revived old grudges between the different different the between grudges old revived and tensions pre-existing reinforced fact It has in in office. term President’s the marked has that issue divisive only the not is government Issoufou’s Mahamadou by threat Haram Boko of the management The elections. February of the ahead of action freedom their of curtailing means anew as them using is regime the claim who opposition, political of the members and by society civil by condemned strongly been have measures These operates. army the in which conditions the criticizing were who of activists arrest and the demonstrations, public on aban liberties, and religious civil on restrictions in Diffa, of emergency state of a imposition the government: the by introduced being measures controversial of highly anumber to led has threat new This itself. area the and in attacks launches it which from Haram, for Boko arear-base as serves now ) capital the from km (1,360 of Diffa region InNiger, south-eastern the countries. neighbouring into influence its expand to of 2014 end the at shift and started strategic a made of Nigeria, north-east in the activities its focused initially which movement, Islamist violent The Haram. Boko by targeted heavily world, in the countries developed year, last , the least of the one Over 1 Development Index. Index. Development Niger is ranked last (188) in the UNDP Human Human UNDP the in (188) last ranked is Niger Niger on the eve of elections shadow the of BokoUnder Haram: 1 has been been has On the eve of the elections, this short short this elections, of the eve the On settlement. political country’s of the balance fragile already the endangers that of contention layer adding anew realm, political Nigerien of the components and enabled the organization of credible of credible organization the and enabled of law, rule and the democracy restoring for environment institutional an adequate created officials, and military of civilian mix a comprising government a transitional formed rapidly junta, military the up by set abody (CSRD), of Democracy Restoration for the Council Supreme The observers. international by amodel as seen was that transition apolitical into country the led Tandja Mamadou president and overthrew coup 2010, 18 amilitary On February inner circle power around the President’s transition concentration – of The aftermath of the 2010 threat. Haram Boko the tackle to designed policies his government’s latest of implications the contextualize to attempt in an mandate, ofbeginning Issoufou’s the since in Niger have developed that and instability current the underlie that highlight main aims factors to the analysis

Thibault Van Damme CRU Commentary CRU Commentary

elections.2 , the winning While this maneuver allowed him to secure presidential candidate, immediately formed a a comfortable majority within parliament government that mostly benefited members (74 seats out of 113) and to co-opt some of of his political party – the Parti Nigérien pour his most influential political adversaries, it la Démocratie et le Socialisme (PNDS) – and forced him to make important concessions – those who had supported him during the for example, grant the presidency of the elections3, but that completely left out the National Assembly to Amadou. It also proved architects of the successful transition. Key to be unsuccessful, as defections and rumors portfolios were rapidly handed out to PNDS’s of a potential parliamentary coup precluded strongmen, while less important ministries any possibility of this alliance being sustained were distributed to allied political parties. in the long term.

By completely disregarding key players of Following this failed attempt to strengthen the transitional period, the newly elected his position, the President launched the idea President provoked disillusionment within of forming a government of national unity – a population that had hoped the transition bringing together all the political parties. would result in a positive break from the He justified this plan by stressing the need previous regime. Instead, what it witnessed for the nation to unite against the threat was a continuation of the neo-patrimonial posed by Boko Haram. The plan backfired, trends that characterized the Tandja as one of the main opposition parties, presidency. The end result of this has been the Mouvement National pour la Société a loss of legitimacy with regard to Issoufou, du Développement (MNSD) led by Seini and a further widening of the gap between Oumarou,5 refused to join the government of the aging political elite (most members of the national unity, and , frustrated government emerged in the early 1990s) and by the composition of this new government, the country’s youth, who represent the vast decided to withdraw from the coalition. majority of the population. The end result was a government that, in the end, was still monopolized by the PNDS and A fragile political equilibrium now alienated most of the other Nigerien political parties. Issoufou’s reaction to this After winning the 2011 elections, Issoufou was not to work towards rebuilding trust knew that his party, occupying only one- but, instead, to adopt a more radical attitude third of the seats in the National Assembly, towards his opponents, allegedly ‘buying off’6 needed to form a political coalition in members of the opposition and interfering order to govern. He first attempted to do in judicial cases so as to exclude his most so through the creation of the Movement influential competitors from the political for the Renaissance of Niger, an alliance composed of a wide range of political parties, including that of his long-standing rival and leader of the MODEN, Hama Amadou.4

2 Chauzal, G. (2011) ‘Les règles de l’exception: la régulation (du) politique au Mali et au Niger’, 5 The MNSD-Nassara was formerly the sole political PhD thesis, Université de Bordeaux. party of Niger, led by until 2001. 3 Some of those former supporters are now openly It was then run by Hama Amadou until he was opposed to Mahamadou Issoufou. obliged to pass the leadership to Seini Oumarou 4 Hama Amadou has been a dominant figure in following corruption charges. the Nigerien political landscape since the 1980s. 6 Jeune Afrique (2015) ‘Niger: unie dans une He has been prime minister twice, under the nouvelle coalition, l’opposition exige des élections presidency of (1995–96) and transparentes’, Jeune Afrique, 18 August 2015, that of Tandja Mamadou (2000–07). After a period http://www.jeuneafrique.com/257790/politique/ of exile in , due to allegations of corruption, niger-lopposition-veut-imposer-elections- he returned to Niger in 2010. transparentes/

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scene in an attempt to clear the way for the dissenting voices that might have jeopardized 2016 elections.7 the conclusion of a deal, but these actions predictably antagonized civil society. The opposition’s distrust of the government The new agreement signed by Niger and has been growing steadily, as illustrated Areva, presented as a success by Issoufou, by the request for impeachment filed by has been called into question by civil 34 members of the National Assembly at society organizations such as the Réseau the end of November, and the more recent des Organisations pour la Transparence decision by the opposition to suspend its et l’Analyse Budgétaire (ROTAB), arguing participation in the audit of the electoral that the tax agreements between the registry in the absence of external control. two stakeholders have not even been While this latest grievance has been published yet. addressed by the secondment of experts from the Organisation Internationale de la The same tactic has been applied and Francophonie (OIF), it nevertheless illustrates intensified by the government within the climate of suspicion that prevails in the the framework of the fight against Boko run up of the February elections. Haram. The examples of Moussa Tchangari and Nouhou Azirka seem to illustrate the tendency of the regime to shut down every Repression of the civil society dissenting voice that might endanger what Issoufou tries to present as “unified popular Issoufou’s first year in office coincided with support” behind the government and the the end of a ten-year uranium exploitation army. Both activists were arrested in May agreement between Niger and the French 2015 for their “lack of cooperation with the company Areva, which forced stakeholders authorities in the fight against Boko Haram” to renegotiate the terms of the arrangement. and for “criminal conspiracy linked to Boko Popular pressure was mounting as Issoufou’s Haram terrorist activities”.9 It appears that the constituents demanded a re-balancing of the reason for their incarceration was that they agreement in favour of Niger, the previous had criticized the government for its inability one having required Areva to pay a royalty to protect the population of Diffa, despite of only 5.5% of the value of extracted having imposed a state of emergency, resources, which meant the country was and for its failure to provide the army with denied what should have been an important the necessary equipment and training to contribution to its economy.8 The government confront the Islamist movement. adopted a repressive attitude during the negotiations, banning protests organized Overall, it seems as though anyone who by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) criticizes the government’s handling of and imprisoning some of their leaders; certain issues can be seen as a potential its intention was to hide the existence of threat to the state and is thus vulnerable to politically motivated intimidation and arrest. This trend is not new in Niger but as the army began to suffer many losses in its struggle 7 See, for instance, the arrest of Hama Amadou for against Boko Haram, the government grew his presumed involvement in a baby-trafficking more nervous and stepped up its repressive case: RFI (2015) ‘Affaire des bébés nigérians: measures.10 le tribunal correctionnel jugé compétent’, Jeune Afrique, 14 July 2015, http://www.rfi.fr/ afrique/20150714-nigeria-affaire-bebes-trafic- tribunal-correctionnel-hama-amadou-hadiza 8 According to ROTAB, a coalition of ten NGOs working on financial transparency, Nigerien 9 https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ uranium represents one-third of the uranium used AFR4317162015FRENCH.pdf in French nuclear power stations. For more on this, 10 Carayol, R. (2015) ‘Niger: face à Boko Haram, see interview with Ali Idrissa, ROTAB’s coordinator: les nerfs à vif’, Jeune Afrique, 22 September 2015, http://multinationales.org/Ali-Idrissa-L-accord- http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/234943/ annonce-entre-Areva-et-le-Niger-etait-du-bluff politique/niger-les-nerfs-a-vif/

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Tensions within the army deadlock (for example, in 1996 and 2010).13 The tense political and security climate Along with a feeling of being undervalued, that has developed over the last two years owing to the French and US military could – especially in the event of turbulent presence in the country as part of the elections – present the army with a reason to continuous fight against terrorism, a certain step in. sense of weariness and discontent has spread within the ranks of the Nigerien army. Despite the substantial investments Election time – a critical test for made in the defence sector since 2012 to Niger? modernize and better equip the military, the Nigerien army has shown itself to be incapable of securing its own territory.11 Since the beginning of Issoufou’s mandate The Boko Haram attack on Karamga in 2011, discord on several fronts has grown Island (Lake Chad) on 25 April 2015, which between the government and the rest of cost the lives of 48 soldiers, exposed the the country. On the eve of the February inadequacy of the Nigerian armed forces’ elections, the situation looks particularly equipment, training and preparedness. unstable: an antagonized political opposition, It also brought into question the wisdom an alienated civil society, the loss of the of the government’s decision to become so younger generation’s support, a dissatisfied heavily involved in peacekeeping missions army and, finally, the looming threat of outside of the country’s borders. At the Boko Haram. The latter has spurred the end of 2015, Niger’s contribution to UN Nigerien government into mobilizing a great peacekeeping missions, mainly in Mali and deal of (sometimes misguided) energy and Côte d’Ivoire, stood at 1,866 troops, making it resources, at the expense of other issues that the ninth biggest contributor among African many people deem more pressing (poverty, countries.12 soaring rates of population increase, food shortages, etc.). It may have been the military’s mounting discontent that led to the alleged coup The absence of any tangible success in attempt at the end of last year. the fight against Boko Haram, coupled On 19 December 2015, the Nigerien with the repressive policies introduced presidency announced the arrest of nine by the government, provides grist to the officers from three major military units mill of Issoufou’s opponents who have (the Niamey air base, the Tillabery artillery been quick to draw parallels between the battalion and the special forces attached to mismanagement of that particular issue the President) for conspiring to overthrow and the general failures they believe to the regime. Opposition parties have characterize the President’s overall tenure expressed reservations about the allegations in office. Issoufou, on the other hand, seems and have asked the government to provide confident that he will win the presidential proof – so far, without success. While it race, despite four members of the opposition, is difficult to assess the motives behind, including Oumarou and Amadou (still in or even the veracity of, such an attempted prison) having signed an agreement under coup, it is worth bearing in mind that which they will join forces to defeat him the Nigerien army historically has had a in the event of a second round of voting. tendency to intervene in times of institutional

11 The south-eastern region of Diffa is not the only area of concern in Niger, given that the country is bordered by southern Libya and northern Mali. 12 ‘UN Mission’s contribution by country’, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 13 Baudais, V. and Chauzal, G. (2010) ‘The 2010 coup http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ d’état in Niger: a praetorian regulation of politics’, contributors/2015/dec15_1.pdf African Affairs, 110/439, 295-304.

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It is difficult to predict how the February elections will unfold, it seems realistic to assume that if they fail to meet certain standards of fairness and transparency they will inevitably give rise to unrest, given the current context. If that were to happen, and clashes between supporters of the different candidates followed, a careful eye would have to be kept on the Nigerien army.

5 About the Conflict Research Unit

The Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ is a think tank and diplomatic academy on international affairs. The Conflict Research Unit (CRU) is a specialized team within the Institute, conducting applied, policy-oriented research and developing practical tools that assist national and multilateral governmental and non-governmental organizations in their engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations. www.clingendael.nl/cru-overview

About the author

Thibault Van Damme is a research assistant at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit. His research focuses on understanding political and security dynamics across fragile environments in Africa.