Security Intransition

SECURITY INTRANSITION HOW to COUNTER AGGRESSION WITH LIMITED Resources Kyiv 2016 This report was prepared within the “Think Tank Support Initiative” implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with Think Tank Fund (TTF) with financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine. The contents are those of the Institute of World Policy and do not necessarily re- flect the views of the Swedish Government, the International Renaissance Founda- tion, Think Tank Fund. No part of this research may be reproduced or transferred in any form or by any means, graphic, electronic, or including photocopying or by any information storage retrieval system, without the proper reference to the original source. Authors: Sergiy Solodkyy, Oleksiy Semeniy, Leonid Litra, Olena Betliy, Mykola Bielieskov, Olga Lymar, Yana Sayenko, Yaroslav Lytvynenko, Zachary A. Reeves Cover Picture: Michelangelo, David and Goliath, 1509 © Institute of World Policy, 2016 CONTENTS Foreword 5 1. Asymmetric security model 7 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 1.1. Definition of asymmetric security model ……………………………………………… 10 1.2. Key elements in development of asymmetric security model ………………… 12 1.3. The model’s stability (sustainability) in the short, medium and long term 21 Recommendations ………………………………………………………………………………………… 23 Advantages and disadvantages of the model …………………………………………………… 24 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact 25 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 25 2.2. Best-case security cooperation with the US ………………………………………… 31 2.2.1. Mutual defense agreement ……………………………………………………… 31 2.2.2. Prospects for Ukraine ……………………………………………………………… 36 2.2.3. Major Non-NATO Ally ……………………………………………………………… 38 2.2.4. Alternatives to MNNA Status …………………………………………………… 40 2.3. New Formats of Security Cooperation between Ukraine and the USA …… 41 Recommendations ………………………………………………………………………………………… 43 Advantages and challenges of the Defense Cooperation Agreement or the Strategic Framework Agreement with the USA ……………………… 45 Advantages and challenges of the bilateral security agreements (the Philippines, Korea Republic, Japan) with the USA for Ukraine ……………………… 46 Advantages and challenges of MNNA status for Ukraine …………………………………… 47 Appendices …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 48 3 3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider 52 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 52 3.1. Assessment of the Current Status of Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO ………………………………………………………………… 53 3.1.1. The Comprehensive Package of Aid to Ukraine ………………………… 53 3.1.2. Trust Funds ……………………………………………………………………………… 55 3.1.3. Strategic Defence Bulletin and Interoperability ………………………… 59 3.1.4. Assistance from Advisors of NATO Member States ……………………… 60 3.1.5. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication ………………………… 61 3.1.6. Information Exchange and Cybersecurity ………………………………… 61 3.1.7. Reform of the Security Service and Intelligence of Ukraine ……… 62 3.1.8. Fighting Corruption ………………………………………………………………… 64 3.2. Benefits of the NATO Partnership ……………………………………………………… 65 3.3. The Likelihood of Implementation of the Model ………………………………… 69 Recommendations ………………………………………………………………………………………… 70 Strengths and weaknesses of partnership with NATO ……………………………………… 71 4. Regional Security 72 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 72 4.1. Regional Dimensions of the Security Service of Ukraine ……………………… 72 4.2. Examples of Models of Regional Security …………………………………………… 74 4.3. Disadvantages of the Model ……………………………………………………………… 76 4.4. The Transformation of GUAM into a United Security Grouping Following the Example of ASEAN ……………………………………………………… 77 4.5. Accession to the European Security Complex ……………………………………… 80 4.6. Options for reducing the influence of Russia on the European continent ………………………………………………………………… 85 Recommendations ………………………………………………………………………………………… 89 5. Neutrality 93 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 93 5.1. Assessment of current state………………………………………………………………… 94 5.2. Best examples of the model’s implementation …………………………………… 95 5.3. Disadvantages of the armed neutrality model ……………………………………… 98 5.4. How the model may help to deter the Russian aggression? ………………… 101 5.5. Probability of the implementation of the armed neutrality model ………… 104 5.6. How to implement the model? …………………………………………………………… 106 Recommendations ………………………………………………………………………………………… 107 Advantages and disadvantages of the model …………………………………………………… 108 Acknowledgments 109 Foreword FOREWORD The Russian threat, inconsistent public 4) how well the model might work to re- policy, lack of political consolidation, institu- strain Russia’s aggression; tional incapacity- the Institute of World Policy 5) how probably the model might be imple- examined these dangers facing Ukraine back mented in the short (1-3 years), medium in 2013 in a paper called “Ukraine: Diagnos- (3-5 years) and longer (5 and more years) tics of national (in)security.”1 The report was published just a few months before Russia’s terms; aggression began in earnest. In many ways, 6) recommendations. that three-year-old study has remained very current even today—and the list of threats has Each section also contains a table sum- only grown. The Rating Group’s latest survey, marizing the pros and cons of the analyzed in October 2016, showed that most Ukrainians model. consider the conflict in Donbas the biggest is- In any case, the Institute of World Policy has sue facing Ukraine now.2 no doubt that Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integra- Our current report, “Security in Transition,” tion is inevitable. Still, as analysts, we were ob- serves to respond to this enormous list of ligated to consider other security formats, es- threats. Our main goal here has been to analyze pecially to be able to assess the pros and cons security options based on five models: coopera- of each of the options during a transition peri- tion with NATO, regional security pacts, armed od. For instance, an analysis of recent trends in neutrality, bilateral security instruments, and the modified neutral model could be of inter- the asymmetrical model. Each of the five parts est both to other researchers and, in particular, of this report is dedicated to one of these secu- for decision-makers. Indeed, the Institute’s re- rity options and analyzes each option according search shows that neutral states are gradually to these five aspects: becoming less and less neutral in the traditional sense of this model: such countries are aware 1) an assessment the current status of the of their vulnerability before a number of differ- model, especially in relation to Ukraine; ent threats, whether that be terrorism for neu- 2) best examples of the application of the tral Turkmenistan or hybrid or even traditional model worldwide; war for neutral Finland and Sweden. The asymmetrical model is a transitional 3) the model’s drawbacks; model that fully permits the use of elements from any of the other security options analyzed in this report. It in no case stands in the way 1 http://iwp.org.ua/eng/pub/958.html of Euro-Atlantic integration but, on the con- 2 http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/ob- trary, could prove to be an additional advantage schestvenno-politicheskie_nastroeniya_nasele- niya_oktyabr_2016.html through which Ukraine might become more 5 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources interesting and valuable to the Alliance. As to always there, but it is not inevitable. In recent Euro-Atlantic integration itself, Ukraine needs years, responses to Russia’s aggression were ac- to stop looking for new formats and focus on companied by countless ‘revelations’ about how implementing those programs that are current- international partners will or did cut deals with ly on offer through its partnership with NATO. the Kremlin that were against Ukraine’s inter- Deeper, not broader, integration must become ests. But three years of growing military strength the main motto for all those involved in carrying in Ukraine, the dedicated voluntarism of Ukrai- out the reform plans intended to move Ukraine nians in support of their own army, and Ukraine’s towards the Alliance. For instance, Ukraine’s cur- active political and diplomatic engagement rent Administration is insisting that the country have ensured that this kind of conspiratorial be included in NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities scenario did not materialize. For Ukraine, a suc- Program, which currently includes Australia, Fin- cessful security model is, above all, the further land, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden. Neither NATO reformation of its Armed Forces, but not only. It itself, nor the countries participating in the pro- also means combating corruption, including in gram, can clearly explain how this format might the defense sector, attracting investment to the be important for Ukraine. Nor is there any obvi- economy, gaining the trust of ordinary citizens ous evidence that this program might somehow in their government, and establishing a govern- bring Ukraine closer to the Alliance. ment that is accountable before its citizenry. The Institute of World Policy is aware that the risk of a “grand bargain” among global players is Alyona Getmanchuk Director, Institute of World Policy 6 1. Asymmetric security model 1. ASYMMETRIC SECURITY MODEL The order is submerged not primarily from military defeat or an imbalance in resources (though this often follows) but from a failure to understand the nature

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