SECURITY INTRANSITION
How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
Kyiv 2016 This report was prepared within the “Think Tank Support Initiative” implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with Think Tank Fund (TTF) with financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine.
The contents are those of the Institute of World Policy and do not necessarily re- flect the views of the Swedish Government, the International Renaissance Founda- tion, Think Tank Fund. No part of this research may be reproduced or transferred in any form or by any means, graphic, electronic, or including photocopying or by any information storage retrieval system, without the proper reference to the original source.
Authors: Sergiy Solodkyy, Oleksiy Semeniy, Leonid Litra, Olena Betliy, Mykola Bielieskov, Olga Lymar, Yana Sayenko, Yaroslav Lytvynenko, Zachary A. Reeves
Cover Picture: Michelangelo, David and Goliath, 1509
© Institute of World Policy, 2016 CONTENTS
Foreword 5
1. Asymmetric security model 7 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 1.1. Definition of asymmetric security model………………………………………………… 10 1.2. Key elements in development of asymmetric security model…………………… 12 1.3. The model’s stability (sustainability) in the short, medium and long term…21 Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………………………… 23 Advantages and disadvantages of the model……………………………………………………… 24
2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact 25 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 25 2.2. Best-case security cooperation with the US…………………………………………… 31 2.2.1. Mutual defense agreement………………………………………………………… 31 2.2.2. Prospects for Ukraine………………………………………………………………… 36 2.2.3. Major Non-NATO Ally………………………………………………………………… 38 2.2.4. Alternatives to MNNA Status……………………………………………………… 40 2.3. New Formats of Security Cooperation between Ukraine and the USA……… 41 Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………………………… 43 Advantages and challenges of the Defense Cooperation Agreement or the Strategic Framework Agreement with the USA………………………… 45 Advantages and challenges of the bilateral security agreements (the Philippines, Korea Republic, Japan) with the USA for Ukraine………………………… 46 Advantages and challenges of MNNA status for Ukraine……………………………………… 47 Appendices……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 48
3 3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider 52 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 52 3.1. Assessment of the Current Status of Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO…………………………………………………………………… 53 3.1.1. The Comprehensive Package of Aid to Ukraine…………………………… 53 3.1.2. Trust Funds………………………………………………………………………………… 55 3.1.3. Strategic Defence Bulletin and Interoperability…………………………… 59 3.1.4. Assistance from Advisors of NATO Member States………………………… 60 3.1.5. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication…………………………… 61 3.1.6. Information Exchange and Cybersecurity…………………………………… 61 3.1.7. Reform of the Security Service and Intelligence of Ukraine ………… 62 3.1.8. Fighting Corruption…………………………………………………………………… 64 3.2. Benefits of the NATO Partnership ………………………………………………………… 65 3.3. The Likelihood of Implementation of the Model…………………………………… 69 Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………………………… 70 Strengths and weaknesses of partnership with NATO………………………………………… 71 4. Regional Security 72 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 72 4.1. Regional Dimensions of the Security Service of Ukraine………………………… 72 4.2. Examples of Models of Regional Security……………………………………………… 74 4.3. Disadvantages of the Model………………………………………………………………… 76 4.4. The Transformation of GUAM into a United Security Grouping Following the Example of ASEAN………………………………………………………… 77 4.5. Accession to the European Security Complex………………………………………… 80 4.6. Options for reducing the influence of Russia on the European continent…………………………………………………………………… 85 Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………………………… 89
5. Neutrality 93 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 93 5.1. Assessment of current state………………………………………………………………… 94 5.2. Best examples of the model’s implementation……………………………………… 95 5.3. Disadvantages of the armed neutrality model………………………………………… 98 5.4. How the model may help to deter the Russian aggression?…………………… 101 5.5. Probability of the implementation of the armed neutrality model…………… 104 5.6. How to implement the model?……………………………………………………………… 106 Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………………………… 107 Advantages and disadvantages of the model……………………………………………………… 108 Acknowledgments 109 Foreword
Foreword
The Russian threat, inconsistent public 4) how well the model might work to re- policy, lack of political consolidation, institu- strain Russia’s aggression; tional incapacity- the Institute of World Policy 5) how probably the model might be imple- examined these dangers facing Ukraine back mented in the short (1-3 years), medium in 2013 in a paper called “Ukraine: Diagnos- (3-5 years) and longer (5 and more years) tics of national (in)security.”1 The report was published just a few months before Russia’s terms; aggression began in earnest. In many ways, 6) recommendations. that three-year-old study has remained very current even today—and the list of threats has Each section also contains a table sum only grown. The Rating Group’s latest survey, marizing the pros and cons of the analyzed in October 2016, showed that most Ukrainians model. consider the conflict in Donbas the biggest is- In any case, the Institute of World Policy has sue facing Ukraine now.2 no doubt that Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integra- Our current report, “Security in Transition,” tion is inevitable. Still, as analysts, we were ob- serves to respond to this enormous list of ligated to consider other security formats, es- threats. Our main goal here has been to analyze pecially to be able to assess the pros and cons security options based on five models: coopera- of each of the options during a transition peri- tion with NATO, regional security pacts, armed od. For instance, an analysis of recent trends in neutrality, bilateral security instruments, and the modified neutral model could be of inter- the asymmetrical model. Each of the five parts est both to other researchers and, in particular, of this report is dedicated to one of these secu- for decision-makers. Indeed, the Institute’s re- rity options and analyzes each option according search shows that neutral states are gradually to these five aspects: becoming less and less neutral in the traditional sense of this model: such countries are aware 1) an assessment the current status of the of their vulnerability before a number of differ- model, especially in relation to Ukraine; ent threats, whether that be terrorism for neu- 2) best examples of the application of the tral Turkmenistan or hybrid or even traditional model worldwide; war for neutral Finland and Sweden. The asymmetrical model is a transitional 3) the model’s drawbacks; model that fully permits the use of elements from any of the other security options analyzed in this report. It in no case stands in the way 1 http://iwp.org.ua/eng/pub/958.html of Euro-Atlantic integration but, on the con- 2 http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/ob- trary, could prove to be an additional advantage schestvenno-politicheskie_nastroeniya_nasele- niya_oktyabr_2016.html through which Ukraine might become more
5 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
interesting and valuable to the Alliance. As to always there, but it is not inevitable. In recent Euro-Atlantic integration itself, Ukraine needs years, responses to Russia’s aggression were ac- to stop looking for new formats and focus on companied by countless ‘revelations’ about how implementing those programs that are current- international partners will or did cut deals with ly on offer through its partnership with NATO. the Kremlin that were against Ukraine’s inter- Deeper, not broader, integration must become ests. But three years of growing military strength the main motto for all those involved in carrying in Ukraine, the dedicated voluntarism of Ukrai- out the reform plans intended to move Ukraine nians in support of their own army, and Ukraine’s towards the Alliance. For instance, Ukraine’s cur- active political and diplomatic engagement rent Administration is insisting that the country have ensured that this kind of conspiratorial be included in NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities scenario did not materialize. For Ukraine, a suc- Program, which currently includes Australia, Fin- cessful security model is, above all, the further land, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden. Neither NATO reformation of its Armed Forces, but not only. It itself, nor the countries participating in the pro- also means combating corruption, including in gram, can clearly explain how this format might the defense sector, attracting investment to the be important for Ukraine. Nor is there any obvi- economy, gaining the trust of ordinary citizens ous evidence that this program might somehow in their government, and establishing a govern- bring Ukraine closer to the Alliance. ment that is accountable before its citizenry. The Institute of World Policy is aware that the risk of a “grand bargain” among global players is Alyona Getmanchuk Director, Institute of World Policy
6 1. Asymmetric security model
1. Asymmetric security model
The order is submerged not primarily from military defeat or an imbalance in resources (though this often follows) but from a failure to understand the nature and scope of the challenge arrayed against it Henry Kissinger
In the contemporary world, the security of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers depends on the international status quo Zbigniew Brzezinski
Introduction
After the events of early 2014, which are de- the case of Ukraine, attempts at unconvention- fined now as the Ukraine crisis (events in around al approaches to develop its own security mod- Ukraine), the issue of security models and pos- el5 when traditional tools began to fail or get sible security guarantees became of critical im- stuck were not systematic and, what is more im- portance for Ukraine and rather important for its portant, were not supported by the government. neighbours. The course of previous crises in the The official documents6 usually include conven- new century and the experience of the Ukraine tional answers and are not always able to be crisis show that the known classical models ei- quickly actualized according to the needs of the ther do not work or are not very effective, es- time. Meanwhile, the world’s leading actors (es- pecially for Ukraine.3 It is Ukraine who, almost entirely, pays the cost of these erroneous cal- culations and hasty actions,4 or their failure. In 5 For example, a scientific analysis of possible securi- ty models is set forth in: V.A. Manzhola, V.M. Vdoven- ko. Neutrality and non-alignment in the foreign poli- 3 Even such safe countries as Sweden and Finland recent- cy strategy of Ukraine. / “Ukraine in the post bipolar ly have seriously examined the efficiency of their previ- system of international relations” (the lead author: ous security models and do not exclude their significant V.A.Manzhola) K.: “Kyiv University” Publishing and changes. Zwischen Allianzfreiheit und Einbindung.Finn- Printing Center, 2008 P.374-387 land und Schweden auf der Suche nach einer neuen Si- 6 For example, the latest edition of the National Securi- cherheitsstrategie. SWP-Aktuell, April 2015. Retrieved at: ty Strategy, approved by the Decree of the President of http://www.swp-berlin.org/publikationen/swp-aktuell-de/ Ukraine on May 26, 2015.
7 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
pecially the United States, Russia and China) are The purpose of the security model should be developing and testing systems of modern inte- to ensure the reliability and sustainability of se- grated non-military actions and means to force curity in peacetime and the ability to break the their counterpart to either conduct a policy suit- will of the enemy (and not his military power) able for therm or terminate certain actions.7 to continue further aggression against Ukraine This leads to the conclusion that Ukraine if the conflict bursts out. needs to go beyond previous canons if we are to survive as a country and a state in the current One of the important issues in the construc- turbulent period, both for our region and for the tion of this model is to determine the main world.8 Modern threats and challenges are com- threats and enemies (which are often interrelat- plex and require the same systemic reaction or ed) and ways of responding. Given the current actions ahead of the curve, because ”those un- circumstances, in the near future the Russian der assault are challenged to defend not only Federation is likely to be Ukraine’s opponent in their territory, but the basic assumptions of their the context of security (with threats which de- way of life, their moral right to exist and to act rive from this fact). But is Russia the only enemy in a manner that, until the challenge, had been now and will it be the enemy in the next 10- treated as beyond question.”9 For the Ukraini- 15 years? Should our security system be built an security model such disposition implies the solely as a response to the threat from Russia? need to develop a sufficiently dynamic securi- Should we completely exclude the possibility ty system, which would include some variation- of obtaining new security assurances, including al basic elements and the ability to be quickly from Russia (given voluntarily or under pressure reconfigured depending on changes in key cir- of our allies) in the medium term, given the neg- cumstances.10 ative experience of when the security guaran- tees11 under the Budapest Memorandum (1994) 12 7 See a more detailed analysis of the US means and failed to work properly? Can we consider suffi- mechanisms to force the enemy to necessary actions cient the current proposals of our Western allies without the option of a military conflict in the study David C.Gompert, Hans Binnnendijk. The power to co- erce. Countering adversaries without going to war. 11 According to the American side these are assurances, RAND, 2016. Retrieved at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/ not guarantees (based on the English version of the research_reports/RR1000.html text of the memorandum) 8 According to the authors’ opinion, it will take the next 12 Memorandum on security assurances in connection 5-10 years to reconfigure these systems and to estab- with Ukraine’s Accession to the treaty on non-pro- lish new ones (or strengthening old ones, which is un- liferation of nuclear weapons. (Effective date — De- likely) with appropriate balance cember 5, 1994)
8 1. Asymmetric security model
to improve the security situation in Ukraine?13 rity of the state with limited resources (or sig- And can the security assurances for Ukraine be nificantly superior enemy’s resources) or using a considered quite effective and sustainable, if non-traditional model (traditional ones, such as Russia is not involved in them?14 guarantees from certain states or security asso- Given the very difficult situation in Ukraine ciations do not seem possible for Ukraine in the in the socio-economic, socio-political, industrial near future). and infrastructure areas today and bleak pros- The development of asymmetric securi- pects for its quick improvement in the near fu- ty models is quite an innovative17 step; that is ture, when planning responses in the security why they do not have a clear definition yet and sector we need to seriously work out variants of there is no established list of their mandatory asymmetric responses or actions15 in case of ag- parameters and components. The adjacent topic gression and asymmetric security models (en- of asymmetric or hybrid conflicts and wars18 is suring security mainly through non convention- much more advanced; some of their elements al asymmetric means)16, i.e. to ensure the secu- can be also used in the asymmetric security model. That is why we are in a wide field of un- certainty, which is still to be developed and sys- 13 For example, proposals by high level US experts on tematized. So, probably, the Ukrainian approach- the necessary policy of the United States, which how- es, groundwork and proposals19 (subject to the ever have not been implemented yet. Steven Pi- fer, Strobe Talbott, Ambassador Ivo Daalder, Michele quality development and subsequent success- Flournoy, Ambassador John Herbst, Jan Lodal, Admi- ful application) can be the beginning of the sys- ral James Stavridis and General Charles Wald. Pre- tematization and formation of a new division of serving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must general security models. Do. In: Brokings Report, February 2015. Retrieved at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2015/02/ ukraine-independence-russian-aggression 14 The only scenario that cancels this need is option of a collapse of today’s Russia or its very serious (disas- trous) weakening. 17 Although in the world’s history it is possible to find 15 Assymetric warfare — unconventional strategies examples of successful asymmetric responses to ag- and tactics adopted by a force when the military ca- gressive actions of more powerful opponents by the pabilities of belligerent powers are not simply une- weaker counterparts — for example, Finland against qual but are so significantly different that they cannot the USSR in 1939-1940, Algeria against France after make the same sorts of attacks on each other. In “En- the World War II, Vietnam against the United States cyclopedia Brytannica” Retrieved at https://www.bri- in 1960s-70s, Israel against the Arab coalition in the tannica.com/topic/asymmetrical-warfare 1960s. 18 16 “To develop by less-advantaged side counterstrategies Common approaches to world recent asymmetric for asymmetrical warfare, whereby unconventional conflicts are quite well analyzed in: L.V. Deriglazova. means might be used to overcome more technically Asymmetric conflicts: the equation with multiple un- advanced adversaries”. Definition in “Nuclear strategy knowns. Tomsk, 2009. after the Cold War” In “Encyclopedia Brytannica” Re- 19 As in the case of the idea to create in Ukraine a center trieved at https://www.britannica.com/topic/nuclear- of expertise on hybrid methods of war under the pro- strategy/After-the-Cold-War gram of cooperation with NATO
9 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
1.1. definition of asymmetric and trust between the people and the rul- security model ing circles. An asymmetric security model involves giv- As you can see, Ukraine in many ways meets ing up the traditional security model and a situ- the model or can meet it in the near future (with ation when a state with limited resources must the exception of the high-tech network army pa- find an effective response to the threat(s) of ob- rameter and, to some extent, trust between the viously superior enemy(ies) and discourage him people and the ruling circles). from further aggressive actions. It is character- Concerning the question of actual threats ized by the following parameters: and opponents, one needs to answer what ex- •• less important quantity and lower quality actly from this list Ukraine can use and apply of available traditional security resources in today? To be more specific, we will use the case comparison with the enemy; where we define Russia20 as our today’s main •• focus on maximizing the cost of aggressive enemy and threat. Also, one must take into ac- actions against yourself through significant count the fact that Russia itself now successfully losses incurred by the aggressor in this case employs hybrid tools and mechanisms of influ- •• transfer of the resistance balance to uncon- ence or coercion for certain advantageous ac- ventional responses sector (technologies of tion actions21 in regards to Ukraine and some social influence and manipulation, cyber- other countries. At the same time we can assert sphere, information weapons, the possibili- that the time spent outside direct subordina- ty of significant damage to the aggressor’s tion to Russia plays in favour of an independent state administration systems) security model creation for Ukraine. 22 •• creation of informal support networks in various areas among foreign partners (to obtain the necessary resources and in- crease pressure on the aggressor from the other side) • • purposeful “snap to ourselves” (especially by 20 If any power or country is dangerous for Ukraine in the involving in the possession of certain assets near future, the security model should be appropriate- in the country) of influential regional and in- ly adjusted. ternational actors, especially among neigh- 21 These aspects are pretty well covered in a publication of The Centre for Global Studies Strategy XXI: Putin’s boring countries Hybression. Non-military aspects of new generation •• development and presence of high-tech and wars. Kyiv, 2016 network army capable of long resistance, in- 22 According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “hence time may cluding the tactics of “death by a thousand not be working in favor of a voluntary submission by Kyiv to Moscow, but impatient Russian pressures cuts” to that end as well as the West’s indifference could •• high level of the coherence of society, com- generate a potentially explosive situation on the very mitment to the idea of their own statehood edge of the European Union». Zbigniew Brzezinski. Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Pow- er. Lviv.: Litopys, 2012. P.80
10 1. Asymmetric security model
Asymmetric Model
High number of losses for the aggressor
Strengthened reconnaissance, special operation forces, antiaircraft de- fence, coastal defense, high-level artillery systems. An operative mobi- lization system
New-generation army
Highly-qualified specialists, information and cybertechnologies, use of outer space for effective reconnaissance and communication interfer- ence
Reasonable diplomacy
Broad and consistent informal networks. Influencing the aggressor via partners or powerful states. Pragmatic and proactive diplomacy
«Binding» regional and world actors
Mass attraction of foreign investments from international players as a guarantee of their intervention on Ukraine’s behalf in time of crisis. Re- making the country into a key hub of continental significance. Active mounting of world TNC in critical manufacturing chains.
Engagement and motivation of social elites of key states
Systematic work with prominent thinkers and urban social groups which have contacts with Ukraine (diaspora, business, expert institu- tions, etc.)
High level of social coherency
Dedication to the idea of statehood, trust between peoples and the po- litical leaders. Reasonable use of personal human capital
11 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
1.2. Key elements in development becoming a dominant feature of the new war of asymmetric security model (not a frontal collision of large groups). 1. Convention (armed) elements against Therefore it is advisable to develop own con- Russia as a deterrent factor (high cost ventional elements with primary emphasis on of losses for the aggressor) deterrence and making significant harm to the Ukraine is now noticeably inferior to Russia human and material component of the Russian in terms of the existing armed and human po- army in case of aggression. A special attention tential23 and long experience in conducting mil- should be paid to the tools of reconaissance, air itary operations in different conditions. In par- defense, coast guard and artillery systems. It is ticular, it concerns the experience of so-called essential to create an effective and efficient sys- hybrid wars, the main outlines of which were tem of mobilization in case of aggression and presented by the Chief of Staff, V.Gerasymov in ensure periodic training of most of the man- January 2013.24 They anticipated the growing power that can be used for this. Effective Spe- role of non-military means (political, econom- cial Operations Forces (which recently have re- ic, information, humanitarian, together with the ceived the necessary regulatory and legal frame- active use of the protest potential of societies) work for their activities according to the current in achieving political and strategic goals and conditions)25 must become another important their often higher effectiveness compared to the element; they will, when necessary, cause a sig- force of arms. Meanwhile, it was suggested for nificant damage to key parts of the army and conventional military means to focus on creat- state maintenance and management system at ing mobile combined task forces operating in a the territory of the aggressor along the front, be- common reconnaissance and information space; hind the front line in Ukraine and on the agres- the remote contactless impact on the enemy sor’s territory. To some extent, Ukraine should be with massive use of high-precision weapons is ready to use the same hybrid war tools against
23 Russia. Military strength. In: http://www.globalfire- power.com/country-military-strength-detail. asp?country_id=russia Ukraine. Military strength. In: http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military- strength-detail.asp?country_id=ukraine 24 V. Gerasimov. The value of science in anticipation. Military-Industrial Courier Issue 8(476), February 27, 25 According to the Law of Ukraine on amendments to 2013.
12 1. Asymmetric security model
the aggressorwhich the latter has been using report of the Federal Council of 2010, its number against Ukraine in recent years.26 by 2018 should not exceed 100 thousand peo- ple29) for the size of the country , with necessary 2. Smart defense and new generation military preparation for the majority of the adult army population that is enrolled in the reserve. These One of the key prerequisites to building an citizens get periodic training, where their coher- effective asymmetric security model is to build ence and compliance with modern war condi- a new generation army, where the emphasis is tions are tested and worked on. For example, made on quality staff (including in reserve) and recent similar national security trainings were modern technical equipment (modern protected conducted in 2014 (the next are scheduled for communications systems, high-precision means 2019), and a detailed report on their results has of destruction, mosquito fleet for a blockade been issued and recommendations have been and a powerful coast guard system, integrated drafted.30 In general, this model focuses almost combat system already at the level of compa- exclusively on the existing strength of the coun- ny-squads). Certain examples of this approach try. It can be described as a dynamic (if neces- to building such a system can be found in the sary, it rapidly increases its potential) and high- experiences of Switzerland27, Sweden, or Israel. technology (based on the power of the country’s The Swiss model is based on a regular army economy) model. that is sufficiently large (currently approx. 140 The Swedish model has a slightly differ- thousand people28, and according to the Security ent emphasis, because of its history and differ- ent security environment. It provides for a fairly 26 James Sherr describes the complex of Russia’s ac- strong regional army (until 2010 the system of tions as follows: “Today as in the past, the combina- call to military service was used. It will be com- tion of means that Russia relies upon — blatant and 31 insidious, cooptive and coercive, ‘humanitarin’ and de- pletely replaced by a contract army by 2018) — structive — causes disorientation as much as discord, today the Swedish Armed Forces comprise about and it brings an antagonistic spirit to many a coop- erative enterprise. (...) The 1990s revived the Musco- vite principle that chaos is simply a medium to be ex- 29 Data of the Government of the Confederation on the ploited for achieving concrete objectives” James Sherr. future army development.Retrieved at: http://www. Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia’s Influence vbs.admin.ch/de/verteidigung/weiterentwicklung-ar- Abroad. K.: Zapovit, 2013. P.119 mee.html and a report «Our Swiss Army Tomorrow» 27 The RAND Corporation recently has even developed Retrieved at: http://www.vbs.admin.ch/content/vbs- proposals for the Baltic countries on non conventional internet/de/die-schweizer-armee/die-weiterentwick- options for the defense based on the Swiss approach. lung-der-armee.download/vbs-internet/de/publica- Read more: Unconventional options for the defense of tions/verteidigung/weiterentwicklungderarmee/Bro- Baltic States. The Swiss approach. RAND Corp., 2016. chure-WEA-d.pdf Retrieved at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/ 30 Read more in «Final report on security trainings of the PE179.html Confederation». Retrieved at: http://www.vbs.admin. 28 Information about countries’ military strength. Swit- ch/de/themen/sicherheitspolitik/sicherheitsverbund- zerland. Retrieved at: http://www.globalfirepower. suebung-2019.html com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_ 31 More about Swedish Armed Forces: http://www.fors- id=switzerland. varsmakten.se/en/about/organisation/the-army/
13 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
40 thousand people32 — and a defense sector and armed forces — the maximum and compre- with intensive security cooperation with NATO, hensive mobilization of society in terms of se- Finland, and the Nordic countries. Due to the re- curity and clear positioning of the army as the cent heightened turbulence of the internation- people’s affair (from the general concept to the al environment (particularly in Europe) Sweden smallest detail), which puts in the center the life has decided to increase defense spending (it is of every citizen of Israel. A systematic approach stated in the defense policy and the budget for like that also includes economic components 2016-2020 years33) and to develop the Total De- that naturally promote good economic dynam- fense concept,which includes military and civil ics and an extremely successful development of protection. So, the model makes more emphasis the military industrial complex of Israel (with on their own ability to deter together with active special emphasis on high technology products). cooperation with allied countries (mainly neigh- This model requires huge constant efforts and bors) and institutions. big expenses, but has proved to be highly ef- The example of Israel has significant differ- fective in an almost completely hostile environ- ences and its own specificity. First of all, the pri- ment for nearly 70 years already. ority of the security policy from the beginning In general, for the successful construction of was, and still is, the survival of the state of Is- a smart defense system, a systematic approach rael. It is even reflected in the major goal of Is- in reforming the military sector should be ap- rael’s Defense Forces — “responsible for ensuring plied — a new army model (staff, scheme of in- the existence of Israel, its security and sovereign teraction between different levels, quality man- rights.” 34 Currently, the Israeli armed forces com- agement, technical equipment), development prise 160 thousand people, while another 630 of the military industrial complex to meet the thousand are in reserve35 (with a total popula- needs of the new generation army (moderniza- tion of 8 million.). This demonstrates the fun- tion of existing weapons, new quality models damental and conceptual approach to security and a rapid launch of their serial production), and active practical cooperation with foreign 32 Information about countries’ military strength. Swe- partners to acquire necessary skills and best den. Retrieved at: http://www.globalfirepower. practices in implementation of the latest equip- com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_ ment in an integrated model of modern warfare. id=sweden 33 Read more in Sweden’s Defense Policy 2016 to 2020. In smart defense a special role in asymmetric Retrieved at: http://www.government.se/globalassets/ operations will be played by information and cy- government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/swe- ber technologies, and the use of outer space for den_defence_policy_2016_to_2020 effective reconnaissance and damaging the en- 34 Read more in the Jewish Virtual Library “Israel Cab- inet Ministries: Ministry of Defense” Retrieved at: emy’s communications. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Poli- In many of these areas Ukraine already has tics/mod.html a good groundwork, but itt still lacks consisten- 35 Information about countries’ military strength. Israel. cy in its implementation and the coordination Retrieved at: http://www.globalfirepower.com/coun- try-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=israel of its parts, as well as a stable state policy in
14 1. Asymmetric security model
this direction. A critical issue in this context is specific country.36 During a crisis contacts with appropriate personnel and financial support for these countries should be prompt and systemat- creation of such a new generation army. Accord- ic in order to ensure that the overall signal and ing to the author, one of the necessary steps for its effect on Russia from different sides reach this should be, for example, to legislate for the maximum efficiency. To this must be added in- next 5 years at least 3-4% of the GDP for spend- fluence through these countries on the position ing on the army. of certain international organizations, in which most of these countries play an important role. 3. Asymmetrical influence through The existing efforts to form “coalitions” using smart diplomacy foreign partners when deciding or discussing is- Smart diplomacy plays a key role in the de- sues which are important for us in international velopment of an effective asymmetric security institutions should also be strengthened. system because it allows for restraining the ag- Nor should we exclude the creation of “dis- gressor through efforts of other actors and in dif- tracting targets”37 for the aggressor within his ferent directions, thereby blocking his resources territory or next to his borders. But this tool and tying his hands to prevent more aggressive should be applied only in case of emergency actions. History knows many examples of a suc- and already inevitable armed escalation by the cessful diplomatic game when there was an ap- aggressor in the short term. parent disparity in the armed component. In this context and in view of present realities, it is im- 4. The transformation of Ukraine into portant to more actively engage in influencing an important multifunctional hub of Russia through its important partners that it re- continental importance spects (China, India, Japan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, A derivative element of smart diplomacy is the USA, Germany and France). Ukraine should the policy of turning Ukraine into an important pay particular attention to establishing such hub in its sub-region38 and a key stabilizing bal- contact with China, which now plays an essen- ance lever at the crossroad between Europe, tial role in the global strategy of Russia. So far, it is not possible to talk about an effective coop- 36 lthough at the same time Russia’s behavior particu- eration in political and security terms between larities concerning its counterparties should be ob- served. According to James Sherr, «it trusts interests Ukraine and China. Although there are all pre- more than principles, the sense of agreements more conditions for this, there is no political will. than their spirit. For the Russian diplomacy — what Each of these countries has a different lev- is not negotiated, is not obligatory». James Sherr. Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia’s Influence el of relationship with and priority for Russia, Abroad. K.: Zapovit, 2013. P.121 as well as having different influence, which we 37 Creation, encouragement or facilitation of evolution should definitely take into account when pro- of crisis situations in or around Russia, that would dis- moting models of influence on Russia via a tract from the realization of undesirable aggressive plans in regard of Ukraine. 38 The example of Singapore for Southeast Asia and of Switzerland and Luxembourg for Western Europe
15 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
Eurasia, and Asia. This will require an extremely of its own economy and representatives of its cautious and skillful diplomatic game (because business. The presence of significant assets the reverse side of the coin in this case is disas- abroad (especially in important sectors for a trous competition for this hub between geopo- specific country) can serve as a practical guaran- litical actors aimed at getting a mandatory con- tee that, in case of aggressive actions by another trol over it). The main functions of the hub could actor, they will be actively protected and at least include: a neutral platform for financial and eco- pressure will be put on the aggressor in case of nomic exchanges, moving resources and goods danger or even that substantial assistance will from different areas and their possible refor- be provided to the victim of aggression in or- matting, balancing migratory flows, creating a der to protect theirassets. For the optimistic de- soft offshore jurisdiction for legal entities, and velopment of this approach in the medium term, a possible negotiation platform. Ukraine has to become an independent connect- Given the growing instability in Asia, Eur- ing node of the continental geopolitical (simi- asia, and the Euro-Atlantic area, creating a sta- lar to the role of Switzerland in Western Europe) ble hub with necessary infrastructure and hu- and geo-economic architecture (the role of a big man resources could satisfy a request for a porto franco, which is beneficial to all major ac- safe place for various transactions from a wide tors), thus making impossible an overpressure range of subjects. At the same time, its existence or threat from one side (due to excessive losses would additionaly increase the cost of aggres- for that side). sive actions against a hub like that due to the However, Ukraine has to diversify strategic harm for many subjects from different regions investments, both by the countries of origin and of the world. It would also accelerate the pace by specific sectors. The ultimate goal should be of socio-economic development and moderniza- a balanced system of foreign capital presence tion of the governance system of the sate and it without substantial domination by any of them, would stimulate the economy to move towards which can be achieved, as well, by involving sev- more modern structures. The increase of the re- eral parties in the same sector. Today, a similar sources that could be invested in the further de- distribution (involvement) of influential actors velopment of the asymmetric security model in Ukraine could look like this: (its state system, military and industrial compo- •• For the US — nuclear power, oil and gas ex- nents) would be an important side result. traction sector, banking and financial sector, venture capital and IT sector, creative econ- 5. Massive foreign investment from omy global players’ countries as a guaran- •• For Germany — biochemical industry, ma- tee of their intervention in favour of chine building (especially machinery, trans- Ukraine in case of a crisis port and agriculture), energy efficiency and In addition to strategic interests or their own renewable energy industry, metallurgy obligations under certain associations, every •• For the UK — financial and banking sector, modern state is rather sensitive to the interests creative economy and venture capital
16 1. Asymmetric security model
•• For France, Italy — light industry, entertain- enterprises and companies as possible in ment, food production global corporations’ production chains. And, •• For Switzerland and Austria — financial and it is necessary to deliberately seek to occu- banking sector, eco-industry (development py critical positions in them that would pre- of a premium brand “Ukraine” for food) and vent or minimize the possibility of a quick bioengineering, renewable energy and waste change of the “Ukrainian element” in these management chains. As in the case of attracting invest- •• For Canada — aircraft construction, nuclear ments, it will increase the cost of Russia’s industry aggression due to the possibility of a direct •• For China — large infrastructure projects, confrontation with TNCs, some of which may military industrial complex, high-quality be present on the Russian market or play a food and deep processing, IT sector vital role in the supply chain in various criti- •• For India — the sphere of military-industri- cal areas. al complex (especially shipbuilding, mainte- Given the dependence of TNCs’ business on nance and modernization of Soviet weapons the political climate and the sensitivity to in- models), pharmaceutical and food industry stability (the factor of direct losses and a drop •• For the Gulf countries — aircraft construction, of their own capitalization in case of force chemical industry, agricultural sector and re- scenarios), TNCs can often act in advance to sort industry prevent an escalation if they see such threat •• For Iran — military-industrial complex, agri- (almost all world major corporations have culture, food industry, chemical industry appropriate analytical and planning depart- •• For Japan — new technological production of ments to assess the situation and risks of po- the 5th-6th waves of innovation (possible use litical and military nature) and not to respond of the FTA with the EU for export of products to the development of the aggression. It will manufactured by Japanese technology, but also include pressure on governments of cer- at a lower cost), nanotechnology, energy and tain countries to intervene in the situation in renewable energy industry, technologies and order to prevent the implementation of ag- production for waste management, transport gressive scenarios against Ukraine. engineering Initially this embedding will require an indi- •• For South Korea — space, nuclear and missile vidual approach to involve every major TNC into technologies, agricultural sector, new com- a specific project or sector (including contacts posite materials at the highest political level) in order to create a success story for other TNCs. Later, there will 6. Active embedding of as many TNCs as be a need to systematize it and to propose to possible in production chains concrete TNCs well-prepared projects, where Another important economic tool for the Ukraine has calculated the desirable positive development of the asymmetric model is a consequences and minimized the possible neg- conscious embedding of as many Ukrainian ative ones.
17 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
7. Active work with social elites and confrontation) is systematic work with opinion communities in key countries abroad leaders and groups of local people, which, for and their active involvement in the various reasons, have a more or less regular con- “projects” on Ukraine tact with Ukraine (diaspora, business, social and Today, in most countries, there is a very ef- cultural groups, expert community, scientific and fective relationship between public opinion and academic community). This would mean regular actions of the authorities (in Western democ- contact with them, their involvement in bilateral racies the sensitivity to the sentiment factor is projects in different areas, and periodic invita- even far too high because of elections). There- tions to various programs and visits to Ukraine. fore, the formation of this opinion or influence on it, and not only in usual formats,39 becomes 8. Use of information weapons and in- extremely important. The opinion of events out- fluence on the public opinion of the ag- side the country is usually formed by the expert gressor community and media in the first place and, in For now, for various reasons Ukraine is most- the second place, by the political class (which ly in a defensive position in the context of the often takes into consideration the expert opin- information warfare against it. At the same time ion of the first two ones). Currently, we are per- it has existing preconditions for effective coun- ceived more or less positively in the most im- teractions in this area, despite Russia’s very ef- portant countries for Ukraine in regard to the ficient system of information influence and con- Ukrainian-Russian confrontation. This position trol of their own information environment to- is, however, based on ‘being the victim’ and on day. First of all it concerns the struggle between an almost complete lack of our own significant the senses40 and conducting media and narra- progress, which is the basis for productive long- tive wars,41 development and subsequent use of term cooperation with groups of supporters ideas-viruses which then begin to live their own abroad. Therefore, to fix the positive attitude,we lives and destabilize your opponent’s system. need to create and then intelligently promote Ukraine today does not have a mechanism of our own success stories, because only this can impact on the information environment of the be the basis of aconstant positive attitude to- enemy to change its behaviour, despite all the wards us. declarations of its necessity. An additional element to gain favor- able opinions of Ukraine on certain impor- tant issues(including on the Ukrainian-Russian 40 G.Pocheptsov. New approaches in “soft” info wars: from influence operations to behavioral conflicts. 2015.
18 1. Asymmetric security model
Considering nowadays, the most realistic growing number of migrants from outside. The task in the short term is to influence public opin- modern world, among criteria of the strength of ion in Russia and change the relevant informa- states and their economies, prioritizes the qual- tion mainstream concerning Ukraine.42 This can ity of human capital and the availability of op- have an indirect (we should not hope for more portunities for its sustainable development. under Russia’s current system of power) influ- Therefore, to improve our own sustainability we ence on the attitudes and actions of Russia’s have to focus both on the already existing hu- leadership; as the greatest effect it may have is man capital and on the design of policy, aimed to break or damage the existing negative infor- at attracting high-quality human capital from mational templates and matrices in regards to outside and its successful integration into Ukrai- Ukraine, which can be considered a satisfacto- nian society. ry result. Considering the still intensive contacts However, in order to enfeeble the enemy’s44 between the two nations and societies, a grad- capacity, one should consider the possibility of ual change in the public opinion in Russia to- draiingn from the enemy best parts of his hu- wards a direction favorable for Ukraine (includ- man capital. In the case of Russia, Ukraine has ing through strategic and network communica- serious advantages due to close contacts and tions43) seems possible even if Russia’s current the already existing migration of a large part propaganda machine keeps working. of opposition-minded people out from Russia. Given that a significant part of this new wave 9. fOCUS on optimal use of the own hu- of emigration (which mainly goes to the West) man capital and its possible imports is well-educated and creative and has good re- from outside sources, “poaching” them to Ukraine’s side (rea- The next element of the model provides for sons for this could be different) can increase the a focus on the development and optimal use of capacity of our country.45 human capital and maximum containment of its irrevocable outflow from the country. Given the 44 However, we must not underestimate the strength of demographic (namely the decrease in Ukraine’s the current system of government of Russia. Accord- ing to James Sherr, “Russia’s neo-feudal system might population) and climate (both the increase of reward mediocrity, diminish value and institutionalize migrants in the world because of the bad condi- theft, but that does not make it unstable. (...) Russia’s tions of their former territories, and Ukraine as strength lies in prolonging the life of outmoded prac- tices. If these practices cannot produse a positive end an attractive place for migration) trends, Ukraine (...), then the achievement of negative ends is suffi- in the near future should be able to welcome a cient. (...) If Russia cannot have a seat at the table, it will be the elephant in the room. The effectiveness of this mode of statecraft and management should not 42 More about opportunities and implementation of be dismissed” James Sherr. Hard Diplomacy and Soft information influences: G.Pocheptsov. Mind control. Coercion: Russia’s Influence Abroad. K.: Zapovit, 2013. K.: Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Publishing House, 2012. p.122 P.39-72 45 In particular, and thanks to the reverse impact of 43 More on this: G.Pocheptsov. Mind control. K.: Kyiv-Mo- those who left on those who stayed in Russia; it will hyla Academy Publishing House, 2012. P.176-213 be of a multifunctional nature.
19 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
At the same time, the numerous risks that Cooperation in this area and exchange of expe- could be caused by migration of this kind from rience and technology with foreign partners and Russia to Ukraine in the present situation should allies which are also interested in weakening be also considered. However, the “deteriora- this international aggressor are necessary. tion” of the Russian human capital through the emigration of its best part abroad, cou- pled with the ability to redirect and use at least a part of it in Ukraine, is quite an ambitious task, which is worthy of attention in the context of asymmetric actions.
10. Cyber attacks on critical infrastruc- ture objects and important social and economic networks Given the need to ensure your own safety against your superior enemy, the ability to affect, damage ,or destroy the enemy’s critical infra- structure objects (to prevent aggressive actions against you and to reduce the scale of aggres- sion once it starts) is important. The best tool for this for Ukraine would be the use of the cyber- space with relevant cyber attacks against these objects or the ability to control them remotely (i.e. activation of the destruction scenario at the right time). However, this automatically means a deployment of a reliable effective defense sys- tem of one’s critical infrastructure objects. Such actions are aimed at either disabling these networks (for a short or long time) or dem- onstrating the vulnerability of the aggressor in specific areas that would stimulate him to redi- rect efforts; it will gain the time needed to elim- inate the damage caused to specific areas and to work to prevent this in the future. The efficiency of this element requires constant work to iden- tify the opportunities of access to such networks via cyberspace and improvement of cyber tools to affect or destruct relevant facilities remotely.
20 1. Asymmetric security model
1.3. the model’s stability will need, for sure, a specific regulatory handling (sustainability) in the short, and organizing, as well as a full legitimation medium and long term through representative bodies and democratic If it is fully applied, the asymmetrical model mechanisms of Ukraine’s citizens’ expression of is quite stable in the short term, as it provides will. If the opinion that the model has fulfilled a good level of proactive defense46 against the its main mission prevails, in peaceful time this current main adversary. The only significant risk model can be curtailed or preserved for turbu- is in the process of necessary internal transfor- lent times in the future. mations to build up the model and the need to Economic and political cost of the model’s quickly launch the country’s economic engine development and application for its full application. It is difficult to calculate more or less accu- The model is also quite balanced in the me- rately the cost of the development and use of a dium term, as it creates a prerequisite for stabil- model like that in financial and economic terms. ity thanks to many pillars (i.e. loosing one pillar Only military components will require an ap- would not cause the collapse of the entire mod- proximate annual expenditure of 2% to 6% of el). In addition, it reduces the risk of possible ag- the GDP, depending on how critical the state gression against Ukraine because of the relent- of safety is and on the level of aggression and less growth of its own power and increase of in- threats to Ukraine’s security.47 It is impossible fluential foreign actors’ interest in the absence to calculate correctly the non-military expendi- of such aggression and willingness to actively tures for the model, because they vary too much oppose it if the situation evolves in a negative and highly depend on the internal development way. At the same time this model will growingly of the country and the situation around it. Al- contribute to the country’s overall rapid devel- though in general we can say that this model opment and successful transformation of its so- will require significant expenditures at the first cio-economic model both by ensuring the nec- stage of its development — both direct (e.g. for essary security circuit and because of the multi- upgrading and reconfiguring the army) and indi- plier effects of its own implementation. rect (e.g. for reforming the state apparatus and In the long term this model is quite depen- the overall socio-economic model of the state). dent on external factors: for example, the end At the same time it should be noted that this of the turbulence in the surrounding world and model provides for its fast return because it rap- some stabilization may eventually require the idly ensures an acceptable level of safety and model’s transformation to its softer modifica- tions or a switch to a different security mod- el (a model for a quiet, peaceful time). Then it 47 As an example we can adduce the expenses of Swit- zerland, Israel, Sweden and Finland in the defense sector In: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Re- trieved at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex The 46 It includes not only defense and response to enemy’s World Bank. Military expenditure (% of GDP) Retrieved actions, but also “counter” attacks and proactive ac- at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND. tions when needed. GD.ZS?locations=CH-SE-IL-FI
21 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
multiplier benefits from the overall transforma- to some extent even a player on the Euro-At- tion of the country and development of many re- lantic and Eurasian chessboard. This transfor- lated areas (e.g. the defense industry sector, cre- mation of Ukraine from its current pitiful state ative economy, IT, information technologies and could conflict with a number of interests of in- the cyberspace). fluential players in these regions,48including the The political cost of building the asymmetric undesirable appearance of a rather strong com- model for the current system of government in petitor in some areas. In this context, the cost Ukraine is very high or even unacceptable; with of the model can also be quite high because high probability it provides for a radical trans- of the need to overcome some external resis- formation (a real willingness for which has not tance along the way, even from actors which are been noticed yet) or a complete replacement (of friendly today to Ukraine, because some of them the model and certain personalities). The key can have their own vision of the necessary po- reasons for this are some important features sitioning of Ukraine in the Euro-Atlantic area and requirements of the model that the current and of her fulfilment of certain limited range of state of affairs in Ukraine does not meet Name- functions without much space for her own inde- ly, the issue of trust, support for the government pendent actions. by the people and the ability to mobilize the so- ciety and all state mechanisms to create such a system for the effective confrontation of the enemy which dominates you, not tactical ma- noeuvring in a “neither peace nor war” style; lack of serious foreign investment and inclusion of Ukrainian enterprises in important production chains due to the high distrust of authorities in Ukraine (the key causes — corruption and au- thorities’ chaotic actions) and poor business cli- mate. This model also requires a dynamic devel- opment of the economy and its profound trans- formation to meet the needs of key elements of the model, such as modern tools of conventional and non-traditional warfare; unfortunately, de- spite the many preconditions, there are no signs of it in Ukraine. It should also be noted that not all current allies will appreciate the use of such an asym- metric model, because Ukraine, in case of the successful application of the asymmetric model, 48 Resistance of Russia is a separate topic, because in the would become a quite independent entity and baseline scenario, Russia is categorized as an enemy.
22 1. Asymmetric security model
Recommendations should be paid to work with the society, 1. In situations where, for Ukraine, tradition- which must clearly link the army and secu- al security models fail or are unable to pro- rity system. vide adequate security, it’s worth develop- 5. A critical role for the success of any security ing modern adaptive models that can an- model for Ukraine is played by a smart and swer the most important security challeng- proactive diplomacy — systematic work with es. These models should go beyond the es- all important partners, creation of necessary tablished canons, and survivability and ef- networks and coalitions, actions in advance, fectiveness should be their main criterion. promotion of the transformation of Ukraine 2. Given the real situation inside and outside into an important continental hub (an attack Ukraine, the asymmetric security model is against which is too expensive), work with able in the short and medium term to give the social elites and business in key coun- adequate answers to the most important se- tries. Therefore, the support for a reasonable curity issues in Ukraine. One of its key fea- reform of the Ukrainian diplomacy and allo- tures is the ability to provide an effective re- cation (despite all difficulties) of adequate sponse to a dominating enemy using limit- resources should be one of the few (3-5) real ed resources and to break his will to contin- priorities for the state in the medium term. ue aggression. So, a broad professional dis- cussion on real security models for today’s Ukraine should be initiated. The presented model is to be one of the models to discuss. 3. The implementation of this model will re- quire considerable efforts and investment in the first phase, along with the need for a fundamental change in the current state system (primarily, in regard to staff). There- fore it is necessary to begin a systematic work on planning the implementation of the asymmetric model initially at the level of its elements and their promotion in the society, because without their approval any model will not be stable and strong. 4. In the development of conventional mili- tary capabilities the emphasis should be on building a system of “smart defense” and a relevant new generation army (some exam- ples can be found in the armies of Switzer- land, Israel and Sweden). Particular attention
23 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
Advantages and disadvantages of the model
Advantages Disadvantages of the asymmetric security model of the asymmetric security model
1. It is sufficiently flexible and adaptable, 1. Its innovative nature and the lack of oth- able to respond to most Ukraine’s secu- er examples where it has been tested (to rity problems and challenges in the short assess its effectiveness and quality char- and medium term. acteristics). 2. It is able to provide an effective response 2. Implementation of this model will re- to a dominant enemy with limited re- quire considerable efforts and expenses sources and break his will to continue ag- in the first phase gression. 3. A serious internal «state reset» is quite 3. It provides vitality for the state and an possible to launch the model (especially acceptable level of safety for the public staff renewal); it has a risk of turbulence in quite an ambivalent and adverse ex- and destabilization. ternal environment. 4. There is a possibility of resistance from 4. It uses an integrated approach — a com- the outside during its implementation — bination of traditional security tools and not only from Russia (the model (with necessary modernization) and the gives a role to Ukraine which differs from latest developments (e.g. smart defense, how some external actors would like to proactive diplomacy, information work see it). and cyber-tools). 5. Because of its novelty this model does 5. Has a positive macroeconomic effect. not have yet the necessary legitimation 6. The sustainability of the model and its in Ukraine. resistance to external shocks are ensured due to the fact that the model is based on numerous (not just 1-2) basic ele- ments. 7. Provides potential for transformation in- to other security models.
24 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
Introduction 2.1. Current formats of Ukraine- The Budapest Memorandum of 1994 has US collaboration been the most obvious example of how insti- The basis for security cooperation between tutionalized security guarantees offer no cer- Ukraine and the United States is established in titude that they will actually be implemented. Section II of the Charter on Strategic Partner- The problem lies in how this kind of guarantee ship, which emphasizes Ukraine’s status as a is perceived by its stakeholders. Ukraine saw the state that has not been granted the Membership guarantee as a real guarantee, while other part- Action Plan by NATO but is considered a poten- ners saw it as simply an assurance. After Rus- tial future member. Against the background of sia’s aggressions, Ukrainians began to debate the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and Ukraine’s the option of getting more specific guarantees fears regarding the prospects for its member- from the United States. One concept was that a ship in NATO, the Charter could be seen as a Singaporean model of cooperation with the US symbolic gesture to reassure Kyiv of Washing- would push Ukraine to more actively modern- ton’s support. ize its own Armed Forces. This type of strategic As can be seen in Figure 1, prior to Russia’s framework agreement not only encourages re- aggression in 2014, military and political aid straint on the part of an aggressive neighbor but to Ukraine had been slowly shrinking, partly as also the possibility of expanded defense coop- a result of the ‘reset’ between the US and Rus- eration in the future using other available secu- sia and partly because of Viktor Yanukovych’s rity instruments. Kuwait and Bahrain cooperate claims of “non-bloc status” after he came to with the US in the framework of a Defense Co- power in 2010. This negative trend in security operation Agreement of DCA, which eventually cooperation between Ukraine and the US may allowed them to gain MNNA status as a major be one of the reasons why Moscow decided to non-NATO ally. The main flaw with American se- annex Crimea and stir up an armed conflict in curity guarantees is that Washington is not pre- the eastern part of Ukraine. Although the main pared to take on any new third-party commit- variables in Russia’s calculations when it decid- ments, a trend that is likely to be strengthened ed to be aggressive were the political instabil- by the coming to power of Donald Trump. ity in Ukraine and the deteriorated state of its Armed Forces, the absence of real security mea- sures on the part of NATO and the US are likely to also have been a factor.
25 Допомога збройним силам і поліції (млн $)
400 345,57 350
300
250
200 154,264462 150
100 80,508469 67,743528 71,409775 32,917628 41,098933 50,804748 87,866175 50 22,63672 48,431841 41,979829 46,937331 48,230116 49,760718 0 26,578631 25,040897 SECURITY2000 2001IN TRANSITION 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
Figures 1-4. US assistanceДопомога to Ukraine збройним силам і поліції (млн $)
Military and police aid volumeГуманітарна (sum) допомога/ year) та допомога у розвитку (млн $)
400 500 436405,6,5872 354050
30400 350 250 301,873 300 200 250 154,264462 150 176,992 172,684 200 156,389 144,165 140,579 131,94 101050 80,508469 67,743528 98,437 102,993 110,265 71,409775 86,331 77,808 83,05 92,703 100 32,917628 41,098933 50,804748 76,976 87,866175 50 22,63672 80,102 50 48,431841 41,979829 46,937331 48,230116 49,760718 0 26,578631 25,040897 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Arms sales by year authorizationsДопомога збройним (sum) / deliveriesсилам і поліції (sum) (млн $)
ДозвілОбсяг продажу зброї (млн $) Поставки Гуманітарна допомога та допомога у розвитку (млн $) 400 140 345,57 350 129,878589 12500 300 460,682 450 100 250 400 76,396999 38500200 301,873 154,264462 300150 62,876422 60 250 44,020075 100 80,508469 71,409775 46,756194 200 176,992 172,684 67,743528 40 32,917628 156,389 41,098933 50,804748 87,866175 50 26,2 144,165 22,63671240,579 131,94 25,856025 30,680845 29,259576 150 110,265 49,760718 154,83,94231188341 98,437 13,92761341,97982194,43896476,91347,73131710927,993 48,23011962,703 20 0 26,578631 25,04088967,331 77,808 83,05 76,976 100 5,07 12,678435 5,066215 8,741572 21,321822 6,160928 80,102 50 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 200710,0 85 2008 2009 7,2 20109679 1 201113,7 7746 20121 2013 2014 201510,2 61 2016 0 7,597 6,58 0 0 5,555 1,205 3,696 1,799 5,614 3,654695 20002000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 20142013 2015 2014 2016 2015
Humanitarian and development aid volume (sum) / year
ГуманітарнаОбсяг допомога продажу та зброїдопомога (млн у $) розвитку (млн $)
140 500 460,682 129,878589 450 120 400
100 350 301,873 300 76,396999 80 250 62,876422 200 176,992 172,684 60 156,389 44,0124040,17655 140,579 131,94 150 110,265 98,437 102,993 92,703 46,756194 86,331 77,808 83,05 76,976 40 100 30,680845 26,2 25,856025 80,102 29,259576 50 15,392183 13,927613 14,717979 20 14,438967 0 5,07 12,678435 5,066215 21,321822 6,160928 8,741572 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1 20070,0 85 2008 2009 7,29 2010679 1 1 20113,7 77461 2012 2013 2014 1 20150,26 1 2016 0 0 5,555 7,597 1,205 3,696 1,799 5,614 6,58 3,654695 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
26 Обсяг продажу зброї (млн $)
140 129,878589
120
100 76,396999 80 62,876422 60 44,020075 46,756194 40 26,2 25,856025 30,680845 29,259576 15,392183 13,927613 14,717979 20 14,438967 5,07 12,678435 5,066215 21,321822 6,160928 8,741572 10,085 7,296791 13,777461 10,261 0 0 5,555 7,597 1,205 3,696 1,799 5,614 6,58 3,654695 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
The conflict in Ukraine changed the US’s long-term prospect. For the next while, Ukraine strategy towards Russia. After 2014, Ukraine needs to look at intensifying cooperation with became one of the priorities on the American the US, which continues to insist on the neces- security agenda. Despite Ukraine’s obvious po- sity for sanctions against Russia, in the context sition as the victim of Russian aggression and of programs designed to train and re-equip the as an integral part of Europe’s security architec- Armed Forces, and to provide non-lethal aid. In ture, the country is not even written into the ex- this context, it’s extremely important to analyze isting institutional mechanisms that the US set the available security formats and to consider up during the Cold War or its War on Terrorism. whether the current level of bilateral security Ukraine has not been offered a mutual security arrangements provide the kinds of options that agreement along the lines of those signed with will restrain an aggressor. Southeast Asian countries, nor status as an MN- According to data from the US Department NA, that is, a state that cooperates with the Unit- of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation ed States against radical groups. Agency (DSCA), there are now three programs Although the main accent continues, as be- providing aid in security areas between the US fore, to be placed on Ukraine’s prospects for and Ukraine (see Table 1). NATO membership, this is only a medium- or Table 1. US aid programs and purposes49 US assistance Purpose European Reassurance Assistance to the governments of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Initiative (ERI) Ukraine; the placement of additional equipment and forces in the relevant countries and their territorial waters. Aimed at increasing defense potential of allies and partners in the framework of NATO. Global Security Contin- Improving national armed forces and enforcement agencies re- gency Fund (Ukraine) sponsible for domestic security and defense. Anticipates short- and (GSCF-U) medium-term aid programs.
Ukraine Security Assis- A comprehensive program that authorized the US Government to tance Initiative (USAI) provide Ukraine’s Armed Forces with assistance, including trainers, equipment, lethal defensive weapons, logistical support, provision of materials and services, provisions, as well as intelligence data for national armed forces and law enforcement agencies; replace- ment of weapons and defensive equipment provided to the Gov- ernment of Ukraine from the US Government.
49 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, BPC Programs and Authorities. Available at: http://www.samm.dsca.mil/table/ table-c15t2
27 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
• European Reassurance Initiative50 Europe but also the strengthening of Ukraine’s In some sense, the European Reassurance security sector (see Table 2). Of the US $85.5mn Initiative (ERI) is Washington’s strategy in re- earmarked for strengthening the capacity of sponse to the challenge coming from Moscow. partner countries, US $5.6mn have been set In order to reach these objectives, the ERI fo- aside for the Joint Multinational Training Group- cuses on increasing the US presence, carrying Ukraine under the US’s European command out bilateral and multilateral exercises, increas- and for a program to train and equip Ukraine’s ing deployment effectiveness, improving infra- Armed Forces under the US’s special ops com- structure, and increasing the capacity of partner mand in Europe. With in this second program, countries. the main focus is on establishing a new gen- In the 2017 financial year, the ERI budget is eration of Ukrainian special operations forces.51 triple the funding directed at increasing the US presence in Europe after Russia’s aggressions in 2014. A budget of US $3.4 billion means not only Table 2. European Reassurance Initiative, 2015- the placement of additional American forces in 2017
2015 фін2015ансо FвYи й рік Прийнято 2016 фін2016ансо вFYи й рік Прийнято Adopted Adopted
423,1 40,6 471,4 985 136,1 789,3 196,5 108,4 89,1 175 62,6 57,8 13,7 Category 2017 FY Announced Increasing presence 163,1 Holding additional bilateral and multilateral 1 049,80 exercises Increasing deployment effectiveness 3 419,70 1 903,90 Improving infrastructure Developing partnerships Initiative transfer fund 217,4 85,5 Total:
2017 фінансовий рік Заявка 50 European Reassurance Initiative, Department of De- Source: comptroller.defense.gov fense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. Available at: http:// comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/def- budget/fy2017/FY2017_ERI_J-Book.pdf 51 Ibid p.19
28 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
• Global Security Contingency Fund (Ukraine) • Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) After Russia invaded Crimea and began is an experimental initiative whose aim is to en- the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the US Con- sure common technical assistance from the U.S. gress passed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, Department of Defense and the State Depart- which authorized the President to raise sanc- ment. It is also intended to combine the resourc- tions against Russian defense companies and es of these two agencies to fund emergency se- to provide Ukraine with “defense articles, de- curity assistance for US partner countries.52 The fense services and training... for the purpose of main focus of the GSCF is ensuring that armed countering offensive weapons and reestablish- forces are prepared and equipped and providing ing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of assistance in areas such as rule of law and do- Ukraine.”55 In the 2015 FY National Defense Au- mestic stability.53 In Ukraine, the goal includes thorization Act (NDAA), Congress recommended combating the Russian proxies and basic infan- a needs assessment of Ukraine’s Armed Forc- try training.54 Another element of the program es in terms of military technology and services, is reforming Ukraine’s police force and assisting previously provided assistance, and ways to im- in the formation of the National Guard, which prove the situation.56 In the 2016 NDAA, Con- turns out to be a key approach to reforming the gress formally identified the range of security security sector and aimed at protecting Ukraine, aid and support for intelligence-gathering un- not only from external aggression but also from der the general name “Ukraine Security Assis- internal threats. Given that this Fund has been tance Initiative.” Section 1250 (b) clearly states built on the principle of combining resources what kind of support Ukraine may receive from from various agencies, the ultimate extent of the United States: the support is not that easy to calculate. How- ever, an important nuance in this specific instru- 1. Accurate real-time or near-real-time up- ment is its orientation towards short- and medi- dated intelligence, including by leasing um-term results: current projects are expected the necessary technology from private to be funded until September 2017. companies in the US.
2. Lethal weapons, such as anti-tank sys- tems, mortars, guided weapons systems
52 U.S. Department of State, The Global Security Contin- 55 Сongress.gov, S.2828 — Ukraine Freedom Support gency Fund. Available at: http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ Act of 2014. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/ sa/gscf/ bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2828 53 Rachel Clark, Army contracting team in Ukraine to 56 Сongress.gov, H.R.3979 — Carl Levin and Howard P. support U.S. initiative, U.S. Army, 12.03.2015. Available “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act at: https://www.army.mil/article/144312/Army_con- for Fiscal Year 2015, Section 1275. Available at: htt- tracting_team_in_Ukraine_to_support ps://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house- 54 Ibid. bill/3979/text
29 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
and ammunition, grenade launchers and weapons might fall into the wrong hands.57 In ammunition, small arms and ammunition. light of this, technical aid and institutional de- velopment, including the set up of a Special Ops 3. Counter-artillery radars, including mid- Command, remain the key aspects of bilateral and long-range radars capable of locat- security efforts. ing and artillery batteries. Today, Ukraine is one of the top recipients of foreign aid from the US, but war fatigue in gen- 4. Intelligence-gathering drones. eral and a rough period in European and Ameri- can politics could upset the current level of col- 5. Assistance in cyber security. laboration. This is why one condition for main- taining existing achievements is institutionaliz- 6. Instruments to combat electronic warfare, ing bilateral security relations. This means an- such as secured communications systems alyzing available formats and formulating pro- and other electronic security systems. posals regarding alternative architectures.
7. Other instruments for electronic warfare.
8. Training in the repair and use of technol- ogy described in items 1-7.
9. Training in carrying out critical battle operations: planning, commanding and management; small unit tactics; counter- artillery tactics; combating homemade explosive devices; tactical combat casu- alty care; treatment of combat wounds; and medical evacuation.
Although the current cooperative security programs between the US and Ukraine provide for a broad range of measures, Washington has been placing the priority on training and non- lethal weapons, not on supplying lethal weap- ons. This approach on the part of the Obama Ad- ministration has probably been driven by con- cerns about escalating the crisis should Ukraine 57 Ivan Medynskyi, U.S. Lethal Weapons for Ukraine: receive lethal weaponry, and also that such Mechanisms and Consequences. Institute of World Policy, p. 5. Available at: http://iwp.org.ua/img/US_ weapons_eng.pdf
30 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
- 2.2. Best case security Korea were partners in security agreements cooperation with the US with the US as guarantees of security against The nature of international relations around the remilitarization of Japan. This possibility is security since the end of the Second World War now causing concern in the region. spurred both superpowers to draw up mutual Bilateral agreements between the US and defense agreements that de facto established a South Korea, the Philippines and Japan unified bipolar world. Bilateral agreements with Japan, the regional security arena of all these coun- Korea and the Philippines, trilateral defense tries: an armed attack on one side is automati- pacts such as ANZUS,58 and regional alliances cally considered an attack on the other and is along the lines of NATO and the Rio Pact59 re- seen as a threat to the security of the United flected US determination in combating the chal- States itself. However, these agreements are not lenges of the communist world. Once the Soviet binding but rather provide for each country to Union fell apart, Washington’s leading role only participate in any potential conflict in line with strengthened in the new international order. its own Constitutional provisions. According to the US Constitution and the War Powers Reso- 2.2.1. Mutual defense agreement lution of 1973, the Commander-in-Chief is em- Bilateral security agreements were signed powered to declare war without the approval of between the US and the Philippines, Japan and Congress only in the case where there is a direct the Republic of Korea at the beginning of the attack on the United States or its armed forces. Cold War as a way to contain communism in the Thus, the real guarantee of security is provided, Far East and ensure America’s own security. In not by the agreements, but by the presence of the new security environment, the US saw Japan American bases on the territory of other coun- and the Philippines as key logistical centers for tries. the projection of power in the war on the Ko- In the case of Japan, a separate agreement rean peninsula and in Vietnam. Washington saw provides for measures ensuring security for the Seoul as the frontline of the defense of Japan US and Japan to be regulated by an “administra- and an instrument of direct contact with Chi- tive agreement” that allows the US President to na. In this situation, the Philippines and South immediately send forces in case of an attack.60 In contrast to the arrangement with the Philip- pines, the security agreements with Japan and 58 ANZUS, the security treaty among Australia, New Zea- land and the United States. In 1986, the US terminated South Korea call for military bases on their ter- its security obligations towards New Zealand, which ritories. Between Manila and Washington, sep- had established a nuclear-free zone around itself, but arate interstate agreements govern the place- continued them in relation to Australia. 59 The Rio Pact or the InterAmerican Agreement on Mu- tual Assistance came into effect in 1948. Art. 3 of the Pact declared that an attack on one of the countries 60 Ricardo Saludo, Big holes in the Philippines-US de- of the Americas would be considered an attack on all fense treaty. The Manila Times, 20.03.2014. Availa- and that every country was obligated to provide sup- ble at: http://www.manilatimes.net/big-holes-in-the- port to such a country. philippines-us-defense-treaty/84117/
31 Графік 1. Найбільші реципієнти допомоги США в 2016
4
3,5 3,652 3 3,1 2,5
$, млрд. 2
1,5
1 1,3 1,275
0,5 0,715 0,658 0 Афганістан Ізраїль Єгипет Йорданія Ірак Україна
SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
Figure 1. Top recipients of the U.S. aid in 2016 by country Figure 3. Top recipients of the U.S. aid in 2016 by country ($, bln.)
4
3,5 3,652 3 3,1 2,5 $, bln. 2
1,5
1 1,3 1,275
0,5 0,715 0,658 0 Afghanistan Israel Egypt Jordan Iraq Ukraine
Source: “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016”
ment of military bases. This gives the Philip- Despite Manila’s desire to have security pines the option of unilaterally regulating the guarantees from the US, the Obama Administra- presence of American forces on its territories tion made no statements as to whether the dis- without amending the main agreement on secu- puted territories came under the security guar- rity or withdrawing from it altogether. antee.61 Critically, the United States has no wish When the Cold War ended, bilateral security to be drawn into any open conflicts with major pacts began to lose their primary meaning and regional powers. What’s more, growing nation- in 1992, Manila was the first to tear up its agree- alistic fervor in the Philippines regarding Amer- ment about the placement of American military ica’s military presence there is preventing the bases on its territory. The ensuing security vacu- country from being a reliable long-term partner um in the Philippines was suddenly filled by Chi- in terms of Washington’s ability to project power na’s occupation of the Mischief Reef in 1995. By in that region. But the US also needs to maintain 1998, the US and the Philippines signed a new its role as security guaranty in the region in or- agreement that allowed joint military exercises der not to have the Philippines move into Chi- to resume. However, joint exercises proved un- able to prevent military aggression: in 2012, Chi- na continued its expansionist policy, seized the 61 Geoff Dyer, Tom Mitchell, Hague ruling: US, China Scarborough Shoal and is continuing the same on collision course? Today, 19.07.2016. Available at: http://www.todayonline.com/commentary/hague-rul- policy with the Spratly Islands. ing-us-china-collision-course
32 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
na’s sphere of influence or to undermine trust basis.65 According to this agreement, US service in its security guarantees in Japan and South personnel were to be established at five bases. Korea.62 For this reason, the US has continued Today, the Philippines’ armed forces remain to support the Philippines in settling territorial among the weakest in the region66 and suffer claims with the help of international law. from lack of funding and endemic corruption.67 One of the main reasons why the dialog on To compensate, Washington has not only been security was picked up again between Manila providing material and technical support but and Washington after the end of the Cold War has focused on helping reform public adminis- was new common threats: terrorism and China’s tration and the judiciary, and on combating cor- growing power. In 2002, the Philippines and US ruption.68 signed a Military Logistics and Support Agree- However, Filipino policy shifted with the ment (MLSA) that allowed the Philippines to be election of Rodrigo Duterte president in late used as a logistical hub in supplying the war on June 2016, towards reviving dialog with China terrorism in the region. In return, the Bush Ad- and gradually reducing cooperation with the ministration granted the Philippines MNNA sta- US. Duterte’s initiatives to stop joint marine pa- tus.63 This status increased the Philippine’s de- trols and have US military advisors withdrawn fense options at a time when China was start- from the island could end in a rupture of these ing to flex its muscles.64 By 2011, the US’s for- areas of cooperation. On the other hand, a fu- eign policy focus began to shift from the Middle ture Trump Administration could well agree to a East to the Far East in the framework of Obama’s Asia rebalance policy. One result of this policy 65 Wyatt Olson, Philippine base upgrades for US troops was the signing of an agreement to expand the in limbo as president-elect prepares for office. Stars US military presence in the Philippines, which and Stripes, 14.05.2016. Available at: http://www. stripes.com/news/philippine-base-upgrades-for-us- brought American marines and air force person- troops-in-limbo-as-president-elect-prepares-for-of- nel back to the island country on a rotational fice-1.409552 ; Ralph Jennings, US Navy edges back to Subic Bay in Philippines — under new rules. The CS Monitor, 12.11.2015. Available at: http://www.csmoni- tor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2015/1112/US-Navy-edg- es-back-to-Subic-Bay-in-Philippines-under-new-rules 66 Philippines: US Lifts Restrictions On Military Aid. De- fense News, 22.01.2015. Available at: http://www. defensenews.com/story/defense/international/ asia-pacific/2015/01/22/philippines-military-aid- 62 Bonnie S. Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea. funds/22173719/ The Council on Foreign Relations, April 2012. Avail- 67 Eleanor Albert, The Now and Future US-Philippines able at: http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed- Military Alliance. Defense One, 29.06.2016. Available clash-south-china-sea/p27883 at: http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/06/us- 63 Michael B. Yahuda, The International Politics of the philippine-military-alliance/129504/ Asia-Pacific, p.266. 68 Eleanor Albert, The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance. 64 Rommel Banlaoi, Philippine Security in the Age of Ter- The Council on Foreign Relations, 21.10.2016. Availa- ror: National, Regional, and Global Challenges in the ble at: http://www.cfr.org/philippines/us-philippines- Post-9/11 World, p. 317. defense-alliance/p38101
33 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
compromise and not challenge these initiatives. es of “extended deterrence” that have led to de- At the same time, given China’s growing appe- bates over restoring the country’s own nuclear tite for territory, the Philippines will likely have capacities as a more reliable guarantee of de- to rely on the United States on national security terrence.72 Similar concerns have emerged in Ja- issues in the future.69 In other words, Washing- pan as the global security environment shifts ton’s security guarantees will continue to be a in the region and Japan is now also gradually major factor in Manila’s security policy, as Presi- remilitarizing itself: in the 2016 state budget, dent Duterte’s rhetoric has already shown. a record US $42bn was allocated for defense.73 In contrast to the Philippines, the US sees By contrast, the Stockholm International Peace South Korea and Japan as more reliable part- Research Institute (SIPRI) places Ukraine 44th ners, which is related to the continuing pres- among 140 countries for defense spending in ence of American military in these countries 2015, at a mere US $3.622bn.74 since the end of WWII. In this context, the US, Moreover, Japan is in the process of changing unlike with the Philippines, has guaranteed Ja- its Constitution to shift its defense position to pan that their security agreement will extend “active pacifism.” Washington sees this as a posi- to all of Japan’s territory, together with the Sen- tive change, because it would like Tokyo to be a kaku/Diaoyutai Islands that China has also been more equal partner, capable of taking on at least trying to claim.70 In addition to this, the US has some responsibility for regional security. guaranteed both Japan and South Korea, which With Korea and Japan both arming and mod- it is covering with its “nuclear umbrella,” protec- ernizing their defense sectors, they have gained tion using all available military means, includ- status as NATO plus 5 countries, which offers ing nuclear ones.71 Despite this, there are doubts broader possibilities than MNNA. In 2014, South on the South Korean side about US reassuranc- Korea was the US’s biggest buyer of arms, with total purchases worth US $7.8bn.75 Meanwhile, 69 Eleanor Albert, The Now and Future US-Philippines in addition to gaining greater access to the Military Alliance. Defense One, 29.06.2016. Available US arms market, Japan has won a license from at: http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/06/us- philippine-military-alliance/129504/ 70 Disputed islands covered by US-Japan security trea- 72 Charles D. Ferguson, How South Korea Could Acquire ty: Obama. The Straits Times, 24.04.2014. Available at: and Deploy Nuclear Weapons. Available at: http:// http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/disputed- npolicy.org/books/East_Asia/Ch4_Ferguson.pdf islands-covered-by-us-japan-security-treaty-obama 73 The Japanese government approved a record defense 71 U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement of the Se- budget BBC, 24.12.2015. Available at: http://www.bbc. curity Consultative Committee: A Stronger Alli- com/russian/news/2015/12/151224_japan_defence_ ance for a Dynamic Security Environment The New budget Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, 74 27.04.2015. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Available at: htt- prs/ps/2015/04/241125.htm; United States Forces ps://www.sipri.org/databases/milex Korea, Full text of 47th ROK-U.S. Joint Communique, 75 Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers 01.11.2015. Available at: http://www.usfk.mil/Media/ to Developing Nations, 2007-2014. Congressional Re- News/Article/626859/full-text-of-47th-rok-us-joint- search Service, 21.12.2015. p. 40. Available at: https:// communique/ www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44320.pdf
34 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
an American manufacturer to produce its own United States would immediately respond to an weapons.76 external threat. After North Korea fired at South In contrast to the Philippines, Japan’s and Korea, Seoul received no active military support Korea’s deterrence is based on the size of the from the US and was unable to strike back sig- military contingent based on their territories. nificantly itself since operational control was More US military are stationed in Japan than in with the US Command. The US is very sensi- any other country in the world:77 nearly 54,000 tive to the possibility of military responses, con- service personnel from the army, navy and air cerned that a massive attack could lead to a new force.78 Japan’s marine forces are among the war between North and South Korea81 and drag most powerful military fleets in the world, and China and the US into a global confrontation. the US is more closely tied to them than to US support for cooperation between Japan any other naval forces: every year, it organizes and Korea is now changing from bilateral local about 100 joint exercises79. Meanwhile, Korea cooperation to multilateral regional collabora- has around 30,000 US service personnel perma- tion. Washington believes that the only possi- nently stationed there.80 Since 2004, the US Air ble effective restraint on China and North Ko- Force has increased its attacking force in South rea is this kind of broader format. One of the Korea through regular rotations of frontline deterrents that the US uses in the region as the bombers, which are intended to serve as a guar- confrontation over the Eastern and South Chi- anteed deterrent from external threats against na Seas grows is to build up Japan’s multilater- this country. al connections with Australia, South Korea and Still, even the presence of such a military ASEAN countries.82 contingent is not an absolute guarantee that the In the context of these policies, the US has been working to establish the PRO triangle with the participation of Korea and Japan. In 2003, Ja- 76 Robbin F. Laird, Edward Timperlake and Richard Weitz, pan began to acquire PRO systems from the US, Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy, p.166. which gave it the second strongest anti-missile 77 Hannah Beech, The Tense Relationship Between Ja- pan and the U.S. Military. Time, 08.06.2016. Available at: http://time.com/4360940/us-military-navy-japan- okinawa-alcohol-bases/ 81 Kyung-young Chung, The Year 2015 or After: Transi- 78 About USFJ. U.S. Forces, Japan, The Cornerstone of the tion of Wartime Operational Control, Self-esteem of Pacific. Available at: http://www.usfj.mil/About-USFJ/ the Republic of Korea, and Trust-building Process. East 79 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, The U.S.-Japan Asia Institute, 30.09.2013. Available at: http://www. Alliance. Congressional Research Service, 09.02.2016, eai.or.kr/type/panelView.asp?bytag=p&code=eng_ p.18. Available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ report&idx=12522&page=4 RL33740.pdf 82 U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement of the Se- 80 North Korea: US forces in South put on highest lev- curity Consultative Committee: A Stronger Alli- el of alert; allies discuss ‘strategic assets’. ABC News, ance for a Dynamic Security Environment The New 11.01.2016. Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/ Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, news/2016-01-11/us-troops-in-south-korea-on-high- 27.04.2015. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ alert-after-north-nuclear-test/7081296 prs/ps/2015/04/241125.htm
35 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
defense system in the world.83 So far, Washing- historically. Since 1991, Ukraine has been seen ton has also come to an agreement to set up by the US as an important component of re- its PRO THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area De- gional security structures, although giving up fense) systems in South Korea.84 Given that Chi- its nuclear arsenal was critical for American na agreed to this, in return for certain conces- security policy in Europe. At the same time, sions regarding North Korea, fearing that its nu- US reluctance to enter into conflict with the clear program could become an excuse for the Russian Federation is obviously not improv- US and its allies to use force.85 ing Ukraine’s prospects for getting bilateral security guarantees in the foreseeable future. 2.2.2. Prospects for Ukraine What’s more, the challenge presented by the The fact that the idea of a bilateral securi- RF is seen in Washington as more of a region- ty agreement similar to those with South Korea al than global threat. This means that offering and Japan is not currently being considered by security guarantees will only increase risks for the US as a possible option for Ukraine has be- the US itself. come a sore spot in dialog with Washington.86 Still, Washington will clearly benefit from a America’s security agreements with Asia-Pacif- strategy that will increase Ukraine’s status as a ic countries were rooted in regional history and NATO partner that can effectively deter Russia seen as a guarantee that the US would region- on its own. At the same time, Ukraine could de- ally be in a position to counter the communist pend on the US for assistance in structural re- threat, later as a platform in the war on terror- forms of the security sector, combating corrup- ism, and now as a deterrent against North Korea tion in the defense arena, holding joint exercis- and China, and protection for trade routes in the es, and modernizing its defensive capacities. South China Sea. On the European continent, the North Lessons for Ukraine Atlantic alliance serves the same function •• Be a reliable partner. The examples of the Philippines on the one hand, and the Re- 83 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, The U.S.-Japan public of Korea and Japan on the other show Alliance. Congressional Research Service, 09.02.2016, that the US grant security guarantees only if p. 19. Available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ RL33740.pdf Washington is confident in the long term re- 84 The US and South Korea deploy the THAAD anti-rock- liability of the partnership. Ukraine need to et system. ВВС, 08.07.2016. Available at:http://www. guarantee the United States that Ukraine’s bbc.com/russian/news-36744604 geopolitical vector on the Euro-Atlantic inte- 85 А. Lankov, Why real sanctions are being employed against North Korea. The Moscow Carnegie Cent- gration will remain unchanged. . er, 17.03.2016.Available at: http://carnegie.ru/ •• Arm oneself. Today, none of the three coun- publications/?fa=63046 tries that have bilateral security agreements 86 А. Getmanchuk, Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-USA. have confidence that the USA would provide World Policy Institute, 29.03.2016, p.10. Available at: http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/1982.html security guarantees in the case of conflict
36 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
escalation; all three states set their courses the Russian Federation. It should be clear- toward strengthening their own defense sec- ly stated that providing Ukraine with arma- tors. Meanwhile, the US welcomes the fact ments will transfer responsibility for further that its partners in the Asian-Pacific region conflict escalation exclusively on Russia, as are claiming more responsibility for their Ukraine will use the new armaments only own security. Establishment of a powerful for defensive purposes, and not for a possi- army, capable of effective deterrence, is one ble operation to return the SDDLR by mili- of the guarantees of American support in the tary means. event of an armed conflict. •• Take advantage of the situation created •• Fight corruption. One of the main focuses by the conflict on the territory of Ukraine. of the US in strengthening the security of Strengthening the security cooperation be- the Philippines is the fight against corrup- tween the USA and the Republic of Korea, Ja- tion in the defense sector. The transparency pan, or Philippines occurred only in the face of Ukraine’s defense sector should become of common threats and decreased after they one of the key tasks in cooperation with the have been overcome. Ukraine should make United States. the best use of time for cooperation with the •• Procure lethal armaments. The sensitive is- USA to complete modernization of its own sue of granting Ukraine lethal armaments defense sector before resolution of the con- might be replaced with providing licenses on flict in Donbas by any means. their production, or with joint projects with •• Ukraine should focus on keeping the Ameri- American companies on the development of can and NATO member states military con- new weapons. tingent, which provides training for Ukraini- •• Attempt to procure the necessary defensive an military staff, on the territory of Ukraine. lethal armaments. If the US further refuses Moreover, Kyiv should put maximum efforts to provide Ukraine with the necessary lethal in promotion of the idea of strengthening armaments free of charge, Ukraine could try the presence of the US and the NATO in the to submit an official application to the US Balkans and in the Black Sea region. This State Department for acquisition of the ap- would force the Russian military contingent propriate antitank missile systems (Javelins). in Crimea to focus not on further aggression During the talks with the US on the possibil- against Ukraine, but on opposing NATO forc- ity of ATMS procurement, Kyiv should active- es. The necessity of such strengthening of ly promote the idea that selling defensive ar- the Southern part of the NATO’s eastern flank maments will not place any obligations on should be substantiated by the fact that to- the United States to provide military support day the Russian force in occupied Crimea is in the event of escalation of the conflict. In more potent that the one Kremlin placed in return, procurement of weapons would ac- the Kaliningrad region in terms of both num- tually create a sustainable deterrence ef- bers and advanced armaments. fect against potential future aggression by
37 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
2.2.3. Major Non-NATO Ally model does not provide any security commit- Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) is a term used ment from the White House, it emphasizes the by the United States to designate countries, strategic role of the respective state for the which do not have bilateral defense agreements region, as well as for the United States. with Washington, but either have long term se- After Russian aggression against Ukraine in curity partnerships or seek strategic coopera- 2014, the United States Congress passed the tion. As of today, MNNA status has been granted Ukraine Freedom Support Act introducing sanc- to Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, the Republic of tions against Russia and allocating funds to Korea, New Zealand, Jordan, Argentina, Bahrain, support the security sector of Ukraine. Accord- the Philippines, Thailand, Kuwait, Morocco, Pak- ing to the first proposal of the US Senate Com- istan, Afghanistan and Tunisia, while Taiwan is mittee on Foreign Relations, Ukraine, together considered a major ally without official status87 with Moldova and Georgia, had to be granted (see Appendix 1. Allies of the USA). MNNA status, which would facilitate the proce- According to the United States Code, in order dure of supplying all three countries with mil- to grant MNNA status, the US President should itary equipment89. However, this provision was inform Congress in writing at least 30 days be- removed from the final version of the docu- fore making such a decision. ment. The reason for this decision could be as- MNNAs are entitled to a wide range of fi- sociated with the approach applied by the US nancial and military benefits. Among them lawmakers: to use the MNNA status as a bar- are the opportunity to receive additional gaining chip in talks with the US President to funds from the US government for research ensure the adoption of the law as a whole90 (see programs, coordination of bilateral counter- Appendix 2. The major documents adopted by terrorist exercises, and development proj- the US Congress to support Ukraine). ects. Furthermore, MNNAs have the oppor- Although Ukraine hasn’t received MN- tunity to purchase or lease surplus American NA status, the level of American aid aimed at military equipment and use American finan- strengthening its security sector through the cial aid to do that88. However, the MNNA sta- provision of non-lethal equipment and in- tus does not provide any agreement on mutual structors, as well as the organization of joint defense, which clearly distinguishes the mem- exercises is comparable with the level of sup- bers of NATO from MNNA states. Although this port currently provided for certain countries
87 Designation of major non-NATO allies. Available at: http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC- 89 Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, Background prelim-title22-section2321k&num=0&edition=prelim; and Key Details. Available at: http://www.foreign.sen- U.S. Department of State, Major Non-NATO Ally Status ate.gov/imo/media/doc/UFSA_1-pager.pdf for Afghanistan, 07.07.2012. Available at: http://www. 90 George Barros, Analysis of Ukraine Freedom Sup- state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194662.htm port Act after amendments. Euromaidan Press, 88 U.S. Department of State, Designation of Tunisia as a 17.12.2014. Available at: http://euromaidanpress. Major Non-NATO Ally, 10.07.2015. Available at: http:// com/2014/12/17/analysis-of-ukraine-freedom-sup- www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244811.htm port-act-after-amendments/#arvlbdata
38 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
with MNNA status. Despite refusing to sup- United States as not a situational partner, but ply Ukraine with lethal weapons armaments, as a long-term ally. such as anti-tank missile systems, Washington The draft budget, proposed by the House has been consistent in providing other nec- of Representatives for the 2017 fiscal year, in- essary equipment. Over the past two years, cludes the allocation of 150 million dollars of Ukraine has received Humvee armored ve- aid to Ukraine, compared to 300 million allocat- hicles, anti-artillery and anti-mortar radars, ed in the previous year91. If the amount of aid medical equipment, radio systems, and other further decreases, the Ukrainian government non-lethal military equipment. Moreover, fo- will be able to get loans, provided by MNNA sta- cus has been shifted towards training Ukrai- tus, to fund future projects, and to procure mili- nian armed forces and assistance in the im- tary resources at discount prices. plementation of defense reform, two factors However, despite the pretentious name, the that could significantly increase the capability real benefits of the MNNA status are some- of Ukrainian armed forces. Another reason for times hard to distinguish. MNNAs have the this approach stems from the fact that Ukraine right to lease military equipment and receive remains one of the largest exporters of arma- the US funding to purchase is, but on the oth- ments, and its own military industrial complex er hand, they do not have the right to get it free is able to both meet the requirements of the of charge. It is up to the countries themselves armed forces and stimulate the economy. to take advantage of these opportunities. If the The questions of both the likelihood and the Ukrainian government does not have a clear potential benefits of MNNA status for Ukraine plan for the effective use of MNNA status ben- remain open. Since the Bush administration, efits, receiving this status will be of little signifi- MNNA status has been granted to the respective cance by itself. countries as a reward for their participation in MNNA status will not necessarily become the fight against terrorism. Today, it is difficult to a panacea for the problems of Ukraine. Mem- predict whether this practice will be maintained bers of the US Congress have repeated- and, if yes, whether Ukraine will be able to to ly stated that the current system of grant- help allies in the War on Terror. ing MNNA status does not encourage coun- If Ukraine received MNNA status, it would tries to implement comprehensive internal secure the position of a key US ally. Despite the fact that there were discussions within the United States about revoking the MNNA status for some countries, e.g. Argentina, due to anti- American sentiments, so far there is no exam- ple of a country having lost MNNA status due to a decrease of its strategic utility. Through 91 Mike Eckel, U.S. Bill Backs More Defense Spending receiving the MNNA status, Ukraine would en- For Europe, Ukraine. Radio Liberty, 28.04.2016. Avail- able at: http://www.rferl.org/a/us-bill-more-defense- sure its place on the security agenda of the spending-for-europe-ukraine/27705097.html
39 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
reforms.92 If the Ukrainian government does tional agreement aimed at developing coop- not manage to overcome corruption that eration between the two countries in one of drags the country backwards, they will defi- the most essential aspects: retrofitting the Air nitely not manage to take advantage of MN- Force of Singapore. After signing the agree- NA status benefits. ment, it was announced that Singapore signed a 914 million dollars worth contract for the 2.2.4. Alternatives to MNNA Status supply of required equipment with Lockheed Instead of seeking MNNA status, Ukraine Martin95. could follow the footsteps of Singapore and Following the footsteps of Singapore could achieve the signing of a separate bilateral se- be a more pragmatic option for Ukraine. curity and defense agreement with the Unit- ed States. For instance, Singapore refused to accept the US proposal to grant MNNA sta- tus due to concerns regarding a potential negative response from China and its Islamic neighbors in the region93. In 2005, Singapore and the United States have signed the Strate- gic Framework Agreement that complement- ed the terms of the Memorandum of Under- standing of 1990 regarding granting the ac- cess to US troops to military facilities in Sin- gapore94. Both agreements have laid the foun- dation for joint military exercises, as well as to exchange of information and equipment between the two countries. In 2015, the Unit- ed States and Singapore have signed an addi-
92 Gayatri Oruganti, Todd Ruffner, U.S.-Tunisia Security Cooperation: What It Means to be a Major Non-NATO Ally. Security Assistance Monitor, 14.07.2015. Available at: http://securityassistance.org/blog/us-tunisia-secu- rity-cooperation-what-it-means-be-major-non-nato- ally 93 Tan, See Seng, “America the Indispensable Power: Sin- gapore’s Perspective of America as a Security Partner,” Asian Politics & Policy 8, №1, 2016, p.127. 94 The Strategic Framework Agreement- official release. 95 Wendell Minnick, Singapore-US Agreement To Boost Ministry of Defence (Singapore), 12.07.2005. Available Defense Cooperation. Defense News, 08.12.2015. at: https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/ Available at: http://www.defensenews.com/story/de- official_releases/nr/2005/jul/12jul05_nr/12jul05_ fense/policy-budget/leaders/2015/12/08/singapore- fs.html#.V35GiTX4XE8 us-agreement-boost-defense-cooperation/76980618/
40 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
2.3. New Formats of Security expiration of the existing programs, etc. The se- Cooperation between Ukraine curity assurances provided by the United States and the USA in the Budapest Memorandum should be backed The critical role of the US in maintaining the by real security mechanisms. security architecture in Europe in the light of ag- Our analysis of the existing modes of bilat- gression from the revanchist Russian regime is eral security cooperation between the US and becoming increasingly apparent. Sanctions be- its partners indicates that while the Mutual De- came the main mechanism of deterrence from fense Agreement could provide the most reli- further invasion on the territory of Ukraine. It is able security guarantees for Ukraine, it is rather likely that Obama’s decision to apply sanctions unlikely, even in the long term. We recommend came from his belief that direct military support following another scenario, which includes sign- for Ukraine could lead to an escalation of the ing of the Defense Cooperation Agreement or conflict. Moreover, it can be argued that his pre- the Strategic Framework Agreement with the vious experience in dealing with Iran’s nucle- US, in the short and medium term. The Strategic ar program through a set of sanctions showed Framework Agreement, signed by the US with their efficacy in putting pressure on Tehran. fI we Singapore, is broader than MNNA status; howev- compare Washington’s actions aimed at elim- er, it opens the door to closer working relations inating the threat posed by Iran and Russia, it in the fields of security and prevention of ter- becomes clear that the US relies on deterrence, rorism. This agreement has formalized bilater- rather than on the open confrontation. The ma- al security relations between the two countries jor difference between these cases is that Wash- and is based on the “places-not-bases” strategy ington’s decision to impose sanctions against in the region. This approach granted the US mil- Iran was accompanied by powerful declarations itary access to military facilities of the country on the protection of regional partners, which on a rotational basis without affecting the sen- were subsequently institutionalized through bi- sitive sovereignty issues96. lateral agreements, while in the case of Russia, The progress of relations between the US Ukraine has not get the opportunity to become and Singapore shows that the gradual develop- a part of the “improved” model of bilateral rela- ment of security relations with the United States tions with the United States. is possible without irritating their major region- Although Kyiv officially declared its course al rival. Ukraine should emphasize this when towards NATO membership, this should not pre- trying to negotiate new security agreements vent both countries from reaching a new level with the United States. In addition, Kyiv has al- of bilateral security cooperation, which would ready signed a Memorandum of Understanding serve as a deterrence factor in the nearest fu- ture. At this stage, it is essential for Ukraine to institutionalize security partnership between 96 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Singapore: Background and U.S. the two countries in order to avoid its weak- Relations. Congressional Research Service, 26.07.2013, p. 3. Available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ ening due to the changes in the US leadership, RS20490.pdf
41 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
with Washington in 1992, laying the foundation In general, such agreements have strength- for future projects between the two countries. ened security relationships between the United The Strategic Framework Agreements and States and every country that has signed them, the Defense Cooperation Agreements have a thus creating additional preconditions for long- less serious tone than the Major Non-NATO Ally term defense relations, as well as opportunities Status Agreement. It is vital to emphasize that for military exercises, training, and supply of de- such documents such as the Strategic Frame- fensive armaments. The presence of American work Agreement would demonstrate the US’s troops in these countries in the form of a limit- commitment to Ukraine without provoking Rus- ed military component with pre-installed infra- sia, unlike the other types of security and de- structure has become an important deterrence fense agreements. factor against potential aggressors98. The Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), It is also important that the examples of signed by the United States with the countries Bahrain and Kuwait show that the DCA is not a of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States barrier to future expansion of relations with the of the Gulf, is another format that could be mod- US; on contrary, it could serve as an additional eled for Ukraine. After the security crisis in the incentive. Having signed the Defense Coopera- Middle East in the early nineties, the United tion Agreements in 1991, Bahrain received MN- States imposed sanctions against the countries NA status in 2002, and Kuwait — in 2004. that violated the sovereignty of their neighbors, As noted above, the presence of the US and extended security commitments towards troops in the partner countries proved to be an their strategic partners in the region. Those effective tool for deterring the aggressive poli- agreements included the following main as- cy of their neighbors during the Cold War, and pects: continues to perform this function today. The •• Joint response to external threats, if each logic of deterrence is that the aggressor coun- party recognizes that necessary; try will not attack if the cost of such an action •• Granting US troops access to military facili- is too high. ties of the respective country; Despite the presence of American mili- •• Early deployment of the US military equip- tary servicepersons in Ukraine as consultants ment in the respective country by mutual and participants of joint exercises, the prob- agreement between both parties; ability of permanent deployment of the US •• Provision on the status of military forces, forces in Ukraine is very low, given the cau- which regulated the legal status of US troops tious approach applied by Washington. Howev- stationed in the respective countries97. er, the institutionalization of the existing lev- el of cooperation is vital for maintaining and improving the security dynamics in the short 97 Russell, James A. “Extended Deterrence, Security Guar- antees, and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf,” Strategic 98 Sami G. Hajjar. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Chal- Insights, Volume VIII, No. 5 (December 2009). lenges and Prospects. p. 27
42 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
Recommendations term. Therefore, institutionalization of securi- ty cooperation with the United States through 1. Ukraine should gradually expand cooper- the Strategic Framework Agreement or the DCA ation with the United States by seeking addition- in the short to medium term would allow main- al common interests in the defense sphere. Step taining the existing level of cooperation and by step development of relations between the would not hinder Ukraine’s main goal, which is US and Ukraine and their institutionalization either membership in the NATO or MNNA status. through official agreements should be accom- Establishing long-term, formal, and practical panied by modernization of Ukrainian military security relations between Washington and Kyiv capabilities in the medium term. In terms of va- would have a multiplier effect not only on the lidity, such a document should be more effective prospects of Ukraine’s membership in the NA- than the Charter, and eventually should reach TO, but also on the current deterrence strategy the level of the Strategic Framework Agreement, of the Alliance, where Ukraine is a key element. or the Defense Cooperation Agreement. In or- der to narrow the negotiation corridor for the allies and approve a final document, the tactics of negotiations on such an agreement should be based on the demand for higher level of coop- eration than the current one. Ukraine should be cautious and not put pressure on the US until the point when Kyiv is ready to get the final an- swer. Otherwise there is a risk of failure. Such an agreement should cover the following priority aspects: •• Joint military exercises;
•• Cooperation in armaments development;
•• Consulting, material, and technical aid for defense sector reform;
•• Cooperation in cyber security (an impor- tant element of cooperation with the US, given that Russia had been conduct- ing hacker attacks against both the US and critical infrastructure facilities in Ukraine);
43 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
•• Cooperation in the maintenance of inter- 4. Ukraine should promote the idea national peace and security, which would of strengthening the presence of the US and the strengthen Ukraine’s role as a strategic NATO in the Balkans and in the Black Sea re- country for the United States. It is impor- gion. This would force the Russian military con- tant to fill this cooperation with real con- tingent in Crimea to focus not on possible ag- tent and avoid a declarative character; gression against Ukraine, but on opposing the NATO forces. The necessity of this action should •• Joint research and analysis of the methods be substantiated by the fact that today Russian of hybrid warfare. force in occupied Crimea is more potent that the one Kremlin placed in Kaliningrad region 2. A gradual rapprochement between the in terms of both numbers and advanced arma- US and Ukraine in the field of defense through ments. the Strategic Framework Agreement, or the DCA, as well as the gradual modernization of the de- fense sector of Ukraine should develop into clos- er cooperation with the United States through integration into NATO or signing of a Security Agreement between Ukraine and the USA in the long term. The new forms of regional defense cooperation in case of NATO format changes under Donald Trump’s presidency should also be considered. 3. Attempt to reach an agreement to in- stall the rotation-based US military base in Ukraine. On the one hand, it would become a symbolic gesture of support from the US, and on the other, it would create additional precondi- tions for joint exercises with Ukrainian military staff and enhance the interoperability between the two armies. Such a military base could be- come a hybrid warfare research center, which would increase the US’s interest in it. In case of a refusal to install a military base in Ukraine on the “places-not-bases” principle, Ukraine should focus on maintaining the presence of the US and the NATO member states troops on its terri- tory to continue military exercises.
44 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
Advantages and challenges of the Defense Cooperation Agreement or the Strategic Framework Agreement with the USA
Advantages Disadvantages
1. A number of successive security agreements (e.g. the ex- 1. The US is not willing to en- perience of Singapore) could become an incentive for the gage in a global confronta- Ukrainian government to continue implementing the nec- tion with Russia, which could essary reforms aimed at integration of Ukraine into the Eu- result in a declarative inter- ro-Atlantic security space. national instrument without any effective defense mecha- 2. The agreement would not prevent Ukraine’s integration in- nism for Ukraine. to the NATO].
3. The agreement would promote the institutionalization of a security partnership and prevent the weakening of coop- eration between Ukraine and the US.
4. The progress of relations between the US and Singapore shows that the gradual development of security relations with the United States reduces the frustration of the lat- ter’s major regional rival. Deployment of US military forces in Ukraine under the “places-not-bases” strategy (see the example of Singapore) would create less than any bilateral security agreement, following the examples of Japan or the Republic of Korea that allowed installation of the US mili- tary personnel on a regular basis.
5. The US military presence in Ukraine under the defense agreement between the two countries would serve as an additional deterrence factor against Russian aggression.
6. The agreement would enhance bilateral relations in such aspects as military exercises, training, and supply of defen- sive armaments.
45 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
Advantages and challenges of the bilateral security agreements (the Philippines, Korea Republic, Japan) with the USA for Ukraine
Advantages Challenges
1. A formalized bilateral agreement be- 1. Washington’s reluctance to engage in glob- tween Ukraine and the US would serve al confrontation with Russia. as an additional deterrence factor 2. Kyiv’s activation of dialogue with the US against Russia in Ukraine. At least, this on signing a bilateral security agreement agreement would make the Kremlin might result in the intensification of prov- more cautious in its military activities ocations, armed hostilities, and Russian aimed against Ukraine. pressure on Ukraine. 3. The issue of American security guarantees 2. A full bilateral security agreement, simi- for Ukraine is currently an irritator in the lar to the agreements signed by the US dialogue between Kyiv and Washington, with the Republic of Korea, Japan, and and it will remain so at least until the mo- the Philippines, would force Washing- ment when Ukraine is institutionally ready ton to support Ukraine more actively in to provide the US with a “success story” if deterring Russia in order to not under- the security agreement is signed between mine the confidence of other allies of the two countries. the United States. 4. Washington’s consent to approve the bi- lateral security guarantees could result in 3. Installation of US rotation based mili- additional agreements limiting Ukraine’s tary bases in Ukraine under the securi- freedom of military decision-making dur- ty agreement would not only serve as a ing the activation of hostilities (e.g. the ex- deterrence factor, but also create addi- ample of the Republic of Korea). tional preconditions for joint military ex- 5. The US President may initiate military ac- ercises. The red line for the Kremlin in tivities without the Congress’ consent only case of full-scale hostilities on the ter- in case of attacks on US military personnel. ritory of Ukraine would depend on the Therefore, any security agreement with- geographical location of such bases. out American military presence in Ukraine would be less effective than the agree- ments signed with Japan and the Republic of Korea.
46 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
Advantages and challenges of MNNA status for Ukraine
Advantages Challenges
1. Provides Ukraine with the guaranteed 1. The MNNA status has more symbolic than and consistent role of Washington’s ma- practical meaning. jor ally. 2. The Ukrainian public might become disap- 2. Allows Ukraine to procure additional pointed in this format, if it is not followed military resources. by decisive support, especially in the case of further provocations by Russia. 3. Allows Ukraine to receive American credit aid in the case of limited direct 3. The White House is concerned that the new, funding. higher status might further worsen rela- tions with Russia. 4. Would become a strong signal of partner support for Ukrainian public. 4. The credits themselves are not sufficient to resolve the significant issues in Ukraine’s defense sector.
5. MNNA status would undermine Ukraine’s commitment to the course towards integra- tion into the NATO.
47 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
Appendices
Appendix 1. Allies of the USA99 100 Albania, Belgium, the UK, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Po- NATO land, Portugal, the US, Turkey, Hungary, France, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia
The agreement between the US, Australia, and New Zealand (in ANZUS 1986, the US suspended security guarantees for New Zealand)
Bilateral The Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Japan security agreements
Major allies without official Israel, Chinese Taipei99, Singapore status
Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba (the status is uncertain)100, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Rio Pact Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Trini- dad and Tobago, Uruguay Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zea- MNNA land, Jordan, Argentina, Bahrain, the Philippines, Thailand, Ku- wait, Morocco, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tunisia
99 Beckley Michael. The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts, 2015, с. 24. Режим доступу: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf 100 Neelesh Moorthy, Libertarian candidate Gary Johnson mischaracterizes U.S. defense obligations. Politi Fact, 09.06.2016. Режим доступу: http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jun/09/gary-johnson/liber- tarian-candidate-gary-johnson-mischaracterize/
48 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
Appendix 2. Major documents adopted by the US Congress to support Ukraine
Name Type Adoption Number Main terms date
Support for the Law 03.04.2014 H.R.4152 Support for reforms and Sovereignty, In- assistance to security tegrity, Democ- sector of Ukraine. Autho- racy, and Eco- rization for the US Presi- nomic Stability of dent to impose sanctions Ukraine Act against persons involved in violation of the territo- rial integrity and stability of Ukraine.
Consolidated Ap- Law 18.12.2015 H.R.2029 Providing additional propriations Act, funding for the armed 2016 forces and national se- curity forces of Ukraine. Demand to instruct every representative of the US in international institu- tions to vote against any program that would vio- late the territorial integ- rity of Ukraine.
Imposing sanc- Law 18.12.2014 H.R.5859 Imposing sanctions tions on the Rus- against Russia. Alloca- sian Federation tion of $350 million to in order to pro- Ukraine for military pur- vide addition- poses, including defen- al support for sive armaments and aid Ukraine and oth- for the IDPs. This law was er objectives adopted as an alternative to the Bill S.2828, which initially granted Ukraine the Major Non-NATO Ally status.
49 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
Calling on the Resolution 23.03.2015 H.Res.162 Includes calling on the President to pro- adopted by US President to provide vide Ukraine with the House of Ukraine with lethal de- military assis- Representa- fensive armaments. tance to defend tives its sovereignty and territorial in- tegrity
Continuing Ap- Law 30.09.2015 H.R.719 Ensuring financial flexi- propriations Act, bility for specific interna- 2016 tional actions to support Ukraine in countering ex- ternal aggression and in- fluence.
National Defense Law 25.11.2015 S.1356 Allocation of $300 mil- Authorization Act lion to promote secu- for Fiscal Year rity, military training, lo- 2016 gistics, as well as for the needs of other security services of Ukraine. A ban on the use of funds for co-operation between the US and Russia as long as Moscow keeps occupying the territory of Ukraine and does not take actions to imple- ment the Minsk Agree- ments.
50 2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
National Defense Agreed 14.07.2016 S.2943 A ban on the allocation Authorization Act of funds from FY2017 on for Fiscal Year military cooperation be- 2017 tween the governments of the US and Russia un- til the end of Russian oc- cupation of the territory of Ukraine. Allocation of funds for military support to Ukraine.
Stability and Draft ad- 21.09.2016 H.R.5094 Maintaining the sanc- Democracy for opted by the tions against Russia until Ukraine Act House of Moscow implements the Representa- Minsk Agreements. A ban tives by the US government on recognition of the an- nexation of Crimea by the RussianFederation. Support for investments in Ukraine. Maintaining sanctions in Crimea un- til Ukraine regains sover- eignty over the peninsu- la. American support for Ukraine includes supply of lethal defensive arma- ments.
51 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider
Introduction format of working with NATO. Moreover, Ukraine The integration of Ukraine into NATO has has currently not fully utilised all those mecha- been of a zigzag nature: until 2002 collabora- nisms for collaboration that it has been offered. tion was characterized by a “special relation- The partnership between Ukraine and NATO is ship” partnership schema. Kyiv officially main- unique, with an unprecedented level of sup- tained a course of integration into NATO during port for its partner nation. This does not exclude 2002-2004, and later during 2005-2010. In the any possibility of scaling up aid, but the Alli- last year of Leonid Kuchma’s tenure, the issue ance has stressed that in the first instance Kyiv of joining the Alliance was withdrawn from the should demonstrate a proper level of mastery of agenda, and the coming to power of Viktor Ya- the current amount of support, for Ukraine now nukovych in 2010 was marked by a “non-align- has to fully take advantage of current aid up to ment” status proclamation which was not un- its absorption capacity. Ukraine should not ex- derstood by most experts. Such inconsistency pand areas of cooperation, but deepen existing highlighted the strategic weakness of Ukraine: formats, focusing on the implementation of cur- NATO partners did not understand completely rent programmes. what Kyiv wanted; Russia, meanwhile, was well To go up to another level of cooperation it aware of the vulnerability of the country. is important that there are not only and not so After Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, public much changes in the international regional situ- support for integration into the Alliance has sig- ation, but reforms inside Ukraine itself. To coun- nificantly increased (almost double compared ter the hybrid war, Ukraine should focus on clos- to 2013). However, any future membership is er collaboration not only with NATO but also in no way affected by this. The factor of pub- with its member states, particularly in informa- lic support has not played a key role for NATO tion-sharing and cyber security spheres. A bilat- membership, as it had not in the prewar period. eral agreement should not become a substitute Above all, the reluctance of Alliance members to for collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, aggravate relations with Russia was however a but has already demonstrated its greater effi- factor up to 2014. The NATO Warsaw Summit in ciency. At NATO’s headquarters, when Ukrainian 2016 showed the Alliance’s readiness to further experts complain about the lack of aid in certain support Ukraine. sensitive areas, they get the response that they Today Ukraine can not afford any rheto- had better come to a bilateral agreement, espe- ric along the lines of “membership or nothing”, cially when it comes to sharing intelligence. but must make the most of all opportunities The nation needs to create key narratives for partnership with the Alliance. Ukraine can- for the Alliance. In particular, Ukraine has been not afford to ignore any fundamentally new a giver, not a taker, of security ever since 1991.
52 3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider
Its expertise in combatting a hybrid war against 3.1. Assessment of the Current one of the most powerful armies in the world is Status of Cooperation between already causing significant interest from West- Ukraine and NATO ern partners. The particular areas of interest is Ukraine is the largest recipient of assistance Ukrainian resilience from the side of its service- from NATO. It is also the only partner of the men and volunteers. 101 Alliance which is involved in all major peace- keeping operations under auspices of the Alli- ance. Since 2014 Ukraine has taken first place in receiving funds from NATO for scientific projects. For example, the Alliance highlight- ed itswork with Ukraine under the “Science for Peace and Security” programme in 2014, when 2.2 million euros, and later 3.4 m. eu- ros in Euros, were provided. The total planned budget for 2014-2019 will be some 15 million euros (see. Infographic 1).102 In Ukraine itself the NATO “Improving Military Education” (DEEP) programme is the largest that the Alliance has implemented in any partner country. Below we consider some areas/issues in the collaboration between Ukraine and NATO.
3.1.1. The Comprehensive Package of Aid to Ukraine At the Warsaw Summit in 2016 a compre- hensive aid package for Ukraine was approved, as then confirmed at NATO headquarters, — the largest plan for aid in the history of the Alli- ance. It provides 40 targeted support meas- ures in 13 key areas. In fact, this package rep- resents a systematization of all the assistance that NATO is providing Ukraine as well as sup- port for some new areas, including countering
102 NATO’s Support to Ukraine, North Atlantic Trea- ty Organization, fact sheet, — July 2016. Available 101 Medynskyi, I., “What Ukraine can Offer to NATO?” / In- at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/ stitute of World Policy, 15 December 2015. Available pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-nato- at: http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1870.html ukraine-support-eng.pdf
53 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
improvised explosive devices and hybrid war. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was rec- Forming a platform to study the experience of ognized by NATO as one of the threats to the hybrid warfare is especially important because Alliance itself. According to the last summit in in this Ukraine will demonstrate its added value Warsaw, in addition to allocating Ukraine a com- to the Alliance. One of the important aspects of prehensive package of aid, a number of impor- measurable effectiveness which should be not- tant decisions related to this were taken: ed is cooperation with the Parliament and secu- 1) establishment of a Joint Intelligence and rity sector reform (SSU). Security Directorate, to be managed by Relations between Ukraine and NATO are the Aide to the Secretary General for In- characterized by an uncertain level of con- telligence and Security. Up until now In- fidence, and a mismatch of expectations. If telligence belonged more to the authority Ukraine wishes to count on timely, flexible, and of most member states themselves; large-scale aid, the Alliance insists that Kyiv 2) assigning four battalions to the eastern moves away from its traditional ad hoc approach borders of NATO in 2017 in Estonia, Lat- and moves to more rigid strategic planning that via, Lithuania, and Poland; will change the quality of defence and the na- 3) willingness to employ Article 5 of the tional security sector.103 Washington Treaty in response to hybrid However, the Alliance responds negative- war, and adopt a strategy and action plan ly not only to the lack of a strategic approach concerning NATO’s role in combating hy- by Ukraine, but also to the lack of compliance brid warfare; with certain procedures, and protocols of a dip- 4) a cybersecurity operational space was lomatic nature. Thus, in NATO there is a view recognized that NATO is ready to defend that there is a short-sighted lack of purpose by as effectively as the Alliance functions on Kyiv in the appointment of a Head of Mission in land, in the air, and on water. Indeed, NA- Ukraine for NATO. According to NATO officials, TO and the EU signed an agreement in on the eve of the Warsaw Summit it was expect- February 2016 to strengthen mutual work ed that the President of Ukraine would approve on cybersecurity, which included the cre- a certain long-awaited candidate, but this did ation of two teams that will operate in not happen. The last Head of Mission, Ihor Dol- emergency conditions. hov, ceased to undertake his functions in spring The Warsaw Summit saw a logical continu- 2015. The Alliance perceived this as a lack of a ation of this policy, the first outlines of which permanent representative in addition to a lack were formulated in Wales in September 2014. of focus on a strategic partnership. But if the summit in Wales suggested ad hoc so- lutions in response to changes in the security situation, the summit in Poland adopted a spe- cial communiqué that laid the foundations of 103 Getmanchuk, A., “Ukraine-NATO: a Hidden Integration a new NATO strategy. The Warsaw Summit also or Undeclared Neutrality?”, 26 June 2015. Available at: http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1588.html brought Ukraine the news that it was possible
54 3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider
to design a new form of partnership with the Al- another country under the new programme, as liance, under the auspices of the Enhanced Op- well as benefits of the programme for partici- portunities Programme with its enhanced capa- pating countries. Ukraine should focus less on bilities. This format was launched at the sum- external effects, and more on practical content mit in Wales in 2014, calling for greater coop- to fulfil existing initiatives. At NATO headquar- eration to improve interoperability, starting with ters an impression has been formed that for Ky- five countries: Georgia, Finland, Sweden, Jordan, iv the programme of enhanced opportunities is and Australia. Then NATO agreed that this list only important for communication and to dem- may be extended by other countries that have onstrate progress in relations with the Alliance. “engaged in significant contributions and have interest.” During the Warsaw Summit, Ukraine 3.1.2. Trust Funds expressed such an interest. However, for Ky- The NATO assistance package also includes iv it is important to understand that this very 6 new trust funds that have been launched since initiative may not provide anything more than 2014. The planned total budget for these funds Ukraine has already received. The Alliance can- is more than 9 m. euros. Currently this is an in- not at the moment assess additional benefits for crease of over 50%.104
Name of Fund Planned Budget Contribution
Fund for the modernization of command systems, € 1,760,000 € 1,541,081 management, communications and computerization Fund for retraining and social adaptation of service € 435,000 € 435,000 personnel Fund for medical rehabilitation € 2,250,000 € 187,610 Funds for the reformulation of logistics and stan- € 4,100,000 € 1,263,146 dardization systems Cybersecurity Fund € 560,000 € 1,065,000 Fund for land-mine removal € 50 000 Overall budget: Already account- Total 9,105,000 ed for: 4,541,837
As of June 2016
104 NATO Trust Funds to Support Ukraine, Institute of world policy. Available at: http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/pub- lic/2094.html
55 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
Trust Funds are perhaps the most striking trust funds. One can only express hypoth- example of delays in collaboration between eses about the causes: either Paris has a Ukraine and NATO. They identify key challeng- greater interest in the southern directions es for deepening cooperation, and also that the of its foreign policy or simply the Ukrai- Alliance is cooling off in its response to propos- nian government is not sufficiently artic- als from Kyiv to extend support, because the na- ulate with their expectations in negotia- tion can not yet deal with the available aid in tions with partners. terms of its absorption capacity. The main prob- lems found in collaboration in terms of trust It is likely that efforts by a largely inactive funds are: Kyiv in the above-mentioned issues have led 1. Slow response by Ukraine. Trust funds to a clotting in any large-scale support from that were launched at the NATO summit NATO — trust funds are being added to very in Wales in early September 2014 to mid- slowly. Two years after their creation, the coun- 2015 have not yet come into play due to tries have contributed only 50% of the planned the lack of an appropriate legal frame- amount. The major problems in finance are in work in Ukraine. perhaps the most important funds — Logistics 2. lack of strategic vision. Ukraine for a long and standardization, and medical rehabilitation time could not offer actions plans for co- (see. Infographic 2). operation in any particular sector. With- out a proper understanding of the situ- In addition, there is a slightly different vi- ation and accordingly, without an incre- sion in the direction for financing by trust funds. mental working plan, any measures tak- Ukrainian Agencies expect more urgent pro- en would be a chaotic waste of money. vision of specific logistical and medical assis- This situation can change with the Stra- tance that could be used rapidly — specifically tegic Defence Bulletin. Perhaps this is the for Ukraine to house military forces respond- first document of this kind in the history ing to Russian aggression. In turn, the Alliance of Ukraine which contains clear goals and Member States prefer to channel funds to con- indicators of defence reform. sulting and advisory services, through sending 3. Problems in bilateral cooperation. Any aid their experts to Ukraine.105 The first stage of from trust funds is predominantly the re- procedures by the Alliance for trust funds is a sult of bilateral agreements. It is not suffi- gap analysis and feasibility study comprising an cient that Ukraine negotiates support for analysis of the needs and future requirements defence reform only with NATO, but al- of the implementation. In the area of logistics, so necessarily with the relevant decision this process took a year, on some other issues makers in the EU Member States. In par- ticular, the situation looks rather strange in that France — according to official data 105 Getmanchuk, A., “Ukraine-NATO: a Hidden Integration or Undeclared Neutrality?”, 26 June 2015. Available at: — has not contributed a single cent to the http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1588.html
56 3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider
Infographic 2. NAТO trust funds supporting Ukraine
NATO TRUST FUNDS TO SUPPORT UKRAINE
SINCE 2014 NATO HAS ESTABLISHED 6 NEW TRUST FUNDS SUPPORTING UKRAINE IN CRITICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE
UPGRADING THE RETRAINING TREATING REFORMING DEVELOPMENT DEMINING COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIAL INJURED MILITARY THE LOGISTIC OF CYBER EXPLOSIVE SYSTEM AND ADAPTATION OF OFFICERS AND SYSTEM AND WARFARE DEVICES ENHANCING MILITARY OFFICERS RENOVATING THE IMPLEMENTING DEFENSE UKRAINIAN INJURED DURING REHABILITATION NATO STANDARDS SYSTEM AIMED MILITARY FORCES THE ANTI- CENTERS IN IN UKRAINIAN AT PROTECTING MANAGEMENT TERRORISTIC UKRAINE DEFENSES UKRAINE FROM ACCORDING TO OPERATION FORCES CYBER-ATTACKS THE UP-TO-DATE STANDARDS
DURATION DURATION DURATION DURATION DURATION 2 YEARS 3 YEARS 2 YEARS 3 YEARS 2 YEARS CONTRIBUTING CONTRIBUTING CONTRIBUTING CONTRIBUTING CONTRIBUTING STATES STATES STATES STATES STATES
UNITED KINGDOM DENMARK GREECE LUXEMBOURG BULGARIA SLOVAKIA DENMARK NETHERLANDS ESTONIA ROMANIA LEAD COUNTRY – SLOVAKIA
GERMANY CANADA NORWAY PORTUGAL TURKEY ESTONIA POLAND TURKEY HUNGARY TURKEY
LATVIA LITHUANIA TURKEY CROATIA FINLAND JAPAN CZECH REPUBLIC CANADA ALBANIA PORTUGAL
TURKEY ICELAND ALBANIA HUNGARY LITHUANIA BULGARIA BELGIUM ITALY USA
USA POLAND NETHERLANDS SWEDEN USA
USA
ESTIMATED BUDGET ESTIMATED BUDGET ESTIMATED BUDGET ESTIMATED BUDGET ESTIMATED BUDGET €1,760,000 €435,000 €2,250,000 €4,100,000 €560,000 FINANCIAL FINANCIAL FINANCIAL FINANCIAL FINANCIAL FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS CONTRIBUTIONS CONTRIBUTIONS CONTRIBUTIONS CONTRIBUTIONS CONTRIBUTIONS €1,541,081 €435,000 €187,610 €1,263,146 €1,065,000 €50,000
25 NATO MEMBER STATES AS WELL AS FINLAND, SWEDEN AND JAPAN DECLARED THEIR INTENTION TO CONTRIBUTE OVER 9 MILLION EUR INTO THE TRUST FUNDS FOR UKRAINE.
OF PLANNED FUNDS HAVE ALREADY 50% BEEN CONTRIBUTED
TRUST FUND – A KIND RESERVE FUND FOR VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM NATO COUNTRIES – CONTRIBUTORS
Institute of World Policy DESIGN MARK KANARSKY
57 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
even longer. Ukraine was not quite ready, as not- leaders as a recipient, along with such coun- ed at the headquarters, with Kyiv expecting to tries as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Serbia. Budgets launch practical projects immediately after the implemented by NATO in trust funds for coun- first funds were available. Currently, as of the tries range from €205 thousand to almost €10 second half of 2016, trust funds are coming to a million. For example, financing for the retrain- stage of practical implementation. For the sake ing and reintegration of soldiers and civilians in of objectivity it should be noted that there were Bosnia and Herzegovina, completed in 2009, to- deficiencies both on the part of Ukraine and by talled €5.83 million. When taking into account the Alliance. the trust fund for the disposal of surplus/obso- Comparing trust funds for Ukraine and anal- lete weapons in Ukraine which was launched in ogous projects with other NATO partner coun- 2006, Ukraine moves into absolute first place — tries, it appears that Ukraine is among the the project budget exceeds 30 m. Euros.
Tabl. 2. The Largest Trust Funds of NATO to Aid Other Countries106 107 108 109 110 Country Trust Fund Budget Bosnia and Fund for the retraining and reintegration of soldiers and € 5.83 m. Herzegovina civilians (2006-2009)107 Fund for NATO to raise physical security and stockpile Afghanistan € 7.7 m. management (2008- 2011)108 Fund for the development of alternative sources of live- Serbia lihood for released Serbian defence personnel (2006- € 9.65 m. 2011)109 Bosnia and Fund to aid those released personnel of the Armed € 4.82 m. Herzegovina Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2010-2013)110
106 Status of trust fund projects. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 10 June 2016. Available at: http://www.nato.int/na- to_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_06/20160313_160610-trust-funds.pdf 107 NATO-Perspektiva programme. International organization for migration — Fact sheet, December 2013. Режим доступу: http://bih.iom.int/sites/default/files/factsheets/FOR%20WEB%20-%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20NATO%20 Perspektiva%20Programme.pdf 108 NATO assists Afghanistan to improve munitions stockpile safety. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 07 May 2016. Режим доступу: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_7258.htm?selectedLocale=en 109 Trust Fund project helps former Serbian defence personnel find jobs in the private sector. North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization, 17 May 2011. Режим доступу: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_74420.htm?selectedLocale=en 110 NATO-Perspektiva programme. International organization for migration — Fact sheet, December 2013. Режим доступу: http://bih.iom.int/sites/default/files/factsheets/FOR%20WEB%20-%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20NATO%20 Perspektiva%20Programme.pdf
58 3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider
3.1.3. Strategic Defence Bulletin and In- of a visible commitment of the Ukrainian au- teroperability thorities to the course of reform and, above all, For the first time in the history of collabora- in the defence sector. This is not only about fi- tion between Ukraine and NATO, NATO showed nancial support, but also about raising the pro- their active interest in reforms in Ukraine, name- fessional level of the Government’s staff,i.e. rep- ly the support of the Alliance in developing a resentatives of Ministries coordinating the im- Strategic Defence Bulletin, which provides for plementation of reforms in the context of Euro- the introduction of NATO standards in defence Atlantic integration. The Government of Ukraine and security by 2020.Ukrainian authorities had needs to submit to NATO Member States a pro- until recently not been acting seriously manoeu- posal to improve the qualifications of those re- vring and unready to undertake certain funda- sponsible for these reforms. mental Alliance provisions, in particular, civilian For twenty years Ukraine has been underval- control over the Armed Forces and restructuring uaing the essence of interoperability. After the of the Armed Forces (it is proposed that the Gen- military aggression of Russia, Kyiv has no alter- eral Staff will be controlled by the Ministry of native but to show a serious approach to achiev- Defence and that the Minister will be a civilian). ing the highest possible levels of interaction be- It should be emphasized that the Armed tween the Ukrainian army and armies of NATO Forces interoperability with the armed forces of countries. Interoperability with NATO forces to- NATO Member States had been set as the goal day is fundamentally pragmatic in nature for in the Charter. In 2017 it will be 20 years that Ukraine. Ukrainian troops still have the oppor- Ukraine has been working on this task. Howev- tunity to acquire skills in accordance with the er, the most significant progress in the reform, rules prescribed within NATO peacekeeping op- the introduction of civilian control and manage- erations and military exercises (the most famous ment of security services, has not taken place. of them being Sea Breeze, Fast Trident, Cossack Achieving interoperability is also one of the key Steppe, Secure Sky, Light Avalanche and Maple objectives of a comprehensive package of assis- Arch). Those soldiers who have experience of tance for 2016. It is important to note that the working within Alliance missions have especial- newly formed Committee for the Coordination ly excelled in the battle with terrorism, which of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine has been should serve as the most significant evidence engaged in monitoring effective implementa- of the need to adapt to the models of military tion of the Annual National Program=. Lack of management training. One of the most strik- coordination and political will is traditionally an ing examples is the 95th Zhytomyr Paratrooper obstacle to implementation of the Euro-Atlantic and Assault Brigade. Currently, 600 Ukrainian integration of Ukraine andbringing the national soldiers are part of the ‘LITPOLUKRBRIG’ which defence sector to the standards of the leading is being trained in accordance with the NATO countries of NATO. Strengthening the role of the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro- Atlantic integration may be one of the indicators
59 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
standards.111 Participation in such joint mili- Annual National Programme (ANP) of coopera- tary units only promotes the absorption of NATO tion between Ukraine and NATO. However, the standards of management and communications ANP does not show clear results and indicators, into the Ukrainian military. which should fully reach Ukraine: the document is written in a way that the appraiser has no al- 3.1.4. Assistance from Advisors of NATO ternatives but toplace high scores for the imple- Member States mentation of the programme. NATO similarly Member States have provided advisory ser- recognizes that until now Ukraine has been pre- vices to Ukraine for the development and reform paring the ANP as a formality: only in the sec- of the security sector and defence. In Kyiv to- ond half of 2016 have there been changes in day there are over 15 advisors operating, sec- this sense, since the Cabinet has attracted repre- onded from their NATO countries. Their exper- sentatives from the non-governmental sector to tise includes defence planning, logistics, infor- advise on the development of new programmes. mation systems development, civil and military For example, the ANP prepared in 2015 indicat- cooperation, and cybersecurity. However, even in ed that the priorities are “to consult,” “study the 2015, these advisers did not have permanent ac- issues”, “continue cooperation”, “take measures to cess to the Ministry of Defence — NATO was out- further reform”, “hold meetings of joint working raged: Why invite experts if Ukraine does not groups,” and so on, so that the ANP led to a pro- trust them at all? Today, the issue of access to in- cess and not to an outcome. formation and facilities has been removed from The authors of the ANP have to at the very the agenda, largely thanks to the personal will least undergo appropriate training on writing and intervention of Defence Minister Stepan policy documents on the basis of results-based Poltorak. For the sake of objectivity it should management. This tool has long been used by be recognized that the work and qualifications foreign governments and international orga- of all the advisors are not equally effective, and nizations. The UN moved to this technique for this is not always the fault of Ukraine. For exam- planning in 2000. If the check indicator of suc- ple, the cybersecurity advisor sent by Turkey, has cess for the ANP is measured by the SMART test been replaced every six months — during which (specific, measurable, assignable, realistic, and time each of them barely has time to come to time-related), then the Ukrainian document may terms with the situation in Ukraine. not reach 5% on a scale for objectives that The plan for interoperability between the meet those rules. If Ukraine fears that such clar- Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of NA- ity in the document may weaken the security of TO Member States is highlighted also in the the state for targets in sensitive issues, then this should be declared in the indicators from the start and the ANP simply be classified as “secret”. 111 Siruk, М. One of the most limiting factors for Russia to- However, what should not be taken away is the day is Ukraine. Den, 1 July 2016. Available at: http://day. whole document, — only that part relating to kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-planety/odnym-iz-naybilshyh- strymuyuchyh-chynnykiv-rf-sogodni-ye-ukrayina the defence sector. Political and economic topics
60 3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider
could well be in the public domain, if only for the government and civic society(track II di- the public sector to control the pace of Ukraine’s plomacy) and inside the community (track III Euro-Atlantic integration . NATO should be in- diplomacy).113 It should be noted that in this volved in the preparation of the ANP at every context the non-government sector needs to stage — from training document authors to ad- be progressive in the mobilization of all these justing unclear wording in the programme. In “tracks” of diplomacy. Extensive experience has this sense, the parties can be of mutual benefit particularly been gained by the Ukrainian Crisis in the preparation process of an SDB. Media Centre, the Institute of World Policy, and the Renaissance International Foundation. 3.1.5. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Com- munication 3.1.6. Information Exchange and Cyberse- NATO provides Ukraine with advice and fi- curity nancial support for public diplomacy, working Since the beginning of the aggression by with the mass media and strategic communica- Russia against Ukraine, the exchange of infor- tions, to help Ukraine strengthen the robustness mation with the Alliance focused on the ques- of opposition to Russian news manipulation. tion of the ability of the Nation to protect its ter- Work on the implementation of a Road Map ritorial integrity. Given the increasing number of for a Partnership in Strategic Communications terrorist attacks, NATO also came to understand between the National Security and Defence the need to strengthen collaboration in this ar- Council of Ukraine and NATO International Sec- ea between the Alliance nations and between retariat has been sagging on both the side of partners. This was demonstrated in the decision NATO, in that initiatives lack a systematic nature, at the Warsaw Summit to create a Joint Intelli- as much as on the side of the Ukrainian authori- gence and Security Agency. For Ukraine this is ties. Among the results can be seen a crisis help- crucial in becoming a reliable partner who can centre in Ukrainian media, and information from be trusted. the Kyiv Post on Crimea and Eastern Ukraine by CIA Director John Brennan, during his visit to their reporters. 112 Ukraine in December 2014 discussed the cre- Ukraine must establish communication not ation of new, safer channels of communication only with the NATO Alliance but primarily with between the Ukrainian side and American intel- the member states themselves, and for that it ligence to help Ukraine withstand the onslaught has to invest not only in communication at the by Moscow. It was also reported that the pur- inter-governmental/inter-parliamentary level, pose of the visit was to identify support within known as track I diplomacy, but also between the political leadership of Ukraine and to inform it about new practices in limited intelligence
112 NATO support for Ukraine. North Atlantic Trea- ty Organization, fact sheet, — July 2016. Available at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ 113 Lete, B. How Ukraine Can Open Its Door to NATO, In- pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-nato-ukraine- stitute of world policy, 6 July 2016. Available at: http:// support-ukr.pdf iwp.org.ua/eng/public/2088.html
61 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
sharing. Traditionally, the US side provided in- Russia to stabilize the situation in the Middle formation to Ukraine, however it had been re- East. This was demonstrated by the Obama ad- ported that the main problem is that the com- ministration in offering Russia an expanded ex- munications network and military officer en- change of information on terrorist organizations vironment had been deeply penetrated by the in Syria.117 The Trump administration is likely to Russian security services. 114 In this regard, the remain consistent in the matter of trying to co- Americans provided satellite images to Ukraine operate with the Kremlin. with delayed and intentionally degraded quality NATO does not hide the fact that the because of fears that US information and tech- coordination of intelligence efforts is the nology had become accessible to the Russians. weakest factor in Euro-Atlantic cooperation: 115 even allies do not fully trust each other. It Sometime in February 2015, images of the is unlikely that the Alliance will be able to location of pro-Russian terrorists and mili- soon change this situation and therefore re- tary equipment in the combat zone in Eastern mains reliant on cooperation in this sensi- Ukraine were provided by Canada.116 A public tive area without any alternative on a bi- notice was made in 2016 that the provision of lateral basis. Establishment of cooperation images was to be discontinued, although Cana- with NATO depends on Ukraine itself, in so da argues that this was due to financial consid- far as it can demonstrate its reliability and erations, yet this was still for the Ukrainian side added value to NATO as a whole, or to indi- a negative political signal. vidual Member States. The disappointment in the delay in carry- ing out reforms by Ukraine is of particular con- 3.1.7. Reform of the Security Service and cern against the background of increased coop- Intelligence of Ukraine eration between some NATO member states and The process of reforming the Security Ser- vice of Ukraine began in 2016 on the level of development of new legislation. Having a large 114 Lake, E. Here’s What the CIA Director Was Really Doing in Kiev. The Daily Beast, 16 April 2014. Available at: number of staff in the Security Service does not http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/15/ always affect the efficiency of the structure. here-s-what-the-cia-director-was-really-doing-in-ki- Thus, the Law of Ukraine “On the overall struc- ev.html ture and size of the Security Service of Ukraine” 115 Dyrektor TSRU Dzhon Brennan nanis nespodivanyj vizyt do kyyeva. Europe-Ukraine, 15 April 2014. Avail- able at: http://ua.europe-ukraine.eu/2014/04/15/ dyrektor-tsru-dzhon-brennan-nanis-nespodivanyj- 117 DeYoung, K. As Kerry pushes for coordina- vizyt-do-kyyeva-na-tli-pogroz-pro-vvedennya-novyh- tion with Russia in Syria, others in administra- sanktsij-proty-rosiyi-foreign-policy/ tion cry foul. The Washington post, 12 July 2016. 116 Shevchenko rozpoviv pro vyskovu dopomogu Ka- Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ nadi Ukraini. Liga.Novosti, 01 June 2016. Available world/national-security/as-kerry-pushes-for-co- at: http://news.liga.net/ua/news/politics/10981038- ordination-with-russia-in-syria-others-in-admin- shevchenko_rozpov_v_pro_v_yskovu_dopomogu_ka- istration-cry-foul/2016/07/12/83623008-484d- nadi_ukra_n.htm 11e6-bdb9-701687974517_story.html
62 3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider
approved the number of staff in the Service at left the occupied peninsula, moving to other 27,000 for the given period, unless there were to areas of Ukraine. 120 be a special period (except for a period of mar- The Concept document on Security involved tial law) when that could rise to 31,000 peo- both NATO and the EU Advisory Mission. This is ple.118 In comparison, the British MI5 Service has a good and constructive example of coordina- 4,000 staff .119 tion by the EU and by NATO to provide advisory Ukraine needs to reform and restructure assistance. These recommendations are primar- all agencies and services involved in the ex- ily strategic in nature and do not provide quick change of information, to reduce the num- fixes for the SSU. 121 The key NATO interests lie ber of people with access to confidential in implementing democratic oversight, focus- and sensitive information, and to be sure ing on parliament and civic society, as well as that they work exclusively in the interests the de-politicization of these structures.122 NA- of Ukraine (a polygraph is not an absolute TO believes that it would be appropriate to cre- guarantee of employee loyalty). Distrust of ate a civilian oversight committee to NATO stan- the Security Services of Ukraine by western dards, with the assistance of international and partners is associated with a good example Ukrainian experts, under whose supervision of betrayal of the Ukrainian Security Servic- there would be reform of the security services. It es oath by officers in 2014. Immediately af- is important to establish a mechanism for stra- ter the flight of former President Viktor Yan- tegic communication between different depart- ukovych, employees and main offices of the ments, civic society, and international partners Ministry of the Interior and the Security Ser- to strengthen mutual trust. 123 vice of Ukraine in Crimea and in Sevastopol Ukraine spends about 10,000 euros per year began sabotaging orders from Kyiv. Of the per full-time employee of the security services. 20,000 military service personnel from the Armed Forces, Security Service, State Guard 120 Service, and police ffficers of the Ministry Remarks to the second anniversary of the Russian ag- gression against Ukraine.UCMC, 18 February 2016. of the Interior of Ukraine, and intelligence Available at: http://uacrisis.org/ua/40347-gorbulin- agencies stationed in the Crimea, only 6,000 tezy 121 Experts summed up the preliminary results of NA- TO summit. Defense express, 20 July 2016. Available at: http://defence-ua.com/index.php/statti/publikat- siji-partneriv/1277-eksperty-pidvely-poperedni-pid- sumky-samitu-nato 122 Governance and reform of national security and intel- ligence: the best international practices, Verkhovna 118 Law of Ukraine «On the overall structure and size of Rada of Ukraine, 24 May 2016. Available at: http:// the Security Service of Ukraine». Available at: http:// rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/130638.html zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3014-15 123 Speech by the Deputy Director of the NATO Liaison Of- 119 People and organization. Security service Mi-5. Avail- fice in Ukraine Ann-Kristin Bjergene, Verkhovna Rada able at: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/people-and-organi- of Ukraine, 24 May 2016. Available at: http://rada.gov. sation ua/news/Novyny/130638.html
63 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
In some of the intelligence structures of the US between Ukraine and NATO, but, above all, se- and Europe, this figure exceeds €100,000.124 riously weakens national security to external Since 2014 Ukraine has increased its yearly bud- challenges. The battle against corruption — es- get for the SBU to about 1 billion UAH. Howev- pecially in the defence sector — may be the first er, in US dollar terms, the security budget has by and most obvious fundamental task for Ukraine contrast declined over the past 3 years. Thus, on in its determination to implement change, but the one hand, we talk about efficiency in terms at least it does not require money and expen- of financial constraints, while on the other hand, diture. Instead it saves money. NATO countries Ukraine still needs to increase the budget of the have in this sense substantial experience that SSU, given the escalating threat of Russian ag- can be shared with Ukraine. gression. In 2008 Ukraine joined the NATO pro- NATO does not fully take into account that grammes for building integrity, transparency, ac- Ukraine is at war, and so the process of reform- countability, introducing ethics, and implement- ing the intelligence services needs to be ap- ing reductions in corruption risks in defence proached with wariness. In addition, it should and security institutions.125 That is, programmes be noted that dilemmas in the reform processes have now been implemented for 8 years aimed during a state of war arise not only in the con- at reducing corruption risks in the defence sec- text of the SSU, but also in the defence sector tor. In a study by the Transparency International, as a whole. Recommendations made by Alliance published in December 2015, the level of cor- representatives have been based more on mod- ruption in the defence sector of Ukraine was els of countries not at war. Their advice focused ranked as a D, which is for countries with a high on a strategic development perspective. Ukraine risk of corruption. The study also identified pro- in NATO communications must be clearly em- curement as the most risky area in the Ukrainian phasized with the need to take into account the defence sector. One establishment that has be- situation under which it has found itself. How- gun to fulfil its obligations is the Training and ever, without reform of the Security Service, Educational Centre of Building Integrity of the Ukraine cannot count on confidence and coop- National Defence University of Ukraine, where eration in information exchange with the Alli- representatives of NATO member states lec- ance member-states. ture.126 The ANP has not defined clear and spe- cific steps to be taken to combat corruption in 3.1.8. Fighting Corruption Corruption is one of the key factors stand- ing in the way of not only deepening relations 125 Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Build- ing — PAP-DIB. Available at: http://ukraine-nato.mfa. 124 The issue of intelligence in terms of financial con- gov.ua/ua/ukraine-nato/programa-iniciativa-natoreap straints, using the experience of leading countries 126 Ukraine is still a high risk of corruption in the defense for Ukraine. Policy Brief, National Institute for Strate- sector.Transparency International, 03 December 2015. gic Studies. Available at: http://www.niss.gov.ua/arti- Available at: http://ti-ukraine.org/news/oficial/5636. cles/896/ htmlhttp://ti-ukraine.org/news/oficial/5636.html
64 3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider
3.2. Benefits of the NATO the defence sector — this situation needs to be changed in the new paper. Partnership To reduce corruption risks in the defence and In general, the Alliance works closely with 41 security sectors, effective civilian control needs nations around the world, together with inter- to be introduced. An efficient measure would be national organizations including the UN, EU and to introduce higher penalties in cases of corrup- OSCE.129 In 2011, after the Lisbon Summit, NA- tion in the defence sector (for example, in 2014 TO developed partnerships, built frameworks for the US company Hewlett-Packard was fined 108 mutual work, and individual programmes, which m. USD127) and the inevitability of punishment include about a thousand activities and areas of for being involved in corruption, despite the work available to all partner countries. Partner- statute of limitations for such crimes. 128 ship with NATO is aimed at building up the ca- pabilities of partner countries, so as to strength- en regional security and combat crises. When looking at imminent partner countries, such as Finland, Sweden or Australia, then in the long run, their formats of cooperation and action differ little from those areas provided for in the partnership between NATO and Ukraine. Anoth- er thing is that they do not just use them to the maximum in implementation, but demonstrate significant added value for the organization. In fact, both Finland and Sweden, in the event of expressing political desire for NATO member- ship, would automatically become members of NATO. Moreover, Sweden and Finland have signed a 2014 memorandum with NATO under which the alliance and the Scandinavian coun- tries will strengthen their mutual work in the defence industry, and NATO troops will be pres- ent on their territory. 130 These countries have reached the maximum level of interoperability
127 SEC Charges Hewlett-Packard With FCPA Violations. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 09 April 129 NATO partners. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 11 2014. Available at: http://www.ethic-intelligence.com/ November 2015. Available at: http://www.nato.int/ wp-content/uploads/sec_charges_hp.pdf cps/en/natohq/51288.htm 128 International experience in fighting corruption in the 130 Sweden Ratifies NATO Cooperation Agreement. The security sector: Lessons for Ukraine.Policy Brief, Na- Wall Street Journal, 25 May 2016. Available at: http:// tional Institute for Strategic Studies. Available at: www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-ratifies-nato-coopera- http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/1848/ tion-agreement-1464195502
65 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
with the forces of other NATO countries. In this has contributed to a new qualitative ap- sense, Ukraine must learn from such countries. proach to planning and evaluation of re- Given the fact that in the short term Ukraine forms in security and defence. Currently, it is cannot count on NATO membership, for us the important to involve the Alliance to develop main goal at this time should be to get maxi- the ANP further in defining clear programme mum use and benefits provided by the partner- objectives and benchmarks for performance. ship format. •• Obtaining financial assistance for the im- plementation of projects. Ukraine receives Benefits for Ukraine of partnership with funds from NATO for the implementation of NATO: research projects within the framework of •• Getting assistance in conducting reforms. the “Partnership for Peace” project, and in The financial and advisory assistance from 2014 even took first place in the receipt of the Alliance, which is implemented in par- funds from the Alliance, which helps to pre- ticular through a comprehensive package of serve and develop the scientific potential of aid and trust funds and the work of advisors Ukraine. from NATO Member States, promotes faster •• Opportunities to modernize the Ukraini- implementation of reforms and partially cov- an Military-Industrial Complex (MIC). Even ers the financial costs of their implementa- though Ukraine has massive potential to de- tion, which is crucial for Ukraine in terms of velop its MIC (it has a complete cycle of air- opposition to Russian aggression and a total craft designs, engines, and components;has lack of funds in the Ukrainian budget. Utilis- experience in building warships and civilian ing the experience and resources of the Al- vessels for various purposes, a unique com- liance to implement reforms in security and plete manufacturing cycle for tanks and ar- defence is already yielding tangible results. moured vehicles, and is one of only 10 na- •• The opportunity to learn from the advanced tions that are developing missile and radar military experience of the Alliance. Partic- technology, and precision weapons131), it still ipation in military exercises, peacekeep- needs the help of NATO in the modernization ing operations, and NATO partnership pro- and development of new models of weapon- grammes all contribute to effective reform of ry. Working with defence enterprises in NATO the Armed Forces and increase defence ca- Member States will in the future allow com- pabilities, through experience of profession- panies in the Ukrainian MIC to participate in al levels of achievement and interoperability NATO projects from production, moderniza- with the forces of NATO member states. tion and disposal of military equipment to •• Involving representatives of the Alliance in world standards. the preparation of strategic documents. Co- operation with NATO in this area has been successfully demonstrated in the develop- 131 Kryvtsun, D. Rozumna oborona. Den, 21 April 2015. Available at: https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobyci/ ment of the Strategic Defence Bulletin. This rozumna-oborona
66 3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider
•• Partnership with NATO provides Ukraine influence the acceleration of the reform pro- with an important platform for commu- cess in Ukraine. Work on the new ANP with nication with the leading nations of the representatives of NGOs is actually as a re- world. The ability to report directly their sult of the policy conditions instigated by own vision to the Alliance allows Kyiv to NATO. defend its interests in one of the most in- •• In the long term successful partner- fluential international platforms. NATO’s ship opens the doors for full integra- policy of containment of Russia (even tion- membership. Although at present against the backdrop of continued dia- Ukraine’s membership of the Alliance is logue) should indicate that Ukraine will not officially on the agenda, it is obvious listen. In NATO countries it is increas- that for an increasing number of Ukraini- ingly recognized that Ukraine well un- ans integration with NATO appears to be derstands what is expected of it, hence the inevitable route for providing securi- the high value of keeping the channel of ty for the nation. In 2008, when Ukraine communication. did not receive a Membership Action Plan, •• The positive dynamics of the partnership there were discussed three main obsta- with the Alliance as a whole can help in- cles to deepening cooperation between crease confidence in Ukraine and to strength- our nation and the Alliance: lack of pub- en ties with individual Member States. This lic support; lack of reforms in Ukraine; in turn enables Ukraine to work with indi- and Russia’s reaction. This last factor was vidual Member States, for example in such publicly mentioned by few politicians. Of critical areas as information sharing and cy- the first hurdle today, we can say that it bersecurity. has been overcome (in fact half the pop- •• Partnership with the Alliance helps to ulation now supports Ukrainian integra- strengthen cooperation with other part- tion to NATO). Currently, Ukraine is mov- ner countries of NATO. For example, Fin- ing towards overcoming obstacles in the land, Sweden and Japan, as partners of second area, when Ukraine will take ad- NATO, have joined the finance trust funds vantage of opportunities for partnership in support of Ukraine. It is important for with NATO with its reforms, then mem- Ukraine to be able to study the experi- bership becomes feasible as the neces- ence of Finland, Sweden and Georgia in sary standards are reached. The chances achieving compatibility with NATO stan- of joining the alliance will increase pro- dards. portionally. At the time, respectively for •• The risk of losing the support of the Alliance various reasons, the issue of NATO mem- is an important stimulus for the Ukrainian bership may disappear but the need to authorities to implement reforms. In partic- withstand Russian threats will continue ular, the preparation of SDB has demonstrat- even if Ukraine refuses membership of ed that NATO has sufficient ammunition to the Alliance.
67 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
Partnership with NATO, even with all the States or groups of countries. For example, benefits that were mentioned above, has a num- the United States initiated a Joint Coordinat- ber of shortcomings, even weaknesses. In partic- ing Committee on military cooperation and ular, the following topics point away from mem- defence reform. Later, this association was bership. joined by Britain, Canada, Lithuania, Estonia, •• Partnership does not provide any securi- and Poland.133 The problem of such associa- ty guarantees. Partnership with NATO can- tions may be in that they do not necessarily not be an effective tool to counter aggres- coordinate their assistance with the Alliance, sion because of the inability to become in- so it may be duplicated, or even worse, ad- volved under the fifth article of the Wash- visors can provide conflicting recommenda- ington Treaty. However, in fairness it should tions. be noted that most NATO countries are cur- •• Not taking urgent needs into account. The rently not fully sure whether the Musketeer reforms to be carried out by Ukraine and principle of “one for all and all for one” would NATO assistance are both aimed at the fu- actually be activated in the event of a seri- ture and geared to a quick response strategy, ous threat. These fears intensified especially which is extremely dangerous in terms of ag- against the backdrop of pre-election promis- gression and unpredictability from Russia. 134 es by the new US president Donald Trump. 132 Of course, there is nothing wrong with this •• Bureaucracy weakens NATO. The Alliance approach, but Ukraine has always lacked an has a complicated bureaucratic system, so effective leadership strategy. However goals decisions are made over a long period. Ac- biased towards the long-term can still be cordingly, NATO responds slowly to modern relevant in a period of open conflict, which challenges. This is an especial threat when, continues at this moment in time. for example, in Russia decisions are actual- •• Mismatch of expectations and opportuni- ly made by one person and in a matter of ties. NATO expects from Ukraine more than hours. The need for consensus on any deci- it can do. For example, reform can require sion weakens the NATO Alliance in terms of major financial outlay. Without financial help rapid response. In the case of unexpected from the NATO countries, Ukraine cannot threats, this does not play in favour of NATO. fully reform the security sector and ensure •• Duplication and contradictions in partner- ships. The NATO bureaucratic machine can be avoided by establishing direct relation- ships either with individual Alliance Member 133 Bilateral military cooperation of Armed Forces of Ukraine has steadily expand. KMU, 05 July 2016. Avail- 132 Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO, Turkey’s Coup able at: http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/ Attempt and the World. The New Yourk Times, article?art_id=249163648&cat_id=244277212 21 July 2016. Available at: http://www.nytimes. 134 Getmanchuk, A., “Ukraine-NATO: a Hidden Integration com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign- or Undeclared Neutrality?”, 26 June 2015. Available at: policy-interview.html?_r=0 http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1588.html
68 3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider
large-scale rearmament of the Army.135 On 3.3. The Likelihood of the other hand, some Ukrainian stakeholders Implementation of the Model are too focused on the narrative of member- In the short term, i.e. until 2020, the main ship, not on what is given by the current lev- task for Ukraine is the proper execution of an el of partnership. If there is only focus on re- updated RNP. If Ukraine proves to its partners turns, not the actual changes required under that it is not a Client State, but a Contributor “membership or nothing”, then Ukraine can State, and in this experience in countering Rus- eventually get “nothing”. sia is particularly important, in the medium term Kyiv may have a chance for deeper cooperation, Thus, the number of benefits provided by including membership. partnership with NATO is much greater in the The approach to the development of an- case of successful implementation, and Ukraine nual national programmes should be re- can in the future reach a level that it will apply vised. It is advisable to strengthen the work for membership of the Alliance. of Ukraine with NATO at an inter-institution- al level to ensure proper implementation of the ANP — strengthening the human resources and financial office of Deputy Prime Minister by far-reaching stages. Communication must occur at all levels, including at the level of in- dividual departments and services that are di- rectly involved in the implementation of tasks. Civil servants, who are responsible for reform in Euro-Atlantic integration, need to have the opportunity to improve their skills in accor- dance with NATO standards. In the medium term Ukraine must complete the necessary reforms and achieve interopera- bility with NATO member countries. Fundamen- tally, it is also necessary to achieve success in the implementation of other reforms, particular- ly in the fight against corruption, judicial, reform of the Prosecution Service, improving socio-eco- nomic status, and other such tasks. The threat of political instability could ag-
135 Experts summed up the preliminary results of NA- gravate the situation. Therefore, it is impor- TO summit. Defense express, 20 July 2016. Available tant for Ukraine to achieve significant results at: http://defence-ua.com/index.php/statti/publikat- as soon as possible, and depoliticize the secu- siji-partneriv/1277-eksperty-pidvely-poperedni-pid- sumky-samitu-nato rity structures so that a change of government
69 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
or coalition does not become a threat to nation- Recommendations al security. 1. Strengthen the human resources and finan- Implementation of these conditions will al- cial coordination of reforms in Euro-Atlantic low Ukraine in the long term, in the most op- integration. timistic case, to count on NATO membership, 2. Develop documents that regulate the scope while even in a less optimistic scenario, to be- of reforms to bring Ukraine closer to NATO come a sufficiently strong state even to curb standards, with clear objectives and success Russian aggression. Support from the Alliance indicators by results-based management. will increase if Ukraine proves its credibility and Involve NATO representatives in the devel- value as a partner. opment of the Annual National Programme with defined and clear objectives, indicators to measure responsibility, and timescales. 3. Prepare a clear action plan for monitoring and evaluating the ANP. The NGO sector should con- tinue to be able to influence the preparation of such a document, as well as its evaluation. 4. In the shortest terms possible show the re- sults of fighting corruption in the defence sector. Punishments should be more severe than in the civilian sector. Legislation should provide for punishment of companies that send proposals to corrupt structures in the areas of defence and national security. 5. Avoid delays in decisions that do not really require a lot of time, but affect the country’s reputation. For example, delaying the appoint- ment of Head of Mission of Ukraine to NATO. 6. Reforming the SBU must restore trust be- tween NATO and Ukraine in more effectively combatting hybrid war. 7. The Government needs to work more close- ly with the non-governmental sector as Ukraine and NATO Member States have to create new positive narrative about the na- tion as a country that is a contributor to the Euro-Atlantic security environment andas a nation that has unique experience in terms of sustainability in combatting hybrid war.
70 3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider
Strengths and weaknesses of partnership with NATO
Strengths of partnership with NATO Weaknesses of partnership with NATO
1. Ukraine belongs to the top group of recipients of 1. Partnership cannot guarantee the aid from NATO. Financial assistance by NATO, in- safety and protection of sovereignty cluding that through the Trust Funds, partially cov- and territorial integrity ers the reform of the security sector and defence, which is essential given Russian aggression. 2. Alack of prospects for membership in NATO could negatively affect re- 2. Participation in the NATO partnership programmes forms in the defence and security contributes to effective reform of the Armed Forces sectors.
3. Participation by representatives of the Alliance in 3. NATO Bureaucracy is slow in deci- formulating strategic documents contributes to sion making. Some NATO countries, changing the approach to planning and evaluation fearing a deterioration of relations of the reform of defence and the security sector with Russia, could block any deep- ening of relations with Ukraine. 4. NATO funding helps maintain the scientific poten- tial of the nation as a whole 4. Financial assistance by NATO, in- cluding that through trust funds, is 5. Partnership with NATO provides Ukraine with an not sufficient to fully implement re- important platform for communication with the forms in security and defence and leading countries of the world, clarifying their own stop Russian aggression. positions, and protecting national interests.
6. Partnership with the Alliance and the risk of losing its support is an important stimulus for the Ukrai- nian authorities to implement reforms.
7. Successful partnership could in the long term lay the foundation for full integration- membership.
71 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
4. Regional Security
Introduction 4.1. Regional Dimensions of the The current security situation requires the Security Service of Ukraine use of new approaches by Ukraine in building The National Security Strategy of Ukraine a regional security system that takes into ac- document as adopted in May 2015 provides ex- count trends in the hybrid war and utilises mul- ternal guarantees of security “by the means of tilateral diplomacy to strengthen its position in creating a network of alliances with both indi- the international arena. The main slogan for the vidual nations and regional organizations, and determination of new configurations of region- initiatives demonstrated by concluding agree- al cooperation should be: more cooperation — ments on joint defence or military assistance, more security. and with international security organizations, The regional security of Ukraine should be by participating in the mechanisms of collective based on several pillars: 1) bilateral cooperation security.”136 Furthermore, bilateral cooperation with friendly neighbours; 2) multilateral coop- with the United States and China was defined eration in infrastructure, economic, cultural, etc. as key. In terms of regional cooperation in Cen- projects with the countries of Central and East- tral and Eastern Europe, it is planned to further ern Europe; 3) bilateral cooperation with the US, develop relationships with the OSCE and Coun- Germany, and Britain, whose policy on Central cil of Europe. Otherwise, no less important for and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region is Ukraine, in the Black Sea this can be achieved a deterrence factor in the area; 4) bilateral coop- through denuclearization and demilitarization eration with Japan and the strengthening of its in common with the policies for the Black Sea support for Ukraine’s presence in Asia; 5) region- region of European allies. At the same time, this al cooperation within the GUAM organization in strategy does not provide for the implementa- the post-Soviet space; 6) multilateral military tion of their own initiatives aimed at ensuring and military-technical cooperation with defence that Ukraine has truly effective mechanisms to associations in Europe; 7) international cooper- ensure security with respect to neighbouring ation with the UN and the OSCE. countries. Instead, references are made to ex- Each of these formats of cooperation has its isting formats that still have no real impact on strengths and weaknesses, as well as in that the improving the climate of security in the region, development and implementation of each of such as the Visegrad Group (V4), GUAM, BSEC or them requires careful strategic planning with the CEI. the joint participation of experts and staff of the Key factors for the security of the state have Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. now been specified in the new “Military Doctrine
136 Strategy of the National Security of Ukraine, http://za- kon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/287/2015
72 4. Regional Security
of Ukraine.” This analysis has focused on spe- visit of President Petro Poroshenko to Azerbai- cific trends of the modern world and regions. A jan, presiding over GUAM in 2016. particular point is that we cannot fail to agree In addition, economic cooperation in four ar- with the conclusion of the analytical section — eas has strengthened: transport, energy, culture, “foreign political conditions are not conducive and the establishment of a Free Trade Agree- to the settlement of the armed conflict in east- ment (FTA). Specifically, Prime Minister Volody- ern Ukraine” and followed by the statement: “In myr Groisman announced an initiative to restart such circumstances, Ukraine must count primar- economic and trade cooperation within GUAM, ily on its own strength and support of the US, EU which provides practical benefits and a FTA be- member states and NATO who believe that pre- tween the quartet of nations. However, the In- serving the independence and territorial integ- ternational TransCaspian Transport Consortium rity of Ukraine is one of the key factors for ensur- needs to be highlighted and utilised to enhance ing global and regional stability.”137 the investment appeal of the GUAM Space. In its Ukraine has a long history of collaboration turn, Ukraine has the opportunity to build transit in different regional formats, which today has routes bypassing Russia for goods manufactured acquired a new context. In particular, the resto- in Ukraine and attract rail capacity to the nation ration of active cooperation within GUAM has as part of the “New Silk Road” project from China more and more support. Since the Russian ag- to the EUthrough Ukrainian territory. This would gression against Ukraine started all the GUAM be in addition to developing internal cooperation participant countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbai- together with mutual projects as part of GUAM+. jan and Moldova) have found themselves in the In particular, the organization is actively interest- same situation — at different times the territo- ed in Japan. Collaboration was established in 2007 rial integrity of each of them has been violated. and provides for meetings and seminars to deepen It is considered as part of their collaboration in sectoral projects of mutual benefit. It is notewor- the framework of the General Assembly of the thy that as one of the achievements of “GUAM-Ja- UN to provide mutual support and joint efforts pan”, Tokyo is considering strengthening its pres- to protect national interests. Accordingly, GUAM ence and reputation with the international com- may provide these four nations with the same munity. 138 Given this experience GUAM can revital- functions as the Visegrad participant countries ize another initiative, launched at the beginning of — an intensified political voice in the interna- the 2000s under the format “GUAM-USA” and es- tional arena to draw attention to the UN of the tablish close liaison with Visegrad Group. In addi- problems of prolonged conflict: a zone of insta- tion, meetings between Altai Efediyeva, General bility, destabilization, and internally displaced Secretary of the organisation, and ambassadors of persons. These issues were raised during the EU member states in Kyiv have resulted in Europe-
138 Croatian Ambassador to Ukraine reception of GUAM 137 Military doctrine of Ukraine, http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/ Secretary General, 23/06/2016, http://guam-organiza- documents/410.html?PrintVersion tion.org/node/1918
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an countries being interested in supporting GUAM 4.2. Examples of Models of as a separate regional organisation. In particular, Regional Security Croatia may also share its European integration International relations at a regional level is experience as well as experience in conflict reso- best seen as an analysis of regional security con- lution. 139 glomerates — “a group of nations whose securi- Another proven area of regional cooperation ty issues and risks are so inter-related that the is the development of multilateral relations in a problems of national security of each of them number of formats between NATO Member States cannot be analyzed or resolved away from other and the EU. At this stage we can only develop mod- groups of nations.” 140. This can have the char- els of deeper cooperation in the long run. Instead, acter of: conflict formation, in which the basis in the short term relations will develop bilaterally of relations is competition and mutual threats; with allocated sectoral aid, involving military units a security regime, in which the threat level is of the Armed Forces in joint exercises and opera- reduced due to appropriate measures/ agree- tions of NATO and the EU and regional develop- ments; a security community, in which states ment programmes of NATO. are no threat to one another, and thus none of Today Ukraine already has positive expe- them applies force against another. This focus rience in military collaboration in the form of on the analysis of relations between neighbour- EU Battle Groups (under the implementation of ing nations which incorporates geographic loca- the Common Foreign and Security Policy), Bal- tion, based on the understanding that the dan- kan (HELBROC) and Visegrad (V4 EU BG), as well ger is to a specifically individual nation which as in numerous exercises and NATO operations, is often neighbouring, and not a remote nation. as well as significant experience in working in Accordingly, it focuses on the dynamics of rela- UN peacekeeping contingents. In addition, the tionships, on examples of alliance and hostili- agreement finally achieved the creation and de- ty within a security conglomerate and from the velopment of a trilateral brigade — LITPOLUKR- balance of power there arises an overall con- BRIG (Lithuania-Poland-Ukraine) — whose HQ is ceptual analysis. Also important is the reference stationed in Lublin, Poland and which is aimed to two key aspects that determine the interde- primarily at peacekeeping. Also the possibility pendence of relationships in the region — the of creating another tripartite brigade has been balance between friendly and unfriendly steps discussed, consisting of military units in Roma- and the existence of common threats.141 Due to nia, Bulgaria and Ukraine. The interaction of en- these, we can determine the configuration in the gineering units of national armies has partially present environment and predict the occurrence been worked out under the Multinational Engi- of future regional associations. neer Battalion TISA (Carpathian region) format.
140 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. — Cambridge, 2003. 139 Japan-GUAM cooperation program, http://www.mofa. — P. 44 go.jp/mofaj/files/000115518.pdf 141 For more details see: Barry Buzan, op.cit., pp. 45-92.
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Ukraine is on the knife edge of two security the EU is not a guarantee of non-interference conglomerates: the former Soviet Union, which in the complex area of European security. This is dominated by Russia, and Europe, which to- is particularly true in the Baltic states, who feel day coincides with the territory of the EU. Russia that they are the subjects of Russian propagan- announced its rights to the post-Soviet region da and a Russian hybrid war, as well as Swe- at the beginning of the 1990s, when in 1993 it den and Finland, where their possible member- defined the idea of“near abroad” with a foreign ship in NATO is kept under close supervision by policy main priority of expansion of spheres of Russia. In addition, Moscow has demonstrated influence in the newly independent nations. that it is ready to use Kaliningrad and its mil- It attempts to defend its assumed Great-State itary presence in Belarus for turning the Baltic identity and recognition in the world as an in- territories into an A2/AD zone for NATO, with ternational player through a peremptory status a prohibition zone and limited access. Despite as a regional leader in the post-Soviet Space. In all the measures taken by the Scandinavian and fact, the creation of GUAM in 1997 can be con- Baltic countries, there still remains the question sidered the first reaction to this “near abroad” of whether through bilateral agreements, such policy from the new post-Soviet Russia. On the as with the United States and Britain, between other hand, the creation of the Shanghai Co- Sweden and Finland, and between Denmark and operation Organization in 1996 in response to Sweden, or multilateral cooperation in the for- the strengtheningUS role in the world and as mat of NORDEFCO, the Enhanced Opportunities an attempt to strengthen the influence of Rus- Partners (EOP) with NATO, CFSP of the EU, and sia and China are extremely important to the in- others, they can strengthen the military pres- terests of Washington in the Asiat — especially ence of NATO in the region so as to retain key in Central Asia. Nevertheless, all of these have islands (Bornholm, Åland, Gotland) and offset failed to implement their policy in the post- the possibility of the creation of an A2/AD situ- Soviet countries during the 1990-2000’s, which ation in the region by using the “Bastion” com- attempt to apply mutually exclusive tactics: on plex in Kaliningrad.142 For Kyiv the consequenc- the one hand, strengthening the unipolar nature es of this situation are clear: Ukraine cannot get of the region (including attempts at different rid of the influence of the Russian factor in the levels of influence and the impact of political security situation in the nation, even by becom- blackmail on neighbouring countries), and on the other hand, initiating several proposals at 142 For more details see: Baltic Sea security: How can al- unifying multilateral cooperation (the Customs lies and partners meet the new challenges in the re- Union, the CSTO, strengthening security unions gion? / ed. by Ann-Sofie Dahl. — Center for military in the CIS), which could not attract all newly- studies, university of Copenhagen, http://cms.polsci. ku.dk/english/publications/balticseasecurity/down- independent nations to the creation of a post- load/BalticSEASecurity.pdf See also: Edward Lucas, Soviet State. The coming storm — Baltic Sea Security report, June Analysis of this regional security conglomer- 2015, http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/me- dium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20(2). ate also shows that membership in NATO and compressed.pdf
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4.3. Disadvantages of the Model ing a member of the EU or NATO. The priority is to develop effective strategies for the contain- When assessing models for multilateral co- ment of Russia. operation in this region is important to under- The disinterest of Russia in the stabilization stand that none of the models available to- of the situation in neighbouring countries is al- day for regional associations in other parts of so reflected in its destructive role as a mediator the world and Europe can be fully transferred in resolving the now so-called frozen conflicts to Ukraine. In particular, because in the region- in the GUAM countries. This approach helps to al security conglomerate the aggressor was the Moscow to continue military and political pres- former nuclear leader-state of the region, which sure on neighbouring countries and to suppress led to a situation that only hypothetically ap- their economic development. Some tactics used peared in other security groupings in the world. in this strategy include support for pro-Russian Most of the examples of such formats include political forces in these countries (e.g. Moldo- associations that may be deterrents in such cas- va), and strengthening military-technical coop- es, but in reality no one knows how effective eration and collaboration with the energy sec- such a deterrent will be in a case similar to our tor from the centre (e.g. Azerbaijan). Thus, where situation — for example, if China refuses peace- there is no fixed presence by Moscow today un- ful coexistence with Asia. der the CSTO and an additional bilateral agree- Therefore, a brief description of the situation ment on a regional air defence system, it is in- in regional security associations in the post- stalled by supporting “breakaway regions” and Soviet territory, which is dominated by Russia, pro-Russian political players. shows how limited the possibility is for devel- oping an effective model of regional security for Ukraine. There is no talk of creating a new se- curity model since that is currently impossible by definition, as is the search for strategies that develop the new requirements for regional as- sociations with neighbouring states that share the threat with Ukraine. When developing such models however, we should not always look back to Russia, because it often ends with the recognition of an assumed right by Moscow to veto different steps by Ukraine and its allies. In- stead, it is necessary to analyze what the tactics and goals are at a regional and global level and then look for the corresponding balancing re- sponse.
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4.4. The Transformation of GUAM of northern and southern parts of Asia.143 This into a United Security Grouping forum created the Council for Security Cooper- Following the Example of ation in Asia Pacific, which is an implementa- ASEAN tion format for track II diplomacy, bringing to- gether experts and researchers from different When planning the further institution- participating countries to develop common se- al development of GUAM, if such a decision is curity concepts and development of the region. made(which today looks doubtful), we should This format promotes the notion of “coopera- take into account the achievements of ASEAN tive security,” which means the promoting of (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), includ- standards of peaceful coexistence in the region ing the political, security, economic and socio- and the development of collaboration in differ- cultural environments. ent aspects.144 Another type of collaboration de- Security has been the foundation of ASEAN signed to build trust between nations and en- since its inception in 1967. Ensuring such secu- hance shared responsibility for the region is the rity was not to be through legal mechanisms to ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) as formalise security guarantees, but by develop- the highest level of consultation and collabo- ment of a culture of internal dialogue. Non-in- ration within the organization in the field of se- terference in internal politics, non-implemen- curity .145 tation of force and peaceful conflict resolution, The experience of building ASEAN can be development of bilateral and not multilateral used in the further institutional development of military cooperation, consultation and consen- GUAM. In particular, attention needs to be paid to sus are the essence of dialogue in ASEAN. This how ASEAN has created partnerships with other union of states in Southeast Asia manages to organizations and countries to form partnership hold a balance in Asia. In addition the Commu- dialogues, known as the “plus” format. Also in nity involves all the major players in the region the short term, it is important to initiate con- — China, Japan, Australia and the USA — albeit tacts between ASEAN and GUAM, which will fa- with differing levels of status. Particularly inter- cilitate the entry of GUAM into the strategically esting is the ARF format (ASEAN Regional Fo- rum), which, as the name suggests, is a regional 143 27 nations take part, among them 10 Member States forum which brings to the same table leaders of АSЕАN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malay- sia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), 10 dialogue partners (Austria, the EU, India, Canada, China, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, the US and Japan), ASEAN observers — Papua-New Guin- ea, also North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. 144 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever…, p. 160. 145 For more details see: ASEAN Political-security com- munity blueprint, http://asean.org/wp-content/up- loads/images/archive/5187-18.pdf
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important market146 of ASEAN, strengthening its the US in Southeast Asia.150 It is also very nec- international visibility and gaining experience essary to take into account developments in of cooperation not just with individual countries Japan,151 particularly in its key policy of “proac- but with regional organizations (which will al- tive pacifism.” Tokyo initiated the “Japan-GUAM so contribute to finding a common platform for Dialogue” that has become an important plat- GUAM members). In developing a serviceable form for debate, which involved both research- plan for cooperation, the many years of expe- ers and diplomats, and that GUAM wishes to rience of cooperation between ASEAN and the EU147 will need to be taken into account. The de- cision to establish a free trade zone between the Eurasian Union and ASEAN has to be also con- sidered in orderto help determine implemen- tation options created by a separate research team in 2016.148 Given the fact that a constituent part of ASE- AN relations with third countries is sectoral co- operation, joint work in tourism could be a pi- lot project for collaboration by these organi- 150 see: Fact Sheet: U.S.-Japan Global and Regional Co- 149 operation, 25/04/2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ zations. Kyiv could become involved by ini- the-press-office/2014/04/25/fact-sheet-us-japan- tiating a working group of experts from GUAM global-and-regional-cooperation countries to study opportunities for collabora- 151 Bilateral dialogue with Australia, trilateral coopera- tion between GUAM and ASEAN. tion (TSD) with Japan, USA Australia; Joint political Declaration Japan-NATO, resolution on “historical dis- Another objective is to activate a GUAM+2 putes” in relations with South Korea, military and tech- format, similar to the cooperation of Japan and nical cooperation with ASEAN countries, development of relation with India in the Asian Democratic Arc for- mat and influence by the Chinese factor on the in- volvement of India on the trilateral cooperation with 146 Today the ASEAN is the 7th largest economy in the TSD. Thus the experience of Japan may be useful for world, with prospects of attaining 4th position. GUAM countries and Ukraine in terms of improving re- lations with neighbouring countries with which there 147 ASEAN, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries- were conflicts in the past, and in the search for po- and-regions/regions/asean/ ; About the EU mission tential allies, and in developing a joint format for de- to ASEAN, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/associ- terrence of the leading country of the region, and for ation-southeast-asian-nations-asean/905/about-the- continual development of relations with most friendly eu-mission-to-asean_en countries. The experience also proves that strength- 148 Decision on a free-trade zone 5/08/2016, http:// ening security means collaboration with many players. forbes.kz/news/2016/08/05/newsid_117484 More detail: Brad Glosserman, Peak Japan and its im- 149 Of critical importance to Kyiv is strengthening bilat- plications for regional security. Special Report. March eral cooperation with Asian countries. Dialogue inten- 2016, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196438/Peak%20 sified by Petro Poroshenko during the President’s visit Japan%20and%20its%20implications%20for%20re- to Indonesia and Malaysia in August 2016 to continue gional%20securit.pdf; The U.S.-Japan Security Alli- cooperation with ASEAN countries and the obtaining ance. Regional Multilateralism / ed. by T. Inoguchi, G.J. of membership of the Europe-Asia Forum Ikenberry, Y. Sato. — NY, 2011.
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continue to develop.152 The importance of this by its own production, and then export). Region- format for events is that it is not only designed alism, underpinned by private capital and in- to exchange views but also indicate GUAM posi- vestments, may be the key to peace in our re- tioning outside the region. In particular, it seeks gion. After all, every post-Soviet nation, except answers to questions about the attractiveness Russia, agree that a stable military and politi- of the region, the opportunity to be a common cal situation is the key to economic develop- market for third countries to attract Japanese ment and will serve as a legitimization of pow- commercial drives and investment to the region, er. Russia stands out because it has shown that and so on153. This generally suits the Japanese the state can go to war, which nullifies economic approach, which it applies in different regions prosperity in pursuit of status clear only to itself. by involving the region, and not an individu- Thus, for Ukraine it is not only important to ex- al country in dialogue, by initiating a range of amine the concept of Japanese regional policy, workshops and activities. but to use it in its own foreign policy (given the What may be very interesting at this point “flying geese” paradigm and its political use). It is looking at the experience of creating an eco- is also important to develop relations with To- nomic system by using the “flying geese para- kyo, realizing that Japan is building relations digm” model, (a Japanese model of successive with GUAM and the Black Sea region as a whole, overtaking which involves cycling the three not only to maintain international order, but al- stages of a particular industry: imports, followed so to strengthen relations with the EU accord- ing to the formula: “The more Japan is involved in Europe, the louder the voice of Japan will be 152 There is a n opinion that the war in eastern Ukraine 154 may negatively influence the development of rela- in Asia. ” With an ambitious goal — to become tions between Japan and GUAM. In particular, insuf- a permanent member of the UN Security Coun- ficient support of GUAM by Japan in the context of re- cil — the country of the Rising Sun already wants lations with Russia may damage bilateral cooperation. On the other hand, excessive support of GUAM coun- to show the world its ability to support inter- tries by Japan may direct Russia into China’s embrace. national security in different parts of the world, At the same time, the economic crisis in Ukraine drives unlike Russia, with participation in peacekeep- a search for investment by China and options for strengthening military and technical cooperation with ing operations as a part of the plan. Effective co- Beijing which may be negatively perceived by Tokyo. operation with Ukraine in regional formats can Thus, to preserve relations, the GUAM countries must facilitate this. avoid collaborating with China in the areas sensitive to Japan. see.: Anno Tadashi, Challenges for Japan’s GUAM Policy: Liberal Principles vs. Realist Calculus? / The Second Japan-GUAM Dialogue: The Japan-GUAM 154 Shiegeo Mutsushika, Why the Black Sea Area Is Im- Relationship in the Changing World, Conference Pa- portant Now — Towards an Extension of Japan’s Dip- pers, 2015, http://www.gfj.jp/j/dialogue/20150717_ lomatic Horizon, Keynote speech of the Symposium, cp.pdf “The Black Sea Area in a Changing World—Old Issues 153 For more details see: The Second Japan-GUAM Dia- in a New Bottle,” University of Shizuoka, 29-30 Octo- logue: The Japan-GUAM Relationship in the Changing ber 2011, Shizuoka, Japan, http://werc.u-shizuoka-ken. World, Conference Papers, 2015, http://www.gfj.jp/j/ ac.jp/attach.php/656e676c6973685f353376634f4f63 dialogue/20150717_cp.pdf 4d/save/0/0/Keynote%20speech.pdf
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Besides using ASEAN as an example of peace- 4.5. Accession to the European ful integration into regional unity in an area of Security Complex potential conflict, our diplomacy should look to In an environment of regional cooperation the development of relations in other parts of with countries in the region that have become Asia. In this frame there is cooperation between part of the EU and NATO, Ukraine is demonstrat- Japan and Australia, as well as the transforma- ing a lack of its own future initiatives. The afore- tion of India to the status of major player in and mentioned have stated their readiness to sup- out Asia. An important here is finding a unified port Kyiv within currently existing formats, but format of cooperation within the UN. Such co- there are no current examples of a proactive po- operation cannot be limited only to General As- sition and the desire to go to the countries of sembly Resolutions, but also should include co- Central and Eastern Europe with concrete pro- operation between the United Nations and the posals. In addition there is also a lack of under- Organization for Democracy and Economic De- standing of the signals that are coming from velopment — GUAM.155 Western partners. For example, the offer by An- drzej Duda, President of Poland, to enhance re- gional cooperation in December 2015 went un- noticed. Currently, there are also doubts that the speech by Andrzej Duda was heard at the Ambassadors Meeting on August 24th, (year?) in Kiev. It also discussed interests, threats and challenges common to the entire region of Cen- tral and Eastern European. After all, this was a speech outlining the implementation of a new model of cooperation in the region –the free nations of Central and Eastern Europe — which once used to be called “communist” Eastern Eu- rope, sandwiched between Russia and Germa- ny. Now, for greater clarity, the region is being named the Trymoryam (Three Seas) region to include nations that are located between the Adriatic, the Baltic and the Black Sea. It is very important that the region potentially includes Ukraine, which historically belongs to it. Anoth- er important fact is that in terms of format, the
155 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 2 region is seeking political identity as a part of, April 2015 — 69/271. Cooperation between the Unit- and not as an alternative to, the Euro-Atlantic ed Nations and the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development — GUAM, http://www.guam- organization.org/attach/res02042015en.pdf
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community as part of the EU and NATO.156 How- The fundamental step towards the realiza- ever, the main idea of a new format of coopera- tion of this initiative was the forum in Dubrovnik tion is down to changing the status of the coun- on August 25th, 2016 with the participation of tries in Central and Eastern Europe that joined Presidents, Ministers and Deputy Ministers of 12 the EU in the 21st century from being peripheral. countries in the region: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, The Trymorya form of cooperation an- Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithu- nounced by Duda is based on three components ania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. (you have 4 here): security — a military envi- The result of the meeting was the declaration ronment building its own defence capabilities that the participants “supported the Trymorya in the region, while the development of trans- as an informal platform, which should serve as atlantic relations and multilateral cooperation obtaining political support and organization of between individual countries takes place, such specific activities relating to the identified mac- as the creation of a “Lithuania-Poland-Ukraine ro-regional and cross-border projects that are of Brigade”(Lytpolukrbryh); energy — an energy en- strategic importance for the countries involved vironment for developing cooperation in this in the energy and transport sectors in digital sector and independence to allow disengage- communications and the economy.”158 ment from possible energy blackmail by Russia; The next meeting of the leaders of these na- infrastructure — especially for the development tions is to be held in June 2017 in Wroclaw. The of a transport network for better accessibility Declaration noted openness to initiatives from throughout the region, which will contribute to, other participants, so we can only hope that by and attract new investment; social — develop- June next year, Ukrainian diplomats will deter- ment of history dialogue to reduce the impact of mine their proposals for the format of accession historical factors in the development of contem- by Ukraine. porary relationships. In his speech, the President Although the official communiqué made no of Poland gave a clear signal to Kyiv that War- references to discussion of a common defence saw is ready for cooperation in all these dimen- policy in Dubrovnik, or later in Warsaw, we need sions of bilateral relations and will gladly wel- to carefully study the closer military cooperation come Ukraine’s contribution to the development that has begun in the eastern flank of NATO. Par- of the CEE region, stressing that “your future will ticular attention should be given to models of be determined by the fact of who you want to a common defence policy, which involves those unite with and build alliances with.”157 nations that are not members of NATO. The best example here might be NORDEFCO (Nordic De- fence Cooperation).
156 Wystąpienie Prezydenta RP w Akademii Dyplomatyc- znej w Kijowie, 24/08/2016, http://www.prezydent.pl/ aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wystapienia/ 158 Wspólna deklaracja w sprawie Inicjatywy Trójmorza, art,67,wystapienie-prezydenta-rp-w-akademii-dyplo- 25/08/2016, http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/ matycznej-w-kijowie.html wizyty-zagraniczne/art,105,wspolna-deklaracja-w- 157 ibid. sprawie-inicjatywy-trojmorza.html
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In the first instance, because in their collab- the citizens of the region.160 Since 2014 they oration, the Northern European countries, Den- have developed cooperation with a third party mark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, — the Baltic Nations — in terms of weapons, mil- have shown promising military cooperation in itary training, veterans,161 planning, and security the format of “smart defence” by avoiding du- sector reform. It is assumed that by 2020, the as- plication of functions, specialization, and joint sociation will not only achieve synergies in the procurement savings in finance. Secondly, they security and defence sector, but also be able to have illustrated that such cooperation requires offer the international community its capabili- careful preparation and a well-developed plan ties in constructing development in such coop- of action. Thirdly, this defence alliance is being eration. developed within the legal framework of NA- Without waiting for 2020, Ukraine can al- TO, which has a North Atlantic Treaty Article 5, ready draw upon the experience of setting up and the EU, which has article 42.7 of the Lisbon military cooperation. This would involve com- Treaty, allowing participating countries to guar- parisons of national plans in all areas of coop- antee protection in the event of an attack on by eration, and the identification of those activities a third party. that can be strengthened as a result of coopera- NORDEFCO was established in 2009.159 The tion. The exchange of observation should be in- main aim of cooperation is the strengthening of troduced to improve situational response. Early the defence sectors of the participating coun- harmonization of military requirements will fa- tries and establishing close liaison in order to cilitate better and more effective cooperation in coordinate joint actions and joint decisions. Re- the purchase of weapons. Ultimately, this part alization of this goal was facilitated by such fac- of the collaboration is the most difficult to im- tors as the experience of years of mutual coop- plement. Therefore, Ukraine, if it has not already eration, a common culture and identity, a clear done so, should study the experience of Scan- organizational structure, and popularity among dinavia and develop a plan of cooperation in purchase of necessary weapons within at least
160 Pernille Rieker, Marcin Terlikowski, The Limits and Achievements of Regional Governance in Securi- ty: NORDEFCO and the V4, PISM: Policy Paper, No. 25(127), August 2015, https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_ 159 A significant part of the success of this project was en- plik=20209 p. 7 sured by the presence of a clear concept of coopera- 161 In September the third NORDEFCO Veteran Confer- tion of the Nordic countries in security and defence. ence, that studied the experience of nations in resolv- This concept was developed by Thorvald Stoltenberg, ing the issues posed by veterans. Given the impor- former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence of Nor- tance of this issue to Ukraine it is advisable to look way. Thorvald Stoltenberg, Nordic cooperation on more closely at the abovementioned experience of foreign and security policy. Proposals presented to the the Scandinavian countries as well as initiate partici- extraordinary meeting of Nordic foreign ministers in pation of Ukrainians in the following events: http:// Oslo on 9 Februrary 2009, https://www.regjeringen. www.nordefco.org/files/program-nordefco-confer- no/globalassets/upload/UD/Vedlegg/nordicreport.pdf ence-2016.PDF
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bilateral agreements, and work out options for Scandinavian nations to the definition of coop- integration of the Ukrainian military-industrial eration areas — COPA — and developing a clear complex into NATO. It should be borne in mind plan for each of them (capabilities; armaments; that the military-technical cooperation of NA- human resources and education; training and TO Member States is not limited to the funda- exercise; operations). In particular, cooperation mental treaties. The plan for the procurement in implementing joint training and exercises de- of arms should not, however, forget that mem- veloped for five years (Combined Joint Nordic ber states may transfer/sell Ukraine arms only of Baltic Exercise Plan). 164 their own production and not those purchased The example of military cooperation be- elsewhere. 162 tween the Scandinavian countries is often com- To improve skills and competencies it is nec- pared with similar development in cooperation essary to immediately develop a common ed- within the Visegrad Group, but not in favour of ucation space for military training and educa- the latter. The causes are believed to be sever- tion.163 In this context, Ukraine would have to al: insufficient institutionalization of V4, which harmonize the curricula of its military universi- makes all integration projects dependent on the ties with the curricula of the military academies nation holding presidency, and a different atti- of NATO and the EU, and to insist on the creation tude to Russia.165 For multilateral military coop- of a joint NATO training centre (such as Georgia). eration to successfully develop shared interests In addition, options need to be found for ac- are essential. This is also noted by the group of cess to the Norwegian Computer Training Net- experts which developed possibilities of mili- work and the Finnish Small Arms Indoor Train- tary cooperation for the Visegrad Group in 2011- ing Simulators format of training exercises. The 2012. development of such types of cooperation re- Thus, this group the necessary criteria for ef- quires careful study of the approaches of the fective cooperation in the field of defence and security: similarity of cultures; trust and soli- darity; the quantity and quality of the armed 162 Instead, certain limitations were provided for cooper- forces; and clarity of intent. Ukraine also ap- ation with Russia by the Bill H.R. 5094 entitled “Sup- port for stability and Democracy in Ukraine, ratified pears in their studies in the context of an in- by the House of Representatives and Congress in the tention of closer cooperation of NATO with USA at the end of September 2016: ”Use of U.S. influ- ence to seek North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NA- TO) adoption of a policy that opposes the transfer of defence articles and services to Russia while Russia occupies the territory of Ukraine or of a NATO member, and direct appropriate U.S. agencies to monitor and 164 NORDEFCO: Annual Report, 2014, http://www.nordef- identify transfers by NATO members of defence arti- co.org/Files/NORDEFCO_arsrapport_2014.pdf, p.34 cles and services to Russia.” — https://www.congress. 165 Pernille Rieker, Marcin Terlikowski, The Limits and gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5094 Achievements of Regional Governance in Securi- 163 The NORDEF MCC Action Plan 2015-2018, http:// ty: NORDEFCO and the V4, PISM: Policy Paper, No. www.nordefco.org/files/141211_NORDEF%20 25(127), August 2015, https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_ MCC%20AP2015-18_final.pdf plik=20209
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non-members166 through the implementation in the formation by Ukrainian troops, particularly of specific projects that do not necessarily imply as consultants in the development of operation- the participation of all members of the group al plans. After all, Ukrainian soldiers today know and allows other nations to engage bilaterally best the combat tactics of Russian armed forces. (experience of the joint Polish-Ukrainian peace- On the other hand, it is important to work with the keeping battalion; the participation of Ukraine Visegrad group partners to work through options in the V4 BG; and here we can also recall the for joint use of military infrastructure, as Russia Lithuania-Poland-Ukraine Brigade). As in NOR- and Belarus do, but also like Denmark and Sweden. DEFCO, significant importance is also given to In addition to the formats, there is collabora- joint military exercises and educational projects. tion developing between NATO member states. Russian aggression has affected the imple- This includes the so-called Bucharest format mentation of plans to deepen military cooperation of nine countries: Romania, Poland, Bulgar- within the Visegrad Group. Specifically, during the ia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary meeting of Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group and the Czech Republic, whose leaders in No- in December 2014, decisions were adopted in the vember 2015 signed a joint declaration on “Al- Bratislava Declaration that proclaimed deepened lied Solidarity and Shared Responsibility,” aimed defence cooperation.167 As a result a military group at strengthening the capabilities on the east- from the Visegrad Group, in which Ukraine took ern flank of NATO,168 For Ukraine, this declara- part in in the first half of 2016 (using the mech- tion was important not only because it declared anisms of the EU CFSP), was created.Visegrad readiness to cooperate with neighbouring coun- and the participation of Ukraine in the first half tries under NATO’s open door policy and a tough of 2016 (). Given the fact that the aforementioned and unanimous condemnation of Russian ag- declaration also provides for permanent SH forc- gression, but also because of the emergence es to support the NATO Response Force and the of a new format of cooperation of neighbour- EU, it would be appropriate to study involvement ing NATO member states. Some discussion of its development also took place during the Sum- mit in Warsaw. In particular, the creation of a tri- partite brigade was announced for the partici- pation of Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. Another form of cooperation was established between Poland, Romania and Turkey under the Warsaw
166 DAV4 Full Report. Towards a deeper Visegrad Defence Partnership / ed. by Tomas Valasek, http://www.cepoli- 168 9 Central European countries sign joint declaration on cy.org/sites/cepolicy.org/files/attachments/dav4_full_ Allies Solidarity and Shared Responsibility, 4/11/2015, report_0.pdf http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/defence/9-central-europe- 167 Bratislava Declaration of the Visegrad Group Heads an-countries-sign-joint-declaration-on-allied-solidar- of Government on the Deepening V4 Defence Coop- ity-and-shared-responsibility.d?id=69479594 ;for the eration, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2014/ text of the declaration see: https://nato.mae.ro/en/lo- bratislava-declaration cal-news/904
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initiative. The first trilateral meeting was held 4.6. Options for reducing the in June 2016 in Warsaw and was devoted to the influence of Russia on the issues of strengthening the eastern flank of NA- European continent TO. The second was in Ankara in August 2016; In order to change the balance of power on its goal was to probe the politics of Turkey af- the European continent, it is necessary to signifi- ter the failed coup and reconciliation between cantly limit any Russian leverage of the situation Erdogan and Putin.169 Given the importance of in the EU. This can be achieved by improving the the Black Sea to Ukraine’s security, it would have legal framework of the member states, which been desirable for an active position to be taken will then make it impossible to register any or- by Ukrainian diplomats for closer cooperation ganizations such as the so-called “Luhansk Peo- with NATO countries in all formats, including ple’s Republic” and the “Donetsk People’s Repub- strengthening the position of NATO in South- lic” in the EU, as was done in the Czech Republic eastern Europe. in late August 2016 with registration through a In addition to synergy in military coopera- pseudo-consulate of these unrecognized “repub- tion, Ukraine should also look closely at the ini- lics”; an effective information policy; and the re- tiatives of Western countries on updating the striction of Kremlin agents in the EU (of course, Vienna Document (on which NATO insists first liberal democracy can not adopt an equivalent of all170) and the Open Skies Treaty within the law on “foreign agents”, but since the activi- OSCE.171 Given the fact that Ukraine suffers ties of such groups are designed to weaken the most from the breach of the two agreements by member states and the EU as a whole, we can Russia, Kyiv needs to involve itself more active- consider it as a key threat to national security). ly in these discussions on the renewal of nego- Equally important is an effective solution to the tiations on effective arms control exercised by migration problem. Europeans must understand OSCE. that an EU absorbed by internal problems is not a major player on the international scene. In ad- dition, the EU being marginalized across the
169 W czwartek w Ankarze spotkanie szefów MSZ Polski, world helps Russia with its foreign policy. Turcji i Rumunii, 24/08/2016, http://www.msz.gov.pl/ Russia has today lost the confidence of key pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/w_czwartek_w_ankarze_ players in the international community. The at- spotkanie_szefow_msz_polski__turcji_i_rumunii titude to it can be described as follows: “If there 170 Joint press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the German Minister of Foreign Af- is anything learned in recent years, it is that at- fairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, 2/09/2016, http://www. tempts to predict the behaviour of Russia will nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_134549.htm ; Re- be in vain. From its rapid invasion and annexa- marks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassa- dor Alexander Vershbow at the OSCE Security Days, tion of Crimea to unexpected military interven- 3/10/2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opin- tion in Syria — all that can be expected by the ions_135530.htm West with even a slight chance of probability is 171 Reviving Co-operative Security in Europe through that Russia prefers the element of surprise in the OSCE, 1/10/2015, http://www.osce.org/ networks/188176?download=true ;
85 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
its actions.”172 The use of “guessing game” as a diplomacy and evil military policy, things are method of knowing Russia has been exhaust- moving well.”174 ed. Instead, we have come to understand that Therefore, Russia today proves the persua- Russia is guided by principles different from any sive efficiency of “coercive diplomacy” policy, Western foreign policy implementation “Obvi- pointing out the weakness of the policy of con- ously, the West found it difficult to accept the tainment. By its constant maneouvers and train- fact that Russia’s foreign policy is often based on ing, as well as militant rhetoric, Moscow is forc- prestige and status, not on any material or eco- ing the West to seek effective methods of deter- nomic premises. In the perception of the West, rence under conditions of lost time and lost po- economics and trade relations matter more in sition. In particular, only at the summit in Wales the management of foreign policy, and so coun- were there at least some elements of protection tries expected that Russia will not act against its plans for the eastern reaches of NATO. Also de- own economic interests.”173 layed was the development of measures of op- Therefore, the analysis of foreign policy of position to Russian propaganda under the Strat- Russia by western analysts must now take in- com format. But still, in spite of extensive col- to account the “status factor,” noting that in the laboration between the Scandinavian countries, collective mind of Moscow, preserving a“super- the Baltics and Poland, there has still not been state” identity is crucial for the survival of Russia worked out a common format for defence coop- as a political entity. There is also an understand- eration for all the countries in the region. Giv- ing that dominance in the region through weap- en the new versions of bilateral agreementst- ons remains part of its policy to preserve this hat are already signed or are ready to be signed status. Thus, in the rhetoric of Moscow we con- between Sweden and Finland with the Unit- tinue to hear its dictations of its own require- ed States and Britain respectively (but without ments and that Russian weapons will be used the inclusion in their clauses on protection ar- to strengthen it- both in Ukraine and in other eas), the involvement in strengthening defence parts of the world, including Syria. Proof of this via two key military giants remains an effective is found in the texts of Russian internationalists mechanism for strengthening the military po- close to the Kremlin. They emphasize the suc- tential of non-NATO nations. cess of foreign policy in which “through brilliant Although the war in Ukraine has now con- tinued for over two years, the European capitals
172 Julianne Smith, Jerry Hendrix, Assured resolve: testing have not offered any other political formula re- possible challenges to Baltic Security, 07/04/2016, garding the attitude toward Russia other than https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/assured- resolve-testing-possible-challenges-to-baltic-securi- ty, p.12. 174 Aleksei Peskov, Sergei Kraganov: Fundamental Rus- 173 Bettina Renz, Hanna Smith, Russia and Hybrid War- sian Commodity is Security, 6/04/2016, http://vpk- fare — going beyond the label // Papers Aleksanteri, news.ru/articles/30074; Gleb Strunnikov, Fedor Luky- 1/2016, http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/english/ anov: «Putin is not even a tactician — he is a fatalist», publications/presentations/papers/ap_1_2016.pdf , p. 22/08/2016, https://discours.io/articles/social/fedor- 15. lukyanov-putin-dazhe-ne-taktik-on-fatalist
86 4. Regional Security
the one that was written by Pierre Harmel, Bel- it worked or other factors influenced develop- gian Foreign Minister, in 1967 in his “Report of ments in the situation.176 the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance.” Therefore, at this stage Ukraine needs to un- Offered in what is now known as the Harmel derstand the origin of the German policy toward Report was an approach that formed the basis Russia. Berlin will cooperate with Russia where of NATO policy, that was down to two princi- it considers it necessary and possible, and will ples: deterrence and dialogue. This is the for- condemn unacceptable behaviour by Moscow. mula still used today by NATO. In the recently The playing field for such cooperation is not published White Paper: 2016, Berlin condemned currently taken by Ukraine since this niche has the aggressive policy of Moscow and its vio- for a longer time been taken by Syria (although lation of international order, while proclaim- non-fulfilment by Russia of agreements on Syr- ing that a balance in relations with Russia was ia can change the situation) and the other “fro- found. “It is much more important in our rela- zen conflict” zones in the post-Soviet area177. In- tions with Russia to find not only the right bal- stead, Kyiv should have paid more attention to ance between collective defence and increased other statements from Germany — the desire to resilience on one hand, and approaches to se- Europeanize defence policy on the continent curity cooperation and sectoral cooperation on and create a European Security and Defence the other hand.”175In addition, the German gov- Union. Although plans to create such a union ernment assumes the task of promoting this du- trace their history from the distant 1950s, the al approach in NATO to Russia. Using Harmel’s activity of German diplomacy and of Chancellor formula, which was proposed in peacetime, as a Angela Merkel in discussions on the eve of the base fails to consider the fact that this formula summit in Bratislava for plans to create a Euro- was proposed at a time when Eastern Europe pean army with different groups of EU Member had been unconditionally committed to Moscow States may indicate the resolve of Berlin to this after the interference of the West in the Hungar- time bring the matter to its logical conclusion. ian events of 1956. And this is also the weakness In addition, Germany taking the role of region- of the concept of deterrence — to prove its ef- al leader in guaranteeing security on the conti- fectiveness in practice is almost impossible, be- nent opens additional opportunities for Kyiv to cause it is extremely difficult to prove whether strengthen military cooperation with Germany within the framework of strengthening the east- ern flank of NATO.
176 For more details see: Antulio J. Echevarria II, How should we think about “Gray-Zone” Wars? // Hy- brid Warfare, op.cit., http://www.helsinki.fi/alek- 175 White Paper 2016: On German Security Poli- santeri/english/publications/presentations/papers/ cy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, http:// ap_1_2016.pdf , pp.33-39. www.new-york-un.diplo.de/contentblob/4847754/ 177 Initiatives of Steinmayer regarding Transdniester Daten/6718448/160713weibuchEN.pdf, p..32 within the OSCE
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Ukraine may deter aggression by Russia An important factor in enhancing the con- by using asymmetric methods (hybrid) proven tainment of Russia in the region is by using the by Russia itself in a war that involves the use UN platform. In particular, Ukraine needs to take ofboth military and non-military methods. Kyiv an active role in the discussions to progress re- has the duty of using Russia’s strengths (a mod- form of the UN Security Council and the princi- ernized army and diplomacy) against itself, in ples of the right of veto. This issue is further ex- the same way as Russia uses the strengths of acerbated by Syria, which demonstrated the fail- democracy (rule of law and freedom of speech) ure of the UN Security Council to prevent in time against Western democracies, by subverting a humanitarian catastrophe and crimes against them from the inside. In particular, it is impor- humanity. These discussions have been taking tant for the Ukrainian side to continue to inform place for years, and Ukraine can strengthen the the public in Western countries about the reali- positions of Germany and Japan.178 Such coop- ties of war in Donbas, particularly war crimes, eration at an international level will allow dip- and human rights violations in Crimea, and lomatic cooperation in the region to strengthen. strongly stress these subjects within the UN. In Implementation of the above named steps addition, it requires a separate analysis of the involves deciding specific policy concerning participation by Russia in conflict resolution in Russia. Ukraine must have a clear plan of action, the post-Soviet Union Space (including rheto- taking into account different scenarios, as is cus- ric by Volodymyr Yelchenko, Permanent Repre- tomary with operational planning in the Gener- sentative of Ukraine to the UN, which compared al Staff. In this respect, Minister Klimkin called the actions of Russia in Aleppo to Grozny and Ukrainian diplomacy the diplomatic front-line of can be heard not only during sessions of the UN Ukraine, so it is time for Ukrainian diplomats to Security Council). Using the examples of con- earn this status. flict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkha- But the main weapon Ukraine can use zia and Ossetia, Transnistria and the Donbas, it against Russia is that of successful reforms. It is can be proved that the participation of Russia important that all our leaders not only function in the role of mediator is destructive. Instead, in at the level of rhetoric, but that this also move the settlement of conflicts in which it is not in- volved, there is a positive trend. Such examples are the ones that question the success of Rus- 178 See: Takako Ueta // Towards an EU global strategy sian diplomacy and point to the fact that Rus- — Consulting the experts, 2016, http://www.iss.eu- ropa.eu/uploads/media/EUGS_Expert_Opinions.pdf, sia is satisfying its own interests. Despite this all pp. 35-36; UN Security Council reform: High level being a commonly- known fact, it is necessary to meeting at the Federal Foreign Office, 27/02/2015, deliver this information to the societies of West- http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/Vertretung/new- yorkvn/en/__pr/press-releases/2015/20150227-un- ern countries that are not informed of this situ- security-council-reform-high-level-meeting-ber- ation and are consequently easily influenced by lin.html?archive=2984628; Germany seeks UN Se- Russian propaganda. curity Council seat again, 28/06/2016, http://www. dw.com/en/germany-seeks-un-security-council-seat- again/a-19361160
88 4. Regional Security
on to become a daily routine of implementa- Recommendations tion. As already noted, identity is one of the key 1. To strengthen Ukraine’s position in the post- facets of the regionial institution-building pro- soviet space and to reduce the influence of cess. In addition, only reform and economic de- Russia, Kyiv must necessarily actively de- velopment can drag Ukraine from the mire it has velop bilateral and multilateral security, found itself in — backward, an unstable neigh- defence and sectoral cooperation with EU bouring country which is not trustworthy and Member States and NATO by taking advan- has a poor international reputation. Ukrainian tage of the Trymorya format, NORDEFCO, EU authorities in their spectrum of activities today Battle Groups, the Lithuania-Poland-Ukraine effectively help Russia in propounding abroad Brigade, peacekeeping operations, etc. and such an image of Ukraine. In this way Kyiv it- weigh up the prospects for the revitalization self precipitates the moment when the West will of GUAM. cease to support Kyiv and Ukraine will fall back 2. In the event that a decision is taken to fur- into Moscow’s sphere of influence.179 ther develop GUAM, there should first be ini- Successful containment of Russia demands tiated promotion of the idea in the interna- proactive Ukrainian diplomacy and military pol- tional arena as well as in the region. There- icy, using all possible configurations of regional fore Ukraine should take the initiative for political and military cooperation, effective im- the development of a “GUAM+” format with plementation of reforms, and thorough planning the US and Japan and GUAM cooperation activities in the international arena at both re- with ASEAN. It is also necessary to develop gional and global levels. Successful completion an information campaign for GUAM, which of these tasks requires thorough daily monitor- should include not only the organization ing and analysis of the situation in Russia con- of visits of journalists and experts, but also cerning changes in domestic policy across to joint representation stands at prestigious in- the new initiatives of Russia in various parts of dustry exhibition venues. An important step the world. Due to a lack of anadequate number in strengthening institutional cooperation of experts in Ukraine, it is desirable to use the will be the creation of the GUAM Regional aforementioned Asian experience of institution- Cooperation Fund, similar to the Visegrad alization of single-format track II diplomacy to Fund where the annual budget in 2014 was create a common platform to analyse Russian 8m. euros.180 Its aim should be to promote foreign and domestic policy. This platform can regional collaboration between non-govern- provide a means to discuss common challenges mental organizations, young people, experts, to the security situation and develop appropri- and academics. ate solutions that can be adapted at the level of 3. The Foreign Ministry of Ukraine in conjunc- track I diplomacy. tion with the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine should establish a working group to analyze
179 Variations of this scenario are already being written about by western experts. 180 About the Fund: http://visegradfund.org/about/
89 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
the format of closer military cooperation training centre in Ukraine, which in the short with groups of Member States in NATO and terms could comprise simulation train- the EU. This analysis should be based on an ing centres or founding a regional military assessment of common interests, risks, and academy similar to the one in Tartu,Estonia, opportunities for Ukrainian involvement in 181 This can be discussed with the Visegrad military cooperation under the auspices of Group, which has included the establish- the concept of “Smart Defence.” More spe- ment of such an educational centre as part cifically, there needs to be a close look at of their development of the defence collabo- Ukraine’s participation in a range of proj- ration. ects: NORDEFCO (at an observer level of sta- 5. Successful implementation of the opportu- tus and participation in education and train- nities offered by a regional security model ing in collaboration with the military-indus- requires proactive activity from Ukrainian di- trial complex); the Bucharest Nine for col- plomacy. From the point of view of the ini- laboration with the countries of the eastern tial phase of cooperation in the framework flank of NATO; military cooperation within of the Three Seas Trymorya (Intermarium/ the Visegrad Group, continuing involvement ABC), it is essential that Ukrainian embassies with V4 EU BG, joint exercises and opera- in the region strengthen the idea of Ukraine tional development plans. The fundamental belonging to the region and initiate the in- aim of this cooperation is maximum integra- volvement of Ukraine in various projects of tion in the military and security space of the regional cooperation, as provided for under EU and NATO, without actual NATO member- this format. Kyiv has all the arguments to ship for Ukraine in the short and medium prove that the prosperity of the region with- term. out Ukraine cannot be achieved — as a re- 4. Implementation of NATO standards and a gional energy and transport hub, and an im- shift to the European Security Space re- portant trading partner. It should also take quires urgent change in approaches to the into account the principle that cooperation curricula of military training establishments need not involve the participation of all the in Ukraine and military training in general. countries in the region in the implementa- Military training and modern military edu- tion of a project; Projects can be many, and cation is a mandatory component in estab- the number of participants may vary. lishing regional cooperation in existing and 6. Given that the regional security of Ukraine newly-initiated projects in defence, and par- depends on Russia, it is important for Kyiv ticularly in NORDEFCO. That is why Ukraine to initiate the creation of a format of track should not only learn from the experience II diplomacy which will form an intellectual of European countries, but also make efforts hub to research Russia. This will also be a to create a common educational space for Ukrainian and European troops. In particular, 181 Estonian National Defense College, http://www.ksk. Kyiv could propose the creation of a NATO edu.ee/en/
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platform for cooperation between analytical centres that would analyze not only hybrid war, but the different forms of regional col- laboration, both geopolitical and geo-eco- nomic. The dynamics of change in different parts of the world that affect Russia’s posi- tion not only requires constant monitoring, but timely development of necessary action plans for the leadership of the nation. The initiator can be the Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs, and the donors — Western partners. 7. A necessary element for strengthening re- gional security of Ukraine is also an active use of the opportunities presented by the OSCE and the UN. Strengthening GUAM’s position within the UN, support initiatives to reform the UN Security Council, and in- sistance on modernization contracts of arms control in the OSCE (Vienna Document and the Open Skies Agreement) comprise the minimum set of existing initiatives, in their consideration of which the voice of Kyiv should be strengthened. The task of Ukrai- nian diplomacy is to inform the world about the destructive role of Russia in the settle- ment of conflicts and continue to expose its aggression against Ukraine and other former Soviet countries.
91 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
Advantages and disadvantages of regional cooperation
Strengths of regional cooperation Weaknesses of regional cooperation 1. The necessary clear strategic plan that takes into ac- 1. Will give effective results only in count the regional and global position of Ukraine in the medium and long term the world. 2. Dependent on the use of the 2. Regional cooperation is a conceptual foundation for Ukrainian factor in the internal building up collaboration in the region and beyond; political struggle in the region. an asymmetric security model, bilateral cooperation with the USA and the development of collaboration 3. Sensitive to the historical poli- with NATO — are all instruments of the implementa- cies of neighbouring countries. tion of the regional security model. 4. Regional cooperation is being in- 3. Allows Ukraine to initiate the strengthening of the fluenced by Russia. existing regional organization — GUAM — as well as proceeding with formats for cooperation projects between Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, which will promote the deepening of regional cooperation, re- duce dependence on Russia and the strengthening of the three countries in the Eastern Partnership
4. Ukraine has mechanisms for adding to existing re- gional initiatives that have coming into existence or are being developed in the EU Member States and NATO, in the military, security, economics, and the in- frastructure. As a result, Ukraine will be able to inte- grate into the right areas even without membership of the EU and NATO.
5. The development of horizontal relations between the countries of the region is being promoted and contacts increased between people.
92 5. Neutrality
5. Neutrality
Introduction Historically, neutrality was defined as the nent neutrality of Switzerland, Belgium and Lux- non-participation of a state in an armed conflict. embourg. In 1955, the great powers agreed by However, over time the concept of neutrality be- consensus to transform Austria to a permanently gan to acquire wider significance. On the one neutral state. Austria’s model was implemented hand, the notion of “permanent neutrality” has using a “permanent neutrality in exchange for emerged; it is an improved version of the tem- territorial integrity” scheme. porary/war-time neutrality.182 This model means The case of Sweden during the 19-20 cen- having respective rights and obligations for a turies184 should be considered an example of state both in peacetime and in wartime under classic neutrality. The neutrality of this state the Conventions V and XIII of the Hague Peace was the result of the course independently se- Conference of 1907, and the Paris Declaration of lected by the national establishment in specific 1956. historical conditions, and thus was not imposed It should be noted that “permanent neutral- by the great powers of the international system. ity” is often a result of an agreement of the great Also, the neutrality of Sweden was not fixed in powers of the international system that is fixed any national document, and was based solely in the Constitution and guaranteed by major on political declarations that were made during states. Such agreements are intended to prevent the exacerbation of conflicts. Today, Sweden’s control of one of the great powers over a strate- neutrality is declared in policy documents and gically important country, which thus would un- statements of each new government. dermine the balance of power and interests be- In any case, regardless of its type neutrali- tween major countries and would make inter- ty is understood as commitments by the state national relations more volatile. This practice that declares such policy.185 First, it means a re- became widespread in Europe during the peri- fusal to join military blocs. However, a possible od of the Concert of Europe in the 19 century condition for the preservation of neutrality in as a form of maintaining the balance of power its broader political sense may be a refusal to and interests between the five major powers of join economic associations — which is why Aus- the system of international relations.183 As a re- tria, Finland, and Sweden during the Cold War sult, this model was used to declare the perma-
184 Agius C. ‘Neutrality: A really dead concept?’ / C. Agius, 182 Agius C. ‘Neutrality: A really dead concept?’ / C. Agius, K. Devine. // Cooperation and Conflict. — 2011. — №46. K. Devine. // Cooperation and Conflict. — 2011. — №46. — P.268-269 — P. 265–284. 185 Laws of War: Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and 183 Kissinger H. World Order / Henry Kissinger. — New Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V) [Online]. York: Penguin Press, 2014. — 432 p. — (1st edition), — 1907. — Available: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_ page 67 century/hague05.asp.
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refused to join the European Economic Com- 5.1. Assessment of current state munity (EEC), despite the wishes of the political Neutrality policy in peacetime and wartime elite and the population. Secondly, if a state con- is aimed at hindering involvement of the coun- ducts a policy of neutrality, it cannot place other try in a war between third parties and thereby to states’ military bases on its territory, excluding prevent its transformation into a battleground, contingents of UN peacekeepers. Thirdly, in case thus avoiding material losses and casualties. In of war the neutral state can continue to interact the conditions of the Russian aggression against with all warring parties, but using non-discrim- Ukraine the course towards neutrality is impos- inatory approach. sible — the object of aggression in this case is On the other hand, the great powers (espe- Ukraine, not a third party. cially when it comes to permanent neutrality Since Ukraine’s independence, in the aca- on the basis of an agreement between them) demic discourse and in practical proposals neu- undertake to respect the position of the coun- trality has been considered to be one of security try which has declared a neutrality policy. It guarantee models, along with integration to NA- means the prevention of aggression against TO/EU and non-alignment. The Declaration of that country. State Sovereignty of Ukraine (1990) stated the The historical experience and practice of a need to transform Ukraine into a permanent- number of European countries have not sug- ly neutral state in the future. Likewise, in 2004, gested the existence of a single model of neu- 2005 and 2007 bills on Ukraine’s transforma- trality. The implementation of this model can be tion to a neutral state were introduced into Par- a result of an actually imposed consensus be- liament. During this discussion neutrality was tween the great powers or a unilateral decision considered as a hardly possible model, given of an individual state and not provide any spe- Ukraine’s particular importance in the interna- cific external guarantees. In the latter case, neu- tional relations of the region, the need to spend trality is similar, but not identical (!) to the policy a larger share of its GDP than Ukraine is used to of non-alignment, which Ukraine tried to imple- on defence (neutral countries spend 7-8%, and ment in 2010-2014. Kyiv was conducting a pol- Ukraine, before the war, spent only 0.8-0.9%). icy unique in the world practice of internation- But eventually Ukraine chose the model of non- al relations — it deliberately limited its right to alignment, which functioned during 2010-2014. conduct an independent foreign policy in terms of the possibility to choose military-political al- liances without obtaining guarantees that are inherent to neutrality (in particular, the willing- ness to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity or non-placement of military bases).
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5.2. Best examples of the model’s ble plans to invade the country, Switzerland car- implementation ried out its own army mobilization and clearly Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland are con- warned about the willingness to fight and cause sidered to be indicative examples of conducting unacceptable losses to the enemy. During the neutrality policy in Europe in the 19-21 centu- Cold War Switzerland continued to pursue its ries. The examples of Sweden and Switzerland policy of armed neutrality — their armed forc- are salient in terms of the great experience of es comprised 640,000 soldiers with a popula- conducting the policy of neutrality in different tion of 6.3 million, and spending on defence ac- historical circumstances, while the example of counted for 20.2% of the total budget expendi- Finland is interesting for Ukraine with regard to tures.187 the similar geographical proximity to Russia. Sweden proclaimed the policy of neutrality Switzerland is considered to be the first per- after the Napoleonic Wars as a result of signifi- manently neutral state, the status of which had cant casualties and territorial losses.188 With the been fixed in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna outbreak of World War I Sweden in 1914 pub- and confirmed in 1919 under the Treaty of Ver- lished a declaration of permanent neutrality. sailles. Also, this country is considered to be the This made it possible to prevent involvement in first who introduced the principle of “armed the war, as well as for neighbouring Denmark neutrality” in its modern sense. In other words, and Norway. However, during the 1930s Stock- Switzerland in its foreign and defence policy did holm began to shift to a policy of “armed neu- not rely solely on the external guarantees of the trality.” In 1939, at the beginning of World War great powers concerning respect for its neutral II, these three Scandinavian countries declared status. Switzerland considered its armed forces, neutrality. However, already in 1940, Denmark which created the necessary deterrence effect, and Norway became targets of aggression by as the main guarantee of its international po- the Third Reich. This step by Berlin was aimed litical status. As a result, it helped the country in at ensuring access for their own navy (especially 1870 to avoid indirect involvement in the Fran- submarines) to the North Sea and the Atlantic co-Prussian war and also to remain neutral dur- Ocean, as well an uninterrupted supply of strate- ing the First World War, mobilizing more than gically important Swedish iron ore through the 500 thousand soldiers. However, it was World Norwegian port of Narvik in the event ofa pos- War II which helped the most to popularize the idea of the effectiveness of this armed sover- 187 Martin D. Armed Neutrality — Australia’s Alternative eignty policy.186 In 1940, against the background [Online] / David Martin // Peace Dossier. — 1984. — of the Third Reich’s military successes and possi- Available: https://www.mapw.org.au/files/downloads/ Armed-Neutrality_David-Martin.pdf ., P. 3. 188 BASSETT B. FACTORS INFLUENCING SWEDEN’S CHANGING STANCE ON NEUTRALITY [Online] / BER- 186 DeVore M. From Armed Neutrality to External Depend- GEN BASSETT // College of the University of Illinois ence: Swiss Security in the 21st Century / M. DeVore, Urbana-Champaign. — 2012. — Available: https://www. A. Stahli. // Swiss Political Science Review. — 2011. — ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/34336/ №17(1). — P. 4. Bassett_Bergen.pdf?sequence=1. , P. 10-12.
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sible landing of British troops there. Unlike its provide appropriate assistance to Finland.192 As neighbours, Sweden managed to maintain its a consequence, the armed forces of the country neutrality during World War II. Therefore, it is indirectly contributed to the neutrality of Fin- clear that a proclamation of neutrality by itself land. Effective armed forces of Finland would does not guarantee the prevention of aggres- guarantee the prevention of the use of its terri- sion if the aggressor state possesses necessary tory or airspace for aggression against the USSR, resources and is interested in control or use of thereby preventing the appearance of the So- geostrategically important areas. viet armed forces on their own territory. To do During the Cold War, Sweden continued to this, Finland in the 1960s bought, using Soviet pursue its policy of “armed neutrality.” The coun- loans, interceptor aircrafts MiG-23. In addition, try had an advanced Air Force based on its own the agreement of 1948 provided for the non- production (330 units of Saab 37 Viggen jet participation of the parties in alliances directed fighters) while the fleet consisted of 34 surface against each other.193 ships and 12 submarines Swedish make.189190 The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the The total size of the army was 800,000 persons military naval base of Porkkala-Udd in 1956 with a population of 8.3 million people. Defence strengthened the neutrality of Finland, since it spending accounted for 8% of the total bud- meant that Finland’s territory would not be used get.191 as a platform for possible Soviet aggression Finland is a special case of the policy of against NATO countries, thereby indirectly in- armed neutrality. According to the Agreement volving Finland in a hypothetical confrontation. on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assis- In the conditions of the ended bipolar con- tance of 1948 with the USSR, Finland had to frontation in Europe, Switzerland, Sweden, and prevent possible aggression against the Soviet Finland actually began to abandon implement- Union through its own territory. For this purpose, ing the classic policy of neutrality or to upgrade if necessary, the USSR could, after consultations, it in accordance with the new conditions. First of all it was demonstrated by the accession of Fin- land, Sweden, and Austria to the EU in 1995 and Switzerland to the UN in 2002, plus the partici- pation of these three countries in the Partner- ship for Peace and provision of their own troops 189 The SAAB 37 Viggen [Online] — Available: http://www. airvectors.net/avvig.html. 192 The Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mu- 190 Eckstein M. U.S., Sweden Sign Agreement To Collabo- tual Assistance between The Union of Soviet So- rate On Anti-Sub, Anti-Air R&D, Exercises [Online] / cialist Republics and The Republic of Finland [On- Megan Eckstein // USNI. — 2016. — Available: https:// line] — Available: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/ news.usni.org/2016/06/08/sweden_us_agreement. show/246_004. 191 Martin D. Armed Neutrality — Australia’s Alternative 193 Visuri P. Evolution of Finnish military doctrine [Online] [Online] / David Martin // Peace Dossier. — 1984. — / Pekka Visuri // War College. — 1990. — Available: htt- Available: https://www.mapw.org.au/files/downloads/ ps://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/119958/ Armed-Neutrality_David-Martin.pdf., P. 3. FDS%201%20OCR.pdf?sequence=2., P. 45-46
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for NATO operations (Kosovo, Afghanistan). Such war.196 During the NATO BALTOPS 2016 exercise a shift from the classic neutrality policy was de- a NATO contingent for the first time carried out fined by the extension of the range of threats a landing in Finland. to national security of these countries, opposi- On June 8, 2016 the defence ministers of tion to which demanded increased cooperation Sweden and the United States signed a state- with intergovernmental international organiza- ment of intent to strengthen military coopera- tions and bodies.194 195 In the case of Sweden tion. This document, among other things, pro- one can talk more and more about a policy of vides for joint military exercises and training, non-alignment, not neutrality as such. Because, the exchange of information, and cooperation in fact, non-alignment and Sweden’s neutrality in air force and anti-submarine combat areas. mean a unilateral declaration of intent; it does The document clearly states that the agreement not exclude the possibility of direct or indirect is aimed against “regional states that test the involvement in military operations. Meanwhile, limits of endurance.197” To date, Finland is ne- Switzerland, starting in the 1990s, moved to a gotiating a similar agreement with the United model of “differentiated neutrality.” In practice, it States.198 meant a willingness to support economic sanc- tions against an aggressor state, but to refrain from providing military troops. In the conditions of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, countries like Sweden and Fin- land officially started to strengthen their co- operation with the US and NATO. At the Wales Summit in 2014, the two countries signed an agreement with the Alliance on providing to the latter access to their airfields in the case of
196 FREEDBERG S. Fear of Russia drives Sweden closer to NATO [Online] / SYDNEY FREEDBERG // Breaking Defense. — 2016. — Available: http://breakingdefense. 194 DeVore M. From Armed Neutrality to External Depend- com/2016/09/fear-of-russia-drives-sweden-closer-to- ence: Swiss Security in the 21st Century / M. DeVore, nato/. A. Stahli. // Swiss Political Science Review. — 2011. — 197 Eckstein M. U.S., Sweden Sign Agreement To Collabo- №17(1). — P. 1–26. rate On Anti-Sub, Anti-Air R&D, Exercises [Online] / 195 BASSETT B. FACTORS INFLUENCING SWEDEN’S Megan Eckstein // USNI. — 2016. — Available: https:// CHANGING STANCE ON NEUTRALITY [Online] / BER- news.usni.org/2016/06/08/sweden_us_agreement. GEN BASSETT // College of the University of Illinois 198 Militarily neutral Finland in talks with U.S. on closer Urbana-Champaign. — 2012. — Available: https://www. defense collaboration; minister [Online] // Reuters. — ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/34336/ 2016. — Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/us- Bassett_Bergen.pdf?sequence=1. finland-usa-defence-idUSKCN10X1AA.
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5.3. Disadvantages of the armed neutrality.200 The historical experience of several neutrality model other European countries clearly demonstrates Despite the formal effectiveness of the this. Thus, Belgium during the outbreak of World armed neutrality model, researchers cite three War II proclaimed a policy of armed neutrali- conditions for its successful implementation: ty, but it did not save the country from German aggression. The same applies to Denmark, Hol- •• creating a strong deterrent effect; land, Norway, and Finland during World War II. •• useful effect of neutrality for the interna- In other words, actually, the first and foremost tional system; criterion that determines the possibility for suc- •• recognition of the neutral status by the great cess of the policy of armed neutrality is the geo- powers. strategic importance of the country for the state that is conducting aggressive (revisionist) poli- In Switzerland a culture of readiness for mil- cy. Therefore, even if a country declares and pur- itary service among the population was shaped sues a policy of armed neutrality, this policy will already in the 13 century199, which in practice not help her to avoid aggression if this country was implemented through constant training. To- is in the area of geo-strategic interests of a great day Switzerland uses the model of territorial de- power. fense, which means that weapons are direct- In fact, even the successful experience of ly in the hands of soldiers. On the other hand, Switzerland and Sweden during World War II the factor that the great powers received ben- confirms this fact by contradiction. The geostra- efits of this military-political status of Switzer- tegic position of these countries was secondary land helped to maintain Switzerland’s neutral- for the Third Reich for implementation of their ity. This country during two world wars acted as plans to establish dominance in Europe. So they platforms for informal contacts between war- were not of particular interest to Berlin, which ring states and for providing humanitarian as- would justify the war. Meanwhile, in the con- sistance to victims of war and refugees. As a re- ditions of actual dominance of the Third Reich sult, this led to the fact that the neutrality of in Europe in 1940-1943, both Switzerland and Switzerland began to be perceived as an inte- Sweden were forced to modify their foreign pol- gral part of any international order in Europe icy to take Berlin’s interests into account, thus during the XIX-XX centuries. literally breaking commitments of classic neu- However, it should be noted that even tral countries.201 First of all it concerned conces- these factors may not be enough for a suc- sions in the economic sphere. During this period cessful implementation of the policy of armed
200 Dreyer J. Swiss Neutrality Examined: Model, Exception or Both? / J. Dreyer, N. Jesse. // Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. — 2014. — №15(3). P.69-72 199 Dreyer J. Swiss Neutrality Examined: Model, Exception 201 Dreyer J. Swiss Neutrality Examined: Model, Exception or Both? / J. Dreyer, N. Jesse. // Journal of Military and or Both? / J. Dreyer, N. Jesse. // Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. — 2014. — №15(3). — P.73-82 Strategic Studies. — 2014. — №15(3). P.66
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Sweden had a clear understanding that the suc- CK37 computer. The Americans did this in hopes cess of the policy of armed neutrality, above all, that in case of total war the air force of Sweden was determined by the fact that they were not could oppose Soviet ASW aircrafts that would be the main subject of this aggression.202 In other directed against US submarines. Thus we can say words, if the Third Reich had complete domina- that the US assistance to Sweden on building its tion over Europe, the possibility of a direct ag- military capabilities, which promoted the policy gression against Switzerland and Sweden would of armed neutrality, was determined by its real significantly increase if they refused to conduct interest to strengthen the defence capacity of the policy according to Berlin’s interests. their own and allied armed forces in case of to- The Cold War also proved that the geostrate- tal war. Finally, in 1960, an informal agreement gic position of the country is the main condition on assistance from the West in case of USSR ag- for the possibility of an effective implementa- gression against Sweden was reached.204 So, one tion of the policy of armed neutrality. The exam- can say that during the Cold War, Sweden, actu- ple of Sweden is more revealing; unlike Switzer- ally, shifted from its policy of armed neutrality. land this country during the Cold War was on the Furthermore, according to the USSR’S plans, front line between the two rival blocs. especially before the 1960s, in case of war be- Therefore, already in the 1950s, a Swed- tween NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Sweden was ish Prime Minister, Erlander Tahe, decided to likely to become an object of aggression. This is strengthen cooperation with the US and NATO, directly related to the geostrategic importance knowing that in the event of war Sweden would of the country itself. In case of war, it was impor- not survive if a real policy of armed neutrality tant for the USSR to gain control over the Atlan- was conducted.203 In the end of 1950s Sweden tic coast of Norway, which would allow avoid- decided to allow American submarines with nu- ing the blockade of the Soviet Northern Fleet. clear weapons to enter its own territorial wa- At the same time, Sweden was situated in the ters. In exchange, the US helped Sweden to cre- way of the Soviet Union to Norway, which is why ate the above-mentioned Saab 37 Viggen air- in a fight for the Atlantic coast of the Scandi- craft, which was equipped with the American navian Peninsula Sweden would most likely be- come an object of aggression of the USSR.205 Ac- tually, Sven Anderson, former Defence Minister 202 BASSETT B. FACTORS INFLUENCING SWEDEN’S of Sweden, also confirms this in his memoirs. CHANGING STANCE ON NEUTRALITY [Online] / BER- GEN BASSETT // College of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. — 2012. — Available: https://www. ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/34336/ 204 Pond E. Secrets of the Baltic: Swedish Cold War Neu- Bassett_Bergen.pdf?sequence=1, P.12 trality Revisited [Online] / Elizabeth Pond // World 203 BERGER S. THE GREAT PARADOX OF SWEDISH NEU- policy blog. — 2012. — Available: http://www.world- TRALITY IN THE COLD WAR AND TODAY [Online] / policy.org/blog/2012/09/26/secrets-baltic-swedish- SUSANNE BERGER // War on Rocks. — 2015. — Avail- cold-war-neutrality-revisited. able: http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/the-great- 205 Sweden: Cold War sites [Online] // The Baltic initia- paradox-of-swedish-neutrality-in-the-cold-war-and- tive and network — Available: http://coldwarsites.net/ today/. country/sweden.
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During a visit to Moscow in 1971 and a meeting status. However, the Russian Federation refused with military leaders of the USSR, they made it this offer using unofficial channels. The exam- clear that in case of a wide-scale war in Europe, ple of Moldova clearly confirms that the perma- the Kremlin would not respect the neutrality of nent neutrality cannot neither prevent nor re- Sweden, as well as the fact that Sweden did not verse the effects of aggressive actions of anoth- have enough resources for its defence.206 er state if the revisionist state has other plans. Thus, we can speak about a formation after The example of Turkmenistan can be consid- the Second World War of a myth about the ef- ered another unique case; this country at first fectiveness of the policy of armed neutrality in fixed permanent neutrality in their national conditions of active revision of the internation- legislation, and in December 1995 the UN Gen- al order by individual states. The historical ex- eral Assembly adopted a resolution which rec- perience of European countries clearly demon- ognized and supported the country’s new inter- strates that the main condition for the effective- national political status.207 In addition, this res- ness of such policy is the absence of a signif- olution contained a call for other UN member icant geostrategic interest of revisionist states states to respect and support Turkmenistan’s in regard to the countries that pursue a policy neutral status. But this practice of neutral status of armed neutrality. The success of the policy recognition through a resolution of the UN has of armed neutrality of Sweden and Switzerland become a unique phenomenon. The resolution during World War II is, indeed, an exception that of the UN GA does not create effective mecha- proves the complexity of conducting this policy. nisms to guarantee the neutral status of Turk- When reviewing and analyzing the experi- menistan. ence of the neutrality as a model for Ukraine Initially, the vision of the neutrality policy one should also keep in mind the examples of objective was reduced to turning the country in- two former Soviet Union countries Moldova and to a place for resolving regional disputes and Turkmenistan. Moldova not only unilaterally de- then as a way for the regime of Saparmurat Ni- clared permanent neutrality, but cemented this yazov to maximally protect the country from ex- position in its constitution. This position was ternal influence. Ashgabat managed to maintain fixed in order to force Russia to withdraw its the status of a neutral state despite the agree- troops and weapons from Transnistria. But the ment with the United States in 2002 on the use Kremlin, despite these concessions and unilat- of the country’s airspace and the capital’s airport eral steps of Chisinau, actually continues to vio- for the transit of goods to Afghanistan. late the territorial integrity and sovereignty of However, the growing destabilization in Moldova. In the late 2000s Chisinau even pro- neighbouring Afghanistan, which is manifested posed to fix the permanent neutrality of Mol- dova through international recognition of this 207 Maintenance of international security — A Perma- nent neutrality of Turkmenistan — http://www. 206 Take Gotland in 6 hours — http://www.svoboda. un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/ org/a/28010697.html RES/50/80&Lang=E
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by Taliban raids to Turkmenistan, is an indirect 5.4. How the model may help to challenge to that policy. In October 2015, during deter the Russian aggression? a visit to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan’s President, The armed neutrality model was not prof- Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, raised the ques- itable for Ukraine both before the Russian ag- tion of getting Tashkent’s assistance to combat gression against Ukraine, nor during it; because the growing threat from the Taliban. At the same this model does not allow the realization of na- time, the Foreign Minister of Turkmenistan was tional state interests which are based, among visiting the US; they also raised the issue of get- other things, on the right to freely choose the ting US assistance to enhance the security of the vector of political and economic integration for country. After that, the Russian Defence Minister, creation of economic and political conditions for Sergey Shoygu, during his visit to Turkmenistan, the sustainable development of the country. on June 8, 2016 proposed to assist Ashgabat in On the one hand, one could assume that order to strengthen defence capacity against an agreement between the US and Russia on the Taliban. Later, the Russian media wrote that Ukraine’s transformation into a neutral state, Ashgabat accepted Moscow’s offer of coopera- along with the implementation of Barack tion. Turkmenistan is trying to continue to down- Obama’s administration’s policy of a “reset” of play the threat from the Taliban and relies on relations with Russia in 2009-2010, would al- the Turkmen paramilitary units in Afghanistan. low the prevention of the Kremlin’s aggression But, eventually, against the background of in- against Ukraine. However, it should be recalled creasing destabilization in Afghanistan, Ashga- that the issue of Ukraine’s place in the military bat will face the need to attract external actors security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region to counter the threat of the Taliban. This, in turn, was closed in 2010 when the policy of non- will question the ability of Turkmenistan to con- alignment was proclaimed through the adop- tinue to conduct a positive neutrality policy. This tion of the Law on Domestic and Foreign Poli- is especially important in light of the fact that cy by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on July 1, the Russian Federation is usually inclined to ex- 2010. change assistance in one area for concessions But even a possible agreement between the in another which take into account Russia’s na- major powers on the declaration of Ukraine as tional interests. a neutral state would, most probably, not save Ukraine from Russian aggression. Thus the re- al cause of Russia’s aggression was the loss of non-military tools of influence on Ukraine, giv- en the actual loss in confrontation with the EU in terms of Ukraine’s choice to integrate.. There- fore, even a possible agreement on neutrality, which would be certainly better than the unilat- eral declaration of non-alignment made by Kyiv, since it would provide for the need to remove
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the Black Sea Fleet from the territory of Ukraine, in the regional security system. That is why the certainly would not save Ukraine from the ag- idea that Russian aggression was a result of Ky- gression. iv’s declaration concerning a move towards NA- The cause of the Russian Federation’s ag- TO, as well as the fact that a possible agreement gression was not the question of Ukraine’s mil- on neutrality will resolve all contradictions, are itary orientation (in any case this issue was not confirmed. The aggression was launched by closed after the adoption of the aforementioned the Kremlin in the absence of Kyiv’s declared in- law of July 1, 2010), but rather its economic in- tentions to become a full member of NATO, and tegration, which is not controlled by a policy of hence a possible agreement on neutrality, which armed neutrality. It is known that the nation- would remove, first of all, the question of the al debate on the need to reject the non-align- Ukrainian-Russian relations from the agenda, ment started in Ukraine only during the active does not guarantee that the Kremlin abandons Russian aggression against our country in 2014. the aggression against Ukraine. Only in December 2014 the Verkhovna Rada of A state cannot implement a neutrality policy Ukraine voted for the rejection of non-align- while being an object of aggression. Moreover, ment. This step was a result of Russia’s aggres- such a policy makes quite impossible coopera- sion. Meanwhile, back in March 2014, high-lev- tion with both individual partner countries like el Ukrainian authorities were ready to guaran- the United States, and with NATO to enhance tee to the Kremlin the absence of Euro-Atlan- Ukraine’s defence capability in the conditions of tic integration plans. Thus, in March 2014, the aggression through bilateral and multinational then-Prime Minister of Ukraine, Arseniy Yatse- exercises in Ukraine. Thus, in the current context nyuk, clearly stated during his first visit to the the introduction of the policy of armed neutral- United States that Ukraine did not intend to de- ity makes an effective response to Russia impos- clare a course towards the Euro-Atlantic inte- sible, which is, among other things, based on in- gration.208 The then-Foreign Minister of Ukraine, ternational assistance. Andrii Deshchytsia, made similar statements.209 Meanwhile, among researchers that rep- As a result, Ukraine had already become an ob- resent the realist school of international rela- ject of Russian aggression before the review of tions the belief about the possibility of turn- its approach to the military-political positioning ing Ukraine into a neutral state between Russia and Western institutions, which would resolve
208 Yatsenyuk says that Ukraine does not discuss the prospects of NATO membership [Online] // Zerkalo Nedeli. — 2014. — Available: http://zn.ua/POLITICS/ya- cenyuk-zayavil-chto-ukraina-ne-obsuzhdaet-perspek- tivy-chlenstva-v-nato-140560_.html. 209 Deshchytsia: No document says that Ukraine must become a member of NATO [Online] // Den. — 2014. — Available: http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/news/190314- deshchicya-v-zhodnomu-dokumenti-ne-napisano- shcho-ukrayina-maie-stati-chlenom-nato.
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the conflict and end the war, is widespread.210 Earlier, Russia had tried to implement this In current circumstances after 2.5 years of war through the involvement of Ukraine in their a modified Austrian scenario of 1955 is pro- economic integration organizations; after real- posed to Ukraine; this scenario actually means izing the failure to realize this maximum goal maintaining Russia’s control over de facto and in 2014 Russia shifted to aggression as a last de jure occupied territories and a guarantee of form of maintaining control over Ukraine. There- non-aggression against Ukraine in exchange for fore, in the present circumstances a hypothetical Ukraine’s refusal of Euro-Atlantic integration.211 declaration of Ukraine’s neutrality according to a However, these proposals do not take into con- modified Austrian scenario has every chance to sideration the underlying driving force of Mos- repeat the fate of the Budapest Memorandum. cow’s policy towards Ukraine: Russia not only Such an agreement will allow Russia to avoid re- aims to achieve the guaranteed non-participa- sponsibility for its aggression. Ukraine’s declara- tion of Ukraine in military-political organiza- tion and conduction of the policy of armed neu- tions, but to get at least a proper level of control trality will only increase the risks to our coun- over those processes related to Ukraine. Hence, try — it does not take into account the historical the implementation in the case of Ukraine of experience that this policy can be successful if the Austrian scenario (“territorial integrity in ex- it concerns a country, which is of a secondary or change for neutrality”) is doubtful. In the case tertiary interest for the revisionist state. of Ukraine the Kremlin is interested not only in neutral status, but in the actual mechanisms guaranteeing this status — namely, the conser- vation, de facto or de jure, of control over the occupied Crimea and ORDLO, and through them over the rest of Ukraine.
210 Michael O. How to Save Ukraine [Online] / O’Hanlon Michael // 2015 — Available: http://www.politico.com/ magazine/story/2015/05/a-way-forward-for-the- west-on-ukraine-and-russia-118471. Mearsheimer J. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault [Online] / John Mearsheimer // Foreign Affairs. — 2014. — Avail- able: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia- fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault. Walt S. Why Arming Kiev Is a Really, Really Bad Idea [On- line] / Stephen Walt // Foreign Policy. — 2015. — Avail- able: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/how-not- to-save-ukraine-arming-kiev-is-a-bad-idea/. 211 MACGREGOR D. The Ukrainian State Treaty: An Offer Putin Can’t Refuse [Online] / DOUGLAS MACGREGOR // Foreign Policy. — 2016. — Available: http://foreign- policy.com/2016/08/01/the-ukrainian-state-treaty- an-offer-putin-cant-refuse-russia-nato-ukraine/
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5.5. Probability of the need and relevance to introduce an armed neu- implementation of the armed trality policy, because the question of Ukraine’s neutrality model military-political or economic integration vector The case of the armed neutrality and the will not be essential for the Kremlin. possibility of its implementation by Ukraine However, in this context, the results of a sur- face a paradoxical situation. As long as the cur- vey carried out by TNS and commissioned by the rent perception of Ukraine as a country that is a Institute of World Policy (in 2016) deserve spe- part of their sphere of influence and actually de- cial attention. In general, 24.7% of respondents void of international subjectivity prevails in Rus- support the neutrality as a priority of Ukraine’s sia, the implementation of the model of armed foreign policy.213 The idea of turning Ukraine in- neutrality is impossible.212 Meanwhile, in case to a neutral state is considered attractive par- Russia gives this position up, there will be no ticularly in the east — it was supported by 32.9% 1. Якими, на Вашу думку, мають бути головні пріоритети? Graf. 4. What should be the main priorities of Ukraine’s foreign policy?
Пошук ринків збуту для українських Search for the markets for Ukrainian business 54,1 (economizationвиробників (ек оofно мtheіза цforeignія зовніш policy)ньої
IntegrationІнтег рintoація дtheо ЄС EU 30,4
IntegrationІнтеграці яinto до Н АNATOТО 27,9
Intensification of cooperation with the neighboursПосилення сforпівп counteringраці з сусідам иRussian для 26,7 протидії російській агaggressionресії
УкрUkraineаїна має б shouldути нейтр beаль нneutralою 24,7
Підвищення професіоналізму українських Professional development of Ukrainian diplomats 21,7 дипломатів Україна має проводити багатовекторну Ukraine should adhere to the multi-vector foreign policy 21,5 політику Україна має стати регіональним лідером в Ukraine should become a regional leader in Eastern Europe 19,4 Східній Європі Повернення, по можливості, до If possible, Ukraine should return to the pre-conflict level of cooperation with 10,4 Russia, even at the пexpenseопереднь оofго рnationalівня співп interestsраці з … Україна має стати мостом для діалогу 8,6 Ukraine should become a bridge for the dialogue betweenЗах оtheду і РWestосії and Russia
Ukraine Уshouldкраїна м аdeclareє оголоси warти вій onну РRussiaосії 2,2
ІншOtherе (вкаж і(pleaseть, що сам state)е) 1,9
Мене це питання не турбує/Я не I don't care / I didn't think about it 1,8 замислювався( -лась) над цим питанням Пріоритети зовнішньої політики не 0,2 Foreign policy priorities do notпот рrequireебують з мanyін changes
ВажI кcan'tо відп оanswerвісти 4,6
212 D. Trenin. Russia and the World in the 21st century / Dmitriy Trenin. — Moscow: Exmo, 2015. — 384 p. — 213 What do Ukrainians think about foreign policy priori- (Special edition), «Russia and the sovereignty of other ties? [Online] // Institute of World POlicy. — 2015. — countries» Available: http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/2116.html.
104 5. Neutrality
of respondents there. In the west the idea is the campaign for parliament elections voiced supported by only 9.9% of respondents. In Ky- the idea of a referendum if they entered the Par- iv — 22.2%, in the north — 17.9%, in the center liament on Ukraine’s membership in NATO. But — 25.2%, in the south — 23.5%. It should be em- political forces, which formed the ruling coali- phasized that Ukrainians refer to Switzerland as tion after the elections to the Verkhovna Rada, a model by which Ukraine could be guided in declared in the agreement that one of the prior- choosing and implementing a policy of armed ities of their work is to return to an Euro-Atlantic neutrality. integration. course This can be explained primarily by the lack However, to date, after reformatting the cur- of a clear understanding of the causality of the rent coalition one can talk about changing the events of 2013-2014 associated with the be- approaches of a number of political forces on ginning of Russia’saggression against Ukraine. the positioning of Ukraine as compared to 2014. One can also talk about the lack of understand- First of all, in August 2016 the leader of the Rad- ing among the population of causes that deter- ical Party, Oleh Lyashko, expressed his opinion mined the success of the policy of armed neu- that the best model for Ukraine would be neu- trality in Switzerland. On the other hand, such trality. After they entered the Verkhovna Rada of sentiments can be used by supporters of turn- Ukraine, the All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” ing Ukraine into a neutral state; it gives a dif- (Batkivshchyna) did not raise the issue of a ref- ferent task — active work with the public to cre- erendum on Ukraine’s membership in NATO. At ate real understanding of the neutrality mecha- the same time, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, Peo- nism. Otherwise, the sociology data on the atti- ple’s Front and Samopomich Union continue to tudes among the population can be used to im- support the idea of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlanticinte- plement plans that are contrary to the national gration,, thus not considering the possibility of interests of Ukraine, and as a way to justify and turning Ukraine into a neutral state. However, it promote the idea of the external imposing of should be noted that overstated expectations the neutrality model. concerning the possibility of rapid Euro-Atlan- After the victory of the Revolution of Dignity tic integration can cause frustration among the and the beginning of the war of Russia against population. Ukraine a consensus on the need to abandon the policy of non-alignment and instead recov- erUkraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration course be- gan to form among the leading national politi- cal parties. Only the position of the Opposition bloc may be considered an exception; in their program in September 2014, it was noted that they supported the idea of Ukraine’s non-align- ment and neutrality. In contrast, the All-Ukrai- nian Union “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna) during
105 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
5.6. How to implement the terms of ORDLO into Ukraine. Another question model? is how Ukraine after the experience of the Buda- In case a possible agreement on the neutral pest Memorandum can rely on any guarantees status of Ukraine is discussed, Kyiv should start provided by the Russian Federation. Thus, ad- the negotiations with strong demands. It in- vocates of Ukraine’s neutrality through the ac- cludes restoration of sovereignty and territorial tual recognition of the present state ignore the integrity to where it was as of February 1, 2014 fact that Russia in its current worldview is in- in exchange for Ukraine’s refusal of the right to terested in control over Ukraine. An agreement freely choose the direction of the military-polit- on neutrality should be able to guarantee such ical integration — in other words the rejection control only under the condition of the proper of NATO membership. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s re- reintegration of ORDLO This, if realised, is likely lations with the EU should not be negotiable to undermine the political stability in the rest of given that issues of economic integration vec- Ukraine through the de-legitimisation of a re- tor by their nature are not related to neutrality gime that would accept the implementation of status, which concerns the military and politi- the Russian scenario of the actual neutralization cal positioning of a country. Such an approach of Ukraine. This neutralization would take place is necessary, because confrontation in terms of through the implementation of the Minsk agree- the foreign economic orientation of Ukraine in ments. late 2013 early 2014 became the background Besides, a possible agreement on neutrality against which Russia launched its aggression will not solve the issue of Ukraine’s position in against Ukraine. However, it is difficult to imag- an actually grey area of security in Europe giv- ine the implementation of such a maximalist en the impossibility of obtaining real security position of Ukraine — not for the least reason guarantees — in fact Ukraine will continue to re- the legitimacy of the current Russian political ly on themselves above all in national defence regime is related to the annexation of Crimea, matters. Thus, a possible agreement on neutral- and aggression. Similarly, the model of de facto ity without modification of the Russian attitude and de jure recognition of the controlled territo- towards Ukraine would not resolve the current ries of Ukraine (ORDLO, Crimea) as Russian, with situation. On the contrary, this decision would a guarantee of Ukraine’s non-participation in meet, above all, the interests of Russia, to a less- NATO in exchange for security guarantees from er extent of the EU and the US, but would be the Russian Federation for Ukraine, ignores two fully inconsistent with Ukraine’s interests, which fundamentally important issues. First of all, the consist of maintaining maximum freedom to Kremlin is not interested in those ORDLO terri- choose the vector of economic and political inte- tories that it controls today. Russia’s interest was gration and thus ensuring all the conditions for and still is control over Ukraine. In the present sustainable development of our country. Thus, circumstances, the Kremlin would like to get re- any agreement on neutrality in the present sit- al guarantees of control over the foreign poli- uation, especially with appropriate guarantees cy of Ukraine through reintegration on its own through reintegration of the ORDLO on Russia’s
106 5. Neutrality
terms may repeat the fate of non-alignment. In Recommendations other words, it would strengthen, not weaken, 1. Based on the above analyzed experience of the risks to national security and defence in to- a number of countries and on the features day’s conditions. So, as it has been clearly dem- of the interaction between Kyiv and Moscow, onstrated, even armed neutrality policy might at the current stage Ukraine’s transforma- not work when the country that conducts it is a tion into a neutral state, provided a policy of main target of aggression. The Kremlin’s current armed neutrality is conducted, will not fully foreign policy identity, which denies any subjec- guarantee the national interests and secu- tivity of post-Soviet states, will stimulate Russia, rity. A declaration of such course should be in one way or another, to take aggressive steps avoided. against Ukraine as the last form of control. In 2. If there are attempts from external actors to such circumstances neutrality would increase, impose a model of neutral state on Ukraine not decrease, the possibility of extending Rus- in the regional security system, official Kyiv sian aggression policy against Ukraine. has to set a number of conditions. They in- clude the restoration of Ukraine’s borders to where they were as of 1 February 2014 (de- occupation of Crimea, along with the com- plete withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and de-occupation of the ORDLO), withdrawal of Russian troops from the bor- der of Ukraine with a parallel deployment of a permanent OSCE monitoring mission to confirm the absence of military threats to Ukraine, strict guarantees of military as- sistance from countries-signatories of the agreement on Ukraine’s neutrality in case of violation of its sovereignty and territorial in- tegrity. Meanwhile, such a hypothetical large agreement cannot concern the strengthen- ing of economic and political relations of Ukraine with the EU. Otherwise, any agree- ment on the neutral status of Ukraine may repeat the fate of the Budapest Memoran- dum.
107 SECURITY IN TRANSITION How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources
Advantages and disadvantages of the model Advantages Disadvantages of the neutral status of Ukraine of the neutral status of Ukraine
1. It will allow the countries in Europe and the 1. Ukraine will remain in a gray area of secu- US to remove the Ukrainian issue from the rity, not being a member of effective secu- agenda of relations with Russia and there- rity guarantee mechanisms. by reduce the degree of tension in collabo- ration with Moscow. 2. May exacerbate political instability in Ukraine. A part of the society will perceive 2. May partly reduce the polarization in Ukrai- that decision as a betrayal of national in- nian society — especially in the eastern and terests and a decisive capitulation to Rus- southern regions of Ukraine, who still do sia. not accept integration to NATO. 3. Requires significant resources, while the possibility to get foreign aid will be limited.
4. Given the revision and correction of the neutrality model by other countries, which actually shows its inability to respond to all security challenges of our time, Ukraine’s decision will not be in accordance with global trends to shift from hard neutrality to various forms of active cooperation with military alliances.
108 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Institute would like to extend sin- cere gratitude to its colleagues in other think- tanks, both in Ukraine and abroad, to individu- als representing various government agencies in Ukraine, and to international diplomats and politicians, all of whom have made their con- tributions to this study but preferred to remain unnamed. Specific thanks for their interest in this paper go to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. We are also grateful for the support offered by the National Security Council, the Ministry of Defense, the Office of Reforms un- der MoD, the Office of the Vice Premier for Eu- ropean and Euro-Atlantic Integration, and NATO headquarters. The Institute thanks Oleksiy Se- meniy, who supported the study with analytical know-how at every stage. Immeasurable assis- tance was also provided by John Herbst, Director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasian Center at the At- lantic Council (Washington) and former US Am- bassador to Ukraine (2003-2006); Arkady Mosh- es, Director of the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood and Russia research program at the Finnish In- stitute of International Relations (Helsinki); and Bruno Lete, analyst from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Brussels). IWP also thanks its long-time partner, Serhiy Sydorenko, editor-in-chief of Yevropeiska Pravda, for com- municational support. All the best ideas in this report are the result of the IWP analytical team interacting with these specialists in security is- sues. Any errors are the exclusive responsibility of the authors of this report.
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