THE STRUGGLE FOR RECONCILIATION: THE , ANTI- POLITICS, AND THE ______

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of

California State University, Fullerton ______

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Science

in

Kinesiology ______

By

Tanya Kathleen Jones

Thesis Committee Approval:

Professor Matthew Llewellyn, Chair Professor John Gleaves, Department of Kinesiology Professor Toby Rider, Department of Kinesiology

Summer, 2016

ABSTRACT

On April 24, 1968, , president of the International Olympic

Committee (IOC), announced that South would not be permitted to participate in the 1968 Mexico Olympic Games. This decision was made due ’s prevailing apartheid policies, which prohibited the creation of racially mixed South African teams, and even outlawed direct international competition against racially mixed teams from other countries. This transformed the Olympic Movement into a battlefield of political agendas and presented a problem for international federations such as the IOC that were founded on the fundamental principle that sport should be available to all irrespective of race and ethnicity, gender, , or political affiliation.

A number of United States organizations, administrators, and private citizens sympathized with IOC president, Avery Brundage and the IOC’s predicament. Some, like

Douglas Roby, president of the United States Olympic Committee and a United States representative to the IOC, even pledged their full support for South Africa’s inclusion in the Games by emphasizing his desire to keep politics and separate. Like Brundage,

Roby argued that if South Africa were to be expelled based on its governmental policies, the Olympic Movement would be doomed to failure. The official decision in 1968 to expel South Africa from the Games would intertwine South African politics and the

Olympic Games for the next 24 years.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iv

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

A Brief History of South African Racial Discord ...... 3 Apartheid and the Olympic Games ...... 5

2. THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL PARTY, APARTHEID POLITICS, AND THE DISCRIMINATORY REALITIES OF SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT ...... 10

Early Attitudes Towards the Issue of South African Apartheid ...... 16 Avery Brundage: Early Attitudes Towards Apartheid and the SAN-ROC ...... 26 Early American Attitudes Towards Apartheid, South African Sport, and South Africa’s Exclusion from the 1964 City Olympics ...... 31

3. RISE OF THE UNITED STATES ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT AND THE 1968 OLYMPIC GAMES ...... 38

Early Rise of United States Anti-Apartheid Movement ...... 38 The Rise of the United States Anti-Apartheid Movement ...... 41 The 1967 IOC Tour to South Africa ...... 44 The Growing Tension within the United States as the Games Draw Near ...... 48 United States Response to South Africa’s Welcome Back into the Olympic Movement ...... 53 Brundage's 1968 Announcement and United States Response of South Africa’s Exclusion from the Olympic Games ...... 57 Douglas Roby’s Attitudes Towards Apartheid and South African Sport ...... 59

4. CONCLUSION ...... 63

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 72

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my mother, Gracie, my father, Larry, my brother Chris, my sisters Kristin and Michelle, my nieces Mariah, Natalie, and Mikayla, my boyfriend

Philip, and my friends Julia, Melissa, Carlie, Andrea, and Paulina, for all the support they have given me over the process of writing this thesis. I would also like to give extreme thanks to my advisors Dr. Matthew Llewellyn, Dr. John Gleaves, and Dr. Toby Rider, for all the time they have spent reading this thesis. They have shaped my life tremendously. I could not have done it without them. It is by the grace of God and the support of my family, friends, and academic advisors, that I could complete this academic journey.

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1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On April 24, 1968, Avery Brundage, president of the International Olympic

Committee (IOC), announced that South Africa would not be permitted to participate in the 1968 Mexico Olympic Games. This decision was made, Brundage explained, due to the “explosive conditions throughout the world and the ugly demonstrations, rioting, and other violent happenings in many different countries during the last sixty days, there was actual danger if a South African team appeared at the Game.”1 South Africa’s prevailing apartheid policies, transformed the Olympic Movement into a battlefield of political agendas, and caused collaboration amongst newly formed African nations to threaten to boycott the 1968 Olympic Games in protest. South Africa’s discriminatory statutes prohibited the creation of racially mixed South African teams, and even outlawed direct international competition against racially mixed teams from other countries.2 This presented a problem for the IOC, an organization founded on the idealistic principle that sport should be available to all irrespective of race and ethnicity, gender, religion, or political affiliation.

Under Avery Brundage’s leadership, the IOC had long appeared conflicted with which course of action to take. Expelling South Africa would cause the IOC to make a decision based on political affiliation.3 On the other hand, allowing South Africa to participate in the Olympic Games would violate the fourth fundamental principle in the

2

Olympic Charter that identified the practice of sport as “a human right.”4 Privately,

Brundage opposed the decision to exclude South Africa from the Olympic Movement.

Throughout his administrative career, Brundage regularly displayed a sympathetic attitude towards and the ruling National Party . A successful Chicago contractor and property investor, Brundage was, in the words of historian Maynard

Brichford, “a hundred-and-ten-per-cent American and an old-fashioned Republican.”5

Brundage was often called a disciple of , therefore believing that no matter what, “the Games must go on.”6 He remained wedded to the idealistic belief that the IOC “must not become involved in political issues, nor permit the Olympic Games to be used as a tool or as a weapon for extraneous causes.”7 Thus, Brundage rationalized his opposition towards efforts to expel South Africa, insisting that to do so would drag the

Olympic Movement into political warfare.

Like Brundage, Douglas F. Roby, president of the United States Olympic

Committee (USOC) and a long-serving United States representative to the IOC, had long expressed his support for South Africa’s continued participation in the Olympic Games.

Roby shared close ties with South Africa, cultivating personal friendships with the white sporting administrators that governed South African sport. Roby regularly expressed his sympathy to Reginald Honey, president of the South Africa National Olympic Committee and a South African representative to the IOC, for the dilemma that South Africa had found itself in.

Despite Roby and Brundage’s public and private support, an emerging anti- apartheid movement in the United States began angrily expressing its aversion toward

Pretoria’s policies of systematic oppression and discrimination, and pressured the IOC to

3 exclude South Africa from the Olympic Movement. This thesis plans to explore the polarized attitudes of United States citizens, anti-apartheid lobby groups, sporting officials and athletes on the subject of South African apartheid in the years leading up to the 1968 Mexico City Games. Coinciding with the , a growing chorus of African-American, liberal, political, and religious organizations joined voices in vocally expressing opposition against South Africa’s continued membership in international Olympic competition. Others, such as Douglas Roby and Avery Brundage expressed a far more sympathetic position. As private correspondences will reveal, Roby and Brundage worked behind the scenes to silence anti-apartheid opposition and preserve

South Africa’s status within the Olympic Movement.

A Brief History of South African Racial Discord

South Africa’s history has been intertwined with racism and segregation since the first Dutch settlers led by Jan Van Riebeeck, merchant from the Dutch East India

Company (VOC), came to the area in the 1652.8 Throughout history, Europeans have viewed and expansion as their divine right. Christopher Columbus and

Hernan Cortez are just two examples of “explorers” who encompass the European mindset of expansion. These two examples show that Europeans have always seen themselves as pure, presuming any culture they come across does not have the same value as they do. It is due to this mentality that the white settlers, Dutch and eventually

British, would come to rule over South Africa and later create the apartheid policy that would legally segregate the population of South Africa along racial lines. This policy influenced all aspects of society, from education, to politics, and even into sport. This

4 interference of racial segregation in sport caused the international sporting community to join the fight to end the apartheid policy.

The long-standing tradition of colonialism allowed for Dutch settlers to conquer the native people of South Africa with very little resistance. The two main tribes that the early Dutch settlers encountered were the San, who were hunters and gathers, and the

Khoi, who were herders, both of which had very little advancements in weaponry or combat. European industrialization allowed for more advanced weaponry then those of the native Africans, making it easier to conquer, enslave, and kill the natives until the

Dutch had full control over the southern region of Africa. By the early nineteenth century, British colonists started to command leadership in South Africa, much to the distain of the Dutch settlers of , also known as .3 When it was discovered that there was an excess of gold and diamonds where the Afrikaners had settled, an intense conflict between the British and Afrikaners ensued. Before the war between the British and the Afrikaners broke out in 1899, a novelist by the name of H.

Rider Haggard wrote a statement saying that there was space for “only one paramount power in South Africa”.9 The British won the war and created a new state where both

British and Dutch settlers inhabited and began to take more control over their black counterparts.10 Historian William H. Worger wrote that the in 1910 left a “self-governing state” in which many South Africans were unhappy.11 Out of this union, the National Party was created in 1913, which soon implemented racist, discriminatory legislation in the form of the Native Land Act (1913) and the Natives

Urban Areas Act (1923). The Native Land Act restricted black Africans to specific areas, or reserves, of South Africa, which only made up about seven percent of the country. The

5

Natives Urban Areas Act was an extension of the Native Land Act, allowing for discrimination and segregation in urban settings. This allowed for all-white cities in which blacks were only allowed to work.12

Under the leadership of the all-white, Afrikaner National Party, South Africa legally separated whites and non-whites in political and social situations.13 The apartheid policy gave whites higher privileges in all areas of life, including business owning, education, politics, and sports. According to historian Douglas Booth, the National Party embraced a decidedly racist, social Darwinistic world view. “The social order is accounted as the product of natural selection of those persons best suited to existing living conditions and in accord with which a position of laissez-faire is advocated,”14 and scientific racism, which used science to say that whites were better then non-whites, in order to validate the segregation. The apartheid movement elevated white Afrikaners, which, in statistics taken in 1985 by , and 1986 by R.E. Lapchick, only

15.5% of society was White, where as 72.7% was Black, 9% was Coloured, and 2.8% was Asian.15 These legal specifications of “race” allowed for the flagrant discrimination of non-white South African peoples at the hands of the ruling, white minority.

Apartheid and the Olympic Games

The implementation of governmental apartheid policies had a direct effect on the organization of South African sport. White Afrikaners enjoyed the benefits of racial privilege. They received significant governmental funding to upkeep their sporting facilities, and were chosen as the sole representatives of South African teams in international sporting and Olympic competition. In contrast, non-, were not given the opportunity to play sport at a competitive level. Apartheid forbade

6 mixed competitive teams, white teams competing against non-white teams, and non- white teams competing internationally. Non-white teams found it difficult to find practice and playing facilities and equipment due to an obvious lack of governmental funding.

The discriminatory realities of South African society, including its sporting system, eventually captured the attention of the international community. After decades of turning a blind eye to the horrors of apartheid, international sporting governing bodies and officials slowly began debating whether to isolate South Africa from the international sporting community. In 1964, the Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee took one of the first major steps in protest against apartheid by refusing to invite South Africa to the 1964

Olympic Games. The issue of South Africa’s Olympic participation sparked considerable discussion within the United States. Both USOC president Douglas Roby and IOC president Avery Brundage received a deluge of letters expressing both support and opposition towards the issue of South Africa’s Olympic participation. Civil Rights activists in the United States pushed for South Africa to be expelled from the Olympic

Games.16 Led by prominent American sociologist Harry Edwards, the Olympic Project for (OPHR) was established in October 1967 to protest racial segregation both at home in the United States, as well as throughout the globe. The OPHR threatened to mobilize an African-American boycott of the Mexico City Games unless our specific conditions were met, which included the expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic

Movement. United States citizen Vera Herbstman urged Brundage to join the “Black-

American boycott,” explaining that the “United States stands as a symbol to all other

Nations as the standard of ‘fair play,’ a ‘melting pot,’ “One Nation Indivisible.’”17

Retired African-American star Jackie Robinson stated in one of his many letters

7 to the IOC that “America cannot . . . condone the racist policies of South Africa.”18 Other

Americans showed their support for an Olympic boycott by signing a statement, which explained, “Segregation and discrimination in South African Sports have not changed . . .

. The IOC’s acceptance of South Africa, even though nothing has changed in the country, and they continue to violate the .”19

As political sympathizers with the Pretoria regime, both Brundage and Roby worked to ensure South Africa’s continued Olympic participation. In order to soften the threat of a boycott, and at Brundage’s behest, the IOC sent an inspection committee, made up of Sir Ade Ademola from , Reginald Stanley Alexander from , and

IOC Secretary J.W. Westerhoff, to South Africa in September 1966 to determine the accuracy of the South African claims concerning the reformed, racially inclusive nature of sport in the country.20 The IOC concluded in March 1968 that South

African government had implemented satisfactory changes and as such, should be invited to participate in the forthcoming Mexico City Games.21 The fact-finding committee argued that since “progress” had evidently been made, “the Tehran proposals of SANOC are an acceptable basis for a multi-racial team to the Mexico Olympic Games.” These proposals made at the 1967 IOC session in Teheran stated that both whites and non- whites would represent South Africa in one team, and that the team would travel and live together during the Olympic Games.22 The report noted that even though white and non- white members of the team will be picked in separate trials, “the sportsmen of all communities are prepared to accept the selection by the joint body as provided for in the

Teheran statement.”23 Brundage took the report as proof that discriminatory apartheid policies were no longer present in South African sport. He thus saw no reason why South

8

Africa should be excluded from competing in the Olympic Games. He and the IOC had hoped that these conclusive results would be satisfactory to those who wanted to boycott the Games or have South Africa permanently expelled from the Olympic Movement.

In contrast, the IOC’s report and Brundage’s conciliatory actions only served to intensify the resolve of those who called for change. Anti-apartheid activists predicted that the South Africa government would only send a mixed-raced Olympic team as a façade to fool the IOC. They pointed out that though a mixed team would be sent to represent South Africa, the trials would be held separately according to race and thus, violated the Olympic Charter.24 Multiple national Olympic committees, including the

Third World bloc of African Nations, the ,25 and Norway,26 exerted so much pressure on the host nation that the Mexico City Olympic organizers moved to revoke

South Africa’s invitation to the Games.

Ultimately, the argument for South Africa’s inclusion came down to whether

South Africa violated the humanitarian principles espoused by the Olympic Charter, or whether the IOC would violate its own statutes by mixing politics with sport in banning

South Africa from Olympic competition. The Olympic Charter’s fundamental Principle 1 states, “The Olympic Games are held every four years. They assemble amateurs of all nations in fair and equal competition. No discrimination is allowed against any country or person on grounds of race, religion or political affiliation.”27 South Africa stood in clear violation of this first fundamental rule, as well as Clause 25, which stated that, “National

Olympic Committees must be completely independent and autonomous and in a position to resist all political, religious or commercial pressure.”28 The South African National

Olympic Committee (SANOC) failed to adhere to these two very specific rules, and by

9 failing to do so, directly violated the spirit of the Olympic Games

After much debate and numerous attempts to keep South Africa in the Olympic

Movement, Brundage begrudgingly went on record stating that both he, and the IOC, felt that it was in everyone’s best interest, and for the safety of the South African team, that

South Africa’s invitation to the 1968 Mexico Games be revoked. “The only point in the lengthy discussions on which the nine members of the Executive Board could agree, was, that because of the explosive conditions throughout the world and the ugly demonstrations, rioting, and other violent happenings in many different countries during the last sixty days, there was actual danger if a South African team appeared at the

Games” he noted somberly.29 Remarkably, South Africa would remain in the international sporting wilderness until 1992, when the nation was finally readmitted into the Olympic Movement following the abolition of apartheid.

10

CHAPTER 2

THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL PARTY, APARTHEID POLITICS, AND THE DISCRIMINATORY REALITIES OF SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

South Africa enjoyed a long-standing relationship with the Olympic Movement.

At the time of the Baron Pierre de Coubertin’s revival of the Olympic Movement in 1894,

South Africa was not a fully formed country. It would take until 1910 before the two separate British colonies of and Natal united alongside the Dutch of Orange and Transvaal to forge the Union of South Africa. Two decades after its inception, South Africa became a self-governing Dominion under British rule in

1934, and after breaking away from the Commonwealth over the issue of racial apartheid in 1961, South Africa established itself as an independent, self-governing nation-state.

Though South Africa was not a fully formed country at the time of the earliest

Olympic festivals, the British and Dutch provinces that comprised it supplied some of the first participants in the Olympic Games. South African athletes did not attend the inaugural Olympic Games in Athens in 1896, nor were they present at the 1900 Paris

Games. A duo of South African marathoners did, however, ensure that the geographical region was represented at the third installment of the Olympic spectacle in 1904 in St.

Louis. Most international observers at the time deemed the 1904 St. Louis Games anything but a success. Held in conjunction with the Louisiana World’s Fair, a grand cultural exposition marking the centennial celebration of the Louisiana Purchase, the St.

Louis Olympics were renowned for their glaring mismanagement and poor international

11 turn-out. The fusion of the Olympic Games with the World’s fair, however, ensured that

South African culture was represented in the form of an exhibition chronicling their recent war for independence titled, the “Anglo-Boer War Historical Libretto.” Two native

Africans who fought in the war for independence, Len Tau and Jan Mashiani, comprised part of this exhibit.1 As such, both Tau and Mashiani were afforded the opportunity to formally compete in the Olympic Games. Both men participated in the marathon race, and though neither won the event, Tau finished ninth after running barefoot the whole race, and Mashiani finished thirteenth overall. In hindsight, it is astonishing and ironic that South Africa’s first Olympic athletes were of native African descent, because for the next eleven editions of the Olympic Games, only white South Africans (Afrikaners) participated. 2

The formation of a South African National Olympic Committee in 1908 permitted

South Africa to send a representative team to compete in the London Olympic Games.

Henry Nourse, a white South African, became the first president of the South African

Olympic Committee. Following the participation of Tau and Mashiani in the 1904

Games, Nourse compiled an official Olympic team of fifteen athletes to represent South

Africa in the British capital, all of whom were of white, European decent. South Africa won its first gold, in the 100-meter dash, and silver medal in the marathon, in these

Games. In 1912 South Africa sent an even larger contingent of twenty-one athletes to the

Stockholm Games, winning four gold medals and two silver medals. Importantly, none of the South African team was of African descent. In fact, eight of the twenty-one team members that comprised the 1912 team were not even born in South Africa. Ken

McArthur, Walter Gates, George Harvey, Robert Patterson, Len Richardson, Arthur

12

Smith, and Arthur St. Norman were all born in , and Charles Jeffreys hailed from New Zealand.3 South Africa’s central position within the framework of the British

Empire ensured that imperial athletes were free to cross “national” borders and represent the different dominions under British colonial rule.

The outbreak of the Great War scuttled Berlin’s aspirations of staging the 1916

Olympic Games. After western civilization remerged from and ruins of war,

Antwerp, a city recently liberated from German occupation and oppression, agreed to host to the next Olympic Games in 1920. South Africa sent its largest Olympic , until that point, in its country’s short history. The forty-eight team member South African contingent, clinched three gold medals, four silver medals, and three bronze medals.4

Reflecting the racial dimensions of sport in South African society, only white South

Africans, five of whom which born in Great Britain, represented the nation in the Belgian capital. The lack of representation of non-white, native-born Africans provided an early glimpse of the racialist policies that would shortly subsume South Africa and make itself a pariah within the international political and sporting community.

Like all countries that participate in the Olympic Movement, South Africa found pride in sending their “best” athletes to participate and bring glory to their country. The

Olympic Games are a way to showcase a countries strength and vitality. Pierre de

Coubertin, the credited founder of the modern Olympic Movement, wanted the Olympics to stimulate peace and harmony. He dreamt of nations fighting for mastery within the realm of peaceful competition rather than violent military conflict. Though the Olympic

Games do not stop war, the notion that a country can show their strength and worth through the Games remained a common belief. For the four British and Dutch colonies

13 that comprised the incipient Union of South Africa, participation in the Olympic provided it with a platform to exhibit their strength on a global scale and, perhaps, more importantly, reaffirm their legitimacy and status as a modern nation-state. South Africa’s early Olympic forays revealed, however, that it only wanted to celebrate the athletic accomplishments of its white populace, a reality that mirrored the nation’s emerging formulation of racist apartheid legislation.

In the aftermath of World War II, the South African government began aggressively passing anti-democratic, racist, discriminatory legislation that supplemented existing statutes limiting black ownership of land and property (1913-Natives’ Lands

Acts) and precluding blacks—except in a service capacity—from visiting white residential areas (1923-Natives Urban Area Act). Following its assent to power in 1948, the Afrikaner National Party passed a series of far-reaching statutes prohibiting inter- racial marriage (1949-Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act), criminalizing inter-racial sexual contact (1950-Immorality Act), segregating the races in all public areas (1952/3-

Restoration of Separate Amenities Act), extending to even schools (1953), colleges

(1955), and universities (1959). Apartheid policies separated non-whites from whites in all areas of political, economic, and social life.5 Apartheid limited the areas that non- whites could live or visit, limited the work non-whites could do, prohibited non-whites and whites from having sexual relations, and even prohibited non-whites from representing South Africa in international sporting events, including the Olympic Games.

The ruling National Party maintained a policy of strict racial segregation across all layers of South African sport from club to international level. White sport flourished under this policy of forced racial segregation amongst both players and spectators. Only

14 whites could earn Springbok honours, as well as serve as officials on international sport federations. White sport also enjoyed the benefit of lavish governmental subsidies, with one report estimating that Pretoria spent up to 23 times more per capita on white than on black sports. South African sport propagated key apartheid policies to the detriment of its black majority. Under-funded, under-equipped, under-staffed, and weather ravaged, sport in black town ships inevitably laboured in isolation.6

Based on the principles enshrined within the Olympic Charter, the all-white national teams representing South Africa in the Olympic Games presented a problem for the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The emerging realities of apartheid legislation in South Africa forced the IOC to address the situation. Downplaying his nation’s segregationist sport policies, Ira G. Emery, Honorary Secretary of the South

African Olympic and Association, reassured that they were doing everything in their power to send a diverse team to the Olympic Games. In an October

14, 1958 letter to IOC president Avery Brundage, Emery proposed that the only way to overcome this problem was for South Africa to be permitted to send two separate teams to the Olympic Games.7 Citing the Olympic Charter’s one-nation, one-team policy,

Brundage dismissed the notion of two separate, racially distinct teams representing South

Africa at future Olympic Games.8 The South African government remained unequivocal in its belief that racial groups should not be allowed to mix in the realm of competitive sport. Eben Donges, Minister of the South African Department of the Interior, captured his government’s combative tone:

The policy of separate development expressed the South African custom that whites and non-whites should organize their sporting activities separately, that there shall be NO INTER-RACIAL COMPETITIONS WITHIN OUR BORDERS, that mixing of the races

15

in teams should be avoided, and that sportsmen from other lands should respect our customs, just as we respect theirs.9

Donges reassured Olympic officials that the South African government guaranteed that non-whites had the same rights in sports as the minority white, Afrikaners. In fact,

Donges continued, “ . . . non-Whites are not debarred from competing outside South

Africa, nor are non-European sportsmen from outside prevented from entering South

Africa to compete with non-whites here.”10

From the government’s perspective, however, only teams comprised of white athletes were viewed as a true representation of South African culture. Based on imperialistic and Darwinian thinking about race, which considered non-white peoples as savage, uncivilized, and at the bottom of the racial hierarchy, governmental officials declared South Africa’s black majority population as unfit to play in competitive sport.

As the issue of racial discrimination in sport continued to attract international attention, the South African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association did everything it could to present a case supporting their decision to affirm governmental policy and keep the races separate in Olympic sport. In 1958, Emery wrote a letter to Brundage explaining

South Africa’s long history with the Olympic Games. He stated that their first Olympic appearance was in 1908, casually leaving out the successes of the two native African marathon runners from their country in 1904. He admitted that in all the years of Olympic participation, the athletes that represented South Africa were of European decent explaining, “this is the traditional policy of South Africa and is based largely on social grounds.” Emery moved to defend this reality on the basis that the non-white sportsmen were mostly professional athletes, therefore could not conform to the amateur standards of the Olympic Games. Emery also hid behind a defensive smokescreen when he argued

16 that the newly inferred issues of racial discrimination in sports within South Africa, and the applications of non-whites to compete at the international level is just a political scheme rather then a true desire to participate in sports at an international level.11 Finally,

Emery cited, “the many competing tribal groups among the nation’s non-white population which shows how difficult it would be to get this tribal difference sorted out if ever you demand a competition of mixed races from South Africa at the Olympic

Games.”12

Early Attitudes Towards the Issue of South African Apartheid

Against the backdrop of mounting international condemnation of South Africa’s racist apartheid policies, and the flagrant segregation of South African sport, the IOC continued to turn a blind eye to the situation. IOC officials ignored countless letters from members of sport governing bodies both within and outside South Africa highlighting the manner in which white officials unfairly excluded athletes of color from participating in international sporting events. Dennis Brutus, a man who would soon emerge as the leading figure in the anti-apartheid movement, wrote a series of letters to the IOC pleading with Olympic officials in Lausanne to help bring about an end to discrimination in South African sport. Brutus, a founding member of the South African Sport

Association (SASA), a non-racial sporting body that claimed to represent all South

African athletes, made his case to IOC president, Avery Brundage. “We believe that basically our problem is a simple one,” Brutus opined. “The prejudice of sports administrators being expressed in a colour-bar in sport without the justification of law, tradition or the wishes of sportsmen generally.”13 Brutus intimated that with the support of the IOC, prejudice and racial discrimination in South African sport could be fixed. On

17

April 30, 1959, Brutus and the SASA published a condemning report that outlined how the all-white South African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association had violated the regulations of international sporting bodies by imposing a strict color bar.

The SASA report took aim at the comments of General H.B. Klopper, Chairman of the

South African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association— now known as the

South African Olympic Games Association (SANOC)— for his remark that non-whites were permitted to wear the Springbok colors, but that non-whites had never “proved themselves fit in the past.” The SASA report dismissed these claims, reasoning that non- whites have consistently proved their worth.14

The SANOC quickly moved to rebut the claims made by Brutus and the SASA.

SANOC officials insisted that contrary to opinion, it had no problem with non-whites representing South African in international competitions. The association sent a report to the IOC explaining that each sport in South Africa has their own Amateur Athletic

Association. In effect, they argued that each sport chose the athletes that will represent the nation in international competitions irrespective of governmental policies and outside of the influence of South African Olympic officials. The SANOC moved to further dismiss Brutus’ claims, explaining that any non-white (or, multi-racial) sporting associations could be granted affiliation with the corresponding national (white) governing body on the condition those sports stage trials for international competitions under its supervision. If the non-white athletes met the requirements for international competitions, the SANOC reassured, then there would be no reason they could not represent South Africa at the international level.15

18

Although the IOC continued to receive a barrage of letters from Dennis Brutus and the SASA further highlighting the fallacies of the SANOC’s arguments, Olympic officials in the halls of Lausanne did little to stem the tide of racial segregation in South

African sports. In truth, apartheid sport was slow to provoke the moral sensibilities of the predominately-white men that governed and control international sport. Closed, self- recruiting sporting bureaucracies, boasting weighted voting systems, initially coalesced in support of their white colleagues from South Africa. Historian John Hoberman identifies the prevalence of colonist thinking and racial attitudes, as well as decades of predominately white self-recruitment (including both Nazis and Nazi sympathizers), as explanations for international sports leaders firm loyalty to South Africa’s government and its tolerance of its racial policies.16 Led by Olaf Ditlev-Simonsen, an IOC member from Norway, at least a handful of Olympic officials began encouraging the IOC hierarchy to intervene into the South African situation. Ditlev-Simonsen wrote to Otto

Mayer, Chancellor of the IOC, requesting that an investigation be undertaken in order to examine the claim that South Africa had racial discrimination in sports.17 In response,

Mayer assured his colleague that he was monitoring the situation and that he had personally proposed to Avery Brundage, that South Africa be expelled from the Olympic

Movement. However, Mayer stated that South Africa’s expulsion would most likely not happen because the IOC cannot “control the legislation of every country.”18 Mayer went onto state that if the IOC does suspend South Africa, the situation with racial discrimination will not change and that it will only prevent athletes whom cannot control their government’s policies from attending an event they had worked hard for. To

Mayer’s credit, the IOC did issue repetitive warnings to the SANOC, explaining that if

19 they did not alleviate the racial discrimination occurring in their sports, then it would expelled from the Olympic Movement.19 This “warning” was not well enforced, acting more like a slap on the wrist, which did not give South Africa any really cause to worry.

The IOC’s passivity on such an important topic occurred against the backdrop of a burgeoning anti-apartheid movement. A “Hybrid collection” of transnational advocacy networks, pressure groups, multinational corporations, churches and foreign governments mobilized, strategically coordinating their efforts on a global scale to expose the plight of

South Africa’s black population.20 Drawing invaluable media coverage, the anti-apartheid movement began rallying around specific issues including sport. Throughout the northern and southern hemispheres, anti-apartheid demonstrators offered a riposte to discriminatory legislation by deploying a creative arsenal of tactics.21 SASA’s mission began to grow, and Brutus started gaining broader international recognition and more supporters. Brutus wanted nothing more than equality in sports and the recognition and understanding that non-whites from South Africa could contribute majorly to the world of sports. He continued pressing the IOC to help stimulate change. In an April 21, 1959 letter to Otto Mayer, Brutus explained that non-whites from South Africa were drastically underrepresented in international sport. He stated that out of the ten million non-whites that lived in South Africa, only a small portion were allowed to represent the country in international competition, albeit in the predominately black sport of soccer. Brutus insisted that because there was very little representation of non-whites in athletics, there is “no accurate account of their plight or their activities” making it extremely difficult to show their potential contribution to the sporting world.22

20

The SASA formulated a campaign titled, a Campaign Against Race

Discrimination, to raise awareness of the severity of the situation in South Africa. Rev.

Michael Scott, a European anti-apartheid activist for SASA, wrote a powerful letter to the

IOC in which he argued that people from around the world cannot stand by idly and watch this injustice occur. The Rev. Scott exhorted:

While some may argue that this is a matter for the South Africans to decide for themselves at home, the rest of the world cannot allow the standards and actual times and records of international sport to be limited by an arbitrary handicap which excludes millions of possible claimants from participating because they are not white.23

Stirred by growing anti-apartheid sentiment, the American Committee on Africa lent support to Brutus’ cause, stating that only white athletes represented South Africa in the 1960 Olympic Games, yet eighty percent of the population in South Africa was non- white.24 The committee complained that this was a violation of the Olympic Charter, which stated that there should be no discrimination in sport. The committee continued to state that non-whites were “forbidden to demonstrate group caliber against a white team, forbidden to enter the recognized associations as individuals where they might demonstrate caliber in mixed teams.” It argued further that fear that non-whites could show dominance over their white counterparts was the reason South Africa would not allow racially mixed sports.25

Brutus and his growing band of anti-apartheid sympathizers maintained that the

South African government failed to conform to the principles laid out in the Olympic

Charter, since it is the role of governments to provide programs “of physical culture, recreation, and health for the youth of their country.”26 Evidently, the South African government in Pretoria had only supported the recreational and sporting needs of its

21 white populace. Mindful of mounting international criticism, Ira G. Emery, General

Secretary of the SANOC, wrote to Avery Brundage defending the racist realities of South

Africa’s Olympic participation, citing the major differences between races. He used the example of a riot started at a mine between “Coloured’s, Indians, and Bantu.” Emery explained that the government was doing all they could to educate the non-whites on a civilized standard of living and education.27 Once the non-whites could grasp those concepts, they would be allowed to participate in racially mixed sports. Emery later maintained this line of defense in a correspondence with Otto Mayer. He even presented the example of a team of non-whites South African soccer players who were charged with murdering three players on the opposite team. Emery argued that non-whites could not represent the high ideals of and compete as part of a racially mixed team.28

Still, international opposition against apartheid continued to build. As such, the

IOC faced renewed pressure to act on the issue of racial discrimination in Olympic sport.

Anthony Steel, Secretary for the Campaign Against Race Discrimination in Sport, located in London, , wrote to Otto Mayer, explaining that the SANOC had clearly violated the Olympic Charter by not permitting non-whites to represent South Africa on the Olympic team. Steel cited Rule 20 (4) of the South African Amateur Rowing

Union’s constitution which stated that “No Association shall admit to membership nor permit clubs to it affiliated to admit to membership any person who is not a European and an amateur and every association shall vigorously apply the definition set out and enforce the same, and require clubs to them affiliated to do the same.”29 Even when presented with unequivocal evidence about the nature and extent of South Africa’s discriminatory sport policies, the IOC remained reluctant to act.

22

Buoyed by the growing support coming to the aid of the anti-apartheid movement in sport, Dennis Brutus requested that the IOC place the SANOC’s practice of racial discrimination in sport on the agenda at the IOC Executive Board meeting in Rome in

1960. He charged SANOC with a direct violation of the Olympic Charter and exhorted that this violation could no longer go on. He also requested permission for both he and

G.K. Rangasamy, president of the SASA, to attend the meeting in Rome.30 Brutus and

Rangasamy efforts to expose the plight of South Africa’s non-white populace drew the attention of the fiercely right-wing Afrikaner government. Bureaucrats in Pretoria placed a travel ban on the two upstarts. Police interrogated both Brutus and Rangasamy and the

Department of Interior denied their passports applications for international travel.31

Despite the government’s obstructionist tactics, Brutus and the SASA fought long and hard to become a recognized international sporting body. Mindful of Brundage and the IOC’s policy that it would only accept one sporting body per country, the SASA decided to dissolve in 1962 and create the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee

(SAN-ROC). Brutus planned to apply for membership at the IOC meeting in ,

Kenya, arguing that it served as the true representative of all South African athletes and governing bodies.32 The newly formed SAN-ROC sought to traverse the trail blazed by the SASA.

In 1962, Otto Mayer, IOC Chancellor, wrote a letter to SANOC stating that the

IOC planned to formally investigate the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa due to the report that there had been no improvements on allowing a racially mixed team to attend the Olympic Games. Mayer explained in his letter that Reginald Honey, Honorary

Life President of SANOC and South African IOC representative, had assured the IOC

23

Executive Committee at the 55th IOC Session in Rome, that South Africa would present a racially mixed team at the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo.33 Lilian Francey, General

Secretary of SANOC responded to Mayer, expressing that the issue of racial discrimination in sports was a domestic matter and should be handled as such. She insisted that the SANOC and its affiliates were doing everything in their power to encourage non-white participation in sports and that they had sent a multi-racial team to a recent international event in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia.34 Francey reassured that the SANOC had no desire or intention to divert from the Olympic ideal. She claimed that the SANOC would in future choose athletes to represent South Africa irrespective of their color:

As for your Executive Board’s decision, we feel that, with all due respect, we as sportsmen and sport’s administrators are being judged by what appears to be a politically inspired controversy aimed at the breaking of the good relations which have existed between the South African Olympic Games Association and the International Olympic Committee since 1908.35

Although Mayer assured Francey that the IOC had no intensions of cutting ties with

SANOC,36 the issue of apartheid in South Africa and racial discrimination in sport become known on a global platform. This prompted many countries to demand that the

IOC take action against the rebel apartheid state and its racist policies.

The 1960 Rome Olympic Games were the last Olympic Games that South Africa would compete in until 1992. In 1960, the South African Olympic team recorded its worst Olympic performance winning only four bronze medals. Just as the Olympians had fought for the gold and did not succeed, the SANOC would lose its fight for continued inclusion and recognition in the Olympic Movement. In 1963, N. Rathinasamy, Chairman of the SAN-ROC requested that Japan take a stance against South Africa’s racial

24 discrimination in sports and revoke their invitation to the 1964 Tokyo Games.37 Mindful of the growing international opposition to apartheid as well as the looming threat of a mass-Afro-Caribbean boycott of the Tokyo Games, the Japan Olympic organizers promptly rescinded South Africa’s invitation.

The establishment of SAN-ROC prompted a fierce governmental response.

Brutus, the founding president of SAN-ROC, was arrested in in 1963 in .

The government punished Brutus by not allowing him to teach, publish writings, enter townships or factory premises, and forced him to work for minimal wages.38 Later that year, Brutus was shot and arrested alongside SAN-ROC chairman John Harris for attending the IOC session at Baden-Baden. The government never formally charged

Brutus nor Harris with committing a crime.

This clear abuse of power inspired SAN-ROC to continue pushing forward with their mission to end racial discrimination in sport and to achieve its concurrent aim of being recognized by the IOC as the sole and official national Olympic committee of

South Africa. N. Rathinasamy, chairman of SAN-ROC, wrote a statement to all sportsmen and national Olympic committees, begging them to stand up against the clear violation in the Olympic Charter. He argued that the SAN-ROC had improved the situation in South Africa, and could prove it, while proving that the SANOC had done nothing but maintain racial discrimination in sports.39 The SAN-ROC argued that non- white athletes had been denied the opportunity to represent South Africa in stark violation of the Olympic Charter. The South African government perpetuated racial discrimination and stifled the growth of true sportsmanship and camaraderie the SAN-

ROC argued. In order to promote multi-racialism and establish full racial equality in

25 sport, the SAN-ROC proposed that it become the leading Olympic organization for South

Africa. It promised to end racial discrimination in sport and only allow members to join if they were part of non-racial sporting bodies and followed the ideals of Olympism.40

Although the SAN-ROC failed to gain official IOC recognition, it refused to stop fighting. On May 24, 1963, Dennis Brutus addressed a letter to both the IOC Executive

Board and the international sports federations arguing that the situation of racial discrimination had deteriorated in South African sports. Brutus contented that the IOC was obligated to suspend SANOC from participating in the Games because it was enforcing the South African government’s policy of racial discrimination in sport.

Championing the SAN-ROC’s claims for official recognition, Brutus explained that there are two “national” bodies that represent South Africa, an all-white national body and a multi-racial national body, which illuminates the segregation of South African sport:

That in view of the manifest injustice and absence of fairplay in South African sport as a result of political and racial influences, the International Olympic Committee and the International Sports Federations should adopt the clear policy as stated in the program set out by Mr. Avery Brundage, President of the I.O.C., and Mr. Otto Mayer, Chancellor of the I.O.C., which would exclude political interference in sport and that this program should be applied immediately to sport in all countries and particularly to South Africa.41

Brutus’ efforts slowly began to penetrate the IOC’s exterior wall of apathy and indifference. On August 5, 1963, IOC president Avery Brundage sent a letter to the

SANOC warning that if it did not show proof that there was no longer racial discrimination or political influence in sport, the IOC would “remove their name from the list of recognized Olympic Committees.”42 Frank H. Braun, president of the SANOC leapt to attention. In a report presented to the IOC during its 1963 annual session in

Baden-Baden, Braun reassured Olympic officials that the SANOC would ensure that a

26 racially mixed team compete at the 1964 Tokyo Games. In a sweeping defense, Braun reassured that everything was being done to promote sports within non-white communities and townships and that the government had set aside money to provide non- whites with training facilities, clubhouses, and coaching.43 Members of the IOC appeared temporarily appeased.

Avery Brundage: Early Attitudes Towards Apartheid and the SAN-ROC

One figure stood at the center of the debate surrounding South Africa’s participation in the Olympic Games: Avery Brundage. Throughout his long and successful administrative career, the American regularly displayed a sympathetic attitude towards Pretoria and the ruling National Party’s discriminatory apartheid policies. He remained wedded to the idealistic belief that the IOC “must not become involved in political issues, nor permit the Olympic Games to be used as a tool or as a weapon for extraneous causes.”44 Thus, Brundage rationalized his opposition towards efforts to expel

South Africa, insisting that to do so would drag the Olympic Movement into political warfare.

Brundage was very clear throughout the entire process that he did not want South

Africa to be expelled from the Olympic Movement. In early correspondences with Ira G.

Emery, he expressed sympathy with South Africa’s racial troubles “because we have similar problems in this country, which have not always been handled wisely.”45

Brundage’s attitudes were clearly reflective of his opposition towards the rising Civil

Rights Movement sweeping the United States. Emerging during the early-1950s, the

Civil Rights Movement called for social change against racial discrimination in the

United States. Though it was contradictory to the Olympic Charter’s fundamental

27 principle that sport should be available to all irrespective of race and ethnicity, gender, religion, or political affiliation, Brundage supported the rebel apartheid state and its continued Olympic participation. Brundage held close relationships with the organizing members of SANOC. In one letter, he thanked Emery for a “beautifully illustrated desk calendar that came with your Holiday Greeting.”46 His personal relationships with the members of SANOC affected his ability to be impartial to the situation at hand. In another letter to Emery, Brundage expressed his support for the SANOC’s claims that non-whites were not at a sufficient caliber to compete in elite, international sport.

Brundage suggested that if South Africa were to hold separate time trials for the Olympic

Games, this would satisfy the request to allow non-whites to participate in the Olympic

Games, while simultaneously proving that they were not fit to perform at an international level. “You state that the individuals in question are neither amateurs nor of international class, and I am reasonably sure you are correct. If you held separate tryouts, none of them would qualify on one ground or another, and you would comply with the rules,” he noted.47 Evidently, Brundage appeared unmoved by the lobbying efforts of Dennis Brutus and SAN-ROC and their requests for South Africa’s all-white national Olympic committee to be expelled from the Olympic Movement.

Regardless of his personal feelings, Brundage attempted to appear neutral on the subject matter. When Emery requested that South Africa be allowed to send two separate teams to the Olympic Games, Brundage again denied the request on the grounds that it was against IOC policy to allow two separate teams to represent one country.48 Brundage may have sympathized with Emery and the SANOC, but since he was IOC president, he had to follow Olympic regulations. The SANOC, comprised exclusively of wealthy,

28 conservative men of European descent, enjoyed a long-standing relationship with the IOC president. Thus, it is not hard to understand why Brundage proved inclined to keep the

SANOC within the Olympic Movement. For example, when the South African Amateur

Weightlifting and Body Building Federation contacted Brundage about the lack of non- white representation he dismissed calls for an IOC inquiry arguing it was a national rather than an Olympic issue. Brundage advised that the South African Amateur Weightlifting and Body Building Federation should take up their protest with the SANOC representatives.49 Brundage lacked the care and interest in helping non-whites gain recognition on an international level. Brundage assured Emery that the IOC would not interfere with the African Amateur Weightlifting and Body Building Federation’s complaint, insisting that it was an internal matter. He explained that the IOC only recognized SANOC as the international governing sports body. Brundage again encouraged South Africa to hold separate tryouts in order to satisfy IOC members and as well as the SAN-ROC’s demands for equal opportunity for non-whites athletes.50

As racial discrimination in South Africa became more apparent on an international level, Dennis Brutus again took his calls for an end to apartheid in sport directly to Brundage. While Brutus conceded that the situation of racial discrimination in sport was complicated because it went well beyond sport, he insisted that the SANOC was not doing anything to improve the situation in South African. “While my Federation agrees completely that the situation is very complicated, we are not satisfied that the S.A.

Olympic Committee is truly ‘endeavouring to find a solution in line with Olympic regulations’ and we will continue to press for a full examination of the position by the

International Olympic Committee,” he averred.51 Brutus knew that the SANOC did not

29 want to change the way sport in South Africa operated. As Ira G. Emery had stated, the all-white South African teams that went to the Olympic Games were a tradition. It was not a governmental law to have only white teams, but it was a social law.

Brundage continued to be confronted with the issue of racial discrimination in

South African sport. As SAN-ROC became more prominent and continued to gain wider international sympathy, Brutus called upon IOC members to attend SAN-ROC meetings in order to ascertain the true level of injustice in South African sport. Brundage, however, continued to inform Brutus that it was not necessary for him to send a representative to the meetings. He stated that the IOC would not stand for discrimination of any kind in sport, but that they would handle it in an appropriate way.52 Brundage’s letters to Brutus continued to be professional but embodied a sense of distain. Certainly, there was no hint of the comradery that Brundage enjoyed in his exchanges with the all-white members of the SANOC. In fact, Brundage showed sympathy towards his white colleagues from

South Africa. In a personal missive to Lilian Francey, Honorary General Secretary of the

SANOC, he expressed hope that the SANOC would be able to make the “necessary adjustments” in order to preserve their Olympic status. He also expressed his understanding of the fact that the racial dynamics of South African sport were based on governmental laws and policies and that the IOC could not expect SANOC to function any differently or produce better results than they have.53

Despite his sympathetic stance, Brundage faced a mounting public backlash from anti-apartheid groups and activists, especially within the United States, which condemned the IOC president for his failure to address the situation in South Africa. Brundage maintained a simple defense: the IOC did not “intervene in national affairs” unless its

30 regulations were being directly violated. He also explained that he relied on the reports from the national representatives in South Africa to provide reliable and up-to-date information.54 Brundage’s statement that the IOC relied on the honesty of the national representatives in South Africa proved the fallacies of the system. With each letter that

Brundage received, he continued to preach that the IOC had full faith in SANOC. He explained that it was not the IOC’s position to interfere with the political affairs of other countries. Brundage believed that if South Africa was expelled from the Olympic

Movement due to their apartheid policies, it would be the start of using the Olympic

Movement for political propaganda. Under Brundage’s sympathetic tenure, the IOC demonstrated a remarkable degree of patience in dealing with the rebel apartheid state.

They gave SANOC officials repeated opportunities to fall in-line with the Olympic

Charter, and its prohibitions against racial discrimination in sport, or else face sanction, or even permanent expulsion. The wider implications of apartheid legislation outside of the realm of sport seemingly failed to trouble Olympic leaders

Unfortunately, for Brundage and South Africa, their fight to keep South Africa included on the Olympic program would come to an end. In 1964, the Japanese Olympic

Organizing Committee revoked South Africa’s invitation to the 1964 Tokyo Games due to racial segregation imposed on sport by the South African government. Fearful that its government’s apartheid laws could cost the country permanent separation from the

Olympic Movement, the SANOC immediately organized separate time Olympics trials for non-whites South Africa athletes. The SANOC also promised to allow non-whites and whites to participate together under the same flag, however, the athletes would be prohibited from traveling or rooming together. Though this “attempt” seemed valid,

31

SAN-ROC and other NOCs including the Third World bloc of African Nations, the

Soviet Union,55 and Norway,56 continued to demand South Africa’s expulsion. Brundage feared that if the IOC were to expel South Africa from the Olympic Movement, they would never be able to rejoin.57

Early American Attitudes Towards Apartheid, South African Sport, and

South Africa's Exclusion from the 1964 Tokyo City Olympics.

The struggle for racial equality in South African society received support from religious, African-American, and left-wing political groups within the United States.

Non-governmental bodies—such as the Council on African Affairs, which consisted of black radicals who used demonstrations, such as sit-ins, to influence United States foreign policy,58 the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), which “advocates progressive stances on civil rights and liberties, social and economic justice, sensible foreign policy, and sustainable environmental policy,”59 and the American Committee on

Africa (ACOA), which was created in 1953 to help support anti-colonialism in Africa— led the United States anti-apartheid crusade.60 ACOA was a product of the “Americans for South African Resistance (AFSAR) which was formed to support the Campaign of

Defiance Against Unjust Laws led by the African National Congress (ANC).”61 The

Campaign of Defiance Against Unjust Laws was the first massive non-violent protest of non-white South Africans against apartheid. This campaign included non-violent protests like bus boycotts and marching on police stations.62 The correlation between the United

States and South Africa was easy to make during this time, since both countries were fighting unjust treatment of non-whites.

32

Groups like the ADA and ACOA worked to highlight the SANOC’s failed efforts to end racial segregation in sport. ACOA penned an article explaining while the Olympic

Charter does not allow for racial discrimination in sports only white athletes represented

South Africa in 1960, despite the fact that eighty percent of the country’s population is non-white.63 The article highlighted the fallacies of the SANOC’s claims that non-white athletes were not capable of performing at an international level. ACOA explained that non-whites did not have proper training facilities; therefore, they could not perform to the best of their abilities. It also noted that talented black athletes were often forced to violate international amateur regulations because they could not afford to spend time away from the workplace with financial compensations. “Of course the problem of fair Olympic participation from South Africa is tied up with the whole problem of apartheid in South

Africa, and cannot be totally isolated from it,” the article concluded, 64

ACOA had many representatives on the committee that fought for Civil Rights in the United States. The issue of apartheid appeared inseparable from the central tenets of the United States Civil Rights Movement. The Civil Rights Movement in the United

States fought for equality in all aspects of life, for all citizens, regardless of their skin color. Although African-Americans competed in the Olympics under the US flag, they still faced discrimination in wider American society. In the South, public places including restaurants, restrooms, and drinking fountains were—in a fashion similar to apartheid

South Africa—segregated along racial lines. Martin Luther King Jr., Eleanor Roosevelt,

George Houser, Bayard Rustin, and Bill Sutherland were all members of ACOA as well as strong activist for the Civil Rights movement. Each of these members sponsored an international “Declaration of Conscience on South Africa.” This declaration asked the

33 world leaders to join the fight against the Union of South Africa and “organized inhumanity of the government.”65

John A. Williams, a prominent ACOA member, highlighted the example of the

South African Amateur Weightlifting Federation (SAAWF), 66 open to all, no matter their race. Williams explained to Brundage that the SAAWF, had not been invited to send athletes to compete in both the 1956 Melbourne Games and the 1960 Rome Olympic

Games due to its status as a non-racial governing body. Williams continued, comparing the South Africa situation to ’s refusal to shake hands with in

1936.67 However, at least Hitler allowed non-whites to compete with the Aryan race, regardless if it was to attempt to prove that all races were inferior, Williams remarked. He concluded his letter to Brundage by opining:

We know here in America that full participation in sports by all athletes has done immeasurable good in race relations. Despite this, there are those in the world who feel your position as president of the International Olympic Committee, and an American is an ironic one. They prefer to ignore the progress made in the area you serve. But whatever our shortcomings, they are infinitely superior to those in the Union of South Africa, and therefore we feel you should not hesitate to use the prestige of your office to help achieve a solution to the problem of South African discrimination.68

A number of American citizens joined anti-apartheid and anti-colonization organizations in condemning the racial discrimination in South African sport. In a letter to Brundage, John Papandrew, Minister at the Community Church of New York, protested against the inclusion of an all-white South African team at the 1960 Rome

Olympic Games. With a poor grasp of historical knowledge, Papandrew argued that the reason the ancient Greeks established the Olympic Games was to bring all people together, not separate them. Thus, the inclusion of South Africa and its apartheid policies,

34 he argued, made a mockery of the Olympic ideal.69 The Baron Pierre de Coubertin created the modern Olympic Movement to allow all people to participate in the Olympic

Games regardless of their race, religion, or political beliefs to enjoy competitions. By allowing South Africa to partake in the Olympic Games, Papandrew challenged,

Brundage had allowed South Africa to make a mockery of the Games. Marshall

Knappen, another United States citizen, also wrote to Brundage protesting SANOC’s continued membership in the Olympic Movement. Knappen was a former official, as well fan of the Olympic Movement. He argued that it was important to make sure that the fundamental rules were followed, allowing for fair play and good sportsmanship. Knappen concluded that SANOC violated the Olympic ideal since they discriminated against non-whites. In his typically brash and terse manner, Brundage responded to this barrage of letters with the common refrain: “no discrimination is allowed against any country or person on grounds of race, religion or politics.”70 His continued assurance that the IOC had full trust in the SANOC to provide a racially diverse team to the Olympic Games appeared incredulous to international observers.

South Africa’s racial discrimination in sports naturally piqued the interest of prominent athletes and celebratory figures. Jackie Robinson, the first African-American to play in professional baseball’s Major Leagues in the twentieth century, expressed his hope that the IOC would take a stand against the racial discrimination tolerated and practiced by SANOC and the South African government. As an athlete, who had spent his entire professional baseball career breaking racial barriers and leading the fight for racial equality, Robinson fully supported the efforts of non-white athletes in South Africa who were trying to break racial barriers in their own country. “Sport competition is a

35 uniquely non-racial activity. Only performance counts. Athletes at all levels must therefore be free to compete against equals or near-equals. To restrict competition within racial groups is to restrict ultimate performance,” Robinson asserted.71 He knew the struggle and effects of racial discrimination in sport. He knew what it was like to not be able to show his full potential. Robinson originally played baseball in the Negro League because, at that time, blacks did not have the opportunity to play in the white-only Major

Leagues. Through the ingenuity and fair-mindedness of Brooklyn Dodgers president,

Branch Rickey, Robinson eventually broke the color barrier in professional baseball, even though he spent his professional career fighting racism and segregation, and trying to prove his worth. Robinson wanted the non-whites of South Africa to have the opportunities he so greatly fought for in the United States. He accused Brundage and the

IOC of tolerating the South African government’s racist and politicized sports system.

Despite the persistent efforts of the United States anti-apartheid movement, a number of United States organizations, administrators, and private citizens sympathized with the South African government and even supported the continuation of their discriminatory practices. Robert E. Kennedy, assistant track coach at the University of

Connecticut, captured the pro-Pretoria sentiment prevalent within the U.S., stating that the situation in South Africa was not bad at all, and that other countries discriminate racially in a far more open and egregious manner. Kennedy, who toured South Africa and witnessed the treatment of non-white athletes, offered his support to South Africa: “I would say, without reservation, that the non-white was given equal opportunity to avail themselves of the knowledge I had to offer.”72 He continued saying that the sporting federations in South Africa were very helpful, making sure his competitions with non-

36 whites went smoothly. He explained that, despite SAN-ROC’s claims, the non-whites had better sporting facilities then the non-whites back in the United States He also explained that, though the non-whites he saw compete were good athletes, they were nowhere near

Olympic-level. Kennedy explained that he would support SANOC and their fight to remain in the Olympic Movement.73

Kennedy’s comments illustrated the unfortunate truth that the United States, like

South Africa, was fighting their own discriminatory demons. At the time anti-apartheid groups started to form, Jim Crow de jure and de facto segregation laws were still in existence in the United States These laws did not allow African-Americans and whites to eat in the same room, use the same restroom facilities, or have interracial marriages.74

Unlike South Africa, whose Afrikaner government enforced discriminatory laws on a national scale, the United States’ segregationist policies mostly affected Southern states.

The apartheid issue arrived at the cusp of the Civil Rights Movement. This movement mostly consisted of non-violent protests, resulting in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which ended segregation in public places, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which allowed

African-Americans to vote.75 It is no mystery why United States citizens took strong views either against, or in support of, apartheid in South Africa. America was fighting its own battles, making both sides of the controversy want to lend a helping hand to South

Africa. The issue of racial segregation in South African sport was clearly not just a sports issue.

The IOC had a decision to make. Though Brundage fought hard to keep South

Africa in the Olympic Movement, on January 28, 1964,76 the Japanese Olympic

Organizing Committee revoked South Africa’s invitation to the 1964 Tokyo Games. Ira

37

G. Emery had stated years before the 1964 Games, “it is going to be a slow battle, but I am convinced that ultimately at least when the Tokyo Games are held, South Africa will have overcome the racial prejudice in sport, at any rate.”77 Unfortunately, for South

Africa, the Japanese Olympic organizers did not view their “progress” as being sufficient.

Despite Emery’s protestations, South Africa continued the practice of apartheid in sport, as well as all other aspects of living:

It was pointed out to the representatives of the South Africa N.O.C. by a number of speakers at the I.O.C. Meeting at Baden-Baden that to fulfill this obligation ot (sic) was essential that it should collectively, clearly and publicly disassociate itself from the policy of non- competition in sport in South Africa between whites and nonwhites, and would continue to urge this point of view. The International Olympic Committee considers that the South African N.O.C. has not carried out this obligation adequately. Under these circumstances, the resolution passed at Baden-Baden still stands and the invitation to the South African team to compete in Tokyo is withdrawn.78

United States reactions ranged on the subject. For some, like the ADA and ACOA, this decision was a long time coming, and was necessary to provoke SANOC officials to bring about serious change in South African sport. Others angrily decried the exclusion of

South Africa from the Tokyo Games as a grave injustice and an intrusion of politics into the apolitical realm of sport. As Charles Soltis, Professor of Management at Kent

University in Ohio, fumed: “the vote . . . to bar South Africa from participation in the

Olympic Games was not in the spirit of the modern Olympiads and should have never occurred.”79 The mixed reactions from South Africa’s revoked invitation to the 1964

Tokyo Games would build as the 1968 Mexico Games approached.

38

CHAPTER 3

RISE OF THE UNITED STATES ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT AND THE 1968 OLYMPIC GAMES

Early Rise of United States Anti-Apartheid Movement

On August 28, 1963, Martin Luther King Jr., an advocate for Civil Rights and equality both in the United States and across the globe, marched on Washington. In a speech that occupies a place in the annuls of United States history, Dr. King explained that although slavery had long been abolished, African-Americans were still not free in the United States and they were “badly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the chains of discrimination.” Dr. King “dreamt” that people would be judged by their character and what they contributed to society rather than by their race.1

Dr. King cast his gaze toward the plight of people of color outside of the United

States. In particular, he strongly condemned apartheid in South Africa. Appalled by the systematic oppression that the non-white majority faced under the Afrikaner ruling

National Party, Dr. King agreed to serve on the American Committee on Africa, which advocated for the abrogation of all apartheid legislation, as well as the restoration of full political and social rights for all South Africans rights. With Dr. King’s high-profile public support, the American Committee on Africa pushed the United States government to acknowledge the damage and injustice that apartheid had wrought. Dr. King received many letters of support for the fight to abolish apartheid. One letter came from Philip

Randolph, chairman for the Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid. He advised that

39 committee would start a campaign asking Americans to withdraw their money from both

Chase Manhattan and First National City banks in protest of their continued business and trading practices with both the South African government and South African corporations. According to Randolph, a pilot protest undertaken months earlier showed success. He explained this protest would make it clear to the US government that the

American public would no longer stand for the injustice happening in South Africa.2 On

March 7, 1967, the American Committee on Africa also wrote a letter explaining that they would be protesting outside Chase Manhattan Bank for the continuing support and loans the bank gave to the South African Government.3 Although apartheid drew increased international scrutiny, many United States banks continued to trade and deal openly with the South African government. Harry Belafonte, an American Committee on

Africa member, exclaimed that the US government’s disavowal of how South Africa treated its non-white citizenry, made America complicit in the persecution. “How could other countries truly believe the United States stood for racial equality if they kept supporting South Africa by continuing monetary funding from their banks?” Belafonte questioned.4

The struggle for the dissolution of apartheid may have started within South

Africa, but the anti-apartheid movement soon took on global dimensions. Within the framework of the , Western and non-Western governments had earlier taken their first major step against apartheid in 1950 through the passage of Resolution

395(V) which declared that "a policy of 'racial segregation' (apartheid) is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination.”5 This resolution remained in accordance with earlier resolutions made on race and discrimination, such as Resolution 103 (I) titled

40

Persecution and Discrimination, and Resolution 217 (III) titled International Bill of

Human Rights. The General Assembly created Resolution 103 (I) during its inaugural at session in 1946 in order to “put an immediate end to religious and so-called racial persecution and discrimination” and also to “call on the Governments and responsible authorities to conform both to the letter and to the spirit of the Charter of the United

Nations, and to take the most prompt and energetic steps to that end.”6 The drafting and implantation of a series of further resolutions took aim at the South African government’s flagrant discrimination of people of color.7

On March 21, 1960, the issue of South African apartheid legislation generated considerable international media exposure following the murder of sixty-nine unarmed

African protestors by forces. The , prompted the U.N. General Assembly to hold an emergency meeting calling for the South African government to abandon its policy of apartheid before more blood spilled.8 Incensed by the South African government’s intransigence, the U.N. subsequently created the Special

Committee on the Policies of Apartheid in 1963, which formally requested South Africa to cease the practice of apartheid entirely. The U.N. also passed a series of resolutions that prohibited the sale of military hardware to South Africa.9 The South African

Government’s failure to make any noticeable movement towards the abolishment of apartheid later forced the U.N. General Assembly in 1966 to demand all of its member- states to stop economic backing of South Africa:

To discourage immediately the establishment of closer economic and financial relations with South Africa, particularly in investment and trade, and also to discourage loans by banks in their countries to the Government of South Africa or South African companies, and to submit reports to the Secretary-General on steps taken in this respect,

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such reports to be transmitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and the Special Committee.10

Unlike the U.N. that categorically denounced South African apartheid, the

International Olympic Committee (IOC) proved decidedly indifferent over whether to remove South Africa from the Olympic Movement throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The

Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee took the intuitive in 1964 by refusing to invite

South Africa to the Games. IOC president Avery Brundage and his colleagues believed that the argument for South Africa’s inclusion came down to whether South Africa violated the humanitarian principles espoused by the Olympic Charter, or whether the

IOC would violate its own statues by mixing politics with sport in banning South Africa from Olympic competition. On the eve of the 1968 in Mexico

City, the question of South Africa’s Olympic participation reappeared as a major agenda item and one that, predictably, generated a considerable amount of interest.

The Rise of the United States Anti-Apartheid Movement

During the early 1960s, a fledging United States anti-apartheid emerged. United

States citizens rallied alongside non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the

Council on African Affairs, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), and the American

Committee on Africa (ACOA), in protest of apartheid under the heel of the South African government. Collectively, anti-apartheid sympathizers began organizing sit-ins and mass- public protests in an effort to draw attention to the human rights violations occurring in

South Africa. United States anti-apartheid supporters soon turned their attention to the

Olympic Movement in order to heighten the international pressure on the South African government.

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Throughout the 1960s, a flood of anti-apartheid advocates lobbied members of both the IOC and the United States Olympic Committee (USOC). Vera Herbstman,

United States citizen, pleaded with Avery Brundage to expel South Africa from the

Olympic Movement. “The United States stands as an example to all Nations of the

World, as the place where dissatisfied and outcast people sought and found refuges—and freedom—from those very Nations with which we compete in the Olympics!” She concluded her passionate appeal by challenging Brundage to lead by example and not allow South Africa and its apartheid policies back into the Olympic Games.11 Douglas

Roby, president of the USOC, also received a deluge of correspondences on the subject.

One anti-apartheid sympathizer called upon the USOC to support the growing international movement to expel South Africa from the Olympic Games:

If the Olympic Committee seriously respects the Olympic Charter, it cannot possibly allow South Africa to participate, since it is obvious that Vorster’s new sports policy is obviously going against the Olympic Charter, which states that no discrimination is allowed against any person on grounds of color, and that National Olympic Committees must be free of political pressures.12

The anti-apartheid NGOs used their organizational resources in the months leading up to the Mexico City Games to support South Africa’s permanent Olympic exclusion. George M. Houser, Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa, sent a letter to Douglas Roby, asking in “empathetic terms for the US Olympic

Committee to vote against the lifting of the suspension against South Africa as long as

South Africa’s policy in sports remains what it is.”13 The letter included twenty-four signatures and statements of prominent United States athletes such as African-American hall of famer baseball star Jackie Robinson, in protest against the growing possibility of

South Africa’s inclusion in the Olympic Movement. Robinson’s statement raised the

43 prospect of black African nations withdrawing from the Olympic as part of a mass protest against South Africa’s continued participation in the Games. The statement proclaimed that “American athletes, too, are joining the international protest against possible lifting of the ban on South Africa and are particularly concerned about the United States vote in the current ballot.”14 The statement continued:

The South African Prime Minister has said, concerning segregation in South Africa, there can be ‘no compromise, negotiations, or abandonment of principles.’ This means the practice of segregation in sports and spectators will continue. It means that nonwhite athletes must still train with inferior facilities and will not compete in the best stadiums. If the International Olympic Committee accepts South African tokenism, it will appear that international sportsmen condone South Africa’s apartheid policy. To the nonwhite majority in South Africa it will be just another indication that the world is willing to compromise with the indignity of white supremacy.

The twenty-four signatories of the document included and Tommy Smith, who gained international prominence at the Mexico Games for famously raising their fists on the winner’s podiums in defiance of racial segregation and racism both within the

United States and across the globe.

Like the American Committee on Africa, the ADA also took aim at the Olympic

Movement by highlighting the plight of non-white athletes suffering under the weight of apartheid legislation in South Africa. Leon Shull, National Director for the ADA, wrote to Avery Brundage advising the IOC president that South Africa’s apartheid laws violated the Olympic Charter. “It appears clear to me that the Pretoria Government's

‘New Sports Policy’ patently circumvents the tenor, spirit and legality of the Olympic

Charter . . . . I would strongly urge you not to accept the 'New Sports Policy" that would allow South African participation in the 1968 Olympics.”15 The “New Sports Policy” represented a deliberate gambit of behalf of the South African government to hoodwink

44 international observers into believing that South Africa encouraged racially mixed teams.

Unconvinced, the Saint Louis Committee on Africa, an affiliate of the American

Committee on Africa, released a statement on March 18, 1968, demanding that South

Africa not be allowed to participate in the 1968 Mexico Games on the grounds that “non- white African athletes can never achieve full equality within South Africa under the evil racist Apartheid system.”16

The 1967 IOC Tour to South Africa

The IOC proved decidedly reluctant to deal with the issue of apartheid in South

Africa. As the issue of apartheid generated greater international exposure, however,

Brundage and the IOC faced more pressure to address the issue of racial segregation in sports. At its 64th Session held in Rome, in 1966, the IOC formally decided to establish a sub-committee comprised of Ireland’s Lord David Killanin (Chairman),

Reginald Stanley Alexander (Kenya), and Sir Adetokumbo Ademola (Nigeria) to investigate the widespread claims that South African sport was corrupt and violated the

Olympic Charter by practicing racial segregation.17 Prior to the sub-committee’s departure, the IOC, at its 65th Session in Teheran, Iran, demanded that the South African

National Olympic Committee (SANOC) send a multi-racial team to the 1968 Mexico

City Olympics. Further, the IOC insisted that the team must travel and live together during the Olympic Games:18

The International Olympic Committee on the basis of reports presented to its notes progress by South African National Olympic Committee in relation to the problem of racial segregation in sport in South Africa and resolves that its Commission on South Africa proceed to that country not later than the end of August, 1967 and submit its report to the President of the I.O.C. by the end of September, 1967 for consideration by the International Olympic Committee at Grenoble in February, 1968.19

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Fearful of permanent exclusion from the Olympic Games, SANOC agreed to some concessions. “Whereas previously South Africa’s participation in the Games was to have been on the basis of non-whites representing non-whites and whites representing whites, in future non-whites and whites will would form one team to represent South Africa,” it reassured.20 SANOC claimed it boosted the support of the South African government to send a racially mixed team to compete in Mexico City however, “it desires that others, when visiting South Africa, comply with our practice, i.e. within our borders Whites compete against Whites and Non-Whites against Non-Whites.”21

Under Brundage’s leadership, the IOC stated it was only concerned with issues of racial discrimination and segregation in sport. Thus, if the IOC Fact Finding Commission reported that sport was available to all who wanted to participate, irrespective of abuses and discriminations in other areas of South African life, South Africa would be eligible for the 1968 Mexico City Games. “The Commission set out to establish merely whether the Olympic rules and regulations are being observed and whether every athlete, whatever his race, has the possibility of competing for his country in the Olympic

Games.”22

In September 1967, following its ten-day in-country investigation the IOC Fact

Finding Commission produced a detailed report stated that Prime Minister Balthazar

Johannes Vorster attended meetings with Killanin, Alexander, and Ademola, in order to show his eagerness to support South Africa’s continued participation in the Olympic

Games. Vorster expressed his personal support for the Teheran proposal and the formation of a multi-racial South African team, but remained adamant that his government would not support mixed race Olympic trials. “The Prime Minister said that

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South Africa was very eager to compete in the Olympic Games, but not under false colours if this meant integrated sport in South Africa. If this were the case they would prefer to stay out.”23 Vorster concluded his meeting with the IOC emissaries with the sentiment that “the responsibility now rested with the I.O.C. as to whether Non-Whites and Whites were now to be prevented from competing.”24

The Report of the IOC Commission on South Africa created a very thorough outline of the conditions in South Africa, in the sporting communities and all other communities as well. The Report included: an outline of South Africa’s legislation, the

Constitution of SANOC, affiliated and other bodies, a section on facilities, training, coaching, and competitions, international federations, method of selection, political interference in sport, attitude of sportsmen, attitude of sportsmen outside of South Africa, outside influences, and a summary of facts. The outline of South Africa’s legislation included policies such as the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No. 25 of 1945, which controlled the areas that non-whites could live in. This act exemplified the intensity of the apartheid policy, controlling matters as simple as where and what alcoholic beverages non-whites could drink. The Reservations of Separate Amenities Act,

1953, separated common areas for whites and non-whites, including which vehicles of transportation they could use. Lastly, the Fact Finding Report included the Group Areas

Act, No. 36, 1966, which controlled the areas whites and non-whites could be in together.

Killanin, Alexander, and Ademola explained that even though each legislation did not specifically mention the separation of whites and non-whites in sport, these Acts crossed over into the sporting world.25

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The section on the Constitution of SANOC noted that the organization boasted few non-white members of SANOC “not because of direct legislation in regard to sport but owing to general legislation to which this report has already referred.”26 The report stated that SANOC did affiliate with mixed race associations who had a high number of non-white members. These associations included: the South African Amateur Athletic

Union, the South African Boxing Association, the South African Amateur Weightlifting

Union, and the Football Association of South Africa. The report also stated that no other

Olympic sport associations had restrictions on who can join or affiliate:

The South Africans are sport loving people and sports organisations abound all over the country. The Commission interviewed members of many sports organisations, unions and clubs. The Commission ventures to say that there are more sports organisations in South Africa than in many other countries known to members. Not many of these bodies, however, presented the Commission with their Constitutions. In all, twenty-two Constitutions of sports organisations, including that of SANOC itself, were put in evidence and the Commission has examined them in detail. The Constitution of SANOC (Appendix M) is a simple document of twenty-four medium size pages and it is in no way different to Constitutions of other National Olympic Committees members have been privileged to read. There is nothing discriminatory in its provisions.27

The IOC Commission also visited multiple training and competition facilities, however, due to the brevity of time the Commission stayed in South Africa, they did not feel they were able to “report in detail on such an extensive subject.”28 The Commission stated that the training facilities were arguably more favorable than those in other black

African countries. The report noted that white training facilities were in better condition than non-white training facilities due to the lack of “meaningful development expenditure.”29 The Commission also noted that white training facilities were in better condition because whites paid membership fees to upkeep their facilities whereas non-

48 whites did not.30 The failure of IOC members Killanin, Alexander, and Ademola visit federations not internationally recognized helped solidify the fallacy that South Africa had created integrated, multi-racial sports. After all, people of color ran non- internationally recognized sports federations; thus, they would have shed a different light on the true situations happening in sport.

The method of selection proved an exceedingly contentious question because the government made it clear that “trials between whites and non-whites either inside or outside South Africa will not be permitted.”31 The SANOC wanted the IOC Commission to understand that, although they did not have issues with mixed trials, they could not go against the laws of their government. As such, the SANOC advised the IOC that white and non-white members of the team will be picked in separate trials.32

After ten days in South Africa, touring athletic centers in the country, and interviewing around one-hundred fifty sports administrators,33 the members of the IOC

Fact Finding Commission concluded that since South Africa had demonstrated significant organizational and administrative changes, the SANOC should be formally invited to send a team to the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games.34 “The overwhelming evidence from sports administrators and competitors of all communities in inside

South Africa is that the Teheran proposals of SANOC are an acceptable basis for a multi- racial team to the Mexico Games,” the Fact Finding commission concluded.35

The Growing Tension within the United States as the Mexico City Games Draw Near

As the IOC concluded its investigatory Fact-Finding mission, both Avery

Brundage and Douglas Roby received a flurry of letters from concerned United States citizens expressing radically different attitudes on the subject of South Africa’s Olympic

49 participation. Reflecting upon a recent visit to South Africa, Arnold Eddy, a travel consultant from Los Angeles, enthused that the South African government is “doing a better job and a more Christian job then some of the rest of us.”36 Other pro-South

African correspondences displayed a deliberately racist tone. “Let the Nigro (sic) go to hell,” Sterling A. Hutt, an angry United States citizen, fumed.37

On the other side of the spectrum, former African-American baseball star Jackie

Robinson advised USOC president Roby that he remained “unalterably opposed to South

Africa’s inclusion” in the 1968 Mexico City Games.38 Robinson insisted that, contrary to the government’s claims, apartheid remained extremely active in South Africa. He also highlighted the numerous examples of non-white South Africans who fled their homeland and competes for other countries:

Ironically Precious Mackenzie, a South African non-white, won a in weightlifting for Britain in the recent Commonwealth Games. He could not participate in South Africa. Basil Dolivera, a famed cricketer is a member of the team representing England because he could not even try out for a South African team. Papwa Swegolum, who has won the Dutch Open twice, cannot compete in golf tournaments in South Africa against white participants. Hartley Davis has lifted the heaviest weights as a featherweight in South Africa, but cannot be recognized as champion because he is non-white. This is only a brief mention of the way discrimination affects sports in South Africa. The list of abuses could be further extended.39

Robinson also recounted a December 12-14, 1966 meeting with the Supreme Council for

Sport in Africa in which all members agreed to “subject their decision to participate in the 1968 Games to the reservation that no racialist team from South Africa takes part.”40

Robinson called upon Roby and the USOC to take the same stance as the Supreme

Council, arguing that since “the American teams are interracial, no compromise on this will be tolerated.” Robinson included thirty-one names of supporters for South Africa’s

50 exclusion, including actors, television personalities, athletes, writers, and ministers. The issue of racial segregation in South African sport had reached far beyond the athletic world.

Not all United States supporters of the anti-apartheid movement were famous athletes or occupied prestigious positions. United States citizen Charles G. Hitchcock expressed to Roby his concern with South Africa’s reentry to the Olympic Games. He stated that after much research and background reading he had done on South Africa, he felt “very strongly that Principle 1, Clause 25 of the Olympic Charter will be defied again.” Hitchcock continued: “Prime Minister Vorster has attempted to circumvent the spirit of the Olympics with a façade of minor technical changes in the sports policy of

South Africa.”41 Joseph and Carol Schwab, supporters of the American Committee on

Africa also addressed a letter to Roby. “We are not fooled—and trust that you are not fooled either—by South Africa’s promise to send a racially mixed team to the Olympics; obviously black athletes do not have an opportunity equal to that of whites to qualify for a South African team,” they argued.42 The letters continued to flood Roby’s desk. In another correspondence, Margret Flory, Executive Secretary of the Office of Student

World Relations at the United Presbyterian Church in the United States, challenged both

Roby and his fellow compatriot on the IOC, president Avery Brundage, to not allow

South Africa back into the Olympic Movement. “We believe that Americans who are concerned about international peace and harmony, as well as true sportsmanship and brotherhood, should not allow South Africa to compete in the Olympics as long as her racial policies are practiced in sports,” Flory reasoned.43 Flory’s statement added true sentiment to what was occurring in the United States in the 1960’s. As the Civil Rights

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Movement waged on, the country continued to divide between those who sought peace and “brotherhood” and those who saw non-whites as a threat to the “American way of life”.

Arne Sovik, Executive Secretary for the Board of World Missions for the

Lutheran Church in America, expressed to Brundage that his church abhorred the South

African government’s support and defense of apartheid legislation. “As Christians,”

Sovik opined, “we deeply deplore the racial policies of the government of South Africa and who believe in the unity of the human race under God, we would urge that the

International Olympic Committee does not re-admit South Africa to Olympic competition until there is evidence of racial integration in athletics in South Africa itself.”44 Sovik not only called for racial integration in the current South African Olympic team, but in all of

South African sport.

After the decision in 1964 by the Japanese Olympic Organizing Committee to disinvite South Africa to the Tokyo Games, international observers waited anxiously to see what the fate of South Africa would be for the 1968 Mexico Games. Following the

Fact Finding Committee’s return from South Africa in 1967, word began to spread that the IOC might officially invite South Africa to participate in the high altitudes of Mexico

City. The prospect of South Africa reappearing on the Olympic stage caused a variety of different emotions. At this time, the Civil Rights Movement entered into its final stages, causing higher racial tension in certain parts of the United States. felt a bond between themselves and non-whites in South Africa. For the past century, African

Americans had also suffered flagrant discrimination and open segregation, including being barred from certain restaurants, drinking from “black only” water fountains, using

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“color only” restrooms, and sitting in the back of the bus, all because of their skin color.

Thus, when news of the South Africa’s possible reinstatement to the 1968 Mexico Games broke, a group of African American athletes called for a boycott of the Olympic Games.

In a campaign called the Olympic Project for Human Rights (OPHR), African-American athletes stood up against the prejudices that followed them in their everyday lives. Lee

Evans, 400-meter sprinter, explained that the movement started when none of the

African-American athletes were allowed to rent housing near their university. He explained that Dr. Harry Edwards, lead organizer for OPHR found out about the athletes struggles and offered to help their campaign.45 The members of OPHR believed that black athletes were being used by the US government to convince the world how accepting America was of all races. In their opening statement, OPHR exclaimed:

We must no longer allow this country to use . . . a few “Negroes” to point out to the world how much progress she has made in solving her racial problems when the oppression of Afro-Americans is greater than it ever was. We must no longer allow the Sports World to pat itself on the back as a citadel of racial justice when the racial injustices of the sports industry are infamously legendary...[A]ny black person who allows himself to be used in the above matter . . . . is a traitor to his country because he allows racist whites the luxury of resting assured that those in the ghettos are there because that is where they want to be . . . So we ask why should we run in Mexico only to crawl home?46

Not all African-American athletes supported the OPHR’s cause. Famed four-time

Olympic gold medalist from the infamous 1936 Berlin Games, Jesse Owens, expressed his disapproval of the OPHR’s plans to boycott the Mexico City Olympics in protest.

Owens, arguably the most decorated African American Olympian of all time, explained that he believed a boycott against the Olympic Games was a poor decision. He explained

“people don’t care who is on the team. They care about what the team is doing.”47

Clarence Ray, a United States Olympic sprinter, supported Owen’s assertion, explaining

53 that a boycott would destroy unity in the United States. “The US should be represented by the best athletes regardless of race, creed color, or religion. I think a boycott will exploit the fact that there is a racial problem in the US but on the other had we are not alone in racial differences as other countries have the same problem . . . By division we show disunity and America’s image will be destroyed. I am an American first, last and always,” Ray averred.48

United States Response to South Africa’s Welcome Back into the Olympic Movement

On February 15, 1968, Avery Brundage announced that the IOC, with “an absolute majority,” had voted to invite South Africa back into the Olympic Movement.

When news broke of South Africa’s admission back into the Olympic Games, the

Supreme Council for called for United States athletes to support an international boycott of the Mexico City Games and stated they “deserve nothing but support from ‘all American Athletes.’”49 George M. Houser, Methodist minister and executive director of the American Committee on Africa, sent a telegram to Douglas

Roby expressing his extreme disappointment. The “US Olympic Committee has an obligation to make vote public (sic), we hope all American athletes will boycott

Olympics in solidarity with African nations against apartheid.”50 Leonard H. West III, a member of the Board of Directors for the African Cultural Center Incorporated, responded to Brundage’s announcement expressing his Boards “shock and utter dismay” at South Africa’s reinstatement to the Olympic Movement. “Because of this horrible and completely unwarranted decision by the IOC, with American support,” West blustered,

“it is the decision of this organization to end all support for, the United States Olympic

Committee, and to encourage through the mails, all our members to boycott the United

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States Olympic Committee and all its functions, until they go on record as opposed to this most unfortunate decision of the IOC, and until they successfully get that decision reversed.”51 West repeated a question asked by the Ethiopian Sports Confederation:

“What has the IOC (and the US Olympic Committee) achieved if the status quo is maintained in South Africa after the Mexico Games?” He concluded his letter “Shame on the US Olympic Committee!!!” The support that Douglas Roby and the USOC lent to

SANOC was called into question.

Other members of the American public expressed their feelings on the subject but from a radically different perspective. Marshall Ludwig penned a letter to Roby noting his growing fear that that a boycott might now occur due to the most recent decision of the IOC. The “so-called negro militants are out to disrupt the games and the political conventions this year,” Ludwig waxed hysterical. He insisted that these people should be

“hanged for their crimes of violence and to top it all; these stooges have recently boycotted the NYAC indoor games at the new Madison Square Garden by declaring that the NYAC fails to admit negroes and Jews as members.”52 Though Ludwig’s letter seemed to be heading into the direction of support for the IOC’s decision to allow South

Africa to participate in the 1968 Mexico Games due to the recent boycotts of the New

York Athletic Club (NYAC), he took a sharp turn stating that he only detested athletes who supported an American boycott. Ludwig noted his opposition to South Africa’s readmission into the Olympic Movement, remarking that the apartheid policy “deprived negroes of their basic rights including those of athletic competition. This policy equals that of slavery that the negroes here in America faced during the Civil War and before the war.” Ludwig ended his statements explaining how proud he was to live in Los Angeles,

55 and if Los Angeles were to host the Games again, he would hope that they could do so knowing that all “countries and thier (sic) athletes are to compete on equal basis. This then is the true ideal spirit and sportsmanship pride that is the Olympic Games.” Dick

Cockrell, member of the Church of the Good Shepherd and fellow church member of

Douglas Roby, called out the contradictions at play. He stated that he did not understand how the IOC could not see the harm they were causing to both the white and black communities by allowing South Africa to participate in the Games:

The longer this contradiction continues the greater the bloodshed and the hatred that will pour forth in a racial war. I find greater compassion for and the African Nations than I do for our own countrymen that are so insecure and irrational—indeed neurotic and paranoid that they can applaud South Africa’s tyranny in this manner. Doug, America is a confused mess of white racism and your Olympic Committee is no exception.53

The letters of protest against the IOC’s decision to allow South Africa into the

1968 Games continued to pour onto Douglas Roby’s desk. George M. Houser sent a telegram to Roby asking whether he “will publically support the IOC Executive

Committee recommendation for South African withdrawal from Olympic Games?”54

Beverly Baker Kelly, a resident of New York City, wrote that she protested against South

Africa’s participation due to the hoax of the “New Sports Policy.” She stated that this policy still allowed for racial segregation because the athletes were being chosen “only after racially segregated trial competition.” She asked the IOC not to have any

“sympathy” for South Africa and not allow them into the Olympic Games in 1968.55

Though some citizens felt that the IOC had made a poor decision by allowing

South Africa to participate in the Mexico City Games, the New York Times published an article in support for the IOC’s ruling. The looming international Olympic boycott, the

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New York Times reasoned, illustrated the “refusal of African nations to live by accepted rules of international conduct. They say, in effect: Run this show our way or we won’t play.”56 The article conceded that South Africa still had work to do to dissolve segregation in the country; however, it believed the government had taken a step in the right direction. The Los Angeles Times also expressed its opposition to a proposed boycott of the Mexico City Games. The “intrusion of international politics is nothing new in the Olympics. But the games have continued in their great tradition of competition and sportsmanship among individual athletes from throughout the world. The 1968 Olympics must go on as scheduled in Mexico City. A boycott by one or a number of nations will hurt the athletes who stay home far more than it will the Olympic Games.”57

Those articles, however, did not express the sentiments of every American. David

H. Rubenstein, Associate Secretary for Africa at the United Church Board for World

Ministries, expressed to Roby that he too remained upset about South Africa’s admission back into the Games. He noted the IOC knew the athletes from South Africa would be chosen in separate trials, and that non-white athletes who did not “belong to the approved, that is to say segregated, sports organizations, will not be included.” He concluded by stating that the IOC should reevaluate its decision to allow South Africa back into the Olympic Movement, therefore African nations, and those who supported the fight against apartheid, would not have to boycott the 1968 Olympic Games.58 United

States resident, Forrest Johnson, exclaimed, “since the United States exercises a leadership role in Olympic activities I hope you will use your important office to insure that our country is not further alienated form people of color.”59

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Avery Brundage responded to the numerous letters of disappointment that he received; defending that there was a misunderstanding of the true role of the IOC. The

IOC “did not approve the Government of South Africa nor its political policies. It does not deal with governments nor with the political policies of any country and every member stands firmly against discrimination of any kind in sports. The Olympic Games are contests between individuals and not between nations, notwithstanding the unofficial and misleading point scores published.” Brundage continued to defend that for the first time in South African history, non-whites would have the opportunity to participate in the

Olympic Games. He assured those who did not agree with the decision that this invitation was only to the 1968 Games, and that South Africa’s sports policy would be reviewed again before the 1972 Games scheduled to be held in , Germany. Brundage shunned the word boycott, exclaiming that it was a “political word not used in Olympic circles.”60 “The IOC cannot very well reform the world; it can only set, in the Olympic

Games, a good example for the politicians to follow,”61 Brundage concluded.

Brundage's 1968 Announcement and United States Response of South Africa’s

Exclusion from the Olympic Games

On April 24, 1968, following months of criticism and growing fears of an international boycott of the Olympic Games, IOC president Avery Brundage went on record stating that it was both in everyone’s best interest, and for the safety of the South

African team, that South Africa’s invitation to the 1968 Mexico Games be revoked. In a statement, Brundage explained that the IOC had not bent to the threat of a mass-African boycott from the 1968 Games, but rather the IOC’s decision was based on the safety of all athletes attending the Games:

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The only point in the lengthy discussions on which the nine members of the Executive Board could agree, was, that because of the explosive conditions throughout the world and the ugly demonstrations, rioting, and other violent happenings in may different countries during the last sixty days, there was actual danger if a South African team appeared at the Games” he noted somberly . . . Since our primary concern is the assembly of the youth of all the 125 countries now active in the Olympic Movement, in friendly and peaceful competition, we regret deeply the consequences for the individual participants who had hoped to take part in this Grand Festival of Youth in Mexico City. It is a sad commentary on the state of the world today.62

Over the following weeks, a number of United States citizens wrote in both support and also opposition to Brundage’s announcement that South Africa would be denied entry to the Mexico City Olympic Games. Don J. McCrery wrote that he completely disagreed with the IOC’s decision to disallow South Africa from competing at the Games. He explained the hypocrisy of it and suggested that the IOC had fallen victim to the wishes of Communist countries, stating, “it is my understanding that politics are to play no part in the Games. What right have we to prescribe South Africa’s social structure while we by implication approve the Iron Curtain countries.”63 Others expressed their opposition at the IOC’s decision to introduce politics into sport. In a letter to Arthur

G. Lentz, Executive Director of the USOC, Jeff Kellogg explained that he believed South

Africa should not be barred from the Olympics because the Olympic Games was an athletic event and not a political one. He argued, “the object of the Olympic Games is to further the understanding of nations, but with the exclusion of countries from the

Olympic Games the most important goal of the Olympic Games is destroyed.”64

Although the Olympic Games have never been without political influence, American sympathizers towards South Africa strongly believed that politics should play no role in

59 sport, and that the athletes of South Africa should not be punished for their governments political policies.

Douglas Roby’s Attitudes Towards Apartheid and South African Sport

Born in 1898 in Port Tobacco, Maryland, Douglas Roby became a staple in the

Olympic Movement. He held high administrative positions in the Amateur Athletic

Union (AAU), the USOC, and the IOC. Roby became the AAU president from 1951-

1953, during which time he began his role as a United States representative to the IOC in

1952-1986, vice-president of the USOC from 1953-1965, and later president of the

USOC from 1965-1968.65 As President of the USOC and a long-serving United States representative to the IOC, he had a lot of responsibility because the decisions he made represented the United States as a whole. When the IOC voted following the publication of the Fact Finding Commission’s report, Roby pledged his support for South Africa’s continued Olympic participation. Roby took the liberty of personally thanking , the former African-American heavyweight-boxing champion, for telling the press he did not agree with the boycott and that “Negro athletes would make a serious mistake if they did not represent American in the Olympic Games.”66 Louis told the Herald Tribune,

“maybe they don’t have equal opportunity in America, but they are gaining it every day.

And that’s something you should realize. Things are improving. If they were going backwards, it would be different.” Roby mentioned in his letter to Louis that other prominent African-American athletes such as Jesse Owens, Rafer Johnson, Ralph Boston, and Hayes Jones expressed the same sentiments. He ended his letter stating, “there are evil forces in our country who are attempting to use racism as a means of destroying everything we have. We certainly should not let this prevail.”67

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Roby shared close ties with South Africa, cultivating personal friendships with the white sporting administrators that governed South African sport. Roby expressed his sympathy to Reginald Honey, president of the SANOC and a South African representative to the IOC, for the predicament that Honey and his colleagues found themselves in. In April 17, 1968 letter to Honey, Roby noted that he hoped “Avery will continue to support the position which the I.O.C. has taken with reference to South

Africa.”68 Like Brundage, Roby agreed that politics had no place to play in the world of sport, and he condemned the Soviet Union for rallying Third World nations and anti- apartheid activists with alleged falsehoods. After the IOC made its decision on April 24,

1968 to disinvite South Africa from the 1968 Mexico Games, Roby wrote to members of the USOC Board of Directors. He stated that after much discussion, a team from South

Africa would not be represented at the Mexico Games, “even though it may not be to the linking of all of us.”69 Reflecting on the IOC’s decision to expel South Africa from the

Olympic Movement, Roby charged, “This was all rotten politics, and in my opinion, the

Soviets got away with a big bluff.”70 “I feel that it was outrageous that the Executive

Committee of the I.O.C., which at the present time is weighted with members that think as the Soviets do, reversed the Grenoble decision regarding South Africa.”71 Roby continued to blame the Soviet Union for influencing South Africa’s expulsion from the

Olympic Games. He responded to another letter, written by Jeff Kellogg, exclaiming:

Action taken at Grenoble, France, on February 15, with sixty-six members voting, was in favor of admitting South Africa to the Mexico City Games. As a result of this decision the USSR was able to encourage a number of relatively new African nations to instigate a campaign with severe political overtones against the South African decision. The final result was that a second vote was taken and the I.O.C. reversed the decision taken on February 15 at Grenoble, France. A number of our members reversed their vote, not for what is right, but

61

as expressed by one member “due to world atmosphere”. I wish to state that I supported the South African situation and I did not reverse my vote because of present “atmosphere”, which, in many instances, is completely wrong.72

Roby continued to reply to letters of disappointment about the revocation of South

Africa’s invitation. He responded to Joseph C. Winslow, reassuring that it was not his decision to exclude South Africa from the Games. “I wish you to know that I strongly supported the resolution in favor of South Africa and I, like you, was disappointed that, for political reasons, South Africa is barred from the Mexico City Games.”73 Roby also responded to a letter written by Peter G. Kohler, who had earlier stated that he and his company regretted donating to the USOC due to the decision to expel South Africa from the Olympic Games.74 Roby proclaimed his support for South Africa and his distaste for the IOC’s decision. “I agree with your sentiments and want you to know how disappointed I was at the turn of affairs. Our first thought might be to resign and withdraw but after consideration I believe that we must continue to fight for what is right in the hope that we may someday see change,” Roby appeased.75

Over the forthcoming months, Douglas Roby responded to numerous letters from angry United States citizens insisting that it was not his decision to exclude South Africa from the Olympic Games. “The United States Olympic Committee had no part in eliminating South Africa from the forthcoming Olympic Games,” Roby pleaded. “There are three persons from the U.S.A. on the International Olympic Committee. I happen to be one of these three and I voted for the participation of South Africa in the Games. I am not positive as to how the other two United States members voted, but I have a feeling that Mr. Brundage and Mr. Garland both were in favor of the participation of South

Africa,” he continued.76

62

As the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games approached, political and racial tensions within the United States remained high. The sight of John Carlos and Tommy

Smith raising their fists in defiance prompted Douglas Roby and the USOC to officially suspend them from the United States Olympic team. “When an incident took place on the victory stand before the eyes of the world, showing disrespect for our flag and promoting a cause completely foreign to the Olympic Games, we had to do something about it and make sure this type of incident did not continue,” Roby asserted.77 “There are many problems in many part (sic) of the world and for those responsible for the promotion of the Olympic Movement to permit the Olympic Games to be used as a platform from which to express political, social, religious, or racial problems would soon make our ceremonies appear as a farce before the eyes of the world,” he sermonized.

Though both Brundage and Roby continuously stated that the Olympic Movement should not be used as a political weapon, their opposition to South Africa’s exclusion from the Olympic Movement revealed that they both brought their own political beliefs and biases to bare on IOC meetings. Unlike Roby and Brundage, the United States public appeared polarized on the question of whether South Africa should be expelled from the

Olympic Movement. Fledging anti-apartheid groups and sympathizers expressed their vocal support for South Africa’s expulsion from the Olympic Games. Others, however, evoked the Olympic Movement’s mantra of not mixing politics with sport when calling for South Africa to be included in the quadrennial Olympic Games.

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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

After South Africa’s exclusion from 1968 Mexico City Games, the South African

National Olympic Committee (SANOC) vowed to ensure their nation’s participation in future Olympic festivals. Even though it was forced to watch from the sidelines in

Mexico City, SANOC still received an invitation to attend the International Olympic

Committee (IOC) meeting in Dubrovnik in 1969. However, due to the backlash from other national Olympic committees, SANOC decided not to attend the meeting.78 Over the next few years, South Africa would face heightened resistance from the newly formed

African nations, as well as those nations that rallied in support of the anti-apartheid cause.

Collectively, Olympic member nations called for South Africa’s permanent expulsion from the Olympic Movement, applying sustained pressure on IOC president Avery

Brundage in order to achieve this goal. In May, 1970, the IOC officially expelled South

Africa during its 69th annual meeting in . “The final day of our Amsterdam session was given to deliberation and debate on the South Africa situation and this thorny question was disposed of when it was voted to expel the National Olympic Committee of

South Africa from the Olympic Family. The vote on this question was 35 for expulsion and 28 for not doing so, there being but 63 members present on the final day,” the IOC reported.79 Jean-Claude Ganga, Secretary General for the Supreme Council for Sport in

Africa, thanked Brundage for his decision to take SANOC’s Olympic violations seriously

64 and expel them from the Olympic Movement. He exclaimed, “the Olympic Movement has been accepted by the 5 because of its purity, its honesty and all that is outside political intrigue and pecuniary preoccupation; because it places spirit above know-how, mobility above fame and honor above success and because it holds a hope of a happier world, healthier and more peaceful.”80 South Africa’s expulsion represented a significant success for those nation’s committed to eradicating racial inequality.

For South Africa’s all-white Olympic officials, the IOC’s decision only represented a minor setback. Rudolf Opperman, who became president of the SANOC in

1971, eagerly wrote to Brundage, asking when South Africa could receive international recognition again. He outlined all the revisions that the SANOC had undertaken in order to regain international Olympic recognition, including his organization’s willingness to accept “three representatives of the newly-formed South African Non-White Olympic

Committee as full members of its Council.”81 Unfortunately for SANOC, Brundage stated that it was not a suitable time for South Africa to request admission back into the

Olympic Movement. “In my opinion, nothing whatsoever should be done until the

Rhodesian problem is resolved,” Brundage opined.82 He suggested that the SANOC wait patiently for anti-apartheid anger to subside. The South Africa issue stirred mixed feelings within the IOC. Though it praised South Africa for its continued efforts to promote multi-racism in sport, the IOC knew full well that it could not permit South

Africa’s reentry into the Olympic Games while the National Party still enforced discriminatory apartheid laws. As the IOC acknowledged during its 1972 annual session in Saporo, Japan: “The International Olympic Committee notes with pleasure the progress in mutual participation of Whites and Non-Whites in international competitions

65 and national administration. The International Olympic Committee hopes that this progress will continue, enabling the mixed S.A.N.O.C. to rejoin the Olympic family and the Olympic Games”83

Despite their exclusion, South Africa continued to pursue international recognition in any way possible. In 1973, the South African government held the South

African Games, sending invitations across the globe to all countries to come and participate. These Games represented a politicized attempt to show the international sporting community how accepting South Africa had become of non-whites. These

Games prompted Avery Brundage to reaffirm the IOC’s decision to expel South Africa from the Olympic Movement. In a letter sent out to all IOC members, Monique Berlioux, director of the IOC, echoed Brundage’s verdict: “The South African National Olympic

Committee was expelled in 1970 and the situation is the same today. Therefore, no official contact between this organisation and the IOC members is possible. It is essential that members should realise this, and not accept any official invitations from or in any way recognise SANOC. The same applies to your National Olympic Committees who should be advised.”84 She continued, stating that though South Africa’s international recognition in the IOC had been suspended, it was not the same for all international federations: “some international federations still recognise South Africa for international competition, some for limited competition, while others have suspended or expelled the

National Federations.”85 The IOC did not believe that SANOC should be using

“Olympic” in its title since they were no longer an Olympic organization. Reginald

Honey, South African IOC representative, responded to the IOC’s concerns stating that

SANOC used their old Olympic title in order not to confuse other nations who were sent

66 the invitation. “For very many years the registered and accepted name of the South

African body has been the S.A. Olympic and National Games Association. It has been known by no other name in South Africa. However, for some reason or another, the

I.O.C., in all its documents, has always referred to the Association as “SANOC”.

Invitations, therefore, went out under this name to avoid confusion and certainly not to claim non-existent I.O.C. recognition.”86 Honey also noted that, even though SANOC may have sent out the invitations to other NOC’s, they were not responsible for sending out individual invitations to the participants. Unfortunately for South Africa, despite the attendance of athletes from across the globe, including the United States, the Games were not successful. According to Stan Wright, chairman of the men's track and field committee of the United States Amateur Athletics Union, “The South were an attempt to project the country's programmes in a good light, but I don't think it succeeded at all.”87 This blatant attempt from South Africa to redeem its international reputation proved ineffective. South Africa remained in the international sporting wilderness.

The IOC’s decision to reaffirm South Africa’s expulsion from the Olympic

Games sent a ripple effect across other sport governing bodies. South Africa became under careful scrutiny throughout the world of sport, and fought to maintain international recognition in any way possible. Adriaan Paulen, president of the International Amateur

Athletic Federation (IAAF), expressed his thanks to the president of the South African

Amateur Athletic Union, for the work that he and his organization had done with regards to the way sports is handled in South Africa. “We would like to place on record our congratulations to the South African and its present members for

67 the efforts which they have undoubtedly made to ensure, as best they can, that those sports are carried out at every level without regard to color, race or creed,” Paulen applauded.88 Despite his initial congratulatory tone, he stated that the IAAF did not believe that sport was truly multi-racial in South Africa. He exclaimed, “we do not see that Athletics, or indeed, sport in general can be isolated from the existing laws of a country. We do not consider that truly equal opportunities to train and to participate in sport can occur in a country which discriminates generally on the basis particularly of colour.”89

SANOC continued over the next two decades to fight for Olympic inclusion.

Numerous letters to the IOC continued to pour in requesting another opportunity for

South Africa to participate in the globe’s most watched event. On May 25, 1981,

Opperman sent a request for re-affiliation into the Olympic Movement. He stated, “after twenty years of isolation and, particularly, after so much has been achieved by the South

African Olympic and National Games Association to do away with discrimination and, thereby, to comply with the principles and the spirit of the Olympic Charter, I hope that you will agree that such an application is not only warranted but highly overdue.”90 This request would not be obliged. South Africa continued to receive verbal and written support in their search for recognition. At the IOC meeting in Baden-Baden on

September 21, 1981, the meeting minutes stated that “nothing would make us happier than to be able to open the doors wide to the athletes of South Africa.”91 This sympathetic tone continued to push SANOC to request Olympic participation. Reginald Honey called the IOC’s decision to exclude South Africa into question. He stated that his country’s exclusion no longer had to do with sports, but with the broader political dynamics of

68

South Africa apartheid. “The South African National Olympic Committee has now been in the Olympic wilderness for over twenty years. It is stressed by the IOC itself that this is not due to any breach on the part of SANOC of the IOC rules, but due to the political situation prevailing in the country.” Honey argued that SANOC continued to upkeep the

Olympic ideal in sport, regardless of the laws and regulations that prevailed in the country.92

South Africa’s appeals for affiliation sparked discussion among the IOC about whether or not to send a new Fact-Finding Commission to South Africa in order to survey conditions on the ground. In 1982, Denis McIldowie, South African official, wrote to United States Olympic Committee (USOC) president Douglas Roby, requesting that a commission be sent to South Africa. He appealed: “the 1967 Commission recommended in its report that the position in South Africa should be constantly reviewed. That was in

1967—after 15 years nothing has been done to give this effect to the recommendation. As

I said, I dearly need your assistance at the present and would be most grateful if you would drop a note to the President suggesting that a Commission be sent as soon as possible.”93 South Africa was ready to come out of exile and rejoin the Olympic community in time for the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. Rudolf Opperman continued to press the issue of a Fact-Finding Commission’s visit to South Africa before the commencement Olympic Games. He explained that South Africa and its athletes had done all they could to comply with the IOC regulations. “The sports men and women have done everything within their power to do away with inequity and discrimination.”94

Opperman pleaded, “in the name of sportsmen and women of 28 million people of all colours and creeds, please do not procrastinate any further . . . not to discriminate in the

69

Olympic Games against any person or country on political, racial, or religious grounds and—as De Coubertin intended—to bring the youth of the world together despite their differences, political or otherwise.”95

Despite Opperman’s enthusiastic and heartfelt plea, South Africa would not be re- admitted to the Olympic Games until 1992, when they would finally make their appearance on the world platform in . The decision to allow South Africa back into the Olympic Movement came after the announcement from the South Africa’s government that it intended to abolish apartheid laws. The Los Angeles Times captured

South Africa’s sentiments in a 1991 article, exclaiming, “It is an important step toward ending South Africa's status as a sports pariah, banned from playing fields and arenas the world around.”96 After 28 years, South Africa had finally been accepted back into the international sporting community.

South Africa’s twenty-eight-year exclusion from the Olympic Games illustrated the politically charged nature of modern sport.97 The United States anti-apartheid movement exposed the role that politics plays in sports. Both the he IOC and the USOC received numerous correspondence against South Africa’s involvement in the Olympic

Games, putting pressure on these organizations to suspend South Africa’s participation in the Olympic Movement. Americans Avery Brundage and Douglas Roby, two sympathetic champions of South African sport, denied that their support for South Africa had anything to do with their support for apartheid. Rather, they defended that their support for South Africa had more to do with separating sports and politics. Brundage argued that Olympic Games should not be dragged into political warfare because it would ruin the true meaning behind the Olympic Games.98 Roby also shared Brundage’s

70 feelings on the matter. Roby stated in a correspondence to a distraught United States citizen, that he did not agree with the IOC’s decision to expel South Africa from the

Olympic Games. “I wish to state that I supported the South African situation and I did not reverse my vote because of present ‘atmosphere’, which, in many instances, is completely wrong,” he blustered.99

Anti-apartheid lobby groups such as the Americans for Democratic Action

(ADA), Council on African Affairs, American Committee on Africa (ACOA), and

Americans for South African Resistance (AFSAR), helped bring a voice to the United

States citizens that did not agree with South Africa’s racist regime participating in the

Olympic Games. These organizations allowed dissatisfied Americans to voice their opposition for South Africa to the IOC and USOC. The United States anti-apartheid movement, not only used correspondence to voice their distaste for South Africa, but used threats of boycotts against the Olympic Games. These threats made a statement that

United States citizens and athletes would not stand for racial segregation in sport, or in everyday life. As the United States continued to fight its own issues of racial inequality at home, support grew for South Africa’s non-white athletes and fellow countrymen. The

IOC’s decision to expel South Africa from the Olympic Games represented a great victory for the United States anti-apartheid movement. With countless correspondences to the IOC and USOC, the United States anti-apartheid movement played a small role in stimulating a positive change.

Following the IOC’s decision to expel South Africa from the Olympic Games, the

South African government eventually agreed to a democratic transition of power and the full abrogation of apartheid laws.100 As such, the IOC welcomed South Africa back into

71 the Olympic family. “Sport has played an important role in the transformation of South

Africa,” stated Winnie Mandela, South African politician and wife of former South

African president .101 Brundage and Roby may not have wanted to bring politics into the Olympic Movement, but without the efforts of United States anti- apartheid groups and the threat of United States athletes boycotting the Olympic Games,

South Africa may have been even slower to abolish apartheid in their country.

72

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Berger, Iris. South Africa in World History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Brichford, Maynard. “Avery Brundage: Chicago Businessman”. Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 91.4 (1998): 218-32.

Booth, Douglas. The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa. London: FrankCass Press, 1998.

Cornelissen, Scarlett. “‘Resolving “the South Africa problem’: Transnational activism, ideology and race in the Olympic movement, 1960-91,” The InternationalJournal of the History of Sport 28.1 (2011): 155-155.

Guttmann, Allen. The Olympics, a History of the Modern Games. Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press, 1992.

Hartmann, Douglas. Race, Culture, and the Revolt of the Black Athlete: The 1968Olympic Protests and their Aftermath. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Hill, Christopher. Olympic Politics: Athens to Atlanta, 1896-1996. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996.

Hoberman, John. “Olympic Universalism and the Apartheid Issue” In F. Landry et al., Eds, Sport, the Third Millennium: Proceedings of the International Symposium 523-534. Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de I’Universite de Laval,1991.

Lapchick, Richard. “South Africa in figures. of South Africa: Standard Bank Investment Corporation,” Fractured Focus. Maryland: Lexington Books,1986.

Lapchick, Richard. The Politics of Race and International Sport: The Case of South Africa, 98. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975.

Merrett, Christopher. “'In nothing else are the deprivers so deprived': South Africansport, apartheid and foreign relations, 1945-71,” International Journal of the History of Sport 13.2 (1996):146-165.

Middleton, John. "Apartheid." In Africa: An Encyclopedia for Students (4) 46-58. New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002.

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Nauright John. “The Burden of the Past: (Re) Presentation, History, Sport, and Society in the Rainbow Nation,” in Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa,182. London: Leicester University Press, 1997.

Nesbitt, Francis. Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 19461994. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

Sports Editor. “—Olympic Rules Violated.” Salient, Victoria University Student Newspaper 36.9. May 01, 1973.

Tempest, Rone. “South Africa Readmitted to Olympics Competition: Apartheid: Nation Ends 21 Years as a Sports Pariah Because of Racism. It Is Eligible for the1992 Games,” Los Angeles Times, June 10, 1991.

“The Defiance Campaign in South Africa, recalled” The Asian Times, London, June 26, 1987.

Van Der Merwe, Floris J.G. “Africa’s First Encounter with The Olympic Games in . . . 1904,” Journal of Olympic History 7 (1999): 29-34, LA84 Foundation,

Winks, Robin W. The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume V: Historiography, eds., William H. Worger, 513-540 New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Zirin, David. “The explosive 1968 Olympics,” International Social Review 61 (2008).

74

Introduction

1 Avery Brundage Statement on South Africa Problem, April 24, 1968, Box 144, Folder 7, Avery Brundage Archives.

2 Otto Mayer to South African Olympic Association, March 10, 1962, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

3 Letter to Avery Brundage, April 1968, Folder 3, Box 147, Avery Brundage Archives.

4 "Olympic Charter." Olympic.org. Accessed December 2, 2015. http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf. International Olympic Committee Website.

5 Maynard Brichford, “Avery Brundage: Chicago Businessman”. Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 91.4 (1998): 218-32. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40193288.

6 Douglas Booth, "The Sports Boycott" in The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa, (London: F. Cass, 1998), 87.

7 Richard Lapchick, The Politics of Race and International Sport: The Case of South Africa (Westport, CT, 1975), 98.

8 Iris Berger, South Africa in World History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

9 H. Rider Haggard, The Last Boer War (London, 1899), xxiv-xxv.

10 John Middleton, "Apartheid." In Africa: An Encyclopedia for Students, (New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002), 46-58. Vol. 4.

11 Robin W. Winks, The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume V: Historiography, eds., William H. Worger, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 513-540.

12 Douglas Booth, The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa (London: Frank Cass Press, 1998).

13 "Apartheid." Merriam-Webster Dictionary. http://www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/apartheid.

14 “Social Darwinism Definition.” Dictionary.com. Accessed May 12, 2015.

75

15 Richard Lapchick, “South Africa in figures. Republic of South Africa: Standard Bank Investment Corporation,” Fractured Focus. (Maryland: Lexington Books, 1986).

16 Jackie Robinson to Avery Brundage, March 21, 1967, Box 144, Folder 5, Avery Brundage Archives.

17 Vera Herbstman to Avery Brundage, December 19, 1967, Box 144, Folder 5, Avery Brundage Archives.

18 Jackie Robinson to Avery Brundage, March 21, 1967, Box 144, Folder 5, Avery Brundage Archives.

19 Agreement statement for Boycotting the 1968 Olympic Games, Box 144, Folder 5, Avery Brundage Archives.

20 Avery Brundage to Reginald Honey, September 23, 1966, Box 60, Folder 19, Avery Brundage Archives.

21 Submissions; March 1968, Box 60, Folder 19, Avery Brundage Archives.

22 Allen Guttmann, The Olympics, a History of the Modern Games (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 126.

23 The South African Olympic and National Games Association and the International Olympic Committee Fact Finding Commissions Report, April 1967, Box 2, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

24 Saint Louis Committee on Africa Release, March 18, 1968, Box 144, Folder 6, Avery Brundage Archives.

25 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, September 19, 1963, Box 144, Folder 3, Avery Brundage Archives.

26 Letter to Mr. Otto Mayer, October 26, 1956, Folder 1, Box 144, Avery Brundage Archives.

27 Manuel Gonzales Guerra to Monique Berlioux, December 11, 1969, Box 147, Folder 3, Avery Brundage Archives.

28 "The Olympic Games: 1967 Olympic Charter." Olympics, 1967, Olmypic.org

29 Avery Brundage Statement on South Africa Problem, April 24, 1968, Box 144, Folder 7, Avery Brundage Archives.

76

Chapter 1

1 “South Africa and the Olympic Games.” South African History Online. January 28, 2013. http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/south-africa-and-olypmic-games.

2 Floris J.G. Van Der Merwe, “Africa’s First Encounter with The Olympic Games in . . . 1904,” Journal of Olympic History 7 (Summer 1999): 29-34, LA84 Foundation, http://library.la84.org/SportsLibrary/JOH/JOHv7n3/JOHv7n3j.pdf.

3 "South Africa at the 1912 Summer Games | Olympics at Sports Reference.com." Olympics at Sports-Reference.com. Accessed March 13, 2016. http://www.sports-reference.com/olympics/countries/RSA/summer/1912/.

4 "South Africa (RSA) Count." PointAfter. http://olympic-medal count.pointafter.com/l/108/South-Africa-RSA.

5 "Apartheid." Merriam-Webster Dictionary. http://www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/apartheid.

6 Douglas Booth, The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa (London: Frank Cass Press, 1998).

7 Ira G. Emery to Avery Brundage, October 14, 1958, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

8 Avery Brundage to Ira G. Emery, October 24, 1958, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

9 Department of the Interior to the Campaign Against Race Discrimination Board, August 1961, Box 144, Folder 5, Avery Brundage Archives.

10 Ibid.

11 Ira G. Emery to Avery Brundage, April 18, 1958, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

12 Ira G. Emery to Avery Brundage, December 28, 1959, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

13 Dennis Brutus to Avery Brundage, April 30, 1959, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

14 South African Sports Association Report, April 30, 1959, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

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15 South African Olympic Games Association Report to the International Olympic Committee, May 1, 1959, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

16 John Hoberman, “Olympic Universalism and the Apartheid Issue” In F. Landry et al., Eds, Sport, the Third Millennium: Proceedings of the International Symposium (Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de I’Universite de Laval,1991): 523-534.

17 Olaf Ditlev-Simonsen to Otto Mayer, October 26, 1956, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

18 Otto Mayer to Olaf Ditlev-Simonsen, October 30, 1956, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

19 Executive Member of SASA statement, June 8, 1959, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

20 Scarlett Cornelissen, “‘Resolving “the South Africa problem’: Transnational activism, ideology and race in the Olympic movement, 1960-91,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28.1 (2011): 155-155.

21Christopher Merrett, “'In nothing else are the deprivers so deprived': South African sport, apartheid and foreign relations, 1945-71,” International Journal of the History of Sport 13.2 (1996):146-165.

22 Dennis Brutus to Otto Mayer, April 29, 1959, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

23 Michael Scott to IOC, August 1960, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

24 American Committee on Africa: South African and the International Olympic Committee, June 1960, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

25 American Committee on Africa: South African and the International Olympic Committee, June 1960, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

26 "Olympic Charter 1967." Olympic.org. http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic Charter/Olympic_Charter_through_time/1967-Olympic_Charter.pdf.

27 Ira G. Emery to Avery Brundage, December 28, 1959, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

28 Ira G. Emery to Otto Mayer, August 5, 1960, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

78

29 Anthony Steel to Otto Mayer, July 13, 1960, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

30 Dennis Brutus to Avery Brundage, July 24, 1960, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

31 Dennis Brutus Statement, August 2, 1960, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

32 Resolution Submitted to SASA Executive 10/7/62, July 9, 1962, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

33 Otto Mayer to South African Olympic Association, March 10, 1962, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

34 L.M. Francey to Otto Mayer, March 19, 1962, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

35 L.M. Francey to Otto Mayer, April 30, 1962, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

36 Otto Mayer to L.M. Francey, May 7, 1962, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

37 N. Rathinasamy to the Secretary of the Japanese Olympic Committee, April 18, 1963, Box 144, Folder 3, Avery Brundage Archives.

38 Abdul Mitty Statement for Press, and Sporting Bodies, 1963, Box 144, Folder 3, Avery Brundage Archives.

39 N. Rathinasamy to all Olympic Committees and all Sportsmen, May 5, 1962, Box 144, Folder 3, Avery Brundage Archives.

40 Constitution of SAN-ROC, January 15, 1963, Box 144, Folder 3, Avery Brundage Archives.

41 Representations to the Executive of the International Olympic Committee and the Conference with the International Sports Federations, May 24, 1963, Box 144, Folder 3, Avery Brundage Archives.

42 Avery Brundage to SANOC, August 5, 1963, Box 144, Folder 3, Avery Brundage Archives.

43 Report Presented to the International Olympic Committee with the Compliments of South African Olympic Games Association (Baden-Baden), October 1, 1963, Box 144, Folder 3, Avery Brundage Archives.

79

44 Richard Lapchick, The Politics of Race and International Sport: The Case of South Africa (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975), 98.

45 Avery Brundage to Ira. G. Emery, April 7, 1958, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

46 Avery Brundage to Ira G. Emery, January 9, 1964, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

47 Avery Brundage to Ira G. Emery, April 27, 1958, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

48 Avery Brundage to Ira G. Emery, October 24, 1958, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

49 Avery Brundage to South African Amateur Weightlifting and Body Building Federation, September 27, 1958, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

50 Avery Brundage letter to Ira G. Emery, September 27, 1958, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

51 Dennis Brutus to Avery Brundage, November 5, 1958, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

52 Avery Brundage to Dennis Brutus, May 11, 1959, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

53 Avery Brundage to L.M. Francey, November 19, 1962, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

54 South Africa General 1955-1967, April 28, 1958, Box 144, Folder 5, Avery Brundage Archives.

55 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, September 19, 1963, Box 144, Folder 3, Avery Brundage Archives.

56 Correspondence to Otto Mayer, October 26, 1956, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

57 1966 64th Session Minutes, IOC Meetings and Reports, April 25-28, 1966, Box 3, Folder 2, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

58 Francis Njubi Nesbitt, Race for Sanctions African Americans against Apartheid, 1946 1994 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

80

59 “ADA’s Mission.” Americans for Democratic Action. http://www/adaction.org/pages/about.php.

60 "Historical Note." American Committee on Africa | Amistad Research Center. http://amistadresearchcenter.tulane.edu/archon/?p=creators/creator&id=28.

61 American Committee on Africa, African Activist Archive. http://africanactivist.msu.edu/organization.php?name=American+Committee+o Africa

62 “The Defiance Campaign in South Africa, recalled” The Asian Times, London, June 26, 1987.

63 American Committee on Africa: South African and the International Olympic Committee, June 1960, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

64 Ibid.

65 Francis Nesbitt, Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

66 Dennis Brutus to Avery Brundage, February 12, 1958, Box 144, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

67 John A. Williams to Avery Brundage, April 22, 1959, Box 144, Folder 5, Avery Brundage Archives.

68 Ibid.

69 John Papandrew to Avery Brundage, June 7, 1960, Box 144, Folder 5, Avery Brundage Archives.

70 Avery Brundage to Marshall Knappen, June 16, 1960, Box 144, Folder 5, Avery Brundage Archives.

71 Jackie Robinson to the IOC, October 16, 1963, Box 144, Folder 5, Avery Brundage Archives.

72 Robert E. Kennedy to Rory Meiring, October 10, 1962, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

73 Ibid.

74 United States National Park Service. "Jim Crow Laws." National Parks Service. October 31, 2015. http://www.nps.gov/malu/learn/education/jim_crow_laws.htm.

81

75 “Civil Rights Movement.” History.com. http://www.history.com/topics/black history/civil-rights-movement.

76 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964, the Official Report of the Organizing Committee, 1964, LA84 Archives. http://library.la84.org/6oic/OfficialReports/1964/or1964v1pt1.pdf

77 Ira G. Emery to Avery Brundage, June 15, 1961, Box 144, Folder 2, Avery Brundage Archives.

78 South Africa, Comite International Olympique, 1964, Box 147, Folder 1, Avery Brundage Archives.

79 Charles Soltis to Avery Brundage, April 26, 1968, Box 144, Folder 7, Avery Brundage Archives.

Chapter 2

1 Martin Luther King Jr., ""I Have a Dream..."" Archives.gov.https://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf

2 Philip Randolph to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. June 27, 1966. The King Center Digital Archives.

3 American Committee on South Africa letter; March 7, 1967. The King Center Digital Archive.

4 Harry Belafonte letter; Date Unknown. The King Center Digital Archive.

5 General Assembly-Fifth Session: United Nations Official Document, December 02, 1950, Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/395(V)

6 Resolution Adopted Without Reference to a Committee, November 19, 1946, https://documents-dds ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/54/IMG/NR003354.pdf?OpenEle ent

7 International Bill of Human Rights, December 10, 1948, https://documents-dds ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/88/IMG/NR004388.pdf?OpenEle ent.

8 South African History Online, “Aftermath: Sharpeville Massacre 1960,” Last updated March 18, 2016, http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/aftermath-sharpeville massacre-1960.

82

9 United Nations Security Council, “Question relating to the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa,” Resolution of 7 August 1963: United Nations Official Document. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/181(1963)

10 United Nations Security Council, UN General Assembly, The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, 16 December 1966, accessed 20 April 2016, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1d67c.html.

11 Vera Herbstman to Mr. Avery Brundage, December 19, 1967, Box 144, Folder 5, Avery Brundage Archives.

12 Elizabeth C. Moore letter to Mr. Douglas Roby, January 13, 1968, Box 144, Folder 6, Avery Brundage Archives.

13 George M. Houser to Douglas Roby, February 8, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

14 Statement by Jackie Robinson and K.C. Jones on behalf of American Athletes Protesting South Africa’s Readmission to the 1968 Olympic Games, February 8, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

15 Leon Shull to Avery Brundage, January 18, 1968, Box 144, Folder 6, Avery Brundage Archives.

16 Saint Louis Committee on Africa Release, March 18, 1968, Box 144, Folder 6, Avery Brundage Archives.

17 IOC 64th Session Minutes, April 25-28, 1966, Box 3, Folder 2, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

18 Allen Guttmann, The Olympics, a History of the Modern Games (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992) 126.

19 Extracts of the minutes of the 65th session of the International Olympic Committee, Teheran, May 6-8, 1967, LA84 Archives.

20 The South African Olympic and National Games Association and the International Olympic Committee, Box 2, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

21 Report of the IOC Commission on South Africa, 1967, Box 1, Folder 5, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

22 IOC Newsletter; IOC Meetings and Reports Publications 1950s-1960s, Box 4, Folder 26, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

83

23 Report of the IOC Commission on South Africa, 1967, Box 1, Folder 5, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

24 Report of the IOC Commission on South Africa, 1967, Box 1, Folder 5, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

25 Report of the IOC Commission on South Africa, 1967, p. 8-9, Box 1, Folder 5, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

26 Report of the IOC Commission on South Africa, 1967, p. 9, Box 1, Folder 5, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

27 Report of the IOC Commission on South Africa, 1967, p. 10, Box 1, Folder 5, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

28 Report of the IOC Commission on South Africa, 1967, p. 10, Box 1, Folder 5, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

29 Report of the IOC Commission on South Africa, 1967, p. 10, Box 1, Folder 5, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

30 Report of the IOC Commission on South Africa, 1967, p. 12, Box 1, Folder 5, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

31 The South African Olympic and National Games Association and the International Olympic Committee, Box 2, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

32 The South African Olympic and National Games Association and the International Olympic Committee Fact Finding Commissions Report, April 1967, Box 2, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

33 The South African Olympic and National Games Association and the International Olympic Committee, Box 2, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

34 IOC 66th Session Minutes, February 1-6, 1968, Box 3, Folder 26, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

35 Report of the IOC Commission on South Africa, 1967, p. 15, Box 1, Folder 6, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

36 Arnold Eddy to Avery Brundage, April 23, 1968, Box 144, Folder 7, Avery Brundage Archives.

37 Sterling A. Hutt to Avery Brundage, November 27, 1967, Box 144, Folder 5, Avery Brundage Archives.

84

38 Jackie Robinson to Douglas Roby, May 5, 1967, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

39 Jackie Robinson to Douglas Roby, May 5, 1967, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

40 Jackie Robinson to Douglas Roby, May 5, 1967, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

41 Charles G. Hitchcock to Douglas Roby, January 12, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

42 Mr. and Mrs. Schwab to Douglas Roby, January 14, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

43 Margret Flory to Douglas Roby and Avery Brundage, January 15, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

44 Arne Sovik to Avery Brundage, January 17, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

45 David Zirin, “The explosive 1968 Olympics,” International Social Review 61 (2008). http://www.isreview.org/issues/61/feat-zirin.shtml

46 Harry Edwards, The Revolt of the Black Athlete (New York: Free Press, 1970), 190-91.

47 Jesse Owens Calls Athletes’ Olympic Boycott Wrong, The Evening Sun, Baltimore, December 14, 1967, USOC Archives.

48 Douglas Hartmann, Race, Culture, and the Revolt of the Black Athlete: The 1968 Olympic Protests and their Aftermath (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 62.

49 Agreement statement for Boycotting the 1968 Olympic Games, Folder 5, Box 144, Avery Brundage Archives.

50 George M. Houser to Douglas Roby, February 15, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

51 Leonard H. West to Douglas Roby, February 17, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library Douglas Roby Archives.

52 Marshall Ludwig to USOC, February 19, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

85

53 Dick Cockrell to Douglas Roby, February 20, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

54 George M. Houser to Douglas Roby, April 22, 1968, Box 1, Folder 2, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

55 Beverly Baker Kelly to Douglas Roby, February 26, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

56 “ . . . and in the Olympics,” The New York Times, March 2, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

57 “Olympics are Bigger than Boycotts,” The Los Angeles Times, March 1, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

58 David H. Rubenstein to Douglas Roby, March 1, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

59 Forrest Johnson to Douglas Roby, March 5, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

60 Avery Brundage to all IOC members, all NOC members, and International Federations, March 18, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

61 Avery Brundage to all IOC members, all NOC members, and International Federations, March 18, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

62 Avery Brundage Statement on South Africa Problem, April 24, 1968, Box 144, Folder 7, Avery Brundage Archives.

63 Don J. McCrery to US Olympic Committee, April 22, 1968, Box 2, United States Olympic Committee Archives.

64 Jeff Kellogg to Executive Director Arthur G. Lentz, April 29, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

65 "Bentley Historical Library: Douglas F. Roby Papers 1914-2003." http://quod.lib.umich.edu/b/bhlead/umich-bhl-9768?rgn=Entire Finding Aid;view=text.

66 “Joe Lewis Claims Negroes’ Olympics Boycott Bad Move,” The Herald Tribune, April 3, 1968, accessed May 25, 2016, Google News Archives, https://news.google.com/news/advanced_news_search?as_drrb=a

67 Douglas Roby to Joe Louis, April 4, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

86

68 Douglas F. Roby to Mr. Reginald Honey, April 17, 1968, Box 5, Folder 2, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

69 Douglas Roby to USOC Board of Directors, April 25, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

70 Douglas F. Roby to Mr. Charles M. Neinas, May 9, 1968, Box 5, Folder 2, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

71 Douglas F. Roby to Mr. Kenneth B. Walton, May 9, 1968, Box 5, Folder 2, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

72 Douglas Roby to Jeff Kellogg, May 20, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

73 Douglas Roby to Joseph C. Winslow, May 20, 1968, Box 5, Folder 13, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

74 Peter G. Kohler to 1968 Olympic Businessmen’s Committee of the United States Olympic Committee, May 7, 1968, Box 5, Folder 3, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

75 Douglas Roby to Peter G. Kohler, May 20, 1968, Box 5, Folder 13, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

76 Douglas Roby to H.J. Daniels, August 2, 1968, Box 5, Folder 14, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

77 Douglas Roby to Samuel P. Connor, November 7, 1968, Box 5, Folder 17, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

Conclusion

78 Circular Letter to all IOC Members, November 25, 1969, Box 2, Folder 27, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

79 Minutes of the 69th IOC Meeting, May 12-16, 1970, Box 4, Folder 10, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

80 J.C. Ganga to Mr. Avery Brundage, June 2, 1970, Box 144, Folder 4, Avery Brundage Archives.

81 Rudolf Opperman to Avery Brundage, May 19, 1971, Box 144, Folder 4, Avery Brundage Archives.

87

82 Avery Brundage to Rudolf Opperman, June 8, 1971, Box 144, Folder 4, Avery Brundage Archives.

83 Minutes of the 72nd Session of the IOC, Sapporo, Jan. 31-Feb. 1, 1972, item 17, p. 38.

84 Monique Berlioux to All IOC Members, February 27, 1973, Box 2, Folder 30, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

85 Ibid.

86 Reginald Honey to Lord Killian, May 9, 1973, Box 4, Folder 39, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

87 Sports Editor, “South African Games — Olympic Rules Violated,” Salient, Victoria University Student Newspaper 36.9, May 01, 1973. Accessed June 07, 2016. http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-Salient36091973-t1-body-d4.html.

88 Adriann Paulen to president of South African Amateur Athletic Union, August 31, 1981, Box 3, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

89 Ibid.

90 Rudolf Opperman to Reginald Honey, May 25, 1981, Box 3, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

91 Baden-Baden Meeting Minutes, September 21, 1981, Box 4, Folder 4, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

92 Reginald Honey to Juan Antonio Samaranch, September 29-November 2, 1981, Box 3, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

93 Denis McIldowie to Douglas Roby, October 29, 1982, Box 6, Folder 16, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

94 Rudolf Opperman to Juan Antonio Samaranch, November 2, 1984, Box 6, Folder 17, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

95 Rudolf Opperman to Juan Antonio Samaranch, November 11, 1984, Box 6, Folder 17, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

96 Rone Tempest, “South Africa Readmitted to Olympics Competition: Apartheid: Nation Ends 21 Years as a Sports Pariah Because of Racism. It Is Eligible for the 1992 Games,” Los Angeles Times, June 10, 1991, accessed June 07, 2016, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-10/news/mn-1896_1_south-africa.

88

97 Christopher Hill, Olympic Politics: Athens to Atlanta, 1896-1996 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).

98 Richard Lapchick, The Politics of Race and International Sport: The Case of South Africa (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975.), 98.

99 Douglas Roby to Jeff Kellogg, May 20, 1968, Box 5, Folder 12, Bentley Library, Douglas Roby Archives.

100 Douglas Booth, The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa (London: Frank Cass Press, 1998).

101 John Nauright, “The Burden of the Past: (Re) Presentation, History, Sport, and Society in the Rainbow Nation,” in Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa, (London: Leicester University Press, 1997), 182.