Albania: The role of North-South divisions for the country’s EU integration

Linde-Kee van Stokkum

Master Thesis European Studies – Institutional Integration of Europe

Graduation date: 31 August 2014

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Michael Kemper

Second reader: Dr. Carlos Reijnen

Preface

Albanians live in a land of jagged skylines, towering peaks, precipitous cliffs, windswept plateaus and snow-filled ravines. They don’t call it Albania, but Shqipëria, the Land of the Eagle. They don’t call themselves Albanians, but Shqiptarë, or Sons of the Eagle. Thus they identify with the noblest birds that soars the highest, mates for life, and nest among one-and- a-half-mile-high peaks.1

Usually when I tell people about Albania, most of them struggle to pinpoint this small western Balkan country on the map. As a result, Albania has often been referred to as the ‘last secret of Europe’. What people neither know is the high pro-European sentiment among the Albanian population: EU support in Albania seems to be even higher than in most present EU member states. On 24 June 2014, the EU granted Albania the EU candidate status and became an official EU candidate state. Keeping in mind the pro-European sentiment and the country’s application in 2009 for EU membership, obtaining the status was received as a milestone in the country’s contemporary history. Aspects as Albania’s political history, its political culture and its strong European conciseness wanted to make me write this thesis about Albania, the Land of Eagles. This thesis is a tribute to the country that has a special place in my heart; however, it is also a critical note to its political landscape.

Acknowledgements

I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who supported me during the process of writing my thesis. Special thanks go to Professor Michael Kemper, who has been a very pleasant supervisor. He has been so patient with me from the beginning, when I first asked him to be my supervisor with a completely different subject. I appreciate his wide variety of efforts and supportive and critical guidance. Further, I would like to thank my dear friends and family, who all supported in this thesis process. Special thanks go to my Albanian friends, who became my experts in small uncertainties and interpretations in Albanian language. I am especially grateful to Elga Mitre, who was more than willing to answer all my questions and to share all the information I asked for. A big thanks goes to Jutbina Hoxha, who committed herself in helping where needed and always inspired me with her stories.

Finally, my thanks goes to Assistant Professor Carlos Reijnen, who is willing to serve as a second examiner.

1 Edwin Jacques, The Albanians: An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present (Jefferson 1995): 13.

2

Table of contents

Preface 2

Acknowledgements 2

Table of contents 3

Acronyms and Abbreviations 5

Figure 1: Administrative map of Albania 6

Introduction 7

1. Clan culture in Albania 13 1.1 Clans 13 1.2 Clans in Albania 15 1.2.1 Ghegs 15 1.2.2 Tosks 19 1.2.3 End of clan structure in (North) Albania? 19 1.3 North-South identities 20 1.4 Political networks 24 1.5 Clan structure in political networks 26 1.5.1 Hoxha’s years of government 26 1.5.2 Berisha’s first term of government 28 1.6 Conclusion 29

2. Historical case: Regional rivalry during Hoxha’s years of government 31 (1944 – 1985) 2.1 Foundations of communism in Albania 32 2.2 Regional politics during Hoxha’s years of government 33 2.2.1 Ideological and Cultural Revolution 34 2.2.2 Collectivization 38 2.2.3 Language 39 2.3 Conclusion 40

3. Regional economic differentiation in Albania 41 3.1 Economic differentiation during communism 41 3.2 Contemporary regional economic differentiation 42 3.2.1 RD Index 44 3.2.2 Population 46 3.2.3 Economic activity 48 3.2.4 Employment 50 3.2.5 Social disparities 51 3.3 Conclusion 54

3

4. Political cleavages in Albanian domestic affairs 57 4.1 Elections and political networks 58 4.1.1 Parliamentary elections in 2009 58 4.1.2 Local elections in 2011 62 4.2 Parliament and political networks 64 4.3 The role of political networks in Media & Civil Society 70 4.3.1 Media 70 4.3.2 Civil Society 72 4.4 Public administration 73 4.5 Conclusion 77

5. Albania’s EU integration 79 5.1 EU-Albania relations 81 5.2 Pro-European sentiment 89 5.3 Difficulties 90 5.4 Pros and Cons regarding Albania’s EU membership 92 5.5 Albania’s ability as a future EU member state/ Conclusion 94

Conclusion 97

Appendix 1: Profiles of Major Albanian Media Owners (September 2013) 100

Bibliography 102

4

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACP Albanian Communist Party AIIS Albanian Institute for International Studies ALAR Association of Local Authorities and Regions CEC Central Election Committee CEE Central Eastern Europe DP (A) Democratic Party (of Albania) EC European Commission EU European Union IPA Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance LGU Local Government Unit MP Member of Parliament NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PM Prime Minister PDU Party for Justice and Unity RD Regional Development SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement SAP Stabilization and Association Process SMI Socialist Movement for Integration SP (A) Socialist Party (of Albania) UNDP United Nations Development Program

5

Figure 1: Administrative map of Albania

Source: Political Map of Albania (http://www.europe-atlas.com/albania-map.htm)

6

Introduction

This Master thesis analyzes one of the most characteristic features of contemporary Albania: its perceived division into North and South. I study this division from several perspectives: clan culture and political networks, twentieth-century history, demography and economy, and contemporary domestic affairs. These factors are then taken into consideration for situating Albania on its path towards becoming an EU member. I want to have a look at the simplified perception of North-South division by looking at the following research question:

‘In how far is the Albanian political landscape embedded in historical and cultural North- South divisions, and what effect does this have on Albania's ability to integrate into the EU?’

Albania is relatively unknown, leaving probably many people ignorant about the fact the country is in the middle of its EU integration process. For the reader to get to know Albania a little better, my work start with my encounter of the stereotypes that Albanians have and maintain about each other. In what follows I would like to briefly present these accounts, always asking the reader to keep in mind that they are stereotypes that may or may not have a factual basis. The images that follow, I gathered from numerous conversations with Albanian colleagues and friends during my work in Tiranë.

North as seen by South and vice versa Albania is a small European country, located in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula.2 Over the time, the Albanian people became divided into two groups, the Ghegs and the Tosks. The Ghegs historically inhabited the area North of the Shkumbi River and the Tosks lived in the land South of the river. While the main difference between the Ghegs and the Tosks is linguistic, both regions have experienced history through the influence of different outside forces and institutions, and internal leaders from both groups can be characterized as quite divergent.3 From a historical point of view, the Ghegs and the Tosks are clearly distinguished in economic, social and cultural domains. From personal experience these internal differences are still present in the contemporary Albanian society. Noteworthy, the Shkumbi River is a relative border between North and South: the difference lies in the different representations of the ‘self and the other’, but are strongly related to geography. For instance, the North is perceived as an area inhabited by backward and dirty shepherds, where

2 Klarita Gërxhani & Arthur Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture’, LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, no. 92 (2000): 2. 3 Brandon Doll, ‘The Relationship between de Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies vol. 2, no. 3 (2003): 149.

7 there are no roads and people do not have any contact with the outside, while the South is seen as outside oriented, multilingual and therefore progressive, striving for the development of their country.4 Here, I assume an important relation between these perceptions and the geography of the country. Geographically, North Albania borders peripheral territories of the former Yugoslavia and it consists mainly of highlands. Climatically, it is characterized by a very cold winter and a cool summer. In the opposite, South Albania consists mainly of plains and has a warmer and more stable climate. South Albania, especially the coastal areas, is a popular holiday destination for Albanians and Kosovarians. For these reasons, is has traditionally been easier to economically develop South Albania than North Albania.5 So, in geographical perspective, North Albania is relatively isolated. Characterized by a mountainous terrain, communication has been difficult and still is difficult in these days. For example, there are several areas in North Albania where phone signals are weak or absent, and where internet is not available. So, the isolated position of North Albania is represented in the quite traditional and primitive way many northerner mountaineers still live, keeping alive the traditional prescriptions of the customary laws. In general, the northerners don’t want to contribute to the development of their country; they prefer to keep their traditional way of living. Like I already indicated, North Albania is characterized by low accessibility and poor mobility, except for the coastal areas in Shkodër and Lezhë. Research turned out that the level of periphery is strongly related to fewer investments and maintenance.6 For example, you need about five and a half hours’ by car – preferably a four-wheel drive car – to travel from the capital Tiranë to Valbonë (up in North Albania); a distance of estimated 285 kilometers, taking into account the route from North to South takes 440 kilometers. From my point of view, the low accessibility of North Albania is strongly related to the attitude of Albanians towards North Albania. In general, the literal distance towards North Albania is often less long than the distance people have in mind. For example, according to many Albanians in Tiranë, it is almost seen as impossible to reach places like Valbonë or Thethi up in North Albania during winter time. In their imagination, the idea of a continuous snowfall blocking the roads prevails. In fact, snow only falls now and then. This probably plays a role in the fact that North Albanians are generally labeled as Malok, what means highlander, but in the context of rude and uncouth people, traditional, a little aggressive and not that

4 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers & Bernd Jürgen, Albanian Identities: myth and history (London 2002): 192. 5 Gërxhani & Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics’, 11. 6 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities in Albania, 97, http://www.in.undp.org/content/dam/albania/docs/Regional%20Disparities%20in%20Albania%20- %20Analysis.pdf (accessed 18 April 2014).

8 intelligent. Northerners are associated with criminality, characterized by the image that everybody has a gun and, therefore, there is a constantly danger in the North of being killed. Remarkably, people from Vlorë (South) are also known for their criminal practices in terms of drugs and prostitution. However, it is said that southerners from Vlorë kill each other for less invalid reasons than the northerners do. For example, people say that northerners kill each other for small cases, like scratching somebody’s car. So, northerners are more violent. Thereby, women in North Albanian do not have rights. The idea rules a northern man can have seven wives. Further, northerners are characterized by their ever-present will to lead and to play a leadership role in any undertaking, their excessive pride and noisiness. Throughout history, South Albania has always been more influenced by foreign invaders who brought differences and innovation, which formed the breeding ground of the dynamic intellectual and economic development of this part of the country, hosting the bourgeoisie of Albania. Especially, the interactive relation with southern neighbor Greece – center of the classic civilization – had a progressive influence on this part of Albania. The South was close to big cities where trade dominated – like Thessaloniki – so people had better exchange opportunities in terms of trade and culture. A flourishing economy brought civilization, and partly therefore, Albania’s culture heritage is mainly located in the South. For example, Albanian properties inscribed on the World Heritage List are the southern cities of Berat and Gjirokastër and Butrint. As a result of this foreign interaction, southerners speak traditionally more languages. Later, in 1912, it was also the southern region – Vlorë – where the Albanian independence was declared. Over the time, Albanian history favored the superior feeling of the southern Albanians. Albanians of the South are labeled with several labels, which in itself are related either to the region of origin or particular features, such as being stingy. For instance, people from Lushnjë and Fier are called Laluc, what means small and not brave, they are even afraid of rabbits. The opposite are people from Vlorë, called Labe, what means very proud, especially on themselves: it is considered they have a hole in their chest, because they are always knocking on their chest and say ‘I, I, and I’. People from the Mallakastra and Berat regions are characterized as stubborn people; people from the Laberia region are typified of having the feeling of being a superior race; and people from the Gjirokastër and Korçë regions are very stingy. A saying teaches us, you should never marry a woman from there, because you marry her mother too. Other typical characteristics of the southerners are their multilinguistic skills; they are more emancipated and have an entrepreneurial set.

9

In geographical perspective, North and South Albania are divided by Central Albania, hosting the country’s capital Tiranë. In the context of best accessibility and good mobility, the country’s literal center appears also to be Albania’s economic and political center. So, it appears that the region between North and South falls beyond the traditional North-South division. Though, Central Albania encounters stereotypes as well. Albanians from central Albania are seen by all other regions as villagers, calm and docile, good enforcers, who love consuming raki while creating no hustle.

Religion The North-South division in Albania is also a matter of religion. Throughout history, religions have arrived in Albania with occupying nations. Traditionally, such religions have been mixed up with politics and have always supported the invaders and had been instruments of power over the people, and agents of division amongst them. Since the eleventh century, Albania was divided by two religions – Catholicism and Orthodoxism.7 The Ottoman domination of Albania in the fifteenth century added a new element to the country’s religious identity – Islam.8 Notably, although Albania was split into three religions each hostile to each other, Albanians never fought any religious war.9 During Ottoman rule, the Ottomans failed to control all of Albania. Partly because of geographical conditions, Ottoman power was weak in the northern highland regions. Albanians staged several rebellions, partly in defense of their Christian faith, so Catholicism preserved relatively well in North Albania. However, as result of Ottoman policy of Islamicization, approximately 70% of the Albanian population had converted to the Islam when the Ottomans withdrew in 1912.10 According to Italian statistics from the year 1942, of the total population of Albania at the time, there were 69% Muslims including the Bektashi, 21% Orthodox, and 10% Catholics.11 Almost 70 years later, after religion was officially outlawed in Albania for almost three decades, the 2011 Population and Housing Census of the Albanian Institute for Statistics (INSTAT), demonstrates the Islam still as the largest religion in Albania, representing 56.7% of the population, followed by 10% Catholics and only 6.8% Orthodox. Notably, 13.8% of the

7 Stefanaq Pollo & Arben Puto, The history of Albania – from its origins to the present day (London 1981), 281. 8 D. E. M. Mihas, ‘Religion in Albania’, Modern Believing, nr. 1, vol. 38 (1997): 32. 9 Pollo & Puto, The history of Albania, 281. 10 Edwin Jacques, The Albanians: An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present (Jefferson 1995): 213. 11 Robert Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania (Lanham 2010): 383.

10 interviews preferred not to answer and critics question the reliability of the statistics.12 So, it is generally assumed that approximately 70% of Albanians are of Muslim background, 20% are Orthodox, and the remaining 10% are Catholic.13 Muslims are found throughout the country, while Orthodox are concentrated in the South and Catholics are predominantly found in and around Shkodër in the North.14 Therefore, very general speaking, Catholicism in Albania can be linked to the northern Gheg culture, while the Tosk culture is more conotated to Orthodoxy and Islam. This division is not strict, particularly in many urban centers, which have mixed populations. In general, Albanians are not religious people, especially after the communist regime, during which organized religion was banned and virtually every sign of religious activity was suppressed.15 In general, religious differences in Albania do not constitute a major societal cleavage, mainly because other measures, such as national identity, remains more important than religion.16 Personally, the Albanian national identity raises the following key words: unique (for instance, the Albanian language does not belong to any of the language groups), rich (referring to the Albanian cultural heritage), complicated in the sense of social mentality, chaotic with regard to the general Albanian approach to the law, and tolerant in the sense of religion. Furthermore, I was intrigued by the great traditional Albanian hospitality and the importance and commemoration of national heroes. In accordance, I found an appropriate expression of the poet Dritëro Agolli who described Albania as a country that has produced more heroism than grain.17

In the process of writing this thesis I came to some remarkable conclusions that nuance or challenge the stereotypes of North and South Albania, further elaborated in the following chapters.

Structure All these personal accounts on North-South divisions and characteristics include several factors that this thesis is going to analyze in individual chapters. In chapter 1 I discuss the Albanian clan culture. I started this work with the idea of writing about Albanian clan politics. However, during the research of the term ‘clan’ – anthropological and metaphorical

12 INSTAT, Population and Housing Census 2011, http://www.instat.gov.al/media/177354/main_results__population_and_housing_census_2011.pdf (accessed 21 May 2014). 13 INSTAT, Population and Housing Census 2011. 14 Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania, 383. 15 Ibidem, 383. 16 Mihas, ‘Religion in Albania’, 39. 17 Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania, 11.

11

– I came to a remarkable conclusion that nuances the idea of Albanian clan politics: Based on the anthropologic terminology of the term ‘clan’, it turned out that Albanian politics are not ruled by clans, but by, what I refer to, political networks. This conclusion made the idea of Albanian clan politics irrelevant. Chapter 2 is a case study on regional rivalry during Hoxha’s years of government (1944 – 1985) in order to follow up the existence of the regional political networks in Albanian politics. In chapter 3 I examine the representation of the North-South division in the economic differentiation of the country. In general, politics and economics are strongly interrelated, so I consider the internal political divisions partly reflected in the economic development of Albania. In chapter 4 I focus on the reflection of the North-South division in Albanian domestic affairs, especially on aspects like elections, civil society, media and public administration. Chapter 5 examines EU-Albania relations and the role the EU and EU integration plays in Albania’s political landscape. Finally, the conclusion links the findings back to the research question and analyses the role of the perceived North-South divisions in Albania’s EU enlargement process, with a specific view on Albania’s ability to integrate into the EU.

Literature Each chapter is built upon a different set of research literature. I used international and Albanian statistics/reports, newspapers from Albania, historical literature, personal observations and conversations. There has not been one specific book or piece that guides me through the thesis, though; there is one report (BTI 2012 – Albania Country Report) that comes up in all the chapters. Furthermore, the article of Klarita Gërxhani and Arthur Schram (Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture, 2000) served as an inspiring piece of literature when I started this work, which I later deported for their different point of view.

Project history Before I go into the analysis, I would like to say a few words about the history of this project. My work on this thesis started when I came back from an internship at the Embassy of the Netherlands in Tiranë. I was intrigued by the widespread pro-European sentiment of the Albanians, and was also fascinated by the deeply enrooted ideas of cultural and ‘clan’ divisions that I found in Albania. These perceptions of internal division, rooted in culture and history, seemed to translate directly into the political landscape of Albania, with regions linked to one of the two political mass parties. The internal discord, it seemed, was in direct contradiction to Albania's desire to join the EU.

12

1. Clan culture in Albania

In the west, clan politics are the subject of an academic discussion, but for many populations across broad parts of the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, East and North Africa and Southeast Asia, clan politics are real-world challenges to governance, economic performance, and in some cases, stability.18 Clan divisions continue to animate power relations in a wide array of contexts, and moreover, such kinship-based divisions often lie at the center of politics.19 Several political scientists and international observers agree about the existence of clans in the Albanian political-economic system. For example, the BTI 2012 Albania Country Report interprets the following:

‘Albanians have a strong sense of solidarity based on family and regional or clan loyalties. This form of traditional social capital has been crucial in sustaining networks that share blood or clan links, but undermines the creation of a culture of civic participation and mobilization beyond narrow family or clan networks.’20

So, I started this work with the idea of writing about Albanian clans. However, what precisely can be defined as a clan? And, subsequently, what is an Albanian clan? Some name the traditional Gheg-Tosk division as clans, others position Albanian clans as criminal groups dealing with organized crime.21 And others typify the Gheg tribal sense of community as the Albanian clan system.22 In this chapter, I discuss the term ‘clan’ in an anthropologic way, as well in a metaphoric way. In contrast to my previous assumptions, I argue that Albania’s political-economic system is not ruled by clans, but by what I label as political networks on regional base in which family relations play a role.

1.1 Clans Anthropologists define a clan, briefly, as an informal identity network based on kinship ties. Every group, in which demonstrable common kinship underlies membership, is categorized as the term ‘clan’. However, within anthropology, one differs about whether clans are based

18 Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics (Seattle 2004), 14. 19 Schatz, Modern Clan, 9. 20 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 – Albania Country Report (Gütersloh 2012), 14. 21 Daniela Irrera, ‘The Balkanization of Politics: Crime and Corruption in Albania’, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, nr. 18 (2006): 6. 22 Brandon Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 3, nr. 2(2010): 152.

13 on ethnic relations or the irrelevance of ethnicity and religion of clans. This difference is for example reflected in the work of anthropologists Kathleen Collins and Edward Schatz.

Kathleen Collins studied clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia. She indicates clans as informal identity networks in which kinship or ‘fictive’ kinship forms the binding element among group members i.e. clan members.23 Edward Schatz studied clan politics and the relationship between clans and the modern state, as well as the persistence and transformation of clan politics in Kazakhstan. In opposite to Collins, Schatz emphasizes the ethnic unity of clans.24 Both agree that relations in clans are based on a certain kind of loyalty, favoring the given clan. Klarita Gërxhani– associate professor of Sociology – and Arthur Schram – professor Experimental Economy both linked to the University of Amsterdam – studied the impact of clan culture on the Albanian political-economic situation. According to them, the term ‘clan’ is often used to describe the intermediate position between interest groups – based on common interests – and ethnic or religious groups – based on an ethnic or religious relation. In contrast to Collins and Schatz arguing kinship as binding power, they state that clan members are not necessarily bounded through kinship, but also culture, religion, race and language and political interest are seen as binding powers.25 Notable, it seems they are not aware of the earlier mentioned different conception about ethnicity in the anthropological model.

According to Collins, clans include both elite and nonelite members, at different levels of society and state. Clan elites are those with power, and often with money, who through birth and accomplishment have status and prominence within the clan. Clan elites provide political, social, and economic opportunities to their network and rely on its loyalty and respect to maintain their status. Nonelites are both normatively and rationally bound to them.26 Collins research among interviewees in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, showed that interclan, kin-based patronage and reciprocity enabled individuals to survive periods of economic instability by informally providing access to goods, resources, and jobs.27 Clan members favor each other when it comes to assigning jobs. Usually, clan elites hold high

23 Kathleen Collins, ‘The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia’, Comparative Politics, vol. 35, nr. 2 (2003): 173. 24 Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 26. 25 Klarita Gërxhani & Arthur Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture’, LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, nr. 92 (2000): 7. 26 Collins, ‘The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia’, 174. 27 Ibidem, 186.

14 positioned jobs and, therewith, are able to provide professional opportunities to other clan members. Regularly, clans offer the only employment prospective.28 Notable, clan membership is determined through birth, so clans do not emerge in times of crisis. Next to clan elites and clan members, Gërxhani and Schram also identify a residual group in their classification. Based on their research on voting behavior of people related to different clans in Albania, this residual group can be divided into two groups. The first group includes the people that are less closely related to a clan, but who profit from party policies favoring a given clan. For example, when a certain clan allocates funds to a certain region, many non- clan members benefit as well. Gërxhani and Schram refer to these as ‘partisans’. The second group includes the people who are not related to a clan at all. They are assumed to determine their political position on general economic conditions. Gërxhani and Schram refer to these as ‘non-partisans’.29

1.2 Clans in Albania Thus, according to anthropologists, a clan includes a group based on kinship ties, whether on ethnic base or not, providing collective identity and socioeconomic functions. In the following section, I further elaborate the eventual existence of this type of clan in Albania.

1.2.1 Ghegs Like already mentioned, Albania is roughly divided into two ethnic groups: the Ghegs – with origin in North Albania – and the Tosks – with origin in South Albania. The main difference between the Ghegs is linguistic, represented by divergent dialectal forms of the Albanian language. Next to linguistic differences, the Ghegs distinguish themselves from the Tosks by their traditional social structure, also defined as the kinship model of community. To define the traditional social structure of the Ghegs, I will use the word ‘clan’, although the term ‘tribe’ is a more familiar term in Albanian ethnography. I argue ‘tribe’ as an outdated concept, so ‘clan’ might be more useful, in addition to ‘brotherhoods’ on a lower scale.

Several studies examined the clan configuration typifying the Gheg culture in North Albania; however, it is difficult to determine the exact period when this clan configuration originated. Ian Whitaker mentions that the ‘Berisha clan’ claims to have the longest genealogy, stretching back to 1370.30

28Collins, ‘The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia’, 177. 29 Gërxhani & Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics’, 8. 30 Ian Whitaker, ‘Tribal Structure and National Politics in Albania 1910 – 1950’, History and Social Anthropology (Eastbourne 1968): 254.

15

Traditionally, the Gheg society was divided into numerous groups of people whose whole life was organized in terms of descent and kinship. The Albanian ‘fis’ has been generally treated as brotherhood, clan, tribe and traditional extended family.31 Briefly, the ‘fis’ was a group of people who were distantly related to a common male ancestor or the founder of the ‘fis’; often a fictitious person.32 One makes a distinction between ‘fis i madh’ (large clan) and ‘fis i vogël’ (brotherhood or patrilineage). Kahreman Ulqini outlines this distinction in terms of size. The large clan consisted of more than one hundred households and was found in more than two villages, whereas the smaller clan consisted of five to ten kin-related households, rarely containing as many as fifty households. The other distinction between the ‘fis i madh’ and the ‘fis i vogël’ is related to their ancestors. The founder of a ‘fis i madh’ often appears as mythical ancestor from twelve to eighteen generations ago, while there is a specified genealogical tree leading to the ancestor of a ‘fis i vogël’ whose name is corresponding to the ‘fis i vogël’.33 Each clan had its own territory, in many cases related to the geographical separation of the landscape. Relations between clans were regulated according to a traditional code of customary laws.34 The customary laws and norms of the Gheg social structure was set out in The Code of Lekë Dukagjini, named after Lekë Dukagjini (1410–1481).35 It is unknown whether he compiled the code or simply gave his name to it.36 The household was at the core of the clan system and formed the basic residential and economic component of the entire clan system. An extended household, which could compromise as many as seventy people, was led by the oldest member of the household. The household also consisted of brothers, and included uncles and cousins as well. As the household splintered due to natural growth, the leader of the household still held authority over other houses and this leader eventually became known as the chief elder. The authority of the chief elder was controlled by the clan assembly, comprised all the village elders, whose main responsibility was the administration of justice within the clan system.37 The earliest recorded clan assembly was in the fifteenth century, when Lekë Dukagjini, who codified the traditional customary laws, is said to have legal points with Skënderbeg (the great Albanian

31 Mentor Mustafa & Antonia Young, ‘Feud narratives: contemporary deployments of kanun in Shala Valley, northern Albania’, Anthropological Notebook, XIV/II (2008): 92. 32 Whitaker, ‘Tribal Structure and National Politics in Albania 1910 – 1950’, 254. 33 Mustafa & Young, ‘Feud narratives: contemporary deployments of kanun in Shala Valley, northern Albania’, 92. 34 Ian Whitaker, ‘The Traditional Role of Women in Northern Albanian Society’, Anthropological Quarterly, vol. 54, nr. 3 (1981): 146. 35 Colin Lawson & Douglas Saltmarshe, ‘Security and Economic Transition: Evidence from North Albania’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 52, nr. 1 (2000): 137. 36 Robert Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania (Lanham 2010), 224. 37 Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 151.

16 national hero) himself at a clan assembly of the men of North Albania.38 Some argue that religious affiliations were a matter to be decided in the light of personal advantage and family honor. Religion was seen as less fundamental than honor.39 However, with the exception of Lumë, North Albania represented predominantly catholic clans, or clans which had been catholic.40 Throughout history, Catholicism in North Albania had to endure the Ottoman Islamicization policy, as well the total eradication of religion during communism. Although, Ottoman power and communism traditionally have been weak in North Albania, decreasing consequences for the amount of Catholics among the northerners could not retain.41 Research in the Historical Dictionary of Albania turned out that an estimated 25 kinship groups are mentioned and can be indicated as northern Albanian clans. These kin-groups are related to traditional regions, now indicated as districts. See table 1 for an overview of this research. However, another source shows the existence of 63 kinship groups in 1918 in North Albania. See figure 2 for an overview of this map. Some of these kin-groups extend into territory of what is now known as Montenegro and Kosovo, or what I now consider as Central Albania. It is unclear which of given kin-groups still exist today.

Table 1: Stocktaking of traditional kin-groups in northern Albania according to the contemporary administrative districts.

District Kin-groups, brotherhoods District of Malësia Madhe Boga, Hoti, Kastrati, Kelmend, Shkreli District of Mirditë Mirdita District of Pukë Berisha

District of Tropojë Gashi, Korasniqi, Nikaj – Mërtur

District of Has Has District of Shkodër Drisht, Dushmani, Gjoni, Shalë, Shoshi, Shllaku, Toplana

District of Kukës Lumë District unknown/ not to be determined Bugjoni, Bytiçi, Gimaj, Gjaj, Kiri, Plani42 Source: Historical Dictionary of Albania

38 Whitaker, ‘Tribal Structure and National Politics in Albania 1910 – 1950’, 261. 39Ibidem, 274. 40Ibidem, 260. 41 Janusz Bugajski, Political Parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the post-communist era (New York 2002): 674. 42 Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania, 1 – 501.

17

Figure 2: An overview of the Albanian clans in North Albania in 1918.43

43 Franz Seiner, Ubersicht der Gliederung der albanischen Stämme (Bajraks, Fahnen) im vormals k.u.k.

18

In addition, the social structure of the Ghegs also created a certain dichotomy. One clan automatically opposed another clan. So, with the existence of at least 25 kin-groups, I assume the northern Gheg population must have been highly fragmented.

1.2.2 Tosks Because of the greater geographical accessibility of South Albania, the region was more firm controlled by the Ottomans. Therefore, the traditional Tosk social organization changed from large units of peasant extended families farming cooperatively, to latifundia owned by powerful, to Islam converted landowners. These latifundia were usually confined to the plains, characterizing the landscape in South Albania. Landowners would get peasants into debt, often assisting them during famine, and thus established themselves as feudal patrons of the formerly independent villagers. In this way, the break-up of the collective families did not lead to a proletarianization, but rather to the creation of a feudal society.44 Thus, the clan structure typifies the social structure of the northern Gheg culture, but is not applicable for the southern Tosk social organization.

1.2.3 End of clan structure in (North) Albania? During Hoxha’s years of government (1944 – 1985) forced collectivization led to the break- up of the country’s traditional clan divisions, feudal families and traditional Gheg-Tosk divisions. According to Vickers & Pettifer, extended families are now very rare in Albania, and there is general agreement that it would be very difficult to return to the arrangements they entail. They argue that because of its association with the years of repression under communism, Albanians have developed an aversion to collective life in any form.45 In chapter 2 I further describe the socialization of the Albanian society and the ideological campaign against clans during communism. In this section, I elaborate on the argument of Vickers & Pettifer and examine if clan connections based on kinship still exist in Albania. After the end of the communist regime in Albania in 1992 and the years of social and political disorder that followed, the Albanian state lost control in many parts of the country and customary practices re-emerged, especially among the rural population in North Albania.46 Several scholars mention a resurgence of blood feud and other activities related to

Besatzungsgebiet: Albanien 1918, http://www-gewi.uni-graz.at/seiner/deutsch/stammesgebiete.html (29June 2014). 44 Whitaker, ‘Tribal Structure and National Politics in Albania 1910 – 1950’, 276. 45 Miranda Vickers & James Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity (London 1997): 138. 46 Ayse Betul Celik & Alma Shkreli, ‘An Analysis of Reconciliatory Mediation in Northern Albania: The Role of Customary Mediators’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 62, nr. 6 (2010): 893.

19 the traditional customary laws and norms of the Ghegs in North Albania.47 The traditional customary laws governed social behavior of the Ghegs on aspects of church; the family; marriage; house, livestock, and property; work; transfer of property; the spoken word; honor; damages; the law regarding crimes; judicial law; and exemptions and exceptions. Vengeance for instance, was accepted as the prime instrument for exacting and maintaining justice. This led to a perpetuation of blood feud.48 Statistics show the number of murders in general and blood feud murders in particular, reached a peak in 1997. For example, in the Shkodër district, out of 76 murders in 1997, 32 were blood feuds. Stéphane Voell describes several characteristics reflecting the role of customary laws in North Albania. It appeared traditional family networks were still the most important social network for the northern Albanians in these times. Respect for the head of the household was no longer unrestricted, but he still had an important position and conflicts were mostly mediated out of court.49 With the strengthening of the state apparatus and the increase of security, the number of blood feuds declined significantly in 2006, when out of nine murders, only two were blood feuds.50 However, in contrast, a Sunday Times report of 2008 claims that 12.000 Albanian youths are trapped at home in order to avoid becoming targets of revenge killings.51 Saltmarshe describes the social structure based on kinship in northern Albania as grounded in the ‘nature of embeddedness’.52 From my point of view, this is the result of the strength of the Gheg culture, characterized by the traditional social structure of a clan configuration. Throughout history, many Ghegs remained their traditional clan structure and unwritten laws to help them structure their lives and to foster a sense of security and stability.53 However, in accordance with Vickers & Pettifer, I argue that clan structures in North Albania are not as powerful anymore as in pre-socialist times, however, some elements of the social field of traditional Gheg customary laws still seem to persist.

1.3 North-South identities Next to an anthropological approach, the term ‘clan’ is often used in a metaphorical way. Many authors use the term ‘clan’ to describe the phenomenon of the existence of antagonistic

47 Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 160; Lawson & Saltmarshe, ‘Security and Economic Transition: Evidence from North Albania’, 137. 48 Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania, 223 – 224. 49 Stéphane Voell, North Albanian customary law kanun as a ‘habitus’, On the occasion of the 8th EASA (European Association of Social Anthropologists) Conference at the University of Vienna (2004): 5. 50 Celik & Shkreli, ‘An Analysis of Reconciliatory Mediation in Northern Albania’, 893. 51 Mustafa & Young, ‘Feud narratives: contemporary deployments of kanun in Shala Valley, northern Albania’, 88. 52 Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 160 – 161. 53 Ibidem, 160 – 161.

20

North-South identities in Albania. These regional identities are not based on kinship ties, but grounded on territorial ties and related cultural and linguistic characteristics. Keeping the anthropology in mind, clans in this context can be better defined as regional identities. Albania has three regional identities, which cover North, Central and South Albania. Regional identities have a significant influence in Albania, for example found in party politics, illustrated by the following example. For about two decades, the bus stop in Albania’s capital Tiranë to Tropojë – located in the northern qark Kukës– had been allocated in front of the Democratic Party (DP) headquarters, despite what government was in place. Tropojë is the birthplace of Sali Berisha; former DP leader and Prime Minister (1992 – 1997 en 2005 – 2013). Berisha used to maintain a very close relation with the northern regions, and in opposite, he used to receive a lot of support from his homeland area. In October 2013, the bus station was removed by the Socialist Party-led government and no other place in the city was appointed. Today, the bus drivers are obliged to use a parking area in the suburban of Tiranë, as station for the passengers travelling to Tropojë.54 This measure pretended to improve the security in Tiranë, but was actually just intended to vex the northern Ghegs, traditionally supporting the DP.

Accordingly, I argue that the northern identity is linked to the Democratic Party and the southern identity is linked to the Socialist Party. Traditionally, the central identity tended to attract more towards to South, and thus politically to the SP. Table 2 presents an overview of the correlation between regional identities and political parties. However, in practice is not that black and white as represented in the table. Mainly, because local elections have different factors from national elections. And some cities are more developed than others, no matter if they are located in North or in South Albania. For instance, the city Shkodër is characterized by emancipation and economic development, though; it is located in North Albania. Further, according to the political officer of the Dutch Embassy in Albania, Korçë and Gjirokastër have, despite their geographical position in the South, a slight tendency to swift to the right wing parties (DP).55

54 Conversation with Jutbina Hoxha, Office Administrative Assistant at the Council of Europe in Albania, October 2013. 55 Conversation with Elga Mitre, Political Officer at the Embassy of the Netherlands in Albania, 30 April 2014.

21

Table 2: Overview of Albanian regional identities linked to political parties.

Regional identity: Political party: North – Ghegs Democratic Party South – Tosks Socialist Party Central Socialist Party/Democratic Party

One of the characteristics of regional identities is a distinct voting behavior. I considered the election results per region for the Albanian parliamentarian elections in 2009 and 2013. I classified 12 qarks (similar to regions) from North – Kukës, Shkodër, Lezhë and Dibër – to Central – Durrës, Tiranë and Elbasan – and South – Fier, Berat, Korçë, Gjirokastër and Vlorë. Table 3 presents the election results of the parliamentary elections in 2009 for the DP and the SP. Table 4 presents the election results of the parliamentary elections in 2013 for the DP and the SP.

Table 3: Election results of parliamentary elections 2009.

Region Total Votes for % Seats Votes % Seats number Democratic for of valid Party (DP) Socialist votes Party (=100%) (SP) Kukës 43.733 25.596 58,53% 3 8.774 20,06% 1 Shkodër 116.427 56.515 48,54% 7 34.294 29,46% 4 Lezhë 69.256 30.504 44,05% 4 21.248 30,68% 3 Dibër 69.755 34.230 49,07% 4 21.168 30,35% 2 Durrës 132.669 60.569 45,65% 7 49.252 37,12% 5 Tiranë 379.788 161.332 42,48% 15 162.757 42,85% 15 Elbasan 153.347 67.653 44,12% 7 57.035 37,19% 7 Fier 173.389 55.033 31,74% 6 83.659 48,25% 9 Berat 81.592 21.805 26,72% 3 39.390 48,28% 4 Korçë 133.608 56.303 42,14% 4 58.289 43,63% 6 Gjirokastër 52.037 18.527 35,60% 2 24.037 46,19% 3 Vlorë 106.016 30.310 28,59% 4 47.284 44,60% 6 Note: Turnout was 50.77%. Out of filled ballot papers, 2.99% was invalid.56

The results of the 2009 elections were a victory for DP-led alliance ‘Alliance of Change Coalition’, who won 70 seats with 46.92% of the votes. SP-led alliance ‘Union for Change Coalition’ won 66 seats with 45.34% of the votes.57

56 OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Albania – Parliamentary Elections 28 June 2009, 33, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/albania/38598?download=true (accessed 17 February 2014). 57 OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Albania – Parliamentary Elections 28 June 2009, 33.

22

Table 4: Election results of parliamentary elections 2013

Region Total Votes for % Seats Votes % Seats number Democratic for of valid Party (DP) Socialist votes Party of (=100%) Albania (SP) Kukës 46.814 22.426 47,90% 3 11.385 24,32% 1 Shkodër 122.048 45.799 37,53% 4 37.984 31,12% 4 Lezhë 80.343 31.605 39,34% 4 26.433 32,90% 2

Dibër 74.582 30.137 40,41% 3 25.103 33,66% 2 Durrës 155.031 52.703 34,00% 5 60.833 39,24% 6 Tiranë 451.407 151.472 33,56% 11 198.837 44,05% 16 Elbasan 173.576 46.788 26,96% 4 75.086 43,26% 6 Fier 202.898 44,18% 22,86% 4 89.637 44,18% 9 Berat 91.396 19.022 20,81% 2 42.897 46,94% 4

Korçë 146.159 47.061 32,20% 5 63.584 43,50% 6 Gjirokastër 59.361 13.509 22,76% 1 25.148 42,36% 3 Vlorë 121.161 21.475 17,72% 3 56.481 46,62% 6 Note: Turnout was 53.46%. Out of filled ballot papers, 1.41% was invalid.58

[Source: website of Albanian Central Elections Commission (http://www.cec.org.al/)]

The result of the elections was a victory for SP-led alliance ‘Alliance for a European Albania’ who won 83 seats out of the 140 parliamentary seats with 57.63% of the votes. DP-led alliance ‘Alliance for Employment, Prosperity and Integration’ won 57 seats with 39.46% of the votes.59 However, one should take into consideration that Albania was already governed by a DP-led coalition for the last 8 years and many people voted for the opposite coalition, because of their wish for a change. Thereby, the DP essential coalition partner – Social Movement for Integration (SMI) – changed its partner and formed a coalition with SP.

Since the introduction of political pluralism after the end of communism, Albania formed a two-party (DP and SP) system, well reflected in table 3 and 4. Despite what region, the majority of the votes goes to one of the two dominant parties. Smaller parties have difficulties consolidating their position in the political system and are only able to enter political life when joining forces with one of the two bigger parties.60 The tables show a decrease in popularity of the DP between the two elections, and there with an increase of popularity of

58 OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Albania – Parliamentary Elections 23 June 2013, 32, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/106963?download=true (accessed 17 February 2014). 59 OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Albania – Parliamentary Elections 23 June, 33 – 34. 60 Stiftung, BTI 201, 13.

23 the SP. Where DP won the majority of the votes in 2009, the SP defeated its rival in 2013, after a government period of eight years. The tables demonstrate there is a remarkable difference in voting behavior across regions. Support for the DP is significantly lower in the South than in the North and support for the SP is significant lower in the North than in the South. This supports the notion of a northern identity linked to the DP and a southern identity related to the SP.61 It also reflects the traditional North-South division and the support to its political networks in the election results per region. Traditionally, the North Albania has equalized with anticommunism, the DP and its former leader Sali Berisha. Although, popularity of the DP decreased during the parliamentarian elections of 2013, the DP still received a majority of the votes in the northern qarks. Also during the parliamentarian elections of 2009, the DP received a majority of the votes in the northern regions, as well as in two of the three central regions; Durrës and Elbasan. The same is applicable for South Albania. Traditionally, these regions have been equalized with the former communist regime and the resultant SP. Although, the SP persisted being the opposition party after the parliamentary elections in 2009, the party received a majority of the votes in the southern qarks. The election results in the central regions – Durrës, Tiranë and Elbasan – reflect their middle position. Traditionally, the center tended to incline to the southern network of the SP, what still can be seen in the election results. However, in general, voting behavior in Central Albania depends on a certain degree on the general economic conditions, and therefore is more variable than in North and South Albania.

1.4 Political networks At last, the term ‘clan’ is also used to indicate political networks of loyalty. From 2000 onwards, the Russian-language news media introduced the concept ‘(political) clans’ used exclusively with reference to the political and economic elite and identified either by the name of their most important representative, that is, ‘the Yeltsin family’, or by locality, that is, ‘the Naryn clan’.62 A political network includes a cohesive and loyal group characterized by multidimensional relationships which include belonging to political institutions, associations, family relationships, friendships and businesses.63 In the case of Albania, I assume the existence of two political networks, represented by the two biggest political

61 Gërxhani & Schram, ‘Albanians Political-Economics, 14 – 15. 62 Svetlana Jacquesson, ‘From clan narratives to clan politics’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 31, nr. 3 (2012): 279. 63 Jorge Gil-Mendieta & Samuel Schmidt, ‘The political network in Mexico’, Social Networks, nr. 18 (1996): 357.

24 parties: the Socialist Party (SP) and the Democratic Party (DP). In contrast, the Albanian political networks are not called after their most important representative, but have general political party names.

The existence of these two political networks is for example reflected in Albania’s public administration. When a new government, led by the other political network, takes office, the personnel of the public administration is usually reshuffled to a large extent. Civil servants are dismissed in favor of employees loyal to the new political network. On 23 June 2013, parliamentary elections were held in Albania. After a reign of 8 years, the DP-led government was replaced by a SP-led government. In the first half year of the SP-led reign, a remarkable amount of employees have been dismissed in the public administration. Rumors go that the new SP Prime Minister – Edi Rama – cleaned up the public administration by removing all civil servants loyal to the former government. The following news item can be interpreted as an illustration of these rumors, and, thereby also the role political networks play in the Albanian public administration.

‘On 5 March 2014, a DP parliament member claimed that 5,000 employees have been dismissed by the Rama-Meta government and replaced with party militants. He said that their dismissal was made in violation to the civil servant law, and that 2,706 of them have reported the dismissal to the DP, while another 700 have filed lawsuits with the Administrative Courts.64

Note: The news item was written in the Albanian newspaper ‘Mapo’, which tend to incline to the political camp in power. At the moment, the newspaper works for Lulzim Basha, mayor of Tiranë and leader of the DP. Thereby, the Albanian political climate is characterized by polarization between these two political networks, so reading this news item should be done while taking into consideration the political ties of the newspaper of origin and the resources of the information in the article.65

The news item symbolizes the traditional rotation of employees in state institutions after a change of government. Since the end of communism, most governing parties have viewed state institutions as property that can be distributed to loyal supporters. This practice has prevented any meaningful progress in ensuring a professional and career-based governmental administration that follows the letter of law instead of political leaders.66 For example, after

64 Elton Tahirllari & Marçeza Kotoni, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Halimi: 2,700 reports collected from dismissed public administration officials, 6 March 2014. 65 Conversation with Elga Mitre, Political Officer at the Embassy of the Netherlands in Albania, 11 March 2014. 66 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 24.

25 the parliamentary elections in 2005, a 2006 parliamentary report on administrative reforms disclosed that within one year of the electoral victory almost 50% of public employees were replaced with party partisans, most of whom had insufficient education and/or experience for their respective job positions.67 Another example took place after the DP victory in the 2009 elections: The son-in-law of the Assembly Speaker was appointed in 2010 to a high position within the Albanian embassy in Paris. Various media revealed that the 25-year-old singer apparently lacked any university degree as well as any required or relevant experience for the job.68 In my view, these examples do not necessarily testify the existence of clans – in the anthropological definition of the word – in the Albanian political-economic arena. Here it goes about the loyalty of particular (party) members to their political network. Like earlier mentioned, term clan is often used to indicate political networks of loyalty. Since these ‘political clans’ are not based on kinship, I argue ‘political clans’ as an improper concept. From now on, I will define these ‘political clans’ as political networks.

1.5 Clan structure in political networks Political networks often shows parallel structures with clan structures. In the following chapter, I look into eventual family-based clan structures in the Albanian political networks. In order to find out, I use two small case studies: Hoxha’s years of government (1944 – 1985) and Berisha’s first term of government (1992 – 1997).

1.5.1 Hoxha’s years of government During Hoxha’s years of government, the party establishment of the Communist Party proved to be almost as dynastic as a family power structure. Like Jacques argues, through more than three decades, three of the founding families, with origins in South Albania, predominated the top party functions.69 As most prominent figure, Enver Hoxha headed this so-called communist network. He served as Prime Minister (1944 – 1954), as minister of Foreign Affairs (1946 – 1953), but above all, he resumed the influential post of party’s first secretary of the Albanians Workers Party throughout his career.70 Hoxha’s wife, Nexhmije Hoxha, headed the Central Committee’s Directorate of Education and Culture, including the

67 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 25. 68 Ibidem, 25. 69 Edwin Jacques, The Albanians: An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present (Jefferson 1995): 436. 70 Jacques, The Albanians, 430.

26 prestigious Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies.71 Despite the focus on economic development, education and cultural reforms were important pillars of the socialization of the Albanian society. Mehmet Shehu, the second most powerful man in Albania during the communist regime, was minister of Interior (1948 – 1954) and later served as Prime Minister until his death (1954 – 1981).72 Shehu’s wife, Fiqrete Shehu, became vice-president of the People’s Assembly in 1950, and headed the highest party school, the V.I. Lenin Institute. Shehu’s brother-in-law, General Kadri Hasbiu, succeeded Shehu as minister of Interior, and head of the Security forces and the People’s Police. The third ranking leader – as interpreted by Jacques – Hysni Kapo, served as party secretary and headed the Directorate of Cadres and Organizations, while his wife, Vito Kapo, headed the very influential Union of Albanian Women.73 They all came from the South. Other important figures in communist Albania were General Beqir Balluku and Spiro Koleka, and may also be added to the dynasty of the founding families. Both were active partisans in the Albanian resistance movement against foreign occupation of Albania (1940 – 1944). General Balluku headed the military policy of Hoxha’s government, served as Chief of the Head Command of the Albanian Army (1948 – 1974) , and, till his execution, as minister of Defense (1952 – 1974).74 Spiro Koleka served as vice Prime Minister (various terms between 1949 and 1976), as well as chairman of the State Planning Commission (various terms between 1949 and 1968) and Minister of Industry and Construction (1953 – 1954). It appears the network of founding families in the party establishment was a horizontal network, in which power was not transferred to the next generation. Hoxha had three children: two sons and one daughter. It is known that his daughter, Pranvera Hoxha, is an architect and designed the former Enver Hoxha Museum in Tiranë.75 One of his sons, Sokol Hoxha, had been director of the state-owned Post and Telecommunication Service. According to others, the second son was the director of a development company. Further information of any party and/or regime-related activities of Hoxha’s children is absent in the available documentation. So, especially during the first three decades of Hoxha’s years of government, Hoxha built his own network, rather indicated as a wartime-comrade-based network. This network was composed of motivated freedom fighters against the foreign

71 Jacques, The Albanians, 436. 72 Ibidem, 431. 73 Ibidem, 436. 74 Ibidem, 491. 75 Tony Wheeler, Lonely Planet Badlands: A Tourist on the Axis of Evil (Victoria: 2010): 49–50.

27 occupation with a common socialistic worldview, a strong sense of loyalty and joint war experiences. It turned out that family relations were horizontal in this network.

1.5.2 Berisha’s first term of government The second case study is related to the first term of Berisha’s government. The turbulent early 1990’s were marked by transformation, of which the elections in 1992 were considered as the real start of changes. The first opposition party was established; the Democratic Party, led by Sali Berisha. The DP won the elections in 1992, and a DP government was in office from 1992 – 1997, headed by president Berisha.76

In Albania, it is common knowledge that Berisha’s origins in the North-eastern highland of Tropojë, dictated his approach to politics. Every ministry and institution was employed – Vickers and Pettifer even use the word loaded – with northerners and professed DP loyalists, and their appointment to ministerial office and other positions were accompanied by a vast migration from the North to Tiranë as families sought to capitalize on relations who were now holding high office in the capital. All civil servants were checked to find grounds for dismissing them in favor of DP loyalists or northern clansmen. Competence and merit were displaced by consideration of loyalty77 – which still characterizes the entire Albanian administration system of today. This is for example shown by the case of minister of Defense, Safet Zhulali, previously a teacher in mathematics. After he started his ministerial post in 1993, many of his family members were employed in various state jobs. His brother became dean of Tirana University’s faculty of economics; one of his sisters was secretary to Blerim Cela – head of state control – ; Cela’s sister became Zhulali’s secretary; Zhulali’s other sister was made director of the country’s foremost hotel; his brother-in-law became departmental director in the ministry of Education; the first cousin of Zhulali’s wife was made head of the Secret Service; and Zhulali’s cousin married a DP parliamentarian and party chairman in the Mirditë region.78 The strong profile of Berisha resulted in a sort of personalized rule. Ministers belonged to Berisha’s own group, individuals with little party experience; and most governments initiatives tend to originate from the Prime Minister’s office.79 However, as earlier mentioned, the traditional clan structure of the northern Ghegs was basically extinguished in post-communism. Therefore, I don’t consider Berisha’s northern Gheg administration as an administration characterized by clan politics, but more as

76 Gërxhani & Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics’, 2 – 3. 77 Vickers & Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity, 244. 78 Vickers & Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity, 244 – 245. 79 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 25.

28 an administration where nepotism took place on a large scale. Berisha‘s administration was clearly identified as northern Gheg. According to Vickers and Pettifer, every ministry and governmental institution was loaded with northerners and DP loyalists.80 So, regional identity played an important role, but within Berisha’s administration there are no indications of relations with specific traditional Gheg clans or relations based on kinship or brotherhood.

Studying the two small case studies of Hoxha’s years of government and Berisha’s first term of government, it turned out; Hoxha’s years of government were characterized by a network of the founding families of the People’s Republic of Albania. This network, mainly applicable on the first three decades of the regime, consisted of motivated freedom fighters against Albania’s foreign occupation with a common socialistic worldview, a strong sense of loyalty and joint war experiences. Family relations turned out to be horizontal. It appeared; Berisha’s first term of government included a large scale of nepotism. In Berisha’s administration every ministry and governmental institution had many northerners and professed DP loyalists, and their appointment to ministerial office and other positions was accompanied by a vast migration from North Albania to Tiranë as families sought to capitalize on family members and friends who were now holding high office in the capital.81 However, based on the breakup of the traditional social structure of the northern Gheg culture during communism, there are no indications of kinship-based relations between Berisha’s administration and the northern Gheg clans. However, it still seems too early to make real conclusions.

1.6 Conclusion Several political scientists and international observers agree about the existence of clans in the Albanian political-economic system. However, the term ‘clan’ is used in various contexts. In this chapter, I discussed the term ‘clan’ and Albanian clans. Anthropologists define a clan, briefly, as an informal the identity network based on kinship. The traditional social structure of the Ghegs in North Albania turned out to be based on kinship. In contrast, the social structure of the Tosks in South Albania is not organized according to a clan structure. After the forced collectivization of Hoxha’s communistic regime, traditional clan connections in North Albania seems to be eradicated. However, after the end of the communist regime in Albania in 1992 and the following several years of social and political disorder, several aspects of the traditional Gheg customary practices re-emerged, especially among the rural

80 Vickers & Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity, 244 – 245. 81 Vickers & Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity, 244 – 245.

29 population. Many authors use the term ‘clan’ to identify the traditional North-South, or Gheg-Tosk identities in Albania. However, the Albanian regional identities are not based on kinship ties, so in this context clans can be better defined as regional identities. The term clan is also used to indicate political networks of loyalty. With the help to two cases – Hoxha’s years of government and Berisha’s first term of government – I discussed eventual family-based clan structures in these Albanian political networks. I consider the existence of three regional identities, which cover North, Central and South Albania. Note that this is a rough classification and that the defined regional identities can be classified into smaller identities. It turned out that these regional identities are strongly interrelated with what I label as Albanian political networks. I consider the existence of two political networks, linked to one of the two country’s mass political parties, namely the Democratic Party (DP) and the Socialist Party (SP). The northern identity – reflects the traditional territory of the Ghegs – is strongly interrelated with the political network represented by the DP. The southern identity – reflects the traditional territory of the Tosks – is strongly interrelated with the SP. Traditionally, the central identity tended to attract more towards to South, nowadays it has the grateful task of the middle and serves as a political arena for the two dominating political networks. Table 5 presents a schematic overview of this interrelation.

Table 5: Overview of interrelation between Albanian regional identities and its political networks.

Regional identity: Political network: North – Ghegs Democratic Party South – Tosks Socialist Party Central Socialist Party/ Political arena

So, in the context of the Albanian political-economic system, I argue ‘clan’ as an improper concept. Using the term ‘clan’ is only relevant in the framework of the traditional social structure of the northern Gheg culture. From my point of view, the political-economic system in Albania is ruled by political networks on regional base in which family relations play a role.

30

2. Historical case: Regional rivalry during Hoxha’s years of government (1944 – 1985)

Like earlier explained in the introduction, over the time, the Albanian people became divided into two regional identities, the Ghegs and the Tosks. The first notable division of northern and southern Albania took place in 395 AD when the Roman Empire became divided. The northern districts of Illyria – the former name of what is now known as Albania – were incorporated into the western Empire under the direction of Rome, while southern Illyria came under control of the eastern Empire and Constantinople.82 Briefly summarized, this first notable division developed further throughout Albanian history, in what is now called, the traditional Gheg-Tosk or North-South division. The traditional North-South relations are intensely entangled with the Albanian political climate and have a significant influence in Albania. On the other hand, Albania is ethnically very homogenous: 95% of its inhabitants are ethnic Albanians, descended from the Illyrian and Thracian tribes. Some areas in the South have a Greek population; Greeks are the largest minority in Albania, accounting for almost 2% of the population. There are also Serbs, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Egyptians, and Gypsies, of which the latter are marginalized as an ethnic group.83 It appears that the regional North-South division, represented in a two-party system, reflects the main cleavage in the Albanian society.84

The hard line communist regime under Enver Hoxha (1944 – 1985) sought to create a united and socialist country, with great aspirations to overcome the heritage of regional and religious differences that affected the development of the national independence movement during the time of the Ottoman Empire.85 Although Hoxha’s years of government were officially communist in ideology, I argue that Albanian politics remained dominated by the rivalry between the regional Gheg-Tosk or North-South divisions.86 Like explained in the previous chapter, I will further refer to this traditional North-South division with the terms ‘regional identity’ and ‘political network’.

I would kindly ask the reader to keep in mind the limited availability of historical works about the Albanian history, especially independent literature is scare. In general, the available literature describes the communist movement in a context of a common soul of resistance

82 Brandon Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies vol. 2, no. 3 (2003): 149. 83 Gloria La Cava & Rafaella Y. Nanetti, ‘Albania: Filling the Vulnerability Gap’, World Bank, nr. 460 (2000): 20. 84 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 – Albania Country Report (Gütersloh 2012), 13. 85 Vickers & Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity, 3. 86 Scott B. MacDonald & Andrew Novo, When Small Countries Crash (New Jersey 2011), 106.

31 against occupying forces – first the Italians and later the Nazi’s – but doesn’t discus communism in terms of the traditional North-South differences. Few critical articles argue that Albanian politics remained dominated by the traditional Gheg-Tosk divisions. Both tendencies – historic and critical – need a critical consideration in terms of propagandistic elements and writers backgrounds.

2.1 Foundations of communism in Albania The origins of communism in Albania can be found in the government of Fan Noli (17 June – 24 December 192487). Since the beginning of the 20thcentury, many Tosks, including Noli, emigrated to the west, and historically, the region had a lot of interaction with foreign worldviews.88 This was the background of the people who formed the National Liberation Committee, the organization that first espoused communist ideals in Albania. The Albanian communist movement built on the work of this organization, and formed two significant communist groups, known as the communist group from Shkodër (North) and the communist group from Korçë (South). Regional differences played a role in the early phase of the Albanian communist movement. Although, the northern and southern groups were strongly divided by regional differences, they put aside their regional differences in 1942 in order to fight for the national independence of the Albanian people and for a democratic government of the people in a Fascist-free Albania. Their cooperation resulted in the foundation of the Albanian Communist Party (ACP), launched in November 1941.89 The initial leader of the communist movement in Korçë, Enver Hoxha, became leader of the Albanian Communist Party. Albania slowly became a battlefield in the fight for national liberation. The capitulation of Italy on 8 September 1943 was immediately followed by a German occupation. Gradually, the partisans succeeded in liberating their country, and the liberation of Shkodër on 29 November 1944 sealed the liberation of the whole country. The very first day after its liberation, Albania entered the way to socialism. During the following elections in 1945, the Albanian Democratic Front – former National Liberation Front; Assembly of all anti-fascists, but dominated by the communist – won 93% of the votes. In January 1946, the People’s Republic of Albania was proclaimed, led by Enver Hoxha and his government.90 From 1944 until his death in 1985, Enver Hoxha assumed the position of first secretary of the

87 Edwin Jacques, The Albanians – An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present (Jefferson 1995), 380. 88 Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 157. 89 Stefanaq Pollo & Arben Puto, The history of Albania – from its origins to the present day (London 1981), 229. 90 Pollo & Puto, The history of Albania, 250.

32

Communist Party, which absolutely controlled all the state institutions. This was assured by the interlocking dual structure of the government and the party. Most of the party’s Central Committee members and Political Bureau members also served as cabinet members or other government officers.91 Further, Hoxha hold the position of commander-in-chief of the Albanian armed forces from 1945 to 1985, he served as Prime minister (1944 – 1954) and initially he was also minister of Defense (1944–1953) and minister of Foreign Affairs (1946– 1953).92

2.2 Regional politics during Hoxha’s years of government During the rise of the communist movement in the end of the 1940’s, the two most significant communist groups came from Shkodër in the North and from Korçë in the South.93 Although, traditional North-South rivalries were put aside for a socialist Albania, communism traditionally has been weak in North Albania. In contrast to its popularity in South Albania, the majority of the population in North Albania forcefully resisted communist rule into the late 1940’s.94 And as soon as the Albanian Communist Party started articulating its power, the center of gravity swung southwards in name of one of its main goals: socialization of the society. The two top communist leaders and a disproportionate number of others were southerners, Tosks, and almost exclusively Muslim in origin.95 According to Doll as well as Vickers & Pettifer, the new communist government preached a doctrine that was alien to adherents of the ‘fis’ system in the North, as well they promoted domestic policies that did much to alienate many Gheg in the North.96 So, the idea is that the communist government – under largely control of southern Tosks – favored its own regional identity with certain kind of policies. Regional-based politics lead to an exaggeration of the usual redistributive tendencies. In particular, one gets more extreme redistribution among regions, but also much more extreme inefficient redistribution among supporters.97

The most prominent figure of the communist regime in Albania was Enver Hoxha, leader of the communist group of Korçë, the Albanian Communist Party and later also of the People’s Republic of Albania. Hoxha’s origin is from the South; he was born in Gjirokastër and

91 Jacques, The Albanians, 439 – 441. 92 Robert Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania (Lanham 2010), 194. 93 Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 157. 94 Janusz Bugajski, Political parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the communist era (New York 2002): 676 95 Jacques, The Albanians, 429. 96 Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 158. 97 Klarita Gërxhani & Arthur Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture’, LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, no. 92 (2000): 18.

33 educated in Korçë. He openly sympathized with his southern identity, for example supported by the following citation about the city he was educated: ‘Korçë is my beloved city, because here my social steps crystalized, here as a young man I found the road I was seeking, the road which every noble young man of our people should follow’.98 Next to openly sympathizing with his region of origin, his political, economic and social policies strongly favored his southern identity, families and regions.99 Despite Enver Hoxha's choice of a Shkodër man – Ramiz Alia – as his successor, it is said the northerners were never really trusted by the dictator and as a consequence the region received relatively low levels of investment.100 Also Hoxha’s right-hand man – Mehmet Shehu – came from the Mallakastra region in South Albania.101 As well, a disproportionate number of other leading figures in the Albanian communist movement and high-ranking officials of the Albanian Communist Party were Tosks. Further it is claimed that the majority of the soldiers of the Albanian Liberation Front were Tosks, and an important number of the first members of the ACP were poor workers and peasants of the South Albanian plains.102 Consider, for instance, the research done by Gërxhani and Schram (2000) to the composition of the Political Bureaus – executive committee of political parties – in the communist era, in practice the center of power in the country. In the six Political Bureaus, the members changed every five years; the number of members varied between 15 and 19. Of the 100 members when Hoxha was in power (1956 – 1986), 82 (82%) came from the South and 18 (18%) from Central or North Albania. In contrast, of the 45 members of the Democratic Party government (1992 – 1996), 26 (58%) members came from the South and 19 (42%) from Central or North Albania.103 As communism traditionally was weak in the North, the Democratic Party represented the anti- communist movement. However, the anti-communistic tendency is not represented in the composition of the Political Bureaus.

2.2.1 Ideological and Cultural Revolution Initially, the seized power of the Albanian Communist Party depended on its neighbor Yugoslavia for economic and military aid. Though, due fear for political domination, Albania

98 Jacques, The Albanians, 429. 99 Gërxhani & Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics’, 10. 100 Colin Lawson & Douglas Saltmarshe, ‘Security and Economic Transition: Evidence from North Albania’, 135. 101 Jacques, The Albanians. 430 – 431. 102 Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 158. 103 Gërxhani & Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics’, 10 – 11.

34 broke its ties with Belgrade in 1948, when Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the communist bloc for ideological reasons. Tirana copied the Soviet model of fast-paced industrialization and strict central economic planning and became a loyal ally of Moscow between 1948 till 1955.104 After its breakdown with Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Chinese–Albanian relations started in themid-1950s in the framework of solidarity and friendship between the countries of the communist bloc. When Albanian leadership broke off relations with the Soviet Union in 1955, the People’s Republic of China took the Soviet Union’s place of main trading partner and supplier of economic aid. By 1962, China accounted 65% of Albanian import and 29% of Albanian export. The Cultural Revolution, which began in China in November 1965, was echoed in Albania from 1966 till 1969.105 The traditional rivalry between the Albanian identities was seen as a major obstacle in the creation of a truly communist state. Ignited and inspired by China’s ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’, Hoxha decided to embark his own ‘Ideological and Cultural Revolution’. A new socialist ideology was established to move further along the road to a classless society, eradicating the old conceptions of bourgeois, petit bourgeois, feudal and patriarchal habits.106 I argue that Hoxha’s socialization policy to create a new socialist order was especially focused on the rougher and isolated northern highlands, bringing down the age-old institution of the traditional customary laws and the patriarchal structure in the northern clan structure.107 However, throughout the years, it turned out, Albania imported far more from China than it exported, and due the enormous trade deficit, China gradually stopped its export to Albania in 1978. When Enver Hoxha openly criticized the Chinese leadership and denounced China as antirevolutionary, China withdrew its experts and blocked all further economic and military support to the country. The Chinese-Albanian alliance was officially ended on 29 July 1978.108 After its breakdown with China, Albania remained one of the most isolated countries in the world until the early 1990’s in terms of political and social ties.109 In the context of Hoxha’s Ideological and Cultural Revolution, the communist government promoted certain domestic policies that did much to alienate the traditional social structure of the Gheg culture in North Albania. These argued domestic policies are illustrated by the following selection of national objectives of the new government in 1946 set down to achieve

104 Bugajski, Political parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the communist era, 676 – 677. 105 Elsie, Historical Dictionary, 80 – 81. 106 Pollo &Puto, The history of Albania, 276. 107 Pollo & Puto, The history of Albania, 278. 108 Elsie, Historical Dictionary, 80 – 81. 109 Bugajski, Political parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the communist era, 677.

35 political and economic independence. I found the following national objectives of the communist government in 1946 in the book ‘The Albanians’ of Edwin Jacques.

- Abolish the tribal divisions of the northern mountaineers headed by their tribal chiefs; - Break up the vast holdings of the feudal families and distribute their land among the impoverished peasants; - Do away with the divisive Gheg – Tosk dichotomy as expressed in customs, traditions, dialects and loyalties; - Place absolute control of the management of Albanian affairs in the hands of the state instead of tribal chiefs, family or religious leaders, crushing any person or institution obstructing this centralized control.110 From my point of view, this fragment, interpreted by Jacques, pursues a particularly policy to bring down the age-old institution of the traditional customary laws and the clan structure in North Albania and to equalize the traditional regional divisions, at the expense of the northern clan culture. Another example applies the national combat against the unequal status of women. In the northern Gheg culture, women had a vastly inferior status, being deprived of virtually all male rights and privileges, but also of all male duties.111 As part of the socialization of the Albania society, the communist government launched a women emancipation movement. Socialist reforms took place relatively slow in the distant northern mountain areas, so many peasant women from southern agriculture cooperatives went to work voluntarily for a few months besides their cousins in the mountains, while young girls from the mountain areas came to the southern plains to see their counterpart’s way of life and learn from them.112 The plight of women in the Gheg culture had been well documented, so a national overhaul of traditional system ran clearly opposite to the social structure of the northern Gheg culture.113 However, this also led to some positive results, like the virtual elimination of illiteracy and the elevation of women to legal equality of men.114 Throughout history, former state authorities, whether foreign or not, have always allowed the maintenance of a particular degree of autonomy and individuality in North Albania.115 For example, the Ottoman system allowed some freedom to the northern Gheg clans under its rule, which let the Albanian Ghegs able to keep their own self-administration in exchange for

110 Jacques, The Albanians, 428. 111 Elsie, Historical Dictionary, 223 – 224. 112 Pollo & Puto, The history of Albania, 283. 113 Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 159. 114 Bugajski, Political parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the communist era, 676. 115 Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 157.

36 paying fixed tributes to the Ottoman-appointed lords.116 With Hoxha’s new socialist order, the Ghegs in the northern mountain regions lost their traditional privilege of local self- governance. It even turned completely around: the northerners were re-educated according to southern standards. The Communist Party sent groups of people to the North to teach the northerners how to cook, how to arrange the household, how to raise their children, and even how to sleep in a bed.117 Over the time, the regime continually sought to narrow the very real differences among Albanian society. Ironically, the party establishment of the Communist Party proved to be almost as closely related as the family power structure which it replaced. Through more than three decades, three of the Tosk founding families predominated the top party functions.118

The official prohibition of religion in 1967 highlighted Hoxha’s Cultural Revolution. Since, basically, all Albanians were religious, the abolishment of religious practices affected whole Albania. Despite the wide scope of such measures, the majority was directed against the predominant Ghegs.119 However, already before the Cultural Revolution took shape, persecution of Catholics in Shkodër started. The northern city of Shkodër holds the largest catholic community (10%) in Albania, and historically has had good ties with the west.120 Most native priests and Italian missionaries were imprisoned, and some were put to death after show trials in 1946.121 I consider the approach of banning Catholicism in northern city of Shkodër as another example of Hoxha’s policy alienating many Gheg in the North. It phrases also the belief that the Catholic Church was a tool of the Vatican and therefore under foreign control. The Church was cut off from all ties with Rome and the outside world.122 Because of the link with Rome, Catholic reports reached the west somewhat more than reports from Muslim or Orthodox survivors. Although it appears that Muslims in Albania did not suffer that much as did the Catholics under Hoxha’s regime, nevertheless executions, imprisonment and loss of property targeted Muslims and Orthodox too.123 By May 1967, all remaining religious establishments in Albania had been boarded up, vandalized, demolished or converted to other uses, making Albania the first atheist state in the world.124

116 Vickers &Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity, p. 132 117 Conversation with Elga Mitre, political officer at the Embassy of the Netherlands in Albania. 17 March 2014. 118 Jacques, The Albanians, 436. 119 Isa Blumi, ‘The Roots of Hoxha’s Postwar State’, East European Quarterly, nr. 3 (1997): 386. 120 Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 159 – 160. 121 Elsie, Historical Dictionary, 76. 122 Ibidem, 76. 123 Jacques, The Albanians, 456. 124 Ibidem, 487.

37

In its place, Albanian culture had to replace all religious expression. So, a strong cultural bias was involved in the state building project. Hoxha’s policy of cultural imperialism took on qualities of the Tosk cultural imperialism.125 With regard to civilization and cultural heritage, the policy had the purpose of preserving and restoring Albanians monuments dating from Illyrian times to present. By special decree, classical cities like Durrës, Berat, Krujë and Gjirokastër were declared as Museum cities and placed under protection of the state.126 Notable, these ‘Museum cities’ are all located in Central or South Albania and so could be argued in the domestic policies of Hoxha’s regime that did much to alienate many Ghegs in the North.

2.2.2 Collectivization Agrarian reforms captured an important element of the socialization process of Hoxha’s government. Albanian agriculture was totally collectivized, with the aim to eradicate the traditional land rights system and distribute the land among peasants.127 The collectivization of the agriculture was organized and implemented in three main phases. The first phase was from 1946 till 1954 and covered the coastal and plain villages in Central –and South Albania: 150 cooperatives were created. The second phase took until 1965 and was concentrated on the hilly villages: by 1959, 1.800 cooperatives were created.128 The third phase aimed to bring to a successful conclusion the collectivization of the northern mountain regions which had until than remained. This objective was achieved in three months.129 By 1967, almost all peasants worked on collective farms.130

The communist government increased its improvements in mountain areas, including state funds for improvement of irrigation. Specialists were sent from the towns to the new agriculture co-operatives in the mountains to work there for several years.131 Geographically and climatically, it has traditionally been easier to economically develop the South than the North. Hence, North Albania has always been an economic underdeveloped region. Critics dissent about the efforts of the communist government to change this.132 As Edwin Jacques tell us, several notions of visitors about giant orchards in the southern and central districts of

125 Blumi, ‘The Roots of Hoxha’s Postwar State’, 385. 126 Jacques, The Albanians, 507. 127 Bugajski, Political parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the communist era, 676. 128 Sonila Papathimiu, ‘The demographic and economic development of Albania during and after the decline of Communist regime (1945-2010)’, Treballs de la Societat Catalana de Geografia, nr. 73 (2012): 114. 129 Pollo & Puto, The history of Albania, 280 130 Bugajski, Political parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the communist era, 676. 131 Pollo & Puto, The history of Albania, 280. 132 Gërxhani & Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics’, 11.

38

Berat, Butrint, Tiranë, Ohrid Lake, as well in the northern districts of Tropojë.133 Thus, the development of the land and intensification of the agriculture seems to have taken place anywhere in the country. However, based on the experiences of visitors, it seems economic prosperity dominated in the southern and central regions compared to the northern districts. Based on the same reference of Jacques, industrial development seemed to have been relatively more distributed, huge industrial projects in Kukës, Shkodër (North), Elbasan, Durrës (Central) and Korçë (South).134

2.2.3 Language As part of the socialization of the Albanian society, the regime started the standardization of Albanian language in 1952. From history, two regional dialects persisted – Gheg in the North and Tosk in the South. As Arshi Pipa points out in his ‘The Politics of Language in Socialist Albania’, the Tosks dominated the Ghegs in the Hoxha Political Bureaus with 4.6 to 1, which seems to explain the predominance of Tosk in the standardized Albanian language, thereafter used in official communications.135 The Albanian Writers Union employed Tosk as the only language used in its publications.136 In 1954, an official dictionary was published by the Institute of Science in Tirana.137 To popularize the use of one unified Albanian language, several important works emerged between 1976 and 1980. According to Jacques these works marked the definitive end of an era when the Albanian language was written in two literal variants: Gheg and Tosk.138 National festivals, like annual May concerts in Tirana, similar November concerts in Durrës, Shkodër and Korçë, the Song Festival for children at Shkodër, the Radio-Television Song Festival at Tirana, and the once every five years gigantic national folklore festival at the ancient castle of Gjirokastër,139 took place anywhere in the country. Although, the most important and extensive festival – the national folklore festival – took place in Hoxha’s Gjirokastër. Another part of Hoxha’s socialization of the Albanian society, was combating the high illiteracy in Albania. Besides of introducing a new education system, Tiranë opened the country’s first university in 1957. Since 1957, additional higher institutions were established,

133 Jacques, The Albanians, 533. 134 Ibidem, 529 – 530. 135 Jacques, The Albanians, 471. 136 Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 159. 137 Jacques, The Albanians, 471. 138 Ibidem, 507. 139 Jacques, The Albanians, 552.

39 like the Teacher Training Institute in Shkodër in 1957 and the Physical Training founded in 1958. In 1971 three other higher institutions were added: the Higher Institute of Agriculture in Korçë, and two Teacher Training Institutes in Elbasan and Gjirokastër. Extension course of the university and higher institutions were offered in several cities, such as Berat, Durrës, Elbasan, Gjirokastër, Korçë and Shkodër.140 The above documentation demonstrates that the establishment of higher education institutions was mainly concentrated in the central –and southern part of the country. Although it might not prove Hoxha’s regional policy, it remains remarkable higher education almost lacks in North Albania, and therefore, it can be seen in the framework of Hoxha’s policies favoring South Albania.

2.3 Conclusion In spite of its homogeneous ethnicity, Albania reflects significant regional divisions, whom its main cleavage seems to apply the rivalry between the regional Gheg and Tosk identities. Although Hoxha’s years of government were officially communist in ideology, I have argued that Albanian politics remained dominated by regional identities. Hoxha’s communist government preached a doctrine that was alien to adherents of the ‘fis’ system in the North, as well they promoted domestic policies that did much to alienate many Gheg in the North. Historically, the mountaineers Ghegs maintained its traditional local self-governance, and compared to the southern area, didn’t acquire that much adaptability towards state authority and foreign invaders. Further, shared communist and secular ethos was dominated by southern Tosks, in contrast to the northern era where the majority of the population forcefully resisted communist rule into the late 1940’s. So, the idea is that the communist government – under largely control of the southern Tosks – favored its own regional identity – the Tosks in South Albania – with certain kind of policies.

140 Jacques, The Albanians, 544.

40

3. Regional economic differentiation in Albania

After studying Albania’s perceived North-South divisions in a perspective of clan culture, political networks and twentieth-century history, this chapter studies the perceived North- South division from an economic and demographic perspective. Note that economic divisions in terms of North and South are partly a product of Albanian history. For example, South Albania was relatively close to big cities where trade dominated – like Thessaloniki – so, people had better exchange opportunities in terms of trade and culture, resulting in flourishing economies. Northerners were neither landowners nor business men, but just supplied to be self-sufficient in agriculture terms. Furthermore, the adjustment of the Albanian economy to the Soviet economic theory during half of a decade had a major impact on the Albanian economy, which is still visible today in terms of economic underdevelopment. For this reason, I start with a brief introduction of regional economic differentiation during Albania’s communist period, followed by an analysis of Albania’s current regional economic differentiation. With the term ‘current’ I refer to the period of the last six years.

3.1 Economic differentiation during communism Historically, the main difference in Albanian economic development was between cities and rural communities, given the overwhelming dominance of agriculture; the traditional isolation of the country, especially the rural areas; and the relative marginality of Albanian cities in the context of Europe and the Mediterranean.141 During communism, Albania’s economy was centrally planned. Following the Soviet economic model, the principal objective was to maximize the economic productivity by accelerating the industry and collectivizing the agriculture.142 The collectivization of the agriculture was organized and implemented in three main phases. The first phase took place from 1946 till 1954 and covered the coastal and plain villages in Central –and South Albania: 150 cooperatives were created. The second phase took place until 1965 and was concentrated on the hilly villages: in 1959, 1.800 cooperatives were created. The third phase only lasted two years – from 1965 till 1967 – and covered the mountainous villages of Albania mainly in North Albania.143 A North-South division can be noted looking at the order of the collectivization process. After

141 Gloria La Cava & Rafaella Nanetti (The World Bank), Albania – Filling the Vulnerability Gap (Washington 2000), 10. 142 Sonila Papathimiu, ‘The demographic and economic development of Albania during and after the decline of Communist regime (1945-2010)’, Treballs de la Societat Catalana de Geografia, nr. 73 (2012):114. 143 Papathimiu, ‘The demographic and economic development of Albania during and after the decline of Communist regime (1945-2010)’, 114.

41

Central –and South Albania, North Albania was last in line. It is argued; this uneven order influenced the equal economic development of the country.

Also Michael Kaser argues that the economic policy of the early communist period widened the North–South differential. This because new factories were built in the southern lowlands for ready access by road, but also because in the northern upland zones, agriculture was replaced for cattle farming and hence reducing labor productivity, especially where terracing was involved. This is shown with data for the beginning of the 1970s showing that the least developed districts accounted for 0.5% of industrial production, while the most developed districts produced 80%. Later, new industrial and social investment became more dispersed.144

3.2 Contemporary regional economic differentiation Albania has three levels of government: national, county (qarks) and local (municipalities and communes). Albania’s territory is organized into 12 counties (or qarks) and 373 Local Governmental Unites (LGUs): 65 municipalities and 308 communes. Noteworthy, the Netherlands counted 403 local authorities in January 2014, usually labeled as municipalities.145 Since it is generally perceived that qarks can be considered as an appropriate level of regions, 146 I refer to the Albanian ‘regions’ as ’qarks’. The 12 qarks from North to South are Kukës, Shkodër, Lezhë, Dibër, Durrës, Tiranë, Elbasan, Fier, Berat, Korçë, Gjirokastër, and Vlorë. See figure 1 for an administrative map of Albania. The current division dates from territorial reforms in 2000, which reorganized the country’s administration into 374 local authorities and introduced 12 qarks as the second tier of local government.147 This second level of local government has the function of developing and implementing regional policies in accordance with national policies. However, qarks do not have their own fundamental functions and powers, so their role remains somehow vague.148 Like every other country, Albania shows profound economic differentiation across its qarks, related to disparities between urban and rural areas, but also related to physical conditions

144 Michael Kaser, ‘Economic Continuities in Albania's Turbulent History’, Europe-Asia Studies, nr. 53, vol. 4 (2010): 633. 145 Netherlands Central Office for Statistics, Municipal Division on 1 January 2014, http://www.cbs.nl/nl- NL/menu/methoden/classificaties/overzicht/gemeentelijke-indeling/2014/default.htm (29 June 2014). 146 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities in Albania, 14, http://www.in.undp.org/content/dam/albania/docs/Regional%20Disparities%20in%20Albania%20- %20Analysis.pdf (accessed 18 April 2014). 147 Ericsson, Rudebeck, Sundström & Young, Territorial Reform in Albania, 15. 148 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 15, http://www.al.undp.org/content/dam/albania/docs/misc/Analysis%20of%20the%20Local%20Government%20Si tuation%20in%20Albania,%20Executive%20summary.pdf(accessed 19 June 2014).

42 like altitude and periphery.149 In 2010, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Albania published a report about regional disparities in Albania. In 2013, Albania carried out national elections and the new government initiated a territorial and administrative reform (still in process) reviewing the Local Government Units (LGU’s) from 373 to 49. This territorial reform will also affect the Albanian regions; therefore, UNDP Albania has not conducted other studies vis-à-vis regional disparities for the last two years. In the context of the reforms, the research focus has been mostly in analyzing LGUs efficiency.150 Therefore, there is limited information about regional disparities available.

According to the 2010 UNDP report, regional differentiation in Albania is evident if the extremes are looked at: the most developed qarks of Tiranë followed by Durrës and the least developed (disadvantaged) quarks of Dibër and Kukës. Herein, economic factors and physical and geographical conditions play an important role. For example, more than 60% of the country’s territory is situated over 800m above the sea level; so many settlements are located above 500m, what complicates accessibility and economic development of these areas.151 Tiranë and Durrës are located on core locations and consist of plains. Thereby, Tiranë accomplishes the role of capital and benefits from its accompanying functions.152 Dibër and Kukës are mountainous areas with large structural problems, like the predominance of agriculture, very high levels of poverty and high degrees of depopulation.153 Regional differentiation is for instance reflected in the 2011 INSTAT publication about Albania’s GDP. In 2011, Central Albania contributed with 45.6% to Albania’s total GDP, followed by South Albania with 29.8%, while North Albania contributed with 24.7%. However, INSTAT imputes Durrës as part of North Albania, where I consider Durrës as Central Albanian region. This means that according to my approach, Central Albania’s contribution to Albania’s total GDP was 55% in 2011, compared to 14.6% of North Albania. The lowest share of Albania’s GDP was contributed by Kukës with 2.4 %, followed by Dibër with 3.1%, while the largest share came from the prefecture of Tirana with 36.3%.154

149 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 – Albania Country Report (Gütersloh 2012), 15. 150 Conversation with Jorina Kadare, National Project Officer on CSR at UNDP Albania, 19 June 2014. 151 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 44. 152 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 22. 153 Ibidem, 24 – 25. 154 INSTAT, Gross Domestic Product For Republic of Albania – Statistical Regions Level 1, 2, 3, 2011, 2, http://www.instat.gov.al/media/204367/gdp_by_statistical_regions_level_2__3_year__2011.pdf (accessed 22 June 2014).

43

3.2.1 RD Index As part of their study, UNDP Albania constructed a uniform Regional Disparities (RD) Index to classify the Albanian qarks by evaluating different aspects of development, like spatial development; growth, competitiveness, economic cohesion; social cohesion; sustainable development, access to infrastructure and services; and local finances. Qarks with a RD Index below 75 are considered to be the least developed. Tiranë with RD Index above 125 is considered as outstanding, and most developed. All other qarks with RD Index between 75 and 125 are classified as medium developed, composing not a uniform group, but with many characteristics shared.155 In table 6, I adopt a brief version of this typology giving an overview of the regional economic differentiation in Albania as seen by UNDP Albania.

Table 6: Typology of qarks according to RD Index

Qark (% of Geographical Spatial typology Regional Disparities Albania’s location (RD) index population) 75 = national average Tiranë (25%) Central Metropolitan center Most developed (capital) (151). High concentration of economic activity. Durrës (10%) Central Central core location Medium developed (privileged) (106). Well-developed economic activities (airport and seaport). Vlorë (7%) South Central core location Medium developed – upper rank (94). Exploitation of touristic potential of Ionian coastline. Gjirokastër (3%) South Inland/intermediate Medium developed – location upper rank (101). Agriculture potential and trade links with Greece. Shkodër (8%) North Inland/intermediate Medium developed – location middle rank (92). Moderate economic base. Korçë (8%) South Inland/intermediate Medium developed – location middle rank (83). Moderate economic base.

155UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 130.

44

Elbasan (11%) Central Central core location Medium developed – lower rank (77). Industrial decline. Fier (12%) South Central core location Medium developed – lower rank (75). Industrial decline. Lezhë (5%) North Inland/intermediate Medium developed – location lower rank (75). Weak economic performance. Kukës (2%) North Peripheral location Least developed (73). Extremely weak regional economy, many structural problems. Berat (5%) South Inland/intermediate Least developed (72). location Weak regional economy, large structural problems. Dibër (4%) North Peripheral location Least developed (61). Extremely weak regional economy, many structural problems. Source: UNDP Albania.156

Table 6 shows a remarkable difference between the RD Index of the most developed qark – Tiranë (151) – and the least developed qark – Dibër (61). Related to the population rate, the table presents that qarks with large populations, enjoy better economic performances. The social and economic status of different qarks is also closely related to population distribution and other geographical features, such as altitude and topography of terrain, land use, etc.157 Since almost two-thirds of Albania consists of mountains, the influence of geographic and economic divisions can’t be excluded in analyzing Albania’s regional economic development. For example, farming in mountainous terrain often results in subsidence, which has its affiliated consequences for the scale and efficiency of the agriculture in mountainous areas.158 For instance, one could relate the hard geographical conditions of North Albania to its low share in Albania’s earlier mentioned total GDP of 2011.

156 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 22 – 25. 157 Ibidem, 32. 158 Albana Mustafaraj, Rooting out Poverty, http://www.seda.org.al/NHDR/CH3.pdf ( accessed 22 June 2014).

45

3.2.2. Population After 1990, free movement and settlement was permitted again in Albania. This resulted in massive migration flows from remote and peripheral mountainous areas towards the western coast and central Albania, especially to cities as Tiranë, Durrës and Vlorë. This led to an increased population density and concentration of economic activities in the recipient areas, urbanization, and significant relocation of the workforce, economic resources and investments.159 Especially in Tiranë and Durrës, the former focus on agriculture changed to a focus more on trade and services. Though, the country’s economy still heavily relies on agriculture.

Figure 3 provides a broad-brush illustration of the relationship between the population density and topography. According to the 2011 Census of the Albanian Institute for Statistics (INSTAT), 53.7% of the population now lives in urban areas, compared with 42% in 2001.160 In 2011, about 64% of the urban population or 34% of the total population lived in the 8 largest cities of the country – Tiranë, Durrës, Vlorë, Elbasan, Shkodër, Kamez, Fier and Korçë.161 According to NALAS statistics of 2012, 19% of the population lived in the capital, which is quite a lot compared to the EU-27 (in 2012) average of 7.3%.162

159 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 32. 160 Ericsson, Rudebeck, Sundström & Young, Territorial Reform in Albania, 12 – 13. 161 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 16. 162 Ericsson, Rudebeck, Sundström & Young, Territorial Reform in Albania, 31.

46

Figure 3: Population density in persons per km².

Source: Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania.163

The rise of population density in urban areas goes in line with a general decline of resident population in Albania. Results from the 2011 Census suggest that the population has declined with 8% over the past decade, to 2.831.741 inhabitants, compared to a population of 3.069.275 inhabitants in 2001.164 The population decline can be explained by the continued net emigration abroad, started from 1990. During the inter-censal period 2001-2011, an estimated 500 thousand persons emigrated abroad.165 It appears that the Albanian population is characterized by a quite high fertility. Migration trends within Albania have continued with

163 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 18. 164 INSTAT, Population and Housing Census 2011, 7 http://www.instat.gov.al/media/177354/main_results__population_and_housing_census_2011.pdf (23 June 2014). 165 INSTAT, Population and Housing Census 2011, 7.

47 substantial numbers moving from remote, mountainous areas in the North-East and South- East to urban and coastal areas in the west.166

In accordance with the earlier typology, the northern qarks – Dibër, Kukës, Lezhë and Shkodër – are characterized by small populations and therefore typified as inland or peripheral locations. Here Shkodër is an exception. Traditionally, North Albania has been featured by small populations, though, since the 1990’s the area faces extreme levels of depopulation.167 Out of the national average of respectively 109%, Kukës and Dibër have the lowest population density with 30% and 49%; as well Shkodër is categorized under the national average with 62%. Related to population density, the lowest urbanization in Albania is also noted in North Albania: Dibër (18%), Kukës (23%) and Lezhë (32%).168 Central Albanian qarks Tiranë and Durrës have the highest population density of the country, 434% and 383% of the national average of respectively 109%.169 High urbanization also applies Tiranë (73%), and Durrës (57%). Here, remaining Central qark Elbasan (36%) is an exception.170 The southern qarks can be divided into two categories: the coastline qarks – categorized as central locations – while the remaining qarks are classified as inland locations. This division is also represented in indicators as population, population density and urbanization. For example, Fier (coastline qark in South Albania) ranks third in Albania’s population density (178%), while South Eastern qarks Gjirokastër (32%) and Korçë (63%) have one of the lowest population densities.171 South coastline qark Vlorë (69%) has the second highest urbanization of Albania.172 In total, the southern qarks inhabit 35% of the population, almost double of the northern qarks, though; the southern qarks include around 45% of Albania, while the northern qarks include around 40% of Albania.173

3.2.3 Economic activity Traditionally, South Albania – referring to the qarks Vlorë, Gjirokastër, Korçë, Fier and Berat – was characterized by its flourishing economies. Today, the old Ottoman cities in the Southeast, like Korçë, have lost their privileged positions as economic and political centers to other national centers in the middle and coastal areas of Albania (e.g. Tiranë, Durrës, Vlorë),

166 Ericsson, Rudebeck, Sundström & Young, Territorial Reform in Albania, 12. 167 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 24 – 25. 168 Ibidem, 36. 169 Ibidem, 32. 170 Ibidem, 36. 171 Ibidem, 32. 172 Ibidem, 36. 173 Johan van der Heyden, GeoHive: Global Statistics, Albania, http://www.geohive.com/cntry/albania.aspx(accessed 28 April 2014).

48 which are now orienting towards Europe.174 Indeed, according to the data provided by the Albanian Institute of Statistics about regional GDP in Albania, Tiranë qark is clearly the engine of the total Albanian GDP, generating 36% of the added value nationwide. Other significant qarks are Fier (9.8%); Durrës (9.4%) and Elbasan (9.2%).175 So, it appears Central Albania captures Albania’s economic center and generates more than 57% of the country’s GDP.176 Despite its moderate economic base and relatively high regional GDP, UDNP notes that Elbasan faces relatively large structural problems, including industrial decline and overall weak economic performance.177 Going South, Vlorë and Korçë qarks generate only 6% each of the added value nationwide. GDP per capita at national level for the year 2012 was EUR 3,271. At regional level, the GDP per capita in Tiranë is about 35% higher than the national one (EUR 4,439), followed by Gjirokastër (EUR 3,382) and Durrës (EUR 3,276).178 The lowest GDP is registered in mountainous qarks: in Dibër (36% lower than the national one) and Lezhë (24% lower than the national one).179 The northern qarks of Albania are therefore characterized by a weak economic performance, expressed in structural low performances when it comes to economic development.180 For example, the productivity levels in the least developed qarks – Dibër, Kukës – are about two times lower than in Tiranë.181 Economic activity reflected by GDP p.c. estimates, the northern qarks (4) generate together 15.6% of the Albania’s total GDP (with 19% of the population), while Tiranë alone generates about 36% of the total GDP (with 25% of population).182 Notably, a qark traditionally known as poor, such as Kukës, has the highest GDP per capita compared to Dibër, Lezhë or even Shkodër and Korçë.183 In contrast to aforementioned data, a report about territorial reform in Albania of the international affiliation of the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (ALAR), suggest that regional GDP per capita in 2009 doesn’t show particularly striking disparities between the regions, apart from Tiranë. Regional GDP per capita varies between 19% of the EU average (in purchase power terms) to 41.8% for Tiranë, with an average of 27.6% for the country as a whole.184 Related to this, the five southern qarks generate about 29% of the total GDP, what is almost double of the

174 La Cava & Nanetti, Albania – Filling the Vulnerability Gap, 10. 175 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 17. 176 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 47. 177 Ibidem, 23. 178 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 17. 179 Ibidem, 17. 180 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 22. 181 Ibidem, 22. 182 Ibidem, 47. 183 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 17. 184 Ericsson, Rudebeck, Sundström& Young, Territorial Reform in Albania, 13.

49 northern share of the total GDP. However, the southern qarks generate double of the northern share of the GDP with more than twice of the population of the northern qarks, so in this context no relevant disparities between the northern and southern qarks seems to be present.

According to data provided by the National Registration Centre in Albania, in January 2014 157 thousand businesses were registered in Albania. Geographic concentration of enterprises corresponds to the data on economic development: over half of general enterprises (52%) and large enterprises (56%) operate in the section Tiranë – Durrës, with the highest concentration in Tiranë. Fier and Vlorë rank second by the number of active enterprises, along with over 15% of the total number of enterprises and large enterprises.185 In contrast to the northern qarks, the distribution of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) by qark remains highly concentrated in Tiranë and Durrës with 80% of all active Foreign Enterprises (FE’s) in 2008. FE’s are considered those which are 100% FDI, as well those in which foreign investment represents a part of the total investment. All other qarks are between 13% (Berat, and Dibër; followed by Kukës, 14%) and 39% (Gjirokastër) of the country average (9.8 Foreign Enterprises per 10,000 inhabitants).186 The same applies for Credit to Business, which is highly concentrated in Tiranë: in 2008 the capital city accounted 72% of the total amount of credits. Only Durrës (78%) and Vlorë (67%) were relatively close to the country average, accounting both for 12% of total credits. Extreme cases are Dibër (2% of the country average) and Kukës (6%), followed by Berat (14%). According to UNDP, one of the explanations of such extreme differentiation could be the large crediting activities in Tiranë’s branches of commercial banks even for businesses from other qarks.187

3.2.4 Employment According to statistical classification, about 68% of the Albanian population has a working age (15 – 64 years old)188, and therefore Albanians are one of the youngest populations of the world. According to INSTAT data, the employment rate is at the level of 50.1% of the working age population. The Albanian ministry of State for Local Government states there are no pronounced inequalities regarding employment rates at regional level,189 though, generally, more advanced qarks like Tiranë (with regard to other economic indicators) have high rates of unemployment and long-term unemployment. This is mostly explained by

185 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 17. 186 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 60. 187 Ibidem, 61. 188 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 18. 189 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 18.

50 intensive emigration and internal migration flows, especially from less developed qarks to Tiranë and Durrës.190 According to statistics of UNDP, this even resulted in a shrinkage of registered unemployment figures in terms of regional distribution. Between 2001 and 2008 registered unemployment shrunk with currently 2-3 times in the least economically developed qarks (Dibër, Kukës, Berat, also Lezhë and Shkodër), while doubled in Tiranë.191 The registered unemployment rate is about 13% at national level, but significantly higher in the southern qarks Vlorë (19%) and Fier (16%).192 Distribution of employment by specific actors indicates a higher concentration of employment in urban areas in industry and service as compared to agriculture as the main source of employment in rural areas.193 The structure of the Albanian national economy shows heavy reliance on agriculture. In some qarks, private agriculture provides employment to more than 60% of the workforce, like Berat, Fier, and Kukës.194 Only Tiranë has more than half (57%) of its working population employed in non-agriculture sector, like manufacturing industry, services and construction, followed by Durrës (50%);195 whereas the agriculture sector employs the majority of the employees in rural areas.196

3.2.5 Social disparities From a regional development perspective, I consider regional economic activities strongly related to the geographical element of social disparities. Albania is one of the poorest countries in Europe. In 2012, poverty in Albania increased till 14.3% compared to 12.4% in 2008. Additionally, extreme poverty increased to 2.2% in 2012 compared to 1.2% in 2008. According to the Albanian ministry of State for Local Government, the increase of poverty rates have an urban character. Poverty values in Albania vary between 72% and 168% of the average (max min ratio was 2.3). The ministry speaks about higher poverty rates in the qarks of Durrës, Fier, Kukës, Lezhë and Shkodër than the national average. The qarks of Gjirokastër, Elbasan, Vlorë, Korçë, Berat and Dibër have the lowest poverty rates. Striking, the same report mentions that the qarks of Shkodër, Dibër and Elbasan have the highest average number of households obtaining economic aid.197 Even more remarkably, UNDP claims the exact opposite with the highest poverty level in Dibër (168% of average), followed

190 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 63. 191 Ibidem, 63. 192 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 18. 193 Ibidem, 18. 194 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 63. 195 Ibidem, 63. 196 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 18. 197 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 30.

51 by Kukës (157%), Lezhë (144%), Shkodër (129%), Elbasan (125%), while the lowest poverty level is in Vlorë (72%), Gjirokastër (76%), and more generally the Central and southern qarks, including Tiranë (92%) and Durrës (98%).198 However, poverty in Albania appears to be widespread in rural and mountainous areas, where according to the World Bank Poverty Assessment Program, around 12% of the population lives below the poverty line.199 Insufficient infrastructure and the lack of proper organization of farmers are the main causes for the communes representing mountain areas to have little incomes and a low living standard despite the quality of their products.200 The transferred road infrastructure was and remains severely damaged. Around 45% of the road inventory is under administration of the qarks. Because qarks are no local government units that generate income, it is unclear how the qarks provide maintenance services or investments in the road infrastructure. It turns out that roads distribution is more related to geographic space instead of the economic capacity of its administrative institution, and consequently great disproportionalities are noticed in the inventory.201 For example, Shkodër qark has under its administration around 1,800 km of regional and communal roads; whereas Tiranë qark – with a higher population and greater budget and human and financial capacities – has only 600 km of road under its administration.202 However, local level data of the UNDP report show that while there is higher concentration of ‘poor’ municipalities and communes in the worst performing qarks, poor LGUs can be found in all qarks. In general, the main causes are: overall economic development and structure, job opportunities and related level of income by occupation type, significantly influenced by location and geographical conditions and toa lesser degree by urbanization level.203 In terms of geography, the regional distribution of social services is characterized by their concentration in the central and western qarks of the country. In contrast, the qarks with high poverty rates in East and North Albania remain uncovered. Most of the services are concentrated in large cities, like Tiranë, Durrës, Shkodër, Korçë and Elbasan; whereas there are some cities where these services are lacking at all, such as Delvinë, Përmet, Patos, Ersekë or Krujë.204 For instance, when we are looking to social assistance, its coverage reflects Albania’s general pattern of poverty distribution among qarks. The number of families

198 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 67 – 68. 199 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 15. 200 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 69. 201 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 23. 202 Ibidem, 23. 203 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 69. 204 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 29.

52 getting social assistance per 10,000 populations reveals very high in North Albania. While 71% of families in Kukës qualify for social assistance in 2008, only 3% do in Durrës. Again the situation is worst in the North (Kukës, Dibër, Lezhë and Shkodër) and additionally in Berat.205 The southern qark Berat can be indicated as an overall outstanding exception. As one of the three least developed qarks of Albania, the economic and social statistic scores of Berat match in the line with Dibër and Kukës in North Albania instead of with its fellow southern regions. Another example applies educational services, one of the most important public services with regard to poverty reduction and economic development. According to statistics of UNDP, regional differentiation of enrolment in primary and secondary schools is relatively low, but the absolute numbers of students are decreasing (except in Tiranë).206 In 2010-2011, the percentage of children between 9 and 14 years of age that attended primary education was 83%. Almost half of the students that attended primary school were registered in Tiranë, Durrës, Elbasan, Shkodër and Fier. These districts also have the highest amount of teachers. However, while analyzing these data; one should take into account the general difference between urban and rural areas. In general, rural areas are characterized by a low population density, what results that rural areas have more educational services compared to population density than urban areas. The percentage of children between 15 to 19 years of age that attended secondary school varies from 45 to 75% with an average of 51%. Almost half of the students that attended secondary school were registered in Tiranë, Elbasan, Shkodër and Durrës, which also have the highest amount of teachers.207 Though, regional differentiation of secondary school enrolment is relatively low, the UNDP report notices some extremes. In 2008, the lowest enrolment in secondary schools was in Durrës (48 or 78% of the average), Elbasan (56%) and Lezhë (57%), compared to the highest enrolment in Kukës (88%), Vlorë (87%) and Berat (78%).208 In rural areas, secondary school enrolment is determined by the presence of a secondary school in the community, education level of parents, per capita household consumption, and ownership of cattle. While in urban areas, secondary school enrolment is more related to the educational level of the household head and spouse and the

205 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 81. 206 Ibidem, 81. 207 Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, 32. 208 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 75.

53 age of the child.209 All in all, it appears there is a relatively low regional differentiation with regard to school enrolment. So, no clear North-South division can be indicated.

However, when it comes to incidence of poverty, a significant regional variation is observed between the poorer North and the richer South. In 2008, the poverty level in mountain areas (26.7%) was more than two times higher than in coastal (13%) and central area (10%), and 3 times higher than in Tiranë.210 Tiranë faces the best situation with a low number of people under poverty line and a relatively small amount percentage of families relying on social assistance, high enrolment in secondary school, easy access to the best health care facilities and very low infant mortality rates.211 Referring to the 2008-2009 ADHS, infant mortality is twice as high in rural areas (24 deaths per 1,000 births) as in urban areas. They often are related to poor living conditions and poor access to services.212 North Albania – Kukës, Dibër, Lezhë and Shkodër, and additionally Berat – experiences a high incidence of poverty and wide reliance on social assistance (21% of families in Berat and Lezhë up to 71% in Kukës). Although, due to a decreased total population there is also a relatively good availability of basic education and health facilities, influenced by the geographic conditions.213 In contrast, the lowest poverty level is in Vlorë (72%) and Gjirokastër (76%) and more generally the central and south qarks, including Tirana (92%) and Durres (98%).214 Referring to data of INSTAT, the number of families getting social assistance is significant lower in the southern qarks than in the northern qarks. Though, the southern qarks are characterized by a mixed situation in terms of social cohesion with notable intra-qark disparities along geographic (low land and mountains) and economic (urban and rural) divisions.215

3.3 Conclusion In spite of its small size – in terms of geography and population – and its ethnic homogeneity, Albania reflects profound regional divisions with regard to its economic development. In this chapter, I analyzed Albania’s current regional economic differentiation to see in how far the Albanian economic situation reflects the country’s traditional North-South division.

209 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 75. 210 Ibidem, 67. 211 Ibidem, 81. 212 Ibidem, 78. 213 Ibidem, 81. 214 Ibidem, 67 – 68. 215 Ibidem, 81.

54

During communism, Albania’s economy was centrally planned, what theoretically should have resulted in an equal development of the country. However, as we have seen, reality turned out to be different. When communism ended, the Albanian economy remained poor and underdeveloped. Since the first democratic elections in 1992, Albania transformed from a central planned economy to a free market economy. And, like we have seen, significant disparities in terms of economic development and related social cohesion, turned out to be present. As shown by the GDP p.c., employment, foreign investments, business credit, poverty, educational services, social assistance, etc. Albania has an outstanding economic center composed of Tiranë and Durrës. However, one should take into account Tiranë’s role as Albania’s capital, and the natural capital benefits it enjoys. The principal causes of the largest regional disparities (Tiranë/Durrës versus the rest) relate to the economic structure of regional units, of which the dependency on agriculture and levels of urbanization are the dominant factors. Likewise, economic differentiation between qarks also reflects the difference in the economic potential of the qarks. Important underlying conditions stem primarily from geographic elements: altitude and accessibility, land productivity, population density, and others.216 Further, internal migration from remote and peripheral areas to western and coastal areas, especially to Tiranë and Durrës, plays an important role.217

Reflecting the research question – In how far reflects the Albanian economic differentiation the country’s traditional North-South division? – I found some aspects that could indicate an interrelation between the traditional North-South division and Albania’s regional economic differentiation. However, I came to a remarkable conclusion that nuances the assumed division between North and South. As economic and social center of the country, Tiranë and Durrës clearly overshadow the traditional North-South division. So, in economic terms North-South divisions are a matter of ‘fade glory’ or outdated. Moreover, there appears to be a new division, which can be globally perceived as a West-East, or coastal-mountainous division, labeling the West as economically well-developed compared to a poor developed East. Coastal qarks tend to swift more toward Albania’s economic center of Tiranë and Durrës, while the remaining mountainous qarks stay more behind in terms of economic development and social cohesion. For example, the northern qarks demonstrate a clustering in terms of their overall weak economic development and poor social cohesion. However, the North-coastal qark Shkodër is an exception. The regional capital, also named Shkodër, is one

216 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities, 140. 217 Ibidem, 18.

55 of the larger cities of Albania and is generally perceived as economic well-developed and well-emancipated. This exceptional position do I explain on the basis of the perceived new West-East division. This new division also applies the southern qarks, mixed in terms of economic development and social cohesion along geographic (coastal and mountains) and economic (urban and rural divisions) conditions. For example, the southern mountainous qark Berat belongs together with the northern Kukës and Dibër to the lowest developed qarks.

56

4. Political cleavages in Albanian domestic affairs

Several reports of international observers in Albania, like the European Commission (EC) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), regularly mention the country’s deep political polarization, combative dialogue and endless political bickering between the ruling majority and opposition, that has drawn needed political energy away from key goals and often stalled democratic institution building.218 Political leadership in Albania is divided between the two earlier discussed political networks: the democratic camp – linked to the Democratic Party – and the socialist camp – linked to the Socialist Party – centered on the anti-communist /former communist cleavage. As the BTI 2012 Albania Country Report tells us, these so-called politics of conflict have deepened divisions, not only between political forces, but also between regions, communities and state institutions. Political leaders have fueled these divisions as an effective strategy to strengthen and distinguish their basis of supporters. In the first instance, Democratic Party leaders, mostly from the North, emphasized their anti-communist program which appeals particular to northerners who were especially repressed by the former communist regime, like I explained in chapter 2. The Socialists, whose main leaders come from the South, tend to appeal to the southern regions where the main power base of the former communist Party was centered.219 Further, the Albanian system is profoundly personalized; identification with a party is based less on agenda and ideology than on personal loyalties. The possession of power is mainly an end in itself and serves to enhance the personal profit of those in power. Those who engage with one of the parties, hope to profit from a possible election victory.220

My intention is to have a closer look at how traditional North-South divisions are reflected in Albanian domestic affairs. Note that the internal political division between Albania’s two political networks or mass parties is the result of the country’s traditional North-South divisions. The division between the two camps is based on their cleavage between anti- communism and former communism, which, as we have seen in chapter 2, was mainly along North (anti-communist) and South (pro-communist) lines. So, what remained is the current power struggle between the two political mass parties, highlighted in for example elections, civil society, media and public administration. With some examples of news articles; I demonstrate this power struggle, which, as I have personally experienced, dominates

218 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 – Albania Country Report (Gütersloh 2012): 23. 219 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 27 – 28. 220 Ulrike Stern & Sarah Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road into the European Union’, DGAP Analyze, nr. 11 (2012): 8.

57

Albanian politics. From my point of view, the consequences of these rivaling divisions are mainly destructive for the democratization of the political process and further development of the country.

In what follows I would like to ask the reader to always keep in mind that (Albanian) media resources are not always that objective as we would expect them to be, especially taking into account that politicians use media for political purposes.

4.1 Elections and political networks As I just noted, one considers the Albanian political system as profoundly personalized and dominated by rivalry between the two deep divided political networks. From my point of view, the election process in Albania is a clear excess of this power struggle. In general, election campaigns aim to emphasize the differences among involved stakeholders, however, in Albania emphasizing the difference of the other – the DP or the SP – by the self – the DP or the SP – seems to increase even more than it actually does during election periods.

4.1.1 Parliamentary elections in 2009 Albania, a parliamentary republic, has a unicameral parliament, the National Assembly, which consists of 140 members elected for a four-year term.221 Albanian governments are mostly coalitions, usually composed before the elections take place, referred as pre-electional coalitions. The Albanian political landscape knows two coalitions, always led by one of the two major parties. The current coalition – in office since the parliamentary elections in June 2013 – consists of the Socialist Party (65 seats) and the Socialist Movement of Integration (18 seats). Together they have 84 seats out of the total of 140 seats, and therefore do not need the opposition when it comes to approving laws that require simple majority or qualified majority. The ruling majority only needs the opposition regarding the approval of laws that affect the Albanian constitution. Constitutional amendments require a three-fifths majority. This applies to many of the decisions made on harmonization with EU law.222 Informally, there is a group in the opposition of four or five MP’s from the Party for Justice and Unity (PDU) which are not fully in line with the policy of the opposition. This group tends to choose the side of the ruling majority, and therefore can play a very important role in the three-fifth voting procedure. According to the Albanian constitution, the Assembly is the highest body of state power and exercises oversight over the executive and institutions it

221 Fisnik Korenica& Dren Doli, ‘The 2009 parliamentary election in Albania’, Electoral Studies, nr, 30 (2011): 223. 222 Stern &Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 8.

58 establishes. However, it is not as independent as the highest body of state power is supposed to be. As the European Union mentioned in its 2010 assessment with regard to Albania’s application for EU membership, ‘despite constitutional provisions, there is a lack of effective parliamentary oversight over the executive and parliament does not function as an independent institution’.223 For instance, the Assembly executes presidential appointments, wherefore a consent majority is needed. However, the Assembly’s ruling majority basically votes on political criteria instead of professional criteria. Therefore, the president usually is a member of the ruling political network, while officially, the presidency is supposed to be independent, or not related to one of the two political networks.224 For example, from 2007 till 2012, the presidency was occupied by an ‘independent-minded’ Democratic Party member, Bamir Topi. Notably, the DP was in power from 2005 till 2013, so it was the DP ruling majority that appointed DP colleague Topi. The same applied with Topi’s successor, the current president of Albania since July 2012, Bujar Nishani. At the time of his election, Nishani was a DP Member of Parliament and minister of Interior. The Assembly elected Nishani as President with a simple majority of 73 votes, so without consensus of the SP-led opposition.225 The Albanian judicial organization consists of three levels: general courts, courts of appeal and the High Court. Despite its independence is provided in the constitution and relevant legislation, effective independence of the judiciary is hampered by political interference. Like presidential appointments, the High Court and Constitutional Court members as well as state prosecutors, need simple majority in the Assembly and therefore are exposed to political pressure. Nominees need to have the grace of the ruling majority political network whereby the political preference of the nominees usually corresponds with the ruling majority. This politicization of votes risks jeopardizing the independence of the judiciary.226 Another big threat to the judicial system’s ability to function is corruption. A European Union assessment noted that ‘corruption is prevalent in many areas and is a particularly serious problem’. According to Transparency International’s 2013 ‘Corruption Perception Index’, Albania ranks 116 out of 177.227 The main problem in the fight against corruption is not the lack of quality anti-corruption laws, but rather their implementation – a consequence of weak

223 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 8 – 9. 224 Ibidem, 9. 225 Ibidem, 9. 226 Ibidem, 9. 227 Transparency International, Albania, http://www.transparency.org/country#ALB (accessed 12 July 2014).

59 institutions and inadequate political will.228 Most allegations of high-level corruption that were disclosed by media investigations have not been translated into court cases.229 For example, the case against SMI Chair Ilir Meta, which despite overwhelming evidence, was acquitted of corruption charges by the highest court in January 2012. At that time, Meta was deputy Prime Minister of a government consisting of a coalition between DP and SMI.230 Nowadays, the SMI is again coalition partner, but now of the SP. Meta fulfills the position of Speaker of Parliament.

On 28 June 2009, Albania held its seventh parliamentary election since the fall of communism. This was the first election held after Albania joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) earlier in 2009, placing greater pressure on the country’s political elite to show their willingness and capability to conduct free and fair elections. As usual, the election contest pitted the two main old rival parties, the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, against one other.231 Based on observation reports of the OSCE and the European Commission, the election campaign of these national elections in 2009 took place in a calm but still polarized environment. Strong language was often prevalent during the campaign, characterized by mutual allegations between the two rival parties or political networks. For instance, the SP substantiated that the DP used state events for partisan campaigning and exerted pressure on public sector workers to attend party rallies.232 In the run of the elections, DP coalition partner Human Rights Union Party decided to join the SP-led coalition. Some evidence suggests that many supporters from the ‘Human Rights Union Party’ were dismissed from their jobs after this change of course when it turned out it was the DP that won the elections.233 For its part, the DP accused the SP leadership of being a legacy of Communist rule, and of composing a nepotistic and corrupted governing class at the municipality level of Tiranë. In reaction, the SP claimed that during Berisha’s time in office, the country fell deeply into corruption. They also accused Berisha of being personally corrupt and identified his family as the roots of that corruption.234 As I explained in chapter 2, Sali Berisha has established the Albanian Democratic Party and played a major role in Albania’s political transition after the collapse of communism. Although Berisha passed on his position

228 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 13. 229 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 10. 230 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 13. 231 Korenica & Doli, ‘The 2009 parliamentary election in Albania’, 223. 232 OSCE, Report by the Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania to the OSCE Permanent, 22 October 2009, 2, http://www.osce.org/albania/39917?download=true (accessed 6 May 2014). 233 OSCE, Report by the Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania to the OSCE Permanent, 2. 234 Korenica & Doli, ‘The 2009 parliamentary election in Albania’, 224.

60 of DP Chair to Lulzim Basha in 2013, the former Prime Minister and DP Chair still plays an active role in Albania’s political landscape. In the media he stands out as an avid participant in the combative political dialogue, and he actively uses his Facebook page to compete with the Socialist Party and its leader Edi Rama, not afraid using harsh language.

During the election campaign, many media outlets appeared to show a strong bias in favor of one of the main two political parties to the detriment of all other political parties.235 Most of the media coverage was in line with well-known affiliations, and independent reporting was scarce during the electoral campaign. The 2009 electoral campaign also highlighted the links between parties and businesses.236 After the June 2009 elections, parliamentary work has been overshadowed and obstructed by a political stalemate.237 Shortly after the parliamentary elections, the Socialist Party (SP), which won 65 seats of the 140 seats in parliament, boycotted the Assembly from 1 September 2009 to February 2010.238 The SP accused the government – and the DP in particular – of electoral corruption and called for a recount.239 Like I already mentioned, the approval of all laws that affect the Albanian constitution require a three-fifths majority in the Assembly. This applies to many of the decisions made on harmonization with EU law. The three-fifths majority became unattainable during the SP boycott.240 Consequently, the SP boycott paralyzed the adoption of laws required by the EU.241 And for its part, the DP-led government showed no readiness to compromise on proposals for overcoming the political deadlock by the Socialist Party.242 As a report of the Council of Europe about the functioning of democratic institutions in Albania tells us, ‘internal political struggle and the absence of parliamentary dialogue and recourse to boycotts, especially following election results, is noted as a recurrent problem in Albania which seriously hampers the democratic functioning of the state’s institutions’.243 While Albania is trying to move forward towards EU norms and standards, it seems that internal political struggles obstruct the common

235 OSCE, Report by the Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania to the OSCE Permanent, 2. 236 Korenica & Doli, ‘The 2009 parliamentary election in Albania’, 224. 237 European Commission, Commission Opinion on Albania’s application for membership of the European Union, 11, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/al_rapport_2010_en.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014). 238Adriatik Mema, Democratization in Albania: The OSCE, NATO and the European Union, 86, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524708.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014). 239 Korenica & Doli, ‘The 2009 parliamentary election in Albania’, 226. 240 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 8. 241 Mema, Democratization in Albania, 86. 242 European Commission, Commission Opinion on Albania’s application for membership of the European Union, 11. 243 Council of Europe, The functioning of democratic institutions in Albania, 10, http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2009/20091217_Albania_E.pdf ( accessed 23 June 2014).

61 national goal of progress of the country. Moreover, since the first pluralistic elections in 1992, almost all major elections have been contested by the losing party.244 For example, in the aftermath of its defeat in the elections of 1997, the Democratic Party boycotted the parliament for a certain period of time.245 The problem of Albania’s political stalemate did not go unnoticed by the European Union.246 Like the Commission noted in its Opinion on Albania 's application for EU membership: ‘The political stalemate is damaging the functioning of democracy in Albania and hindering important reforms, which are necessary for the country’s progress on the path towards EU integration and the rule of law’.247 The EU determined that Albania remained far from meeting the integration criteria, and in December 2010 refused to grant candidate status to Albania. Critics maintain that Albania’s democracy is unsustainable if a consensus over the election result, and a credible judicial mechanism to reach such consensus, cannot be found.248

4.1.2 Local elections in 2011 As a result of the controversial vote count of misplaced ballots and contested results in Tirana, the local elections of 8 May 2011, further accentuated the polarization between ruling majority and opposition. The International Election Observation of the OSCE/ODIHR concluded, as in previous elections that ‘the two largest political parties did not discharge their electoral duties in a responsible manner, negatively affecting the administration of the entire processes’.249 The 8 May local government elections took place in a highly politically polarized atmosphere’.250 During the campaign, the International Election Observation noted that some party leaders used harsh language against their opponents, including all of corruption. Opposition parties expressed mistrust in the authorities and the election administration, while governing parties claimed that opposition-nominated election commissioners would obstruct the process.251 There was a large number of violent election- related incidents in several regions, including non-fatal shooting incidents, explosions targeting the property of candidates and parties, beatings and threats, which marred the

244 FRIDE, Democracy Monitoring Report – Albania, 11, http://www.fride.org/download/IP_Albania_ENG_ap10.pdf (26 May 2014). 245 Gabriel Partos, ‘Why Are Albanian Elections so Controversial?’, Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, nr. 1 (2011): 87. 246 Korenica & Doli, ‘The 2009 parliamentary election in Albania’, 226. 247 European Commission, Commission Opinion on Albania’s application for membership of the European Union, 12. 248 Korenica & Doli, ‘The 2009 parliamentary election in Albania’, 226. 249 International Election Observation, Republic of Albania – Local Government Elections 8 May 2011, 1, http://www.osce.org/odihr/77446?download=true (accessed 26 May 2014). 250 International Election Observation, Republic of Albania – Local Government Elections 8 May 2011, 6. 251 Ibidem, 6.

62 campaign environment.252 The OSCE/ODIHR registered a large number of allegations in most regions of the country in which pressure was applied to state employees, including teachers and healthcare workers, as well as students, either to participate in DP campaign events, or to desist from opposition activities. Such pressure included threats of job loss or lower marks for students.253 Election Day was however relatively calm compared to the pre- election campaign.254 The OSCE/ODIHR Observation Mission noted that ‘voting proceeded relatively well, though, significant problems occurred in around 10% of voting centers and counting was delayed in many areas’. In particular, ‘the determination of the results of the Tirana mayoral election became a highly controversial process and the decisions of the Central Election Commission (CEC) were taken along partisan lines, lacked valid motivation and included inconsistencies’.255

Like we have seen, the conduct of elections in Albania remains controversial.256 There appears to be a persistent power struggle between the government and the opposition, which seem to flourish in election periods. Key words are: harsh language, personal accusations, threats, pressure all along partisan lines. The role of the government and the opposition rotate among Albania’s two rival political networks, positioned by the DP and the SP.For example, the DP had led the government coalition government since the 2005 elections. Part of its electoral campaign in anticipation of the parliamentary elections in 2009, the DP stoutly defended its records, pointing out it had taken Albania into NATO, and was on course for further EU integration.257

I have used the examples of the 2009 parliamentary elections and the 2011 local elections, to show the reflection of the regional political networks in Albanian domestic policies, but rivalries and aspects of polarization also apply to other elections. Although, there have been notable improvements in the conduct of voting, mutual mistrust between politicians and political parties remains deep-seated.258 Actually, it appears that the content of both the political campaigns as the political agendas of the political networks seems to be largely based on allegations against the other. Therefore, I see the idea of the ‘self and the other’

252 International Election Observation, Republic of Albania Local Government – Elections 8 May 2011, 6. 253 Ibidem, 7. 254 Ibidem, 10. 255 European Commission, Albania 2011 Progress Report, 7, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/al_rapport_2011_en.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014). 256 Partos, ‘Why Are Albanian Elections so Controversial?’, 92. 257 Korenica & Doli, ‘The 2009 parliamentary election in Albania’, 224. 258 Partos, ‘Why Are Albanian Elections so Controversial?’, 89.

63 reflected in illustration of political networks. The term ‘other’ refers to that what is divergent from what is given, such as a norm, identity or the ‘self’. Power acting in the Albania’s political landscape strongly goes in line with this idea of the self and the other in the sense that both political networks use the other to identify themselves. The DP identifies itself with support of the, according to them, poor governmental performances of the SP. The other way around, the SP uses the poor performance of the DP to build upon its legitimacy. For example, during the meeting of the DP parliamentary group on 9 April 2014, when DP chair Basha blamed the serious crisis affecting the country on what he said ‘were the inept and irresponsible experiments and wrong policies pursued by the ruling majority led by the Rama-Meta duo’.259 By emphasizing the governmental policies as inept, irresponsible and wrong, the DP chair tries to portray his party as the necessary alternative to govern the country. Note that parties seem to be equally culpable; none stands out as solution-oriented.

4.2 Parliament and political networks Like several observing reports have told us, also the parliamentary work in the National Assembly, both on passing legislation and executing oversight, has for years been strongly marked by an often unconstructive political power struggle between the ruling majority and the opposition.260 Despite the Albanian media is part of the political power struggle, which I will discuss later in this chapter, it is also a platform that clearly reflects this strong politics of conflict. With support of some examples of news articles, prepared and translated by the Political and Public Affairs Unit of the OSCE, I demonstrate the polarized interaction between the political networks in the parliament and parliamentary work. It seems the internal rivalry is often given a higher value than solving problems that matter to citizens. Note that a polarized climate is not always per definition deconstructive; parliamentary work is carried out. A follow up follows later in this chapter.

What happens rarely or almost never in the Dutch parliament; the Albanian opposition walks out of parliamentary sessions from time to time. Usually, walking out ceremonies are related to matters set down by the ruling majority which are considered as undemocratic, unfair or unrealistic by the opposition. From my point of view, these ceremonies can be determined as a certain ritual of the opposition to make statements of protest. In most cases the opposition returns in the next parliamentarian session and the political process continues. For instance,

259 Elton Tahirllari & Marçeza Kotoni, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Basha: DP’s return to power necessary to stop Rama-Meta’s inept experiments, 10 April 2014. 260 European Commission, Commission Opinion on Albania’s application for membership of the European Union, 11

64 on 26 March 2014 the DP-led opposition walked out of a hearing in the Parliamentary Legal Affairs Committee, in protest against what they said was ‘an unexpected and non-notified change of the meeting’s agenda, saying that the amendments to the criminal code were on the agenda consensually approved two days ago’. DP MP Oerd Bylykbashi described the agenda’s change ‘as a flagrant breach of the Assembly rules of procedure on the part of the Committee Chair Fatmir Xhafaj (SP)’. He said that ‘it bore evidence to the arrogance of the ruling majority and its disregard of procedures and regulations.’261

The news item demonstrates that political culture in Albania is not conducive and parliamentary work is easily hampered. Thereby, one should take into account that this so- called deconstructive attitude remains active. In order to show disagreement, the Albanian opposition in general considers walking out a session as more fruitful than starting a dialogue, partly because the opposition is not needed in many cases. So, democratic standards and preserving these standards are not always a matter of case, regarding to both the ruling majority as well the opposition. While the opposition accuses the ruling majority of undemocratic behavior disregarding procedures and regulations, such practices as walking out amplifies the existing weakness in parliamentary oversight, and can be neither determined as democratic nor strengthening democratic principles.

Another example took place in mid-May 2014 when the DP (opposition) held a five hour rally in front of the Assembly. They demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Rama, following the crash of a small aircraft in Divjaka suspected of smuggling drugs. The rally was held at the same time with the plenary sitting and DP MPs went in and out of the Assembly while inside debated about policies against drugs trafficking. The media reported an exchange of accusing statements between representatives of the two political networks. Former DP Minister of Interior Flamur Noka that ‘the government (SP-led coalition) crashed along with the plane in Divjaka. The government does not represent Albanians, and that for this reason, PM Rama could not stay in his position as Prime Minister any longer’. DP MP Jorida Tabaku said ‘they (the DP opposition) would not stop until PM Rama resigned, because a government captured by crime did not make sense’. DP MP Gerti Bogdani said ‘Rama tried to lie about the Syrian chemical weapons too, and that is incapable of governing the Albanians’. Also DP chair Basha joined the protest and blamed PM Rama as the main person responsible for the drug trafficking in the country. ‘The opposition would not let the

261 Elton Tahirllari & Marçeza Kotoni, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Opposition walks out of parliamentary committee over sudden agenda change, 27 March 2014.

65 country being governed by a drug cartel’. Meanwhile, in the Assembly, former DP PM Berisha accused PM Rama for ‘being a drug lord and a drug user too’, while Rama invited Berisha and other DP leaders to go to the Prosecutors Office together. According to Berisha, ‘Rama had to realize he was the only PM in Europe who turned his country into a second Columbia. The most important thing was to save Albania from the drug trafficking’. In response, SP MP Erion Braçe said ‘the DP suffered severe amnesia and did not remember the planting, harvesting, processing and sale of the drugs under its governments’. According to SP MP Blendi Klosi, ’the drugs operation of the state could have been even more successful, but the miserable condition in which the DP-led government left the State Police did not allow it.’262

Like the news item shows, there is a very strong culture of partisan politics polarizing stances in parliament. Elements as personal abuses, threat with court proceedings, the link with unrelated issues and past records are commonly used during political debates. This results in highly confrontational and profoundly personalized debates, which often capture unrelated matters. During these debates, harsh language is ruling. The Prime Minister is a popular target of the opposition, As the news item demonstrates, he is often personally abused for the whole social-economic situation of the country, and in this case he is even called ‘a drug lord and drug user’. In response, the government generally attempts to proof the poor performance of the opposition, evidence frequently searched in irrelevant issues.

Moreover, it appears that parliamentary power struggles are not only highly confrontational in verbal sense, but sometimes even turn out in physical clashes. On 27 May 2014, a debate during a meeting of the Parliamentary Legal Affairs Committee ended in a physical clash between DP MP Gent Strazimiri, and SP MPs Xhemal Qefalia, Armando Prenga, and Gentian Bejko. According to an OSCE summary of several articles published in Albanian newspapers, a debate started when the DP MP criticized the poor functioning of the High Court of Justice due to the poor prestige of the SP-led government. High tensions led to the DP MP becoming violent, followed by a fight. As reaction, DP Chair Basha accused PM Rama for ‘ordering the fight between Prenga and Strazimiri’. According to Basha, Rama orders the Socialist MPs to get involved into physical fights to force the opposition MPs not to speak. Basha said ‘Rama has failed in all aspects and that the economic-social situation in the country is beyond his control. The drug cartel controls Albania, but the DP will win over

262 Elton Tahirllari & Marçeza Kotoni, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Assembly meets while DP rally outside, 16 May 2014.

66 the drug trafficking oligarchy and Rama will be held personally responsible’. SP MP Armando Prenga issued an appeal in the evening to his DP colleague Strazimiri to publish the official acts proving that he had been allegedly sentenced by the Italian justice, shedding light into the motive of his earlier physical confrontation with the DP MP. He said he would resign his MP mandate if Strazimiri’s comments proved to be correct.263

Like I already mentioned, one of the elements of the highly confrontational and profoundly personalized debates characterizing parliamentarian landscape in Albania, are the numerous attempts of personal slander. Like can be read in the last paragraph of the above news item, SP MP issued an appeal to his DP colleague publish the official facts he had been sentenced by the Italian justice. So next to the fact he is considered as the instigator of the fight that has taken place, there are also rumors he has been in prison, what, according to the SP MP, increases his violent reputation and therefore demonstrates his incapacity being a good MP. However, keep in mind, it is all personal slander, based on rumors, and above all unrelated to the debate about the functioning of the High Court of Justice.

The antagonistic rivalry between the ruling majority and the opposition is not limited to the parliament. As the BTI 2012 Albania Country Report writes, the central government uses to seek for interventions by diminishing local competences and enacting budget cuts, especially in localities run by the opposition. For example, under the DP-led government (2005 – 2013) the Tiranë municipality, run by the opposition leader Edi Rama (current Prime Minister), had been working without a budget since 2009, because of political maneuvering by the DP majority that controls the city council.264 Since the SP-led government took office in September 2013, the roles seem reversed: It is now the SP-led government that seeks to intervene in the Tiranë municipality, run by the opposition leader Lulzim Basha. A personalized political war seems to take place between the leaders of the country’s political networks, fulfilling the two most important political positions in Albania. SP chair Edi Rama is Prime Minister of Albania and DP chair Lulzim Basha is Tiranë Mayor. Although both are supposed to operate at another level of government – national versus local – they are constantly vying for power, which I partly attribute to the fact that the working field of both chairs mainly captures Tiranë. While the DP chair does everything to slice down the PM, the PM is seeking for interventions to bother the Tiranë Municipality.

263 Elton Tahirllari & Marçeza Kotoni, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Parliamentary Committee meeting ends in scuffles, 28 May 2014. 264 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 12.

67

For example, on 14 March 2014 the OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit reported that the Democratic Party accused Prime Minister Rama for breaking one of its most vocal election promises, namely that no school kids would be used in political events. The DP substantiated that the SP used state events for partisan campaigning. The DP spokesperson said ‘Rama has instructed the directors of the schools – which she claimed are now under Rama’s political control – to request the school kids and students’ mandatory participation in the government’s celebrations of the Summer Day, 14 March’. Summer Day is a national holiday celebrating the end of the winter265 that today identifies the city of Elbasan, known for special cultural traditions.266 Thus, said the DP spokesperson, ‘Rama is violating a government decision declaring tomorrow as a national holiday, and also the Summer Day tradition of students taking a break from school and scholastic activities’. In response, Socialist Party MP Olta Xhaçka dispelled the DP accusations as ‘groundless, saying that no students had been ordered to attend any celebrations’. She said that ‘the ruling majority expected thanks from the opposition, in view of the fact that the government is doing the Tirana municipality’s job by organizing the Summer Day celebrations.’267 The article demonstrates the attacking and accusing attitude of the opposition, constantly trying to trip out the government. According to the opposition, the SP Prime Minister is unreliable (he does not accomplish his promises), inhuman (he uses children for political purposes), and shows dictatorial characteristics (he as PM controls all the schools, while this is supposed to be the responsibility of the ministry of Education). In response, the SP reproaches the municipality of Tiranë – led by a DP mayor and therefore the opposition – of neglecting of its official duties, namely the organising of the Summer Day celebrations. From my point of view, this attitude goes beyond being critical in a natural way. It seems both parties are constantly searching for opportunities to accuse each other. Though, in fact, it ‘just’ goes about the organization of a traditional holiday.

Another example of the power struggle between the SP-led government and the DP-led municipality of Tiranë goes about the extension of the main boulevard in Tiranë. On 20 March 2014, the OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit reported that Deputy Mayor of Tirana Enno Bozdo said ‘only one day after the court decided that the construction works for the new boulevard of Tirana be resumed, Prime Minister Edi Rama blocked them again’.

265 Yamei Wang, Albania celebrates Summer Day Festival, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/culture/2014- 03/15/c_133187406.htm ( accessed 5 July 2014). 266 Wang, Albania celebrates Summer Day Festival. 267 Elton Tahirllari & Marçeza Kotoni, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Ruling majority, opposition clash over Summer Day celebrations, 14 March 2014.

68

According to him, ‘PM Rama is driven by jealousy only, because the new boulevard is currently the only construction site in Albania’. Bozdo said ‘Rama’s only objective is to block Tirana Municipality’s projects, at all costs’. He accused Rama for having previously blocked the Municipality’s budget, then the expropriations for the cemeteries, now the boulevard and for reducing the total income of the Municipality. Tirana’s Prefect Office issued a press release immediately after Bozdo’s statements, explaining that the expropriation fund for the owners affected by the construction of the new boulevard needed to be fully, rather than partially, approved by the Municipal Council in the 2014 budget.268 The article shows the central government seeks for interventions by diminishing local competences and enacting budget cuts in the municipality of Tiranë, run by the opposition leader. Therefore, the competitive relation between the ruling majority and the opposition is also reflected on municipality level. The opposition accuses the PM of deliberately counterworking the municipality of Tiranë (DP), because of personal motives (jealousy). Note that Rama has been mayor of Tiranë from 2000 to 2011. Unofficially, it might be PM Rama doesn’t like the idea that his former city is constructing a showpiece – the extension of the main boulevard is generally regarded as a showpiece– of which the opposition will take the credits. Though, it is interesting why and how the PM is involved in an issue which is officially a local issue. In related news, it turned out that the funds allocated first by the Berisha government for this construction project do not match the amount of money appearing on the municipal budget for the same project, so the municipal budget item should be first corrected.269 Further, the article speaks about an immediate counter reaction of the other party, a fact I consider as typical for the power struggle between the ruling majority and the opposition. Reactions, or accusations, closely alternate each other, reinforced by the phenomenon of social media. Albanian politicians relatively make extensive use of social media channels as Facebook and Twitter, as a platform for political purposes.

However, despite an extreme polarized environment, political decisions are made and carried out. This is because in many cases, the ruling majority doesn’t need the support of the

268 Marçeza Kotoni & Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Municipality, central government clash over extension of Tirana’s boulevard, 20 March 2014. 269 Elton Tahirllari & Marçeza Kotoni, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Tirana Municipality complains over blocking of municipal budget, 27 March 2014.

69 opposition when it comes to decision-making. Under the Albanian constitutional guidelines, a government depends on a parliamentary majority of at least 71 seats (of the 140 seats) in the National Assembly. The government, a coalition of the SP and the SMI (Social Movement for Integration), holds 84 seats, which is a majority. The parliament has three voting procedures: simple majority, qualified majority and three-fifth majority. However, only the laws that affect the Albanian constitution require a three-fifths majority. Unfortunately, this applies to many of the decisions made on harmonization with EU law.270 Personally, I believe this non-necessity of a cross-party consensus in the Albanian parliament doesn’t promote cooperation between the opposition and the ruling majority, and perhaps stimulates their rival relation. However, as the 2013 progress report of the Commission tells us, both opposition (SP) and the ruling majority (DP and SMI) adopted three key measures required for progress on EU integration, namely the Law on the Civil Service, the Law on the High Court and parliament’s rules of procedure, just before the 2013 parliamentary elections.271 In the first instance, this appears to be a contradiction: the Albanian Assembly is dominated a deconstructive power struggle between the ruling majority and the opposition, but new laws are adopted with a party-consensus. Might there be an unidentified conflict resolution strategies taking place behind the scenes? On contrary, according to insider sources, a cross-party consensus is only established under hard pressure from the EU and other conditionality’s. With mediation and lobbying, EU representatives pressure Albania’s political decision-making process. Since the internal power struggle overshadows the political interest for EU integration, it turns out that the EU is often a decisive factor in Albania’s reforming process.

4.3 The role of political networks in Media & Civil Society The political cleavage between the socialist and democratic camp not only affects Albania’s political system; it also pulls along media channels and civil society institutions, and therefore influences the independence of these institutions.272

4.3.1 Media Albania’s legal framework guarantees freedom of expression and organization of mass media. Provisions in the criminal code that outline prison sentences for defamation remain in force, but they have not been applied in recent years. In fact, the media landscape is widely

270 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 8. 271 European Commission, Albania 2013 Progress Report, 5. 272 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 11.

70 varied, with each political party having its own media mouthpiece. As the BTI 2012 Albania Country Report tells us, this plurality of media outlets has increased the watchdog role of the media, especially regarding government policies and wrongdoings. A number of cases of political corruption were first unveiled by a media investigation.273 Yet, the media feels political pressure. The government has used several measures, from policies to economic threats, to harass critical media outlets and affect the editorial line. As is written, in 2010, both Vizion Plus and Top Channel were forced to change new directors reportedly after direct political pressure.274 Therewithal, many media outlets count on financial sources that have a political agenda in order to survive. This has created a climate in which, in order to remain viable, many media outlets are reliant upon sources of funding that promote particular economic or political agendas.275 In consequence, almost all important radio and print media outlets are close to either the political network of the Democratic Party or the political network of the Socialist Party, resulting in a polarized media landscape representing the interests of one or the other political network. Media power is fully integrated in Albania’s politics of conflict; it is even claimed that independent news coverage practically never occurs.276 Especially during electoral campaigning, both broadcast and print media are traditionally largely divided along political lines.277 For example, TV Klan (founded in 1997), one of the two country’s private TV stations, has been DP-oriented since the 2005 general elections. Aleksandër Frangaj, who together with his wife owns 80% of the shares, has been very close to Sali Berisha (former Prime Minister and former DP leader) during the past eight years. He established ABC News – a news TV, formally owned by his relatives – right before the 2011 local elections to serve the DP campaign.278 Public radio is entirely under the influence of the government. Local personnel, as well as employees of the state news agency, are mostly replaced after a change of government. And it appears the government pressures private media outlets that do not conform with their reporting, for example through the introduction of new taxes or the cancellation of rental contracts.279 Problematic is also the triangular relations between politicians, the media and business leaders, whereas the media is interchangeably used for both political and business interests. Lack of transparency of media ownership and media financing exacerbate the problem. In the 2010 Commission’s Opinion

273 Stiftung, BTI 2012 , 8. 274 Ibidem, 8 275 FRIDE, Democracy Monitoring Report – Albania, 17. 276 Stern &Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 11. 277 International Election Observation, Republic of Albania – Local Government Elections 8 May 2011, 10. 278 Appendix 1: Profiles of Major Albanian Media Owners (September 2013). 279 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 11.

71 about Albania, it was stated that ‘political influence over the media and their use as propaganda tools by political parties or influential businessman create conditions for biased reporting and self-censorship of journalists’.280 See appendix 1 for the total overview of the major Albanian media owners.

4.3.2 Civil Society The Albanian legal code ensures freedom of assembly and association. NGO’s can freely register, manage their affairs and address matters of public debate without state interference. However, the country’s weak civic traditions and the lack funds, count for a generally weak capacity of civil action in Albania’s political process.281 There is a lack of formal mechanisms as well as a lack of political will to utilize the expertise civil society institutions are generating.282

Mainly as a survival strategy, Albanian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are almost forced to focus on political alliances. Especially since 2009, when the availability of foreign funds in Albania started shrinking, the need of NGO’s to focus on political alliances to survive in an environment where parties need NGO’s to increase political support and legitimacy while NGO’s need political parties for financial support has increased.283 According to civil society representatives who have criticized its awarding process, the Albanian government discriminates against organizations that are critical of the government in terms of fund allocation.284 As the BTI 2012 Albania Country Report tell us, that details on NGO’s that receive state funds, disclosed on the state agency’s website, shows that the groups are mostly insignificant organizations known for their closeness with the government.285 Thus, it seems the allocation of the state fund for civil society organizations goes via political lines, and therefore, political divisions are also reflected in civil society. Indirectly, the Albanian government allocates funds to NGO’s that support them, and the specific allocation depends on which political network in in government. As a result, NGOs are largely divided between supporters of either the government or the opposition. And NGOs that seek to refrain from this conflict lack a broad public platform.

280 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 8. 281 Ibidem, 7. 282 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 12. 283 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 28. 284 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 12. 285 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 8

72

As Stern & Wohlfeld write, civil society influence develops if you play along, in its turn strongly related to the position you have.286 Most leaders and board members of civil society have implicit and sometimes explicit affiliations with political parties. For example, many members of one of the largest NGO’s in Albania ‘Mjaft Movement’, are affiliated with the SP. Mjaft’s founder and former leader, Erion Velia – member of the Socialist Party – started as minister of Social Welfare and Youth in the SP-led government in September 2013.287 Out of Mjaft Movement evolved Veliaj’s political movement ‘G99’ (Group 99). In the 2009 parliament elections the G99 movement was closely associated with the Socialist Party.288 So, it seems Albanian civil society can be considered as a lengthening or arms of the country’s political parties. Moreover, it appears there is a lot of overlap between staff in politics and civil society. For many, a career in civil society is a springboard for political office. In turn, former politicians often find jobs in civil society organizations. Moreover, distinguished civil society leaders were included in the main party’s list in the parliamentary elections of 2005 and 2009.289

Both media and civil society turned out to be involved in the power struggle of Albania’s two political networks. The Albanian media is largely part-political and prone to take sides in the ongoing political power struggle between the SP and the DP – either overtly or covertly – and Albanian civil society is divided as well, only a very few organizations are truly independent.290 So, it seems that the antagonistic environment in the Albanian political landscape negatively influences the independence of its interlacing partners, like civil society and media, and determines them as marionettes of political alliances in order to survive.

4.4 Public administration State building and particularly public administration reforms often have been distinguished as one of the most problematic areas of the post-communist transition in Albania.291 The Copenhagen Council Meeting in 1993, which first defined criteria for EU enlargement, did not include clear references to the administrative criterion of applicant countries.292 Though,

286 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 11. 287 Erjona Rusi, The slow path to building civil society in Albania, http://euobserver.com/news/123272 ( accessed 26 May 2014). 288 Robert Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania (Lanham 2010): 308. 289 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 11. 290 Ibidem, 16. 291 Arolda Elbasani, ‘EU Enlargement and State Institutions after Communism – Reforming Public Administration in Albania’, L'Europe en Formation, nr. 3 ( 2008): 16. 292 Elbasani, ‘EU Enlargement and State Institutions after Communism’, 6.

73 in its Agenda 2000, the Commission’s outlined a criterion of ‘general administrative capacity’ for assessing a country’s eligibility to membership.293

The first anti-communist opposition party and the winner of the first competitive elections in Albania, the Democratic Party, came to power in March 1992. The DP cleaned the previous administration from those who had served during the communist regime since they were perceived as bearers of the communist system, and therefore not suitable for any kind of cooperation.294 So, during the DP’s first term in power 1992-1996, the state institutions were filled with political activists, solely on the basis of political criteria. This was largely facilitated by the lack of a proper legal framework to protect public employees.295 Consequently, the political directors in various state institutions insisted on taking advantage of the legal loopholes as well as the ample political discretion they allowed to push forward political appointments.296 ` Since 1996, when the first civil service law was adopted, successive Albanian governments did several attempts to reform the country’s public administration. When Albania submitted its first formal application for EU membership in 2009, the Commission outlined 12 key priorities as identified in the 2010 Opinion on the Country’s European Union Membership Application – conditions that Albania still has to meet before it can be accepted as an EU member.297 Public administration reform still was a matter of issue, identified as one of the key priorities of the Opinion.298 Though, it was already one of the areas under consideration when the EU proceeded with the opening, negotiation and conclusion of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA),299 as I will discuss more extensively in the next chapter, the reform of the public administration became an urgently needed reform after the outlining of the 12 key priorities.

Like I already introduced in chapter 1, the Albanian public administration is another case reflecting Albania’s politicized internal divisions. This is very well reflected in changes of government when public authority personnel undergo sweeping replacements.300 Each

293 Elbasani, ‘EU Enlargement and State Institutions after Communism’, 7. 294 Ibidem, 18. 295 Ibidem, 19. 296 Ibidem, 20. 297 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 3. 298 European Commission, Albania 2013 Progress Report, 7, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/brochures/albania_2013.pdf ( accessed18 February 2014). 299 Elbasani, ‘EU Enlargement and State Institutions after Communism’, 35. 300 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 8.

74 incoming party tends to place in administration its own supporters.301 Therefore, most positions in public administration institutions at all levels, are filled with anti-communist northerners when the DP is in power and with southerners when the SP controls the majority. The party’s strong clientelistic strategies in state employment have furthered existing regional divisions and cleavages302 and thus rob public agencies of important experience and expertise.303 The existing position-based career system has provided the possibility to make ‘undesired’ civil servants redundant through of restructuring the ministries by incoming new ministers.304 For example, after the parliamentarian elections in summer 2005, a new party turnover took place. Although there are no official data, nonofficial figures regarding dismissals and politically motivated replacements abound. The opposition sources assert that within the first months of the new DP government 4.500 public employees, of which 1.300 from central administration, 30% from fiscal institutions, and the rest employees at different levels of administration were fired.305

Despite the adoption of the new Civil Service Law in May 2013, seen as a major step towards de-politicizing public administration by of the European Commission,306 Albania’s public administration is still routinely staffed on the basis of politics rather than professional criteria.307 The Law became effective on 26 February 2014 and its secondary legislation was adopted in time for its entry into force on 1 April 2014.308 It aims to create a consistent legal framework comprising state administration, independent institutions and local government units.309 As more often in the Albanian legal framework, its implementation remains challenging. For example, the new Civil Servant Law became active almost six months after the new government took office. Rumors go that SP Prime Minister Rama and his relatives first restructured the public institutions according to SP preferences, before they let the new Law become active. These issues of dismissals from the public administration created another political tension between the ruling majority and the opposition, for example reflected in the public hunger strike that took place in Tiranë in the end of May 2014. On 21 May 2014, a

301 Elbasani, ‘EU Enlargement and State Institutions after Communism’, 17 . 302 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 27 – 28. 303 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 8. 304 European Commission, Commission Opinion on Albania 's application for membership of the European Union, 15. 305 Elbasani, ‘EU Enlargement and State Institutions after Communism’, 29. 306 European Commission, Albania Progress Report 2013, 7. 307 Elbasani, ‘EU Enlargement and State Institutions after Communism’, 2. 308 European Commission, Report on Albania’s Progress in the Fight Against Corruption and Organized Crime and in the Judicial Reform, 3, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/al_report_june_2014.pdf ( accessed 23 June 2014). 309 European Commission, Albania Progress Report 2013, 7.

75 dozen of dismissed public administration officials started a hunger strike in protest against what they said were their unjust firings by the Rama government. They also sought to be reinstated in their previous jobs. The strikers were fully and openly supported by the opposition, accompanied by a number of DP MP’s and visits of DP chair Basha.310 The hunger strike ended on 4 June 2014, as was said because of the involvement of EU Commissioner Stefan Füle who visited the country to announce the Commission’s decision to the Albanian government, which suggested the candidate status for Albania. During the joint press release with the Prime Minister, Füle especially addressed the strikers. He promised that his office would follow the issue of the strikers closely and raise it regularly with the government.311 Despite the strike took place close to the Prime Minister’s office, the little attention the government paid to the strike, was in stark contrast with the attention the opposition paid to the strike. According to the media, PM Rama did not even visit the strikers once.312 The way the strike was used by the opposition to blame the government, and especially PM Rama, of their mismanagement and poor and undemocratic performance, typifies the usual way of communication of blaming and shaming between the government and the opposition. Furthermore, it reflects the earlier mentioned decisive role for EU in Albania in enforcing or pressuring political progress, since it was EU Commissioner for EU Enlargement, Stefan Füle, who in fact ended the hunger strike. Finally, the motivation of the strikers could indicate there has taken place a certain kind of restructuring of the public administration along the governmental political network when the new SP-led government took office in September 2013. However, the fact that the strike was supported (or even organized) by the opposition, can serve as discrediting this indication.

So, it appears that the introduction of EU enlargement instruments has not succeeded yet to break down patterns of instability and politicization, which undermine the whole reform across the Albanian administration.313 One can thus argue that the relevant domestic actors have not been really enticed to give up their short term interests of replacing in administration their own supporters.

310 Elton Tahirllari & Marçeza Kotoni, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Dismissed public administration officials go on hunger strike , 22 May 2014. 311 Elton Tahirllari & Marçeza Kotoni, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Hunger strike of dismissed public administration officials ends on 15th day, 5 June 2014. 312 Elton Tahirllari & Marçeza Kotoni, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Hunger strike of dismissed public administration officials enters 7th day, 27 May 2014. 313 Elbasani, ‘EU Enlargement and State Institutions after Communism’,39.

76

4.5. Conclusion In this chapter I had a closer look at how traditional North-South divisions are reflected in Albanian domestic affairs. I came to the conclusion that the perceived traditional North-South divisions can only be related to Albanian domestic politics, if I link the regional political networks to one of the two mass political parties. From my point of view, the struggle for power between the two mass political parties – the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party – reflects Albania’s traditional North-South divisions as I have discussed in the previous chapters. This power struggle is the main cause for internal political divisions in the country’s political landscape. When political pluralism was introduced after the communist regime ended, both parties were established along North-South lines, related to the anti-communist vs. former communist cleavage. More than two decades later, it seems that time has decreased the sharp edges of the traditional North-South division. This can for example be seen in the swift of regional economic disparities from a traditional North-South division towards a current West-East division. What remains today, is the combative and competitive power struggle between the two rivaling parties, wherefore Central Albania functions as a stage. Of course, the traditional North-South division did not totally disappear yet; there are still certain regions of where the majority of its population traditionally supports a specific political party.

Speaking about internal divisions, the election process is a good example of reflecting the struggle for power between the two mass parties. Especially the election campaign is a very important competition, since the outcome determines who will be the ruling political network of the coming four years. Since cross-party consensus is rare in the Albanian political landscape, the opposition fulfills a small and irrelevant role, what also affects all associated networks, institutions, persons and regions. Therefore, the two political networks try as hard as possible to blame each other as much as possible, to identify themselves as the better version of the other. Comments and accusations are rarely accompanied by alternatives or solutions. Also the Albanian parliament is a popular venue to execute the power struggle between the two political networks. Highly confrontational and profoundly personalized debates are characterized by elements as personal abuses, threats, personal slander, blaming, insulting, harsh language, irrelevance and irresponsibility. For example, when the European Council postponed its decision about granting Albania the candidate status in December 2013, the DP immediately blamed the government for the Council’s decision, where it was the SP Prime Minister that responded with: ‘The memory of the previous government is still

77 fresh, with its numerous laws and lack of implementation, particularly concerning organized crime and corruption’.314 This longstanding political stalemate hampers parliamentary work and the necessary constructive and sustained political dialogue. Further, this power struggle in parliament affect the relation between central government and localities, especially those run by opposition. For example, under the DP-led government (2005 – 2013) the Tiranë municipality, run by the opposition leader Edi Rama (current Prime Minister), had been working without a budget since 2009, because of political maneuvering by the DP majority that controls the city council. Despite their freedom is legally guaranteed, civil society and media function as extended arms of the two mass parties, or political networks. Albania’s public administration is another domain where I consider the country’s internal divisions. Although, reforms are increasing its independency, the public administration clearly reflects the political network in power. For example, after changes of government, each incoming party tends to place in administration its own supporters

However, at the same time, ideological differences between the DP and SP are small. EU integration heads the official agendas of both parties.315 Like is stated in the media on 4 June 2014, both the majority and the opposition agreed at the Parliamentary Commission of Integration, saying that Albania needs the EU candidate status.316 Yet, rivalry between the two political networks is also reflected in the country’s EU integration process. So, in the following chapter I further analyze this role, followed by a conclusion if Albanian politics are a solid base for EU membership.

314 Marjola Rukaj, Observatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Albanian rejected, resoundingly, http://boafnelb3.balcanicaucaso.org/bhs/Regions-and-countries/Albania/Albania-rejected-resoundingly-146368 (accessed 6 May 2014). 315 Stern &Wohlfeld, Albania’s Long Road, 8. 316Anonymous, Albanian Daily News, Majority and Opposition Together for EU Integration, 4 June 2014, p. 3.

78

5. Albania’s EU integration

Shortly after the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), EU integration became a matter of interest. For Albania, the EU offers substantial geopolitical, sociocultural and economic benefits.317 Today, Albania and its neighboring western Balkan countries are at the center of the EU’s enlargement process.318 However, while Albania’s EU is a political priority, as well a matter of national interest, it also characterizes the main challenge of the country. In the early 1990s, Albania was the last of the CEE states to end its communist regime. As a result of massive requests for changes, democratic reforms, like the introduction of political pluralism and a free market economy, began in 1990. However, in general the 1992 parliamentary elections are considered as the real start of changes, because this is when the communists had to transfer power to the opposition.319 The transition has proven difficulties as successive governments have tried to deal with high unemployment, widespread corruption and a dilapidated infrastructure.320 Especially, the principle of democracy is a challenge for Albania, seen in the fact that more than two decades after the transition from communism, democracy in Albania remains fragile.321 Most international reports and critics attribute these problems to Albania’s entrenched political infighting and immature political class.322 For example, all five Conditionality Reports issued by the European Commission on Albania in between 1997 and 2000 referred to an almost identical description for the political climate in the country: ‘Political and parliamentary life in Albania remains dominated by extreme bipolarization and confrontation between the political parties’.323 The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission briefly considered the 23 June parliamentary elections ‘as competitive with active citizen participation throughout the campaign and genuine respect for fundamental freedoms. However, the atmosphere of distrust between the two main political forces tainted the electoral environment and challenged the administration

317 John O'Brennan & Esmeralda Gassie, ‘From Stabilization to Consolidation: Albanian State Capacity and Adaptation to European Union Rules’. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, vol. 11, nr. 1 (2009): 29. 318 Adriatik Mema, Democratization in Albania: The OSCE, NATO and the European Union, 69 – 70, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524708.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014). 319 Klarita Gërxhani & Arthur Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture’, LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, nr. 92 (2000): 2. 320 Arjan Vasjari, ‘The Democratic Impact of European Integration: Case Study of Albania’, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, nr. 6, vol. 4 (2013): 223. 321 FRIDE, Democracy Monitoring Report – Albania, 4, file:///C:/Users/6128130/Downloads/IP_Albania_ENG_ap10.pdf(accessed 26 May 2014). 322 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 – Albania Country Report (Gütersloh 2012): 17. 323 Gjergji Vurmo, Relations of Albania with the EU, 60, http://idmalbania.org/sites/default/files/publications/albania_eu_relations_vurmo.pdf (accessed 2 June 2014).

79 of the entire electoral process’.324 In accordance with the OSCE/ODIHR Mission in Albania, the Commission however held that ‘the overall elections marked tangible progress with respect to previous practice, therefore meeting the key priority on the conduct of elections’.325 It can be concluded that the smooth conduct of the 2013 elections reflects the progress Albania has made during the years of its democratization process. However, today, the two main political forces remain to play a significant role in Albania’s political landscape. Since the introduction of political pluralism, the deep political cleavage between Albania’s two political forces, or political networks, is represented by the two major parties – the Democratic Party (DP) and the Socialist Party (SP) – and the strong personal feud between their leaders, who are currently Lulzim Basha (DP) and Edi Rama (SP). This political stalemate makes a constructive political dialogue between the parties and therefore any speedy progress to implement the necessary reforms to meet EU standards very difficult. Hurdles to EU membership that still need to be overcome, include the lack of rule of law, rampant organized crime and corruption, and an economy that is hardly able to compete with those of present EU members.326 Political dynamics show there is a huge gap between declared commitment to pursue reforms required of the EU accession process and their implementation in practice.327 Despite EU integration tops the official agenda of both political networks, concrete measures to achieve this integration is often blocked due their extreme polarization.328 Causes for this strong polarization can be found in the political culture in Albania – which historically has no experience in democracy.329 This lack of democratic experience appears to be in stark contrast with the values and norms of the EU that are related to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, protection of minorities and a market economy.330 My intention is to have a closer look at the deeply divided Albanian political landscape, in order to establish whether Albania is able to integrate in the EU. How can a country with almost no experience in democracy become a member of a Union that is basically founded on the principle of democracy? I first study EU-Albanian relations in a historical and

324 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Parliamentary Elections 23 June 2013, 1, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/106963?download=true (accessed 19 February 2014). 325 European Commission, Albania 2013 Progress Report, 5, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/brochures/albania_2013.pdf (accessed 18 February 2014). 326 Ulrike Stern & Sarah Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road into the European Union’, DGAPanalyze, nr. 11 (2012): 3. 327 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 17. 328 Stern & Wohlfeld, Albania’s Long Road, 8. 329 Stern & Wohlfeld, Albania’s Long Road, 3. 330 Vasjari, ‘The Democratic Impact of European Integration:’, 223,

80 contemporary perspective, further I discuss the strong pro-European sentiment among Albanians, followed by a brief paragraph about the difficulties of the integration process and motivations for Albania to become an EU member state. I end with analyzing the effect of Albania’s internal political divisions on the country’s ability to integrate into the European Union. In what follows, I would kindly ask the reader to always keep in mind that my personal observations are framed by a student from the Netherlands who only spent five months in Albania. Remarks on Albania’s political system, its democratization process, reforms and other related issues, are based on a comparison with the Dutch political system. My personal background might sometimes result in a different perspective than that of the European Commission. Note that the European Delegation in Albania is well-equipped and trained to monitor the Albanian EU integration process. Further note that EU enlargement is part of the Commission’s proceedings, and therefore the Commission has a certain interest in the EU integration of Albania. This difference in perspective might partly explain the different tones (positive vs. negative or critical) that the reader will find in the chapter that follows.

5.1 EU-Albania relations EU-Albania relations started as early as in 1991, when the country’s communist regime collapsed and its transition towards an institutional infrastructure for democratic governance started. Albania was adopted in the EU PHARE assistance program, and receiving funds through the PHARE program helped the country facilitate and support domestic transition efforts.331After the pyramid crisis in 1997, as a result of the dramatic rise and collapse of several huge financial pyramid schemes, international intervention in Albania intensified.332 In June 2003, during the Thessaloniki Summit, the Stabilization and Association Process was confirmed as the EU policy for the western Balkan countries, Albania included: ‘Countries participating in the SAP are eligible for EU accession and may join the EU once they are ready’.333 Following the opening of the negotiations with the European Commission on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), Albania established the Ministry of European Integration in 2004 to coordinate its efforts to join the European Union.334 Two

331 European Commission, Albania – A future with Europe, 4, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/seerecon/albania/documents/albania_future_with_europe.pdf (accessed 12 July 2014). 332 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 29. 333 EU Info Centre/Albania, Important Facts, http://euinfocentre.al/content.aspx?id=5&idd=23 (accessed 11 February 2014). 334 Vurmo, Relations of Albania with the EU, 6.

81 years later, in June 2006, the SAA between Albania and the EU was signed; it entered into force in 2009.335 The signing of the SAA with the EU made the integration process more concrete.336 The primary objective of the SAA was to support the consolidation of democracy, rule of law, economic development and regional cooperation.337 In the same year – 2009 – shortly after Albania became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Albanian government applied for the status of candidate with the EU. The European Council approved Albania’s application for EU membership whereupon the European Commission (EC) issued its Opinion on Albania’s membership request, including a set of 12 key priorities to be fulfilled in view of opening accession negotiations.338

The European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 set a number of political, economic and legislative criteria for accession to be met by applicant countries.339 Candidate countries must obtain:

- Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, the respect for human rights and protection of minorities; - The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with the competitive pressure of market forces within the Union; - Ability to take the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.340 It is noted as important to not only access the aquis communautaire into national legislation, but also ensure the effective application through appropriate administrative and judicial structures.341 From an EU point of view, conditionality through the prospect of EU membership is the most effective lever for Albania’s further development. In accordance, since 2000, EU integration process has been increasingly seen as the motor behind reforms.342 A central element of this reforming process is the annual progress reports that

335 EU Info Centre/Albania, Important Facts, http://euinfocentre.al/content.aspx?id=5&idd=23 (accessed 11 February 2014). 336 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 23 – 24. 337 Council of the European Union, Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, 8, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/albania/st08164.06_en.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014). 338 European Commission, Key findings of the 2013 Progress Report on Albania, 3, file:///C:/Users/6128130/Downloads/MEMO-13-888_EN.pdf (accessed26 February 2014). 339 European Commission – Enlargement, Accession Criteria, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm (accessed 6 May 2014). 340 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency-Copenhagen European Council, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/europeancouncil/pdf/cop_en.pdf (accessed12 July 2014). 341 Vasjari, ‘The Democratic Impact of European Integration:’, 224. 342 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 29.

82 describe a country’s success in fulfilling its accession criteria.343 Though, John O'Brennan says, when assessing Albania’s progress in meeting the Copenhagen political criteria, EU attitudes to further enlargement have hardened, and EU conditionality has increased in the enlargement process.344 Therefore, Albania and other current candidate states thus face a qualitatively different and more challenging enlargement environment than previous applicants.345 Further, we have to consider the fact that during the Cold War it was completely derived of any relations or agreement with the European Community or European Union.346

The demands of the European integration process have increasingly impacted the reform and implementation of domestic legislation toward compliance with EU standards.347 Though, progress has been slow, successive Albanian governments increasingly focused their efforts on satisfying the requirements of accession.348 The influence of the European Union through a combination of stick (via the progress reports) and carrot (through the perspective of membership) has been decisive in spurring the Albanian government into action.349

As Klajda Gjosha, the Albanian minister for European Integration, said in November 2013: ‘Albania is changing its mentality. It is transforming to become a more democratic country. Significant reforms are being made. Not only because the EU is asking for them, but also for the benefit of the Albanian people’.350

Like the words of the Albanian minister for European Integration illustrate, EU requirements play a great role in Albania’s democratization process. From my point of view, these words also reflect it is mainly the EU being the driving force behind reforms instead of the needs of the Albanian people. The minister seems to imply that the general mentality of politicians is increasingly changing in the sense that politicians and political institutions, really want to reform the country for the benefit of the people, not just for the EU. Personally, I am critical about the extent of this tendency of change. During my time in Albania, I was intrigued by

343 Stern &Wohlfeld, Albania’s Long Road, 15. 344 O'Brennan & Gassie, ‘From Stabilization to Consolidation:’, 15. 345 O'Brennan &Gassie, ‘From Stabilization to Consolidation:’, 16. 346 Vasjari, ‘The Democratic Impact of European Integration:’, 223. 347 O'Brennan & Gassie, ‘From Stabilization to Consolidation:’, 19 – 20. 348 Mema, Democratization in Albania, 92. 349 Corina Stratulat & Gjergji Vurmo, Albania and the European Union – No time to depart from the ‘carrot and stick’ approach, file:///E:/Albania/Literature/pub_3719_albania_and_the_european_union.pdf ( accessed 12 July 2014). 350 Christina Vasilaki, NEWEUROPE, Albania progress sufficient for candidate status, says the EC, http://www.neurope.eu/article/albania-progress-sufficient-candidate-status-says-ec ( accessed 5 June 2014).

83 the pro-European sentiment, but at the same time I was also intrigued by the lack of evidence of this pro-European attitude in practical terms. In general, politicians regularly tend to openly promote their wish for and commitment to EU membership, though I missed concrete measures that would really lead to achieving this goal of EU membership. In how far give Albanian politicians EU integration a higher value than it actually has for them? In an ideal situation, Albanian politicians should carry out reforms not because the EU asks them to do so, but because they want to address the needs of the citizens, to raise their living standards. In my opinion, the lack of this mentality is one of the characteristics of the problematic political infighting and immature political class in Albania. However, I do acknowledge that a vital change in the Albanian political class has been started. Albania has one of the youngest populations of Europe, a phenomenon also reflected in Albania’s political life. For example, the youngest MP is only 21 years old, while the above mentioned minister of European Integration counts 27 years. But, Albania’s political landscape is dominated by many political actors who were also politically socialized in the communist period.351 For example, Sali Berisha, who served as President and Prime Minister of Albania, and years has been leader of the Democratic Party, was also actively political involved in the communist regime: He was secretary of the committee of the Communist Party in the medical faculty of the Tirana University and served as personal cardiologist of the communist leader himself, Enver Hoxha.352 Furthermore, the EU is not only a driving force for transforming the Albanian society in a political way, but it also is a driving force in a financial way. Politically in the sense that the perspective of membership is decisive in spurring the government into action, or in other words, it is the EU that stimulates and motivates the Albania’s political class to commit themselves to achieve the goal of EU membership. Financially in the sense that reforms and their implementation as well depend on international assistance, whether funded by the EU or other international donors, like the OSCE, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) or individual embassies. Therefore, Albania can be depicted as a client state depending on foreign hands to help it achieve the features of a European state. From my point of view, this so-called wait-and-see attitude from the Albanian side has created a culture of dependency, where international actors bore the costs for most of the work in major issues facing the country. As one prominent Albanian politician, Genc Ruli, admitted, after 1997 ‘not a single problem has been solved without the intermediation, supervision and intervention of various structures of

351 Stern &Wohlfeld, Albania’s Long Road, 12. 352 Sabrina P. Ramet, Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989 (New York 2010): 440.

84 the international community’. Although the DP-led government (in office from 2005 till 2013) managed to reduce the country’s international dependency, various international organizations continue to be actively involved in major policy issues and initiatives.353 For example, in a meeting between the Albanian State Police and international donors in Tiranë in the beginning of 2014, the State Police brought up their needs for support to further reform the institution. The meeting lacked any concrete proposal or plan from the Albanian State Police, what I consider as at least remarkable since international donors are one of the few options in Albania to provide assistance in the form of funds, because the state budget constantly faces a deficit. Therefore, the party seeking assistance should clearly know your needs and wishes, as well have a clear proposal how to achieve those needs and wishes.354 Note that international institutions as well internationals in Albanian, are generally perceived by the Albanian population as more reliable than domestic leaders and institutions.355 Probably this might be one of the reasons why Albanians consider the EU more as the authority that should reform their country rather than their own authorities.

Albania’s first application for EU membership in April 2009, just ahead of the forthcoming elections of July 2009, was intended as a big government achievement. However, as many experts argue, it was a premature step as the EU Commissions 2010 monitoring report was not only very critical, but also refused the country’s application in gaining formal EU candidate status.356 In follow-up, the European Commission outlined 12 key priorities – serving as so-called sticks – the Albanian government should endorse, in order for the Commission to recommend the European Council to grant Albania the candidate status – serving as so-called carrot. Still, in 2010, the visa liberalization for Albanian citizens to the Schengen area entered into force,357 what can be counted as a success in the EU integration process. After two rejections in 2010 and 2011, the Commission first offered Albania its tentative approval in 2012, but included conditions.358 However, the European Council denied the Commission’s recommendation to grant Albania the EU candidate status. According to the Dutch representation in Albania, still a lot of things remain to be done in Albania to meet the integration criteria: ‘The fight against corruption and organized crime has not yielded much result yet. The Commission’s progress report states clearly that Albania

353 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 29. 354 Albanian State Police, International Donor Meeting, Tirana, 10 January 2014. 355 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 17. 356 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 24. 357 European Commission, Key findings of the 2013 Progress Report on Albania,3. 358 Kate Holman, Albania deserves EU candidate status, http://euobserver.com/opinion/122466 ( accessed 8 July 2014).

85 should build up a credible track record showing that it is possible to execute and implement these laws. This is not the case yet and therefore the Netherlands is of the opinion that it is too early to grant candidate status’.359 One year later, the Commission’s progress report of 2013 found that Albania has made good progress on key reforms. For example, Albania has adopted the remaining key judicial, public administration and parliamentary reform measures with cross-party consensus, what means that the ruling majority and the opposition cooperated to adopt a number of legal instruments in parliament. This includes the adoption of the Law on Civil Service, the Law on the High Court and the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure and a set of amendments to the Criminal Code and the Civil Procedure Code.360 Further, the new SP-led government in Albania has made a strong commitment to fighting corruption and has prioritized this issue in its program. Albania took initial steps towards improving the efficiency of investigations and prosecutions in the fight against organized crime and corruption. The number of convictions in corruption and in money laundering cases has increased, as has the number of investigations into the trafficking of people and drugs. All of the Council of Europe’s recent recommendations concerning financing of political parties and legal provisions on corruption have been satisfactorily addressed.361 Additionally, the 2013 parliamentary elections were conducted in an overall smooth and orderly manner.362 Despite the positive recommendation of the Commission, the Council decided in December 2013 to postpone its decision with six months. Out of the 28 EU member states, five member states remained critical towards the real progress that had been made by the Albanian government. A political decision was set up in order for these critical member states to be able to legitimize the decision about Albania’s candidate status as well in their national politics, where aspects as Eurosceptism and Islamphobia play an important role in the general EU reluctance. Therefore, these five states – Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – demanded for another six months to let the Albanian government show some more results. As was officially stated, ‘a demonstration of the effectiveness of the promising measures that have been taken by the Albanian government, also will lead to lasting results was required before granting Albania with the EU candidate

359 Netherlands Embassy in Tirana, Dutch government opinion: Albania not ready yet for candidate status, http://albania.nlembassy.org/news/news-2012/november-2012/dutch-position-albania.html (accessed 7 May 2014). 360 European Commission, Albania 2013 Progress Report, 1 361 European Commission, Albania 2013 Progress Report, 1. 362 European Commission, Key findings of the 2013 Progress Report on Albania, http://europa.eu/rapid/press- release_MEMO-13-888_en.htm ( accessed 8 July 2014).

86 status’.363 So, against the procedure – usually the Commission only publishes progress reports once per year in October – the Commission prepared an extra report that primarily covered recent progress on judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organized crime. In this report the Commission confirmed its earlier recommendation to grant the EU candidate status to Albania.364 Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy, Stefan Füle, stated during the publication of the report on 4 June 2014 that ‘The Commission have based this recommendation on the continued political will to act decisively in the fight against corruption and organized crime and on the commitment to a comprehensive judicial reform as well as on our assessment of the progress made in these areas and the actions taken by Albania since the last Progress Report’.365 In the meantime, no alarming situations took place that could serve as reason for the critical member states to deny granting the candidate status, meanwhile, according to the Commission further improvement was made. So, it seems the message of the five critical member states has got through, and therefore, it is probably no coincidence that a week ahead of the decision in Brussels, the police in Albania brought a stronghold for the growing of marihuana under control. In the village of Lazarat, which is known as Europe’s biggest cannabis-growing area, the police destroyed 12 tons of marihuana.366 Furthermore, Prime Minister Rama actively lobbied in the EU member states, with special focus on the member states whose criticism had been decisive during the Council decision in December 2013. Also the Netherlands was seen as a major obstacle in the coming decision-making, as could be read in an interview with Prime Minister Rama during his visit to Austria on 12 May 2014. PM Rama visited the Netherlands on 26 May 2014, followed by a visit of the Albanian minister for European Integration, Klajda Gjosha, to the Dutch Directorate-General for European Cooperation and Parliamentarian Commission for European Affairs in the beginning of June 2014. Also the visit of the Albanian minister of Justice, Nasip Naco, to his Dutch counterpart in May 2014 can be considered as an attempt to change the Dutch critical vision. Next to lobbying; the Albanian government settled its unresolved issues with present EU member states to counteract any reason for the (critical) EU member states to reject the candidate status. For

363 Netherlands Embassy in Tirana, Council conclusion on EU candidate status for Albania, http://albania.nlembassy.org/news/2013/december/council-decision-about-albania-2013.html (accessed 7 May 2014). 364 Europa.eu, EU candidate status for Albania, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-439_en.htm ( accessed 6 July 2014). 365 Editorial, Albanian National News Agency, EU-Albania: Solid argument for candidate status, http://www.noa.al/en-post/en/420369.html ( accessed 8 July 2014). 366 Angelina Verbica, Deutsche Welle, Albania on the rocky road to EU membership, http://www.dw.de/albania- on-the-rocky-road-to-eu-membership/a-17742793 ( accessed 7 July 2014).

87 example, a moment, it appeared the Czech government would block Albania’s candidate status, because of a bilateral dispute between the Albanian government and the Czech utility company CEZ Group, which majority is owned by the Czech state. In 2009, CEZ Group invested for a 76% share in a local CEZ unit in Albania. On 21 January 2013, Albanian regulators stripped CEZ of its license of CEZ’s local unit in Albania, holding central Europe's biggest utility liable for damages for importing insufficient electricity and not investing in the country's power grid. The Czech government estimated the costs of the local CEZ unit in Albania alleged failings at estimated 700 million euros, and therefore started international arbitration.367 The Albanian government committed itself to achieve a compromise in the Arbitrage: the Albanian government paid 95 million euros to CEZ Group and the Czech government voted in favor of Albania’s candidate status. Further, the Albanian government paid the maintenance costs of the helicopters it bought from France in 2010, just before PM Rama visited France. And after Albania obtained the candidate status, the Albanian media reported about a deal the Albanian government made with Spain: Spain would only vote in favor of Albania’s candidate status if Albania would favor Spain in its UN candidacy.368

Around the time, on 27 June 2014, the European Council endorsed the decision of the General Affairs Council on 24 June 2014 to grant EU candidate status to Albania. The Commission released in a press release that officially being a candidate for EU membership is a clear step forward in EU-Albania relations, reflecting the progress the country has made in European integration and in implementing the necessary reforms. The decision underlines the EU's continued commitment to support Albania in its efforts towards this goal. For Albania, obtaining the candidate status should translate into a strengthened endorsement of its reform agenda. Albania still needs to meet key priorities, with particular focus on administration and judiciary reform, fight against corruption and organized crime and fundamental rights, as highlighted in the Council Conclusions of December 2013. Moreover, a constructive and sustainable political dialogue will remain essential to consolidate and continue reforms.369 So, throughout the years, the aspirations of the Albanian government to become EU member, increased in priority in the country’s political landscape.370 Pressure through conditionality

367 Jason Hovet, Reuters, UPDATE 1-Czech power firm CEZ starts arbitration in Albania row, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/07/cez-albania-idUSL5N0B76MU20130207 ( accessed 12 July 2014). 368 Conversation with Elga Mitre, Political Officer at the Embassy of the Netherlands in Albania, 7 July 2014. 369 Europa.eu, EU candidate status for Albania, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-439_en.htm ( accessed 6 July 2014). 370 Stiftung, BTI 2012, 23.

88 sometimes created achievements, like the appointment of an Ombudsman in December 2011, the formal adoption of a voting reform in July 2012, the adoption of the new Law on Civil Service in October 2013, and other reforms that can be read in the annual progress reports of the Commission. In the end of June 2014, Albania finally became an official candidate to join the EU. However, despite of what has been reached so far positively considered by the European Parliament, Commission, Council of Ministers and the governments of EU member states, it doesn’t prove that the EU ‘doors’ are now open for Albania.371 The start of accession negotiations is a subsequent, separate step in the EU integration process, for which additional progress, in the key priorities, is required.372 Further sustainable changes in Albania require a constructive cooperation between the actors in the country’s political landscape, wherefore the earlier described lack of full political commitment as well as the struggle for power between the country’s two political networks, need to be overcome.373

5.2 Pro-European sentiment Like I already mentioned, EU membership is not only a government priority; pro-European sentiment among the Albanian people is extremely high. As the 2013 survey of the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS) about the Albanian public views of the EU integration process tells us, in 2013 public support for EU membership was extraordinary high among Albanian citizens. 85% of the Albanian citizens were supportive of Albania’s membership in the EU.374 In 2010, even 90% of the population endorsed EU accession.375 Albanians seem to be more enthusiastic about the EU than countries which are already EU member states; they strongly believe in the transformation power of the EU integration process. The survey explains that Albanians believe that the EU integration process will improve their life quality, will provide them more employment opportunities, will improve the judicial systems, will reduce poverty and bring more democracy to the country.376 As the 2014 study of the AIIS tell us, reasons to be in favor of EU membership of Albanian citizens, are mainly economic, namely the expected improvement of living standards, an increase of

371 Vasjari, ‘The Democratic Impact of European Integration:’, 228. 372 Europa.nu, EU candidate status for Albania. 373 Stern &Wohlfeld, Albania’s Long Road, 16 . 374 EU Info Centre/Albania, ‘The European Perspective of Albania: Perceptions and Realities 2013’ survey results presented at the EUIC, http://euinfocentre.al/content.aspx?idjadok=407 (accessed 11 February 2014). 375 EUNACAL Institute, Analysis of key survey results on the perceptions and expectations of citizens and business toward Albania's EU accession and the use of web 2.0 technologies for political deliberation, http://eunacal.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Executive_Summary_EUNACAL_and_OSFA_Survey.pdf (accessed 7 May 2014). 376 EU Info Centre/Albania, ‘The European Perspective of Albania’.

89 jobs and the decrease of poverty.377 The newspaper Tirana Times writes on 13 June 2014 that if there should be a referendum in Albania today to decide whether or not to be in the EU, it would be the most successful one in the history of EU enlargement. In such hypothetic referendum, 77% of Albanians would vote in favor of membership, according to the 2014 survey released on 11 June 2014 by the ASSI.378 Despite the strong support for EU integration among Albanians, this recent survey also shows the largest ever year-to-year decline – 7% – since the survey started a decade ago. Notably, the survey turned out that whereas in the previous years the majority of the respondents always picked EU integration of Albania as main priority, this year, for the first time the majority says that integration is important, but not the most important thing to them personally anymore. But, it is interesting to notice that about 70% of the respondents blamed the Albanian government and political class for the delay of granting Albania with the candidate status. Among the main reasons were weak rule of law, the high rate of crime and corruption and political conflicts.379 On the other hand, it was the Albanian media that set down a strong image of unfairness of the EU authorities to postpone their decision granting Albania the candidate status.380

5.3 Difficulties Despite the strong pro-European desire, Albania faces several difficulties in its integration process, related to issues like electoral reform, economic development, institutional, market, as the reform of the judiciary.381 Backwardness and poverty as result from the autarkic policy of the communist regime are generally considered as the main reasons. In addition, Albania struggles with acute and fundamental difficulties in basic state building.382 The lack of political consensus and cooperative spirit among political actors are one of these fundamental difficulties in Albania’s state building that restrict the progress of the country’s reforming process, for example reflected in the functioning of the its state administration. Like the Commission’s 2013 progress report tells us, ‘progress has been made in public administration reform and a major step taken with the adoption of the Civil Service Law’.

377 Albanian Institute for International Studies, Conference: ‘The European Perspective of Albania: Perceptions and Realities 2014’, Tirana, 10 June 2014. 378 Editorial, Tirana Times, Challenges after the status, 13 June 2014, p. 6. 379 Anonymous, Tirana Times, As priorities shift, support for EU membership sees slight decline, 13 June 2014, p. 3. 380 Anonymous, Tirana Times, As priorities shift, support for EU membership sees slight decline, 13 June 2014, p. 3. 381 Kasem Cenaj & Myzafer Elezi, ‘Albania's integration challenges for strengthening of public administration in the context of EU integration’, The Macrotheme Review, nr. 5, vol. 3 (2014): 67. 382 Sajdini, European Integration of Albania, http://www.studymode.com/essays/European-Integration-Of- Albania-1830532.html (accessed 3 June 2014).

90

However, the report also notes the Albanian Public Administration is still a weak institution where politicization, corruption, nepotism in appointments, promotions and dismissals, inefficiency and financial unsustainability are common issues.383 Albania’s founding as a national state in 1912 came rather late compared to other countries in the region.384 Since then, the country had little experience with democracy and democratic changes of government.385 There has never been a civil society in the western sense. After Albania’s monarchical authoritarian regime, the Italian and German occupation, the communist regime led by Enver Hoxha was the most repressive system of any time. The Communist Party dominated and monitored all aspects of life. Any kind of opposition was repressed, and possessing power within the country’s administration offered one of the forms of life insurance. This political legacy of the mentality of authoritarian control and the strong focus of power continues today.386 Both political networks compete for power without respecting the rules and democratic standards of governing as set by the EU. This political behavior led to the deficiency of political stability in Albania.387 Like I explained in the previous chapter, this power struggle is clearly reflected in domestic policies. Since EU integration is the priority of both political networks, EU integration seems to be an appropriate topic to overcome internal rivalry. However, as we have seen in the previous sections, the power struggle is as well reflected in Albania’s EU integration process. Both networks strive for achieving significant results in the integration process, of which obtaining the candidate status until recently was the highest attainable. According to insider sources, the only similarity in the highly polarized relationship between the ruling majority and the opposition was the desire to get the EU candidate status. Next to this desire, each kind of conformity ended. For example, in December 2013, after the negative decision of the Council to postpone its decision to June 2014, it was the DP-led opposition who immediately accused Prime Minister Rama as the only one to be blamed for this decision. DP Chair Basha stated ‘that Edi Rama is not trusted even by Brussels now’. ‘The refusal made by the EU to the new government is a clear signal as to the reasons why it should not continue to govern the country’.388 In case of a positive decision of the Council, the DP would probably have given

383 European Commission, Albania 2013 progress report, 8. 384 Stern & Wohlfeld, Albania’s Long Road, 12. 385 Gërxhani & Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics’, 2. 386 Stern & Wohlfeld, Albania’s Long Road, 12. 387 Vasjari, ‘The Democratic Impact of European Integration:’, 227. 388 Anonymous, Independent Balkan News Agency, European Union does not grant candidate status to Albania, http://www.balkaneu.com/european-union-doesnt-grant-candidate-status-albania/ (accessed 6 July 2014).

91 all credits to the DP-led government that was in office till the last parliamentarian elections in June 2013. The government tried as much as possible to show the progress Albania has made, while the opposition tried as much as possible to deny the progress the government has made. According to the opposition, the government is involved in drug trafficking, the independence of institutions is affected, the president is stripped of his power and 7.000 people are unfairly dismissed from government service. One would think that all of these issues would be enough reason to deny Albania the candidate status, however; this conclusion the opposition did not want to draw, because that would decrease their popularity among the Albanian population. The blaming and shaming is an integral part of this power struggle, but raises a paradox in the above mentioned issue. The struggle for power overshadows the political interest for EU integration and makes EU integration just an instrument in the domestic struggle, and probably explains the slow progress.

5.4 Pros and Cons regarding Albania’s EU membership In 2009 Albania submitted its formal application for EU membership. Supported by a broad majority of its citizens, the top politicians of the country made the achievement of this membership their main political goal.389 Five years later, Albania made an important step forwards in the achieving this goal and officially became an EU candidate by obtaining the candidate status. Albania’s troublesome EU integration process raises disagreements within and among the present EU member states; wherefore reasons can be found in the different perspectives the achievements Albania has made are seen. The achievements can be considered from two perspectives, broadly divided into a positive perspective and a negative perspective. It is the European Commission that reflects this so-called positive position, which I define as ‘positive, but there are some problems’, and it is my personal position that reflects this so-called critical position, which I define as ‘negative or critical, but there some achievements’. Before discussing the discourse about Albania’s candidate status in the context of these perspectives, let’s make clear both perspectives see Albania’s future within the EU. The biggest difference applies the time frame in which obtaining full EU membership should take place. Like I have elaborated earlier, the Commission’s 2013 progress report found that the Albanian government made good progress on key reforms, like the strengthening of the fight against organized crime and corruption, the smooth conduct of the 2013 parliamentary

389 Stern & Wohlfeld, ‘Albania’s Long Road’, 3.

92 elections, the adoption of remaining key judicial, public administration and parliamentary reform measures with cross-party consensus. Therefore, the Commission recommended the European Council to grant Albania the candidate status. Like we now know, the Council’s decision in December 2013 was postponed to June 2014. During my stay in Albania (September 2013 – January 2014), I was able to closely experience the publishing of the Commission’s 2013 progress report, the lobbying of the Albanian government, the European decision-making process, the Council’s decision in December 2013, and the impact of these events on Albanian politicians and the Albanian people. The core of the general EU discourse at that time was about whether Albania should be granted the EU candidate status or not. Those in favor of granting Albania the EU candidate status were convinced the status would recognize the progress that Albania has made so far. The candidate status could serve as a renewed motivation to overcome the remaining obstacles and to improve political and social dialogue. Thereby, it was already the second recommendation of the Commission, what created high expectations among the Albanians. If the Council would again fudge its way out of granting Albania this expected ‘carrot’, it would undermine the credibility of the integration process.390 Furthermore, the EU candidate status could function as a tool to monitor government performance and to strengthen the rule of law.391 Those against granting Albania the EU candidate status, believed there was still a lack of concrete reform results: proof of guaranteed results was needed and a promising atmosphere was not enough. Despite the European Commission has been pushing Albania to reform, the seriousness of EU integration seems not have internalized yet by Albanian society and the political elite. As reflected in the media, Albanians consider EU membership generally as something that Albania deserves, which in turn is characterizing for the country’s integration approach: the EU is seen as a charger of domestic action, while the Albanians wait and see for further progress.392 Experiences of the past showed the consequences of premature EU accession in the cases of Romania and Bulgaria: once they were officially EU member state they decreased their commitment to implement reforms towards EU norms and standards. In the context of the ‘European crisis’ and the growing populism of some political parties, the policies of European enlargement are certainly under scrutiny. This not only pertains to

390 Stratulat & Vurmo, Albania and the European Union – No time to depart from the ‘carrot and stick’ approach. 391 National Democratic Institute in Albania, Dialogue between Citizens and Politicians Key to Better Governance and a Stronger Economy, 6, https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI-Albania-2014-Focus-Group-Report.pdf ( accessed 5 July 2014). 392 Gjergji Vurmo& Corina Stratulat, European Policy Centre, Opportunity Knocks: Can the EU Help Albania to Help Itself?, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=141942 (accessed 7 July 2014).

93

Albania and its population with a Muslim majority, but also applies for the European member states.393 In spite of the great pro-European sentiment and the progress that has been made so far Albania’s way to EU membership is still far, a lot still has to happen. The way forward requires those in power to take ownership of the reform agenda and to act responsible, drafting and implementing policies that coincide with the needs of the electorate. Likewise, it requires Albanian civil society to hold their leaders accountable for specific policy outcomes and to demand that they respect formally-enacted rights and standards.394

5.5 Albania’s ability as a future EU member state/ Conclusion This Master thesis analyzed one of the most characteristic features of contemporary Albania: its perceived division into North and South. In the previous chapters I studied this division from several perspectives. In chapter four I concluded the contradistinction between the country’s two mass political parties is what remained from this traditional North-South division. So, the traditional North-South division is represented in the current DP-SP division. The DP-SP division effects Albania’s ability to integrate into the EU in two ways. The first effect of Albania’s political divided landscape on its ability to integrate into the EU, I consider in a practical sense: the fierce power struggle between the two largest parties and their leaders, which has become a permanent fixture of political, social and economic life in Albania since the fall of communism in the early 1990’s, represents a major stumbling block in the country’s further development.395 More than two decades since the fall of its communist government, Albania remains one of Europe's poorest nations. Chaotic transition to capitalism and polarization between the two main political blocs - the Socialists and the Democrats - has slowed reform and left the country mired in poverty and corruption. The Socialists of former Tirana mayor Edi Rama took power last year following eight years of Democrat rule under fiery veteran Sali Berisha. The two remain sworn enemies.396 Additionally, this never-ending cycle of demonization between the political networks and state institutions that officially should be independent, but because of strong political involvement are extension of political parties, such as the prosecutor in the Supreme Court, has kept the focus away from required reforms, democratic processes and institutions, and

393 Marjola Rukaj, Observatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Albania rejected, resoundingly,http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-and-countries/Albania/Albania-rejected- resoundingly-146368 (accessed 6 May 2014). 394 Vurmo & Stratulat, Opportunity Knocks: Can the EU Help Albania to Help Itself?. 395 Vurmo & Stratulat, Opportunity Knocks: Can the EU Help Albania to Help Itself?. 396 Benet Koleka, Reuters, EU to decide on putting Albania on road to membership, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/04/uk-eu-albania-idUKKBN0EF1LN20140604 (accessed 7 July 2014).

94 perpetuated a negative image of the country abroad.397 The lack of political consensus and political cooperation caused by the constant power struggle hinders reforms required for EU accession, whereupon slowed reforms have a negative impact on the progress of the integration process. I consider this negative image the country obtained, as the second effect of Albania’s political divided landscape on its ability to integrate into the EU. It is the tense political climate that damages Albania's image, increased by the gap between the pursued commitment and real commitment of Albanian politicians. This attitude contributes to Albania being not taken seriously in the outside world. Sometimes, one wonders whether Albania really wants to become an EU member, since the concrete track records does match with the proclaimed measures. The EU can be a pathfinder for Albania’s decision-makers, but is not a substitute for domestic action.

However, I believe Albania is able to integrate into the EU, mainly due to its strong EU support. Note this strong EU support is predominantly motivated by economic reasons. However, Albania’s ability is affected by the country’s traditional North-South divisions as reflected in the power struggle between the two political major parties: Democratic Party and Socialist Party. This power struggle overshadows the political interest for EU integration and makes EU integration just an instrument in the domestic struggle. Consequently, this resulted in a slow reform process inside Albania and established a negative image abroad. Though, EU accession seems to be one of the few issues that could serve as a common ground for the Albanian political networks to overcome the country’s political cleavage and focus on reforms that are closely related to EU integration. However, it seems that once one of the two political networks is in the opposition, it uses to switch off certain European senses and make it extremely difficult to reach consensus for what is called a European agenda.398 This effect is likely to happen because of the underdeveloped bottom-up channels of social accountability and civic involvement in the Albanian policy-making process.399

So, despite the strong pro-European sentiment in Albania, as well the fact that Albania’s future lies within the EU, a change is needed to convert Albania’s ability to integrate into the EU into results-oriented practices. As the European Council stands by the European commitment expressed at the Thessaloniki Summit that ‘the future of the Balkans is within the European Union’, at the same time, ‘progress of each country towards the EU will

397 Vurmo & Stratulat, Opportunity Knocks: Can the EU Help Albania to Help Itself?. 398 Koleka, EU to decide on putting Albania on road to membership. 399 Koleka, EU to decide on putting Albania on road to membership.

95 depend on its own merits in meeting the Copenhagen criteria’.400 Granting Albania the EU candidate status in the end of June 2014 was an important political signal for Albania and its citizens, showing that the country is moving to the next phase of the European integration process. As a candidate country, Albania will continue to profit from EU funds under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) in order to carry out comprehensive reforms and strategic investments, and will benefit from the participation in EU programs.401 Full membership, however, remains years away, and a strong showing by Eurosceptic and anti- immigration parties in European Parliamentary elections in May 2014 may further turn opinion in Europe against taking in other poorer ex-communist nations in the east.402 As the 2014 survey of the AIIS about the European Perspective of Albania tells us, the majority of the Albanian citizens expect full membership in 2020, or only after 2020.403 I think they might be quite right: personally I estimate that 2020 is the minimum when Albania will become an official EU member state. Therefore, following the words of a report of the European Council, a constructive and sustainable dialogue between the government and the opposition on EU related reforms will be vital in securing Albania’s future in the EU.404 Progress will depend on political will of the government and opposition to seek common ground in the interests of moving closer to the EU and to take decisive action against organized crime and corruption, and on reforming the judiciary.405 Furthermore, the progress of the vital change of the Albanian political class is needed. A reinforced political will lies in the new generation that will represent its electorate in its cultural and religious plurality, setting aside its usual counter-productive alibis.406

400 Europa.eu, EU-Western Balkans Summit – Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003, http://europa.eu/rapid/press- release_PRES-03-163_en.htm ( accessed 12 July 2014). 401 Europa.eu, EU candidate status for Albania, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-439_en.htm ( accessed 6 July 2014). 402 Koleka, EU to decide on putting Albania on road to membership. 403 Albanian Institute for International Studies, Conference about The European Perspective of Albania: Perceptions and Realities 2014, Tirana, 10 June 2014 404 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions. 405 Koleka, Reuters, EU to decide on putting Albania on road to membership. 406 Rukaj, Albania rejected, resoundingly.

96

Conclusion

Albania is a small European country, located in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula. Over the time, the Albanian people became divided into two groups, the Ghegs and the Tosks. The Ghegs historically inhabited North Albania and the Tosks lived in the land South Albania. This Master thesis analyzed Albania’s traditional division into North and South. I studied this division from several perspectives: clan culture and political networks, twentieth- century history, demography and economy, and contemporary domestic affairs. These factors were then taken into consideration for situating Albania on its path towards becoming an EU member. I wanted to have a look at the simplified perception of North-South division by looking at the following research question:

‘In how far is the Albanian political landscape embedded in historical and cultural North- South divisions, and what effect does this have on Albania's ability to integrate into the EU?’

I initiated this work when I came back from an internship at the Embassy of the Netherlands in Tirana. I was intrigued by the widespread pro-European sentiment of the Albanians, and I was also fascinated by the deeply rooted ‘clan’ divisions dominating Albania’s political landscape. So, I started this work with the idea of writing about Albanian clans, their role in Albanian politics and their influence on the country’s EU integration process. In the first chapter, discussing the term clan and Albanian clans, I came to a remarkable conclusion that nuances my assumed presence of clans in Albanian politics. The results of chapter 1 turned out that the northern Gheg culture is typified by a social structure based on kinship, but this kinship based social structure is not applicable for the southern Tosks. Thus, Albania’s political landscape is not dominated by, what in the anthropology is called clans, but by what I labeled as regional political networks. I do argue that these political networks reflect Albania’s traditional North-South division. Furthermore, the two networks are linked to one of the country’s mass political parties: the Democratic Party (DP) and the Socialist Party (SP). The northern political network is linked to the DP and the southern political network is linked to the SP. The two political parties, or political networks, are engaged in a perpetual struggle for political power. The results of the case study about regional rivalry during Hoxha’s years of government (1944 – 1985) in chapter 2 demonstrated that this power struggle between North and South is not a contemporary phenomenon. Although Hoxha’s years of government were officially communist in ideology, Albanian politics remained dominated by regional identities. Further, shared communist and secular ethos was dominated

97 by southern Tosks, in contrast to the northern era where the majority of the population forcefully resisted communist rule into the late 1940’s. So, the idea is that the communist government – under largely control of the southern Tosks – favored its own regional identity – the Tosks in South Albania – with certain kind of policies. In fact, the current political rivalry is a legacy of these regional policies during the communist era: Hoxha’s communist government preached a doctrine that was alien to adherents of the ‘fis’ system in the North, as well they promoted domestic policies that did much to alienate many Gheg in the North. As a result of these regional policies, the DP and SP established along anti-communist and former communist lines, when political pluralism was reintroduced. Thus, it is this anti- communist vs. former communist cleavage that enters the main cleavage between DP and SP. Note that the traditional Gheg social structure was mainly eradicated by the communist’s socialization policy, though; certain kinship elements still remained in the northern political network, or the Democratic Party, but might be better indicated as nepotism. However, as the results of chapter 3 have shown, the traditional North-South division has decreased its sharp edges throughout the time. Analyzing Albania’s regional economic differentiation, I came to a remarkable conclusion that Tiranë and Durrës, as economic and social center of the country, clearly overshadow the traditional North-South division. So, economically and demographically, the perceived North-South division is rhetoric. Moreover, there appears to be a new division, which can be globally perceived as a West-East, or coastal-mountainous division, labeling the West as economically well-developed compared to a poor developed East. Coastal qarks tend to swift more toward Albania’s economic center of Tiranë and Durrës, while the remaining mountainous qarks stay more behind in terms of economic development and social cohesion.

Albanian domestic politics might be considered in line with this shift from a traditional North-South division towards a division not clearly linked to certain regions. Although, there are still several features that certain regions are linked to one of the political networks, I noticed a tendency that the cleavage between DP and SP is no longer naturally associated with the traditional North-South division. However, Albanian domestic politics remain dominated by the polarized power struggle between DP and SP, as I demonstrated with examples of the election processes, parliamentary work and public administration. Political debates are highly confrontational and profoundly personalized with elements as harsh language, threats, personal abuses and personal slander. It turned out that despite Albanian media and civil society are considered to be independent institutions, they nearly almost

98 function as extensions of one of the two the political networks. So, Albania’s North-South division plays a major role in the country’s political landscape. Because the country is in the midst of its EU integration process, these traditional internal divisions also play a decisive role in the country’s EU integration process. Decision-making goes along partisan lines, creating a political stalemate that makes a constructive dialogue between the parties very difficult, and therewith hampers the speedy progress to implement the necessary reforms to meet EU standards. Many of the decisions made on harmonization with EU laws, requires a three fifths majority. In these cases, the ruling majority needs a cross-party consensus. It is only under hard pressure from the EU and other conditionality’s that cross-party consensus decisions are carried out. In the first instance, I assumed that EU integration could serve as a common ground for the two rivaling political parties to bridge their traditional differences. In fact, the political programs of both political networks do not differ that much from each other; both programs prioritize Albania’s EU integration. However, the reality is different; the struggle for power overshadows the political interest for EU integration and makes EU integration an instrument in the domestic struggle. Both networks strive for achieving results in the integration process, but at the same time they try as much as possible to deny the progress that the other network made. Like we have seen in chapter 5, this political attitude negatively affects the ability of the country to integrate into the EU. In my opinion, a slow reform process and a negative image of the country abroad are the main consequences. In the end, it is the strong pro-European Albanian population that is duped by its political system.

99

Appendix 1: Profiles of Major Albanian Media Owners (September 2013)

Media Shareholders407 Background Top Channel Aurel Baçi Top Channel (2001) is one of the two 20% national private TV stations, part of Top Lorela Hoxha Media Group, which also includes Top 8% Albania Radio, Top Gold Radio, Shqip Vjollca Hoxha newspaper, Top News, and part of pay TV 8% platform Digitalb. The President of the Itan Hoxha group is Vjollca Hoxha, who took over 8% after her husband’s death in 2008. The Sara Hoxha shareholders’ structure changed after his 8% death to accommodate his wife and Albert Sino children. Top Channel is left-leaning, but 40% in a professional way, and has had several Redia Hoxha disputes with Berisha’s government. 8% Klan TV Aleksandër Frangaj Klan TV (1997), one of the two national 40% private TV stations, has been DP-oriented Alba Gina since the 2005 general elections, when it 40% made a clear shift from its previous left- Ervin Gjikola leaning position. Aleksandër Frangaj, 20% who together with his wife own 80% of the shares, has been very close to Berisha during the past eight years. He established ABC News – a news TV, formally owned by his relatives – right before the 2011 local elections to serve the DP campaign. Frangaj also owns Koha Jonë newspapers, but there are speculations that he may close or sell it out of financial difficulties. At the moment, with the government change, Klan TV has taken a step back from being a strong supporter of Berisha and is considering its editorial line, which now seems to favour the SMI. Vizion Plus (Media Artan Dulaku Vizion Plus (2000) was established by the Vizion) 33,33% Dulaku brothers – businessmen in Genci Dulaku construction, trade and 33,33% telecommunications. Since 2012, they are Adrian Dulaku again the only owners of the TV station 33,33% after German WAZ Media Group pulled back. The TV station has been left- leaning most of the time – they became less critical of the government in 2009- 2012 when WAZ held the majority of shares. Tring, a pay TV platform, is formally owned by Dulakus’ wives and

407 Data extracted from the National Registration Centre database, September 2013

100

relatives. Panorama Irfan Hysenbelliu Hysenbelliu, a businessman in beer 100% production and constructions, first took to the media with Panorama (2002), now the biggest newspaper in Albania. In May 2011, just around local elections, together with businessman/banker Artan Santo he established Focus Group and bought News 24 TV, Gazeta Shqiptare, Radio Rash and Balkanweb website from the Italian Edisud. The editorial line of these media outlets – up to that time very critical of Berisha – changed with the new owners and now News 24 is considered to be a politically-balanced TV station. Ora News Redon Ndroqi Ora News (2006) is a news-oriented TV 8% station with the biggest number of live Ylli Ndroqi broadcasts. It showed a clear preference 52% for the Socialist Movement for Mimoza Ndroqi Integration in 2008 when the SMI 40% opposed constitutional changes done jointly by DP and SP, however Ylli Ndroqi is considered to be in good terms with both political camps, and news editions are politically balanced. Ndroqi started his business in Albania as an importer and exporter of drinks, and further expanded it to construction, restaurants, travel, and exchange agencies. He also owns Channel One TV, is Mexico’s Honorary Consul in Albania, and President of the Boxing Federation.

______Affiliations:

ABC News TV Klan Balkanweb (website) Panorama Channel One TV Ora News Digitalb (digital platform) Top Channel GazetaShqiptare (newspaper) Panorama Koha Jonë (newspaper) Klan Klan Kosova TV Klan News 24 TV Panorama Rash(radio) Panorama Shqip (newspaper) Top Channel Top Albania Radio Top Channel Top Gold (radio) Top Channel Tring (digital platform) Vizion Plus

101

Bibliography

Albanian Daily News, Majority and Opposition Together for EU Integration, 4 June 2014, p. 3.

Albanian Institute for International Studies, Conference: ‘The European Perspective of Albania: Perceptions and Realities 2014’, Tirana, 10 June 2014.

Albanian State Police, International Donor Meeting, Tirana, 10 January 2014.

Blumi, Isa, ‘The Roots of Hoxha’s Postwar State’, East European Quarterly, nr. 3, vol. 31 (1997): 379 – 398.

Bugajski, Janusz, Political parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the post- communist era, (New York 2002).

Celik, Betul Ayse & Shkreli, Alma, ‘An Analysis of Reconciliatory Mediation in Northern Albania: The Role of Customary Mediators’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 62, nr. 6 (2010): 885 – 914.

Cenaj, Kasem & Elezi, Myzafe, ‘Albania's integration challenges for strengthening of public administration in the context of EU integration’, The Macrotheme Review, nr. 5, vol. 3 (2014): 62 – 67.

Collins, Kathleen, ‘The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia’, Comparative Politics, vol. 35, nr. 2 (2003): 171 – 190.

Council of Europe, The functioning of democratic institutions in Albania, http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2009/20091217_Albania_E.pdf ( accessed 23 June 23, 2014).

Council of the European Union, Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/albania/st08164.06_en.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014).

Doll, Brandon, ‘The Relationship between de Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies vol. 2, nr. 3 (2003): 147 – 162.

102

Editorial, Albanian National News Agency, EU-Albania: Solid argument for candidate status, http://www.noa.al/en-post/en/420369.html (accessed 8 July 2014).

Editorial, Tirana Times, Challenges after the status, 13 June 2014, p. 6.

Elbasani, Arolda, ‘EU Enlargement and State Institutions after Communism – Reforming Public Administration in Albania’, L'Europe en Formation, nr. 3 (2008): 119 – 134.

Elsie, Robert, Historical Dictionary of Albania (Lanham 2010).

Ericsson, Rudebeck, Sundström& Young, Territorial Reform in Albania, 10, http://www.shtetiweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/121218-SKL-Albania-final-lores.pdf (accessed 20 June 2014).

EU Info Centre/Albania, Important Facts, http://euinfocentre.al/content.aspx?id=5&idd=23 (accessed 11 February 2014).

EU Info Centre/Albania, ‘The European Perspective of Albania: Perceptions and Realities 2013’ survey results presented at the EUIC, http://euinfocentre.al/content.aspx?idjadok=407 (accessed 11 February 2014).

EUNACAL Institute, Analysis of key survey results on the perceptions and expectations of citizens and business toward Albania's EU accession and the use of web 2.0 technologies for political deliberation, http://eunacal.org/wp- content/uploads/2010/06/Executive_Summary_EUNACAL_and_OSFA_Survey.pdf (accessed 7 May 2014).

Europa.eu, EU candidate status for Albania, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14- 439_en.htm (accessed 6 July 2014).

European Commission, Albania 2011 Progress Report, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/al_rapport_2011_en.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014).

European Commission, Albania 2013 Progress Report, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/brochures/albania_2013.p df ( accessed 18 February 2014).

103

European Commission, Albania – A future with Europe, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/seerecon/albania/documents/albania_future_with_eu rope.pdf (accessed 12 July 2014).

European Commission, Commission’s Opinion on Albania’s application for membership of the European Union, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/al_rapport_2010_en.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014).

European Commission – Enlargement, Accession Criteria, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm (accessed 6 May 2014).

European Commission, Key findings of the 2013 Progress Report on Albania, file:///C:/Users/6128130/Downloads/MEMO-13-888_EN.pdf (accessed26 February 2014).

European Commission, Report on Albania’s Progress in the Fight against Corruption and Organized Crime and in the Judicial Reform, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/al_report_june_2014.pdf (accessed 23 June 2014).

European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency-Copenhagen European Council, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/europeancouncil/pdf/cop_en.pdf (accessed12 July 2014).

FRIDE, Democracy Monitoring Report – Albania, http://www.fride.org/download/IP_Albania_ENG_ap10.pdf (accessed 26 May 2014).

Gërxhani, Klarita & Schram, Arthur, ‘Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture’, LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, nr. 92 (2000): 1 – 22.

Gil-Mendieta, Jorge & Schmidt, Samuel, ‘The political network in Mexico’, Social Networks, vol. 18, nr. 4 (1996): 355 – 381.

Holman, Kate, Albania deserves EU candidate status, http://euobserver.com/opinion/122466 (accessed 8 July 2014).

104

Hovet, Jason, Reuters, UPDATE 1-Czech power firm CEZ starts arbitration in Albania row, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/07/cez-albania-idUSL5N0B76MU20130207 (accessed 12 July 2014).

Hoxha, Jutbina, Office Administrative Assistant at the Council of Europe in Albania, Personal communication, October 2013 – June 2014.

Independent Balkan News Agency, European Union does not grant candidate status to Albania, http://www.balkaneu.com/european-union-doesnt-grant-candidate-status-albania/ (accessed 6 July 2014).

International Election Observation, Republic of Albania – Local Government Elections 8 May 2011, http://www.osce.org/odihr/77446?download=true (accessed 26 May 2014).

INSTAT, Gross Domestic Product for Republic of Albania – Statistical Regions Level 1, 2, 3, 2011, http://www.instat.gov.al/media/204367/gdp_by_statistical_regions_level_2__3_year__2011.p df ( accessed 22 June 2014).

INSTAT, Population and Housing Census 2011, http://www.instat.gov.al/media/177354/main_results__population_and_housing_census_201 1.pdf (accessed 21 May 2014).

Irrera, Daniela, ‘The Balkanization of Politics: Crime and Corruption in Albania’, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, nr. 18 (2006): 1 – 23.

Jacques, Edwin, The Albanians: An Ethnic History from a Prehistoric Times to the Present (Jefferson 1995).

Jacquesson, Svetlana, ‘From clan narratives to clan politics’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 31, nr. 3 (2012): 277 – 292.

Kadare, Jorina, UNDP Albania, National Project Officer on CSR, Personal communication, 19 June 2014.

Kaser, Michael, ‘Economic Continuities in Albania's Turbulent History’, Europe-Asia Studies, nr. 53, vol. 4 (2010): 627 – 637.

105

Koleka, Benet, Reuters, EU to decide on putting Albania on road to membership, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/04/uk-eu-albania-idUKKBN0EF1LN20140604 (accessed 7 July 2014).

Korenica, Fisnik & Doli, Dren, ‘The 2009 parliamentary election in Albania’, Electoral Studies, vol. 30, nr. 30 (2011): 223 – 226.

Kotoni, Marçeza & Karapataqi, Joana, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Municipality, central government clash over extension of Tirana’s boulevard, 20 March 2014.

La Cava, Gloria &Nanetti, Rafaella (The World Bank), Albania – Filling the Vulnerability Gap (Washington 2000).

Lawson, Colin & Saltmarshe, Douglas, ‘Security and Economic Transition: Evidence from North Albania’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 52, nr. 1 (2000): 133 – 148.

MacDonald, Scott B., & Novo, Andrew, When Small Countries Crash (New Jersey 2011).

Mema, Adriatik, Democratization in Albania: The OSCE, NATO and the European Union, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524708.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014): 1 – 109.

Mihas, D.E.M., ‘Religion in Albania’, Modern Believing, nr. 1, vol. 38 (1997): 32 – 40.

Ministry of State for Local Government of Albania, Administrative and Territorial Reform, http://www.al.undp.org/content/dam/albania/docs/misc/Analysis%20of%20the%20Local%20 Government%20Situation%20in%20Albania,%20Executive%20summary.pdf (accessed 19 June 2014).

Mitre, Elga, Political Officer at the Embassy of the Netherlands in Albania, Personal communication, September 2013 – July 2014.

Mustafa, Mentor & Young, Antonia, ‘Feud narratives: contemporary deployments of kanun in Shala Valley, northern Albania’, Anthropological Notebook, XIV/II (2008): 87 – 107.

Mustafaraj, Albania, Rooting out Poverty, http://www.seda.org.al/NHDR/CH3.pdf ( accessed 22 June 2014).

National Democratic Institute in Albania, Dialogue between Citizens and Politicians Key to Better Governance and a Stronger Economy, https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI-Albania-2014- Focus-Group-Report.pdf (accessed 5 July 2014).

106

Netherlands Embassy in Tirana, Dutch government opinion: Albania not ready yet for candidate status, http://albania.nlembassy.org/news/news-2012/november-2012/dutch- position-albania.html (accessed 7 May 2014).

Netherlands Embassy in Tirana, Council conclusion on EU candidate status for Albania, http://albania.nlembassy.org/news/2013/december/council-decision-about-albania-2013.html (accessed 7 May 2014).

O'Brennan, John & Gassie, Esmeralda, ‘From Stabilization to Consolidation: Albanian State Capacity and Adaptation to European Union Rules’. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, vol. 11, nr. 1 (2009): 61 – 82.

OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Albania – Parliamentary Elections 28 June 2009, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/albania/38598?download=true (accessed 17 February 2014).

OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Albania – Parliamentary Elections 23 June 2013, 32, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/106963?download=true (accessed 17 February 2014).

OSCE, Report by the Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania to the OSCE Permanent, 22 October 2009, http://www.osce.org/albania/39917?download=true (accessed 6 May 2014).

Papathimiu, Sonila, ‘The demographic and economic development of Albania during and after the decline of Communist regime (1945-2010)’, Treballs de la Societat Catalana de Geografia, nr. 73 (2012): 101 – 118.

Partos, Gabriel, ‘Why Are Albanian Elections so Controversial?’, Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, nr. 1 (2011): 87 – 92.

Pollo, Stefanaq & Puto, Arben, The history of Albanian – from its origins to the present day (London 1981).

Ramet, Sabrina P., Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989 (New York 2010).

Rukaj, Marjola, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Albania rejected, resoundingly, http://boafnelb3.balcanicaucaso.org/bhs/Regions-and-countries/Albania/Albania-rejected- resoundingly-146368 (accessed 6 May 2014).

107

Rusi, Erjona, The slow path to building civil society in Albania, http://euobserver.com/news/123272 (accessed 26 May 2014).

Sajdini, European Integration of Albania, http://www.studymode.com/essays/European- Integration-Of-Albania-1830532.html (accessed 3 June 2014).

Schatz, Edward, Modern Clan Politics (Seattle 2004).

Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie & Jürgen, Bernd, Albanian Identities: myth and history (London 2002).

Seiner, Franz, Ubersicht der Gliederung der albanischen Stämme (Bajraks, Fahnen) imvormals k.u.k. Besatzungsgebiet: Albanien 1918, http://www-gewi.uni- graz.at/seiner/deutsch/stammesgebiete.html ( accessed 29 June 2014).

Stern, Ulrike, &Wohlfeld, Sarah, ‘Albania’s Long Road into the European Union’, DGAPanalyze, nr. 11 (2012): 1 – 21.

Stiftung, Bertelsmann, BTI 2012 – Albania Country Report (Gütersloh 2012).

Stratulat Corina & Vurmo, Gjergji, Albania and the European Union – No time to depart from the ‘carrot and stick’ approach, file:///E:/Albania/Literature/pub_3719_albania_and_the_european_union.pdf (accessed 12 July 2014).

Tirana Times, As priorities shift, support for EU membership sees slight decline, 13 June 2014, p. 3.

Tahirllari, Elton & Kotoni, Marçeza, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Assembly meets while DP rally outside, 16 May 2014.

Tahirllari, Elton & Kotoni, Marçeza, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Basha: DP’s return to power necessary to stop Rama-Meta’s inept experiments, 10 April 2014.

Tahirllari, Elton & Kotoni, Marçeza, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Dismissed public administration officials go on hunger strike, 22 May 2014.

Tahirllari, Elton & Kotoni, Marçeza, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Halimi: 2,700 reports collected from dismissed public administration officials, 6 March 2014.

108

Tahirllari, Elton & Kotoni, Marçeza, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Hunger strike of dismissed public administration officials ends on 15th day, 5 June 2014.

Tahirllari, Elton &Kotoni, Marçeza, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Hunger strike of dismissed public administration officials enters 7th day, 27 May 2014.

Tahirllari, Elton & Kotoni, Marçeza, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Opposition walks out of parliamentary committee over sudden agenda change, 27 March 2014.

Tahirllari, Elton & Kotoni, Marçeza, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Parliamentary Committee meeting ends in scuffles, 28 May 2014.

Tahirllari, Elton & Kotoni, Marçeza, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Ruling majority, opposition clash over Summer Day celebrations, 14 March 2014.

Tahirllari, Elton & Kotoni, Marçeza, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Shkodër local officials complain over ‘ridiculously low’ development funds, 29 April 2014.

Tahirllari, Elton & Kotoni, Marçeza, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Tirana Municipality complains over blocking of municipal budget, 27 March 2014.

Transparency International, Albania, http://www.transparency.org/country#ALB (accessed 12 July 2014).

UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities in Albania, http://www.in.undp.org/content/dam/albania/docs/Regional%20Disparities%20in%20Albania %20-%20Analysis.pdf (accessed 18 April 2014).

Van der Heyden, Johan, GeoHive: Global Statistics, Albania, http://www.geohive.com/cntry/albania.aspx (accessed 28 April 2014).

Vasilaki, Christina, NEWEUROPE, Albania progress sufficient for candidate status, says the EC, http://www.neurope.eu/article/albania-progress-sufficient-candidate-status-says-ec (accessed 5 June 2014).

Vasjari, Arjan, ‘The Democratic Impact of European Integration: Case Study of Albania’, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, nr. 6, vol. 4 (2013): 223 – 228.

109

Verbica, Angelina, Deutsche Welle, Albania on the rocky road to EU membership, http://www.dw.de/albania-on-the-rocky-road-to-eu-membership/a-17742793 (accessed 7 July 2014).

Vickers, Miranda & Pettifer, James, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity (London 1997).

Voell, Stéphane ‘North Albanian customary law kanun as a ‘habitus’, On the occasion of the 8th EASA (European Association of Social Anthropologists) Conference at the University of Vienna (2004): 1 – 21.

Vurmo, Gjergji & Stratulat, Corina, European Policy Centre, Opportunity Knocks: Can the EU Help Albania to Help Itself?, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital- Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=141942 (accessed 7 July 2014).

Wang, Yamei, Albania celebrates Summer Day Festival, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/culture/2014-03/15/c_133187406.htm ( accessed 5 July 2014).

Whitaker, Ian, ‘The Traditional Role of Women in Northern Albanian Society’, Anthropological Quarterly, vol. 54, nr. 3 (1981): 146 – 156.

Whitaker, Ian, ‘Tribal Structure and National Politics in Albania 1910 – 1950’, History and Social Anthropology (Eastbourne 1968). Wheeler, Tony, Lonely Planet Badlands: A Tourist on the Axis of Evil (Victoria: 2010).

110