Vernon Parker Oration Darwin's Importance to US Asia-Pacific Strategy Action, Reaction: Are Vietnam's Growing Maritime Force
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ISSUE 145 September 2012 Vernon Parker Oration Darwin’s Importance to US Asia-Pacific Strategy Action, Reaction: are Vietnam’s growing maritime forces postured toward countering China? The Role of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve: today and the future Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits? Interview - Rear Admiral Tony Parr Chief of Navy, Royal New Zealand Navy Operation Chromite and the Merits of Maritime Manoeuvre Navy Trivia - On the Beach JOURNAL OF THE Issue 145 3 Hamming it up in the 40’s Contents 1940s sailors hamming it up for the camera. Leading Seaman Stoker Francis Vernon Parker Oration, Australian Pipe (centre) pictured with mates from HMAS Sydney, probably leaving or Naval Institute – 4 August 2011 4 joining the ship. Pipe was posted off before the Sydney’s last voyage. (Photo courtesy Steven Pipe) Darwin’s Importance to US Asia-Pacific Strategy 14 Action, Reaction: are Vietnam’s growing maritime forces postured toward countering China? 16 Being There Still Matters 22 The Role of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve: today and the future 26 Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits? 35 Interview - Rear Admiral Tony Parr Chief of Navy, Royal New Zealand Navy 37 Operation Chromite and the Merits of Maritime Manoeuvre 40 Navy Trivia - On the Beach 46 VALE - Commodore John Alan “Rocker” Robertson, RAN (Rtd) 48 Qualities of Leadership – Admiral Sir Victor Alfred Trumper Smith 50 F ront page : HMS Alliance submarine set for £6.5m HMAS Newcastle (left) restoration work 62 and HMAS Warramunga at Pelorius Sound, New HDW reveals new AIP submarine Zealand, as part of the for Israel 64 Long Navigation Course Book Reviews 66 Issue Number 145 Printed by Visions from the Vault 79 Everbest Printing SPONSORS: Company - RAYTHEON - BOOZ & COMPANY - AUSTAL Style Notes for Headmark 81 ISSN 1833-6531 - THALES NAVAL GROUP - DMS MARITME - QINETIQ - ATI - SAAB Design & DTP by Diane Bricknell - AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION - LOPAC - BLOHM+VOSS NAVAL ANI Membership Application Form 83 [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute RK PA ER N O O R 4 N A T R I Vernon Parker Oration E O V Australian Naval Institute N E H 4 August 2011 This article was published in the March 2012 edition, T but with some text missing as the result of a FROM REAR ADMIRAL JAMES GOLDRICK, RAN production error. This article contains the full text. et me start with two caveats. The should explain that when I talk of a understanding how that seaborne first is that some of the arguments ‘fleet unit’, I am not describing a task trade operates or explaining just why as Land ideas which I will propose are group or task force as such, but a range well as how it should be protected. In ‘works in progress’. The second is that of capabilities which together provide doctrinal terms, I could describe much I will speak here specifically about a coherent construct that meets our of the debate in Australia as oscillating the Navy – after all, if I cannot do so maritime strategic requirements. And, historically between a focus on denial here, where can I? – but many of my while I will talk here only about the – the cliché of ‘fortress Australia’ – and comments do have applicability to the navy, the truth is that a ‘fleet unit’ also on projection – the cliché of ‘deployed other Services and to the ADF as a encompasses air and land capabilities forces in distant lands’ – while missing whole. when they have maritime application. much of the necessary link between The story of the Australian Navy It is clear that part of the issue over these two of control, which remains is one that reflects the continuing force structure has been partly due an abiding requirement for a sea strategic challenges faced by our to a difficulty in achieving national dependent nation like ours. Just what nation as it has evolved towards acceptance of the full span of our constitutes an effective ‘fleet unit’ may full independence and a greater maritime strategic requirements, which be change as a result of changes in the understanding of its place in the world. have always included both surety of the relative priorities for denial, control T he Australian And as I consider, from the basis of local and regional environment and and projection, but in the Australian destroyer HMAS studies that I have done over the years protection of the maritime networks situation there will always need to be Brisbane (DDG 41) on our carrier acquisition program, our upon which Australia’s economy some mix of all three. and the US Navy DDG acquisition and, most recently, depends. Perhaps there should be The second aspect relates to destroyer USS John the history of our various submarine little conflict between these two, but the national commitment, human S. McCain (DDG 56) cruise side by programs1, I perceive a recurrent there has been a tendency, despite and material, required to maintain side in Australian theme. It is one of critical mass and our dependence upon seaborne trade, the desired force structure. It is an waters during a struggle to sustain a level of effort to ignore its absolutely fundamental empirical observation, but I believe Operation Exercise which will be truly effective in relation importance – and the navy has not that we sit in Australia at a point Tandem Thrust 2001 to the resources that we devote to it. always been good at either fully at which the relationship between (Courtesy RAN) There are two aspects to this problem. The first is that of force structure – what I term the ‘fleet unit’ question, whereby Australia has repeatedly sought to create a force capable of meeting our strategic demands, but has often found it more expensive and difficult to sustain than the nation was willing to accept. I 1 See the author’s ‘Carriers for the Commonwealth’ in T.R. Frame, J.V.P. Goldrick & P.D. Jones (Eds) Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, 1991; J.V.P. Goldrick & P.D. Jones Struggling for a Solution: The RAN and the Acquisition of a Surface to Air Missile Capability RAN Sea Power Centre Working Paper No. 2, January 2000; James Goldrick ‘From Submersibles to SWUP: The First Seventy Five Years of Submarines in Australian Defence and Naval Policy’ 2011 Creswell Oration. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute RK PA ER N O O R N A Issue 145 5 T R I E O V N the investment required to sustain E our desired force structure and the actual combat capability realised is H T at its most unfavourable. I emphasise here that I am not talking just about the resources required to maintain ships and systems in service but those needed to experiment, to innovate, to develop doctrine and to push both technological and operational boundaries. These are the really difficult things, these are the things which involve risk and, quite frequently, failure. Indeed, the problem of critical mass relates not just to sustained funding – although that remains critical - but to the difficulty, given the complexity of our defence requirements, of generating sufficient intellectual capital to have a navy which is completely self reliant. In CAPT Dechaineux, other words, while we need multiple Government had no money and would capital ship for the Royal Navy. RADM Collins, CMDR capabilities in our order of battle, it is not until greater control of tax revenues But a ‘one off’, however generous, Rayment on bridge very hard to manage the conundrum passed to the Commonwealth after was not the same thing as an Australian HMAS Australia 1944 of generating them effectively from ten years. Nevertheless, many issues navy and others prevailed who had a national base that is too small to be were identified in what was a complex a more sophisticated understanding ideal. problem. The record of small navies of the threats to its shared sea In 2011 this remains a fundamental was not good, while many in Britain dependent interests that the British challenge and, as I go on to discuss viewed with dismay the prospect of empire faced. The Fleet Unit concept the last century, I’d ask you to bear local services which they felt would which was announced by the famous this in mind, because I believe many contribute little to the British Empire’s ‘Jacky’ Fisher, at the Imperial Defence of the difficulties in our history have global security. Others, however, Conference of 1909 provided a derived at least partly from a simplistic were coming to understand that the remarkable solution because it understanding of just what is required only way to get the new dominions to satisfied both nationalist sentiment not only to maintain a navy but to contribute significantly was to allow and – at least partly – the concerns develop it and that this naiveté has them ownership of their own forces. of Whitehall. The heavily armed, fast stemmed at least in part from our early On the locals’ part, the more that a and long ranged battle cruiser (and experiences. If I have a bumper sticker navy was thought about, the more its long range was a key factor) and for the RAN – perhaps for the ADF as formidable the commitment seemed the supporting force of light cruisers, whole - it would be ‘self awareness, not to be. Australians wanted to control destroyers and submarines was capable self reliance’ and I do not think that their own naval destiny, but they were of both offensive and defensive action our journey to full self awareness is yet becoming increasingly aware that they for denial, control and projection in the complete.