The First Hegelians: an Introduction by Lawrence Stepelevich

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The First Hegelians: an Introduction by Lawrence Stepelevich 12 The First Hegelians: An Introduction by Lawrence Stepelevich Taken from The Philosophical Forum, Volume 8, number 2-3-4, pp. 6-23, (1976) As an identifiable philosophic movement, Young only a trace in the persons of some prudent "Old Hegelianism endured for less than two decades, from 1830 Hegelians," such as Johann Erdmann, who, in 1866, half- to 1848. It first appeared in Feuerbach's ignored treatise, humorously referred to himself at the "letzten Gedanken uber Tod und Unsterblichkeit, and it made its Mohikaner."[4] last coherent expression in Karl Schmidt's Das Verstandestum und das Individuum. This last work The hopes of these Hegelians to engage in a free-flowing appeared anonymously in 1846, and caused as little theological and cultural dialogue was tempered, then turned concern as Feuerbach's introductory work. By 1848, "the into bitter anger or sour silence in the face of an adamant struggles of the school were ended, and it collapsed into union between a defensive church and a reactionary itself, becoming insignificant in both intellectual and monarchy. The German revolution of 1848 came too late political life."[1] In sum, the school existed between two for the Young Hegelians, and as it was not born out of hope politically eventful poles, being born in the revolutionary but of despair, it left all sides dissatisfied. In this view, year of 1830, and dying in the revolution of 1848. At its Young Hegelianism is not seen in its usual light -- as a rise, it shared the optimism of its older literary brother, confused extrapolation of Hegel's original thought carried Young Germany, for at that time the rebellion of the; on by visionary disciples of little originality - - but rather as French against the reactionary visions of their King, a graduated philosophic response to a debilitating union of Charles X, had sent a spasm of romantic hope throughout religious dogmatism and political power. the whole European intellectual community. German intellectuals were no exception, and Heine recalled that Hegel himself lived only long enough to experience the first when the news of the revolution was received, "each item few external criticisms and inner developments of his was a sunbeam, wrapped in printed paper, and together thought, a system of thought by which he had intended -- they kindled my soul into a wild glow . Lafayette, the against Kant -- to restore the dignity of metaphysics, the tricolor, the Marseillaise, -- it intoxicates me.,, Bold, ardent ideal content of religion, and the primacy of civil order. hopes spring up, like trees with golden fruit. "[2] The And so, what then had been understood to be a "Restoration long-delayed promises of the first French revolution were philosophy"[5] had yet to reveal its revolutionary potential. finally to be realized Certainly, the students of Hegel were This unwelcome revelation of the esoteric "absolute"[6] prepared to accept his charge that they "grasp the spirit of revolutionary character of Hegelianism was the vocation of the time, and each in his own place -- consciously to bring Young Hegelianism. it. from its lifeless seclusion into the light of day."[3] Just as Hegel's original thought explicitly focused upon the In 1830, all who were to become the central figures of the restoration of metaphysics, speculative theology and Young Hegelian school were young men. At 28, Arnold conservative social and political theory, so the first Ruge was their senior member, Ludwig Feuerbach was 26, arguments concerning the worth of Hegel's legacy followed Max Stirner 24, David F. Strauss 22, Bruno Bauer 21. The serially upon these same three features. A few years before rest, August von Cieskowski, Karl Schmidt, Karl Marx, and after Hegel's death, until 1835 -- the publication date of Friedrich Engels, and Edgar, the brother of Bruno Bauer, Strauss' Leben Jesu -- the debate over the value of were yet children. Of these, only the youngest members -- Hegelianism turned upon its metaphysical worth. After the as communists -- would survive 1848 with some measure Leben Jesu, and until shortly after Friedrich Wilhelm IV of social idealism. The older members, as their biographies ascended the Prussian throne in 1840, attention fixed upon indicate, found whatever solace they could in a pragmatic the theological implications of Hegelianism. By the early pessimism. Hegelianism itself would fade away, leaving 1840's, the religious debate suddenly gave way to 43 arguments concerning the political and social tent of Hegelianism, but proved that Hegel himself was an "Old" original Hegelianism. By 1848, Hegelianism was no Hegelian. longer a subject deemed worth of any further interpretive efforts. On this matter, Hegel is -- just as Goschel -- sensitive to the complaint of both rationalists and theologians that And so, within two decades, the "decomposition" -- as speculative philosophy, i.e. Hegelianism, would "by means Engels would have it -- of the original Hegelian corpus of the Notion... create another truth." This, as Hegel notes, was complete. It could well be at even Hegel, particularly is a totally mistaken view, the young Hegel of the Phenomenology of the Mind, would see in this dissolution a sad, yet comforting for in this higher sphere of thought is understood that testimony to the "portentous power of the negative." which constitutes the innermost truth -- the untruth of the Certainly, if not the young Hegel, then the Young difference between form and content, and that it is the pure Hegelians -- for they had much in common.[7] But be that form itself which seeks content."[13] as it may, it is a fact that the old Hegel was among the first to join in the defense of his doctrines against some early This essential unity of philosophical form and spiritual objections. He set out, in the Berliner Jahrbucher, to content, of Hegelianism as formulated Christinity, is the refute five separate attacks on his metaphysical principle of conservative Hegelianism, of that which came teachings.[8] He soon tired of the game, having replied, to be known as "Old Hegelianism." In this conservative somewhat contemptuously, to only two detractors, and perspective, original Hegelianism stood as the conclusion excused himself by remarking -- "must I quarrel with such of thought, and not as a premise for future action. Carl rabble?"[9] As to whether or not he would have continued Michelet, who stood in the 1840's "on the dividing line to remain aloof is a question that his unexpected death left between Old and Young Hegelians,"'[14] tried to unanswered. The task of defending the Master fell upon diplomatically unite them in order to lead them. To this his disciples, the 'epigoni', as they were first called,[10] end, he appealed to both sides that philosophy was not and they faced an ever more formidable opposition, an only "the Owl of Minerva" which introduced a night in opposition which in time did not hesitate to use the power which form and content joined, but equally a "cockcrow" of the Prussian state to make its point. which proclaimed a new dawn. But the schism had endured too long, and reached back into the very core of Among these first defenders, none was more loyal than Hegelianism itself. Michelet failed to reconcile the "hostile Carl Friedrich Goschel. He had come to Hegel's defense in brothers." 1829, with a work entitled Aphorismen uber Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen. The Aphorismen is remarkable by Young Hegelianism can be said to have made one of its reason of its exalted view of Hegel's thought, a vision earliest appearances in a letter that Ludwig Feuerbach sent which saw in Hegelianism the highest speculative to Hegel in November of 1828. The letter was enclosed expression of spiritual life, Or Christianity itself. along with a copy of his recent doctoral dissertation, De Christianity and Hegelianism were related as premise to Ratione, une, universali, infinita, and both testify to their conclusion, and to be a true Christian was to be a author's indebtedness to Hegel.[15] Feuerbach was no less Hegelian. Indeed, for, Goschel, becoming a Hegelian was fulsome than Goschel in his praise of Hegel's thought, not unlike undergoing a religious conversion, a expansively declaring it to be the "Incarnation of the pure philosophical "Pentacost," for "without a rebirth no one Logos." But still, Feuerbach took the opportunity to can rise from the sphere of natural understanding to the introduce his own perception of the import of speculative height of the living notion." Further, as the Hegelianism. To Feuerbach, the knowledge gained reward of attention, God's word could be esoterically through the study of Hegel should not merely discerned in the language of philosophy, and to find out that word, one must be directed to academic ends, but to mankind -- for at the least, the new philosophy can make the claim that it is willingly and fully transport thyself into the concepts of compelled to break through the limits of a school, and to philosophy;... be only first disposed to endure and to reveal itself as world-historical, and to be not simply the accept them, and thou will experience in thy heart their seed in every spirit of a higher literary activity, but rather life and truth, that is, their total agreement with the word to become the expressed universal spirit of reality itself, to of God, whose restatement [Uebersetzung] they are."[11] found, as it were, a new world-epoch, to establish a kingdom....There is now a new basis of things, a new Finally, and more significantly for the future of history, a second creation, where... reason will become the Hegelianism, it was defined as "the highest product of universal appearance of the thing.
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