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Iraq – Kirkuk – Communal Violence – Security Situation – Insurgents

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Iraq – Kirkuk – Communal Violence – Security Situation – Insurgents Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: IRQ35259 Country: Iraq Date: 11 August 2009 Keywords: Iraq – Kirkuk – Communal violence – Security situation – Insurgents This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Question 1. Please provide a brief update on the situation since 2005 in Kirkuk addressing ethnic tensions, with a focus on what groups in Kirkuk are anti-US and whether they are launching attacks from there. RESPONSE 1. Please provide a brief update on the situation since 2005 in Kirkuk addressing ethnic tensions, with a focus on what groups in Kirkuk are anti-US and whether they are launching attacks from there. Introduction On 30 June 2009 the United States withdrew its military forces from the city of Kirkuk as part of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The withdrawal would not appear to be total. Reporting on the various withdrawals which occurred at this time the American Forces Press Service reported that: “The departing American brigades and battalions leave behind a significantly smaller contingent of US trainers and advisors in the cities, where Iraqi forces now have primary authority”. The US also maintains a significant presence outside the city of Kirkuk, including the “1st Cavalry Division’s 2nd Heavy Brigade”, whose primary “objective in Kirkuk is to focus on developing ethnic interactions to enhance community relationships”. Even so, several commentators have expressed concern about the future of security in Kirkuk in the lead up to, and aftermath of, the US military’s withdrawal from the city. A number of major bomb attacks occurred in Kirkuk during the transition period and ongoing attacks upon US forces and Iraqi police were also reported. This noted, the primary concern of much of the commentary on the US withdrawal from Kirkuk has been not the insurgency but the build up in Kirkuk of Iraqi military personnel, on the one hand, and Kurdish militia (peshmerga) forces, on the other, as both the Iraqi central government and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) maneuver for control of the oil rich and ethnically mixed city. A number of stand-offs have already reportedly taken place (for information on the withdrawal and the SOFA agreement, see: Knights, M. 2009, ‘Iraq Withdrawal Deadline: Subtle Shift in U.S. Mission’, Policy Watch, Washington Institute website, no.1544, 26 June http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3082 – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 7; for the ongoing US presence in the vicinity of Kirkuk, see: Kruzel, J.J. 2009, ‘As U.S. Meets Withdrawal Deadline, Baghdad Declares Holiday’, Elites TV, source: American Forces Press Service, 30 June http://elitestv.com/pub/2009/06/as-u-s-meets- withdrawal-deadline-baghdad-declares-holiday – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 8; Carden, M.J. 2009, ‘Kirkuk Progress is “Impressive,” Mullen Says’, US Department of Defense, Defenselink website, source: American Forces Press Service, 13 July http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=55105. – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 9; for concerns and bomb attacks at the time of the US withdrawal, see: Rao, P. 2009, ‘Kirkuk police chief wants US troops to stay’, Yahoo News, source: Agence France- Presse, 10 August http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20090810/pl_afp/iraqunrestussecurity – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 10; ‘Kirkuk bombed amid US pullout’ 2009, Al Jazeera, 1 July http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/07/20097135313957256.html – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 11; ‘Five Christians killed as Kirkuk archbishop questions US withdrawal’ 2009, Asia News, 4 June http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=14922 – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 12; for concerns about a possible clash between Iraqi government and Kurdish forces, see: International Crisis Group 2009, Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line, Middle East Report no.88, 8 July – Attachment 1). In terms of insurgent, or anti-US, networks operating in Kirkuk, a range of sources report that the city is affected by the activities of both Baathist nationalist fighters and Islamist militants. With regard to the latter type of group, news bulletins from Kirkuk have, in recent years, frequently reported on the arrest, capture or death of persons suspected of belonging to the Kurdish Islamist network known as Ansar al-Islam (sometimes also referenced as the Kurdistan Brigades; and formerly as Ansar al-Sunnah). Ansar al-Islam reportedly has the backing of the Al Qaeda in Iraq umbrella network. In reporting on major bomb attacks against public places (targeting civilians) in Kirkuk, some news articles have related local suspicions of an Al Qaeda in Iraq involvement. Very little information is available on the nature of the Baathist nationalist militants reported to be active in Kirkuk, though one report identifies the 1920 Revolution Brigades as one such network. Some reports relate comments to the effect that Baathist nationalist insurgents are responsible for the majority of the attacks on security forces in Kirkuk (as opposed to attacks on civilian targets, which are alleged to be the work of Islamist militants). Typically, however, little information is available on the suspected identities of the perpetrators of the various security incidents which occur in Kirkuk on an almost daily basis. Such incidents involve, most regularly, attacks on police, but attacks on US troops, Iraqi troops and peshmerga militiamen also occur in Kirkuk, as do bomb attacks on civilian targets (for an overview of such suspicions and allegations, see: Danish Immigration Service, the Danish Refugee Council & Landinfo 2009, Security and Human Rights Issues in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and South/Central Iraq (S/C Iraq) Report from the Danish Immigration Service´s (DIS), the Danish Refugee Council´s (DRC) and Landinfo’s joint fact finding mission to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, KRI; and Amman, Jordan 6 to 23 March 2009, July http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/5EAE4A3C- B13E-4D7F-99D6-8F62EA3B2888/0/Iraqreport09FINAL.pdf – Accessed 10 August 2009 – Attachment 2; and: Chulov, M. 2009, ‘Kurds lay claim to oil riches as old hatreds flare’, The Observer, 14 June – Attachment 4; for background on the presence in Kirkuk of the Islamist Ansar al-Islam and the nationalist 1920 Revolution Brigades, see: Khalil, L. 2007, ‘The Kurdistan Brigades: Al-Qaeda’s Kurdish Henchmen’, Terrorism Focus, vol.4: no.14, 18 May – Attachment 6; for raids on suspected members of Ansar al-Islam, see: Gamel, K. 2009, ‘Truck bomb kills over 70 at Iraq Shi’ite mosque’, Washington Times, source: Associated Press, 21 June http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/21/truck-bomb-at-shiite- mosque-kills-at-least-72/ – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 19; Bakri, N. 2009, ‘Truck Bomb Kills Dozens in Northern Iraq’, Washington Post, 21 June http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/06/20/AR2009062000434_pf.html – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 20; for examples of raids upon, or the arrest of, suspected Ansar al-Islam militants, see: ‘US, Iraqi forces launch major operation in Kirkuk’ 2009, International News Safety Institute website, source: Agence France-Presse, 15 April http://www.newssafety.org/index.php?view=article&catid=84%3Airaq- security&id=12814%3Aus-iraqi-forces-launch-major-operation-in- kirkuk&option=com_content&Itemid=100378 – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 21; ‘Ten Iraqi Police Killed in Kirkuk Car Bomb’ 2009, Kurdish Institute of Paris, source: Agence France-Presse, 16 April http://www.institutkurde.org/en/info/ten-iraqi-police-killed- in-kirkuk-car-bomb-1232550491.html – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 24; ‘Iraqi forces detain militants’ 2008, United Press International, 31 January http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2008/01/31/Iraqi-forces-detain-militants/UPI- 15131201813510/ – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 22; ‘Attacks kill several in northern Iraq’ 2008, United Press International, 5 March http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/03/05/Attacks-kill-several-in-northern-Iraq/UPI- 99141204724903/ – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 23; ‘Ten Iraqi Police Killed in Kirkuk Car Bomb’ 2009, Kurdish Institute of Paris, source: Agence France-Presse, 16 April http://www.institutkurde.org/en/info/ten-iraqi-police-killed-in-kirkuk-car-bomb- 1232550491.html – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 24; for examples of day-to-day attacks in Kirkuk, see: ‘Factbox-Security developments in Iraq, June 20’ 2009, Reuters, 20 June http://www.reuters.com/article/featuredCrisis/idUSANS035939 – Accessed 10 August 2009 – Attachment 5; ‘Factbox-Security developments in Iraq, July 4’ 2009, Reuters, 4 July http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSMOH445395 – Accessed 10 August 2009 – Attachment 15; and: ‘Factbox-Security developments in Iraq, July 23’ 2009, Reuters, 23 July http://www.reuters.com/article/middleeastCrisis/idUSLN220947 – Accessed 10 August 2009 – Attachment 16; and for suspicions of an Al Qaeda in Iraq hand in recent bomb attacks, see: Gamel, K. 2009, ‘Truck bomb kills over 70 at Iraq Shi’ite mosque’, Washington Times, source: Associated Press, 21 June http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/21/truck- bomb-at-shiite-mosque-kills-at-least-72/ – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 19; Bakri, N. 2009, ‘Truck Bomb Kills Dozens in Northern Iraq’, Washington Post, 21 June http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/06/20/AR2009062000434_pf.html – Accessed 11 August 2009 – Attachment 20). Source information overview On 14 June 2009 The Observer published an extensive report on the evolving situation in Kirkuk authored by The Guardian’s Baghdad correspondent Martin Chulov.
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