Bonaventure on Evil and “Nothingness”
Andrea Di Maio
My purpose in this paper is to show how important the “Problem of Evil” is in
Bonaventurian philosophy and theology; how we can try to study it in a lexicographic way; what Bonaventure can teach about this question, even today. I will do this in the following steps: “An Introductory Lexicography of Evil”; “Phenomenology and the Logic of Evil”; “Diagnosis and Therapy for Evil”; “Metaphysics and Metaphorics of Evil”;
“Figures of the Evil One and of the Redeemer”; and some conclusions.
According to a late biographer, the name “Bonaventure” itself (assumed by him at his entrance into the Franciscan Order) referred to the exclamation made at his sudden healing after a fatal illness when he was a child: “What good luck!” Even if this is a legend, it is very significant and corresponds well with his character. Actually, Bonaven- ture concerned himself with the idea that humankind was affected by a spiritually mortal illness and considered both philosophy and theology as forms of diagnosis and therapy.
Following Francis’s recommendation (in every predication to preach about virtues and vices, rewards and punishments), at the beginning of Breviloquium Bonaventure says that the general purpose of the Bible is to “revoke from Evil,” «per timorem» and to
“move to Good,” “«per amorem»; besides, he says that the last purpose of the “The Lord’s
1
Prayer” is to be delivered from (past, future, present) Evil.1 So Evil is on the horizon of
Bonaventure’s entire theology. That is why we have to explain this notion.
* 1. AN INTRODUCTORY LEXICOGRAPHY OF EVIL “That is so interesting… What are we talking about?”
It is important to detect and to understand the exact terminology Bonaventure uses about what we usually call Evil; besides, it is important consider that Bonaventure plays on words (like Heidegger will do).There are many puns in his texts, which are not under- standable in other languages. That is why a lexicographic approach is required.2 A real useful tool is the digital concordance of most of the works by Bonaventure inside the
Library of Latin Texts.3 Let us use it in a progressive analysis: a first step is lemmatization; a second one is the linguistic census of taxonomies (hyponims and antonyms and meta- phor in particular); a third one is the analysis of the contexts.
To begin, ‘malus’ is an adjective (including the adverbial case ‘male’), with com- parative and superlative degrees (‘peior’, ‘pessimus’); a particular case is the ‘malus’ as the evil one, i.e. the devil, or the sinner in general; besides, this adjective can be used as
1 Brev pr § 1 (5, 203); Brev p. 5, c. 10 (5, 264). See LR 9.
2 See Andrea Di Maio, Piccolo Glossario bonaventuriano (Roma, 2008), 166-167, and bibliography there mentioned. Please, remember these lexicographic conventions: between single quotation marks (‘ ’), there are linguistic forms or lemmas; between double quotation marks (“ ”), there are quotations ad sensum or translated; between guillemets (« »), there are literal quotes in the original language..
3 Library of Latin Texts - Series A (LLT-A), database on line (Brepols, 2002); Library of Latin Texts
- Series B (LLT-B), database on line (Brepols, 2009). Both were consulted in the summer of 2017.
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a determined neutral noun, with plural (i.e. a specific ‘malum’; or many ‘mala’), or even as an absolute neutral noun, without plural (i.e. ‘malum’ in general).
Let us consider the amount of data: the occurences of the forms ‘malum’, ‘mali’,
‘malo’, ‘mala’, ‘malorum’ and ‘malis’ in the Bonaventurian opuscules contained the se- ries A of the Library of Latin Texts alone are 444; the whole family in the whole Works are several thousand. So, we can give here just a quick overview.
The semantic opposition between ‘malus’ or ‘male’ and ‘bonus’ or ‘bene’ is prob- ably the first conceived antonymy in human language and culture (e.g. many dictionaries, like the Oxford English Dictionary, define Antonyms through the opposition between
Good and Evil. But what kind of antonymy is it? This is the problem! Are they opposites like being and nothing? Or like right and left? Or like black and white? Or rather like seeing and blind? That is, is Evil either a contradictory, or contrary, or relative, or a priv- ative opposite term to Good? The linguistic and conceptual pattern we adopt depends on the metaphysic view we have. According to the choice of a theistic system, in Bonaven- ture’s language Evil is a privation of Good.
There is an interesting asymmetry in Bonaventurian antonymies: whereas the term
‘bonitas’ exists, viceversa the term ‘malitas’ does not. Actually, the term ‘malitia’ exists, but with a mere moral meaning. However, Bonaventure (specifically) uses the term ‘ni- hilitas’ (i.e. nothingness), with both the meanings, natural and moral. The first one means natural defectibility, the second one moral culpability.
There are two (or three) kinds of ‘malum’: malum culpae (i.e. Sin or Guilt) and malum poenae (i.e. Pain and Punishment: it is interesting that in language and culture both the concepts are connected). There is a third kind of ‘malum’, expressed by syntagms like ‘peccatum originale’, ‘corruptela peccati’, ‘fomes concupiscentiae’, ‘peccata
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poenalia’… So, in order to collect all the occurrences of the terminology for Evil in Bon- aventure it is not enough to collect the occurrences of ‘malus’, but we have to collect also the occurrences of ‘culpa’, ‘peccatum’, ‘poena’ and synonyms.
There is an interesting semantic intersection between the concept of Evil and the concept of Nature through the concept of Law: the ‘lex naturae’ is what rules the ‘natura condita’; ‘lex peccati’ is what rules the ‘natura lapsa’ or ‘corrupta’ (in addition, there is the ‘lex scripta’ in the Old Testament, and the ‘lex gratiae’ of the New Testament). This linguistic use implies a paradox: Evil, in the double form of suffering (and death) and culpability, is in a certain sense naturally unnatural and abnormally normal.
Actually, Evil as guilt is only in a free subject; and Evil as suffering is such only for living (and feeling) beings. For instance, an earthquake or a fire is an evil only if it damages life. That is why, according to Bonaventure, the corruption of Good leads not only to necessity or misery, but also mortality.
It is important also to mention two important biblical metaphors connected with the notion of Evil. The first is the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil (‘lignum scientiae boni et mali’) in the biblical books of Genesis and Revelation.4 The second are the Weeds
(in a famous evangelical parable), which in Bonaventure’s interpretation represent Evil in general, rather than evil people, as is said in the conclusion added to the parable.5 Please note that ‘lignum’ means both tree and wood (and even ship); besides, ‘malum’ could
4 Lig Vit (8, 68-86); Brev p. 2, c. 10 (5, 228); Hex (passim).
5 Regn Dei (5, 539-553).
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mean both evil and apple tree, so that in popular culture (but not in Bonaventure’s view) the ‘lignum scientiae… mali’ was misunderstood as an apple tree.
* 2. PHENOMENOLOGY AND LOGIC OF EVIL “Something is rotten in the state of” Humankind
* 2.1 PLEASANT AND UNPLEASANT
We could consider as the basis of the knowledge of Good and Evil the feeling
“well” or “unwell” which follows every one of our “apprehensions”. According to the
Itinerarium, every human experience, after its internal apprehension, is immediately qual- ified as pleasant or unpleasant – according to either its proportion or its disproportion – in relation to the apprehending faculty.6 This means that the difference between Good and
Evil is primarily, immediately and physically perceived, and only in a second phase is it conceptually elaborated. In modern terms, information has not only denotation (of some- thing), but also connotation (well-being or not-well-being).
Of course, sometimes this connotation could be wrong (for example, a poison might taste good). Our first impression is the search for pleasure; but our first experience of pain implies some implicit idea of wellness. On a higher level, we use the same distinction to qualify free acts as right or wrong. In every choice we presume the idea of Good and
Better (in fact, to choose between two possibilities means to decide what is better than the other; but so we assume an implicit idea of the Absolute Best.7
6 Itin c. 2, n. 5 (5, 300-301).
7 Itin c. 3, n. 4 (5, 304-305).
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* 2.2 ANTONYMS AND MODALITIES: EVIL SUPPOSES GOOD8
So, we experience Good and Evil in general. Although the experience of Evil seems to be stronger and more evident than that of Good, it is not so primary. In logical terms, the opposition between Evil and Good is not like the opposition between father and son, or the opposition between black and white… Indeed, if there is a privation, then there should be a habit (so the reality of Evil implies the reality of Good; vice versa, the reality of Good only implies the possibility of Evil).
In logical terms, we can say that since Evil exists, then Good must exist as well; conversely, if Good exists, then Evil may exist (but not necessarily). That is: a totally good world, although not real, is possible and conceivable; conversely, a totally evil world is neither possible nor conceivable.
* 2.3 ANTONYMS AND MODALITIES: EVIL SUPPOSES A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TIME AND MODALITY
In a famous text, Bonaventure connects our experience of both time and modality:
“Discuss what you are, what you were [or rather what you should have been], what you should be, what you might still be.”9
It is paradoxical: Evil is abnormally normal – and normally abnormal. In fact, two opposite tendencies are native to humankind: towards Good or towards Evil. Both are
8 See Brev p. 3, c. 1 (5, 231): «Malum» «non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem, videlicet defectum voluntatis creatae»; «
9 Perf vitae c. 1, n. 5 (8, 109).
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native, but not in the same sense or on the same level. We should distinguish two levels of “native”: the first one, natural or referred to the original state (which belongs to our nature and constitutes it); the second one, from our beginning, but secondary, i.e. not belonging to our ideal nature, but to our present nature, which, in comparison with the ideal one, is called “corrupted”.
Note how complex the evaluation of something as Evil is. We suppose things are in a way they should not be; so, we suppose firstly how things actually are; then, how things should be; finally, that the first and the second condition do not match. In case of moral Evil, the judgement is even more complex: in fact, we suppose that we both had
(and were able) to do (or to avoid) something that nevertheless we did not. The polemic of Bonaventure against the Manicheans (that is the Cathari of his time) is something similar to our present conceptual engineering. He shows that dualism is self-incon- sistent.10
* 3. DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPHY FOR EVIL: THE CHECKMATE OF MODALITIES AND THE “DISCOVERY” OF GRACE
“There are more things in heaven and earth…, than are dreamt of in… philosophy”
* 3.1 PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
In general, wisdom is not only comprehension, but application; not only diagnosis, but therapy. Bonaventure loves this quotation from Aristoteles: “No one has been healed
10 See Andrea Di Maio, “Le questioni fiorentine di ambito bonaventuriano. Un primo studio lessicale e dottrinale,” in Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 109 (2017), 855-858.
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through merely understanding the physician’s prescription, but through putting it into practice.”11Unfortunately (and paradoxically), philosophy was naturally born as a neces- sary but useless cure. “Ancient philosophers promised wisdom but could not keep their promise.”12 Actually, we cannot know our origins, unless someone tells us. So, ancient philosophers could not know the illness (i.e. its causes), the health, the Healer, the cure.13
In conclusion, philosophy is obliged by truth to search for wisdom, but it is not able to find it. However, this checkmate prepares us to receive the grace of God.
More precisely, in Bonaventure’s view, only faith in Christ heals, having in itself both the diagnosis and the cure;14 sacraments themselves are seen as medicine.15 Even theology as a science is conceived as finalized to our spiritual therapy: actually, its goal is “that we become good.”16 In this famous Bonaventurian assertion, we can distinguish two assumptions: firstly, we are not good and we are unwell (more precisely we are un- well because we do not behave well); then, a change is not only needed, but possible (and
Theology can teach us how we can behave well in order to be well in Salvation).
11 Hex coll. 2, n. 3 (5, 337). See Aristoteles, Ethica Nic., l. 2, c. 4.
12 Hex coll. 5, n. 22 (5, 357).
13 See Hex coll. 7, n. 8-11 (5, 366-367).
14 See Hex coll. 7, n. 8-11 (5, 366-367); Brev p. 3 (5, 231-241): «de corruptela peccati»; in particular,
Brev p. 3, c. 7 (5, 236).
15 See Brev p. 6 (5, 265-280): «De medicina sacramentali»; see J. A. Wayne Hellman’s contribution in this volume.
16 Brev Pr §5 (5, 206); see Sent I pr (1, 13).
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* 3.2 “THEOPHANY” RATHER THAN “THEODICY”
In the Bonaventurian view, Evil regards not only what we would call Theodicy,17 but rather what we would call Theophany. The experience of Evil, rather than an objection against the existence of God, is an argument in favor of it. In fact, quoting Aristotle, “by means of the straight we judge both the straight line and the crooked”,18 Bonaventure suggests that we cannot qualify anything as Evil, unless as a deviation and a corruption of Good… That implies that the experience of Evil requires some affirmation of God.
Without God, Evil should be absolutely normal, i.e. not Evil, but is it really so? Absolutely not.
* 4. METAPHYSICS AND METAPHORICS OF EVIL “To be, or not to be, that is the question”
* 4.1 METAPHYSICS OF EVIL
But what is Evil? And where does it come from? Discussing and judging this expe- rience, Bonaventure concludes that it is a particular form of nihility.19Apart from
17 For instance, with regard to the blind man healed by Jesus: see Comm John c. 9, n. 2-3 - v. 2-3 (6,
372-373). In general, see Manuel Lázaro Pulido, “Dios Permite el Mal para el Bien. Dos Approximaciones diferentes desde la metafísica del Ser y del Bien en santo Tomás y san Buenaventura,” in Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 21 (2014), 95-103 (regarding Bonaventure: see 100-101).
18 Hex coll. 5, n. 30 (5, 35): «Privationes non cognoscuntur nisi per habitus suos» (quoted from
Averrois); «Iudex est rectus sui et obliqui» (quoted from Aristoteles, De anima); «Omnis cognitio fit ex praeexistenti cognitione» (quoted from Aristoteles, Analitica Posteriora). See also Itin c. 3, n. 3 (5, 304).
19 See Perf ev 1 concl. (5, 120-121): «Quoniam […] omnia […] ab uno principio manant et de nihilo sunt producta, ille vere sapiens est qui veraciter recognoscit suam et aliorum nihilitatem et primi principii
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“absolute nihility” (which absolutely does not exist), there are two kinds of nihility: the natural (i.e. defectibility) and the moral (i.e. culpability). The first nothingness is said to be in opposition to “natural existence” (and means to be in a finite dimension);20 the sec- ond one is said in opposition to the moral existence or, better, to “existence in Grace”. It is a wonderful way to express the point: it is not enough for us to exist (in nature), but we have to exist in God. This opposition is similar to the one – stated by Luther – between existence in itself and the existence coram Deo.21
sublimitatem. […]. Cum duplex sit esse, scilicet naturae et gratiae, duplex est nihilitas: uno modo per opposi- tionem ad esse naturae, alio modo per oppositionem ad esse moris et gratiae. Et secundum hoc humilitas, quae est […] considerativa nostrae nihilitatis, duplex est: una quidem dici potest humilitas veritatis, quae con- surgit ex consideratione nihilitatis per oppositionem ad esse naturae […]. Alia potest dici humilitas severi- tatis, quae consurgit ex consideratione culpae».
20 In the expression «de nihilo sunt producta», ‘de’ is meant «ordinaliter», not «materialiter»: see
Quaestiones disputatae De productione rerum, De imagine et De anima e schola bonaventuriana (codex
Conv. Soppr. D.4.27 Bibliothecae Nationalis Centralis Florentinae), ed. Mikołaj Olszewski (Rome, 2014),
17. About the differences between ‘ex nihilo’, ‘de nihilo’, ‘ab uno principio’, see Andrea Di Maio, “Le questioni fiorentine di ambito bonaventuriano,” 854-859.
21 About the esse coram in Luther, see Stefano Leoni, “Der Augustinkomplex. Luthers zwei refor- matorische Bekehrungen,” in Reformatorische Theologie und Autoritäten. Studien zur Genese des Schrift- prinzips beim jungen Luther, ed. Volker Leppin, (Tübingen, 2015), 185-294. For a general comparison between Bonaventure and Luther, see George Henry Tavard, From Bonaventure to the Reformers (Mil- waukee, 2005), 64-66, «“One and the same person cannot be just and sinner”» (SD, 366), 83: «Bonaventure and Luther were, at one point, in verbal contradiction. They were also at a number of other points in deep agreement». About Luther’s criticism of some doctrines professed by Bonaventure, see Timothy J. John- son’s essay in this volume.
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On the basis of other Bonaventurian texts, we can better understand the sense of nihility. In a first sense there is something which properly there is not, like the analogous being,22 which is the object of metaphysical science.23 In a second sense there is some- thing which is like vacuum and vain, like sins and sorrows, which are the object of that particular “science of vanity” described in the Book of Ecclesiastes.24 Besides, there is an interesting problem: in Latin, ‘poena’ means both pain and punishment. The assumption of some kind of suffering (“humility as severity”) helps sinners to exist before the face of
God again.
22 See Itin 5.3 (5, 309): «Esse analogum […] minime habet de actu, eo quod minime est». The ex- pression ‘minime est’, in Bonaventurian language, is ambiguous: it could mean both “it absolutely does not exist” and “it exists at a minimum grade”. Actually, analogous being does not exist in itself, but it exists as our insight into the common relationship between finite beings and God, since they depend upon him.
Today this theory seems to suggest a meeting point between Meinong’s and Frege’s disciples in their dis- pute about existence.
23 Bonaventure distinguishes metaphysics (as science of the ideal reasons of things) and philosoph- ical wisdom, which reflects upon the mind itself and other minds and contemplates the first Principle. About metaphysics, see Hex coll. 4, n. 7-13 (5, 350-351), interpreted on the basis of Itin c. 3, n. 3 and 6 (5, 304-
305) and of Red 20 (5, 324). About philosophical wisdom (i.e. philosophical theology), See Hex coll. 5, n.
24-33 (5, 357-359). About the Bonaventurian system of knowledge, see Andrea Di Maio, “La divisione bonaventuriana delle scienze. Un’applicazione della lessicografia all’ermeneutica testuale” in Gregori- anum 81 (2000), 101-136 and 331-351.
24 Bonaventure asks, how is such a science possible, since vanity is nothing? Actually, this science concerns privations, like sins. That is why even an “evil person”, like Salomon (considered as the book’s author), may express something true and good. See Comm Ec pr, q 2 (6, 6-7); q 4, ad 1 (6, 8).
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Indeed, the ontological structure of each finite being25 is the connection of three dimensions: to be, to be such (a being), to be well; but finite beings are not originated from themselves, are not modeled after themselves, are not destined for themselves; so they must be originated from / modeled after / destined for an Other (in which all these dimensions coincide), because “He is that He is.”. So, every finite being is necessarily mixed with not-being; besides, it can also be mixed with not-being-well.
* 4.2 THE METAPHORICS OF EVIL AND THE PARABLE OF THE WEEDS AND THE GOOD SEEDS
In his wonderful and complex sermon concerning the Parable of the Good Seed and the Weeds, Bonaventure developed a systematic treatise upon the Kingdom of God de- scribed in Parables, with particular attention to the Mystery of Evil. In his view, both
Parables and Arguments are required to deal with the Problem.26
25 See Hex coll. 1, n.12 (5, 331); coll. 2, n. 25 (5, 340).
26 See Regn Dei 43 (5, 551-552): «Malum […] non est natura aliqua, sed privatio boni ‘mali’ nomen accepit. Manichaeus non potest intelligere, malum esse privationem, sed ponit naturam esse aliquam; ideo ne- cesse habet ponere mali principium, et sic duo principia […]. Cum enim unitas sit indivisio entis, veritas sit indivisio entis et esse; bonitas addit adhuc super hoc, quia est indivisio entis et esse et agere, et illud agere est est sese diffundere et communicare. Deus autem omne quod agit, agit a se, secundum se et propter se
[…]
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In a few words, Unity is the absence of division within Being; Truth is the absence of division between Being and to be (in fact, true is to say that “being is”); Goodness is the absence of division between Being and to be and to do (or to act). Viceversa, a sepa- ration between acting and its natural goal is a privation, that is an evil.
Irrational creatures are merely moved from something else: when they act, they actually react. On the other hand, free Will acts, and not only reacts. In general, natural actions are properly only reactions, whereas free actions are not simple reactions.
So, we have two orders of reality: the order of beings «tantum acta» (“only done,” or “acted on”), and the order of beings having free will («acta et agens»); when there is a separation between “to be” and “to act”, there are two kinds of Evil according to the two orders of actions: Guilt (in the mixed, active and passive, order) and Pain (in the merely passive or reactive order).27
Please note that according to Bonaventure in a certain sense Evil is not merely pri- vation: actually, «concretive» there are sorrows and sins.28
* 4.3 BEYOND THE METAPHYSICS: CHRISTOLOGY
So we can understand the supreme reason for all these distinctions. On the one hand, humankind exists because it remains founded on the uncreated Word (Verbum increa- tum); on the other hand, humankind is ruined because it abandons the inspired Word
27 Regn Dei 43 (5, 551-552).
28 See II Sent d. 34, a.2, q. 3, concl. (2, 815).
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(Verbum inspiratum),29 “Through Him everything was made; without Him nothing was made”, i.e. “sin happened.”30
There is a “Hidden Christology”; in fact, “the Word (Verbum) is the light which enlightens everyone,” but without their knowing it.31To act “outside” the Word means to miss our own target. So free will which chooses a fake target falls into a kind of “noth- ingness”. In this case, free will falls into a terrible condition of inconsistency with itself.32
This is the worst sorrow: a total failure of existence. So, we have two possibilities: either to be “divine” in God, or to pretend to be “divine” without God, in other words outside the Trinity.33
29 See Brev p. 4, c. 1 (5, 242).
30 See Comm John c. 1, n. 14, q. 1 (6, 249-250), according to the Glossa, which assumes an Augus- tinian interpretation; see Augustine of Hippo, Tractatus in Iohannis Evangelium, tract. 1, cap. 13 (CCSL
36, 7; courtesy of Giovanni Catapano): «Sane, fratres, quod sequitur, omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, uidete ne sic cogitetis, quia nihil aliquid est. Solent enim multi male intellegentes sine ipso factum est nihil, putare aliquid esse nihil. Peccatum quidem non per ipsum factum est; et manifestum est, quia peccatum nihil est, et nihil fiunt homines cum peccant».
31 Hex 1.20 (5, 332). See Sermo “Medius vestrum stetit, quem vos nescitis”, III Dominica Adventus
(SD 156-162).
32 See Hex 1.26 (5, 533-534).
33 In his Collations about the Ten Commandments, Bonaventure distinguishes between our duties toward God and our duties toward our neighbor and ourselves. We have to be inserted in the hierarchy, that is the communion existing in the Holy Trinity and from it expanded to every person. Every sin (even those against our neighbor or ourselves) is fundamentally a violation of the first three commandments (each one of which is appropriated to the persons of the Holy Trinity). See coll. 3, n. 2 (5, 516); coll. 2, n. 223 (5,
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* 5. FIGURES OF THE EVIL ONE AND THE REDEEMER: THE DECEIVER DECEIVED
“Fair is Foul, And Foul is Fair”
* 5.1 DOCTOR FAUST ANTE LITTERAM
Preaching on the first Commandment, in order to show that every sin derives from a lack of adoration of God, Bonaventure gives an example taken probably from some
“collection of examples,” although not yet identified. It is an older form of the famous myth of Doctor Faust.34
An anonymous scholar (in the text is called a “litterate”) wanted to become wealthy.
Since he could not do it through God, he decided to do it through the devil. He searched for sorcerers. In fact, the goals of all magicians’ arts are these: either the change of natures
(that corresponds to the bad part of alchemy), or illusionism of «histriones», i.e. tricksters
(that corresponds to the bad part of «Theatrica», i.e. the Performance Arts) and the
514); coll. 3, n. 24-27 (5, 518-519); coll. 4, n. 15 (5, 522). In fact, every sin begins as an untrue adoration of God; therefore, it continues as an infidelity to the Son (because sinners call God “Father”, but they do not live like his Son, Christ, and so they become inconsistent with themselves); eventually, it becomes a deprivation of the holiness of the Spirit (according to a spiritual interpretation of the commandment: “in this day”, which represents all the time given us by God, “do not do any of your own work”, that is “any sin”). So, what is sin? It is to decide to use my existence in time in order to do something which ends up being exclusively mine: but to pretend to exist autonomously outside the most Holy Trinity would mean to exclude communion with other people too.
34 Command coll. 2, n. 23 (5, 514).
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investigation of contingent future events (that corresponds to the bad part of astrology).35
But among Christians and Jews he did not find any sorcerers.
So, he directly invoked the devil a first time, and nothing happened; another time, and nothing happened, because God had not allowed it; eventually, he invoked him a last time, and the devil appeared and proposed a covenant to him. The scholar accepted and adored the devil.
The devil deceived him, leading him to a river and showing him a lot of stones as if they were gold. He gathered the stones, believing they were gold nuggets, and he stored them in his house, where they caught fire and burnt everything. The scholar went to the river again to gather other nuggets, but, in the end, he realized they were merely stones.
So the scholar was firstly illusioned; secondly disappointed, but still deluded; and even- tually disillusioned.
What is the meaning of the tale? Sin is a failure in the due adoration of God; in particular, the desire for riches (as an end in themselves) is incompatible with it. If people do not truly adore God, they end up adoring the devil.
Let us note that there is a semantic shift from a quest (‘quaerere,’ i.e. to ask to know or to enjoy) to a request (‘petere,’ i.e. to ask to have). That is the change from knowledge as acquaintance to knowledge as power.36 We can observe that search for riches is the first reason for this covenant with the devil; in other words, the egoistic appropriation of
35 See Red n. 2 (5, 319-320) about Theatrica; Hex coll. 5, n. 21 (5, 357) about the luxuriata ratio in alchemy and astrology.
36 Andrea Di Maio, “Tracce e spunti bonaventuriani nella Laudato Si’” in Antonianum 91 (2016),
819-857 (in particular, 843-847 and 856-857).
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Good. By contrast, deep and true Knowledge is not grabbing something, but becoming acquainted with someone or something.37
There is a dramatic circle: stones are mistaken for gold nuggets; then they ravage as if they were burning coals; eventually they are seen as they actually are, as stones. So, there is firstly an illusion, then a counter-illusion, and eventually a disillusion. The meta- morphosis from nuggets to coals is the passage from a merely mental to a real level of
Evil. So, we could conclude that Suffering is a hard, but useful, return to reality.
Lucifer
37 It is so in two recent famous literary figures; on the one hand, Gollum (in The Lord of the Rings) says: «My precious!»; on the other hand, the Fox (in the Little Prince) says, “One only understands the things that one tames” (“It means to establish ties”).
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Bonaventure interprets the Sin of Lucifer as a privatization of Good,38 but an ap- propriated Good is no longer a Good (it is a really Franciscan idea). That is a brilliant reinterpretation of the Augustinian theory: Evil is a privation of Good, i.e. a privatization of it. Presumption ruined the devil and produced envy in him: and envy moved him to try humankind through temptation.39
* 5.2 ADAM
Human sin derives not only from a mistake, but from a temptation, i.e. a delusion, a sophistic argument, whose conclusion is not necessary, but freely taken.40
38 See Brev p. 2, n. 7 (5, 224-225): «Lucifer, suae pulcritudinis et altitudinis consideratione excitatus ad se diligendum et suum privatum bonum, praesumsit de altitudine habita et ambivit excellentiam pro- priam, non tamen obtentam; ac per hoc praesumendo constituit se sibi principium, in se ipso gloriando; et ambiendo constituit se sibi summum bonum, in se ipso quiescendo. Cum autem ipse nec summum esset principium nec summum bonum; necesse fuit, quod inordinato ascensu rueret; pari ratione et omnes in hoc consentientes. […]: ideo voluntas eius impia et actio aversa a Deo conversa est ad hominis odium et invi- diam». See also and Brev p. 3, n. 1 (5, 231): «[…] quia de nihilo fuit et defectiva, [creatura humana] potuit deficere ab agendo propter Deum, ut aliquid faceret propter se, non propter Deum, ac per hoc nec a Deo nec secundum Deum nec propter Deum; et hoc est peccatum, quod est modi, speciei et ordinis corruptivum; quod, quia defectus est, non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem, videlicet defectum voluntatis cre- atae».
39 Brev p. 3, n. 2 (5, 231-233).
40 See Hex coll. 1, n. 26-28 (5, 333-334): «[26] Est autem argumentum Christi et argumentum diaboli.
Argumentum diaboli ducit ad infernum et est paralogismus et sophisticum argumentum et destructivum; argu- mentum Christi constructivum et reparativum. Diabolus enim paralogizavit primum hominem et supposuit quandam propositionem in corde hominis quasi per se notam, quae est: creatura rationalis debet appetere
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Every sin happens as a result of the following kind of sophistic mistake: “A creature made in God’s image should be after his likeness. But: if they eat of the fruit of the
Knowledge of Goodness and Evil, they will be like God. Then: a creature made in God’s image should eat the forbidden fruit”.
In order to make this argument more understandable today, we could reformulate it in this way: “It is right to be happy. But I cannot be happy without having (or doing) this forbidden thing. Therefore it is right that I have it (or do it)”. This argument is not a real syllogism, because there are two meanings of likeness (and happiness). Actually, there
similitudinem sui Creatoris, quia scilicet est imago – unde in damnatis erit maxima poena, quia cum imago sit animae essentialis, similiter et talis appetitus erit essentialis in damnatis – sed si comederis, assimilaberis: ergo bonum est comedere de vetito, ut assimileris. Et per istum [sophisticum] syllogismum omnes peccant, quia, ut dicit Dionysius, “nullus malus fit ad malum aspiciens, sed omnis intendit bonum et appetit bonum; sed fallitur, quia similitudinem boni accipit pro vero”. Per istum paralogismum induxit diabolus hominem in passibilitatem naturae, in necessitatem indigentiae, in mortalitatem vitae. [27] Econtra argumentum Christi fuit salvativum et destructivum argumenti diaboli. Ex quo enim diabolus fecerat hominem dissimilem Deo, cum tamen promisis- set, similem se facturum; necesse fuit, Christum esse similem homini, ut faceret hominem similem sibi, sive
Deo. Christus ergo habuit conformitatem naturae in quantum Deus cum Patre, aequalitatem potentiae, immor- talitatem vitae. In his tribus coniunctus fuit Patri. Necesse ergo fuit, ipsum in aliis tribus oppositis coniungi homini. Assumsit ergo passibilitatem naturae, necessitatem indigentiae, mortalitatem vitae. Tria ergo habuit per essentiam et tria assumsit per misericordiam. Necesse ergo fuit, ut tria vincerentur a tribus. Sed vita per essen- tiam superari non potuit a morte, nec potentia a penuria, nec impassibilitas a passibilitate. Necesse ergo fuit, ut homo transiret a mortalitate ad immortalitatem, a defectu ad opulentiam, de passibilitate ad coronam. […] Chri- stus non dicebat: Sinite me vivere, sed dicebat: Sinite me mortem assumere et alteri extremitati copulari, pati, mori; et tunc sequitur conclusio. Unde ipsum illusit diabolo. […]. Diabolus vero parum reputabat argumentum Christi, cum vidit eum patientem. Sed Christus illusit ei [...]». See also SD 1, sermo 14, n. 8.
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are two kinds of imitation: to emulate someone in order to be actually like him or to mimic him for the sake of appearance (in this sense, the devil is a bad imitation of God). In a similar way, there are two kinds of happiness: the full realization of one’s true nature and the mere satisfaction of only some desires of the moment.
So, because of the two different meanings used in the major and in the minor prem- ises of the syllogism, there is not a middle (common) term, and therefore nor is there a conclusion. In a valid syllogism, conclusion derives necessarily from premises; but in a fake syllogism (i.e. a paralogism) premises absolutely do not imply any conclusion, so that any conclusion taken, although induced by an intellectual mistake, is given by free will. That is why sin is both a mistake and a free choice. A sinner is not compelled to sin, the responsibility is his or hers, so it is his or her fault! Pain is the result of a corruption of nature due to its self-referential deformation. The “fruit of the Tree of Life” is the divine gift, something received and shared, whereas the “fruit of the Tree of the
Knowledge of Good and Evil” is the human appropriation, i.e. the “exclusively mine”.
* 5.3 “PARADISE” NOT COMPLETELY “LOST”
According to Bonaventure, even after sin, paradise cannot be completely lost. He distinguishes two aspects in rational creatures: to be an image of God (this concerns cre- ation, which is the natural level of being: «esse naturae») and to be a similitude of God
(this concerns revelation and salvation, which is the supernatural level of being: «esse gratiae»). According to Bonaventure (differently from Thomas Aquinas) humankind was not immediately created in grace, but for just a moment in mere nature («morula in puris naturalibus»); only later was humankind filled with grace, and it remained so until the
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first human sin.41 Rational creature, through sin, lost its similitude (with God), but not its image (of God). As an effect of corruption,42 human nature became “crooked” («recurva- tur»): it became self-referential. The upper eye (i.e. spiritual faculty) became blind, whereas the inner one (i.e. rational faculties) became cloudy and the outer (i.e. bodily or sensorial faculties) remained acute.43
If humankind had not sinned, everything would be in common.44 But, because of the sin, private property and coercitive power were established, as remedies to the conse- quences of sin. However, because of the salvation through Christ, the history is “prophet- ically” in progress: e.g. the religious vows of poverty and obedience (and in particular
Francis’s example) show a form of partial and progressive restoration of the original con- dition.
According to the aforementioned text in which Christ is described as the center, or the middle point, of doctrine (as the repairer of the devil’s paralogism), Jesus is said to have deceived the deceiver with a brilliant syllogism: having by nature an immortal na- ture, through mercy he assumed a mortal one and accepted death on the Cross; but in so doing, mortality was defeated by immortality and human nature was assimilated to the
41 See II Sent d. 29, a. 2, q. 2 (2, 703-704), for humankind; for angels, II Sent d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2 (2,
116-117).
42 See Luciano Cova, Peccato originale. Agostino e il Medioevo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014); regar- ding Bonaventure, see in particular Cova, “La corruzione della natura umana nel pensiero medievale: Bo- naventura interprete di Agostino,” in I castelli di yale - online (2015).
43 Hex coll. 5, n. 24 (5, 357-358); see Myst Trin q. 1, a. 2 (5, 54-56); Itin c. 1, n. 3-7 (5, 297-298).
44 See Perf ev q. 4, a.1, ad 7 (5, 182); Hex 18.7 (5, 415).
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divine. Whereas the devil supposed that he had beaten Christ, Christ had in fact beaten the devil.
In the same collatio, Bonaventure had exposed an interesting geometrical metaphor:
“having lost the center of a circle, we can find it again by tracing a cross” (i.e. at the crossing of the diagonals of the circumscribed square).45 That is, having lost the center of our life, we can find it again through the Holy Cross (i.e. suffering assumed for the sake of love).
Besides, Bonaventure says that the center of justice, e.g. of the judicial and penal power (that which Christ will be in his final judgment) consists in what “makes the ugly beautiful, the beautiful even more beautiful, and the more beautiful the most beautiful.”46
45 Hex coll. 1, n. 24 (5, 333).
46 Hex coll. 1, n. 34 (5, 335).
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In other words, pain (as punishment), if assumed in love, is what can make moral ugliness beauty again.
* 6. CONCLUSION
* 6.1 SOME SUGGESTIONS
Let us assume that Evil is like the dirt in our homes. Both philosophical and theo- logical explanations would be the attempt to sweep this dirt away. Unfortunately, we can- not eliminate the dirt, we can only move it to another place. This is the problem with the
Evil of the world: we do not have any other place, so we have to hide the dirt by sweeping it under the carpet. Every claim to resolve the problem is not only ineffective, but dishon- est. Typical of Evil is that it is always (just and still) “there”. So, we have to elevate to a higher level of questioning: not how does it work, but what does it mean for me. So Evil can be considered the spur to find the principle of every explanation. That is why we can treat Evil only through parables, as Bonaventure did in his treatise De regno Dei, although he adds that we cannot understand the comparisons between the two elements of the par- ables, if we do not have at least a minimal understanding of each in itself.
So, Evil is mysterious for two reasons: 1) we have to do and be what we are not able to and 2) Evil is normally abnormal.
Evil, as privation of Good, is a privatization of Good. So, privacy is a deprivation.
Comparing Christ’s logic and the devil’s, we can understand that mercy and envy are the two sides of the same coin; more precisely, diabolic envy is the misunderstanding of divine mercy. We know that a problem shared is a problem halved. Well, the merciful ones want to assume the Others’ problems, whereas the envious ones want Others to
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assume their own problems because they suppose that seeing Others in a better condition than theirs is a worse Evil.
To recognize just limitations (“Do not eat this fruit!”) makes us spiritually unlim- ited; to refuse them makes us even more limited.
* 6.2 UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS AND MISSING QUESTIONS
In Bonaventure’s theory of Evil there are unresolved problems, or better, missing questions. The first question: why are human beings connected in a solidarity in evil?
Bonaventure absolutely refuses the Traducianistic solution; he adopts both an Anselmian and a Dionysian explanation.47 The Anselmian explanation is that free will corrupts na- ture and corrupted nature corrupts free will. Besides, this second corruption is produced by sexual pleasure in conception. But this second part of the explanation does not work.48
The Dionysian explanation is that human hierarchy (i.e. communion through order, knowledge and action, in the most Holy Trinity) is ruined because of the sin, even of only one person. Both these explanations are insufficient, but they can show us the path. In fact, who is the “mind” about which Bonaventure speaks (e.g. in the Itinerarium)?
47 See Brev p. 3, c. 6 (5, 235); Itin c. 1, n. 7-8 (5, 297-298).
48 In modern catholic theology (especially after the dogmatic definition in 1854), this theory had to be abandoned because of the doctrine of the immaculate conception of Holy Mary. Although in III Sent d.
3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2 (3, 66-68) Bonaventure refuses this doctrine, he actually only refuses the opinion that the
Holy Virgin did not need grace.
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Actually, it is a cooperative mind, therefore not just a singular person, but also a com- munion of people.49
Another insufficient solution is about eschatology. Quoting Augustine, Bonaven- ture says that damned and punished people are beautifully collocated in the center of the earth (where hell was supposed to be);50 the theologian Balthasar (in his essay on Bona- venture in Herrlichkeit) considered this sentence awful. However, even in this context
Bonaventure gives us some interesting suggestions which we can develop today. Let us consider51 how Bonaventure explains pain as punishment in purgatory and hell.52 Despite
49 See Andrea Di Maio, “La scala e lo specchio: l’Itinerario bonaventuriano riletto in chiave umani- stica odierna,” in La scala e lo specchio. L’originalità di Bonaventura da Bagnoregio a otto secoli dalla nascita, ed. Davide Riserbato (Roma, 2018), 21-22; 35; 40-42.
50 Hex coll. 1, n. 34 (5,335).
51 Thanks to Bernd Goehring for the suggestion.
52 We find the following explanations: IV Sent d. 44, p. 2, a. 2-3 (4, 924-935), about the corporal
“fire” as a kind of material confusion, which afflicts both damned spirits and risen bodies in hell, and – in a different way – holy souls in purgatory; IV Sent d. 46, a. 1-2 (4, 956-966), about the divine mitigation of punishment because God punishes evil people less than they deserve and, besides, both mercy and justice
– or truth – are implied and connected in all God’s work; IV Sent d. 50, p. 2, a. 2, q. 2 (4, 1051-1053), about hell’s “worm” – according to Mark 9:48 – as a metaphor for the spiritual inner pain in damned souls and devils which is due to the inconsistency between their deliberate will, obstinate in sin, and their natural will or synderesis, as a «remurmuratio contra male factum»; Brev p. 7, c. 2 (5, 282-283), about temporary pain in purgatory; Brev p. 7, c. 6 (5, 287-288), about eternal pain in hell; Hex coll. 1, n. 26 (5, 333-334), about the inconsistency as the greatest punishment in damned people; Hex coll. 1, n. 34-38 (5, 335), about final judgement which transforms ugly things into beautiful ones, and about final peace and atonement.
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the limits of his theology, Bonaventure seems to suggest that since the worst Evil is the spiritual inconsistency between natural and deliberate will (so that the creature created as an Image of God is definitely dissimilar to him), then even the infernal “fire” could be considered a kind of repair provided by the divine mercy.
But what about the suffering of innocents? Bonaventure does not consider this sec- ond question so urgent for us nowadays, but also in this case we can collect and develop some suggestions. Our life is continuously threatened by inauthenticity. We always have two reasons to do what we should do: the right reason and the true one. So, suffering helps us to be more authentic. Let us examine our experience of love. Is it wanting the best for someone, or is it feeling the best about someone? At the beginning both are confused.
Only if I have the opportunity to do the best for someone without any kind of gratification can I be assured of the authenticity of love. Theologically speaking, it is not the Cross or suffering which saves, but eternal love which endures in the face of suffering upon the
Cross.
* 6.3 EPICURUS’S TRILEMMA RELOADED AND (ALMOST) RESOLVED
Last but not least, we have to face the famous trilemma traditionally ascribed to
Epicurus and adapted to us today. Why does not God deliver us from Evil? Either he is
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able, but unwilling to do it;53 or he is willing, but unable to;54 or he is neither willing nor able, because he does not care,55 or because Evil is possibly not as bad as it seems.56
In the biblical and theistic search for another solution,57 to transform the trilemma into a quadrilemma, Bonaventure’s theory on Evil can help us to explore this fourth hy- pothesis: God is both able and willing to deliver us from Evil, but not immediately. So it is a question of time. The delay makes us ask and pray and wait. A checkmate of
53 This hypothesis can be interpreted today as a theory of a vindictive justice.
54 This hypothesis can be interpreted today as a theory of Creation as self-limitation of God, accord- ing to Simone Weil and Hans Jonas.
55 Today, as Dostoyevsky’s Ivan Karamazov suggests, such a God cannot be accepted; so, this hy- pothesis can be revisited as tragic atheism. However, in this case it is not God to blame, but nature.
56 This is the hypothesis of Goethe’s Mephistopheles, or that of Blake or Hegel. But if neither God nor nature is to blame, because things work so, why are we so scandalized about Evil?
57 So, the divine permission of Evil can be the way to reach a better Good, or at least to avoid a worse Evil. It can be explained by two possible ways: either by considering pain as a consequence of the finite condition and as a means of self-perfection (since Irenaeus, through Leibniz, to Hitch and Hughes), or by considering pain as a consequence of sin on the basis of the book of Wisdom and the Letter to the
Romans (since Augustine, through Medieval Scholastics, to Neoscholasticism, with different nuances). A third way is refusing simplistic explanations on the basis of the Book of Job (since Pascal or Kierkegaard to Ricoeur). For the first opinion, see John H. Hick, Evil and the God of Love (Basingstoke, 2007); Gerard
J. Hughes, Is God to Blame? The Problem of Evil Revisited (Dublin, 2007). For a general overview of the medieval discussion, see Andrew Pinsent (ed.), The History of Evil in the Medieval Age. 450-1450, ed.
Andrew Pinsent (London, forthcoming in 2018).
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modalities (when we have to do something impossible) makes us open to the gift.58 So, in conclusion, it is difficult to be free: we are creatures and we have to be creative, but not without our creator. In order to learn to be free, we can cross the checkmate and “pass over”. May God give us it.
58 Bonaventure can help us to find the middle point between Irenaeus’ and Augustin’s theodicy.
About the Bonaventurian idea of delay see Andrea Di Maio, “Sacra Scriptura, quae theologia dicitur” in
Deus summe cognoscibilis. L’attualità teologica di San Bonaventura. Atti del Congresso internazionale.
Roma, 15-17 novembre 2017 (in the process of being published by Peeters in 2018).
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