, grinding, drilling or power wire-brushing) on any tank, container, or any equipment that still contains petroleum product or that has not been tested and certified gas free by a competent person using appropriate vapor testing equipment within its test date – normally a service not readily available unless Oil Industry Contractors are onsite. Do not pour petroleum products from one metal container to another, without ensuring that both containers are fully earthed and that an effective earthing connection is made between hose nozzle and receiving container before any transfer is started, and is maintained as long as the transfer continues. Precautions against Toxic Hazards Avoid splashing, or any contact with the eyes or skin. Wear PVC gloves and boots, and cotton, Tyvek® or Nomex® overalls. Beware of static discharge from dissimilar clothing. Wear goggles or face shield if splashing is possible. If clothing gets contaminated with product, remove under a running shower – preferably an outside hose. Do not move as saturated clothing may generate static sparks Do not wash contaminated clothing in a washing machine due to the risk of electrical spark and ignition / explosion. Do not wash any clothing contaminated with hazardous substances including agrichemicals in the family washing machine due to differences in susceptibility to toxic effects between adults and children.
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4. DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
4.1 DEFINITIONS
(a) “boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE)” means the violent rupture of a pressure vessel containing saturated liquid or vapour at a temperature well above its atmospheric boiling point and the resulting flash evaporation of a large fraction of the superheated liquid which produces a large vapour cloud which burns in the form of a large rising fireball due to ignition;
(b) “chief incident controller” means the person who assumes absolute control of the unit and determines action necessary to control the emergency;
(c) “codes of practice” means the codes of practice for emergency response and disaster management plan notified by the Board;
(d) “disaster” means an occurrence of such magnitude as to create a situation in which the normal patterns of life within an industrial complex are suddenly disrupted and in certain cases affecting the neighbourhood seriously with the result that the people are plunged into helplessness and suffering and may need food, shelter, clothing, medical attention protection and other life sustaining requirements;
(e) “disaster management plan“ means a well-coordinated, comprehensive response plan to contain loss of life, property, environment and provide speedy and effective recovery by making the most effective use of available resources in case of a disaster;
(h) “emergency” means a situation or scenario which has the potential to cause serious danger to persons, environment or damage to property and which tends to cause disruption inside or outside the premises and may require the help of outside resources;
(i) “emergency response vehicle (ERV)” means a vehicle for handling emergencies having necessary equipment meant for rescue and relief operations and ERV can be put to use within installation, outside of installation including road incident;
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(j) “hazard” means an event related to the property of substance or chemicals with a potential for human injury, damage to property, damage to the environment, or some combination thereof;
(k) “incident” means an unplanned or unintended or intended event having potential to cause damage to life, property and environment;
(l) “incident record register” means a register containing complete information pertaining to all incidents covering near miss, and all other incidents leading to Level-I, Level-II and Level-III emergencies;
(m) “installation” means facilities, namely, gaseous product pipeline, liquid Product pipeline, hydrocarbons processing installation, oil and natural gas terminals and commercial storage and transportation, hydrocarbons gas bottling Installations including CNG, city gas distribution facilities and retail outlets;
(n) “ leak” means release or discharge of a dangerous chemicals or substances or material into the environment;
(o) “Mutual aid association” means an industrial mutual aid association in which participating industries as a community shall assist each other in case of emergency. Mutual aid associations supplement a site’s emergency control plan. Services of member industries shall be requested only when the emergency threatens to exceed the capability of otherwise available resources;
(p) "occupier” of an installation means the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the installation;
(q) “offsite emergency” means an emergency that takes place in an installation and the effects of emergency extends beyond the premises or the emergency created due to an incident , catastrophic incidents, natural calamities, etc. It no longer remains the concern of the installation management alone but also becomes a concern for the general public living outside and to deal with such eventualities shall be the responsibilities of district administration;
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(r) “Offsite emergency plan” means a response plan to control and mitigate the effects of catastrophic incidents in above ground installation (AGI) or underground installations (UGI) or road transportation. This plan shall be prepared by the district administration based on the data provided by the installation(s), to make the most effective use of combined resources, i.e. internal as well as external to minimise loss of life, property, environment and to restore facilities at the earliest;
(s) “On site emergency” means an emergency that takes place in an installation and the effects are confined to the Installation premise’s involving only the people working inside the plants and to deal with such eventualities is the responsibility of the occupier and is mandatory. It may also require help of outside resources;
(t) “on site emergency plan” means a response plan to contain and minimize the effects due to emergencies within the installations which have a potential to cause damage to people and facilities within the installation premises;
(u) “ risk” means the chance of a specific undesired event occurring within a specified period or in specified circumstances and it may be either a frequency or a probability of a specific undesired event taking place;
(v) “risk analysis” means the identification of undesired events that lead to the materialization of a hazard, the analysis of the mechanisms by which these undesired events could occur and, usually, the estimation of the extent, magnitude, and likelihood of any harmful effects;
(w) “risk assessment” means the quantitative evaluation of the likelihood of undesired events and the likelihood of harm or damage being caused by them, together with the value judgments made concerning the significance of the results;
(x) “Risk management” means the programme that embraces all administrative and operational programmes that are designed to reduce the risk of emergencies involving acutely hazardous materials. Such programmes include, but are not limited to, ensuring the design safety of new and existing
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equipment, standard operating procedures, preventive maintenance, operator training, incident investigation procedures, risk assessment for unit operations, emergency planning, and internal and external procedures to ensure that these programmes are being executed as planned;
(y) “Site incident controller” means the person who goes to the scene of the emergency and supervises the actions necessary to overcome the emergency at the site of the incident;
(z) ‘Spill” means an unintended release or discharge of hydrocarbon or any other dangerous liquid into the environment;
(aa) “transport emergency (TREM) card” means a card containing details about the nature of hazards, protective devices, telephone numbers and actions related to spillage, fire, first aid and other details of national and international (UN) numbers or signage which is common in India and abroad; (ab) “unconfined vapour cloud explosion (UVCE)” means the formation of vapour cloud due to release of significant quantity of liquefied hydrocarbons into the atmosphere and its explosion due to ignition which may cause high over pressure and low pressure that cause very heavy damage.
4.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (DMP) The main objectives of the Disaster Management Plan would be to – Ensure that loss of life and injuries to persons are minimized. Ensure that property losses are minimum. Ensure that relief and rehabilitation measures are put into action at the shortest possible time.
4.3 PRIORITY OF HANDLING EMERGENCIES The general order of priority for invoking measures during the course of emergency will be as follows: Safeguard Life. Safeguard Property. Stop product leakage & contain the spillage from spreading. Extinguish any fire, which develops. Bring to normal operating condition as early as possible.
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4.4 CONTENT OF DMP
The DMP shall include - a. classification of emergencies; b. implementation schedule; c. pre-emergency planning; d. emergency mitigation measures; e. emergency preparedness measures; f. emergency organisation and responsibilities; g. declaration of on-site and off-site emergency; h. medical facilities;
4.5 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Emergencies can be categorized into three broad levels on the basis of seriousness and response requirements, namely: – (a) Level 1 : This is an emergency or an incident which can be effectively and safely managed, and contained within the site, location or installation by the available resources; has no impact outside the site, location or installation. (b) Level 2 : This is an emergency or an incident which – cannot be effectively and safely managed or contained at the location or installation by available resource and additional support is alerted or required; is having or has the potential to have an effect beyond the site, location or installation and where external support of mutual aid partner may be involved; is likely to be danger to life, the environment or to industrial assets or reputation. (c) Level 3: This is an emergency or an incident with off-site impact which could be catastrophic and is likely to affect the population, property and environment inside and outside the installation, and management and control is done by district administration. Although the Level-III emergency falls under the purview of District Authority but till they step in, it should be responsibility of the unit to manage the emergency. Note: Level-I and Level-II shall normally be grouped as onsite emergency and Level-III as off-site emergency.
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4.5.1 Probable Disaster scenarios
The probable disaster scenarios are presented in the following table:
Table 4.1 Probable Disaster scenarios with Emergency Level S.No Scenario Level 1. Fire in the tank farm area major fire Level 1 2. Fire and Explosion in the unit area Level 2 3. Boiler explosion in the Thermal Level 2 Power Station 4. Flood in the Refinery Level 3 5. Large oil spillage which can flow out Level 2 of the refinery 6. Un-notices continuous leak of Level 2 LPG/Propylene from sampling/draning points in the process units or in Off Site 7. Leakage from POL/LPG tank truck Level 1 in the close vicinity outside the refinery, which has potential to have impact inside the refinery 8. Hydrogen gas leak and fire in unit Level 2 9. Pipeline rupture Level 1 10. Flood and Cyclone scenario Level 3 11. Eaerthquake Level 3 12. CO leak from FCC Level 2 13. Heavy leakage in Crude carrying Level 3 pipeline from jetty 14. Toxic gas – H2S and NH3 release Level 2
4.5.2 Causes of disasters. The common causes for the above events are tabulated below for reference and the ERDMP should be prepared by the installation to deal with the following emergencies.
Man made Natural Calamities Extraneous
x Heavy Leakage x Flood x Riots/Civil Disorder/ x Fire x Earth Quake Mob Attack x Explosion x Cyclone x Terrorism x Failure of Critical x Outbreak of x Sabotage Control system Disease x Bomb Threat x Design deficiency x Excessive Rains x War / Hit by missiles x Unsafe acts x Tsunami x Abduction x In-adequate x Food Poisoning/ Water maintenance Poisoning
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4.6 IMPLEMENTATION
4.6.1 Schedule implementation of Code of practice for ERDMP
The following table presents the Haldia Refinery status and Code of practices for Implementation of various activities.
Table 4.2 Code of practices for Implementation of various activities S. No Activity Implementation Time Status from the Notification date of Codes of Practices for ERDMP 1. On-site Emergency 3 months Complied Plan 2. Off-Site Emergency 3 months Complied Plan 3. Resources in position 6 months Complied 4. Accredited Third party 1 year In process Certification of ERDMP 5. Testing and Mock Drills 3 months Complied (On-Site) 6. Testing and Mock Drills 12 months Complied (Off-Site)
4.7 PRE-EMERGENCY PLANNING
4.7.1 Hazard Identification The first stage is to identify the potential incidents that could lead to the release of a hazardous material from its normal containment and result in a major accident. This is achieved by a systematic review of the facilities to determine where a release of a hazardous material could occur from various parts of the installation.
4.7.2 Hazards to the installation
Table 4.3: Hazards to Haldia Refinery Explosion Cyclone Sabotage Failure of Critical Control Outbreak of disease Bomb threat system Design deficiency Excessive rains War/Hit my missiles Unsafe Acts Tsunami Abduction In-adequate Food/Water poisoning maintenance
4.7.3 Risk Assessment The second step is to determine the risk of an incident associated with each hazard. The Quantitative Risk Assessment study for the proposed BS-VI Phase – 1 project is done and presented in Chapter – 3 of Risk Assessment report.
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The basic procedure in a risk analysis shall be as follows:
(a) identify potential failures or incident s (including frequency) ; (b) calculate the quantity of material that may be released in each failure, estimate the probability of such occurrences; (c) evaluate the consequences of such occurrences based on scenarios such as most probable and worst case events; (d) the combination of consequences and probability will allow the hazards to be ranked in a logical fashion to indicate the zones of important risk. Criteria should then be established by which the quantified level of risk may be considered acceptable to all parties concerned; (e) after assessing the risk, the "maximum tolerable criterion" must be defined and above which the risk shall be regarded as intolerable. Whatever be the benefit level must be reduced below this level; (f) the risk should also be made "as low as reasonably practicable" (ALARP) and least impacting the neighbourhood. While conducting the risk analysis, a quantitative determination of risk involves three major steps:-
IRPA (Individual Risk per Annum)
IRPA Fundamental improvements needed. Intolerable Only to be considered if there are no alternatives and people are well informed 10-3/yr Too high, significant effort required to improve 10-4/yr The ALARP or Tolerable High, investigate alternatives region (Risk is tolerated only)
10-5/yr Low, consider cost-effective alternatives Broadly Acceptable region (no need for detailed working to 10-6/yr demonstrate ALARP) Negligible, maintain normal precautions
Fig 4.1: Individual Risk
NOTE- a risk of 10 per million per year, or 10-5/Year, effectively means that any person standing at a point of this level of risk would have a 1 in 100 000 chance of being fatally injured per year.
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The risks of the proposed new units in IOCL Haldia Refinery may be expressed from two perspectives: (1) the risk to individuals and (2) the risk to groups of people. These are referred to, respectively, as individual and societal risk. Table 4.4: Selected failure cases for the RA study are as follows:
S. Unit Line/Equipment Failure Case Failure Mode Consequence No 1. Cold feed inlet to fresh Hole 10 mm & Credible Jet fire, UVCE feed Coalescer drum 25 mm (201-V-01) line 2. Feed Surge drum (201- Hole 10 mm & Credible Jet fire, UVCE V-02) to HHPS feed 25 mm exchanger line 3. Reactor (201-R-01) 25% gasket Credible Jet fire, UVCE outlet line failure 4. RGC Instrument tubing Instrument tubing Non- Credible Jet fire, UVCE full bore failure 5. Stripper (201-C-02) Hole 10 mm & Credible Jet fire, UVCE outlet line 25 mm DHDT 6. Naptha feed surge drum Drum Non- Credible Fire ball (201-V-18) Catastrophic failure 7. Sweet gas knock out Drum Non- Credible Fire ball drum 201-V-20 Catastrophic failure 8. Diesel product a. Hole 10 mm & a. Credible Jet fire, UVCE coalescer o/l line to 25 mm b. Non- hyrdo treated diesel b/l b. 20% Cross Credible Sectional Area (CSA) failure line rupture 9. Flashed vapor from a. Hole 10 mm & a. Credible Jet fire, UVCE flash drum line to SRU 25 mm b. Non- incinerator line b. Full bore failure Credible 10. Amine regenerator Hole 10 mm & 25 Credible Jet fire, UVCE, reflux drum to SRU Line mm ARU failure
11. Drum 208-V-02 Drum Non- Credible Jet fire, UVCE, Catastrophic Fire ball failure 12. Sour Naphtha feed to Hole 10 mm & 25 Credible Jet fire, UVCE, super heater line mm 13. Pump (92-P-01A/B) a. Discharge line Credible Jet fire, UVCE, flange 25% gasket failure. HGU-II b. Pump mechanical seal failure 14. Super heated sweet a. Hole 10 mm & a. Credible Jet fire, UVCE Naphtha feed to 25 mm b. Non- Desulphuriser line Credible
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S. Unit Line/Equipment Failure Case Failure Mode Consequence No b. 20% CSA failure line rupture 15. Process gas from a. Hole 25mm Credible Jet fire, UVCE, Boiler to HTS Reactor b. 25% line flange gasket failure 16. Feed to PSA Unit a. Hole 10 mm & a. Credible Jet fire, UVCE 25 mm b. Non- b. 20% CSA Credible failure line rupture 17. Prime G Pump 87-P-01A/B line a. Hole 25mm Credible Jet fire, UVCE, to FCC Feed line b. Pump discharge line 25% flange gasket failure 18. SHU Reactor O/L line a. Hole 10 mm a. Credible Jet fire, UVCE b. 20% CSA b. Non- failure line rupture Credible 19. FCC Gasoline Splitter a. Hole 25mm a. Credible Jet fire, UVCE outlet Line failure b. Full bore failure b. Non- Credible 20. Reflux drum 87-B-02 Drum Non- Credible Jet fire, UVCE, failure Catastrophic Fire ball failure 21. Stripper (207-CC-01) a. Hole 10 mm & Credible Toxic Release overhead to H2SO4 plant 25 mm Line failure. SWS Unit 22. Stripper (207-CC-01) to Line Rupture Non- Credible Toxic Release Pump (207-PA-02A/B) Line failure 23. ARU gas incoming line a. Hole 10 mm & a.Credible Toxic Release to SA plant 25 mm b. 20% b. non credible CSA failure line rupture 24. SWS gas incoming line a. Hole 10 mm & a.Credible Toxic Release Sulphuric to SA plant 25 mm b. non credible Acid b. 20% CSA Plant failure line rupture 25. Fuel gas incoming line a. Hole 10 mm & a.Credible Jet fire, UVCE to SA plant 25 mm b. non credible b. Full bore rupture
Iso-risk contours have been plotted by PHAST Risk Micro software, Version-6.70 (Latest) of M/s DNV Technica, which is shown in Annexure 1A & 1B of RA report. Iso-risk contour have been plotted by considering existing facilities and other allied facilities. It may be inferred from the Iso-risk contours that acceptable limit of individual risk of 1.0x10-6 per year remains mainly confined within the plant premises. It is also observed from FN curve (Annexure-1C) that Societal Risk is in ALARP or tolerable range. Hence, it may be concluded that with the normal
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operation, plant may be considered safe from environmental risk point of view. 4.8 EMERGENCY MITIGATION MEASURES
4.8.1 Resource Mobilization
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4.8.2 Incident preventing measures and procedures HSE Policy of Haldia Refinery lays strong emphasis on Safety implementations with having a well-established Safety Management system. Safety awareness is propagated through structured programs and various procedures are implemented to prevent incidents as mentioned below through SHE policy.
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4.8.2.1 SHE Policy
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4.8.2.2 Safety Committees At Haldia Refinery the following safety committees have been constituted: a. Management Safety Committee b. Loss Control Tour c. Safety Ambassador a. Management Safety Committee The management safety committee has been constituted to review the performance and lapses in the safety affairs of the company. The meeting is done monthly and chaired by the Executive Director of Haldia Refinery. This meeting is being attended by all the Dept. heads and Sr.Manager as member. The minutes of the meeting is prepared by the HS&E and circulated to all concerned for necessary action at their end. The compliance status is being followed up by HS&E and reviewed the next meeting. b. Loss Control Tour: To check the safety points at the different operational area Loss Control Tour is conducted. Loss control tour is done by middle management everyday in a month. In addition to general awareness on safety they generates the report and sent to management for corrective actions which again addressed in the SCSM for various safety lapses in different area. c. Safety Ambassador: As a part of safety culture in the plant the concept of “Safety Ambassador” choosing people from the respective units are formed. The role of the safety ambassador is to monitor the various safety aspects in the units and accordingly giving feedback to the management from time to time with the corrective actions taken. 4.8.2.3 Safety audits Safety audits through systematic checks and critical appraisal of potential hazards involving operating personnel/process plant/ off site areas etc. are very helpful in assessing effectiveness of existing safety measures in these areas. To meet this requirement, Haldia Refinery has established a multi-disciplinary safety audit team to assess the safety requirement specially covering the following areas: Fire protection system Accident prevention/ safety practices Operating procedures Maintenance & Inspection practices Accordingly internal safety audits are being carried out on regular basis and time bound action plan for implementation of accepted recommendations are drawn. In addition high level safety audits by external safety team experts in the field are also
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being carried out. The safety audit cell of Head quarter, monitors and keeps a close follow up on the implementation of the recommendations.
4.8.2.4 Work Permit system: The refinery follows a very elaborate Work permit system as described below. The system is strictly as per OISD-105. Following work permits are existing at Haldia Refinery. Table 4.5: Types of Work Permit Systems S. No Type of Permit Description 1. Fire permit Any work, which can produce sufficient heat to ignite the combustible/inflammable mixture in atmosphere 2. Excavation permit For digging, cutting of the road. 3. Electric isolation and de- To work on any electrical line/equipment energization permit or associated facilities 4. Vessel entry point To entry of a man into vessel or for nay Maintenance job in a pressure vessel 5. Vehicle entry permit For the entry of vehicles inside the battery area (Hazardous zone) 6. “Working at Height” permit To work at height 7. Radiation permit To work with ionization radiations such as radiography.
4.8.2.5 Gas detection equipment for Gas leakages Latest gas detection equipment are available in the refinery to monitor the environment on continuous basis as well as on grab sampling method. IOC also planning to install Hydrocarbon gas detectors in the various operating areas. Table 4.6: Detection equipment available in the refinery Detector/Analyzer Area where available Numbers available CDU-I, CDU-II, CRU, MSQ, VBU, HGUs, Hydrocarbon detector OHCU, FCCU, TPS, 351 OM&S, DHDS, Propane Bullet area Hydrogen detector HGUs 98 H2S ground level SRU, DHDS, OHCU, 155 monitor DHDT Control rooms of process units, OM&S, sub Smoke detector 1123 stations, TPS, QC lab, Admin Building CO analyzer FCCU 4 Dragger tune (portable Different locations CO: 09; H2S: 76; Responder) for Cl2, SO2: 13; Cl2: 10 H2S, CO and SO2
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4.8.2.6 Fire protection facilities at Haldia Refinery Haldia Refinery is well equipped in tackling any eventual fire or emergency scenario. Refinery is flanked with a fire water network of around 42kms of fire water pipelines spread all over the refinery to give adequate fire water coverage of each part of the refinery. The fire water network of Haldia refinery has been designed on the basis of double fire contingency which meets the demand of 4 hours aggregate pumping capacity. The network has been designed in line with OISD-116 requirement having loop (ring main) design to ensure multi directional flow and adequate pressure. Table 4.7: List of Portable Fire Extinguishers
4.8.2.7 Fire water Storage
There are 3 nos. of MS open roof tanks each of capacity 9000 m3 aggregating total capacity of 27000 m3. The existing storage tanks can be continuously replenished by diverting water supply from PHE water reservoirs at the rate of 1000m3/hr in addition to the continuous supply from ETP.
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4.8.2.8 Fire water pumps
Requirement and selection of type of pumps in Haldia refinery is to cater water demand considering double fire contingency inside refinery and also in line with OISD-116. There are total 6 main fire water pumps out of which 3 are electrical driven and 3 are diesel driven. The discharge capacity of each pump is 1000 m3/hr with 120 m head (Discharge pressure: 12 kg/cm2). All pumps are having auto start facility in sequence with the help of PLC installed in Control room depending upon pressure and flow requirement. Additionally 2 jockey pumps each of discharge capacity of 300m3/hr with a discharged head of 135m have been provided. The firewater network is kept pressurized all the time at minimum of 7kg/cm2 at the remotest point of the network by continuous running of one jockey pump. All the pumps are having remote operation facility from fire station control room as well as the local operation from field. The diesel engines can be started remotely from control room in case of power failure. Power supply to these pump motors has been given from two separate feeders. A direct feeder dedicated only to fire water pumps has been from the substation 14 to ensure reliable power supply.
4.8.2.9 Fire Hydrants and Monitors Around 1020 numbers of double outlet type fire hydrants and 280 single headed fire hydrants are provided through out the ring main in the refinery. Any fire can be covered by at least two hydrants. In addition to fire hydrants, total 339 nos. of ground water monitor have been installed throughout the refinery in the units and long the road side to give wide coverage to the facilities. Monitors of 78 nos have been provided at elevated locations inside the unit area to cover unapproachable facility locations.
4.8.2.10 Long range foam cum water monitors Earlier 27 nos. of variable flow 1000/2000 GPM long range foam cum water monitors were installed in the fire water network at strategic locations. Another 100 nos. of variable flow HVLR monitors 33 nos. 1000-2000 GPM for process units (24 manually operated and 9 remotely operated), 55 nos. 2000-4000 GPM for off-site (38 manual and 17 remote operated) and 12 nos. 500-1000 GPM GPM manual operated for off-site are being installed on the network at strategic locations to cater foam demand in case of two large tank fires (sunken rook condition).
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In addition to above, two nos. of 1000-2000 GPM trolley mounted HVLR monitors are also available in refinery which can be towed to any locations for fulfilling the requirement of remote foam application.
4.8.2.11 Fire protection of Storage tanks: Semi – fixed foam system: It has been provided on 29 nos. floating roof tanks storing Class ‘A’ and Class ‘B’ petroleum products & 99 nos. of fixed roof tanks storing Class ‘A’ and Class ‘B’ petroleum products in line with OISD-116.
4.8.2.12 Firefighting facilities in Captive Power Plant
CO2 type fire extinguishers have been provided in the Turbo generator & Gas turbine area. Dry powder type of extinguishers have been provided in Power plant at strategic locations. In addition fire hydrants are provided within the power plant at strategic locations.
Table 4.8: Address & Location of other Fire services shall be contacted during a disaster S. Fire service Organization Tel No. Contact person No 1 West Bengal Fire serives, 03224-252500/100 Sh.M Maity Haldia station officer 2 Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd, 03224- Sh. Asit Mitra CM Haldia 275916/9434300135 (fire services) 3 PHB Pipelines, pipelines 03224- Sh. Sandip Sarker division, IOCL, Haldia 644005/9434743207 Chief Operation manager 4 Mitsubishi PTA company 03224- Sh. S Basu, Ltd., Haldia 278102/275572/ Head HSE 981017636
4.9 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MEASURES 4.9.1 Emergency Drills and Mock Exercises. To evaluate the thoroughness and effectiveness of an ERDMP, it is necessary to conduct periodic table top exercises full-scale or announced, and unannounced drills. Each site should hold drills on the night shifts, change shifts as well as during the day as mandated. Drills should present a variety of Emergency scenarios and designed to challenge each segment of the organization. Limited scale drills are useful and should be used by Chief of each Support Service to train his own team. Plans should be made to have periodic mass casualty exercises. These exercises should attempt to simulate as closely as possible a fire, explosion, or toxic
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agent release and comparison of the prescribed time lines and the actual received. The warning system, first aid, evacuation procedures and the definitive treatment procedures should all be tested periodically. Some of the drills should also include the participation of outside groups and agencies such as police, fire companies, ambulance service, civil defence organizations and mutual aid groups. Testing and mock drills for onsite emergency plan shall be carried once in three months and for offsite emergency plan twelve months. For other installations, the mock drill shall be carried out once a year. However, for locations having more than one industry member, the annual mock drill can be carried out by one industry member in turn, thus ensuring one mock drill in every year at the location. These mock drills will enable the unit/location to assess the capability of the individual and performance as a group. The frequent discussions and drills will help in eliminating the confusion and shortcomings, if any. Each Mock Drill should be recorded with observations and deficiencies to be rectified within 24 hours. Table 4.9: Disaster Drills and Frequency S. No Activities Reference Frequency Status 1. Fire Mock Drill OISD-116 Once in a month Being followed 2. On-Site MSIHC Rules- Once in 6 month Being followed disaster drill 1987 Once in 3 month Being followed Internal advice 3. Off-site MSIHC Rules- Once in a year Being followed disaster drill 1987
4.9.2 Training An ERDMP shall be easier to use if training material and general philosophy on emergency prevention and control are kept separate from the working plan. Training shall be imparted to all the personnel likely to be involved directly or indirectly to the emergencies including employees, contract workers, transport crew and security personnel. Contract personnel and contract labourer shall be allowed to start work only after clearance of attending and passing safety training. Refresher training shall be conducted at regular intervals. The basic requirements of Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 pertaining to dangerous or hazardous goods transport must be complied by the transporters.
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For this the loading station must conduct training of tank truck crew as per the requirement under Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Training to all contract workers is mandatory before entering inside refinery and to achieve the goal daily training is organized. A dedicated training hall for contractor workers has been made near gate no.2 Training to contract supervisors is given as per OISD-154. The course content includes knowledge of petroleum product and their hazardous property, prevention of fire/accident and safety precautions etc., In addition, fire and safety gives safety talks / demonstration of use of Personnel Protective Equipments (PPEs) before commencement of critical nature of job viz. man entry to a vessel tank, sewage manhole etc.
4.9.3 Mutual Aid. Since combating major emergencies might be beyond the capability of individual unit, it is essential to have mutual aid arrangements with neighbouring industries. Consideration shall be given to the following while preparing mutual aid arrangements:- Written mutual aid arrangements are to be worked out to facilitate additional help in the event of Level-II emergencies by way of rendering manpower, medical aid or firefighting equipments, etc. The mutual aid arrangement shall be such that the incident controller of the affected installation shall be supported by neighbouring industries on call basis for the support services materials and equipments already agreed. Further, all such services deputed by member industry shall work under the command of the site incident controller of the affected installation. Mutual aid associations shall conduct regular meetings, develop written plans and test the effectiveness of their plans by holding drills. Drills are essential to establish a pattern for operation, detect weaknesses in communications, transportation and training. Periodic drills also develop experience in handling problems and build confidence in the organization. To make the emergency plan a success, the following exchange of information amongst the member organizations of mutual aid association is considered essential: - (i) The types of hazards in each installation and firefighting measures. (ii) List of all the installations or entities falling along the routes of transport vehicles carrying petroleum or petroleum products. (iii) The type of equipment, that would be deployed and procedure for making the replenishment.
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(iv) Written procedures which spell out the communication system for help and response. This is also required to get acquainted with operation of different firefighting equipment available at mutual aid members and compatibility for connecting at users place. (v) Familiarization of topography and drills for access and exit details carried out by mutual aid members.
4.10 EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
In case of tow contingencies simultaneously, GM (T)/GM (TS) will act as Chief incident Controller for second contingency and alternate site coordinators shall respond for second contingency. Disaster Control room and chief main coordination group shall be common for both the contingencies. In the absence of main co-ordinators, successor shall respond to first contingency and second contingency shall be attended by second line of successors as mentioned below:
Overall objectives of an emergency control organization shall be: (a) to promptly control problems as they develop at the scene. (b) to prevent or limit the impact on other areas and off-site. (c) to provide emergency personnel, selecting them for duties compatible with their normal work functions wherever feasible. The duties and functions assigned to various people shall include making full use of existing organizations and service groups such as fire, safety, occupational health, medical, transportation, personnel, maintenance, and security. (d) Employees must assume additional responsibilities as per laid down procedure of ERDMP whenever an emergency alarm sounds. In setting up the organization, the need for round-the-clock coverage shall be essential. Shift personnel must be prepared to take charge of the emergency control functions or emergency shutdown of system, if need be, until responsible personnel arrive at the site of emergency. The organization should have an alternate arrangement for each function. The organogram chart is presented below:
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Fig 4.2: Organization Chart of Haldia Refinery
4.10.1 Roles and Responsibilities
4.10.1.1 RESPONSIBILITIS OF OVERALL CO-ORDINATOR ED/GM (HS&E)
a. Decision of Declaring on site Disaster Drill by chief coordinator should be intimated to unit head. b. Unit head will receive necessary input from chief coordinator /disaster control room from time to time and guide chief coordinator as desired. c. In addition to normal communication channel unit head will communicate with top level management at head quarter of refinery / pipe line / marketing as necessary. d. Unit head will facilitate coordinating with higher government authorities for seeking any help required. e. Any information to press or to any outside agency should cleared by unit head.
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f. He will ensure assistant from mutual aid partners. g. Unit head should be kept informed about causalities and he will ensure that necessary medical attention is given to causalities in time. h. In case Disaster is beyond control and which may convert to offsite disaster .Unit head should be consulted by the chief coordinator before communicating district authority. i. Unit head will conduct close out meeting with all coordinators after control of disaster. 4.10.1.2. RESPONSIBILITIES OF CHIEF CO-ORDINATORS GM(T) / GM(TS)
a. Establish emergency control Room. b. Mobilize all coordinators; assemble at Emergency Control Room, size up the situation and to put the disaster control plan in action. c. Declare the danger zone. d. Inform ED / GM (HS&E) about the incident, magnitude of disaster, combating operation and no. of casualties. e. Monitor progress of disaster control activities along with rescue operation, hospital treatment & welfare measures. f. Arrange foam from other sources if required. g. Ask help from Govt. bodies and other bodies like air force, civil defence, pollution control board, district medical team after consultation with ED / GM (HS&E). h. Approve the release of information to press and pass on information to Government agencies through welfare and public relation co-ordinator. i. Keep liaison with HQ. j. Advise finance coordinator for release of fund for emergency procurement as per situation. k. Decide for actuation for OFF-SITE DISASTER CONTROL PLAN after consultation with ED/GM(HS&E)
4.10.1.3 RESPONSIBILITIES OF INCIDENT CONTROL CO-ORDINATOR DGM (PN) / DGM (TS) -SG
a. Liaise with Chief co-ordinator and respective plant in-charge from field for safe shutdown of the process units which are likely to be affected. b. Instruct for isolation of tanks if not isolated at the time of fire. c. Instruct for isolation of tank farms by closing OWS dyke valves/surface drain valves.
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d. Instruct to commission of water spray nozzle system on probable affected equipment tanks. e. Contact TPS to arrange and ensure availability of Power & Utilities 4.10.1.4 RESPONSIBILITIES OF FIRE FIGHTING COORDINATOR DGM-FS/CMFS
a. Arrange to sound disaster warning siren after consultation with DGM (PN) and inform RSM. b. In-charge of entire firefighting and safety operations. Place the fire vehicle, from neighbouring industries, at strategic locations. c. Will give Requisition for necessary resources/manpower from Mutual aid partners WB fire/KoPT fire/CISF personnel. d. Deploy necessary manpower from Refinery employee at strategic locations to control the disaster within a minimum time. e. Monitor the inventory of firefighting materials like foam and will contact material co-ordinator through chief co-ordinator for uninterrupted supply from stores and other sources to the fire spot. f. Impart necessary guidance to the rescue team for safe evacuation of affected persons. g) Monitor the fire water tank level and will contact tube well co- ordinator for uninterrupted supply of water to fire water tank. 4.10.1.5 RESPONSIBILITIES OF RESCUE, REPAIR , SALVAGE AND DECONTAMINATION CO-ORDINATOR GM(PJ)/DGM(PJ)—AT DCR , DGM(MN)CMNM-ML—AT EMERGENCY SPOT, DGM(TS)-AK /DGM(HSE) AT EMERGENCY SPOT
a. Evacuate the affected/dead persons from the fire spot and safe carriage to ambulance. b. Mobilize a team from all disciplines to assist firefighting co-ordinator. c. Arrange to isolate the live electrical lines as necessary. d. Make arrangements for repair of damaged roads and culverts. e. Arrange to repair the damaged electrical / instruments lines. f. Arrange to maintain air conditioner service at hospital for emergency burned patients. g. Arrange to supply power by running generator set at Hospital, in case of power failure. h. Assist firefighting Co-ordinator to stop leakage of toxic chemicals. i. Organize to remove the leaky drums/ cylinders to a comparatively safer place. j. Organize for immediate neutralization of the toxic chemical coming out through the leaks.
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k. Keep in touch with CQCM for any kind of assistance w.r.t. preparation of chemicals for neutralization, supply of chemicals, transportation at site etc. 4.10.1.6 RESPONSIBILTIES OF COMMUNICATION CO-ORDINATOR: DGM ( P&U) / CMNM-EL
a. In-charge of entire communication system: — telephones (internal & external) — arrange manning of fixed wireless sets, Walkie -talkie sets at Refinery. — distribute the walkie-talkie sets to all the co-ordinators b. Ensure mobilization of total crew: resources as above for immediate repairing-restoring of communication. c. Organize messenger service. d. Liaison with P&T Deptt. for quicker communication with desired places.
4.10.1.7 RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEDICAL CO-ORDINATOR CMO/ACMO
a. Mobilize medical and para-medical team internally. b. Arrange ambulance to transfer causalities to first aid centre and hospital c. Arrange to shift the patients to other/mutually aid Hospitals in consultation with Chief co-ordinator. d. Advise supply co-ordinator for procurement of additional drugs/appliances from Kolkata on emergency basis. e. Maintain casualty register (type of injury, number etc. including hospitalization) and will co-ordinate with police for completing the formalities. f. Monitor the treatment of patients admitted at different Hospitals. g. Arrange to shift burn injury patient to burn ward.
4.10.1.8. RESPONSIBILITIES OF ENGINEERING CO-ORDINATOR DGM (ES,IP) /CESM
a. Promptly arrange for renting hiring equipment and labour to meet emergency requirement. b. Provide all engineering help needed by fire Brigade / Govt. agencies on the request of chief-co-ordinator. c. Arrange for urgent fabrication jobs from outside agencies, if required. 4.10.1.9 RESPONSIBILITIES OF SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR DC / AC (CISF)
a. Will mobilize manpower for assistance to firefighting co-ordinators and rescue operations. b. Will allow only authorized personnel/vehicles c. Will arrange for regulating the traffic inside the Refinery premises. d. Will guide Fire tenders of mutual aid partners and others to the incident location.
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e. Will allow only authorized personnel/vehicles f. Will arrange for regulating the traffic inside the Refinery premises. g. Will guide Fire tenders of mutual aid partners and others to the incident location. h. Will arrange to evacuate all unwanted contract personnel and contract vehicle from inside the Refinery. i. Will arrange for police help for control traffic and public. j. Will assist for transportation of firefighting equipment from stores to fire spot. k. To contact S. P. (Purba Medinipur), Haldia Police Station. l. Cordon off oil spill areas & restrict vehicle movement. m. Render Assistance for debris removal, Damage Building Material Remove, Rescue of trapped persons, Road Blockage Clearance Emergency Supply of Food& Water etc. 4.10.1.10 RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUPPLY CO-ORDINATOR DGM(MAT & CC) / CMTM(S)
a. Procure tire fighting equipment and foam on cash basis if required. b. Procure medicines and first-aid items on cash basis after consultations with CMO c. Arrange to issue materials to the authorized persons of various co-ordinators.
4.10.1.11 RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSPORT/WELFARE/PUBLIC RELATION AND MEDIA CO-ORDINATOR GM(HR)/CM(A&W)
a. Arrange all transport facilities for various activities. b. Arrange for sufficient drinking water. c. Arrange to communicate with relatives of the affected persons. d. Arrange for foods for persons involving firefighting and related activities. e. Inform statutory bodies and Govt. agencies about the nature, magnitude of disaster in consultation with chief Co- ordinator. f. Assist chief Coordinator in other related matters as per needs. g. Assist for operation of petrol pumps for fuelling of fire fighting vehicles as per requirement.
4.10.1.12 RESPONSIBILITIES OF POWER & UTILITIES COORDINATOR CPUM/SPUM a. Ensure the necessary supply of water to fire tanks from tube wells/Geaonkhali reservoir/PHE. b. Ensure supply of raw water and drinking water for meeting the requirements.
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c. Constant follow up for quick and immediate repair of tube wells as per the need of the situation. d. Mobilize the manpower for running of tube wells as per requirements. e. Ensure for supply of power to fire water pump motors and Refinery lighting system. 4.10.1.13 RESPONSIBILITIES OF FINANCE & INSURANCE COORDINATOR DGM(F)/CFM(KG):
a. Arrange to release finance to emergency purchase on the advice of chief Coordinator b. Take care of insurance formalities and assess the damage. c. Information to customs/ excise regarding the nature, magnitude and type of damage in consultation with chief Coordinator. 4.10.1.14 WORK INCIDENT CO-ORDINATOR: CPNMs/RSM a. Coordinate with DGM (PN) and Plant —in-charge from field for safe shut down of the respective units which are likely to be affected. b. Instruct for isolation of tank and equipments in case of fire. c. Contact TPS to arrange and ensure availability of Power & Utilities.
4.11 DECLARATION OF ON-SITE AND OFF-SITE EMERGENCIES
1. An emergency starts as a small incident which may become a major incident with passage of time. At the initial stages, the emergency organisation chart shall be put into action. If the incident goes beyond control, the on-site emergency plan will be actuated by the chief incident controller at the appropriate stage as considered necessary. 2. During idle shift or holidays, the security personnel will combat the incident as per the ERDMP organisation chart and at the same time inform various emergency controllers for guidance and control the situation. 3. When emergency becomes catastrophic and evacuation beyond the plant premises is considered necessary by the chief incident controller, the situation will be handed over to district authority for implementing the off-site emergency plan. 4. The management of emergency henceforth has to be controlled by the district crisis management group under the supervision of the District Collector/DDMA. 5. In addition to preparation of on-site emergency plan, furnishing relevant information to the district authorities for the preparation of off-site emergency
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plan is a statutory responsibility of the occupier of every industry handling hazardous substance. 4.11.1 FOR ON-SITE DISASTER: COMMUNICATION TO OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS
Information To Neighboring Industries HPL, MCCPTA, CPT, HUL, IOC (Mktg) and Coast guard /Civic Authority 1 State Authority SDO, SDPO and SDMO, VVB,Fire Services. CISF For Fire, Toxic Gas Release : Manpower Fire Fighting Equipment & Resources to ask for material Vehicles. Personal Protective Equipments, Medical Assistance Communication Wireless communication from KoPT to other agencies Note: A Mutual Aid Agreement for the period of five years has been signed between IOCL, HPL, MCCPTA, and PHBPL which is being renewed at every five years
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Fig 4.3: Communication Chart
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Fig 4.4: Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan
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4.12 MEDICAL FACILITIES
(A) First Aid Centre: There is a full-fledged round the clock manned First Aid Centre inside the refinery near the main gate. The location of First Aid Centre is prominent and known to all. (B) Arrangement and facilities i) At First Aid Centre a) Equipment • Oxygen Cylinder and concentrator • Face mask • Suction apparatus • Ambu bag • Stretcher • Dressing materials • 2 bed observation room • 1 bed critical care • Wheel chair-2 • Trolly on wheel-1 • Freeze-1 • Sterilizer-1 • Glucometer-I • Pulse Oxymeter-I • Weighing machine • Vision Testing box • Stitching material b) Emergency medicine • Emergency lifesaving drugs for treatment of minor Injuries • Comprehensive medicines for Disaster Management are available at Refinery Hospital. c) Decontamination / bath tub facilities • Decontamination facilities are available d) Ambulance Vans • There is one AC Ambulance Van, which remains available round the clock equipped with stretcher, Oxygen cylinder & mask & First aid kit. ii) At township Hospital (8km from Refinery) A full-fledged 24 bed hospital is in the refinery township which is about 8km away from refinery site.
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1. Stretcher and wheel chair 2. ECG Machine 3. Defibrillator 4. Ambu bag 5. Pulse oximeter 6. Endotrachal intubation set 7. LMA 8. Tracheostony set 9. Infusion pump 10. Audiometer 11. Operation theatre 12. Lung function machine 13. Emergency medicnes 14. Ambulance vans 15. Pharmacy/Dispensary 16. X-Ray room
Table 4.10: Strength of Medical staff
S. No Description Number 1. Doctors 06 2. Nursing staff 10 3. Pharmacist 06 4. Lab technician 02 5. X-ray technician 01 6. Hospital Attendant: Male & 05 Female 08 7. Industrial Hygienist (OHC) 01 8. Nurse (OHC) 01
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Annexure – 1: Iso Risk Contour
Annexure 1A, the Iso risk contour for 1 x 10-6 Risk level is plotted based on the consequence analysis with failure frequencies and assumptions made on probability of ignition sources and population in Risk analysis study in the plant during Day and Night conditions.
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Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
Annexure – 1: Iso Risk Contour
Annexure 1B, the Iso risk contour for 1 x 10-6 Risk level is plotted based on the consequence analysis with failure frequencies and assumptions made on probability of ignition sources and population (nearby Admin, Canteen etc.,) in Risk analysis study in the plant during Day and Night conditions.
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Risk Assessment study for BS-VI Fuel Quality Upgradation Phase-1 at Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia Refinery
F-N CURVE
Annexure 1C: Frequency (F) vs Number of Fatalities (N) [F-N] Curve for the proposed units at IOCL Haldia Refinery
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