UPDATED FORCE MAP FOLDOUT INSIDE FALL 2018

U. S. … B ECAUSE STEALTH MATTERS

Undersea warfighting: “Prepare for Battle”

INSIDE Q&A with Vice Adm. Richard The Future of Undersea Warfare Historic View of Sub Command Proven Command Characteristics Annual Photo Contest Winners U. S. SUBMARINES … B ECAUSE STEALTH MATTERS

The Official Magazine of the U.S. Force

Fall 2018 Fall undersea FORCE COMMANDER’S CORNER

Vice Adm. Charles A. Richard, USN 66 Commander, Submarine Forces o. warfighting: N 4 ssue I “Prepare For Battle”

Undersea Warriors, Q & A with Vice Adm. Richard 4 by COMSUBLANT Greetings from Norfolk! This edition of UNDERSEA WARFARE Magazine is truly special to me as it is not only Undersea Warfare—Today and Tomorrow my first Force Commander’s Corner, but also because its theme, warfighting, is so important to me. Lisa and I are 8 by Staff of Undersea Warfare Development Center honored to have been given this responsibility, and we look forward to the rewards and challenges of serving as your 12 Force Commander. Submarine Command In Transition to War Since I relieved Vice Adm. Tofalo in August, I’ve had the opportunity to visit and speak to Sailors in Norfolk, King’s 10 by Capt. Richard B. Laning Bay, and Groton, as well as get some underway time on USS (SSN 787). I must say that I have been impressed with the technical expertise, professionalism, “We must provide Five Historical Innovations in Submarine Lethality and character of every Sailor I’ve encountered. It’s truly our Sailors that make us the our leaders with 12 by Carsten Fries, Naval History Heritage Command, Communication finest Submarine Force in the world. credible options to and Outreach Division If you haven’t done so recently, I’d like you to read through our updated Commander’s protect America from Intent at https://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/hq/Documents/Commanders Intent 16 Teaching Submarine Leadership March 2018.pdf and focus on the letter on page 12, Commander’s Guidance to All attack, to advance by Cmdr. Scott McGinnis Members of the Submarine Force and Supporting Organizations. That letter really gets our prosperity, fur- 16 to the heart of what it means to be a Submariner and a member of our organization. ther our strategic 20 19th Annual Photo Contest Winners Then, as you read this issue of UNDERSEA WARFARE, I want you to think about interests, reassure your role in warfighting within the greater undersea . We exist in a world of our allies and part- The Ultimate Sacrifice: great-power competition, and understanding what is expected of us is fundamental to 22 A Submariners Service in Afghanistan our ability to properly respond should we be required to react to a crisis. ners and deter our In this issue you’ll read about historical innovations that have increased submarine adversaries.” lethality, how technological and tactical developments are increasing our warfighting capability, and the characteristics to successful submarine commanders in combat. We must provide our leaders with credible options to protect America from attack, to advance our prosperity, further our strategic interests, reassure our allies and partners, and deter our adversaries. These rest on the ability of the Navy and our Submarine 20 Force to win decisively if conflict breaks out. To that end, we must instill a warfighting culture in everything that we do.

Prepare for battle. On the Cover Departments Our nation needs you. An unarmed Trident II D5 mis- 1 Force Commander’s Corner sile launches from the Ohio-class AAIII! ballistic missile submarine USS Division Director’s Corner C. A. Richard Nebraska (SSBN 739) off the 2 coast of California. The test launch was part of the U.S. Navy 3 Masthead/Medal of Honor Tribute Strategic Systems Program’s demonstration and shakedown 23 Sailors First operation certification process. Photo by Mass Communication Specialist Downlink 1st Class Ronald Gutridge 25

is online at:www.public.navy.mil/ U. S. SUBMARINE S … B ECAUSE STEALTH MATTER S subfor/underseawarfaremagazine undersea warfare FALL 2018 3 Letters to the Editor LETTERS TO THE EDITOR U. S. SUBMARINES … B ECAUSE STEALTH MATTERS The Official Magazine of the U.S. Submarine Force Vice Adm. Charles L. Munns In keeping with UNDERSEA WARFARE Magazine’s charter Send submissions to: Commander, Naval Submarine Forces Vice Adm. Charles A. “Chas” Richard as the Official Magazine of the U.S. Submarine Force, we Military Editor DIVISION DIRECTOR’S Commander, Submarine ForcesForce, U.S. Fleet welcome letters to the editor, questions relating to articles Undersea Warfare CNO N97 Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic that have appeared in previous issues, and insights and Rear Adm. Jeffrey Cassias 2000 Navy Pentagon CORNER Rear Adm. Daryl L. Caudle “lessons learned” from the fleet. Deputy Commander, Naval Submarine Forces Washington, DC 20350-2000 or  Commander,Deputy Commander, Submarine Submarine Force, U.S. Forces Pacific Fleet Rear Adm. John W. Tammen, Jr., USN Commander, Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet UNDERSEA WARFARE Magazine reserves the right to edit sub- [email protected] Rear Adm. Joe Walsh missions for length, clarity, and accuracy. All submissions Director, Undersea Warfare Division Rear Adm. John W. Tammen, Jr. Director, Submarine Warfare become the property of UNDERSEA WARFARE Magazine and Director, Undersea Warfare Division (N97) may be published in all media. Master Chief Petty Officer Dean Irwin Master Chief Petty Officer John J. Perryman COMSUBLANTCOMNAVSUBFOR Force Force Master Master Chief Chief Please include pertinent contact information with submissions. Master Chief Petty Officer PaulMichael J. Davenport Benko COMSUBPAC Force Master Chief Undersea Warriors, Capt. D.J. Kern I have been in the job for 10 months, and it’s clear to me that, although we dominate the undersea domain today, we Cmdr. Sarah Self-Kyler COMSUBLANTCommander, Undersea Public Surveillance Affairs Officer O MEDAL OF HONOR MOMENT O must continue to accelerate our efforts to deliver next-generation capabilities to our warfighters. Russia and recognize Lt.Cmdr. Cmdr. Corey Jensin Barker Sommer the asymmetric advantage of the undersea domain and are determined to close the gap. The CNO challenged us to expand COMSUBPAC Public Affairs Officer COMNAVSUBFOR Public Affairs Officer our margin relative to undersea superiority. To that end, we will strive to make our ships and weapons more lethal, improve Military Editor: Lt. Cmdr. P. Brent Shrader our stealth, increase our reach, leverage artificial intelligence and machine learning, and get technology in the hands of the Lt. Cmdr. Jeff Davis COMSUBPACSenior Editor, Public Affairs Officer warfighter faster. Vice Adm. Richard’s vision is clear: “Prepare for battle!” Design & Layout: Rick Johnston Lt. Cmdr. Wayne Grasdock Since this summer, I attended the Advanced Naval Technology Exercise (ANTX) at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in ManagingMilitary Editor: Editor: Thomas Lee Newport, R.I.; spoke at the Joint Undersea Warfare Technology Conference in Groton, Conn.; and briefed the Naval Submarine Senior Editor: John Whipple

League’s Fall Symposium in Crystal City, Va. Military, government, industry, and academic leaders attend these events, which Managing Editor: Mike Smith are critical to align our efforts to swiftly get combat-credible capabilities to the Fleet to increase our lethality. One recurring CharterLayout & Design: BlueWater Agency theme was evident at all the venues and through all the speakers: the is once UNDERSEAWeb Design: WARFARE Lakisha is the Ferebee professional magazine of the under- “We have the best again engaged in a great power competition. To outpace these threats, I firmly believe we will sea warfare community. Its purpose is to educate its readers onCharter undersea warfare missions and programs, with a particu- people and the best only get faster through experimentation and not through PowerPoint presentations. This is larUNDERSEA focus onWARFARE U.S. submarines. is the professional This journal magazine will of also the draw under - what made ANTX a phenomenal event; participating organizations developed prototypes uponsea warfare the Submarine community. Force’s Its purpose rich historical is to educate legacy its to readersinstill training. Now is the aon sense undersea of pride warfare and professionalismmissions and programs, among community with a particu - and put them through their paces in the water. Expect to see more at-sea demonstrations, memberslar focus onand U.S. to enhance submarines. reader This awareness journal ofwill the also increasing draw time to get them experimentation, and tactical development exercises in the future. relevanceupon the Submarineof undersea Force’s warfare rich for historicalour nation’s legacy defense. to instill a sense of pride and professionalism among community the best tools and The continued success of our Submarine Force relies on our ability to train and execute Themembers opinions and andto enhance assertions reader herein awareness are the personalof the increasing views of across a broad spectrum of warfare areas. In the CNO’s words, we have to advance our therelevance authors of andundersea do not warfare necessarily for our reflect nation’s the officialdefense. views tactics to outpace of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the high-end capabilities so we control the de-escalation of conflict across all domains. In The opinions and assertions herein are the personal ones of Cmdr. Samuel D. Dealey our adversaries in theDepartment authors and of the do Navy.not necessarily reflect the official views the undersea domain, this requires expanding our tool set beyond ADCAP torpedoes of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the Commanding Officer USS Harder Contributions and Feedback Welcome this great power and TLAMs; we need more ways to give our enemies a “bloody nose.” As such, N97 is Department of the Navy. Send articles, photographs (min. 300 dpi electronic), For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above developing a spectrum of weapons and payloads to maximize the lethality of the sub- Contributionsand feedback to: and Feedback Welcome competition.” and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Harder marines our Sailors take to sea, give operational commanders increased firepower in our Send articles, photographs (min 300 dpi electronic), Military Editor, Undersea Warfare CNO N97 (SS-257) during her 5th War Patrol in Japanese-controlled waters. Flood- response, and allow us to confront our adversaries from the seabed to multiple domains. and2000 feedback Navy Pentagon,to: Washington, DC 20350-2000 E-Mail: lighted by a bright moon and disclosed to an enemy escort In addition to payloads, our boats must evolve with the threat. The Tactical Submarine Evolution Plan (TSEP) is syn- Military [email protected] Undersea Warfare CNO N87 2000Phone: Navy (703) Pentagon, 614-9372 Washington, Fax: (703) 695-9247DC 20350-2000 which bore down with intent to attack, CDR Dealey quickly dived to peri- chronizing our future submarine design efforts to drive additional capability and lethality into Blocks V, VI, and VII of E-Mail: [email protected] scope depth and waited for the pursuer to close range, then opened fire, the class. At the same time, the TSEP is guiding our development of the New SSN. Finally, we transitioned the Phone:Subscriptions 703-614-9372 and back Fax: issues 703-695-9247 U.S. Government Publishing Office sending the target and all aboard down in flames with his third . Integrated Undersea Surveillance Systems (IUSS) family of fixed, mobile, and deployable sensor systems to N97. Realizing SubscriptionsP.O. Box 979050, for St. sale Louis, by MO the 63197-9000 Plunging deep to avoid fierce depth charges, he again surfaced and, with- that Theater Undersea Warfare (TUSW) is not just about submarines but is a team fight, this re-alignment within the SuperintendentPhone: (866) 512-1800 of Documents, or fax (202) 512-2104 (U.S. & Can.) in 9 minutes after sighting another destroyer, had sent the enemy down undersea enterprise puts us in a better position to develop technologies across the undersea domain and build a truly inte- P.O.Washington, Box 371954, D.C. Pittsburgh,area or Intl. PA calls: 15250-7954 (202) 512-1800 tail first with a hit directly amidship. Evading detection, he penetrated orEmail: call (866)[email protected] 512-1800 or fax (202) 512-2104. grated undersea infrastructure. http://bookstore.gpo.govWebsite: https://bookstore.gpo.gov the confined waters off Tawi Tawi with the Japanese Fleet base 6 In this great power competition, we must maintain our advantage in the undersea domain. This being the warfighting Annual cost: $25$28.00 U.S.; U.S.; $35 $39.20 Foreign Foreign away and scored death blows on 2 patrolling in quick succes- Authorization sion. With his ship heeled over by concussion from the first exploding edition, I must recognize the principal reason for our strength as a submarine force. We have the best people and the best Authorization UNDERSEA WARFARE (ISSN 1554-0146) is published quarterly from target and the second vessel nose-diving in a blinding detonation, he training. Now is the time to get them the best tools and tactics to outpace our adversaries in this great power competition. UNDERSEAappropriated WARFARE funds by(ISSN authority 1554-0146) of theis published Chief of Naval quarterly Operations from appropriatedin accordance funds with byNPPR authority P-35. of The the ChiefSecretary of Naval of the Operations Navy has cleared the area at high speed. Sighted by a large hostile fleet force on indetermined accordance that with this NPPR publication P-35. Theis necessary Secretary in of the the transaction Navy has the following day, he swung his bow toward the lead destroyer for another determinedof business requiredthat this bypublication law of the is Departmentnecessary in theof the transaction Navy. “down-the-throat” shot, fired 3 bow tubes and promptly crash-dived to ofUse business of funds required for printing by law this of publicationthe Department has been of the approved Navy. Useby the of Navyfunds Publicationsfor printing thisand publicationPrinting Policy has Committee.been approved be terrifically rocked seconds later by the exploding ship as the Harder byReproductions the Navy Publications are encouraged and withPrinting proper Policy citation. Committee. Controlled passed beneath. This remarkable record of 5 vital Japanese destroyers Reproductionscirculation. are encouraged. Controlled circulation. sunk in 5 short-range torpedo attacks attests the valiant fighting spirit J. W. Tammen, Jr. of CDR Dealey and his indomitable command. CHINFO Merit Award Winner

4 FALL 2018 undersea warfare CHINFO Merit Award Winner Silver Inkwell Award Winner undersea warfare FALL 2018 5 6 by COMSUBLANT Public Affairs FALL 2018undersea warfare Q V thoughts onthefutureofSubmarine Force. Adm. Richardtooksometime tosharehis Commander, SubmarineForces in August, Vice Strategic Command. Command, and deputy commander, U.S. Command for Global Strike at U.S. Strategic uty commander, Joint FunctionalComponent Warfare (OPNAV N97) at the Pentagon; dep- 10 inKingsBay, Ga.;directorof Undersea ments includecommandofSubmarineGroup force structure. integration of unmanned systems into naval Strategic StudiesGroupXXVIII, studyingthe as amemberofChiefNaval Operations’ (Submarine Warfare) staff. Hehasalsoserved duty ontheDeputyChiefofNaval Operations (Policy); squadron engineer of SUBRON 8, and tor ofresources, ofDefense UnderSecretary Wash. Otherstaffassignmentsincludedirec- Submarine Squadron (SUBRON) 17 in Bangor, Submarine Force Atlantic; andcommandof of the Navy; chiefofstaff,Under Secretary the executiveassistantandnaval aidetothe Scranton (SSN 756). (SSN 707), USSAsheville (SSN758)andUSS rine. aboard USS He also served nuclear-powered, deep-submergence subma- Submarine mand ofUSSParche (SSN683)aswell of Alabama. University 1982 aftergraduating withhonorsfromthe “Chas” Richardbegan hisNavy careerin A native of Decatur, Ala., Vice Adm. Charles Upon assuming his current dutiesas Upon assuminghiscurrent Vice Adm. Richard’s FlagOfficerassign- as His staffassignmentsincludeservice His operational assignmentsincludecom- ice NR-1, thentheU.S. Navy’s only &

Adm Portsmouth A platform in any navy. or in space, today’s submarines are delivering capabilities unlike any other on the sea floor, within the water column, on the surface, onin land, cyber, today’s Submarine Force has domain. Whether animpact within itbe every aries vice just our own capabilities. Ithink it’s that important to recognize current threats and spatial bound across spectrum the of geographical full aSubmarineas Force andthe greater maritime on the force focused has to be Fundamentally, we are in athreat-based environment. That means our role Submarine Force in that effort? acceptable to us and our allies.” Whatdoyou asthe see roleofthe domain to deter aggression resolve and to crises peacefully on terms “operate from theto globally the floor sea and in stars the information The recently CNO that said our naval forces must prepared be to we must preparedfail, be to win. marines andcrews have combat to ready times. be deterrence at Should all Force. when Adm. Caudle So Rear andIsay, “Prepare for battle,” our sub the cost our ofchallenging enemies combat-ready to recognize Submarine and adjust our tactics andprocesses for the threats and our we face, will commanding officers andcrews to rehearse the our fight, tacticians to adapt deter conflict,but there in are the noguarantees future. Now isthe time for insince World anger shot atorpedo War to to This isacredit our II. ability of undersea warfare, but that’s Keep in mindthat notenough. we have not equipment advanced most lethal in weapons the andtechnologically history don’tthey dotheir correctly. jobs Our submarines with are the equipped into upon to go a situationmay called be where don’t they come home if our adversaries the to challenge United seek States. The isour fact Sailors spectrum ready forbe the ofpotential full conflictwhenever andwherever required our forces—not just the Submarine Force, ofour but all forces—to andwayance, we oflife have Americans as defended This has for decades. are threatened by those that to the change seek current order, global bal competition, great-power competition that that on the reality we isbased order to prepare for battle. We have returned to aperiod ofgreat-power “PrepareWhen Isaid, for battle,” Imeant what isadirect which Isaid, you meanWhat did by that? told the men and women ofthe Submarine Force to ‘prepare for battle.’ When you relieved asCommander, Submarine Forces in August, you with .

Richard - - -

Photo by Lt. Brian Wierzbicki

United States. seek tochallengethe wherever ouradversaries conflict wheneverand spectrum ofpotential “ …be readyforthefull undersea warfare FALL 2018 undersea warfare FALL 2018 ”

7 7 As the only survivable leg of our strategic deterrent triad, and deploy submarines ready to conduct high-end combat operations. In addition to equipment, we’re focusing on training. We’ve carrying approximately 70 percent of the nation’s accountable This means the ability to surge SSNs in support of Operational restructured and retuned the SSN training period for the high- nuclear warheads, our SSBN force is always on watch, worldwide Plans, homeland defense, and Theater ASW operations. We must end fight. This includes restructuring the Combat Readiness and undetected. Deterrence is all about denying benefit or impos- continue to develop, refine, and validate our plans to rapidly Evaluation and Pre-Overseas Movement Certification to eliminate ing unacceptable cost. Without even having to shoot, just having respond to all wartime contingencies. Most importantly though, duplication and put the right focus in the right place. We’re work- our SSBN force underway every day helps ensure that potential it’s absolutely imperative that we instill a warfighting culture in ing to drive competition inside the Force and into our processes adversaries know the United States has credible and effective everything we do. We can do that by developing toughness while to produce winners and losers, like you would have in battle. It options at any level of escalation. guarding with jealousy those aspects of being an elite force. This, does us no good to be “At Standards” when the other guy is “More I firmly believe that deterrence has helped prevent major power at its core, means we must operate with character and integ- At Standards.” This will help ensure that our submarine crews are war for over 70 years. But deterrence isn’t just based on nuclear weap- rity because only through trust can our submarines be successful. achieving their maximum warfighting readiness for Surge Ready ons. With our ability to conduct undetected operations in a denied When our Sailors are underway and lying in their racks at night, certification while also ensuring that their challenging peacetime environment, our SSN and SSGN forces have a unique access that or driving home from work, they should reflect on their day and mission skills peak for deployment. We’ve also restructured the allows them to collect vital intelligence in support of our national feel satisfied that they’ve done their part to ensure their ship and timing and focused the content of Pre-Deployment Training to

interests. Likewise, we have to treat cyber and electromagnetic warfare our Force are prepared to win in battle. maximize that readiness piece even further. Taking a page from M. Richardson 1st Class Jeffrey Specialist Communication by Mass Photo as warfare domain areas. That touches on how we conduct defensive the aviation community, we are establishing an aggressor squadron Machinist Mate (Weapons) 1st Class Mark Hoel demonstrates the torpedo system aboard USS John Warner (SSN 785) to Commander, Submarine and offensive operations within both the physical and virtual spheres. How do you think we prepare our Sailors to have this mindset? with a team that will become experts in studying our adversaries’ As the CNO has said, the best way to avoid a fight is to develop tactics and capabilities in order to more accurately reflect their Forces, Vice Adm. Chas Richard. the most powerful, deadly, and competitive Navy possible. Not Like I’ve said, we’re in the business of achieving victory in battle. tactics and capabilities within our trainers and evaluations. only to deter a potential adversary, but to ensure that when called Our Sailors must be prepared to fight and win. It’s important to rec- of urgency. We have to challenge ourselves, compete internally ognize, though, that the enemy is fighting to win too. So when the upon, we conduct decisive combat operations to defeat any enemy. What barriers exist that could prevent the Submarine Force from across watch sections, and drive to develop expertise across the day comes when we begin trading ordnance with an enemy, we don’t That’s no easy task, but I know we have the right people for it. being able to accomplish its warfighting mission? full spectrum of submarining. For example, it is not enough to That is one piece. The other piece is to maintain a constructive want to get surprised. Our crews must be ready to respond quickly just shoot a snapshot. We must be able to execute the full range of paranoia about how we measure our readiness and strategically because our assumptions are not going to hold in battle. We’ve got There are a few things that we can do as a Force to ensure that we are motion from rules of engagement to the presets to firing the snap- think about the future. to make sure that we build resiliency within our teams to ensure ready to accomplish the mission. First and foremost, as previously shot to drafting the after action report. Again, ask yourself how Business as usual will not retain our competitive edge. Instead, we they can respond to adversity. To do that, we’ve got to build trust mentioned, we must continue to be a Force that maintains the high- you know that you and your team are ready for combat. must continuously and aggressively innovate in how we will develop such that every member of the crew knows that every Sailor aboard est of standards when it comes to character, trust, and integrity. We Third, going back to cyber and electromagnetic warfare, we a ready force for today and tomorrow, how we will fight today and is going to do his or her job when needed. have to continue to nurture and generate leadership from the most have to treat our virtual ship the same way we treat our physical tomorrow, and understand what our adversaries are doing today We’ve also got to give the enemy unsolvable dilemmas because, junior Sailor on the deck plate to the commanding officer that rec- ship. Just as the chief walks through divisional spaces, deck plate and tomorrow. When you integrate unmanned systems, our access in battle, it’s us or them. Our Sailors need to recognize that if we’re ognizes the standards we are held to as Sailors so that, when we are and command leadership are expected to conduct virtual ship becomes even greater as we grow longer arms, extend our reach across not better than the enemy, we won’t be coming home. The good challenged in combat, our success is built on trust with each other. tours. The failure of SUBLAN, the inability to logon to the shared multiple spectrums, and effectively multiply our Force. We’re able news is that we’ve got an elite Force filled with the greatest Sailors in This trust also takes the form of ensuring that an environment exists drive to plan maintenance, open a work authorization form, or to leverage our stealth to penetrate defensive perimeters to deny safe the world. Rear Adm. Caudle and I know that every one of them is that welcomes critical feedback regardless if it comes from the new- conduct operational planning can result in the same mission kill as haven, reduce the enemy’s defense, and expand our influence into doing everything they can to make sure they are the best. We can look est Sailor aboard or within the Command Triad. Equal is acting on a loss of propulsion or grounding. We have to ensure we treat our areas where we would otherwise not have access. Our potential adver- at history and see that, whenever called upon, the Submarine Force and being responsive to feedback. cyber and IT aboard just as we do our engineering spaces. Doing saries know all of this, and it’s our ability to remain far-forward, on has always responded with resounding success. Just this year the USS Evidence of struggle in this area comes in the form of a poorly this will go a long way in ensuring we have full ship readiness. scene, and unseen that helps deter potential adversaries. John Warner (SSN 785) successfully launched land attack executed Plan of the Day, maintenance refit period, or simply a cruise missiles into Syria. It’s not hard to find examples of that type of Sailor not knowing what he is doing at work the next day before success throughout the recent and past history of the Force. leaving to go home. We’ve all got a part to play in supporting Any parting words for our readers? What do you think we need to do as a Navy and as a Force to these goals. If there are Sailors out there with good ideas or some ensure that we are prepared for the war of the future? I can’t tell you enough just how proud Rear Adm. Caudle and I are What are some things that are going on across the Force that will way to better conduct business, I want to hear from them. In of each and every Sailor in the Submarine Force, not just because of As we published in our Commander’s Intent back in March, the mis- help ensure we can deliver on the imperatives you discussed? fact, give them my email address and they can write me directly the amazing things that they are doing every day across the fleet, but sion of the Submarine Force is to execute the Navy’s mission in and ([email protected]). because of the decision that they made to defend our nation by joining from the undersea domain. In order to do that, we must focus our First, we must ensure we have the right equipment to deliver on Shifting gears, over the past eight years, six SSNs have taken or are the Navy and the Submarine Force. It is a rare character trait to raise efforts on warfighting capability, capacity, and endurance. We have those imperatives. In support of that, we are continuing to deliver projected to take 50 percent to 100 percent longer to complete over- your hand and pledge yourself to a cause greater than yourself, and to ensure the readiness and operational proficiency of our crews to two Virginia-class SSNs per year. It’s absolutely essential that we hauls, with the shortest delay being a non-trivial 11 months. That’s that is reflected in just how few people are willing to make that com- safely and stealthily execute challenging missions. continue that build rate as we drop to 42 SSNs in the late 2020s. something that we are getting after. These challenges directly impact mitment today. More importantly, though, our Sailors have earned Again, for the first time since the fall of the , It’s crucial in our ability to meet the requirement of 66 SSNs. The our ability to provide ready forces, and we have to close the gap. the respect and admiration of the American people. I think that we are experiencing a return to great-power competition. With Columbia-class SSBN is on schedule to be ready to replace our Ohio- Second, while today we continue to enjoy a real advantage in sometimes our Sailors are too close to it to recognize just how amazing a rising China and a resurgent Russia, the United States’ ability class SSBN fleet. We continue to work on improvements to our undersea capabilities, our competitors are working hard to narrow the what they are doing day in and day out is. In August when we had the to conduct sea control and power projection is now threatened. missiles, our torpedoes, and our cyber and electromagnetic warfare gap. As a result, we have to measure our readiness not based on our change of command on USS Washington (SSN 787), every civilian I Our National Defense Strategy, which is guided by the President’s capabilities by pursuing a family of weapons that compliments the internal metrics but realities of our adversaries and the threats they talked to was in awe of the Sailors they interacted with. They’re taken National Security Strategy, directs our Navy to protect the characteristics of our submarines. We’re also working to achieve a pose. I encourage everyone to ask themselves how they know they are aback by the technical knowledge and professionalism exhibited by American homeland, to promote American economic prosperity, family of unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles. These vehicles ready. I think most people would respond to a metric or evaluation our Sailors. Very few people in this country are willing to do some- and to advance American influence throughout the world. This will extend our reach more than ever before. They will allow our standard; but remember, we defined those standards and metrics, not thing that requires such sacrifice, and I couldn’t be more proud of our requires effort at every level; at the Type Commander, within our Force to accomplish missions we are unable to today. Just last year we our adversaries. So we can’t rest on just meeting the standard. Sailors for doing it. I am proud to be your Force commander. And so maintenance organizations, and on the waterfront. established Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Squadron (UUVRON) 1 Rear Adm. Caudle and I need our teams to frame everything to the Sailors of the Submarine Force, thank you for all that you do Even under the context of peacetime operations, we must to field all of the Navy’s UUV family of systems to meet fleet tasking. that they do through the lens of warfighting and do so with a sense and for dedicating your lives to this great Force.

8 FALL 2018 undersea warfare undersea warfare FALL 2018 9 today and tomorrow “If deterrence fails, the Navy will conduct decisive Submarine Force, effective tactical doctrine is already in-place such Operations dictate, these contributions must in turn be fully inte- result of this engagement is the development of Full Spectrum that crews can fully employ new capabilities from day one. grated into wider, theater-level execution supporting the Joint Force USW, a coordinated, integrated, coherent roadmap to the undersea combat operations to defeat any enemy.” In terms of tactical doctrine, the TAG maintains a persistent effort Maritime Component Commander. This integrated fight is the warfighting force of the future, a force that can fully execute the –ADM John Richardson, USN; to develop, plan, execute, and analyze submarine at-sea exercises with by Staff of Undersea Warfare Development Center Development Warfare Undersea Staff of by focus of effort for the UWDC Norfolk and detachments. Fleet Design and out-match any adversary. Understanding the “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” January 2016. the ultimate goal of providing the most effective tactical doctrine to the The San Diego and Norfolk teams have two primary audi- “decisive combat operations” imperatives of a potential conflict Fleet. These tactical development exercises are uniquely constructed ences: Strike Groups (SGs) and Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare today, UWDC is committed to its LOEs that generate the neces- simple statement, elegant and succinct, and at the same along these LOEs, and TAG team members routinely embark partici- Commanders (TASWCs). UWDC works with other Navy stake- sary readiness to “fight tonight,” all while using that knowledge as a time both broad and deep in context: “...decisive combat pating submarines to both evaluate a tactic’s effectiveness and receive holders at all levels of command, including Numbered Fleet staffs foundation to ensure readiness for the potential fights of tomorrow. operations to defeat any enemy.” Submarine crews oper- feedback from and provide feedback to the Force. The value of direct and Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) 4 and 15, to ensure that ASW Combat by its very nature is a demanding task, both physi- ate arguably the most complex and capable weapons of feedback from the Force cannot be overstated; hearing from the actual capabilities and skills at the tactical and operational levels are suf- cally and mentally. Success is never guaranteed, but thorough A operators of our new systems has provided some of the best and inno- war in history, but these capabilities will be squandered if their ficient to win tomorrow’s complex battles. While this LOE origi- preparation mitigates the risks. Given the ever-expanding capa- crews and the commands involved with submarine operational vative advances to our Submarine Force doctrine. nally targeted CSGs, the fielding of the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter bilities of potential adversaries, it is essential that every single employment are unable to appreciate and meet the challenges of UWDC and the Submarine Force rely on the Fleet operators brings with it expanded power projection capabilities for the member of the watchstanding team have a detailed knowledge being decisive against any potential adversary. Warfighting profes- to drive the out-of-the-box thinking on better ways to employ Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), which in turn has increased and understanding of the threat, our Force’s TTPs, and the sionals must constantly ask themselves, “Are we truly ready to capabilities, both current and emerging. The high-end fight is the demand for integrated ASW training. individual and collective responsibilities of his or her command. meet the commander’s intent?” dynamic and fluid. The adversary is constantly evolving, and the Training for both SGs and TASWCs range from peacetime This knowledge requires dedicated study and practice at every In reading Capt. R.B. Laning’s excellent examination of teams that are best suited to staying ahead of the problem are those operations through escalation of hostilities. Across the spectrum, opportunity (a point Laning’s article also raises). wartime submarine commanders, “Submarine Command in waterfront commands who have the latest operational experience. the focus of training shifts from primarily a defensive posture to As a member of the Submarine Force, you may at this point Transition to War” (reproduced in this issue), one recognizes that Frontline expertise and perspective is crucial to mission success; more aggressive, offensive operations that emphasize and stress be asking yourself if it’s reasonable to expect that you’ll be able to the lessons he describes from World War II are just as valid today. commands are encouraged to propose better ways to fight. the coordination between the Warfare Commanders to achieve read and fully understand the myriad manuals, documents, pub- Times and technologies may change, but the need for brave, intui- A separate but closely related TAG effort involves the use of Numbered Fleet and Combatant Commander objectives. Since lications, etc. required of your profession, regardless of what posi- tive, and capable warriors remains as equally vital today as it ever Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) to improve these integrated efforts bridge multiple platforms, close coordina- tion in the crew you hold. If you think that committing the req- was; if anything, the complexities and demands of modern naval submarine crew situational awareness and buy back decision time, tion with other warfighting development centers and the Naval uisite time to your warfighting profession is unrealistic, consider warfare have increased this need. particularly in high-tempo environments such as high-density ship- Warfare Development Command (NWDC) is a critical element this remark: “Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught From the Undersea Warfighting Development Center’s ping areas or approach and attack. The TAG is actively engaged with of this effort. Be it afloat training as part of a SG Optimized Fleet flat-footed by any situation, never at a loss for how any problem (UWDC) perspective, these complexities and demands are broken organizations inside and outside the Navy to explore, adapt, and field Response Plan or ashore training delivered to senior leadership has been addressed before. It doesn’t give me all the answers, but down into two distinct yet closely coupled lines of effort (LOEs): technologies that will streamline some of the more repetitive and and TASWCs and their staffs, UWDC subject matter experts it lights what is often a dark path ahead... A real understanding Submarine Warfare and Integrated Operations. The first LOE routine but necessary tasks currently performed by watchstanders. provide classroom and afloat instruction and, when required, key of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun.” involves the fundamentals of ensuring that a submarine’s crew The goal is to rapidly introduce systems meeting this intent without assessments of ASW mission readiness. The source? Secretary of Defense James Mattis. Put another way, employs its unique capabilities to the maximum desired effect, the delays inherent in the normal acquisition process. The UWDC staff that supports the training and assessment also attributed to the Secretary of Defense, “The problem with and the second LOE involves leveraging and integrating these The team at ASL similarly has a two-pronged LOE: prepare LOE is composed of officers and senior enlisted Sailors with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience (or by your same key capabilities across the range of the Fleet Design docu- submarine crews for Arctic operations today and lead the devel- backgrounds from all of the Undersea Warfare (USW) warfighting men’s experience), i.e., the hard way.” ment—in particular, Distributed Maritime Operations. opment of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for tomor- communities: surface, submarine, fixed- and rotary-wing aviation, Success in combat begins with a solid foundation in warfight- Working the first LOE, UWDC has two groups dedicated to row. Undersea Warfare’s summer 2018 edition extensively and information warfare. They in turn are supported by an equally ing fundamentals—TTP. As the warfighting development center ensuring that submarine crews’ warfighting readiness remains at covered ASL’s most recent biannual Ice Exercise, but on any given diverse staff ashore who work the reconstruction and analysis nec- for the undersea domain, UWDC’s LOEs are driven by the imper- the levels required of a fight against a modern, sophisticated adver- day ASL is closely involved with global submarine operations. essary to provide rapid, detailed feedback to the commands con- ative to provide this foundation to the entire USW team. When sary: the Tactical Analysis Group (TAG) and the Arctic Submarine Specialized equipment installation/de-installation, training, and the ducting and evaluating the various training and rehearsal events. these fundamentals are amplified by individual and collective Lab (ASL). The TAG is based in Groton, Conn. with a detach- embarkation of ASL Arctic Operations Specialists are just a few of Across the Navy, at levels of command from fire control parties initiative, courage, and determination, history demonstrates that ment in Pearl Harbor, and ASL is based in San Diego. the many activities conducted by these highly trained professionals. up through Fleet commanders, UWDC engages to ensure align- the U.S. Submarine Force, and the U.S. Naval Force as a whole, The TAG is constantly advancing two broad fronts: ensuring that Ensuring that the individual submarine can fully employ its range ment, synchronization, and unity of effort for those forces that presents a potential adversary with a true Hobson’s choice: choose current tactical doctrine and operating guidance is up to date, and of capabilities forms the foundation of the Submarine Force con- produce effects in and from the undersea domain. The most recent not to challenge us at sea, for if you do, we will prevail. second, ensuring that as new combat systems are fielded across the tributions to the Joint fight. As the tenets of Distributed Maritime

10 FALL 2018 undersea warfare undersea warfare FALL 2018 11 ability, lack of exercise, etc. Today, the ages of nuclear submarine problem. Even when their faulty performance was observed and and younger men trained, to throw into CO positions at the COs are climbing and war would pose this problem for some of reported, correspondence indicated that the higher commands start of a big war; them. However, their greater operating experience and better ship- tended to credit poor performance to the operator’s fire control fail- • The torpedo fiasco of WWII may be replayed, or another part board living environment should make age a less important factor ures, personnel errors or failures to properly maintain the torpedoes. of a weapon system, the computer for example, may prove the Submarine in adapting to wartime conditions. The let-down suffered by a CO when the torpedoes he used in a Achilles heel, if an unexpected enemy technology or tactic is A third type of inadequate CO was again the result of low highly dangerous approach on an enemy target failed to run true introduced which has not been programmed for or a computer budgets. The variety of operations and functions carried out by or explode on impact, may have been a major cause for the worries outage exists without recognition; peacetime pre-war skippers was low. Competition between COs which incapacitated some of the COs at the start of the war. • The demands on a CO’s intelligence are far greater today than in Command was based largely on appearance of self, crew and boat. Hence a What has been said so far can be brought into better focus by WWII and will increase with time. The use of that intelligence tendency was fostered to have a submarine present a best appear- the observations of one of those COs who transitioned to WWII for innovating should be encouraged and rewarded. Today, rec- ance in any of the rare operations conducted—meaning that the war operations—Vice Robert Rice, USN (Ret). Although ognition of this factor on a man’s fitness report can be a great in Transition CO tended to always put the most experienced officer, himself, in he was a highly effective wartime CO and not one who failed to stimulus to a CO’s warfighting effectiveness; charge of every function. adapt, he passed along a few thoughts to me which clarify some of • The CO must know his own weapons well, and their use, as well The result was that when war came, such officers proved read- the points just made: as the character of his potential enemies and how they are likely ily overworked and exhausted from war action. Today’s far more I’m sure now as I look back, that my age, over 40, was too old for to fight. These are the first requirements of a warrior and their to War extensive operations, improved submarines and greatly improved a good submarine skipper. There were some skippers in those days who development needs encouragement. (The Air Force’s Project methods of training and delegation of jobs should make patrol overly centralized their boats to “look good”—we all know of several, Warrior recognizes this need in today’s peacetime environment.) he start of WWII was a step into uncertainty for submarine exhaustion less of a factor in a war. Additionally, the rapid force one of whom turned his submarine over to his exec and incarcerated Such generalizations are easily, if not casually, developed by commanding officers. For some, war was an environment expansion experienced in WWII submarines, with Reserves, and himself. By and large, there’s no doubt in my mind that the compara- a retired submariner with World War II experience and some to which they failed to adapt and consequently they proved the greatly increased training load they inflicted on submarine tive lack of success of the early skippers stemmed from horrible torpedo awareness of the CO problems in modern submarines. Perhaps a disappointment to the submarine service. Can lessons be COs is not so likely in a nuclear powered force which is far less performance (depth, magnetic exploders, etc.). Remember we had no their only value is in creating an awareness of some factors which T susceptible to rapid expansion. radar, except the very first model SD which turned out to be a most learned from this past experience for those who will command our were eventually recognized at great cost in WWII and need not be more modern boats at the start of a next conflict? Perhaps the CO most susceptible to failure was the one who effective beacon to attract Jap planes while we charged batteries at repeated for WWIII. I was in carriers until after the and hence worried too much about the unknown. The scarcity of information night. My second ship, Paddle, was cursed, along with had no first-hand experience regarding the transition to war of on the enemy at the start of WWII is hard to imagine in today’s her class of boats, with the HOR engine which was Another submariner who saw the transition to WWII, Captain Mike Sellers, sum- submarine COs. But I have subsequently examined this problem environment of a seemingly overwhelming amount of informa- uniformly a flop. marized the characteristics of many pre-WWII peacetime COs. He describes them: through questioning of submariners and through an tion about everything. The profile of the Japanese To these thoughts of Sellars, [Capt. Mike Sellers, extensive reading of submarine patrol reports. My naval man was ill-defined and most derogatory. at right] I would add that the good wartime skipper, • “He was so cautious that everything had to be first double checked, and he own later commands in submarines brought this The characteristics were only too frequently badly in my experience, didn’t necessarily adhere to doc- took the time to do it. He wasn’t about to take a chance of making an error; problem into focus and has caused me to attempt exaggerated. Aircraft, for example, were felt to be trine if innovative actions appeared to have greater • “He blindly followed stereotyped training procedures year after year with few to examine it more seriously. far more of a threat than they actually proved. And payoff. For example, remaining at periscope depth suggestions for improvement; Prior to WWII, submarine COs were a very care- the enemy waters where U.S. submarines fought during an entire day’s submerged patrol was an • “He had to go by the book and do well in competition at all costs; fully selected elite. Most in the initial part of WWII were poorly described. Obsolete Dutch charts innovation which created more target opportunities • “He was either hesitant to, or was incompetent to, speak out on new ideas performed heroically with imagination, daring and for the area, for example, were the only while taking a (greatly exaggerated) risk of being for improvements. “He didn’t rock the boat; dogged persistence in spite of poor intelligence and navigational charts available. was primitive sighted by aircraft. • “He would rarely if ever take a chance. One didn’t take chances in submarines poor torpedo performance. Yet there were some who and of little help to the CO in the assessment of a The good CO knew that war was dangerous and because it was not worth the price of failure, promotion or command; didn’t, and proved expensive to the war effort. Why situation. Radar was very erratic or didn’t exist. The couldn’t be satisfactorily pursued if an attempt was • “And he wasn’t allowed to have the experience of seeing and hearing his COs failed or succeeded needs to be illμminated. bathythermograph arrived later in the war. Effective made to reduce all risk in a situation. Moreover, warshot torpedoes hit and explode in a target, if only a dummy target.” Capt. Richard B. Laning, USN The observations made in this article are not only evasion tactics could only be guessed at. In fact, the good CO acted promptly, even if there was a If today’s COs of submarines are like this, then expect the same sort of problems mine but those of many other submariners who have proved equally early detection of enemy threats was unlikely and hence a skipper’s possibility of error from his actions. (Long study of in transitioning to war. Mike Sellers also gives his ideas of the characteristics for a good wartime CO: interested in this problem. Hopefully, the judgments derived on the imagination could easily run riot if he concentrated too much on the problem and excessive checking of alternatives basis of the past history of COs transitioning to war may serve to the possible dangers close around his submarine. At the same time, invariably seemed to lead to missed opportunities.) • “The vigours (sic: rigors) of submarine war patrols demand a youthful man; alert present submarine commands to ways and means for minimiz- the WWII CO in transition was stressed by an uncertainty about What seems to need consideration for those COs • “The CO had to develop a certain ‘devil may care’ attitude; ing this problem for a next big naval war. the performance of his submarine’s power plant, the , who might enter a World War III is that: • The CO had to have confidence in himself and his crew and rely on his younger Looking at several types of peacetime COs who proved inad- and a great uncertainty about his weapons, mainly the torpedo. officers, both to train them fast for more senior jobs as well as to spread the equate in war, there is first the officer who appeared to be, in The HOR engines were an example of the former material prob- • In this age of specialization, great care must be taken load. This was a recognized risk that had to be taken; virtually every sense, first rate—hyperactive, charming, articulate lem. Known as “the Kaisers revenge” these diesel engines with a to insure (sic: ensure) that COs will acquire the • The WWII CO was accustomed to taking the 60:40 chance of success in most and an outstanding administrative officer, he was nevertheless too high horsepower per pound ratio, rarely ran for five hours without necessary command qualities and skills in addition of his actions. (He knew that high risks led to big payoffs.) This sort of risk- “high strung” to stand the stresses of war. In the low budget years failure of the myriad of oil lines needed for their functioning. Why to their technical specialties; taking was unheard of in peacetime; prior to WWII, submarine operations were insufficiently extensive such an abortion could be accepted by the Navy was evident when • Risk taking by COs should receive special mention • “He generally emphasized training on a daily basis, i.e., underway to and from to test this characteristic in this type of man. Today’s intensive I checked the peacetime correspondence and logs on the engines and credit whereas the tendency towards non-risk patrols, daily battle problems generated by dummy runs on the TDC, emergency nuclear submarine operations, however, should more readily dis- of the submarines I served on. taking should be discouraged; drills, etc. as opposed to the once a week drills conducted prior to WWII; close this type of weakness. Although there was much evidence of trouble with the engines, • An appreciation of history, and particularly of the • “He normally encouraged questions and suggestions, including ones related A second type of CO who proved inadequate was a product of the correspondence extolled the theoretical advantages of the shortcomings of COs in their transition to war in to his actions and decisions—no matter how frivolous. He in turn said what the slow rates of promotion which prevailed prior to WWII. This compact design of the engines and made little attempt to condemn WWII, seems necessary. This would also lead to a he thought and used facts to help train his officers in decision making; resulted in many COs being over 40 years of age at the start of them. It seemed evident from the correspondence that most sub- recognition of the probability of the unexpected • “And he didn’t let red tape or bureau rules inhibit him. (When Bu C and R the war. Thus, some were likely to need early relief due to physical mariners didn’t want to risk disfavor and promotion by criticizing and a developed mind-set to accept this factor as rules did not apply to wartime procedures, we disregarded them although that exhaustion, lack of sleep, discomfort due to poor submarine habit- their material. The torpedoes proved to be the same sort of political part of war; the age factor must be taken seriously would have been a heinous crime in peacetime days.)”

12 FALL 2018 undersea warfare undersea warfare FALL 2018 13 design and sail-mounted dive planes of the nuclear-powered Skipjack Development of submarine lethality has been a matter of debate—often heated—since David class in 1956. The nuclear-powered Soviet Alfa-class (Project 705) attack Bushnell’s Turtle. However, once separated from specific programs or platforms, the concept often submarine, first conceptualized in 1957, represented another leap forward. becomes somewhat amorphous. In a sense, increasing lethality means increasing the warfighting effec- Despite some loss of surface maneuverability, the teardrop hull vastly tiveness of naval forces, which is exactly what Bushnell had in mind as he hand-cranked his submersible heightened underwater performance. barrel across the Hudson River in 1776. The United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and India have since This article seeks to identify specific milestones in the development of submarine lethality since successfully adapted the nuclear-powered teardrop-shaped hull to a variety the beginning of the 20th century. In any such endeavor, no list can be complete to the satisfaction of of operational and strategic missions. To some extent, navies solely equipped all readers, so visit UNDERSEA WARFARE Magazine’s Facebook page (www.facebook.com/USWMagazine) with modern, conventionally powered submarines have followed suit. and share historic developments in subamarine lethality we left out. Extra credit will be awarded to those who provide not just an innovation but a historical example of its use or effect.

Propulsion espite the attempts of individual inventors to find a satisfactory alternative to a combined combustion-electrical propulsion sys- Dtem, diesel-electric propulsion had become institutionalized in modern navies by . As noted above, despite ongoing moderniza- tion of submarine design, this type of propulsion inevitably imposed limits on operations. In 1954, the launch of USS Nautilus (SSN 571), the first nuclear- Historical powered submarine, represented a quantum leap forward in this regard. 5 2Hand in hand with the consistently high degree of operational reactor safety practiced by the U.S. Navy, nuclear propulsion has freed our submarines—as well as those of potential adversaries—from many previous operational boundaries. It will be interesting to see if the still-evolving air-independent Innovations propulsion systems will similarly revolutionize non-nuclear navies. Hull Design he basic hull profile of early operational submarines was limited by diesel-electric propulsion systems.

by Carsten Fries, Naval History Naval Fries, and Carsten Heritageby Command, Communication and DivisionOutreach TDespite the additions of periscopes and rudimen- tary escape trunks, World War I-era submarines in many ways remained surface vessels adapted to submersible operations. Despite increases in capacity, speed, and cruising range, neces- in Submarine sity to surface forced retention of some construction features of 1surface vessels, invariably placing limits on a boat’s operational flexibility and survivability. The hull design of the late-World War II German Type XXI and XXIII U-boats, both equipped with snorkels, began to erode this paradigm and was adopted in the U.S. Navy’s innovative post-war Tang class, the Barracuda class with its specialized sonar array, and the Sailfish-class of radar-picket boats. During the early period, both NATO and Soviet navies followed suit. In 1953, two years before construction began on the Lethality Navy’s Skate class, an evolution of the Tangs and the service’s first nuclear-powered boats, a fully streamlined teardrop hull design was tested with the diesel-electric USS Albacore (AGSS 569). This was to lead to the single-screw “body-of-revolution”

14 FALL 2018 undersea warfare undersea warfare FALL 2018 15 Weapons Systems search radar, sonar, dedicated communications systems, and rudimentary electronic ntil the advent of submarine-launched ballistic countermeasures. In turn, all of these contributed much to the growing operational and cruise missiles, the evolution of the torpedo as versatility and lethality of submarines into the Cold War era. Ua submarine weapon was illustrative of submarines’ The decades-long confrontation with the Soviet Union and its allies had expanding operational role. Improvements in torpedo pro- the effect of applying various degrees of mission specificity to submarine types. pulsion, fuses, warheads and, ultimately, sensors have spanned To some extent, this approach hastened obsolescence for certain platforms as the gamut from Robert Whitehead’s simple compressed-air illustrated by the post-Soviet Russian navy’s submarine boneyards. However, the design to the highly accurate Japanese World War II–era relatively few classes of U.S. submarines commissioned by the Navy since the Type 95 “Long Lance” to the U.S. Navy’s Mark 48 Advanced dawn of the nuclear era speak both for the design quality as well as excellent adapt- 3 ability to Cold War and post-Cold War operational realities. A 2006-2008 case Capabilities weapon with its sophisticated guidance system, depth adaptability, and counter-countermeasures. in point is the modification of four Ohio-class ballistic missile boats to carry both cruise missile vertical launch systems and lockout chambers for special operations missions—both features indicative of evolving mission roles within the changing nature of conflict.

Arming nuclear-propelled submarines with ballistic nuclear missiles and giving these plat- forms a strategic mission arguably changed the nature of the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The creeping retirement of some U.S. land- based strategic strike systems gives continued relevance to our SSBNs’ mission. Although the U.S. Navy armed submarines with cruise missiles as early as 1958 with Submariners the Regulus, regular combat deployment of these weapons (today’s Tomahawk Land-Attack ny discussion of our Submarine Force’s quality Missiles) is a relatively recent addition to the mission profile of U.S. missile and attack boats, must take into account the professionalism of beginning with the in 1991. Nonetheless, the addition of these weapons to the Aeach and every U.S. Navy Submariner, volun- Submarine Force’s arsenal has greatly increased both operational flexibility and lethality of teers within an all-volunteer force. Ever since the steep U.S. submarines. learning curve experienced and overcome by crews of the World War I–era “pig boats,” consummate technical expertise, adaptability, and not a small dose of personal courage have been called for. Mission 5Submariners of all nations have progressed from a efore World War II, limits in range, capacity, and endurance relegated the sub- distant era in which the survivability of their boats was marine to a coastal defense mission or tethered it to operating areas in relative very low through the period when rescue vehicles and Bproximity to its base. However, German development of true ocean-going apparatuses were essentially experimental (rescue of USS boats just prior to and during World War I demonstrated the potential of the submarine Squalus (SS 192) in 1939, Momsen escape lung, etc.) to in a commerce-raiding role—and as a growing threat to surface navies. the high level of survivability today. However, constant During the inter-war period, schools of thought concerning a submarine maintenance of this standard has always required dif- force’s mission(s) varied, leading to such anamolies as the “-submarines” ficult training unique to the Submarine Force—and the employed by the British and French navies, and the very variegated submarine professional dedication of each and every Submariner. 4fleet developed by the Imperial Japanese Navy. Although takeaways from the The loss of the Argentine navy’s ARA San Juan (S-42) last year, as well Naval War College war games carried out during this interval contributed much as the tragic saga of the Russian navy’s “Oscar II” Kursk (K-141) in 2000, to the Navy’s development of aircraft carriers and their central role in the then only serve to underline this point. If the U.S. Navy did not identify and still notional future , insights regarding submarines were few, in some continually develop the high of personnel serving as Submariners, instances merely relegating the boats to scouting. submarines would not fill the key mission roles they do and, in the end, not be the lethal platforms they are. Until 1943, when development of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) Conclusion tactics and weapons became centralized functions in the U.S. (with the establishment of the Tenth Fleet) and British navies, the German sub- Two important contributing elements to the five innovations raised in the marine force severely impacted the Allied war effort in the Atlantic. The article make U.S. submarines the dominant lethal force they are. First are early-war successes of the Kriegsmarine U-boats and the maximum pres- the engineers, planners and builders generating cutting-edge technology and sure applied against the Japanese surface navy and mercantile fleet that giving form and substance to ideas and plans. Second are the Submariners U.S. Navy submarines eventually brought to bear amply demonstrated themselves, who are historically known for their ability to work together to the potential of the undersea forces. find inventive solutions to overcome challenges. Innovation has made the U.S. Aside from targeting adversaries’ surface vessels, most navies also used Submarine Force a stabilizing influence on the world stage since the Cold War, submarines for other missions such as minelaying, special operations, search and it is continued innovation that will enable it to be that stabilizing force and rescue, and surveillance—harbingers of what most modern boats are going forward. capable of today. Expanding mission profiles helped power improved inno- vative design, improved construction techniques, and employment of better

16 FALL 2018 undersea warfare undersea warfare FALL 2018 17 18 by Cmdr. Scott McGinnis FALL 2018undersea warfare Captains The Common of Successful “ Teaching SubmarineLeadership: your expectations. and they’ll outperform feel good aboutthemselves lead others. Makeothers Drive yourselfand Combat Submarine —Adm. Eugene Fluckey (Ret.)

Characteristic ” 1

typically lookatthecommandingofficer (CO)as for—to beready for—undersea combat.Whilewe siveness, andethics. for undersea combatsuchasinnovation, aggres- displaying thequalities thatwe know are valuable environment typicallyresults inthesubmarine team, and foster a supportive environment. This ability toinspire collaboration, build acohesive characteristics seemlessimportantthantheCO’s combat submarinecrew toadopt,theCO’s personal the personification of thecharacteristics we want a A ity asasubmarineforce remains toprepare bat sinceWorld War II,ourmain responsibil lthough we have notfired atorpedoincom - - warfare must be practiced and gun-drilled In other words, the team-building aspect of post combatcommencementto maintainit. that environment over timeandwork hard war withovernight. The COmustbuild cannot changetheenvironment hegoes to torpedo tubestheygotowarwith, theCO as thecrew cannotincrease thenumberof his teamshowed thatheunderstoodthat,just a feelingofunity. Fluckey’s engagementwith tions, pulledtheteamtogether, andfostered pulse,” a “quick tripthrough theboattofeel on goodideasandthat,by routinely taking aboard, hedidnothave amonopoly heknew Below” shows that,whilehe was in charge Overall, Fluckey’s writingin“Thunder Adm. Fluckey andUSSBarb (SS220). demonstrated using practical examples from leadership. These characteristics are then from Adm. Stockdale’s writingoncombat and combinedwithathird characteristic seven characteristics are highlighted below professional underseawarrior. Two ofthese which outlinesseven characterizationsofa SUBFOR document,“Undersea Warfighting,” use thisknowledge today? COs in WWII different andhow can we petence, how were the70mostsuccessful WWII), allhadabaselevel oftacticalcom- Command Course(developed asaresult of rent COs who graduate from the Submarine toreturn homeagain. in surviving the attacktendedtoco-existwithcompetence other 85 percent. Competence in pressing home from patrol aswere thesubmarinesunder COs were three timesaslikelytoreturn safely submarines underthemostsuccessful15percent rate thanthesubmarineforce asawhole. The crews as a group had a much higher survival This meansthemostsuccessfulCOs andtheir mand (Wahoo, Harder, Thresher and Tang). their shipswere lostwhiletheywere incom- MacMillan andGilmore) andonlyfourof four were killedinaction(Morton, Dealey, of theshipssunk.Out ofthese70COs, only 15 percent whoaccountedformore thanhalf ing World War II,itwasthetopperforming Of the465 submarineCOs dur- whoserved titled “Undersea Warfighting” outlines: Submarine Forces (SUBFOR)document ferent outcomes. The July 2011Commander, the sameequipmentcanhave dramaticallydif Let’s beginby referencing thesame Assuming the WWII COs, like our cur- Our WWII statistics show that teams with 3 hereceived substantialrecommenda 2 - - successful wartimeteam.” characteristics ofa one ofthethreemostimportant solutionstothathardwareis in tacticsandmaterial the hardwaretheyareusing;however, innovation operatorsdonothaveachoicein “In general, Fluckey hadearly establishedaphilosophy procedures hardware. associatedwiththenew because there were no tactics, techniques or solved. It encouraged thecrew toexperiment provided aproblem that neededtobecreatively in order toattackJapan’s infrastructure. This loaded rockets andlaunchers(asubmarinefirst) environment.of asupportive a problem with unbounded solutions inside exploited.” serendipity canbequicklyidentifiedand the existenceofan“environment where deliberate planningand,inFluckey’s words, However, more providence thanaseized opportunity. observer, theBarb’s trainattackmayseem chain ofcommandabove him. To thecasual of shared prosperity, andhadasupportive motivated hiscrew, created anenvironment vations were direct results ofthewayFluckey were notaresult ofluckorfate. These inno ing uptothetrain’s demise, we seethatthey impacting ’s wartime logistics. events team to blowing his led up the train, On Fluckey’s final wartime patrol, aseries of self-scuttling underneath charges the tracks. by men sent one ofour ashore who placed train isfortrain a16-car blown symbol up among WWII submarine The battle flags. center apicture ofatrain, isunique which carefully,flag find youwill at the bottom wartime If team. at Barb youlook important characteristics ofasuccessful to that hardware isone ofthe three most innovation in tactics andmaterial solutions in the however, hardware are they using; In operators general, donothave achoice Innovation attack andasafereturn home. environment thatresulted insuccessthe began fosteringapositive, collaborative percent of WWII COs recognized thisand prior tocombatoperations. The top15 The If we break down theseriesofevents lead Barb’s crew, ontheir12thwarpatrol, 4 Barb’s attackwastheresult of Serendipity occurstoovercome ’s battle

- - to ahalt.He accessedthecreativity of the of continuing to bring the enemy’s logistics sink, Fluckey was faced with the challenge take risks,even ifsuccesswasnotguaranteed. andallowedcommand wassupportive himto four previous warpatrols, Fluckey’s chainof see thatthistype ofingenuityrequires a example andour current experience, we can tional autonomywe require. From Fluckey’s toretain theopera - exists andismandatory gimbal,we allknowrotary thisspiritstill room roller nuttoreplace thedishwasher’s exchanger foracoolingsystemortorpedo and Tygon® tubingasareplacement heat station. Whether it’s using the ice machine to amaterialproblem thatkepttheboaton incredible, against-all-oddsSailor solution ofan ment andpatrol results insomestory a collectionofcollardevicestoorganize. crew as an experience base to leverage, not and skills were his metrics. He lookedat his of thoughtandtalent.Strength, experience, he selectedmenbasedforemost ondiversity approach tohisdemolitionlandingparty, mission’s success. To understandFluckey’s Both of these aspects werecharts. vital tothe for themissionandtranslationofJapanese willing toassistintheoperationalplanning POW, “”; therefore, thePOW was his crew, thecrew hadhumanelytreated their a result ofFluckey’s positive demeanorwith weight to complete the switch’s circuit. As to activate thechargeusingtrain’s own suggested usingamicroswitch from theradar electrician who had worked on the railroad call forideaswaspassedthrough theboat,an tling charge and activation switch. Once the helped designtheattackusingashipscut- he engagedhischiefgunnersmatewho after unsuccessfullypollinghiswardroom, ment hehadalready fostered. In thiscase, crew by leveraging thecollaborative environ solutions.” onboard of“we don’t have problems, only When there were no more train ferries to Every current-day submarine deploy 5 Ashore, due to earlier successes in Ashore, duetoearliersuccessesin undersea warfare FALL 2018 - - 19 ones that make you successful in a wartime when it perceives that Sailors are taking too Fluckey understood this reality of warfare. viewed his enemies the same way he viewed navy. If we look at today’s peacetime deploy- much risk? Aggressiveness as a submarine From his actions in combat, we can ascertain his own crew—as passionate people acting ments, some may define success to be no trait is without question required for com- what he taught his team. He emphasizes in on their beliefs in a professional manner. liberty incidents, no incident reports, and bat, but how you get your team aggressive “Thunder Below” that he took extra risk by The time to inspire your people to a higher at least an average on inspections. While is much more than an example of bravado. staying on the surface to look for survivors; purpose and persuade them to become their these are valuable metrics to ensure access to Each decision, reaction, and engagement you he treated all people floating on the sea as better selves is now. Once you’re in combat, foreign ports and a healthy materiel condi- have with your team will build (or destroy) humans, not distinguishing between enemy there is no time to discuss ethics, and the tion, they may not be as valuable in combat. an environment that rewards measured risk or ally. He displays empathy throughout the example you provide while preparing for com- While additional specifics on what defines a and inspires preparation. war: “All our hearts bleed for our mission of bat is all that your team will be left with. How successful peacetime deployment today may mercy... All of our hearts bleed for the poor you handle your team today will determine problem, time constraint, and a supportive be a topic for a future issue of UNDERSEA Ethics wretches, wherever they may be, imprisoned how they act on the battlefield. The more ronment that supports collaboration, inno- , the lesson remains: on their flotsam for this their sixth day.”7 transactional you are today, the less effective vation, and risk taking. Today is the day to environment that fosters innovation. To WARFARE Magazine Let’s start this part of the discussion by revis- we should ensure that the metrics that make Contrast this with the actions of the USS your team will be in combat tomorrow. analyze whether your daily interactions with prepare your team for combat, how are you iting Adm. Stockdale’s view on leadership us successful in combat are the same ones we Dubuque (LPD 8),8 whose captain failed to your team foster aggressiveness and creative encouraging collaboration across your divi- and morality: sions, departments and boat? When Sailors value in peacetime. save Vietnamese refugees stranded at sea in Conclusions ideas. Through Command Management bring you unfavorable news, do you have Using another example from “Thunder “In all that I’ve been saying, I’ve made the June of 1988, and the poor treatment of pris- Equal Opportunity surveys, submarine cul- the emotional discipline to take it in stride Below,” the Barb’s U.S.-issued charts were points that leaders under pressure must keep oners at Abu Ghraib. The message is quite There are obvious ways that our submarines tural assessments, and squadron rides, we and allow them the opportunity to correct not accurate enough to have allowed the themselves absolutely clean morally. They must clear: how you treat people in garrison filters can be used effectively in combat. What may spend a lot of time trying to understand our the issue? When necessary, will you be able Barb to get in close enough to send Sailors lead by example, must be able to implant high- down to the way your team treats people on not be so obvious, however, is that, while the environment. We know that crews who are to leverage the creativity of the entire crew? ashore. Fluckey had both the risk tolerance mindedness in their followers, must have compe- the battlefield. Fluckey gives us one more traits that bring about success in combat are treated like equipment will not aggressively For the command decisions that provide and a willing, aggressive Sailor to recover tence beyond status, and must have earned their view of how he sees humanism in warfare. thought to be personified in the CO, they achieve the boat’s goals, will not be innova- 6 the opportunity for the team to weigh in, 17 charts from the sinking pilot house of a followers’ respect by demonstrating integrity.” After many of his friends died at the hands of actually reflect the CO’s engagement with tive, and are more likely to compromise some commanding officers go around the 1,000-ton enemy cargo ship that they had Leaders know this intrinsically, but based the Japanese, Fluckey wrote, “I do not hate the crew and the environment aboard. Just their integrity. Conversely, we know we get table and require everyone at a minimum to recently disabled. Additionally, when the on unfortunate, recent examples, some might Japanese Naval personnel. They served their as we shift the time burden of warfare from the best results in warfare when we chal- physically turn his or her thumb up or down. Barb carried out the attack on this cargo not fully understand the connection between country well and proudly the same as I, as the point of engagement by gun drilling, we lenge our crews with problems and allow 9 They also require those who disagree with the ship, she used a new homing torpedo that integrity, combat, and efficiency of orders. professional warriors whom I admire.” He must also front load the building of an envi- them to experiment. We have an incredibly decision to say why they disagree. By mak- required the submarine to be below 150’ for To reiterate Stockdale’s two points above: (1) rich heritage to pull from; a heritage of pas- ing everyone weigh in, the team buys in. By safety due to the torpedo arming above 100’. leadership in combat cannot be transactional sionate people acting on their beliefs in a encouraging dissent, you remove group think During the approach, however, the Barb and (2) the virtue of positional authority will Recommendations: professional manner. Shift the time burden and expand the solution set. Innovation could not get below 135’ due to a negative not carry the water to efficiently deliver and • COs, review the 2011 COMSUBFOR document “Undersea Warfighting” as a training topic of warfare to today, drive yourself to engage comes from a team, led by someone who temperature gradient. Despite the safety execute orders. In our daily peacetime opera- with your wardroom and chief’s quarters. Make your dolphin qualifiers lead the discus- your crew, and your crew’s attributes in war- allows for innovation, not merely an inno- restriction, Fluckey gave the order to fire. tions, transactional leadership, or the giving sion on one of the attributes or the history lessons presented throughout. fare will reflect those of our most successful vative leader whom everyone just follows. This demonstrates two aspects of successful WWII COs. and following of orders, seems infallible but, • COs, use the Army’s Center for the Army Profession and Ethic case study on My-Lai or How do you build your teams (watchteams, aggressiveness. First, the fine line between in combat (or under pressure as Stockdale the USNA Hugh Thompson’s “Moral Courage in Combat” as a CPO selectee case study. divisions, or departments)? recklessness and aggressiveness is separated describes it), transactional leadership “finds itself Cover this with your team during “integrity/ethics” training as an example of how some References by a deep understanding of a requirement’s floundering.” He says that “inputs” are needed will use combat as an excuse to justify immorality. 1 Handwritten note on a copy of “Thunder Below,” Aggressiveness basis. Second, significant preparation is May 22, 1997. from the leader in these circumstances. What • N1’s, focus part of our Submarine Cultural Workshops and assessments as a way to required before aggressively attacking the he found is that the leader needs to inspire his 2 “Undersea Warfighting,” July 2011, Commander The COs at the beginning of the war were measure collaboration aboard. Submarine Forces, p. 5. not aggressive enough and took “extreme target. An aggressive leader inspires their team to remove their self-centered goals, inspire team to perform the detailed planning ahead in them a higher purpose, and persuade them • Squadrons, prioritize feedback to command triads on their environment aboard, evalu- 3 Fluckey, Eugene, “Thunder Below,” University of stealth precautions” to the point of hinder- ate those attributes that reward peacetime success versus wartime success, identify Illinois Press, 1992, p. 374. of time so that, when faced with a difficult to become their better selves. To be effective in ing their boats’ performance. Aggressiveness operations that we need to do in wartime but don’t take the risk of doing in peacetime challenge, it is seen as an opportunity, not combat, therefore, a CO’s positional authority 4 Pamphlet accompanying signed copy of “Thunder is the cornerstone of undersea warfighting. (i.e., post-sunset harbor movements). Below,” 1992. something insurmountable. must not be viewed as sufficient to eliminate the As is apparent from the WWII CO statistics 5 Fluckey, “Thunder Below,” p. 369. As with innovation, we like to personify need for these inputs. The CO needs to work • Continue to align deployment and patrol metrics to those attributes outlined in quoted above, those COs who were aggres- “Undersea Warfighting” and the “Design for Undersea Warfare.” 6 Stockdale, Vice Adm. James B. (Ret.), “A Vietnam sive were more likely to accomplish the mis- the trait of aggressiveness in the personality on these inputs before combat begins. of the CO but, by looking deeper into what Experience: Ten Years of Reflection, Machiavelli, sion and get their team back safely. While • NLEC, SOAC, and SOBC, focus a portion of the course on how to foster a collaborative Management and Moral Leadership,” p. 44. made Fluckey successful, it may not be his environment. this is true, it may be more nuanced than 7 Fluckey, “Thunder Below,” p. 133. personal aggressive attribute but rather his just that the new COs had a spirit of aggres- • PCOIs, evaluate and provide feedback to PCO/PXO students on their ability to inspire 8 UPI Archives, “Navy captain’s court- set discipline in preparation and engagement siveness. The new COs were unencumbered collaboration, develop crew talent, and allow risk taking among the crew. in refugee case,” Feb. 9, 1989, https://www.upi. with his crew that allowed him, when chal- com/Archives/1989/02/09/Navy-captains-court- by a peacetime culture that rewarded being • COs, consider, when operationally feasible, requiring all people weighing-in (thumbs up lenged, to know that his team was prepared. martial-set-in-refugee-case/2224603003600. overly conservative. If we believe that being or thumbs down at a minimum) on operational decisions, possibly at ops briefs. a submarine CO is (and was) the definition Aggressiveness as a ship attribute is fostered 9 “Shipmate,” January/February 1993, p. 35. • COs, read L. David Marquet’s “How do we give people more control?”10 and practice it. of a successful career, then the earlier COs by the environment aboard. How much risk 10 Marquet, David L., “How Do We Give People valuing stealth to a fault may demonstrate are individuals allowed to take? How much • UWDC, continue to encourage experimentation in tactics to maintain the spirit of innovation. More Control,” https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ autonomy does the team know that they how-do-we-give-people-more-control-l-david-marq that the skills required to be successful in a • School houses, continue to hold “fight clubs” in the Submarine Multi-Mission Team have? How does the command team react uet?articleId=6419578036747853824#comments peacetime navy, may not be the same as the Trainer to inspire warfighting or gain the capability to do so. -6419578036747853824&trk=prof-post

20 FALL 2018 undersea warfare undersea warfare FALL 2018 21 2nd Each year, the Naval Submarine League (NSL) 19th and Undersea Warfare Magazine team up to sponsor a photo contest. The winter 2018 issue of the magazine announced this year’s Annual 19th Annual Photo Contest and the response was outstanding. The photo contest winners are not only excel- Photo lent examples of the photographers art; they bring to mind some of the things that keep our Submarine Force looking good in every Contest respect. Kudos to this year’s winners and to all those Winners who participated! Photo by Victoria Guillerault. 1st USS Virginia (SSN 774) returning to sea immediately after Christmas 2017 port call in Scotland. 3rd

HM

Photo by Lt. Michael Hughes. USS New Mexico (SSN 779) leaving on deployment from New London Conn.

Photo by Jonathan Beck. Photo by FTCS (SS) Vien Nguyen. At Bremerton for the last homecoming of USS Bremerton (SSN 698), Moment captured during a swim call awarded by CO of USS Olympia (SSN 717) after a sucessful shot and a live ADCAP warshot. moment captured as crew left the boat and met up with their families.

22 FALL 2018 undersea warfare undersea warfare FALL 2018 23 Navy Announces Updates to Uniform Policies Navy announced updates to uniform policy, grooming standards and The Ultimate the launch of a uniform working group in NAVADMIN 233/18, Sept. 21. SailorsFirst Highlights of the changes include: • Completion of fittings and wear tests for new, improved female officer and chief petty officer slacks and skirts, scheduled to be Deployability Assessment and Assignment Program Sacrifice: available for purchase by the end of 2018 This program will ensure the timely disposition, processing, and • Announcement of the improved general safety boot (I Boot 4) accountability of all Active Component, Full Time Support, and with enhanced comfort and durability features, expected to be Selected Reserve Sailors who are either medically, legally or adminis- available for purchase in October 2018 tratively limited from deployment. • CO approval for the wear of coyote brown ball cap with coveralls “The Navy the nation needs is a talented, ready and lethal active A Submariner’s and reserve force, and we need deployment-ready Sailors to accom- and flight suits • CO authorization of command logos on t-shirts worn with Navy plish the mission,” said Rear Adm. Jeff Hughes, DCNP. “While com- Working Uniform (NWU) Type I, II and III, coveralls and flight mand leadership is responsible for overall personnel readiness, our suits Sailors bear the ultimate responsibility for their individual readiness Service in and deployability status, and this new program is designed to help • Fingernail grooming standards for men and women, including our force successfully achieve both goals.” guidance on length, shape and color of nails Starting October 1, 2018, Sailors who have been non-deployable • Lock hairstyle standards for wear, size, length and guidance for for 12 consecutive months will be notified of mandatory processing Afghanistan wear in uniform for administrative separation or referral to the Disability Evaluation • Wear guidance and changes to the allowed material for rings System (DES), as appropriate. The policy applies to all Sailors, regard- and bracelets less of current duty type (operational or non-operational). In keeping with the warfighting rom 2003 to 2011, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan periodically • Announcement for Sailors assigned to Marine Corps units, who Military treatment facilities and Sailors’ commands will make deploy- theme of this issue of Undersea intensified, manpower requirements exceeded the availability of must now abide by Marine Corps grooming standards when ability assessments by determining a Sailor’s ability to perform appropri- Soldiers and Marines to fill overseas billets. To help mitigate short- wearing Marine Corps uniforms ate military duties commensurate with his or her office, grade, rank, or Warfare Magazine, the follow- falls, all the military services provided additional personnel to the • Authorization and wear guidance for the optional simultaneous skill in light of ongoing medical treatment or administrative limitations. ing article is presented in honor F Commands will use written counseling and performance evalua- Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) through the Individual Augmentation wear of the Post-Tour Command at Sea and Command Ashore/ (IA) process. For the Navy, eligible personnel were limited to those serv- Project Manager insignia tions to document a Sailor’s knowing failure to comply with respon- of the only Submariner to have sibilities to maintain individual readiness (e.g., missing medical or ing in non-critical shore duty billets. In some cases, Sailors would show up Navy has launched a uniform policy working group to provide made the ultimate sacrifice in dental appointments or intentional failure to disclose status affect- to their well-deserved shore duty after three to five years on sea duty only a forum for direct Fleet feedback on uniform wear and regulations. ing deployability). Sailors who fail to comply with this policy could ground fighting in the Global War Commands interested in having a crew member participate in a future to find out they were “nominated” and accepted for a 12-month IA to the ultimately receive administrative separation. working group can submit a command-endorsed request with the on Terror (GWOT). Middle East. While the experiences were unique and potentially career- “Sailors who receive notifications will have the opportunity name, rank, rate and availability of the Sailor to the “Ask The Chiefs” enhancing, the threat “outside the wire” was real. to be considered for retention by the Secretary of the Navy,” said email list at [email protected]. Lt. Jeffrey Ammon of Orem, Utah enlisted in the Navy in 1988 as a Capt. Chris Harris, director, distribution management division, career Sailors can provide feedback and recommendations on Navy uni- nuclear machinist mate. After completing the nuclear training pipeline management department, Navy Personnel Command. “All retention forms and the Navy Uniform App at any time via the “Ask The Chiefs” as an Engineering Laboratory Technician (ELT), he applied for and was determinations will be made on a case-by-case basis.” email, on the Navy Uniform Matters Office website at www.npc.navy.mil, Pregnant and post-partum Sailors are exempt from this policy. No accepted as a staff member where he continued to train enlisted and or a link available on the Uniform App. other Sailors are exempt, but special categories for retention consid- officer students. After two years at prototype, he reported to his first Read NAVADMIN 233/18 in its entirety for details and complete eration include combat wounded members, Sailors who will be non- submarine, USS Ohio (SSBN 726). During his first sea tour he qualified information on all of the announced uniform changes, updates and deployable for 12 months or longer due to administrative reasons, in submarines and was selected for the Nuclear Enlisted Commissioning guidelines at www.npc.navy.mil. and Sailors who have attained such years of creditable service so as Program. In 2001 he completed a bachelor degree in Nuclear Engineering to be within three years of qualifying for retirement. from Oregon State University. Returning to the Navy as a commissioned This policy supports SECDEF officer, he completed his nuclear officer training and reported to his sec- guidance to maximize the ond boat, USS Alabama (SSBN 731). lethality and readiness of the Reporting to shore duty in 2007, Lt. Ammon was selected for IA to Welcome Home! joint force, and the release of Afghanistan where he worked to rebuild economic infrastructure through Sailors greet loved ones at Naval DoD Instruction 1332.45. micro-loans. He helped small businesses with restocking, buying business Submarine Base New London in More information on deploy- equipment, repairing damage to shops, and hiring employees. Groton, Conn., during the return ability can be found at the fol- “He felt like he was making a difference,” said his mother, Kathleen of the Virginia-class fast-attack lowing websites: submarine USS California (SSN http://www.public.navy. Ammon. “He really wanted to try a little bit longer to make a difference.” 781). California was on deploy- On May 23, 2008, Lt. Jeffrey Ammon died from injuries caused by a mil/bupers-npc/career/LIMDU/ Lt. Jeffrey Ammon ment for a routine patrol. Pages/default.aspx road-side Improvised Explosive Device. Formally attached to Commander June 16, 1970–May 20, 2008 https://www.med.navy.mil/ Navy Region Northwest, he was on his second tour serving as a member Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Tristan B. Lotz sites/nmcp/Branch/SitePages/ of Provincial Reconstruction Team Ghazni, Aband District, Afghanistan. Norfolk/DeploymentHealth.aspx “Ammon was a loving, caring man who loved going hiking and camp- Read NAVADMIN 239/18 on ing and the outdoors,” said Jim Edwards, Ammon’s brother-in-law. the NPC website at www.npc. He is survived by his wife and two children. navy.mil.

24 FALL 2018 undersea warfare undersea warfare FALL 2018 25 DOWNLINK

Changes of Command COMSUBFOR Vice Adm. Charles Richard relieved USS Indiana Commissioned SailorsFirst Vice Adm. Joseph Tofalo PEO Submarines Rear Adm. David Goggins relieved Navy Updates Post-9/11 GI Bill Benefit Transfer Rear Adm. Michael Jabaley Request Process Undersea Warfighting Dev. Ctr. The Navy released a new electronic form for completing the Rear Adm. Butch Dollaga relieved Statement of Understanding (SOU) needed to submit Post-9/11 GI Rear Adm. James Pitts Bill Transfer of Education Benefits (TEB) requests, and a new policy allowing Purple Heart recipients to transfer education benefits, in COMSUBGRU 7 Rear Adm. James Pitts relieved

NAVADMIN 236/18, Sept. 24. Lotz Class Tristan 3rd Specialist Communication by Mass Photo Rear Adm. Richard Correll Starting Oct. 1, Sailors will be able to complete the required Gerard Butler, Don Keith and George Wallace answer audience questions

SOU online via My Navy Portal, or the My Education web site at following “Hunter Killer” screening. COMSUBRON 6 Leah Stiles Specialist Communication Mass Chief by Senior Photo https://myeducation.netc.navy.mil/webta/home, instead of the Capt. Martin Muckian relieved paper “page 13” that must be processed before submitting an New Sub film gets advance screening at SUBASE Capt. Carl Hartsfield initial TEB request. Naval Submarine Base (SUBASE) New London had the privilege of hold- COMSUBRON 7 Sailors should verify their current email information to ensure ing an advance screening of the Lionsgate’s film “Hunter Killer” at the Capt. Paul Davis relieved prompt feedback on TEB applications. After completing the SOU, Dealey Center Theater, Oct. 20. Capt. Robert Roncska Sailors will receive a link to the Defense Manpower Data Center The screening was attended by the star of the film, Gerard Butler COMSUBRON 12 The crew of the Virginia-class USS Indiana (SSN 789) salute after bringing the ship to life (DMDC) milConnect portal where they can complete the application. and the movie’s director, Donovan Marsh. Capt. David Youtt relieved during the boat’s commissioning ceremony. Indiana is the U.S. Navy’s 16th Virginia-class fast-attack subma- Sailors who are unable to complete the SOU or TEB application Before the movie premier, Butler and Marsh met with Sailors from Capt. Ollie Lewis rine and the third ship named for the state of Indiana. online may contact the Navy Personnel Command GI Bill Office each of SUBASE’s homeported submarines and tenant commands. (PERS-311) to request assistance with their application. “We filmed a lot of the scenes on actual submarines,” said Marsh. COMSUBRON 15 Capt. Timothy Poe relieved The new process does not impact Sailors who already have an “There are real Sailors in the background. I want you to look closely Capt. David Schappert USS John Warner (SSN 785) Lt. Cmdr. Stephen Emerson Lt. Cmdr. Robert Perris approved TEB request in milConnect, or the process for adding during the film and see if you can tell the Sailors from the actors.” Cmdr. Will Wiley relieved FFC Nuclear Propulsion Exam Board USS Maryland (SSBN 738) (B) a dependent or modifying benefits allocated to dependents on When the film concluded and the credits began to roll, the more COMSUBRON 21 Cmdr. Bert Canfield approved TEB requests. than 1,300 Sailors and family members in attendance gave a stand- Capt. Sean Muth relieved Lt. Cmdr. John Gilligan Lt. Cmdr. Mark Rostedt The NAVADMIN also announced that Purple Heart recipients ing ovation and cheered, all turning to face Butler himself, who was Capt. Enrique Panlilio USS Maryland (SSBN 739) (G) NPTU Ballston Spa-GST COMSUBGRU 7 are immediately eligible to transfer their unused education ben- seated in the balcony above, to applaud him directly. Cmdr. Michael Paisant relieved Submarine Learning Center Cmdr. Chris Horgan Lt. Cmdr. Alexander Sayers efits to their dependents without the requirement for six years of “Hunter Killer” is based on the 2012 novel “Firing Point” by author Lt. Cmdr. Collin Hedges Capt. Aaron Thieme relieved USS (SSBN 737) (B) USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) (B) service and agreement to serve four additional years. Purple Heart and war historian Don Keith and retired submarine commander, George Capt. Andrew Jarrett USS Mississippi (SSN 782) recipients are also eligible if their total military service exceeds Wallace. Cmdr. Heath Johnmeyer relieved Lt. Cmdr. Kevin Henderson Lt. Cmdr. Chad Tella Fleet Anti-Submarine 16 years. Cmdr. Eric Rosek Student Marine Corps Univ. S NSTCP PH HI Warfare Training Center All other Sailors requesting transfer of education benefits must Capt. Brandon Bryan relieved USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) (B) Lt. Cmdr. Joshua Hricik Lt. Cmdr. Keith Turnbull have served at least six years and have at least four years remain- Capt. Ron Toland Cmdr. James Lembo relieved USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) (G) COMSEVENTHFLT ing on their service commitment, as outlined in NAVADMIN 170/18. MyNavy Career Center Open for Business 24/7 Cmdr. Jason Geddes Effective July 12, 2019, any Sailor who has more than 16 years USS Boise (SSN 764) Delivering on a promise to provide Sailor-focused customer service Cmdr. Kristopher Lancaster relieved Lt. Cmdr. Damiean Johnson Qualified in of total service will no longer be eligible to transfer education ben- USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740) and around-the-clock assistance, Navy Personnel Command (NPC) Cmdr. Christopher Osborn (crew split) UUVRON 1 Submarines efits to their dependents, unless they are a Purple Heart recipient. opens the MyNavy Career Center (MNCC) contact center. Cmdr. Jeremy Miller assumes Take action now to avoid losing this opportunity! USS Chicago (SSN 721) Lt. Cmdr. Vincent Kahnke Lt. Ian Balczewski Opened Sept. 24, the contact center represents an evolution command of Blue All Sailors who are or will be eligible to transfer their Post-9/11 Cmdr. Chance Litton relieved Cmdr. Jason Anderson assumes COMSUBLANT USS Asheville (SSN 758) in Navy pay and personnel services delivery by providing Sailors a GI Bill education benefits should discuss their options with their Cmdr. Brian Turney command of Gold tiered system, available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to handle Lt. Cmdr. Farrokh Kapadia Lt. Jonathon Casey command career counselor. their queries and transactions. Tier Zero is the service member’s self- USS Columbia (SSN 771) PCU South Dakota (SSN 790) DIRSSP Washington DC USS (SSN 722) For detailed information on transferring Post 9-11 GI Bill edu- Cmdr. Tyler Forrest relieved service option through MyNavy Portal (MNP), my.navy.mil. Tier One Cmdr. Craig E. Litty relieved Capt. cation benefits, read NAVADMIN 236/18 at www.npc.navy.mil. Cmdr. Dave Edgerton Ronald L. Withrow Lt. Cmdr. Richard Kuss Lt. Tyler Cox is communication with one of our agents by phone and email. If a USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) (G) USS Greeneville (SSN 772) Sailor’s inquiry or transaction cannot be handled by a customer ser- USS (SSN 776) USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) (G) vice agent, they will be escalated to Tier Two, where a subject matter Cmdr. Sterling Jordan relieved Cmdr. Jay Bijeau relieved Lt. Cmdr. Christopher Lindahl Lt. j.g. Michael Ebeling expert will take appropriate action. Cmdr. John Roussakies Cmdr. Timothy Clark HQ MARCOM USS Scranton (SSN 756) “This is good for everyone; Sailors, because they will have 24/7 USS Helena (SSN 725) Naval Submarine Support Command Lt. Cmdr. Vincent McCall Lt. j.g. Neil Flattery access through a single point of entry for answers to questions, cur- Cmdr. Andy Cain relieved Cmdr. John Killila relieved USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) (B) USS Scranton (SSN 756) rent information, and responsive support to their transaction needs. Cmdr. Jason Pittman Cmdr. Christopher Lindberg This returns time and energy to Sailors to focus on the mission and Lt. Cmdr. Anthony Nebel Lt. Christopher Kenison PCU Hyman G. Rickover (SSN 795) USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) (B) USS Illinois (SSN 786)\ their families,” said Hughes. Undersea Warfare Magazine has created this section in recog- Cmdr. Thomas Niebel assumes command Qualified for Command nition of the enlisted Submariner—but we want you to get involved This MNCC contact center launch is just the beginning. It is an Lt. Cmdr. Jonathan Ovren Lt. j.g. Henry Kincaid in the success of this effort. We would like you to send us “Commu- incremental step toward an evolving development effort where we USS Indiana (SSN 789) in Submarines USS Scranton (SSN 756) USS Scranton (SSN 756) nity Outreach,” or “Liberty” photos, and/or “Homecoming” photos will field modern and industry standard telephony and customer Cmdr. David Grogan relieved relationship management tools later next year to enhance our ever- Capt. Jesse Zimbauer Lt. Cmdr. Mathew Bridwell Lt. Adam Parkinson Lt. j.g. Riley Merrick of families being re-united as the crews return. STRATCOM Joint Elect. Warfare Cent. USS Minnesota (SSN 783) USS Olympia (SSN 717) Send your submissions to the Military Editor via email to: expanding list of services offered. USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) [email protected] For questions regarding pay and personnel issues, reach out to the Cmdr. Steven Dawley relieved Lt. Cmdr. Louis DeMarco Lt. Cmdr. John Patrick Lt. j.g. Devin Mulcahy MNCC contact center at 833-330-MNCC (6622) or [email protected]. Cmdr. Kevin Moller USS Kentucky (SSBN 737) (B) SOC EUR Theater Spec. Op. Comm. USS Boise (SSN 764)

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Lt. James Neigel Lt. j.g. William Trettin Lt. j.g. Thomas Buffone Lt. j.g. Mark Esposito Lt. j.g. Christopher Johnson USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740) (B) USS Maine (SSBN 741) (B) USS Kentucky (SSBN 737) (B) USS Hartford (SSN 756) USS (SSN 22) Gold Star families and fallen service members honored Lt. Kenneth Piech Lt. j.g. Jakob Yeager Lt. Brock Burdyl Lt. j.g. Brett Evans Ens. Vincent Kahnke USS (SSBN 742) (G) USS Delaware (SSN 791) USS Kentucky (SSBN 737) (B) USS Cheyenne (SSN 773) COMSUBLANT Among the local communi- ty gathered with Sailors and Lt. j.g. Matthew Williams Lt. j.g. Dustin Kuchenbecker Lt. Matthew Burnett Lt. j.g. Christina Faraci Lt. Jeffery Karr USS Delaware (SSN 791) USS Wyoming (SSBN 742) (G) TTF Bangor USS (SSBN 743) (B) USS Kentucky (SSBN 737) (B) civilians of Navy Team New London, were 21 Gold Star Lt. William Woltman Lt. j.g. Collin Parry Lt. j.g. Joseph Carbone Lt. Colin Feiter Lt. j.g. Stephen Keehan family members. Gold Star USS Michigan (SSGN 727) (B) USS Pasadena (SSN 752) USS Alexandria (SSN 757) USS Louisville (SSN 724) USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) families are those who carry Lt. j.g. Samuel Zarn Lt. j.g. Jarod Scott Lt. Jonadel Caro Lt. John Fillmore Lt. Christopher Kenison the weight of a lost loved USS Alaska (SSBN 732) (B) USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) (G) SLCDET SD FLT TT USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) (G) USS Illinois (SSN 786) one who died while on Lt. j.g. Andrew Bates Lt. j.g. Edward Young Lt. j.g. Patrick Celestine Lt. j.g. Neil Flattery Lt. j.g. Ryan Kennedy active duty service. USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) (G) USS Buffalo (SSN 715) USS Alabama (SSBN 731) (B) USS Scranton (SSN 756) USS North Carolina (SSN 777) The names of lost loved ones were read aloud by Lt. Brock Burdyl Lt. j.g. Bradley Hooker Lt. Joshua Clark Lt. Ethan Foster Lt. Curtis Khol USS Kentucky (SSBN 737) (B) USS Greeneville (SSN 772) USS Louisville (SSN 724) USS Maine (SSBN 741) (G) USS Virginia (SSN 774) Capt. Paul Whitescarver, commanding officer, Lotz Class Tristan 3rd Specialist Communication by Mass Photo Lt. j.g. Christopher Cole Lt. j.g. Louis Nabors Lt. Justin Clark Lt. Ryan Fritz Lt. j.g. Henry Kincaid SUBASE New London. After each name, a bell was tolled, followed by a brief moment of silence. USS Providence (SSN 719) USS Toledo (SSN 769) USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) (G) LSFO OPCON CTR USS Scranton (SSN 756) After all of the names were read, four bells were rung to honor the names of the fallen not spoken Lt. j.g. Lee Kaufman Lt. Rohika Wagner Lt. j.g. Seth Cochran Lt. Robert Gacki Lt. Phoebe Kotlikoff aloud, but just as dearly remembered. USS Ohio (SSGN 726) (G) USS Greeneville (SSN 772) USS San Juan (SSN 751) USS Kentucky (SSBN 737) (G) USS Ohio (SSGN 726) (G) “Many have made the ultimate sacrifice,” said Whitescarver. “Their actions attest not only Lt. j.g. Robert Kent Lt. j.g. Zachary Coleman Lt. Forrest Garrison Lt. Matthew Kwasnik to the depth of their devotion, but also to a belief in their country so profound that they were USS Providence (SSN 719) USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723) USS Santa Fe (SSN 763) USS Seawolf (SSN 21) willing to give their very lives for it.” The “star” tradition began in WWI when white service flags were displayed from homes, busi- Lt. j.g. Megan Lewis Qualified Nuclear Lt. Tyler Cox Lt. j.g. Matthew Ginelli Lt. Peter Lailepage USS Maine (SSBN 741) (G) Engineering Officer USS Greeneville (SSN 772) USS Texas (SSN 775) COMPHIBRON 11 ness, schools, and churches. The flags indicated by the use of a blue star, each active service mem- ber in the U.S. Military. A gold star stitched over a blue star showed the nation those who had Lt. j.g. Vigneshwar Manickam Lt. Curtis Allen Lt. Matthew Curtis Lt. j.g. Carson Goldman Lt. Matthew Lanoue given their lives for their country, and it highlighted the devotion and pride of those left behind. USS Indiana (SSN 789) USS Cheyenne (SSN 773) NSSC Bangor USS Wyoming (SSBN 742) (B) USS Texas (SSN 775)

Lt. j.g. Benjamin McFarland Lt. Payton Alsup Lt. Tracy Daniels Lt. Joshua Gray Lt. Daniel Lee USS South Dakota (SSN 790) USS New Mexico (SSN 779) USS San Francisco (SSN 711) USS Virginia (SSN 774) COMDESRON 23

Lt. j.g. Matthew Silberberg Lt. Ian Balczewski Lt. Carolyn Davis Lt. William Gregory Lt. Doyoung Lee Lt. Elizabeth Martinelli Lt. j.g. Chekote Naden Lt. Michael Raynes USS Washington (SSN 787) USS Asheville (SSN 758) USS Louisiana (SSBN 742) (G) USS (SSN 788) USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) (G) USS Florida (SSGN 728) (B) USS Indiana (SSN 789) COMDESRON 28

Lt. j.g. Daniel Tucker Lt. j.g. Samantha Barszowski Lt. George Davis Lt. Brent Grenda Lt. j.g. Samantha Lee Lt. j.g. Patrick McDonald Lt. James Neigel Lt. Christopher Reynolds USS Illinois (SSN 786) USS Florida (SSGN 728) (B) USS Nevada (SSBN 733) (B) USS New Mexico (SSN 779) USS Ohio (SSGN 726) (B) USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) (B) USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740) (B) USS Topeka (SSN 754)

Lt. Korey Whitaker Lt. j.g. Andrew Bates Lt. Vincenzo Delvillano Lt. Matthew Gustafson Lt. Erica Leinmiller Lt. j.g. Benjamin McFarland Lt. Nicholas Nguyen Lt. Shawn Roades USS Connecticut (SSN 22) USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) (G) USS Toledo (SSN 769) NROTC University of Florida USS Florida (SSGN 728) (B) USS South Dakota (SSN 790) USS Santa Fe (SSN 763) USS Minnesota (SSN 783)

Lt. Theja Chadalawada Lt. Reston Bishop Lt. j.g. Karl Destefano Lt. Matthew Hait Lt. Kyle Leonard Lt. Glenn McKenna Lt. j.g. Luke Nicol Lt. Benjamin Robinson USS Pasadena (SSN 752) USS Colorado (SSN 788) USS Alabama (SSBN 731) (B) Student Post Grad. MIT CAM Mass. USS John Warner (SSN 785) TTF Bangor TT USS Jacksonville (SSN 699) USS Albany (SSN 753)

Lt. j.g. Brett Evans Lt. j.g. Andrew Blank Lt. John Dickmann Lt. j.g. Alex Hansen Lt. Justin Liedel Lt. Quinilan Melvin Lt. Michael Nielson Lt. Peter Roemer USS Cheyenne (SSN 773) USS Ohio (SSGN 726) (B) USS Tucson (SSN 770) USS Columbus (SSN 762) USS San Juan (SSN 751) USS Colorado (SSN 788) LSFO OPCON CTR USS Tucson (SSN 770)

Lt. James Frazier Lt. David Bohannon Lt. Christopher Dinelli Lt. James Harris Lt. Samuel Lilek Lt. j.g. Riley Merrick Lt. Nahi Nofal Lt. Josiah Ross USS Pasadena (SSN 752) USS New Hampshire (SSN 778) USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740) (B) USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) (G) USS (SSN 23) USS Olympia (SSN 717) USS Texas (SSN 775) USS Olympia (SSN 717)

Lt. Margaret Gilroy Lt. John Bolchoz Lt. j.g. Jamieson Dodge Lt. j.g. Alexander Hayden Lt. Christopher Linich Lt. j.g. Talaave Meyers Lt. j.g. Ryan Nulsen Lt. j.g. Gregory Russi USS Michigan (SSGN 727) (G) USS South Dakota (SSN 790) USS John Warner (SSN 785) USS North Dakota (SSN 784) S NWARCOL Newport R.I. USS Maryland (SSBN 738) (G) USS Nevada (SSBN 733) (B) USS Maryland (SSBN 738) (G)

Lt. j.g. Carson Goldman Lt. Scott Bolstad Lt. j.g. John Donovan Lt. j.g. Matthew Hitchcock Lt. Kyle Lynch Lt. Trevor Moheit Lt. Derek Oesterheld Lt. Stephen Ryker USS Wyoming (SSBN 742) (B) USS Tucson (SSN 770) USS Virginia (SSN 774) USS Kentucky (SSBN 737) (G) USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) (B) USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) USS Missouri (SSN 780) USS Alabama (SSBN 731) (B)

Lt. j.g. Nicholas Hoffman Lt. Robert Bostock Lt. Micah Dose Lt. j.g. Nicholas Hoffman Lt. j.g. Zachary Lynn Lt. Donald Montemarano Lt. Christopher Patterson Lt. Steven Salva USS Hawaii (SSN 776) USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) (G) USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) (G) USS Hawaii (SSN 776) USS Boise (SSN 764) USS Bremerton (SSN 698) USS Alexandria (SSN 757) USS Annapolis (SSN 760)

Lt. j.g. Akshat Patel Lt. Richard Bradley Lt. Ryan Duffy Lt. j.g. Riley Hoffmann Lt. j.g. Vigneshwar Manickam Lt. Timothy Moore Lt. j.g. Justin Peabody Lt. Jonathan Samuel USS Hawaii (SSN 776) USS Colorado (SSN 788) USS Mississippi (SSN 782) USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) (B) USS Indiana (SSN 789) USS Toledo (SSN 769) USS Helena (SSN 725) USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) (G)

Lt. j.g. Justin Peabody Lt. j.g. Jack Brault Lt. j.g. Matthew Dwyer Lt. j.g. Duncan Howard Lt. Tilford Mansfield Lt. j.g. Devin Mulcahy Lt. Kenneth Piech Lt. j.g. Jarod Scott USS Helena (SSN 725) USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) (B) USS Greeneville (SSN 772) USS Michigan (SSGN 727) (B) CNR NORTHWEST USS Boise (SSN 764) USS Wyoming (SSBN 742) (G) USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) (G)

Lt. j.g. Dustin Swanson Lt. Ari Brown Lt. j.g. Michael Ebeling Lt. Steven Hucks Lt. j.g. Ronald Marciszyn Lt. j.g. Mitchell Murphy Lt. Mary Pummill Lt. Dakota Sicher USS Pasadena (SSN 752) DNI/DDNI NISS USS Scranton (SSN 756) COMSUBGRU 10 USS Boise (SSN 764) USS Minnesota (SSN 783) USS Louisiana (SSBN 743) (G) COMSUBRON 21

Lt. j.g. Elizabeth Terino Lt. j.g. Douglas Brown Lt. Joel Elenbaas Lt. j.g. Kevin Hutto Lt. Courtney Martin Lt. Robert Murphy Lt. Mason Rabalais Lt. j.g. Matthew Silberberg USS Wyoming (SSBN 742) (B) USS Georgia (SSGN 729) (B) USS Scranton (SSN 756) USS Connecticut (SSN 22) USS Georgia (SSGN 729) (G) OPNAV MCIS/GCCS USS Mississippi (SSN 782) USS Washington (SSN 787)

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Lt. David Smith Lt. Korey Whitaker MMNCS Samuel K. Barfuss MMNCS Joseph R. Cefaratti MMNCS Robbie L. Davis USS Illinois (SSN 786) USS Connecticut (SSN 22) COMSUBRON 1 USS North Dakota (SSN 784) NSSC Kings Bay USS Wahoo 75th Anniversary ceremony at SUBASE Lt. j.g. Isaac Smith Lt. Trevor Whitney EMNC John A. Barnett MMNCM Ronald T. Cervone EMNCM Johnny Dawes The heroic sacrifice of USS Wahoo (SS 238), its Sailors and its Commanding Officer Cmdr. USS Topeka (SSN 754) USS Olympia (SSN 717) S NPTU Charleston S.C. DIRDIVOFNREACDOE COMSUBRON 7 Lt. James Wilkerson Dudley “Mush” Morton, were honored with a ceremony held in Naval Submarine Base Lt. j.g. Justin Smith USS Jimmy Carter (SSN 23) ETNC Keith C. Bauer ETNCS Leon Chen MMNCS Arthur D. Dearmond (SUBASE) New London’s Morton Hall Gymnasium Oct. 11. USS Louisville (SSN 724) NPTU Ballston Spa MARF USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) USS Ohio (SSGN 726) (G) The 75th anniversary of Wahoo’s loss Lt. Isaac Wilson Lt. j.g. Raphael Sofaer USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) EMNCM Christopher M. Bean ETNCS Damian C. Chenot ETNC Alexander D. Delisle was commemorated with Morton’s fam- USS Springfield (SSN 761) COMSUBRON 1 USS Kentucky (SSBN 737) (G) USS Florida (SSGN 728) (B) ily including his own daughter, Edwina Lt. Albert Wong Morton Thirsher. Lt. j.g. Michael Sokol USS Olympia (SSN 717) ETNCS Joshua J. Bean ETNCS Patrick B. Childs ETNCM Keith M. Deliteris USS Minnesota (SSN 783) USS Maine (SSBN 741) (G) NPTU Ballston Spa BOS NUFLDASCOL Charleston Wahoo was a Gato-class submarine with Lt. Derrick Woodfield a reputation for bringing the fight to the Lt. Michael Spotts USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740) (B) MMNCS Tommy J. Beman MMNCS Andrew P. Chupashko EMNC Charles I. Delp Japanese with a tight-knit crew and a fear- USS Colorado (SSN 788) SUBDEVRON 5 STAFF USS Illinois (SSN 786) USS Pittsburgh (SSN 720) Lt. Marisa Zahn less commander to match. It snuck into a Lt. Robert Stanton USS Michigan (SSGN 727) (B) ETNCM James P. Berhalter MMNCM Darrin J. Clarke ETNCS Daniel G. Denault Japanese harbor and sank ships in “down USS Maryland (SSBN 738) (G) NETPDC Pensacola TTF Kings Bay FLT TT COMSUBRON 19 the throat” shots. Wahoo was finally sunk Lt. j.g. Samuel Zarn Lt. j.g. Jacob Stevenback USS Alaska (SSBN 732) (B) MMNCS Paul E. Bermingham MMNCM Jason A. Clough MMNCM Joseph L. Devore in the Sea of Japan by a contingent of USS Alaska (SSBN 732) (B) USS Asheville (SSN 758) COMSUBRON 17 USS Santa Fe (SSN 763) antisubmarine ships and aircraft on Oct. Lt. Andrew Zellman

11, 1943. Lotz Class Tristan 3rd Specialist Communication by Mass Photo Lt. Blake Stout USS Seawolf (SSN 21) MMNCM David J. Blake ETNC Kenneth A. Cochran ETNCS Shaun P. Dewar USS Hampton (SSN 767) NRMD MD New London USS San Juan (SSN 751) NPTU Ballston Spa MARF Wahoo was one of the most distinguished Lt. Cmdr. Bradley Boyd, speaks of the legacy of Cmdr. Dudley Qualified Engineering submarines during World War II, earning “Mush” Morton, commanding officer of USS Wahoo (SSN Lt. James Strane EMNCS Matthew J. Blankenship MMNCS Cory A. Codd EMNCS Derek E. Diener the Presidential Unit Citation for its war- 238), during a ceremony held onboard Naval Submarine Base USS Helena (SSN 725) Department Master Chief COMSUBRON 12 SMMS PMT Kings Bay PSBFOROPS COMP (SUBASE) New London in recognition of the 75th anniversa- time actions. Wahoo sank three quarters of a ry of Wahoo’s sinking during WW II, earning the Presidential Lt. Ian Sugg ETNCS Nathaniel W. Abel MMNC Richard T. Bolton EMNCM Aaron Coffey MMNCM Jason W. Dill century ago, but its legacy endures. Unit Citation for its wartime actions. USS Columbia (SSN 771) TTF Bangor TT TTF Bangor TT COMSUBLANT USS Buffalo (SSN 715)

Lt. j.g. Michael Sullivan EMNCS Antonio T. Aguinaldo MMNCS Darrin D. Bostater EMNCS Aaron C. Coffey MMNC Craig J. Double USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) (G) PH SMMS USS Georgia (SSGN 729) (G) USS Maine (SSBN 741) (B) S SUBTRAFAC Norfolk

Lt. j.g. David Swanson MMNC Michael R. Allen MMNCS Nicholas W. Bottoms MMNCS Michael J. Coffman MMNCS David J. Drury EMNCS Anthony G. Fortner MMNCM Franklin K. Gardner ETNC Matthew R. Goodwin USS Key West (SSN 722) USS Indiana (SSN 789) USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740) (B) COMSUBLANT (SSN 571) Nautilus Museum SMMS PMT Kings Bay DIRDIVOFNREACDOE USS Alabama (SSBN 731) (B)

Lt. j.g. Elliot Sykora ETNCM Robert L. Amerman MMNCS Robert D. Bowen ETNCS Timothy J. Coleman MMNCM Ryan T. Dwyer EMNCS Sean Fortney EMNC Michael V. Garland ETNCM James P. Gorman USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) (G) NSTCCPACPHFLT TT USS Alabama (SSBN 731) (G) USS Nevada (SSBN 733) (B) NPTU Ballston Spa BOS COMSUBRON 17 USS New Hampshire (SSN 778) COMSUBLANT

Lt. j.g. Elizabeth Terino EMNC Christopher E. Anderson EMNCS Matthew R. Brake MMNCS Chase R. Connell ETNCS Hunter L. Dyer ETNCM Adam M. Foster ETNCM Craig M. Garner EMNCS Nathan L. Gottsch USS Wyoming (SSBN 742) (B) PCU Delaware (SSN 791) USS New Mexico (SSN 779) COMSUBRON 11 USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723) USS Boise (SSN 764) USS Florida (SSGN 728) USS Columbus (SSN 762)

Lt. j.g. Joel Thomas MMNCS Jonathan L. Andrews MMNCM Joel C. Brandt MMNC Anthony M. Conner EMNCS Christopher M. Echeandia MMNCM William V. Foutz MMNC Christopher R. Gatlin EMNCS Matthew M. Gowan USS Columbus (SSN 762) NPTU Charleston BOS NPTU Charleston D MTS USS Asheville (SSN 758) NPTU Charleston D MTS COMSUBGRU 8 USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) (G) TRIREFAC Kings Bay

Lt. Tyler Thomas MMNC Steven K. Andrews EMNCM Stephen V. Brooke MMNC Aaron C. Cook MMNC James J. Echtle MMNC Nicholas E. Francis ETNCS David C. Gaughan MMNC Alex C. Gozzola USS Tucson (SSN 770) PH SMMS COMSUBLANT USS Greeneville (SSN 772) USS Buffalo (SSN 715) COMSUBRON 4 COMSUBGRU 8 USS Minnesota (SSN 783)

Lt. Emanuel Towns EMNCM Dean Anton MMNC Tommy G. Brooks MMNC Brian Wl Cooper EMNCS Michael A. Edwards EMNCS Cory L. Frazier MMNCM Joshua J. Geasey MMNCS Brian P. Green USS Annapolis (SSN 760) S NUFLDASCOL SC NRMD Point Loma SUBTRAFAC NORFLT USS Columbia (SSN 751) USS Chicago (SSN 721) NPTU Charleston BOS COMSUBRON 12

Lt. j.g. William Trettin ETNC Joshua R. Argo MMNCM Michael W. Brougher MMNCM Jason R. Cox MMNC Kalani K. Eli ETNC Kevin R. Frey ETNCM James R. Gerow EMNC Robert L. Green USS Maine (SSBN 741) (B) U.S. Naval Academy COMSUBGRU 9 COMSUBRON 20 NSTCPACPHCFLT TT SUBTRAFAC NORFLT USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740) (B) USS Alaska (SSBN 732) (B)

Lt. j.g. Daniel Tucker EMNCS Eric L. Armbrister MMNC Timothy A. Brown MMNC Seth A. Crain MMNCM Eric L. Emrick MMNCS John P. Fronek EMNC John E. Gibbons EMNCS Theodore W. Griffith USS Illinois (SSN 786) USS Florida (SSGN 728) USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) (B) COMSUBRON 15 COMSUBLANT NPTU Charleston BOS USS Alaska (SSBN 732) COMSUBRON 4

Lt. Justin Vagts ETNCS Kevin R. Audrain MMNCS Joseph L. Buehring MMNC Ian P. Cross MMNCS Jeremy W. Erickson MMNC Victor M. Fuller MMNC Robert D. Gilkerson MMNCS Dominick A. Grimaldi U.S. Naval Academy SUBTRAFAC NORFLT USS Emory S. Land (AS 39) M/SC NPTU Charleston GST COMSUBRON 7 NPTU Charleston D MTS USS Kentucky (SSBN 737) (G) USS Providence (SSN 719)

Lt. Kyle Vassallo EMNC Jonathan T. Baggett ETNCM Robert M. Burns MMNCS Justin M. Daggett MMNCM Christopher J. Farrell MMNCS Bruce W. Fullmer MMNCM Matthew L. Glisson EMNCM Derek G. Gruell USS Columbia (SSN 771) NPTU Charelston GST NPTU Charleston GST NSUBSUPF New London PSBFOROPS COMP CSPR W C SMMS/PM COMSUBGRU 10 NPS Charleston BOS

Lt. Bryan Walker EMNCM Brent E. Bagwell MMNCM Brandon R. Busch ETNCS John E. Daigle EMNCM David A. Field EMNC James R. Gagnon MMNC Christopher J. Godt ETNC Michael S. Halajian USS Nevada (SSBN 733) (G) USS Michigan (SSGN 727) (B) DIRDIVOFNREACDOE COMSUBRON 4 PCU Oregon (SSN 793) SUBTRAFAC NORFLT COMSUBRON 15 USS Charlotte (SSN 766)

Lt. Matthew Waterman MMNCS Aaron K. Bailey MMNCM Matthew J. Campanile ETNC David M. Danby EMNCS Christopher C. Fisher EMNCM Angelo H. Galindo EMNC Patrick A. Golub ETNC Jimmy D. Hall USS Pittsburgh (SSN 720) S NPTU Ballston Spa PCU Montana (SSN 794) USS Cheyenne (SSN 773) COMSUBRON 7 CNAVPERSCOM MILL COMSUBRON 16 NUFLDASCOL Charleston

Lt. j.g. Aleksander Weismantel EMNC Matthew B. Bailey MMNC Nicholas B. Carriger MMNC Aaron K. Dankof ETNCM Brad J. Flemmons ETNCS Zachary N. Gallegos ETNC Raymond Gomez EMNCS Randy N. Hall USS Annapolis (SSN 760) USS Ohio (SSGN 726) (G) USS Louisville (SSBN 743) (B) USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) (G) USS Jacksonville (SSN 699) USS North Carolina (SSN 777) USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) PSBFOROPS COMP

Lt. Nicholas Wendrych EMNCM John M. Bale EMNC Shane T. Cary ETNCS Evan R. Davis ETNCM Gregory S. Foerster ETNC John J. Garcia ETNC Edwardo Gonzalez ETNC Matthew C. Hallbauer USS Bremerton (SSN 698) COMSUBRON 11 USS San Juan (SSN 751) USS Virginia (SSN 774) SHPYD REP Portsmouth NPTU Charleston GST USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723) USS Buffalo (SSN 715)

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MMNCM Michael G. Haraburda ETNCS Kevin T. Hudson ETNCS Joshua D. Kornmann ETNCS Brian J. McInvale MMNCS Michael R. Nutt PSBFOROPS COMP TTF Kings Bay FLT TT SUBDEVRON 5 STAF USS Missouri (SSN 780) USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) (B)

ETNC Brian P. Harrison EMNC Jeremy L. Hughes MMNCS David J. Labreche MMNCS Stephen M. McKinley MMNCS Alex J. O’Connor USS Jacksonville (SSN 699) USS John Warner (SSN 785) USS Key West (SSN 722) USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) (G) COMSUBRON 11

MMNCS Ryan P. Harrison MMNC Gregory R. Hunt MMNCS George P. Landsberger ETNCM Thomas P. McKinney EMNCM Shawn R. Olmstead USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) (B) NUFLDASCOL Charleston NPTU Charleston GST COMSUBLANT USS Vermont (SSN 792)

MMNCS Paul J. Harton ETNCS Justin L. Huntley MMNCS Jeffrey J. Larrabee MMNCM Michael A. McMurtray MMNCS David M. Olsen NPTU Ballston Spa GST USS Seawolf (SSN 21) NPTU Charleston BOS SHPYD REP NNSY USS Springfield (SSN 761)

ETNCM Corey R. Haseler-Hansen EMNCS James M. Hutchinson MMNC Michael F. Ledestich ETNCS Ryan B. McVeigh MMNC Cody P. Olson NSTCP SITE FTT COMSUBRON 6 USS Georgia (SSGN 729) (G) USS Indiana (SSN 789) USS Scranton (SSN 756)

MMNCS Todd J. Hatch ETNCS Edward A. Jackson MMNCS Elton G. Lee ETNCS Ronald V. McVicker EMNC Peter A. Olson Hildreth 2018/Matt Shipbuilding News by Newport Photo USS Scranton (SSN 756) USS Washington (SSN 787) USS San Juan (SSN 751) USS Minnesota (SSN 783) USS Minnesota (SSN 783)

MMNCM William W. Haussler MMNCS Paul E. Jackson MMNC Joshua G. Leeds EMNCM James W. Meador MMNCM Jacob A. Orlowski COMSUBRON 12 USS Alabama (SSBN 731) (B) NPTU Charleston GST NUFLDASCOL Charleston COMSUBRON 4

MMNCS Jason S. Hays MMNCM Lynn E. Jacobson ETNC Kurtis J. Liberacki MMNCS David M. Medert MMNCM Edward T. Oskorep COMSUBRON 15 COMSUBRON 7 USS Alaska (SSBN 732) (B) USS Topeka (SSN 754) USS Pittsburgh (SSN 720)

EMNCM David D. Hefel MMNCS Jesse D. Jelinek ETNCM Anthony R. Liss MMNCS Jeffrey H. Mejia MMNC Jeffrey M. Owen NPTU Charleston BOS NRMD Kings Bay NRMD MD New London USS Olympia (SSN 717) NRMD MD New London Huntington Ingalls Industries christened the Virginia-class submarine Delaware (SSN 791) on Saturday, Oct. MMNCM Scott A. Heinchon MMNC Wayne R. Jenkins ETNCS Christopher J. Little EMNCS Michael L. Mercer MMNCM Steven D. Owens SHPYD REP Newport News NAVSUBSCOL Groton NUFLDASCOL Charleston USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) (G) TTF Bangor TT 20, 2018 at the company’s Newport News Shipbuilding division. Jill Biden, the former Second Lady of the United States and the ship’s sponsor, smashed a bottle of sparkling wine against the hull, celebrating the lat- EMNCS Craig A. Heinzeroth MMNCM Charles W. Johnson EMNC Matthew A. Looney ETNCS Lyle Q. Milner MMNCS James L. Oxendine est milestone of the newest U.S. Navy vessel prior to its launch. USS San Francisco (SSN 711) PH NSYD & IMF USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) (G) FSC Great Lakes USS Minnesota (SSN 783)

EMNCS Todd E. Hennon MMNCS Roy W. Johnson MMNCM James D. Lucky EMNC Bradley A. Monell MMNCS Dustin A. Palmer NPTU Charleston GST USS Kentucky (SSBN 737) (B) BUPERS COMSUBRON 15 SUBDEVRON 5 STAF

MMNC James R. Henrie MMNCS Steven E. Johnson EMNC Steven H. Luley EMNCM Zachary T. Montello MMNCS Jonathon P. Parks MMNC Brian D. Ponder EMNC Justin W. Reese ETNCS Steven B. Rush SMMS PMT NL NRMD PAC COMSUBRON 17 SR ENL ACAD SUBTRAFAC NORFLT USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) (G) USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) (G) COMSUBRON 11

MMNCM Bryan A. Henry MMNCS Michael H. Johnston EMNC Daniel B. Macomber ETNCS John F. Moran EMNC Trent M. Parrish MMNC Joseph T. Powell EMNCS Jason D. Reifsnyder MMNCS John P. Russo MTS La Jolla (SSN 701) TTF Bangor TT NUFLDASCOL Charleston USS La Jolla (MTS 701) COMSUBRON 6 COMSUBRON 19 USS Maryland (SSBN 738) (B) USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740) (G)

EMNCS Adrian B. Hilderbrand MMNCM Hans P. Jones EMNCS Mitch E. Mahan ETNCM Scott A. Morgan MMNCM Ryan D. Parsons ETNCM Gregory E. Prichard EMNCS Michael S. Reuss ETNCM Justin M. Ryman USS Louisiana (SSBN 743) (G) NPTU Charleston BOS USS Louisville (SSN 724) CSP SHPYD REP PS COMSUBRON 19 NETPDC Pensacola USS Hawaii (SSN 776) USS Maryland (SSBN 738) (G)

MMNCS Christopher B. Hisey ETNC Jonathan B. Jones ETNCS Nicholas B. Manning EMNCS Michael C. Morris ETNC Jeremy P. Patin MMNC John W. Primm MMNCS Alan E. Rice MMNC Arnoldo Saenz USS Alabama (SSBN 731) (G) USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) (B) USS La Jolla (MTS 701) USS Bremerton (SSN 698) TTF Kings Bay CSP SHPYD REP PS Bangor SMMS PMT

EMNCM Robert E. Hitchcock MMNC Gary J. Kalapinski MMNC Justin M. Marchione MMNCS Randall D. Morris ETNCM Matthew T. Payne EMNC Michael T. Proskine EMNC Charles W. Rivers ETNC Michael A. Schaefer USS Frank Cable (AS 40) COMSUBRON 16 COMSUBRON 1 NPTU Charleston D MTS COMSUBGRU 9 SUBTRAFAC NORFLT NRMD Kings Bay USS Louisiana (SSBN 743) (B)

ETNCS Donovan E. Hixson EMNC Curtis J. Kammerer ETNCS Thomas A. Marsland MMNCS Michael W. Mrsny MMNC Apollo S. Pedersen EMNCS Michael W. Quackenbush MMNCM Courtney C. Roach ETNCS Todd R. Schaefer USS Newport News (SSN 750) PCU South Dakota (SSN 790) USS Connecticut (SSN 22) USS Alexandria (SSN 757) SMMS PMT Kings Bay USS Toledo (SSN 769) NPTUBALL SPA GST NRMD Kings Bay

MMNC Matthew V. Hoff MMNCS Timothy S. Kenny ETNCM Frank Mason MMNC Kenneth J. Murray MMNCS David A. Pefley MMNCM James T. Qualls EMNCS James F. Robinson ETNCS Darby K. Schaff COMSUBRON 12 COMSUBRON 19 USS Charlotte (SSN 766) USS Annapolis (SSN 760) USS Pasadena (SSN 752) USS Michigan (SSGN 727) (G) USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) (G) SLCDET SD FLT TT

MMNC James S. Hoffmeyer MMNCS Ronald J. Kielbasa MMNC Christopher M. Matter ETNCM Richard D. Nantell EMNCS Brett J. Percich EMNCS Travis J. Radzyminski EMNCM Andrew L. Rockman MMNCM Brian J. Schlapkohl USS Maryland (SSBN 738) (G) USS Jimmy Carter (SSN 23) USS Illinois (SSN 786) PCU South Dakota (SSN 790) COMSUBRON 19 USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723) USS Alaska (SSBN 732) (B) USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) (B)

Shane D. Hollander ETNC Scott E. Kimbler MMNCM Matthew J. Matteson MMNCS Ben D. Narkis MMNCS Robert L. Perry ETNCS Steven J. Ralph MMNCS Anthony J. Romano MMNC Robert G. Schmitz PCU Delaware (SSN 791) S NPTU Charleston CNR Arlington COMSUBRON 20 USS Hampton (SSN 767) USS Hartford (SSN 768) SHPYD REP Groton COMSUBRON 6

ETNC Matthew G. Holman MMNCS John T. King ETNCS Bradley R. May EMNC Wayne A. Neufeld ETNCS Joshua B. Peterson MMNCS Nathaniel R. Ranck EMNC James M. Ross ETNC Justin W. Schow COMSUBRON 15 USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) (B) USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) (G) USS Alabama (SSBN 731) (G) COMSUBRON 12 SHPYD REP Newport News COMSUBRON 20 COMSUBRON 20

EMNCS Richard M. Holtmeyer ETNCS Alan J. Kinman MMNCM Wayne A. Maynor MMNCS Joshua A. Newcomb MMNC Glen C. Phillips MMNC William K. Ransdell MMNCS Michael S. Rossow ETNCM Eric S. Schroeder USS California (SSN 781) USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) (B) USS La Jolla (MTS 701) NPTU BALLSSPABOS USS John Warner (SSN 785) NRMD Kings Bay NPTU Charleston GST USS Maine (SSBN 741) (B)

MMNCM Gerry M. Hooker ETNCM Joshua Knauer ETNCS Ethan P. Mayo MMNCS Jonathan E. Noll ETNCM Eric R. Playdon EMNC Jonathan D. Ray MMNCS Jason P. Rubenstein EMNCS Eric R. Schulte SUBTRAFAC NORFLT SHPYD REP Groton USS Texas (SSN 775) DIRDIVOFNREACDOE PSBFOROPS COMP USS Maryland (SSBN 738) (B) USS Ohio (SSGN 726) (B) USS Tucson (SSN 770)

ETNCS Zane A. Hornsby EMNC Scott P. Koenig ETNCS Anthony T. Mazza MMNC Nicholas L. Northrup EMNCS Donte T. Polson EMNC Jesse L. Rayburn MMNCS Steven L. Rueschenberg MMNCS Benjamin T. Schulz SUBSCOL FLT TT USS Jimmy Carter (SSN 23) NPTU Charleston D MTS USS Pittsburgh (SSN 720) USS Cheyenne (SSN 773) USS Louisiana (SSBN 743) (G) USS Mississippi (SSN 782) USS Colorado (SSN 788)

EMNCM Mark L. Hubble MMNCM Christopher K. Konopka MMNCS Edward F. McGuire MMNCS Matthew D. Noury ETNC Jason M. Polzin ETNC Robert L. Reed ETNC Aaron T. Ruffin EMNCS Steven A. Schulz SUBDEVRON 5 STAF COMSUBRON 6 USS Georgia (SSGN 729) (B) USS New Hampshire (SSN 778) PH NSYD & IMF TRIREFAC Kings Bay USS New Hampshire (SSN 778) USS Bremerton (SSN 698)

32 FALL 2018 undersea warfare undersea warfare FALL 2018 33 DOWNLINK

EMNC Kevin D. Schwalbach EMNCS Alexander T. Smerz EMNC Jonathan A. Sword MMNCS Jason T. VanGorden COMSUBRON 15 PH NSYD & IMF USS Illinois (SSN 786) NSSC OTH Bangor

ETNC Zachary C. Scott ETNCS Colin A. Smith MMNC Scott A. Tadevich EMNC Anthony J. Vezina USS Indiana (SSN 789) COMSUBRON 19 COMSUBRON 1 SUBDEVRON 5 STAF Keep the Magazine MMNC Daniel A. Selby EMNCS Daniel P. Smith MMNC Albert D. Taylor MMNCS Craig A. Vivian USS Nevada (SSBN 733) (B) SLC Groton USS Santa Fe (SSN 763) USS Alaska (SSBN 732) (G)

MMNCS Shane T. Shadrick ETNCS Matthew C. Smith MMNCM Glenn A. Teter MMNC Joshua G. Walton NNPTC Charleston USS John Warner (SSN 785) S NPTU Ballston Spa TTF Kings Bay Sailing Your way! EMNCS Joseph M. Shaffner ETNCS Randy M. Sparks MMNC Bryan J. Thebo ETNCM Anthony J. Waters USS Greeneville (SSN 772) USS Annapolis (SSN 760) COMSUBRON 16 COMSUBRON 16

ETNCS Robert L. Shawver ETNCS Dustin L. Spicer EMNC Richard T. Thompson EMNCM Michael S. Watson We hope you enjoy reading COMSUBRON 17 USS Hampton (SSN 767) USS Montpelier (SSN 765) PSBFOROPS COMP Undersea Warfare Magazine EMNCM Jonathan P. Sheldon MMNC David A. Spisak ETNCS Ivan R. Tirona MMNC Walter R. Webb as much as we enjoy providing SUBSCOL FLT TT COMSUBRON 4 SLCDET SD FLT TT NUFLDASCOL Charleston you with wide ranging infor- MMNCM John K. Shingleton MMNC Eric B. Stanton MMNCM Christopher L. Tolliver EMNCS David A. Welch COMSUBRON 16 USS New Mexico (SSN 779) CNAVPERSCOM MILL USS Nevada (SSBN 733) (G) mation on the U.S. Submarine

EMNCS Heath M. Shirley EMNC Randell C. Stark EMNCS Nathaniel L. Toole EMNCS Travis S. White Force and other undersea war- CNAVSAFECEN NORV SUBTRAFAC NORFLT DIRDIVOFNREACDOE USS San Francisco (SSN 711) fare releated topics. MMNCS Wesley M. Shuman MMNCS Jason M. Statler ETNC Joel A. Tortoriello ETNC Austin D. Whitmer NRMD Point Loma USS Nevada (SSBN 733) (B) PCU Oregon (SSN 793) NNPTC Charleston To ensure you continue to ETNC Joseph W. Simecek MMNCM Aaron M. Stein ETNC Bradley A. Tracy MMNCS Christopher V. Wilkerson NUFLDASCOL Charleston SUBTRAFAC NORFLT NPTU Charleston D MTS SHPYD REP Portsmouth receive future issues we ask that you send us any change EMNCS Bitt O. Sims ETNCS Jonathan M. Stephens MMNCS Eric W. Turner EMNCS Carl L. Will USS Santa Fe (SSN 763) NPTU BALL MARF USS Missouri (SSN 780) NPTU Charleston D MTS of address via email to under- EMNCS Michael E. Sims MMNCS Scott S. Stephenson ETNCS Terrance S. Tyson MMNC Joshua P. Willett [email protected]. USS Pasadena (SSN 752) SLC Groton COMSUBRON 15 USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723)

MMNCM Charles E. Skelton EMNCS Mark W. Steward EMNC Matthew C. Vance MMNCS Joseph C. Winn NPTU Charleston BOS USS Louisiana (SSBN 743) (B) NPTU Charleston D MTS USS Helena (SSN 725) And While You’re At It…

EMNCS Jerome M. Smallwood EMNCS Robert A. Stough MMNCS Gary D. VanDyk ETNCS Joseph P. Wisniewski So that we may continue to USS Montpelier (SSN 765) USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) (G) USS Maryland (SSBN 738) (B) USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) (B) provide the articles you want EMNC Peter N. Woelkers to read, we encourage you to NIMF PACNORWEST send us feedback on how we Battenberg Cup Awarded MMNCS Benjamin A. Woellert NPTU Ballston Spa BOS are doing.

ETNCM Leonard B. Wolf PCU Hyman G. Rickover (SSN 795) What types of articles interest

ETNCS David L. Wright you most (historical, techni- COMSUBRON 7 cal, event coverage, or other? MMNCS Joseph B. Wright-McGee COMSUBRON 7 What types of topics would ETNCS Andrew J. Yates USS Wyoming (SSBN 742) (B) you prefer to see more of in

MMNCS Timothy R. Zenner the magazine? USS Mississippi (SSN 782)

MMNC Jason N. Zerweck Also feel free to provide any S NPTU Charleston additional feedback or com- ments on magazine content and we welcome any ideas you Vice. Adm. Charles “Chas” Richard, Commander, Submarine Forces, presents the 2017 Battenberg Cup Award to Cmdr. have for future articles. Matthew Fanning, commanding officer of the Los-Angeles class fast-attack submarine USS Hartford (SSN 768), and his crew during the 2017 Battenberg Cup Award presentation ceremony. The Battenberg Cup is presented annually to the Seen here are the jury-rigged sails used to bring R-14 back to port in 1921; best all-around ship or submarine in the Atlantic Fleet on the amassing of the crew’s success. the mainsail rigged from the radio mast is the top sail in the photograph, and Send responses via email to: the mizzen made of eight blankets also is visible. [email protected] Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Steven Hoskins

34 FALL 2018 undersea warfare USS North Dakota (SSN 784) timeline USS John Warner (SSN 785) USS Illinois (SSN 786) to service USS Washington (SSN 787) BLOCK III USS Colorado (SSN 788) 8 ship Multi-Year Contract USS Indiana (SSN 789) Delivering the Nation's Only On Scene but Unseen Multi-Mission Platform PCU South Dakota (SSN 790) 92% PCU Delaware (SSN 791) 84% PCU Vermont (SSN 792) 75% PCU Oregon (SSN 793)

66% PCU Montana (SSN 794)

55% PCU Hyman G. Rickover (SSN 795) BLOCK IV 45% PCU New Jersey (SSN 796) 10 ship Multi-Year Contract 33% PCU Iowa (SSN 797)

23% PCU Massachusetts (SSN 798) 14% PCU Idaho (SSN 799) 7% PCU Arkansas (SSN 800)

3% PCU Utah (SSN 801)

SSN 802 SSN 803

SSN 804

SSN 805

SSN 806 BLOCK V SSN 807 Construction Duration and Delivery to be Determined SSN 808

SSN 809

SSN 810

SSN 811

Numerals indicate Fiscal Years '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 '19 '20 '21 '22 '23 '24 '25 '26 '27 '28 '29 '30 PACIFIC SUBMARINE FORCE ORGANIZATION ATLANTIC SUBMARINE FORCE ORGANIZATION

SUBDEVRON 5 SUBRON 17 STRATCOM Bangor, Wash. Gen. John E. Hyten Groton, Conn. Capt. Stephen Mack Capt. Nicholas Tilbrook SUBRON 12 Omaha, Neb. SUBRON 4 Seawolf (SSN 21)* Cmdr. Christopher George Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) (B) Cmdr. John Frye Capt. Brian Sittlow Capt. David Youtt Jimmy Carter (SSN 23) Cmdr. Keith Floyd Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) (G) Cmdr. Kevin Macy Montpelier (SSN 765) Cmdr. Brad Swanbeck Providence (SSN 719) Cmdr. Jason Grizzle Alabama (SSBN 731) (B) Cmdr. Jeff Yackeren Virginia (SSN 774) Cmdr. Jeffery Anderson Pittsburgh (SSN 720) Cmdr. Jason Deichler Puget Sound Naval Shipyard Alabama (SSBN 731) (G) Cmdr. Matthew Chapman California (SSN 781) Cmdr. Dave Payne San Juan (SSN 751) Cmdr. Ravi Desai Connecticut (SSN 22) Cmdr. Carl Trask Nevada (SSBN 733) (B) Cmdr. Ryan Heilman Minnesota (SSN 783) Cmdr. Brian Tanaka Springfield (SSN 761) Cmdr. Brent Spillner Nevada (SSBN 733) (G) Cmdr. Edward Fulz UNDERSEA WARFIGHTING SUBRON 19 North Dakota (SSN 784) Cmdr. Mark Robinson Hartford (SSN 768) Cmdr. Matthew Fanning Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) (B) Cmdr. Hans Fosser Capt. Michael Lewis DEVELOPMENT CENTER Illinois (SSN 786) Cmdr. Neil Steinhagen Toledo (SSN 769) Cmdr. Orville Cave Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) (G) Cmdr. Roger Ferguson COMSUBGRU-9 Rear Adm. Butch Dollaga PCU Colorado (SSN 788) Cmdr. Reed Koepp New Hampshire (SSN 778) Cmdr. Brandon Todd Ohio (SSGN 726) (B) Capt. David Soldow Kentucky (SSBN 737) (B) Cmdr. Kenneth Roman Rear Adm. Blake Converse Groton, Conn. PCU South Dakota (SSN 790) Cmdr. Ronald Winthrow New Mexico (SSN 779) Cmdr. Daniel Reiss Ohio (SSGN 726) (G) Capt. William Johnson Kentucky (SSBN 737) (G) Cmdr. James Hurt Bangor, Wash. Michigan (SSGN 727) (B) Capt. Bradley Terry Nebraska (SSBN 739) (B) Cmdr. James Lembo COMSUBGRU-8 Michigan (SSGN 727) (G) Capt. James Belz Nebraska (SSBN 739) (G) Cmdr. Jake Wadsley COMSUBGRU-7 Rear Adm. Thomas Ishee Maine (SSBN 741) Cmdr. Kelly Laing Louisiana (SSBN 743) (B) Cmdr. Chimi Zacot DIRECTOR, Naples, Italy Louisiana (SSBN 743) (G) Cmdr. Martin E. Sprague Rear Adm. James E. Pitts *located in Bremerton, Wash. , Japan NAVAL REACTORS Adm. James F. Caldwell Washington, D.C. Naples, Italy CTF 69 SUBRON 11 Capt. Roger Myer Capt. Christopher Cavanaugh San Diego, Calif. Pasadena (SSN 752) Cmdr. Corey Poorman ARCO (ARDM 5) Lt. Cmdr. Zachary Harry DIRECTOR, Scranton (SSN 756) Cmdr. Aaron Peterson Undersea Rescue Command Cmdr. Mark Hazenberg UNDERSEA WARFARE DIVISION Alexandria (SSN 757) Cmdr. Todd Santala Rear Adm. John Tammen Norfolk, Va. Annapolis (SSN 760) Cmdr. John Witte Washington, D.C. Hampton (SSN 767) Cmdr. Phillip Sylvia, Jr SUBRON 6 COMSUBPAC Capt. Martin Muckian Rear Adm. Daryl L. Caudle SUBRON 1 SUBRON 7 Pearl Harbor, Hawaii La Jolla (SSN 701) Cmdr. James Crosley Capt. Richard Seif Capt. Paul Davis Pearl Harbor, Hawaii San Francisco (SSN 711) Capt. Daniel Caldwell COMSUBFOR Helena (SSN 725) Cmdr. Andy Cain Bremerton (SSN 698) Cmdr. Travis Zettel City of Corpus Christi (SSN 705) Cmdr. James Thorp Vice Adm. Charles A. Richard Newport News (SSN 750) Cmdr. Michael Grubb Jacksonville (SSN 699) Cmdr. Steven Faulk Houston (SSN 713) Cmdr. Andrew Ring Albany (SSN 753) Cmdr. Thomas Aydt Buffalo (SSN 715) Cmdr. Micah Maxwell Chicago (SSN 721) Cmdr. Chance Litton Norfolk, Va. Boise (SSN 764) Cmdr. Kris Lancaster Charlotte (SSN 766) Cmdr. Timothy Yanik Louisville (SSN 724) Cmdr. Robert Rose John Warner (SSN 785) Cmdr. William Wiley Greeneville (SSN 772) Cmdr. Terry A. Nemec Jefferson City (SSN 759) Cmdr. Steven Dawley Washington (SSN 787) Cmdr. Gabe Cavazos Texas (SSN 775) Cmdr. Michael Dolbec Columbus (SSN 762) Cmdr. Albert Alarcon Indiana (SSN 789) Cmdr. David Grogan North Carolina (SSN 777) Cmdr. Matthew Lewis Portsmouth Naval Shipyard PCU Delaware (SSN 791) Cmdr. Brian P. Hogan Missouri (SSN 780) Cmdr. George Howell Santa Fe (SSN 763) Cmdr. Christopher Hedrick Mississippi (SSN 782) Cmdr. Heath Johnmeyer Tucson (SSN 770) Cmdr. Chad Hardt Illinois (SSN 786) Cmdr. Neil Steinhagen Columbia (SSN 771) Cmdr. Tyler Forrest COMSUBGRU-10 Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard Cheyenne (SSN 773) Cmdr. John T. Gonser Rear Adm. Jeffrey T. Jablon Hawaii (SSN 776) Cmdr. Sterling Jordan Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard Kings Bay, Ga. Kings Bay, Ga. Olympia (SSN 717) Cmdr. Ben Selph SUBRON 16 SUBRON 20 Capt. Eric Nash Capt. Robert E. Wirth Florida (SSGN 728) (B) Capt. Brett Moyes Alaska (SSBN 732) (B) Cmdr. David P. Brooks Florida (SSGN 728) (G) Capt. Greg Kercher Alaska (SSBN 732) (G) Cmdr. Eric Cole Manama, Bahrain SUBRON 15 Santa Rita, Georgia (SSGN 729) (B) Capt. George Perez Tennessee (SSBN 734) (B) Cmdr. Paul Seitz SUBRON 21 Capt. Timothy Poe Georgia (SSGN 729) (G) Capt. Douglas Jordan Tennessee (SSBN 734) (G) Cmdr. Jon Schaffner Capt. Sean Muth Key West (SSN 722) Cmdr. J. Grady Hill West Virginia (SSBN 736) (B) Cmdr. Jared Wyrick Oklahoma City (SSN 723) Cmdr. Thomas O'Donnell West Virginia (SSBN 736) (G) Cmdr. Jay Bijeau UNITED STATES SUBMARINE FORCE ORGANIZATION Rhode Island (SSBN 740) (B) Cmdr. Jeremy Miller Maryland (SSBN 738) (B) Cmdr. Jesse Pruitt Topeka (SSN 754) Cmdr. Steven Tarr III Rhode Island (SSBN 740) (G) Cmdr. Jason Anderson Asheville (SSN 758) Cmdr. Jeremy Pelstring Maryland (SSBN 738) (G) Cmdr. Michael Paisant Emory S. Land (AS 39) Capt. Michael Luckett [AS OF NOVEMBER 2018] Wyoming (SSBN 742) (B) Cmdr. Christopher Gilmore Frank Cable (AS 40) Capt. Andrew St. John Wyoming (SSBN 742) (G) Cmdr. Kenneth Curtin Jr. WW II Submarine Battle Flags

USS Swordfish (SS 193)

USS Swordfish began her first war patrol from the day after the . On December 9 Swordfish’s crew attacked their first enemy merchant ship. Having heard an explosion, they believed they had sunk it. This was the first attack of the war by a U.S. submarine on an enemy merchant ship. Swordfish’s first confirmed sinking came on December 16th. Her crew spotted a merchant convoy and they fired three torpe­does at the lead merchant ship, sinking the Atsutasan Maru. Swordfish’s first war patrol, resulting in four freighters sunk and a fifth damaged, was a tremendous success, particularly in light of the then-unknown Mk14 torpedo problems, the general climate of risk aversion among submarine skippers, and submarine tactics untested in combat. During her 12th war patrol, Swordfish was lining up for an attack on a guarded convoy. A destroyer became aware of the subma­rine’s presence and rapidly zig-zagged in Swordfish’s direction. At a distance of only 1,200 yards, Swordfish fired four Mk18 torpedoes at the destroyer and went deep. Two torpedoes struck the destroyer Matsukaze, sinking it. Swordfish went missing during her 13th war patrol. The boat received three Navy unit commendations and eight battle stars. According to JANAC, Swordfish sunk 11 non-combatant vessels, one of which was a converted gunboat, and one combatant vessel, the destroyer Matsukaze, for a total of 47,928 tons. Another source claims that Swordfish sunk 18 non-combatants and the Matsukaze and damaged 10 others for a total, sunk or damaged, of 130,362 tons.

The image above, taken in 1944, was painted on the side of the boat’s . The flag shows that Swordfish had sunk 20 merchant vessels and two combatant vessels.