The Doer/Dexter Model: Political Marketing and the NDP 1988 to 2009

The Doer/Dexter Model:

Political Marketing and the NDP 1988 to 2009

Michael Moyes

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of

The University of Manitoba

in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Studies

University of Manitoba

Winnipeg

ABSTRACT

This Master of Arts thesis examines how political marketing, and the Doer/Dexter model specifically, helped the NDP in Manitoba and Nova Scotia win elections from 1999 through

2007 in Manitoba and in 2009 in Nova Scotia. The study uses content analysis on the election platforms of the period and elite interviews with key political strategists of the NDP in order to gain insight and draw conclusions on what political marketing elements were critical to the party’s electoral success. This study concludes that the NDP in Manitoba and Nova Scotia used market research and a similar comprehensive political marketing strategy, now known as the

Doer/Dexter model, which focused on the simplification of communication, the moderation of policy and the inoculation of any perceived weakness in order to win power.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank my loving wife Michelle. I am so grateful for all of your help and support through this whole journey. Without you, none of this would have been possible. I would also like to thank my advisor Dr. Andrea Rounce. Your patience and kindness knows no bounds and I acknowledge that I tested them both. Thank you as well for your insight and advice. I couldn’t have asked for a better advisor. Thank you to my committee members, Dr. Royce Koop,

Dr. Barry Ferguson, and Dr. Jared Wesley for your time and feedback. Also, a special thanks to

Dr. Jared Wesley for starting me off on this mission and for allowing me to take part in a side project of writing a book chapter. Finally, to my parents, thank you for always believing in me and instilling a sense of purpose.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Landon and Nyah. Thank you for being my inspiration and for understanding when Daddy had to write his “book.”

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1- WINNING ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL MARKETING 1

Political Marketing 2

Purpose of the Study 3

Significance to the Field 4

Definitions 4

CHAPTER 2- LITERATURE REVIEW 6

Political Marketing Normative Question- Potential Positives 8

Political Marketing Normative Question- Potential Negatives 9

Political Advertising and Political Communication 11

Market Orientation 13

Super-segmentation and Micro-targeting 15

CCF-NDP 17

NDP- Ideological Purity vs Electability 20

New Labour- Old Labour 23

New Labour- Simplification 27

New Labour- Moderation 30

The Third Way 31

New Labour- Inoculation 34

Electoral Results- 1997, 2001, 2005 36

CHAPTER 3- METHODOLOGY 39

Research Questions 39

Research Design 40

Participants 40

Interview Data Collection 42

Interview Data Analysis 43

CHAPTER 4- FINDINGS- MANITOBA 44

1988 Election 45

1990 Election 49

1990 Election Platform 50

1995 Election 55

1995 Election Platform 56

The Doer Model 59

Manitoba NDP- Simplification 64

Manitoba NDP- Moderation 68

The Manitoba Third Way 75

Manitoba NDP- Inoculation 79

Market Research 83

Electoral Results- 1999, 2003, 2007 87

CHAPTER 5- FINDINGS- NOVA SCOTIA 89

1998 Election 90

1998 Election Platform 91

1999 Election 94

1999 Election Platform 95

The Dexter Model 98

Nova Scotia NDP- Simplification 100

Nova Scotia NDP- Moderation 103

Nova Scotia NDP- Inoculation 108

Market Research 116

Electoral Results- 2003, 2007, 2009 117

CHAPTER 6- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 120

Discussion 120

Discussion- Nova Scotia 2013 Election 122

Discussion- Manitoba 2016 Election 124

Limitations of the Study 124

Conclusions 126

Recommendations for Future Research 128

Reference List 130

Appendix A: Research Ethics Board Approval 136

Appendix B: Informed Consent Form 137

Appendix C: Agreement for Maintaining Confidentiality 139

Appendix D: Interview Questions 140

Appendix E: Initial Contact Script 144

Appendix F: Agreement for Maintaining Confidentiality- “Branding Today’s NDP” 145

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: New Labour Election Pledges- 1997 – 2005 28

Table 3.1: Interview Participants 41

Table 4.1: Manitoba NDP Election Platforms- 1999 – 2007 73

Table 4.2: Manitoba NDP Market Research Spending- 2005 – 2013 86

Table 5.1: Nova Scotia NDP Election Platforms- 2003 – 2009 105

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: New Labour Ten Point Contract 29

Figure 4.1: 1990 Manitoba NDP Election Commitments by Issue 51

Figure 4.2: Manitoba NDP Election Commitments- 1990 – 2007 67

Figure 5.1: 1998 Nova Scotia NDP Election Priorities 92

Figure 5.2: Nova Scotia NDP Election Commitments- 1998 – 2009 103

1. WINNING ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL MARKETING

Elections are the cornerstone from which democracy in Canada is based on. As a

result, winning elections and forming government tends to be the ultimate goal for most

parties. Indeed, given our single member plurality or “first past the post” electoral system,

the ability to win a majority of seats is typically vital if a party would like to enact its

policies. While participating in the democratic process can be touted as noble and

purposeful in its own right, the fact that parties and its leaders are often judged exclusively

on their ability to win elections consequently focuses their attention on how they can

achieve government.

In order to try to win elections, political parties in Canada and around the world are increasingly focused on political marketing.1 Some have even went so far as to call it a “global phenomenon” that promises to transcend ideology and pressure parties, governments and public agencies to be more responsive to the public’s demands.2 Politicians and political parties are ever more looking to enact policies and take positions based on what its target voters or

“market” desire.3 Likewise, academics are increasingly interested in studying political marketing to better understand political behaviour.4 While elements of political marketing have been used for decades, the overall emphasis within the political process and how it is used is a relatively new development.

1 Heather Savigny, The Problem of Political Marketing (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), 1. 2 Darren G. Lilleker, Jennifer Lees-Marshment (eds.), Political Marketing: A Comparative Perspective (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 1. 3 Jennifer Lees- Marshment, The Political Marketing Revolution: Transforming the Government of the UK (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 1. 4 Heather Savigny, “The Construction of the Political Consumer,” in Voters or Consumers: Imagining the Contemporary Electorate, eds. Darren Lilleker and Richard Scullion (New Castle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008), 35.

Political marketing is defined by Alex Marland, Thierry Giasson and Jennifer Lees-

Marshment as:

The application of business marketing concepts to the practice and study of politics and government. With political marketing, a political organization uses business techniques to inform and shape its strategic behaviours that are designed to satisfy citizens’ needs and wants. Strategies and tools include branding, e- marketing, delivery, focus groups, GOTV [get out the vote], internal marketing, listening, exercises, opposition research, volunteer management, voter- driven communication, voter expectation management and voter profiling.5

This definition expands political marketing beyond a tactic or strategy to sell something. Instead, political marketing has now come to focus on a party’s extensive use of market research in order to create a political marketing model.6 Lees-Marshment uses the term “comprehensive political marketing” to describe the seamless integration of marketing into all areas of politics that stems from this change in thinking:

To be most effective, political marketing is not just about cherry-picking one or two bits from marketing; it is about an overall framework of interrelated activities that politicians can use to achieve a range of goals… Political parties can use political marketing to increase their chances of achieving their goal of winning general elections. They alter aspects of their behavior to suit the nature and demands of their market.7

In short, politicians and parties are often now looking at policies and decisions through the lens of political marketing. This change toward weaving political marketing into all areas of a political party is evident in the creation of the Doer/Dexter model in Manitoba and Nova Scotia.

5 Alex Marland, Thierry Giasson, Jennifer Lees-Marshment eds., Political Marketing in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), 262. 6 Jennifer Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing: Principles and Application (London: Routledge, 2009), 1. 7 Ibid, 30.

The Doer/Dexer model was created following the Manitoba NDP’s three consecutive defeats, between 1988 and 1995, and the Nova Scotia NDP’s failure to win government in

1999. In developing the model, both parties significantly transformed their policies and presentation of the party. The creation of the Doer/Dexter model followed the success of

Britain’s New Labour and consisted of the same three main components of simplification, moderation and inoculation. Following the implementation of the Doer/Dexter model the

Manitoba NDP were able to win three consecutive elections under Gary Doer and a historic first election victory for the Nova Scotia NDP in 2009 under Darrell Dexter.

The purpose of this study is to examine how political marketing helped the NDP in

Manitoba and Nova Scotia win elections and to determine the role the Doer/Dexter model played in influencing the party’s decisions. The study focused on five research questions:

1. What was the political context that spurred the creation of the Doer/Dexter model?

2. How did the NDP in Manitoba and Nova Scotia use political marketing, and the Doer/Dexter model specifically, to win government in 1999, 2003 and 2007 in Manitoba and in 2009 in Nova Scotia?

3. What are the main components of the Doer/Dexter model?

4. What role did market research play in developing the Doer/Dexter model?

5. Why was the NDP in Manitoba and Nova Scotia able to be electorally successful after implementing the Doer/Dexter model?

In order to gain an understanding of the Doer/Dexter model, the researcher interviewed eight key political advisors for the Manitoba and Nova Scotia NDP and made use of nine other interviews, conducted by Dr. Jared Wesley. Content analysis was also performed on the party’s electoral platforms over the time period. By gaining the perspectives of individuals directly

3 involved in the creation and implementation of the Doer/Dexter model and examining the changes to the party platforms, it was expected that the study would provide an “insider’s account” on the role and impact political marketing had on the NDP.

Significance to the Field

While political marketing continues to become more sophisticated and the political marketing models parties use more comprehensive, the study of political marketing in Canada at the provincial level is very limited. Indeed, while some research on political marketing has been conducted at the federal level, only a small amount of research has been performed on provincial political parties. Through this investigation into the Doer/Dexter model used by the

NDP in Manitoba and Nova Scotia, it is hoped to fill a small portion of the gap that currently exists within the literature.

Definitions

There are three key terms that play a pivotal role in the Doer/Dexter model and need to be defined to ensure clarity within this study. First, simplification can be defined as a political marketing strategy that incorporates using clear, concise and simple language in order to improve understanding and communication with citizens. Simplification also includes limiting campaign commitments to facilitate the communication of electoral platforms. Second, moderation can be defined as a political strategy to remove perceived extreme ideological positions on issues in favour of adopting a more measured approach. Finally, inoculation can be defined as a political strategy where a party works to mitigate negative perceptions on an issue, often by adopting a more favourable position held its opponents.

Doer/Dexter: A model for the NDP

The Doer/Dexter model was created in consultation with Gary Doer and NDP advisors by NOW Communications in the lead-up to the 1999 election. Following its success in

Manitoba, NOW Communications adapted the model for its use in Nova Scotia prior to the

2003 election. The Doer/Dexter model has three main components- simplification, moderation, and inoculation. The terms simplification and moderation are terms that were developed by the researcher in conjunction with Dr. Jared Wesley for a chapter in Marland et al’s Political

Communication in Canada: Meet the Press and Tweet the Rest.8 Inoculation is a term that is commonly used in the United States in political marketing in reference to ways political parties or politicians can pro-actively stop an attack. While the individual components of the

Doer/Dexter model are not new, with many parties implementing elements of the model, the combination of the three components together signifies a new development.

In order to examine the comprehensive political marketing model the NDP in Manitoba and Nova Scotia used, the remainder of this thesis has been divided into five sections. Chapter

Two provides a literature review of political marketing, the NDP, and New Labour. Chapter

Three delivers a discussion on the methodology of the study. Chapters Four and Five offer the results of this study, beginning with a chapter on the Manitoba NDP and the Doer model and followed by the Nova Scotia NDP and the Dexter model. Chapter Six closes with discussion of this study followed by conclusions.

8 Jared J. Wesley and Mike Moyes, “Selling Social Democracy: Branding the Political Left in Canada,” in Political Communication in Canada, eds. Alex Marland, Thierry Giasson and Tamara A. Small (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014), 74-91.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Doer/Dexter model was the first time the NDP in Manitoba and Nova Scotia used political marketing in a comprehensive and coordinated fashion. The literature review will address the three areas that provide the context for the development of the Doer/Dexter model.

The first section will address research related to the normative questions surrounding political marketing. This will be followed by an examination into how political marketing has continued to evolve. The second section will focus on the NDP as a political party. Finally, the third section will discuss research on the transformation of the Labour Party into New Labour in

Britain that served as the basis for the Doer/Dexter model.

Political Marketing

The idea and application of marketing within the political sphere is not a new concept.9

Indeed, within the Canadian political context, political marketing in its broadest sense, has been around since the 1800’s in the form of advertising agencies helping political parties design posters, billboards and ads during election campaigns.10 What has significantly changed over time, however, is how political marketing is being applied by political parties. The literature on political marketing primarily focuses on two areas. First, the overall increase of political marketing is discussed within the literature as a normative question about the impact, both positive and negative, within a democracy. Second, the literature depicts the evolution of political marketing as moving from primarily being about advertising and political communication to political parties adopting political marketing as an overall philosophy, with

9 Savigny, The Problem of Political Marketing, 1. 10 Susan Delacourt, Shopping for Votes: How Politicians Choose Us and We Choose Them (Madeira Park: Douglas and McIntyre, 2013), 43.

6 market research being used to not only inform but to design its policies and platforms around its target market (i.e. voters).11 Recent literature also illustrates the shift amongst some political parties toward using sophisticated data analysis to super-segment the voting population in order to micro-target individual voters needed to win elections.12 Examining how political marketing has evolved is important to our study in order to understand the context from which the

Doer/Dexter model was developed.

Normative Questions

Darren Lilleker and Jennifer Lees-Marshment describe political marketing as a “global phenomenon with parties from all corners of the world developing political manifestos based around the results of qualitative and quantitative marketing research.”13 This proliferation of political marketing has resulted in a debate within the literature regarding the impact political marketing has on democracy. On one side of the normative debate about political marketing is the critical question: Does political marketing improve democracy by making political parties more responsive to its citizens? On the other side of the dichotomy is the corresponding critical question: Is political marketing antithetical to democracy by forming the “central element in the

[political] process”14 and thus lowering voters to simply consumers, rather than citizens? With the increasing prevalence of political marketing, an examination into both arguments and the questions that surround the normative debate is essential.

11 Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing, 27. 12 Sasha Issenberg, The Victory Lab: The Secret Science of Winning Campaigns (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 5-6. 13 Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (eds.), Political Marketing, 1. 14 Savigny, The Problem of Political Marketing, 5.

The central tenant of political marketing improving democracy is based largely on political parties being more responsive to the general public.15 This occurs as a result of political parties viewing citizens as consumers and therefore the essential driver of political decisions through market research. Heather Savigny describes the consumer in political marketing literature “as being at the heart of the production process.”16 To its proponents, this shift in the operation of political parties could “encourage more responsive government that is more in tune with the people, with political products and services designed to meet citizen demands rather than elite political rhetoric.”17 Likewise, Thierry Giasson, Jennifer Lees-

Marshment, and Alex Marland list seven “potential positives” about political marketing. They include:

1. Getting politicians to listen and understand the electorate more effectively; 2. Enabling effective targeting, not just of majorities but also of minorities; 3. Making government focus more on actual delivery than rhetorical promises; 4. Elevating citizens’ position in the political process; 5. Developing a more mature relationship with the electorate, where political consumers are active players in the political system, understand the complexities of government, and move away from demanding to helping create government; 6. Reducing elite domination of the political process; and, 7. Keeping politicians responsive and accountable.18

Amongst these seven potential results of political marketing, all but one (number three) centres around enabling and providing citizens a greater influence on the political process. Political marketing proponents, such as Lees-Marshment, see the focus on consumers’ needs and wants as a positive shift in the power structure, aligning political parties with ordinary citizens:

15 Lees-Marshment, The Political Marketing Revolution, 239. 16 Savigny, “The Construction of the Political Consumer (or Politics: What not to Consume),” 36. 17 Jennifer Lees-Marshment, “Political Marketing: How to Reach That Pot of Gold,” Journal of Political Marketing 2, no. 1 (2003): 2. 18 Thierry Giasson, Jennifer Lees-Marshment and Alex Marland, “Introducing Political Marketing,” in Political Marketing in Canada, eds. Alex Marland, Thierry Giasson and Jennifer Lees-Marshment (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), 18-19.

“Political marketing, by placing discussion and focus on the masses rather than the elites, holds the potential to improve democracy and give greater voice to the majority rather than the minority.”19 Similarly, Margaret Scammell describes the increased power voters now hold within the political process as a clear benefit of political marketing: “Just as the consumer is empowered through increased choice and vastly expanded resources of information, so too is the political consumer… The political consumer is increasingly the hunter rather than the hunted. In politics as in commerce there is a shift in the balance of market power from the producers to the consumers.”20

Opponents of political marketing counter that adopting political marketing as an overall philosophy and treating citizens as consumers is “antithetical to democracy and serve[s] to disconnect the public from the process of politics.”21 Savigny contends that political marketing replaces the traditional element of ideology and puts the focus on what the political party would do for the individual voter and short-term goals rather than the collective good of society and long-term goals:

To refer to voters as customers and to refer to politics as something which can be ‘purchased’ changes its nature. It constructs politics as something which is material, something which can be discarded when no longer of use or does not satisfy the self-interest of the individual; something which does not require loyalty, engagement or long-term commitment…Rather than enhancing democracy, marketing politics has meant that something has been lost. The content of politics has been replaced, yet it is the content of politics which is essential for a healthy and functioning democracy. This includes a public space where the polity is informed about the decisions and actions of their elites; decisions are taken in the interests of society and a public good; and as a result, an informed collective can hold those elites to account. These ideals are missing in

19 Jennifer Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing and British Political Parties, second edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 11. 20 Margaret Scammell, “Citizen Consumers: Towards a New Marketing of Politics?” in Media and the Restyling of Politics, eds. John Corner and Dick Pels (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 129. 21 Savigny, The Problem of Political Marketing, 4.

the process of marketing with its inherent individualisation of both the public and political actors, and emphasis upon their differing short-term goals. 22

Bruce Newman suggests that political marketing, rather than connecting political parties to citizens through market research, has instead encouraged politicians to use market research to determine what would be best for their own “political interests.” 23

Additionally, perhaps one of the most significant detractions against the widespread application of political marketing is in the common and increasing practice of market segmentation.24 Through the use of sophisticated technology it is now possible for political parties to segment voters into groups by interests, consumer profiles, geography, religion, ethnicity, income or any other socio-economic category.25 This allows political parties to use micro-targeting in order to target only specific groups needed for electoral success, thereby excluding possibly significant segments of the population from political influence.26 A recent example of a Canadian political party using micro-targeting is provided by former Conservative Party strategist and University of Calgary professor

Tom Flanagan in describing the federal Conservative Party targeting specific ethnic groups:

Conservatives will not win a majority government simply by adding seats in Quebec, though that will be part of the formula. They must also win additional seats elsewhere, and that means doing better with ethnic voters… Conservatives must break the Liberal hegemony over Italian, Chinese, South Asian, and other ethnic voters... Harper has recognized the need and has done all he can to move the Conservative Party in that direction, starting with his anti-same-sex-marriage advertising campaign of early 2005. He insisted that the 2005-06 platform contain specific measures, such as an apology for the Chinese head tax, lower landing fees

22 Savigny, The Problem of Political Marketing, 116. 23 Bruce I. Newman, The Mass Marketing of Politics: Democracy in an Age of Manufactured Images (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1999), ix. 24 Giasson, Lees-Marshment and Marland, “Introducing Political Marketing,” 16. 25 Issenberg, The Victory Lab, 116. 26 Giasson, Lees-Marshment and Marland, “Introducing Political Marketing,” 17.

for immigrants, and better recognition of their credentials… He also devotes a substantial amount of time attending events in ethnic communities… If the Conservative Party can expand its bridgehead in Quebec and develop enough ethnic support to win suburban ridings in Toronto and Vancouver, it will become Canada’s majority party for the next generation.27

With examples like these, Delacourt strongly condemns political marketing as little more than propaganda and warns against the use of micro-targeting as going against the difficult but necessary goal of bringing about a shared consensus:

Political marketing, if not held in check, veers dangerously close to the view of consumers as morons. In its extreme forms, it plays to people’s emotions, not their thoughts. It operates on the belief that repeating a catchy phrase, even if it’s untrue, will seal an idea in the mind of the unknowing or uncaring public. It assumes that citizens will always choose on the basis of their individual wants and not society’s needs. It divides the country into “niche” markets and abandons the hard political work of knitting together broad consensus or national vision.28

With political marketing becoming increasingly prevalent and sophisticated in its use by political parties it is clear that the normative debate on the potential positive and negative effects of political marketing will continue.

The Evolution of Political Marketing

Political marketing continues to change and evolve over time. The literature on political marketing illustrates three general phases. The first phase consists of political marketing being synonymous with political advertising and political communication.29 For over two hundred years, different forms of political advertising have been used by political parties within

Canada.30 Delacourt provides a number of historical examples including: advertising agencies

27 Tom Flanagan, Harper’s Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 280-281. 28 Delacourt, Shopping for Votes, 327-328. 29 Lees- Marshment, Political Marketing, 27-29. 30 Delacourt, Shopping for Votes, 43.

11 being involved in Canadian politics during the 1800’s, John A. Macdonald using newspaper ads with key slogans in the 1891 election, the federal Conservatives creating a fictional radio drama in the 1930’s as a form of negative advertising against the Liberal party, the Liberal government creating the Bureau of Public Information in 1939 in order to maintain support for the war effort through advertising, and the “first serious entrée” of advertising experts as senior political advisors in a Canadian election in 1957.31 From this time and up until the 1990s, the political marketing literature continues to focus on the use of advertising and political communications. This is evident in Nicholas J. O’Shaughnessy’s 1990 book The Phenomenon of Political Marketing where the author introduces the concept of political marketing by highlighting political advertising, sales techniques, and political communication but nothing in the way of meeting the needs and wants of voters:

‘Political Marketing’… has come into its own with popular recognition that it is a convenient shorthand for something people recognise as central to the operations of their democracy. In 1988 the Presidential [United States] campaign confirmed yet again the magnetism of approaches that conceived of politics as a product marketing exercise… This book is concerned with political advertising on the paid media and other promotion channels and, to a lesser degree, with free publicity from television news. For this is the fulcrum of the American political process, and its prizes go to those best able to modulate the media. We examine the import of commercial selling techniques to politics and the use of modern technology to communicate candidate, party and programme, arguing that such promotion is demonstrably highly effective…32

Lilleker and Lees-Marshment similarly state that prior to the twenty-first century the focus within political marketing literature remained on “communications… a focus that perhaps stemmed from the common mistake that marketing itself is the same as advertising or selling.”33 Lees-Marshment further summarizes the literature in political marketing during the

31 Ibid, 43-45. 32 Nicholas J. O’Shaughnessy, The Phenomenon of Political Marketing (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 1. 33 Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing, 6.

1980s and 1990s as “focused on how political marketing might be used by parties, presidents and candidates in how they tried to sell themselves. It conveyed how awareness of the market, whether acquired informally or through consultants’ expertise and market research, was beginning to influence party communication.”34 This beginning phase of political marketing, with a focus on political advertising and political communication, coincides with political parties being what Lees-Marshment calls sales-oriented.35 A sales-oriented party is characterized as:

[using] marketing to identify persuadable voters and design more effective communication to sell the party to them. A sales-oriented party does not change its behaviour to suit what people want, but tries to make people want what it offers. Using market intelligence to understand voters’ response to its behaviour, the party employs the latest advertising and communication techniques to persuade voters that it is right.36

With businesses working since the 1960s to implement a marketing model that expands on the

“selling” element toward meeting the needs of consumers,37 it is of little surprise that political parties eventually moved to also having a market orientation.

The second phase in the evolution of political marketing depicts political parties increasingly adopting a “customer-focus” or market orientation in developing its policies and campaign commitments. 38 This shift can be characterized by the majority of political parties using market research to identify the needs and wants of the “consumers” (i.e. citizens). The change by political parties away from using market research to “sell” its position on issues

34 Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing, 27. 35 Ibid, 46-47. 36 Ibid. 37 Margaret, Scammell, “Political Marketing: Lessons for Political Science,” Political Studies 47 (1999): 725. 38 Ibid, 726.

13 toward using market research to determine its position on issues is highlighted throughout the political marketing literature:

The central idea of political marketing is that political parties can seek advantage by integrating the electorate’s needs and wants into the development of their political product.39

Political parties, interest groups and local councils are amongst those entities that increasingly conduct market intelligence to identify citizen concerns, change their behaviour to meet those demands and communicate their ‘product offering’ more effectively.40

The emphasis on strategy is the prime distinctive contribution of the marketing literature… It shifts the focus from the techniques of promotion to the overall strategic objectives of the party/organization. Thus it effectively reverses the perspective offered by campaign studies/political communications approaches. Political marketing is no longer a subset of broader processes: political communications becomes a subset of political marketing, tools of promotion within the overall marketing mix. This is a key premise of the emerging sub- discipline of political marketing.41

Politicians rely on market intelligence to decide on issue priorities, develop communications strategies, and help present themselves as the most competent to address those issues.42

Basically the marketing concept holds that the needs of consumers are of primary concern and should be identified, and attempts made to satisfy the identified needs… When a political party of candidate applies this concept to the political process, they must be in a position to adapt to and satisfy voters’ needs.43

The emerging market orientation of political parties within this phase “suggests a significant transformation of the way the political world operates” by altering the behaviour of political

39 Yannick Dufresne and Alex Marland, “The Canadian Political Market and the Rules of the Game” in Political Marketing in Canada, eds. Alex Marland, Thierry Giasson, and Jennifer Lees-Marshment (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), 25. 40 Jennifer Lees-Marshment, “The Marriage of Politics and Marketing,” Political Studies 49, (2001): 692. 41 Scammell, “Political Marketing,”723. 42 Andre Turcotte, “Under New Management: Market Intelligence and the Conservative Party’s Resurrection” in Political Marketing in Canada, eds. Alex Marland, Thierry Giasson, and Jennifer Lees-Marshment (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), 77. 43 Aron O’Cass, “Political Marketing and the Marketing Concept,” European Journal of Marketing 30, no. 10/11 (1996): 38.

14 parties.44 This results from the market orientation being “more a way of thinking than doing”45 with “market orientation… [being] a general organization will to incorporate the use of market intelligence into the generation of tangible and intangible product offerings.”46 Lees-

Marshment describes the common characteristics of a market-oriented political party:

A MOP (market-oriented party) designs its behaviour to provide voter satisfaction to reach its goal. It uses market intelligence to identify voter demands, then designs its product that meets their needs and wants, is supported and implemented by the internal organisation, and is deliverable in government. It does not attempt to change what people think, but to deliver what they need and want… The MOP concept places emphasis on the development of a product, and market intelligence, rather than communication and campaigning.47

The third and final phase within the evolution of political marketing is the increasing use of sophisticated data analysis by political parties in order to super-segment the population and micro-target key demographics or even individuals.48 The rationale behind super- segmentation and micro-targeting is simple: “Focusing on the needs and wants of the electorate as a whole is not always the most efficient strategy, and targeting specific population segments is often more useful.”49 This practice within political marketing is an extension to the previously common practice of political parties only targeting “winnable” electoral ridings.

Instead, super-segmentation and micro-targeting actively seeks out methods to isolate individuals or groups who potentially could vote for your party. As previously mentioned, the

Conservative Party used this type of political marketing in order to target specific ethnic groups. Similarly, the federal NDP used micro-targeting in order to determine the “next tier” of potential voters prior to the 2011 election:

44 Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing, 33. 45 Ibid, 30. 46 Giasson, Lees-Marshment and Marland, “Introducing Political Marketing,” 7. 47 Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing, 43-44. 48 Issenberg, The Victory Lab, 276-277. 49 Dufresne and Marland, “The Canadian Political Market and the Rules of the Game,” 25.

“Now we wanted to identify the voters who could get the party to 25 percent of the popular vote and beyond… We wanted to know who these people were, where they lived, what their political attitudes were, what they had in common with our voter base and what it would take to move them… We asked Viewpoints (polling firm) to develop a model that used the most modern methods to do research differently. Their innovative model was a hybrid, the best of both worlds: a massive interactive voice-recorded poll of tens of thousands of people to get more accurate numbers and a longer attitudinal poll solely of those in the “next tier”… The next step was to micro-target, zero in on the people who could get us that 25 percent of the vote, and then tailor our campaign message to them while also maintaining the support from our base.50

At an even greater level of sophistication and use of technology in micro-targeting key voters,

President of the United States Barack Obama’s campaign team had data analysts review

“hundreds of individual-level variables thrown into microtargeting algorithms” to predict which voters were more likely to support them.51 That information was then be used in both making individual contact with that specific voter and in informing the political advertising used in micro-targeting a specific demographic: “Now if I know that there are twenty-seven people I want to reach and they all cluster around this bus bench, I’ll buy that bus bench [for advertising]. And if I know these twenty-seven people read the PennySaver, I’ll buy an ad in the PennySaver.”52 While normative questions remain on the issue of super-segmenting the population and using market research to micro-target individuals or key demographics, political parties defend its use as simply using all the technological tools available. Flanagan states: “We are living in the biggest, fastest moving communications revolution in human history. Each election campaign features new technologies. We must continue to be at the forefront in adapting new technologies to politics.”53

50 Brad, Lavigne, Building the Orange Wave: The Inside Story Behind the Historic Rise of Jack Layton and the NDP (Madeira Park: Douglas and McIntyre, 2013), 190-191. 51 Issenberg, The Victory Lab, 274. 52 Ibid, 275. 53 Flanagan, Harper’s Team, 288.

The New Democratic Party

The NDP, or the New Party as its founders affectionately called it,54 was created out of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in 1961 in an attempt to expand the party’s overall appeal while moderating certain elements of the social democratic ideology.55 The ideology of the NDP has continued to moderate gradually over time as the party moves away from its more radical socialist beginnings as the CCF.56 Despite significant electoral success at the provincial level, having won government in six out of ten provinces, the direction of the party and the balance between electoral viability and its ideological principles has been a constant area of debate.57 Examining the progression of the NDP, from its beginning, provides the background to the eventual creation of the Doer/Dexter model.

The social democratic roots of the NDP can be found in its predecessor- the Co- operative Commonwealth Federation. The CCF was founded in 1932, during the time period of the Great Depression, at a convention in Calgary that consisted of “urban labour parties, radical farm organizations, and Christian socialists and intellectuals.”58 The values and ideology of the

CCF was clearly outlined in the strong rhetoric of the 1933 Regina Manifesto. In it, the CCF advocated:

to replace the present capitalist system, with its inherent injustice and inhumanity, by a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by another will be eliminated, in which economic planning will supercede unregulated private enterprise and competition, and in which genuine democratic self-government, based upon economic equality will be possible.59

54 Stanley Knowles, The New Party (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1961), 1. 55 Lynn Gidluck, Visionaries, Crusaders, and Firebrands: The Idealistic Canadians Who Built the NDP (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 2012), 156. 56 Ibid, 12. 57 Ibid. 58 Nelson Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1983), 13. 59 The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, The Regina Manifesto (Regina, July 20, 1933), 1.

The manifesto also stated that: “No C.C.F. Government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism and put into operation the full programme of socialized planning which will lead to the establishment in Canada of the Co-operative Commonwealth.”60 Beyond such strong language, the manifesto called for many programs that the other parties eventually adopted, such as: “state health insurance, unemployment insurance, public pensions… Crown corporations… and a Canadian constitution with an entrenched charter of rights.”61 These practical solutions to problems were overshadowed by the strong socialist language, making it difficult for the CCF to expand their support and “vicious criticism was hurled at the party from all sides.”62 Ivan Avakumovic describes the difficulty the CCF had from the Regina Manifesto:

They [CCF] did not find it easy to defend the Regina Manifesto in its entirety, let alone use the document to enlarge the appeal of the CCF in the 1940s and 1950s. Often passages from the Regina Manifesto, and other works co-authored by prominent CCFers and LSRers (League for Social Reconstruction), were used as the basis for questions about the democratic socialists’ intentions, and the extent to which their blueprints differed from those of the rulers and planners in Moscow.63

With federal electoral results for the CCF peaking at 15.6 percent of the popular vote in 1945, followed by 13.4 percent in 1949, and 11.3 percent in 195364, party leaders knew it needed to expand its base of supporters, especially “to the growing labour movement and urban population.”65 As a result, the CCF moved to replace the Regina Manifesto with the 1956

Winnipeg Declaration, a statement of beliefs that had less socialist rhetoric and shifted away from calling for widespread nationalization.66 Despite this, electoral decline of the CCF

60 Ibid, 15. 61 Gidluck, Visionaries, Crusaders, and Firebrands, 86. 62 Ibid, 115. 63 Ivan Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada: A Study of the CCF-NDP in Federal and Provincial Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), 66. 64 Alan Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism: Essays on the CCF-NDP (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), 2. 65 Ibid, 49. 66 Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada, 162.

18 continued with their share of the popular vote falling to 10.7 percent in 1957, and 9.5 % in

1958.67 With the CCF “clearly on the path to oblivion”68 discussions began on creating a “new party.”

The New Democratic Party was created in 1961 through the negotiated agreement of the

CCF and organized labour in an attempt to “broaden the party’s base and to make victories of the polls more likely.”69 That base was to include the party supporters of the past including workers, farmers, and socialists but increasingly small business owners, professionals and the middle class.70 Additionally, the NDP was seen to provide another opportunity to make inroads into regions of the country that the CCF was unable to, such as in Eastern Canada and especially Quebec.71 The creation of the NDP and its founding convention changed the view of the public on the party. Prime Minister Diefenbaker was concerned enough about this new party to warn “that the next election would be fought on the issue of socialism versus free enterprise.”72 The NDP left the convention as if it belonged “in the major leagues – confident, strong, efficient, yet retaining the idealism and the basic democracy which had given it distinction.”73 In short, the NDP looked ready to make a major electoral breakthrough.

Unfortunately, the party was hampered by a number of factors, including: a lack of party staff to continue organizing and planning for the future, money to fund the enormous job of starting a new political party, and the decision to dissolve all of the “New Party Clubs” rather than automatically transferring their membership into a constituency association.74 Additionally, the

67 Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 2. 68 Ibid. 69 Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba, 87. 70 Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 52. 71 Ibid, 50. 72 Desmond Morton, NDP, The Dream of Power (Toronto: Hakkert, 1974), 27. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid, 28-29.

19 official status of organized labour within the NDP led to the increasing allegation that the party was “labour dominated.”75 This was given further credence when former NDP leadership candidate and MP Hazen Argue announced at a press conference that he had quit the party in favour of the Liberals because “his party had been captured by a clique of trade unionists.”76 By

“crossing the floor” Argue effectively provided credibility to the “most potent argument its opponents could offer against the NDP.”77 The electoral results of the newly created NDP were disappointing. While an improvement over the declining support garnered under the banner of the CCF, the NDP ranged between 13.1 percent and 17.9 percent in the first four elections following its founding.78 The elections after 1968 did not get much better for the federal NDP.

The party over the next four decades has struggled to breakthrough electorally despite significant success in various provinces. Only in 1988, 2011 and the most recent 2015 election did the NDP challenge in a credible way for government. This failure to achieve government has, a number of times over the party’s history, galvanized a significant segment of the NDP calling for a move back toward the “left” on the political spectrum.

Since the NDP and its predecessor the CCF was founded, a debate has occurred within the party on the purpose and role the party should play in effecting change. This debate centres on the question: Should the NDP be about winning government or should the party content itself with influencing other parties while maintaining its ideological purity? Beginning with the

CCF replacing the Regina Manifesto with the more restrained Winnipeg Declaration, certain members of the party have resisted any signs of moderating the party’s beliefs. Former

Manitoba NDP Premier Howard Pawley was one of the party members who opposed any

75 Ibid, 31. 76 Ibid, 32. 77 Ibid. 78 Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 2.

20 changes to the CCF’s strong socialist ideology: “I joined a small number of other delegates… in opposing the adoption of the Winnipeg Declaration. I had considered it a watering-down of the anti-capitalist principles of the Regina Manifesto which had attracted me to the party in the first place.”79 Pawley also opposed the creation of the NDP on similar grounds: “A socialist party should lead public opinion, even though an idea might be unpopular at a certain time… A debate was beginning on the formation of a so-called New Party, one that would be ‘modern’ and ‘pragmatic…’ Opposed were those of us who feared a watering-down of the principles inherent in the CCF and the new party’s domination by labour union affiliates.”80 Similarly, the

NDP in 1969 began examining a more “radical” approach with the resulting “Waffle” movement producing a “Manifesto for an Independent Socialist Canada.81” More recently, in

2001 the party debated the “New Politics Initiative” which would in effect have ended the NDP as a traditional political party in favour of a “nebulous alliance with non-partisan groups.”82

Long-time NDP strategist Gerald Caplan rejects the NDP moderating its policies and beliefs in order to win government:

I maintain that we can never win government in Canada. We need to figure out how best to influence those who do govern. I fear that we no longer have the influence we used to be able to boast about. How do we get that influence? By having ideas and policies we can make so popular that the governing parties have no choice but to steal some of them from us. That’s our job. To be robbed by Liberals and maybe even Conservatives of policies that make this a somewhat better world.83

Long-time party critic and original member of the Waffle movement Jim Laxer concurs and suggests that “the NDP has evolved into a party much like the others. There is little political

79 Pawley, Keep True, 13. 80 Ibid, 15. 81 Morton, NDP, The Dream of Power, 91-92. 8282 Jamey, Heath, Dead Centre: Hope, Possibility and Unity for Canadian Progressives (Mississauga, John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 233. 83 Gidluck, Visionaries, Crusaders, and Firebrands, 12.

21 ferment. Riding association meetings, party conferences and provincial and federal conventions are not occasions for basic debate and education about the state of society and what needs to be done, but rather focus on fundraising, holding raffles, and showcasing the leader for the media.”84 Instead, Laxer advocates for a “creative tension between movement and party” with the party “[caring] about the long-term struggle to win people to socialism as well as the short- term effort to elect members to the House of Commons and provincial legislatures.”85 This in effect is calling for the NDP to move away from political marketing and being a “market- oriented party” and instead becoming a traditional “product-oriented party.”86 Lees-Marshment defines a product-oriented party: “it argues for what it stands for, believing its product is of such value that people will vote for it because it is right. It doesn’t use marketing to change its product or even its communication, even if it fails to gain support.”87 While the tension between staying “left” enough for its base and being electorally viable has continued to re- surface throughout the NDP’s history, overall the party has continued to focus on winning government. Former federal leader Jack Layton states:

There are people who think that if you win seats, you must’ve done something wrong. You must have betrayed some principle. The most principled person wouldn’t win any seats. Well, I’m not that kind of leader… The complaint about us focusing on winning seats, I thought that was the purpose. Tommy [Douglas] rejected that dichotomy totally and explicitly. Because he talked about pragmatic principles. He said, what’s the point of advocating health care for everybody if you can never make it happen? In fact, that was his magic touch.”88

84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing, 46. 87 Ibid. 88 Gidluck, Visionaries, Crusaders, and Firebrands, 11.

New Labour

In the period leading up to the 1997 election, the Labour Party in Britain, under the leadership of Tony Blair, began substantially changing the policies and political marketing of the party. In an effort to once again win government, after eighteen years in opposition, the

Labour Party implemented a comprehensive political marketing model based on extensive market research. This political marketing model focused on the strategies of simplification, moderation and inoculation in order to successfully elect and re-elect New Labour into three consecutive majority governments in the 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections. The New Labour model is significant to our study due to the party being highly influential on the NDP in

Manitoba and Nova Scotia and in providing the context for the creation of the Doer/Dexter model.

The 1983 British election was a pivotal moment for the Labour Party. After losing government in the 1979 election to Margaret Thatcher and the Conservatives, the Labour Party under new leader Michael Foot, began campaigning on a much more radical socialist platform.89

Such a platform included: “major programmes of nationalization, government spending and government intervention in the labour market.”90 This was in response to some in the party, like outspoken MP Tony Benn, feeling that previous Labour governments under Harold Wilson and

James Callaghan had governed too moderately and “had not been socialist enough.”91 So divisive and sharp was the move toward the left wing of the political spectrum that a group within the

Labour Party split in 1981 to form a new more moderate party called the Social Democratic

89 Philip Gould, “Why Labour Won” in Political Communications: Why Labour Won the General Election of 1997, eds. Ivor Crewe, Brian Gosschalk and John Bartle, 3-11 (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 4. 90 Anthony F. Heath, Roger M. Jowell, and John K. Curtice, The Rise of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter Choices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1-2. 91 Ibid.

Party.92 The results of the 1983 election were decisive. The Labour Party lost a quarter of its vote compared to the 1979 election and garnered the lowest votes per candidate since the party formed in 1900.93 Overall, it was the worst result the party had ever achieved since the modern party system was implemented and the right to vote was extended to most adults in 1918.94

According to Labour Party advisor and pollster, Philip Gould, the long term result from such an extreme platform was that the party became negatively defined and completely disconnected from the majority of the public:

Defining is not a word used lightly, for it was this election [1983], and the events leading up to it, that seared into the electoral consciousness of almost every voter in Britain an image so negative, so destructive, so alienating that is has taken 14 years, three party leaders and a totally remade party to eradicate it. The election of 1983 was the greatest betrayal by a progressive party of its supporters, and in particular its working-class supporters, that modern democratic politics has witnessed. It was not just that Labour was not listening. It was Labour declaring unrestrained war on the values, the instincts, the ethics of the great majority of hardworking decent, ordinary voters. Labour unleashed upon its potential supporters the political equivalent of a first-strike nuclear attack… The effect of this period and this defeat was devastating. Nothing about subsequent Labour politics can be understood without appreciating its full and awful damage. Like a freeze frame on a video, Labour’s identity was frozen in time. Labour was the party of extremism, of union domination, of strikes, of roaring inflation and punitive taxation, of soft defence, of massive public ownership, of incompetence, of indiscipline, of disunity. This negative Labour identity stuck, burrowing deep into the psyche of the British electorate, and casting a shadow of fear that was never truly removed until Labour had won and Tony Blair was in Downing Street.95

Similarly, Tony Blair succinctly characterizes the time period between 1979 and 1983 as an

“unmitigated disaster”96 Following the catastrophic 1983 election and subsequent resignation of

Michael Foot, the long process of transforming the Labour Party began.

92 Tony Blair, A Journey: My Political Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 46. 93 Heath, Jowell, and Curtice, The Rise of New Labour, 3. 94 Ibid. 95 Gould, “Why Labour Won,” 4-5. 96 Blair, A Journey, 46.

Neil Kinnock assumed the leadership of the Labour Party following the 1983 election and slowly began moving the party toward more moderate positions.97 To begin, Kinnock worked on internal reforms that strengthened the role of leader versus party activists and battled to expel members of a communist inspired group named the Militant Tendency.98 Despite attempting to move the party toward the political centre and appearing less extremist in their policies, the 1987 election only provided a three percent increase in the Labour party’s popular vote compared to the 1983 election.99 Kinnock further moderated Labour’s policies after the

1987 election by initiating a policy review that resulted in the reversal of some policies that were some of the party’s most controversial amongst the general population, including the nationalizing of the banks and unilateral nuclear disarmament.100 Similar to 1987, however, the

1992 election only provided small gains for the Labour Party with their popular support rising another four percent to thirty-five percent and the Conservatives winning another majority government.101 This disappointing result, while an increase from the previous two elections, was still less than the Labour party achieved in the 1979 election defeat.102 Blair’s interpretation of the time period was that there were two problems with the Labour Party’s progression: “[First,] the direction was right but the pace was too slow… [Second,] it seemed the party and the voters were in two different places, and so the party had to shift against its will. My own feeling, however, was: the voters are right and we should change not because we have to, but because we want to. It may sound a subtle difference, but it is fundamental.”103

97 Heath, Jowell, and Curtice, The Rise of New Labour, 3. 98 Ibid, 101. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid, 102. 102 Ibid. 103 Blair, A Journey, 51.

Following the 1992 election, Neil Kinnock resigned the leadership of the Labour party and

John Smith was elected leader.

The development of the New Labour model came at a time when the Labour Party in

Britain continued to have difficulty. The party had lost four consecutive elections, was unable to significantly increase its popular support and was struggling against traditional party supporters in making any further substantial changes to its policies and political marketing.104

Blair elaborates:

From early on, even before my election to Parliament in 1983, I had realised the Labour problem was self-made and self-induced. We were not in touch with the modern world. We could basically attract two sorts of people: those who by tradition were Labour, and those who came to a position of support for socialism or social democracy through an intellectual process. Many trade union activists were in the first category; I was a member of the second. Neither group were what I would call “mainstream,” and together they did not remotely add up to a constituency large enough to be in a position to win and to govern.105

As a result, Blair emphatically states that: “Labour had to be radically reformed, and not by an adjustment of a shift of a few degrees, but in a manner that changed profoundly its modus operandi, its thinking, its programme and above all its attitudes.”106 This diagnosis for the need for change fits with what was found in market research conducted in 1992 by party pollster

Philip Gould. Even after thirteen years after it last held power, the Labour Party was found in focus groups to be associated with negative values such as depriving people of wealth and choice in education/health/ownership.107 The focus groups also found that there were strong feelings that the Labour Party was hostile to people who have money/savings/pensions, want to start their

104 Ibid, 39-50. 105 Ibid, 42. 106 Ibid, 50. 107 Ibid.

26 own business and those who want the best for their kids.108 It was not until the election of Blair as leader in 1994, following the death of the previous leader John Smith, was the party able to move toward a sizeable change in its platform and use of political marketing in preparation for the 1997 election.109

Simplification

The New Labour model is made up of three main areas. The first area is the principle of simplification. This component works to ensure that all communication from the party is easily understood and focused around a small number of priorities. While New Labour did present a traditional election platform (manifesto) for the 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections that was very long and comprehensive, the party also focused its message around its key pledges. In both the

1997 and 2001 election campaign, New Labour had five pledges that were included in both the platform and on small pledge cards and in 2005 New Labour included six pledges on its pledge card strategy.110 The pledge cards were widely distributed as a political marketing strategy and allowed the party to simplify the election platform down to five or six critical platform commitments that acted as “the first steps towards a better Britain.”111 The pledge card from

1997 attempted to reassure voters that they would follow through with these pledges by challenging the public to hold them accountable for them: “Keep this card and see that we keep

108 Ibid. 109 Heath, Jowell, and Curtice, The Rise of New Labour, 102. 110 Labour Party of Britain, New Labour because Britain Deserves Better, Election Manifesto, 1997, accessed August 8, 2015, http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm.; Labour Party of Britain, Ambitions for Britain, Election Manifesto, 2001, accessed August 8, 2015, http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/e01/man/lab/ENG1.pdf.; Labour Party of Britain, Britain Forward Not Back, Election Manifesto, 2005, accessed August 8, 2015, http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/tutorial/labour%20manifesto%202005.pdf 111 Labour Party of Britain, New Labour because Britain Deserves Better, Election Manifesto, 1997, accessed August 8, 2015, http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm.

27 our promises.”112 Gould reiterates the rationale of emphasizing a limited number of campaign commitments: “What [market] research revealed was that the public wanted smaller, more concrete pledges, they wanted them costed and they wanted them presented in the form of an accountable contract. The result was more honesty, less fudge, more trust.”113 Table 2.1 provides the pledges outlined on each of the cards for the 1997, 2001 and 2005 election.

Table 2.1 New Labour Election Pledges

1997 Pledge Card114 2001 Pledge Card115 2005 Pledge Card116

Cut class sizes to 30 or Mortgages as low as Your family better off under for 5, 6 and 7 year- possible, low inflation and olds sound public finances Fast track punishment for 10,000 extra teachers and Your family treated better persistent young offenders higher standards in and faster secondary schools Cut NHS waiting lists by 20,000 extra nurses and Your child achieving more treating and extra 100,000 10,000 extra doctors in a patients reformed NHS Get 250,000 under-25 year- 6,000 extra recruits to raise Your country’s borders olds off benefit and into police numbers to their protected work highest ever level No rise in income tax rates Pensioners winter fuel Your community safer payment retained, minimum wage rising to £4.20 Your children with the best start

112 Labour Party of Britain, Pledge Card, 1997, accessed August 8, 2015, https://picturingpolitics.wordpress.com/tag/1997-general-election/ 113 Philip Gould, The Unfinished Revolution: How New Labour Changed British Politics For Ever, (London: Abacus, 2011), 266. 114 Labour Party of Britain, Pledge Card, 1997, accessed August 8, 2015, https://picturingpolitics.wordpress.com/tag/1997-general-election/ 115 Labour Party of Britain, Pledge Card, 2001, accessed August 8, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/graphic/0,10292,1410957,00.html 116 Labour Party of Britain, Pledge Card, 2005, accessed August 8, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/feb/11/labour.uk

Additionally, the 1997 election platform also contained a ten point “contract with the people” that the Labour Party committed to accomplishing in its first mandate.117 Figure 2.2 outlines the ten point contract.

Figure 2.1 New Labour Ten Point Contract

Over the five years of a Labour government:

1. Education will be our number one priority, and we will increase the share of national income spent on education as we decrease it on the bills of economic and social failure 2. There will be no increase in the basic or top rates of income tax 3. We will provide stable economic growth with low inflation, and promote dynamic and competitive business and industry at home and abroad 4. We will get 250,000 young unemployed off benefit and into work 5. We will rebuild the NHS, reducing spending on administration and increasing spending on patient care 6. We will be tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime, and halve the time it takes persistent juvenile offenders to come to court 7. We will help build strong families and strong communities, and lay the foundations of a modern welfare state in pensions and community care 8. We will safeguard our environment, and develop an integrated transport policy to fight congestion and pollution 9. We will clean up politics, decentralise political power throughout the United Kingdom and put the funding of political parties on a proper and accountable basis 10. We will give Britain the leadership in Europe which Britain and Europe need118

By using a five to six point pledge card and a ten point contract with voters as a political marketing strategy, New Labour was able to ensure a clear and understandable message and be put in a better position to re-gain government.

117 Labour Party of Britain, New Labour because Britain Deserves Better, Election Manifesto, 1997, accessed August 8, 2015, http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm 118 Ibid.

Moderation

The second area in the New Labour model is moderation. With Blair taking over as leader of the Labour Party in 1994, he immediately pushed the party to take a more moderate position on issues. Indeed, Blair states: “We need neither the politics of the old Left nor new

Right but a new left-of-centre- agenda for the future… Socialism is not some fixed economic theory defined for one time but a set of values and principles definable for all time.”119 Blair also clearly believed the main problem with “Old Labour” was their rigid adherence to an ideology that is no longer relevant in today’s society: “We had lost because we were out of touch with the modern voter in the modern world… If you have the right policy and the right strategy, you always have a chance of winning. Without them, you can lose no matter how certain the victory seems.”120 As a result, one of the first changes Blair proposed was the re-writing of Clause IV from the Labour Party’s constitution at the 1994 Annual Conference.121 This change, although symbolic, was significant in conveying a message of a new direction for the party. Clause IV committed the party: “to secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange” and was reflective of the time period in which it was written, around the Russian Revolution, 1917.122 In effect, the clause called for a major program of nationalization of industry. Blair describes the importance of changing the clause:

Of course, as opponents of the change immediately pointed out once it was announced, it was largely symbolic. No one except the far left ever really believed

119 Tony Blair, New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 31. 120 Blair, A Journey, 4. 121 Dominic Wring, The Politics of Marketing the Labour Party (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 137. 122 Heath, Jowell, and Curtice, The Rise of New Labour, 106.

in Clause IV as it was written. In a sense, that was my point: no one believed in it, yet no one dared remove it. What this symbolized, therefore, was not just something redundant in our constitution, but a refusal to confront reality, to change profoundly, to embrace the modern world wholeheartedly. In other words this symbol mattered. It was a graven image, an idol. Breaking it would also change the psychology in the party that was damaging and reactionary and which was precisely what had kept us in Opposition for long periods…For me, therefore, removing Clause IV was not a gimmick or piece of good PR or a question of drafting it was vital if Labour was to transform itself.123

After six months of internal party debate, the party adopted the changes to Clause IV in its constitution.124 Had the change to Clause IV been rejected by the party, Blair indicated he would have resigned the leadership:

If the change was rejected, I was off. As we approached the twenty-first century, five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and with even Communist China embracing the ‘socialist market’ economy, if the British Labour Party was going to assert that it believed in state ownership of ‘the means of production, distribution and exchange,’ it meant we weren’t serious. Such a position would confirm all the public’s worst fears.125

With changes made to Clause IV in the Labour party’s constitution, Blair and New Labour began moving toward more moderate policy positions that aligned with the third way ideology.

The Third Way

Blair pragmatically describes the third way as maintaining “the structure of our traditional beliefs, including their central foundation – the commitment to social justice,” while accepting “that new ways of developing such foundations were needed in the modern world.”126According to Professor and former Director of the London School of Economics

Anthony Giddens, the third way simply “refers to the renewal of social democracy in

123 Blair, A Journey, 78. 124 Ibid, 87. 125 Ibid. 126 Blair, A Journey, 85-86.

31 contemporary social conditions.”127 This renewal aims to balance the goals of “old left” social democracy while incorporating elements of the “new right” neo-liberalism.128 The specific neoliberal elements that have become incorporated into the third way philosophy is the acceptance of: affordable government and balanced budgets, the increased role of the private sector and markets, and the benefits of economic growth and decreased tax rates. Giddens is careful, however, to distinguish between the third way and neo-liberalism:

Third Way politics is not a continuation of neoliberalism, but an alternative political philosophy to it. Social democrats… need to overcome some of their worries and fears about markets. But the neoliberal idea that markets should almost everywhere stand in place of public goods is ridiculous. Neoliberalism is a deeply flawed approach to politics, because it supposes that no responsibility needs to be taken for the social consequences of market-based decisions. Markets can’t even function without a social and ethical frame-work – which they themselves cannot provide. Neither trickle-down effects, nor a minimal welfare state, are able to provide the social goods that a decent society must involve. Yet it won’t do, as writers from the old left suggest, merely to counterpose the state to markets. Markets do not always increase inequality, but can sometimes be the means of overcoming it.129

Furthermore, Giddens emphasizes the importance placed on individual responsibility and the equality of opportunity within the third way, rather than the goal of equality of outcome associated with traditional social democracy: “The cornerstones of the new progressivism are said to be equal opportunity, personal responsibility and the mobilizing of citizens and communities. With rights come responsibilities… Public policy has to shift from concentrating on the redistribution of wealth to promoting wealth creation.”130 Blair summarizes:

The third-way philosophy… was not a clever splitting of difference between right [wing] and left [wing]. Neither was it lowest common-denominator populism. It

127 Anthony Giddens ed., The Global Third Way Debate (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 5. 128 Jared Wesley, Code Politics: Campaigns and Cultures on the Canadian Prairies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 224. 129 Anthony Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 32-33. 130 Ibid, 2-3.

was a genuine, coherent and actually successful attempt to redefine progressive politics: to liberate it from outdated ideology; to apply its values anew in a new world; to reform the role of government and the state; and to create a modern relationship between the responsibilities of the citizen and those of society – a hand up not a handout on welfare, opportunity and responsibility as the basis of a strong society. It was a way of moving beyond the small-state “no role for society” ideology… and the big-state anti-enterprise ideology… It was we who should be the good economic managers; the people who understood crime; the ones that got aspiration and empathised with it.131

New Labour’s adoption of a moderate approach is clearly evident throughout the election platforms in 1997, 2001 and 2005. The pragmatic tone of New Labour is very apparent from the party’s rejection of an overt ideology: “In each area of policy a new and distinctive approach has been mapped out, one that differs from the old left and the Conservative right. This is why new

Labour is new. New Labour is a party of ideas and ideals but not of outdated ideology. What counts is what works. The objectives are radical. The means will be modern.”132 The key changes that demonstrate this balanced approach include: no longer advocating for a higher income tax or the re-nationalization of privatized industries, shifting toward a more business- friendly and union-neutral stance, promoting the reformation rather than expansion of the welfare state, and advancing harsher penalties for crime.133 It also includes a willingness to balance active government with a market economy and emphasizes the investment in human capital through education and welfare reform.134 By taking a moderate, centrist approach, New

Labour began a process of reassuring cautious voters and inoculating against the opposition’s attacks.

131 Blair, A Journey, 231. 132 Labour Party of Britain, New Labour because Britain Deserves Better, Election Manifesto, 1997, accessed August 8, 2015, http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm 133 Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing and British Political Parties, 186. 134 Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics, 163-166.

Inoculation

The final area in the New Labour model is inoculation. Named after the medical procedure, inoculation refers to the political strategy where a party works to mitigate negative perceptions on an issue, often by adopting a more favourable position held by its opponents.

Anthony Giddens writes and quotes Norberto Bobbio:

Since its ethos has become unpopular, the weaker side usually tries to take over some of the views of its opponents and propagate those as its own opinions. The classic strategy of the losing side is to produce a ‘synthesis of opposing positions with the intention in practice of saving whatever can be saved of one’s own position by drawing in the opposing position and thus neutralizing it.’135

Similar to many left-wing political parties, the Labour Party in Britain was vulnerable primarily on economic issues including taxation.

In order to inoculate themselves against negative perceptions on the economy New

Labour made three critical changes. First, New Labour made a clear commitment prior to the

1997 election to remain within the Conservative Party’s spending limits for the first two years of the mandate.136 The party also began overtly reassuring voters in stating: “Some things the

Conservatives got right. We will not change them. It is where they got things wrong that we will make change.”137 By adopting aspects of Conservative policies, New Labour was able to remove those issues from the public’s concern and blunt the attacks of the Conservatives. The party also aimed to show its new acceptance of the free market and a willingness to forge a new constructive relationship with the private sector through a variety of speeches and

135 Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 39. 136 Labour Party of Britain, New Labour because Britain Deserves Better, Election Manifesto, 1997, accessed August 8, 2015, http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm 137 Ibid.

34 announcements.138 Polling completed both before and after these changes, indicated that the majority of the population felt New Labour was more in line with their own position on the issue of taxes and spending after the changes were implemented.139

Second, New Labour inoculated itself against the perception the party would ruin the economy or raise taxes by providing very specific commitments within the election platforms and pledge cards stating otherwise. These unambiguous statements are seen to inoculate the party for the sole reason that the party must deliver on them or risk losing a significant amount of trust with the voters. In 1997, the New Labour platform included “there will be no increase in the basic or top rates of income tax” and a key pledge on the pledge card indicated there would be

“no rise in income tax rates, cut VAT [value added tax] on heating to 5 per cent and inflation and interest rates as low as possible.” Similarly, the 2001 New Labour platform called for a targeted tax cut for the parents of new born children while maintaining the commitment to “not raise the basic or top rate of income tax.”140 In 2005, the New Labour platform reiterated its pledge not to

“raise the basic or top rates of income tax in the next Parliament” while allowing its record to inoculate the party from attacks on the economy: “Our economic record has finally laid to rest the view that Labour could not be trusted with the economy” and “We have proved our competence.”141

Lastly, the re-branding of the party as New Labour was the final inoculation against lingering negative perceptions from the party’s past. This overt change was designed to

138 Dominic Wring, The Politics of Marketing the Labour Party, 138. 139 Heath, Jowell, and Curtice, The Rise of New Labour, 109. 140 Labour Party of Britain, Ambitions for Britain, Election Manifesto, 2001, accessed August 8, 2015, http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/e01/man/lab/ENG1.pdf. 141 Labour Party of Britain, Britain Forward Not Back, Election Manifesto, 2005, accessed August 8, 2015, http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/tutorial/labour%20manifesto%202005.pdf

35 distinguish the party from its more socialist history, thereby alleviating the perceived risk of a

Labour government by the voters.142 Similar to other well-developed brands, New Labour came to encapsulate the very essence of the changes within the party or as Blair states: “New Labour was not just a slogan. It was an attitude of mind.”143 Although the term New Labour had been used previously by some MP’s and party members in describing changes within the party, its widespread use in the lead-up to the 1997 election helped reassure voters.144 Indeed, Gould states: “New Labour was our key to election victory. In the last few weeks of the campaign, as doubts grew, it was New Labour that saved us; New Labour that gave nervous voters the confidence to make the final jump.”145

Electoral Results

With the Labour Party being completely transformed and after eighteen years in opposition, Tony Blair and New Labour won an overwhelming majority in the 1997 election in what was described as a “Labour landslide.”146 In total, New Labour won 419 seats for a majority of 179 with just over forty-four percent of the popular vote.147 The Conservatives under John Major won 165 seats with just under thirty-two percent of the popular vote and the

Liberal Democrats won a historic party high of forty-six seats with seventeen percent of the popular vote.148 New Labour’s popular vote was the highest for the party since 1970, while the

Conservatives received their lowest share of the popular vote since 1832 and the lowest number

142 Ibid, 62. 143 Blair, A Journey, 89. 144 Philip Gould, “Why Labour Won,” 6. 145 Ibid. 146 Ivor Crewe, Brian Gosschalk and John Bartle eds, Political Communications: Why Labour Won the General Election of 1997 (London: Frank Cass, 1998), xvii. 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid.

36 of seats since 1906.149Additionally, the Conservatives were left without a seat in either Scotland or Wales and without a seat in most major cities (with the exception being one seat in

Birmingham) outside of London.150 In order to win such a decisive electoral victory, New

Labour “abandoned its safe seats in order to concentrate, ruthlessly, on the marginals it needed to win.”151

In 2001, New Labour was able to win its second consecutive majority government with forty-two percent of the popular vote in winning 412 seats and a majority of 165.152 The election win was the first time that the Labour Party had ever won a full second term.153 The

Conservatives were able to gain one seat compared to the 1997 election for 166 seats total with thirty-one percent of the popular vote154 and the Liberal Democrats were able to win fifty-two seats with their share of the popular vote rising to eighteen percent.155

The 2005 election continued New Labour’s electoral success with a third consecutive majority government. New Labour did, however, see a substantial drop in seats compared to the

2001 election in winning 355 seats with just over thirty-five percent of the popular vote.156 Both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats benefitted from New Labour’s drop in support.

The Conservatives won thirty-three more seats than the 2001 election for a total of 198 seats

149 Ibid. 150 Ibid, xviii. 151 Ibid. 152 Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing and British Political Parties, 239. 153 Gould, The Unfinished Revolution, 451. 154 Stephen Driver and Luke Martell, New Labour (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 2. 155 Liberal Democrats, “Where we come from,” accessed August 24, 2015, http://www.libdems.org.uk/history. 156 Driver and Martell, New Labour, 2.

37 with thirty-two percent of the popular vote and the Liberal Democrats won sixty-two seats with twenty-two percent of the popular vote.157

The success of New Labour was the result of a complete transformation of the party. By using simplification, moderation and inoculation New Labour developed a model that helped achieve three majority governments in 1997, 2001 and 2005. Tony Blair describes the changes made to the party as: “recovering Labour values from outdated tradition and dogma and reconnecting the party to the modern world.”158 These same views formed the basis of change in creating the Doer/Dexter model.

157 BBC News, “Blair Wins Historic Third Term- Majority of 66,” accessed August 24, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/vote_2005/constituencies/default.stm 158 Blair, A Journey, 97.

3. METHODOLOGY

The use of a comprehensive political marketing model by the Manitoba and Nova Scotia

NDP constitutes a significant deviation from past election campaigns. The Doer/Dexter model was developed using market research and is comprised of three key components: simplification, moderation, and inoculation. This study examined the case studies of the Manitoba NDP under the leadership of Gary Doer and the Nova Scotia NDP under the leadership of Darrell Dexter using two main research methods – elite interviews and content analysis on election platforms.

These methods were used to address the following research questions:

1. What was the political context that spurred the creation of the Doer/Dexter model?

2. How did the NDP in Manitoba and Nova Scotia use the Doer/Dexter model to win government from 1999 to 2007 in Manitoba and 2009 in Nova Scotia?

3. What are the main components of the Doer/Dexter model?

4. Why were the NDP in Manitoba and Nova Scotia able to be electorally successful after implementing the Doer/Dexter model?

5. What role did market research play in developing the Doer/Dexter model?

This qualitative study described the political context found in Manitoba and Nova Scotia in explaining the Doer/Dexter model’s use and its success. Eight Interviews were conducted with political advisors to gain direct insight into the both the creation and use of the political marketing model. The interview data was transcribed, coded, and analyzed in order to answer the research questions. Further data from transcripts of nine elite interviews conducted by Dr.

Wesley’s 2010 study “Branding Today’s NDP” was also coded and analyzed before being included in this study. Content analysis was performed on the campaign platform of the NDP for the six elections that took place in Manitoba between 1988 and 2007 and the five elections

39 that took place in Nova Scotia between 1998 and 2009. The data from the content analysis was then coded and categorized along themes to help corroborate the data from the interviews.

Research Design

This study examines political marketing within the context of two provinces, Manitoba and Nova Scotia and within the confines of one party, the NDP. Manitoba and Nova Scotia was selected as case studies based on their adoption of the same political marketing model and known networking between the parties. While the NDP has been successful in other provinces, such as Saskatchewan and British Columbia, neither had demonstrated similarities to other

New Democratic Parties in other jurisdictions. To answer the research questions of this study, including the design and implementation of a political marketing model, elite interview were selected in order to allow the perspectives of high ranking political advisors to be heard. It is often these perspectives that are missing from both research and the public domain, despite their important role in politics. The NDP’s election platforms were also selected as the second area to analyze based on the significant difference between platforms prior to the NDP’s adoption of the Doer/Dexter model and after. Ultimately, the goal of this study is to describe the role a political marketing model played in helping the Manitoba and Nova Scotia NDP achieve electoral success from 1999 through 2007 in Manitoba and in 2009 in Nova Scotia.

Participants

Eight elite interviews were conducted specifically for this study. The interviews took place between August 15, 2011 and September 29, 2011, with five interviews being conducted in person and three interviews occurring over the phone. Prior to any of the interviews taking place, approval on the procedure of the research project was granted by the University of

Manitoba Research and Ethics Board (see Appendix A) and all individuals were given an informed consent form to review and sign (see Appendix B). Given the political subject matter and elite political positions of the individuals being interviewed, the informed consent form provided background information on the study and the opportunity to remain anonymous within the study. All individuals interviewed consented to being named and directly quoted. Of the eight interviews, three participants were able to provide insight into the Doer model and the

Manitoba context, two participants were able to provide insight into the Dexter model and the

Nova Scotia context and three participants were able to provide information for both. A list of the individuals interviewed and their role within the NDP/government is below:

Table 3.1 List of Interviews

Interview Participant Participant Title Michael Balagus Former Chief of Staff to the Premier of Manitoba, former Manitoba NDP Campaign Director Ron Johnson Former CEO and founder of NOW Communications Riva Harrison Former Director of Communications- Government of Manitoba Leslie Turnbull Co-founder of Viewpoints Research

Mike MacSween Former Nova Scotia NDP Party Secretary

Eugene Kostyra Former Government of Manitoba Finance Minister, Political Advisor for the Manitoba and Nova Scotia NDP Dan O’Connor Former Chief of Staff to the Premier- Government of Manitoba and Government of Nova Scotia, Political Advisor for the Nova Scotia NDP Shauna Martin Office of the Premier- Manitoba and Nova Scotia

The eight individuals interviewed were selected using a snowball method beginning with individuals closely involved with the creation and/or implementation of the Doer/Dexter model and asking each if there was someone that they would recommend speaking with (see Appendix

E for script contacting potential interviews). To be clear, there were other individuals that the researcher attempted to contact through telephone, email and mutual contacts in order to schedule an interview but was either unable to do so or the interview was declined. It was also mentioned to the researcher by an individual interviewed that often when a series of interviews are requested within the group of political advisors only one individual will respond.

The individuals that were interviewed for Dr. Wesley’s study included sitting Members of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba and key political advisors to the Manitoba NDP. The interviews took place between April 23, 2010 and June 4, 2010. In order to respect confidentiality, all individuals from Dr. Wesley’s interviews remained anonymous in the reporting of this research study, except where their name was published and their quote attributed to them in Dr. Wesley’s book Code Politics. There was some overlap between the two groups interviewed, but questions asked of the participants were different. The eight interviews conducted, combined with the nine interviews from Dr. Wesley’s study, provided enough data that the saturation level was reached, with responses in the interviews showing striking similarity.

Interview Data Collection

The eight interviews conducted for this study were structured, consisting of approximately fifteen predetermined questions. Most of the questions were conducted using a consistent order, with some differences, depending on follow-up questions or where the

42 individual being interviewed took the discussion. The length of the interviews ranged from twenty-seven minutes to one hour and eighteen minutes, with most interviews taking thirty to forty minutes. Interviews being performed in person took place at locations selected by and convenient for the individual being interviewed, with the majority occurring in a relaxed environment, such as a coffee shop. All interviews were recorded for accuracy.

Data Analysis

In order to analyze the data from the interviews, the recordings were transcribed verbatim prior to coding. The coding process began using open coding to decipher general themes. This included reviewing the transcripts in their entirety multiple times and listening to the recordings to ensure the tone and messages of the interviews were clearly communicated.

After the general themes were established, axial coding was used in finding the connections between the themes. This coding process was repeated for the transcripts of interviews for Dr.

Wesley’s study on the Manitoba NDP and again for the content analysis for each election platform studied. In using data from three different sources, it is hoped to increase the overall validity of the study’s results.

4. FINDINGS- MANITOBA

The adoption of a comprehensive political marketing model by the Manitoba NDP, in the lead-up to the 1999 provincial election, signified a dramatic change for the NDP across the country. Prior to this shift, New Democrats in different areas of Canada had used elements of political marketing (i.e. market research, branding, communication strategies, target marketing/market segmentation etc.) but nothing in such a coordinated effort.159 This study found the data from the interviews of party leaders and strategists were remarkably consistent and their accounts corroborated through an examination of corresponding campaign platforms.

The dramatic change, both in campaign promises and strategy, that took place between the

1995 and 1999 Manitoba elections became known as the Doer model and centred on three strategies that were based on market research: simplification, moderation and inoculation.

The Doer model and the success the Manitoba NDP have enjoyed since 1999 has widely been seen within the party (federally and in other provincial jurisdictions) as an example for what the party could achieve elsewhere.160 This, however, was not always the case. The Doer model, similar to most major shifts by a political party including New Labour in Britain, was born out of necessity. That sense of urgency increased gradually over eleven years and multiple elections under the leadership of Gary Doer until, as Manitoba NDP strategist and pollster

Leslie Turnbull described: “Everybody on the left, everybody in the union, got to 99 [1999] and said we can’t stand this [Progressive Conservative government]. We’re willing to compromise.

Go ahead. If you guys think you have a strategy that’s going to win.”161 In order to better

159 Senior Political Advisor G, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, June 4, 2010. 160 Heath, Dead Centre, 250-251.; Mike MacSween, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011.; Brad Lavigne, Personal Communication, Mar. 8, 2012.; Anne McGrath, Personal Communication, Mar. 1, 2012. 161 Leslie Turnbull, Personal Communication, Sept. 1, 2011.

44 understand the Doer model and the significance of the changes the Manitoba NDP implemented leading up to the 1999 provincial election, the context of the previous elections will be examined.

1988 Election

The Manitoba NDP under leader Howard Pawley was historically defeated on a budget vote, only two years into their second majority mandate, following the infamous Jim Walding affair. This crucial vote was the first time in Canadian history a majority government fell as a result of a vote from its own party member.162 The ensuing election saw the party soundly defeated by Gary Filmon and the Progressive Conservatives with the NDP falling from a majority government to the third place party behind the official opposition Liberals. The events leading up to the 1988 election are described by Pawley:

That evening, I further considered what would be in the best interest of the party. Clearly, time was essential. An election called thirty-five days hence was the worst possible scenario. Our defeat would be uppermost in the public’s mind, and we would have no opportunity to erase the impression left by our defeat. In the event that the election was delayed, the extra time might be of some benefit to us. Furthermore, a leadership convention with an attractive array of candidates would help to attract crucial media attention and might even succeed in shifting some of the focus from the circumstances that surrounded our defeat. Many of us recalled the leadership convention during the 1969 election campaign when Ed Schreyer defeated Sid Green and then went on to win… A leadership campaign could possibly ignite the spark that would keep us in the ballpark… I fell on my sword and resigned the leadership. It was my hope that in so doing, I would give the party sufficient opportunity to salvage enough members to become again, within a short time, the alternative party to the Progressive Conservatives.163

Unfortunately, for the NDP, the leadership race that led to the selection of Gary Doer as leader was not enough to stave off defeat for the party with Ian Stewart succinctly describing the

162 Ian Stewart, Just One Vote: From Jim Walding’s Nomination to Constitutional Defeat (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2009), 162. 163 Howard Pawley, Keep True: A Life in Politics (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2011), 254-255.

45 election as a “disaster for the NDP.”164 As bad as the results were for the party, there were indications that it could have been much worse. Doer in a presentation he gave at Queens

University in 2000, shortly after becoming premier, indicates the ominous outlook going into the election:

When we were defeated in 1988 we were at 6 percent in the polls. We had a little work to do. Angus Reid’s polls showed support for the NDP at 12 percent at the highest, and his comment was, “Jesus Christ couldn’t win if he was leader of the NDP.” Perhaps he was correct. But at the time I probably said that pollsters do not use accurate samples. Those polls are far behind our own rolling polls.165

Other party strategists reiterated the abysmal six percent internal polling numbers and all market research indicated the party was at real risk for being all but eliminated, with no seat being safe.166 The result of the election left the NDP with twelve seats, Liberals with twenty seats, and the Progressive Conservatives with twenty-five seats and control of the minority government.167 In terms of popular support, the NDP received twenty-four percent, Liberals thirty-five percent, and the victorious Progressive Conservatives thirty-eight percent.168

Coincidentally, Gary Filmon and the PCs actually received less popular support and seats in the victorious 1988 election than they did in the losing 1986 election with support dropping two percent and the loss of one seat.169 The NDP support, rather, went in significant numbers to

Sharon Carstairs and the Liberal party who were catapulted into official opposition with an

164 Stewart, Just One Vote, 163. 165 Gary Doer, Policy Challenges for the New Century: The Manitoba Perspective, Paper presented at 2000 Donald Gow Lecture at Queen’s University, April 28, 5. 166 Riva Harrison, Personal Communication, Aug. 31, 2011.; Senior Political Advisor A, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010.; Stewart, Just One Vote, 163. 167 Christopher Adams, Politics in Manitoba: Parties, Leaders, and Voters (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2008), 176. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid

46 increase in support of twenty-one percent and a gain of nineteen seats. Not since the 1966 election had the NDP fallen to third party status and received such a low level of support.170

As with any electoral victory or defeat, there are a multitude of factors that influence the overall result. Pawley lists three key issues that he thought might hinder the party should he stay on: the large increases of over twenty percent in auto insurance rates and his direct link in establishing the monopoly crown corporation, the proposed raising of taxes in order to increase the government’s revenue, and his association with the divisive Meech Lake constitutional negotiations.171 Similarly, former cabinet minister and party strategist, Eugene Kostyra cites a number of current issues at the time that were hurting the NDP politically: the tough early election cycle budget that dramatically increased taxes; souring public perception over millions of dollars being spent by the telephone crown corporation MTS in Saudi Arabia and the dramatic increases in car insurance rates that were approved by cabinet.172 There is no doubt that these issues of the day were significant in the drop in support that the NDP felt in the 1988 election but more importantly they added to two key public perceptions - the weakness of the party in financial matters and an overall move away from a centrist position.

The political culture within Manitoba has been described as being “moderate” and

“modest.”173This is not to suggest that differences in ideology, values, principles, ideas, or policies do not exist between the political parties. They of course do. It does, however, mean that parties that stray too far from a moderate approach are unlikely to be successful over any length of time. Indeed, Dr. Jared Wesley states that:

170 Ibid, 175-176. 171 Pawley, Keep True, 254. 172Eugene Kostyra, Personal Communication, September 2, 2011. 173 Wesley, Code Politics, 176.

Most dominant party leaders have emphasized the importance of progress – of moving neither left nor right but forward… Reflecting the sense of modesty embedded in the province’s political culture, Manitoba leaders have focused on building a better Manitoba and comparing themselves to their predecessors rather than being the best among their contemporaries in other provincial governments. Manitoba’s dominant parties have also stressed the importance of finding pragmatic – cautious, prudent, rational, measured, non-idealistic, well-tested, instrumentalist, business-like, frugal – solutions to the challenges confronting the province.174

Such a description is vastly different than one found in a publication put out by the Manitoba

NDP in 1987:

The politics of the Manitoba New Democratic Party government are also important elements in a democratic socialist solution to our society’s problems. Its priorities in the future – job creation, social equality and stronger social programs – represent a fundamentally different approach to the conduct of our economic life. This approach is an explicit rejection of the currently dominant free-market philosophy that places private profit and individual greed above the public good and social progress. The NDP envisions a society based on democracy, equality and co-operation. An NDP government plays an important part in the struggle to achieve this goal. Remembering the crusading heritage of the party, it is also clear that electoral politics and legislation are not the sole tactic to pursue. A broad coalition with progressive groups outside electoral politics – trade unions, co- operatives, women’s and farmers’ organizations, the peace and environmental movements – must be built. Education of all Manitobans must be a priority. Our society, if it is to be truly democratic, must be firmly rooted in the lives of ordinary people.175

Wesley describes Pawley’s tenure as leader as one that largely violates the typical approach and rhetoric from parties and leaders in Manitoba: “Howard Pawley pulled the NDP out of the progressive centre, engaging the party in some of the most heated partisan and ideological competition in the province’s history.”176 With such a discrepancy between a party’s brand and

Manitoba’s political culture, it is of little surprise that the party needed to make changes after its defeat in the 1988 election before it would be competitive again.

174 Ibid. 175 Manitoba NDP, Challenge and Achievement: The Manitoba New Democratic Party (Winnipeg: Manitoba New Democratic Party, 1987), 19. 176 Wesley, Code Politics, 222.

1990 Election

The 1990 provincial election can unequivocally be categorized as a re-building election for the NDP, following their defeat in 1988. The election was the first for the party under Doer for which he had time to fully prepare as leader. The NDP, knowing it was not in a situation to contend for government, focused its attention on battling the Liberal party over who would be the alternative to the Conservatives.177 Turnbull summarizes the singular goal of the 1990 election campaign: “It was about re-establishing relevance and moving us to second place.

That’s all 1990 was about.”178 This, however, was a struggle as the NDP were financially and organizationally exhausted having faced three elections in four years: “[We had] no money because nobody loved us in 1990. The campaign was essentially run by four people.”179 An analysis of the NDP’s financial statements show the party took in $561 399 in contributions in

1990.180 This compares to $863 395 in 1999.181 Even after considering for inflation it is clear the party in 1990 was significantly below the fundraising level compared to the year they were finally successful- 1999. Similarly, local NDP riding associations struggled tremendously in both finances and volunteer numbers through the 1990 election. In St. Vital, a previously safe

NDP seat, the fallout from the Jim Walding crisis and 1988 election resulted in the local NDP association being strapped with a $20 000 debt in 1990.182 The $20 000 debt was only paid off

“through a punitive regime of self-taxation” by the twelve members on the executive committee.183 Despite the financial and organizational difficulties, the party widely considered

177 Member of the Legislative Assembly B, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 19, 2010. 178 Senior Political Advisor A, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010. 179 Ibid. 180Manitoba NDP, Annual Financial Statement of a Political Party, Elections Manitoba, 1990. 181Manitoba NDP, Annual Financial Statement of a Political Party, Elections Manitoba, 1999. 182 Stewart, Just One Vote, 172. 183 Ibid.

49 the 1988 results to be an anomaly, largely because the support they received was below their

“base vote” or what the party had received as a minimum level of support in the popular vote since the early 1960’s.184 As a result, the party had no sense of urgency for widespread change despite having been relegated to third party status. Instead, the NDP worked on “re-establishing credibility” with its previous supporters and campaigned on a platform that largely focused on traditional NDP policies.185

1990 Election Platform

The 1990 NDP election platform is very much what many party insiders and strategists term a “gainsberger” platform.186 This type of platform is where a party promotes a comprehensive, all-encompassing program that often details exactly what it will do should it be elected and includes a large number of commitments on a variety of issues. By including explicit commitments in the platform that are important to the party’s supporters, or what could be referred to in marketing terms as one of its stakeholders, the platform placates those most likely to vote for the party. As a result, the NDP platform in 1990 had a striking similarity in policy and tone to that of the Pawley-led NDP of the past. This is despite having a new leader in Gary Doer and his assurance, when he was first elected leader, that the NDP had “new leadership,” “new ideas,” “new directions,” and “new and interesting people” for candidates187

The platform itself and campaign slogan was “Strong Voice, Clear Choice,” an obvious reference to the NDP’s attempt to position itself as the main opposition party over the Liberals.

184 Member of the Legislative Assembly B, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 19, 2010. 185 Kostyra, Personal Communication, September 2, 2011. 186 Senior Political Advisor A, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010. 187 Stewart, Just One Vote, 163.

The platform was sixteen pages long, discussed fifteen major issues and committed the party to

105 commitments with twenty-one additional sub-commitments that described in further detail how the party would deliver on a specific topic. Figure 4.1 lists the fifteen major issues and the number of commitments for each issue.

Figure 4.1 1990 NDP Election Commitments by Issue

Issue Number of Commitments

1. Agriculture 9

2. Aboriginal rights 4

3. The North 11

4. Education 9

5. Environment 11

6. Health 8

7. Housing 7

8. Work and family 9

9. Women and violence 7

10. Women and poverty 3

11. Women and work 5

12. Seniors 10

13. Jobs 4

14. Liberal party -

15. GST 8

Similarly, the NDP’s campaign material highlighted eleven areas it was committed to: effective health care, action to create jobs, tough environmental laws, justice for Aboriginal people, equality for women, quality public schools, support for working families, healthy northern communities, fair taxes, dignity for seniors, and rural community development.188 The campaign platform and the eleven areas the NDP promoted in its campaign material demonstrate a strategic strong left-wing approach. This allowed the NDP to provide a clear differentiation from the other parties and according to Turnbull helped in “building back our traditional support.”189

On September 11, there is only one real choice for working people – the New Democratic Party. All signs point to a major economic recession. Free trade, high interest rates, and the GST – all Tory creations – threaten our jobs, social services and communities. This is no time for the worn-out policies of the Tories and Liberals. Indeed, these cheer leaders for corporate Manitoba are part of the problem. The New Democrats offer real solutions. Instead of tax breaks for Filmon and Carstairs’ corporate buddies, we stand for fair taxes for working people. Corporations must pay more. Instead of caving in on the federal Tory GST, New Democrats would refuse to collect it. Instead of cuts to health and social services, New Democrats stand for a universal, community-based health care system. We stand for tough plant closure laws to defend workers’ jobs. We demand pay equity so that women no longer have to live on 65 per cent of what men are paid. We want improved health and safety laws to protect the lives and health of working people. For working people, Liberal and Tory governments mean fewer jobs. Social service cuts. A health care system in crisis. Working people deserve a strong voice. The clear choice is to vote New Democrat.190

The platform proposed many new or improved social services, recognition and affirmative action for women and Aboriginal people, tough new labour laws, and a focus on shifting taxes off of people and on to corporations.191

188 Manitoba NDP, New Democrats Stand For…Campaign Pamphlet, 1990. 189 Turnbull, Personal Communication, Sept. 1, 2011. 190 Manitoba NDP, New Democrats Stand For… 1990. 191 Manitoba NDP, Strong Voice, Clear Choice (Winnipeg: Manitoba New Democratic Party, 1990).

The issues addressed within the platform clearly indicate the target voters the NDP were working to win back: women, seniors, Aboriginal people, people living in the North, traditional left-wing voters and those that voted for the Liberal party in the 1988 election.192 By focusing on these target voters, the party was implementing its traditional method of the “North-plus-

North” strategy that both Ed Schreyer and Howard Pawley used to great success.193 The North- plus-North strategy is described by Chris Adams as: “combining support from the North with urban labour and service-sector support” or more simply Northern Manitoba and North

Winnipeg.194 This strategy for the NDP can be directly contrasted by the South-Plus-South strategy, or the combining support from the rural areas of Southern Manitoba with South

Winnipeg, that is used by the Progressive Conservatives.195 While the Manitoba NDP has not typically been associated in recent times with rural issues and agriculture, the party has come to rely on the Northern rural areas of: Dauphin, Churchill, Flin Flon, Interlake, The Pas,

Thompson and Rupertsland, all of which the party maintained through their downfall in

1988.196 This, combined with a focus on winning back its traditional seats in North Winnipeg, is reflected in the 1990 platform, as the NDP worked to re-establish itself as the only party for

“working people.”197

In order for the NDP to assert itself as the main alternative to the government, the platform attacked the Liberals as often as the governing Conservatives. The rhetoric used was at times biting and at the same time reflective of a traditional social democratic distrust of corporations / big business:

192 Ibid. 193 Adams, Politics in Manitoba, 126, 129. 194 Ibid. 195 Ibid, 53. 196 Ibid, 126. 197 Manitoba NDP, Strong Voice, Clear Choice.

In reality, the only important difference between the Liberals and the Tories is their names. They have the same big business connections and the same corporate interests at heart.198

The problem with both of these parties [Liberals and Conservatives] is the big- business company they keep.199

While we don’t know where the Liberals stand, they voted with the Tories 9 times out of 10 during the last session of the Legislature.200

Let’s not kid ourselves, with Liberals like these, who needs Conservatives?201

The NDP similarly attacked both the Liberals and the Conservatives when speaking about specific issues:

Seniors in Manitoba will recall the uncaring attitudes of the Liberal and Conservative governments before Ed Schreyer, Howard Pawley and the New Democrats.202

Liberal commitment to aboriginal justice is no stronger than it was when Jean Chretien, as Indian Affairs Minister, advocated that native people assimilate.203

Where were the Liberals and Tories when New Democrats fought for the northern tax allowance, to save mining communities and to get a fair share for the Port of Churchill?204

New Democrats believe that every Manitoban is entitled to a high quality education. Neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives have demonstrated the same commitment.205

The NDP strategy of grouping the Liberals with the Conservatives and targeting its former

NDP supporters with its platform helped lift the party out of the third party position and into official opposition. The results of the 1990 election was a majority government for the

Progressive Conservatives with thirty seats and forty-two percent of the popular vote, the NDP

198Ibid, 14. 199Ibid, 5. 200Ibid, 1. 201Ibid, 14. 202Ibid, 12. 203Ibid, 2. 204Ibid, 3. 205Ibid, 4.

54 rebounding to twenty seats with twenty-nine percent of the popular vote, and the Liberals falling back down into third place with seven seats and twenty-eight percent of the popular vote.206

1995 Election

The 1995 provincial election was a pivotal election for the NDP. It was this election that served as the catalyst for what ultimately developed into the Doer model. The conclusion that significant changes were needed in both its policies and political marketing, however, had not yet been realized by the party. After rebounding back into official opposition following the

1990 election, many NDP supporters and party officials assumed that the party would be poised to once again win government: “The NDP going in [to the 1995 election] thought that this was their moment. Partly because they had never quite accepted that Filmon was that formidable an opponent and also… there was a whole series of by-elections [that the NDP won] leading up to

95 (1995). They really felt that they had a winning formula.”207A senior political advisor describes the reluctance of parties and its supporters to change even after a bitter election loss:

In every party… there is a strong element of denial following an electoral defeat about what actually happened. People tend to focus on the immediate. [For example] the party was defeated [in 1988] because Jim Walding defected right at the moment that this completely unexpected Autopac issue sprung up and because people saw it on their bills that went out. It was sort of the perfect storm… It takes a while, particularly for party members, to actually accept that it wasn’t just a bad set of circumstances… That there are actually something more fundamental [with] the party being maybe out of step with the kind of government that the electorates looking for… I think as you go through 88 and 90, there really was a feeling that it was the Conservatives that were out of step. That the NDP still reflected what most Manitobans wanted. They just had made a few mistakes under the Pawley government and we’re still paying for those. I think it probably wasn’t until the 95

206Adams, Politics in Manitoba, 176. 207Member of Legislative Assembly A, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 11, 2010.

(1995) election…they realized they hadn’t made a breakthrough and actually that there was something about the Filmon government that had started to resonate with voters… It just took a while to actually get over the denial and accept that there was something fundamental there that had to be addressed.208

According to Kostyra, the NDP in 1995 was still working to re-establish itself as the government-in-waiting, partially because the party was still competing with the Liberals in the polls and partially because the party continued to lack the credibility necessary to win government.209 Furthermore, Turnbull suggests that internally the NDP were not yet fully focused on winning power and that Gary Doer needed more time to further consolidate “his power and influence” before the party could make the needed changes: “You have to get people internally, if you are going to rebrand, to the point that they’re going to put their own priorities in second place and …they’re going to put victory in first place. I don’t think the party was there in 95 (1995) or 90 (1990).”210 The resulting platform was a policy heavy document that while beginning to address some of the traditional criticisms of the party, did not modernize the political marketing and presentation of the NDP.

1995 Election Platform

The 1995 platform was titled “Rebuilding Manitoba Together” and as the title suggests, it portrays a party rising above partisan differences and taking a collectivist approach: “When we have succeeded, as we have done so often in the past, we did so because we worked together.”211 The platform was once again a “gainsberger” platform whose long sixty-five page length was further exacerbated by its paragraph format, lack of visuals, and high word count.

The platform was organized into four broad areas:

208 Senior Political Advisor B, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010. 209 Kostyra, Personal Communication, Sept. 2, 2011. 210 Senior Political Advisor A, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010. 211 Manitoba NDP, Rebuilding Manitoba Together (Winnipeg: Manitoba New Democratic Party, 1995) 1.

1. Healthy Communities

2. Rebuilding Hope and Investing in People

3. Fairness and Common Sense

4. Dollars and Sense

These sections were then used to group a multitude of issues that were only loosely connected.

An example is that in the area of Healthy Communities, discussion and commitments were made on issues of health care, community care, crime / crime prevention, education and inter- governmental coordination.212 This ineffective communication framework highlighted a lack of understanding by the party on political marketing and clearly demonstrated the NDP’s need for a new approach.

The dramatic shift from its traditional positions the NDP embraced in branding itself

“Today’s NDP” just prior to the 1999 election, can begin to be seen in the commitments made and rhetoric used in the 1995 election platform. The platform showcased a less confrontational approach and more moderate policies compared to the 1988 and 1990 platforms.213 No longer did Gary Doer and the NDP attack business and corporations but instead committed to creating an economic council that would be made up of “labour, business and community leaders” that would help advise the government. Similarly, rather than attacking the Liberals and

Conservatives with vigour as they had in the past, the NDP spent most of the platform proposing an extremely detailed account of how the party would govern should it win the election. Perhaps most importantly, however, the 1995 platform clearly demonstrates the NDP

212 Manitoba NDP, Rebuilding Manitoba Together, (1995) 57, 60. 213 Wesley, Code Politics, 226.

57 focusing more on building on its strengths (health care) while mitigating its perceived weakness in the area of the economy and specifically balanced budgets:

Bring back hope. That’s what the program outlined here is designed to do, to bring back hope to all of the people of Manitoba. It is designed to rebuild Manitoba’s health care system, ensuring Manitobans can get the care they need when they need it. We’ve outlined ways we believe our health care system can be improved. Our plan will help Manitobans get back to work and get the training they need to ensure a brighter future for all of us. We’ve spelled out how we’re going to restore faith in public education in this province. And we believe this plan demonstrates the many ways we can treat Manitoba families with fairness while ensuring our Aboriginal people and new Canadians are also treated fairly and with respect. But what about the bottom line? What about common sense? We believe this program takes that fully and completely into account. The days of ever-increasing government revenues are gone. Governments must reallocate resources to pay for new programs and we need to take the utmost care in determining the positive and negative impact of any and all new government programs on government revenues… Our plan calls for the cancellation of some of the big ticket plans of the Filmon government so we can support programs for health, education, jobs and a balanced budget.214

In addition, the NDP tried to reassure voters that the party would not increase taxes to implement its platform: “Here in Manitoba New Democrats pledge not to raise any of the major personal tax rates. We also promise not to lower taxes for business. As a result of the cuts to federal funding of health and education Manitoba’s finances do not allow for any major reduction in taxes.”215 These small but significant changes demonstrate the NDP aligning itself with the moderate political culture of Manitoba and a party working to broaden their support.

The result of the 1995 election was another majority government for Gary Filmon and the Progressive Conservatives with thirty-one seats and forty-three percent of the popular vote, the NDP modestly improving to twenty-three seats and thirty-three percent of the popular vote,

214 Manitoba NDP, Rebuilding Manitoba Together, 1995. 215 Ibid, 59.

58 and the Liberals and their new leader, Paul Edwards, falling further to three seats and twenty- four percent of the popular vote.216 With the 1995 election serving as a catalyst for change, a senior political advisor describes the party as having “an appetite to take a look at different approaches and to deal with what was perceived to be an image that was somewhat out of date and out of step with the mood of the electorate at the time.”217 Increasingly, party members and advisors realized the importance of being in government in order to enact change:

If you want to get things done and you want to change policies and you want to particularly help people who need a helping hand, you have to be in government to do that… You have to have some pragmatism… So we started looking at that and what we had to do. And out of that evolved how ran elections, what we say during elections and what we say about ourselves… So it was a more pragmatic approach and more of a marketing approach to try and talk to the electorate itself.218

The result was a large number of changes both in policy and focus for the party in 1997 and

1998 that became the Doer model.

The Doer Model

The Doer model was a revolutionary approach for the NDP in any jurisdiction. It radically changed the political marketing of the party and dramatically altered what a NDP government stood for. No longer was the Manitoba NDP the party of big social programs, high taxes, convoluted messaging and ideological arguments. Instead, the Manitoba NDP adopted a

New Labour-like-approach to its political marketing, including a greater reliance on market research and some elements of the “third way” ideology that mixes traditional social democratic values with neo-liberal principles, made popular by former British Prime Minister

216 Adams, Politics in Manitoba, 177. 217 Senior Political Advisor B, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010. 218 Senior Political Advisor D, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 4, 2010.

Tony Blair. In short, the Manitoba NDP used the strategies of simplification, moderation, and inoculation to transform the party into one that could once again win power.

The positive environment for change within the NDP, which ultimately developed into the Doer model, can be partially attributed to the deep disappointment of losing their third straight election in 1995.219 Despite gaining three more seats and improving their popular vote by four percent, the 1995 election loss was both surprising and devastating to many within the

NDP: “There had been a lot of angst in the party… There was a real disappointment in 95.”220

Many had felt that following the NDP’s success in winning numerous by-elections in 1993 that the party was poised to win back power.221 This deep disappointment with the election result provided Doer and the party flexibility in making decisions and helped mute any criticisms that some might have had:

The labour movement just decided [leading up to 1999] ‘We can’t do this. We will not survive if the Filmon government is [re]elected. We have to win this time.’ There was steady confidence in Gary that allowed Gary…to say to the party, ‘Look. We got to win this time and this is what the strategy for winning [is]’… People had had enough of the Conservatives and they were willing to take that leap.222

With the NDP regaining more of its traditional support that had been lost in 1988 and solidifying its position as the “government in waiting” over the Liberals, the party began to make changes with a focus on the next election.

Gary Doer and the NDP made the determination to wage the next campaign after 1995 with “modern” policies and presentation. A senior political advisor describes Doer as being

219 Member of the Legislative Assembly A, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 11, 2010. 220 Ibid. 221 Ibid. 222 Turnbull, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011.

“very determined to have a campaign that said this is the NDP of the 1990’s and not harkening back to the 1960’s. There was going to be an election with 1999 issues and 1999 ideas and not

1969 ideas… They wanted to really communicate clearly to Manitobans that this was a modern campaign with a modern outlook.”223 A NDP member of the legislative assembly explains the

NDP’s actions during this time period as working to create an “on-ramp to the public discussion” through “modern policies… innovative policies” and presenting the NDP as “not your father’s Buick.”224

The party began this shift with the hiring of new personnel in key party positions such as Paul Vogt in 1996 as Research Director with a focus on policy and Donne Flanagan in 1997 as Director of Communications. A senior political advisor describes the NDP’s rationale for hiring Flanagan as his “real willingness to look at new approaches and new ways of presenting the party.”225 This desire to present the party differently also led the NDP in 1998 to replace the small local advertising agency they had previously used in previous elections with the much larger national firm, NOW Communications. The combination of NOW Communications working with the NDP’s market research company, Viewpoints Research, provided the party, for the first time, a comprehensive political marketing program that included expertise in the areas of communications, strategy, branding and market research. With these new positions filled and with it widely accepted within the party and by Doer himself that a forth election defeat for the NDP would force him to abdicate the party’s leadership,226 the NDP began

223 Senior Political Advisor G, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, June 4, 2010. 224 Member of the Legislative Assembly B, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 19, 2010. 225 Senior Political Advisor B, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010. 226 Turnbull, Personal Communication, Sept. 1, 2011; Harrison, Personal Communication, Aug. 21, 2011.

61 creating a model that was greatly influenced by the success of Tony Blair and New Labour in

Britain.

The influence of New Labour on the creation of the Doer model and the Manitoba NDP is without question. The New Labour model was consciously incorporated into the establishment of the Doer model. In almost every interview conducted for this study, the subjects described how the changes that led to the electoral success of the New Labour party in

1997 provided a blue print for the Manitoba NDP in the lead up to the 1999 election:

A big model at the time was the New Labour campaign that Tony Blair was orchestrating and putting together for the UK.227

There is no question New Labour was one of the places that we looked at in Manitoba. And in fact, a lot of the balanced budget stuff and the way we talked about it, the language we used, the way we rolled out campaigns not just in the election but in the lead up to the election was very much focused on how New Labour had achieved success.228

If you boil it down… New Labour had a huge influence on us. You can look at Tony Blair’s 97 campaign. They had a lot more resources but that really pulled it together for us.229

The example of New Labour was very influential… The New Labour branding exercise, which at that point was a couple of years old, [and] really the ideas that were coming out of there right down to the language that was being used and the presentation for us was actually a real eye opener and quite influential in what we did.230

These excerpts clearly outline the high level of influence New Labour had on the Manitoba

NDP. That influence remained throughout Doer’s tenure as premier with even the central slogan of the NDP in the 2003 election campaign of “Much accomplished. More to do.” appearing to be based on New Labour’s 2001 election campaign slogan- “a lot done; a lot to do;

227 Senior Political Advisor G, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, June 4, 2010. 228 Shuana Martin, Personal Communication, Sept. 29, 2011. 229 Turnbull, Personal Communication, Sept. 1, 2011. 230 Senior Political Advisor D, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 4, 2010.

62 a lot to lose.”231 The Manitoba NDP’s slogan in the 2007 election campaign of “Forward, not back” is also identical to New Labour’s 2005 election slogan.232 The interviews also strongly suggest the deliberate and specific application of the New Labour approach of simplification, moderation and inoculation in the creation of the Doer model.

The Doer/Dexter model was the first comprehensive political marketing model used by the NDP in Manitoba and Nova Scotia. In order to implement such a monumental shift in both policy and presentation, the party needed to ensure that its members and the unions would be supportive. This is especially true given the potential conflict between the NDP’s social democratic values and the market-based approach inherent to political marketing. Within

Manitoba, the NDP’s decision to support balanced budget legislation, not re-nationalize MTS, and its commitment to ban corporate and union political donations had the potential to cause significant internal dissention. Instead, Doer and the NDP were able to maintain the members and unions’ support for controversial decisions through personal connections and the trust built over time. Senior political advisor A describes the benefit of Doer’s union background for maintaining union support: “Gary comes out of the Labour movement. So it’s not like he didn’t have people who had known over the years that they could trust him and that they wanted him to be premier.”233 The Manitoba NDP also worked to mitigate any internal strife over its controversial decisions by clearly outlining the strategy to win government. Senior political advisor D states:

We had to be up front with people… If you want to actually make changes… we need to get elected… And I was surprised… Although [with] the balanced budget [legislation] and the MTS there was a fair bit of debate but not as much as I

231 Blair, A Journey, 317. 232 Ibid, 512. 233 Senior Political Advisor A, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010.

thought. People didn’t push back as much as I thought and I was quite surprised on how people were ready to take the steps. To take a leap of faith.234

That desire to win by the party’s membership and within the unions provided Doer and the

NDP the flexibility necessary to implement the Doer model. In keeping its “base” supporters onside with the significant changes, the Manitoba NDP was able to focus its energy on targeting non-aligned voters.

Simplification

The Doer model has been described as merely a “pragmatic approach to government.”235 While partially true, it is, however, much more than this description suggests.

The Doer model consists of three main components. The first component is the principle of simplification. Simplification is a strategy that ensures all communications are easily understood, uses concrete terms and limits the overall number of commitments. The most obvious embodiment of a party demonstrating the principle of simplification is in a pledge card election platform. Traditionally, election platforms have included a position or commitment on every conceivable issue and area and as a result are long and convoluted. Therefore, a party employing a simplification strategy will reduce their commitments down to their main priorities in order to ensure that its message is focused and clear. This allows voters to better understand and remember the key points of the platform: “It’s not [that] we are throwing policy out or abandoning things as much as narrowing what you communicate so people actually hear the things you want [them] to hear frequently enough for it to have an impact.”236 This allows

234 Senior Political Advisor Dm Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 4, 2010. 235 Martin, Personal Communication, September 29, 2011. 236 Johnson, Personal Communication, Aug. 24, 2011.

64 people to “actually hear and digest and relate to” [the message].237A senior political strategist concurs and states:

There is only so much you can actually talk about during an election that actually gets through to people… We used to go out there with a book of policy. We had a policy on everything. And a lot of it never saw the light of day… Well that scattered gun approach never really got through to people. So you’re all over the map… And so we felt that we had to simplify it on what provincial governments can accomplish and can do and what’s achievable.238

This realization led the Manitoba NDP to adopt the principle of simplification for the 1999 election with the party eliminating their traditional lengthy platform in favour of a pledge card format with further details coming through press releases.

The Manitoba NDP’s adoption of a simplification strategy for the 1999 provincial election followed the example of New Labour’s use of pledge cards. While New Labour also released a comprehensive election platform in addition to using the pledge cards, the emphasis on the pledge cards during the campaign in effect drastically reduced the amount of election promises. The pared down Manitoba NDP platform consisted of five “core commitments.”239

The five commitments included:

1. End hallway medicine and rescue health care- beginning by opening more hospital beds and hiring more nurses to reduce waiting lists. 2. Renew hope for young people- starting with excellent public schools and by cutting community college and university tuition by 10%. 3. Keep Manitoba Hydro and build a new partnership between business and labour for new and better jobs. 4. Make our communities safer by tackling the causes of crime with improved youth programs and by ensuring immediate consequences for gang violence and home invasions. 5. Keep balanced budget legislation and lower property taxes.240

237 Ibid. 238 Senior Political Advisor D, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 4, 2010. 239 Manitoba NDP, 5 Good Reasons, 1999. 240 Ibid.

A senior political advisor to the NDP describes the desire to follow the lead of New Labour toward a pledge card platform and ensuring the commitments were concrete or “crunchy”:

Increasingly we became attached to the New Labour idea of a very simple pledge card and with all of the commitments on that pledge card having, to use the language of the time, a kind of quality of being crunchy. Crunchy commitments were commitments that actually felt very concrete to the electorate. That people could actually see that they meant something in their lives and would make a difference and also they seemed doable. A government that came in that was really committed to do these things. It wasn`t pie in the sky.It wasn`t expressed in generalities. It had something very pragmatic about it.241

The small number of commitments and clear language in the 1999 platform was a stark contrast to the lengthy and overwhelming sixty-five page platform of the 1995 election or the one- hundred-five commitments proposed in the 1990 election platform. Gary Doer states: “The public would rather hear five commitments you can keep than a hundred and five promises, only some of which are kept.”242Additionally, the dramatic reduction in election promises was designed to combat the perception that the NDP lacked focus and had a complex and convoluted agenda. A senior NDP strategist suggests that the sheer number of promises in previous election platforms indicated a party lack direction and purpose:

All indications were that we had a problem with the way that we had presented the NDP platform in the past… The platform really ended up as a telephone book sized set of commitments that regardless of what was in the commitments and how worthwhile they were, just the heft of it indicated to people a very status quo sort of old style social planning approach to government. It often didn’t convey a sense of priorization or urgency around things that citizens really cared about most.243

A large misunderstanding surrounding the principle of simplification is that its adoption represents a party’s unwillingness to confront complex issues and demonstrates a superficial

241 Senior Political Advisor B, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010. 242 Gary Doer, Policy Challenges for the New Century, 9. 243 Senior Political Advisor B, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010.

66 approach. New Labour strategist Philip Gould disputes this assertion and emphatically states that adopting a simplification strategy does not suggest a lack of thought or principles but rather demonstrates the distillation of those thoughts and principles down to the essence:

You must embrace complication before you can become simple and single- minded. Politics is complicated, multi-layered and dynamic. To make true sense of it you must respect its complexity, but then turn its complication into simple, sustainable, communicable truths. But this means a massive amount of work, and a huge process of distillation. If you just reach for the easy, shallow simplicity it will not last a week before it crumples under scrutiny.244

Figure 4.2 provides for a comparison of the amount of pages, commitments, and press releases used in each of the elections from 1990 until 2007.

Figure 4.2 Manitoba NDP Election Commitments 1990 – 2007

Manitoba NDP Election Platforms 120 105 100 81 80 65 Pages 60 48 Commitments Press Releases 40

16 16 20 11 5 5 7 1 1 2 0 1990 1995 1999 2003 2007

244 Gould, The Unfinished Revolution, 308.

Gary Doer summarizes the importance of simplification on both gaining the support of the public on issues and the role it played in the electoral success of the party in the 1999, 2003 and

2007 election:

It is our responsibility (as politicians) to communicate them (the vision for the future) in simple terms to Canadians… If we want to deal with these issues effectively we have to communicate with the public in clear and simple terms… In the past we used to have huge NDP policy weekends and would produce these fat books dedicated to policy. But this time we took a simpler approach, fearing that if we produced another 600 page document then we would almost certainly lose the election. In its place we produced five pledges and we made sure that each one, and this is perhaps a novel idea, could actually be implemented once we became the government.245

Moderation

The second component of the Doer model is moderation. The move to a moderate agenda by the NDP is a critical element in the electoral success experienced by the party since

1999.With the province being labeled as “the Prairie’s middle ground” and the political culture of Manitoba being described as “grounded in the values of modesty, temperance, accommodation, and conciliation” the shift toward the centre aligns the party with the “code of moderation” necessary to be successful.246 A senior political advisor to the Manitoba NDP concurs:

If you look at Gary’s twelve year lead-up to becoming premier, there was this very, very steady sure movement in party toward the more centrist position. And in Manitoba politics, that’s what you need to get elected. Not abandoning base values but certainly more pragmatic politics if you will… Everybody operated from the same social democratic base… but very much focused on pragmatism.247

245 Doer, Policy Challenges for the New Century, 3-5. 246 Wesley, Code Politics, 175. 247 Senior Political Advisor F, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 7, 2010.

Karine Duhamel and Barry Ferguson similarly write: “Doer’s approach steered the Manitoba

New Democratic Party closer to the centre than perhaps ever in its history.”248 Beyond the general idea that a moderate platform would gain more support from the moderate average

Manitoban, Eugene Kostyra states a more specific target- the swing voters in south Winnipeg:

“Basically it was positioning of the NDP in a way that was right… for the key voters that would make a difference.”249

The conscious decision by the NDP to target voters in the suburbs and specifically the swing ridings in South Winnipeg was a masterful strategic undertaking for a party that has typically used the North + North (Northern Manitoba + Northern Winnipeg) strategy in order to be successful. It also signalled the attempt to broaden the party’s base beyond traditional NDP supporters: “We had target voters. We knew that women and the so-called soccer moms were the people needed to get in the suburbs…We could have our inner-city seats and we can have some of the newly developed seats but we needed to get into the burbs and we needed to have a message that connected with people there.”250 In order to find out how to do this and to better market itself to this new target voter, the NDP almost exclusively focused its market research on the suburbs of Winnipeg:

When we did polling. When we did advertising…We basically did it focusing to win. Knowing that these people were key… and these riding were the key. So when we polled, we over-sampled in those ridings. When we did focus groups, we only invited people from those ridings. When we thought about the five points, we thought, what is going to matter to these people. And when we talk about this,

248 Karine Duhamel and Barry Ferguson, “Gary Doer,” in Manitoba Premiers of the 19th and 20th Centuries, Barry Ferguson and Robert Wardhaugh eds. (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 2010), 392. 249 Kostyra, Personal Communication, September 2, 2011. 250 Senior Political Advisor D, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 4, 2010.

what is going to be credible to them… And what do we say which mitigates their concerns about us being in government.251

In addition to using market research to influence its election platform, the NDP began vetting all its commitments and actions through the prism of a fictional prototypical voter from suburban Winnipeg:

Basically they are people with families, with children who make a decent amount of money. When Gary (Doer) would talk about these people, he had in his mind a family. The parents are in their late thirties with two kids. The guy is a firefighter, the woman is a teacher and he would talk about these people, this family… When he talked, that’s who he was thinking of: So if we do this, what is the firefighter and the teacher going to think?252

Furthermore, the NDP began concentrating the majority of its resources and election spending in targeted specific ridings, rather than the traditional party method of dividing support equally amongst all the ridings.253 This resulted in “safe seats” and seats unlikely to be won receiving less support from the party as the NDP instead, increased its vote efficiency by focusing on where more votes would actually mean winning more seats – the suburbs of south Winnipeg.

This focus on the suburban voter, who lacked party loyalties, led the NDP to engage in an increasingly transactional type of politics with the voters being treated much as an individual consumer and the party working to provide a product meeting their specific need. This is a significant development that highlights the NDP moving from a sales oriented party, with a focus on “convincing people” of the virtues of their ideology and platforms, to an increasingly market oriented party, that tries to align its platform with the desires of voters.254 Turnbull

251 Senior Political Advisor A, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010. 252 Ibid. 253 Senior Political Advisor D, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 4, 2010. 254 Kostyra, Personal Communication, September 2, 2011.

70 states that in order to target this “volatile demographic” the party presented specific commitments that might entice them to give the NDP their support and vote:

In provinces where there’s a significant urban population, the most volatile demographics are people who live in the suburbs. They’re much less attached to political tradition than anybody else… Our model is based on focusing on those people who aren’t strongly aligned. That’s where they live (in the suburbs). Those areas are growing. That’s an important thing….The other thing about people who are swing voters, people who live in the suburbs, people who are your target vote… [While,] the big picture [from our perspective] is about us, together… The specific commitments are about making your life better. It’s about ensuring that when your kid has an ear ache or your kid’s temperature is 104 you can get health care. When you have a cancer scare you can get treated fast. It’s about ensuring that there are opportunities for your kid to stay here and the best way to do that is by making post-secondary education and training affordable. It’s about making your life better and showing that we get it. We understand the life you live. We share your priorities and to try and own the concept of family.255

A specific example of a small campaign promise being designed around a targeted suburban riding is the NDP announcing in a press release during the 2007 election that if re-elected the

Southdale Community Centre would be expanded as part of a larger $60 million dollar investment in community centres across the province.256 This commitment came despite the

City of Winnipeg listing four other community centres as being more of a priority for upgrades or replacement and the city having jurisdiction over community centres.257 Specific promises that were in addition to the five core commitments in the 1999 and 2003 election and seven core commitments in the 2007 election were designed to resonate with voters on a personal basis in order to have a specific “ballot question” while voting:

What we were trying to do in those target seats is we wanted to have a ballot question. We wanted to develop a ballot question on what was going through a voter’s mind when they went into the ballot box and if it was our ballot question we won. The ballot question we thought at first it would be “time for a change”

255 Turnbull, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011. 256 Manitoba NDP, Moving Forward with an Expanded Rec Centre for Southdale, Press Release, May 12, 2007. 257 Bartley Kives, Southdale Centre Jumps City’s Funding Queue, Winnipeg Free Press, June 13, 2009, B-1.

which turns out it was not… It came down to that Gary Doer and Today’s NDP will do something for today’s families… So… we pushed that in the last five or six days (of the campaign) in these targeted seats.258

The core commitments the NDP made in the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections are listed in Table

4.1.

258 Senior Political Advisor D, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 4, 2010.

Table 4.1 Manitoba NDP Election Platforms

1999 2003 2007

“Today’s NDP” “Much Accomplished. “Forward, not back” More to Do.” End hallway medicine and We will continue to More improvements for rescue health care improve our health care health care for you and system. your family.

Renew hope for young We will make it easier for Ensure a cleaner, healthier people- young people to stay in environment. Manitoba.

Keep Manitoba Hydro and We will continue to More skills and education build a new partnership strengthen and diversify our opportunities for young between business and economy. people here at home. labour for new and better jobs. Make our communities We will make our Safer communities. safer by tackling the causes communities safer and of crime with improved more secure. youth programs and by ensuring immediate consequences for gang violence and home invasions. Keep balanced budget We will make Manitoba an Building Manitoba for all of legislation and lower even more affordable place us. property taxes. to live.

Affordable Manitoba, affordable government. Protect Manitoba Hydro for the benefit of all.

The three NDP election platforms from 1999, 2003 and 2007 highlight a combination of traditional party priorities, such as health care and education, and new priorities, such as reducing crime and lowering taxes. A press release from the 1999 NDP campaign concisely describes the pragmatic approach that is evident from the three platforms: “No one expects

73 governments to perform miracles. But there are doable and achievable things a government can do to make a real difference for Manitoba families.”259 At a presentation at Queens University in 2000, Gary Doer used the word “balanced” to describe the 1999 NDP election platform:

The NDP… campaigned on a balance between health care, education and training, and affordable government as an alternative to the singular theme of tax cuts. The New Democratic Party believes government has a larger purpose than simply reducing taxes, and that a provincial government must have broader goals to accomplish its mandate…So long as people understand both the cost for alternative programs and the need for a balance between health care, education and training, and affordable government, they will accept the balanced vision.260

Doer further explains that the NDP’s shift to a moderate position that balances both the economy and social programs is based on the view that issues can no longer be defined along a left-wing and right-wing dichotomy:

I think some of these terms, left-right [wing] are so out of date. I mean if you invest in universities and colleges is that left-wing because it’s inclusive or is it right-wing because it improves productivity and innovation… When we invested in a climate change strategy we not only had the benefits of cleaner air and water, which is a long term objective, but we also had the economic growth of, say, buses (the manufacturing of New Flyer buses)… So is this a right wing item because it’s good for the economy or is it a left wing item because it’s good for the environment. I think these terms are so outdated… The public is so much further ahead than the kind of 1950’s political science analysis that flows from most punditry in Canada. And the public has moved beyond the old definitions.261

This merging of what traditionally have been left or right-wing ideals is the basis for the “third way” philosophy made popular by New Labour and Tony Blair and played a underlying role in the Manitoba NDP adopting a more moderate, centrist position.

259 Manitoba NDP, Five Good Reasons, 1999. 260 Doer, Policy Challenges for the New Century, 3-4. 261 Gary Doer, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 19, 2010, in Wesley, Code Politics, 232.

The Manitoba Third Way

In moving toward a more moderate and pragmatic approach, the Manitoba NDP adopted facets of the third way ideology, primarily in economics. This included embracing the goals of economic growth, balanced budgets and reduced taxation. Rather than advocating that

“corporations must pay their fair share” and calling for “fair taxation,”262 a euphemism for tax increases, the Manitoba NDP began promising tax cuts and calling small business and entrepreneurs “the engine of our economy.”263 Following the NDP’s election in 1999, the government committed to lowering taxes across the board for businesses of all sizes and individuals and also initiated the Lower Tax Commission, whose mandate was to review all taxation issues.264 The 2003 and 2007 Manitoba NDP platform continued the anti-tax sentiment in committing to make “Manitoba an even more affordable place to live” with “affordable tax cuts for middle-income Manitobans” in the 2003 platform265 and pledging to provide

“education property tax relief” and “further reducing personal and business taxes” in the 2007 platform.266

The NDP government also modified its stance towards working with the private sector and the party’s traditional caution towards markets. Instead of viewing the private sector and markets as something that needed to be controlled, the party moved to harness them as “sources of productivity and innovation.”267 The acceptance of the private sector and markets is evident in Doer’s advocacy for increased trade, often leading trade delegations around the world, and in

262 Manitoba NDP, Rebuilding Manitoba Together, (1995) 59. 263 Manitoba NDP, Today’s NDP: Encouraging Small Business Success, Press Release, September 14, 1999. 264 Duhamel and Ferguson, “Gary Doer,” 402. 265 Manitoba NDP, Five Priorities for the Next Four Years, 2003. 266 Manitoba NDP, Forward with Gary Doer, 2007. 267 Adams, Politics in Manitoba, 129.

75 the government’s support for innovative companies in the fields of aeronautics, energy and public health.268 This support helped create a dynamic health industry sector in what became known as “Bio-Med City” and established Manitoba as a leader in public health research and innovation, particularly in the areas of infectious and chronic diseases.269

Another important economic goal the NDP worked towards, according to former

Director of Communications Riva Harrison, was to “end the fighting between business and labour. He (Doer) wanted to end the traditional left-right ‘you can never get along…’ He was all about the private-public sector working together. It was all about getting it done… I’ve heard many times from business guys that they could always pick up the phone and call him.

He always took their call.”270 This cooperation was further established with the creation of an

Economic Advisory Council that reported directly to the premier and included leaders within business, labour and the community.

The Manitoba NDP also followed the lead of New Labour in adopting a third way approach against “anti-social behaviour” and emphasizing individual responsibility. This dramatically changed how the Manitoba NDP responded to crime. Traditionally, social democratic parties have emphasized crime prevention through investments in education, recreation, and childhood / youth interventions as the primary method for addressing crime and rehabilitation for individuals who commit crime. In following the lead of New Labour, the

Manitoba NDP expanded its position on crime to include advocating for stronger consequences and punishment for those convicted. Gary Doer’s former Chief of Staff and former NDP

Campaign Director Michael Balagus describes the NDP’s new approach to addressing crime:

268 Ibid. 269 Ibid. 270 Harrison, Personal Communication, August 31, 2011.

We’ve been trying to show people, demonstrate to people that we’re not soft on crime but that we have a different approach… And the thing that people believe we’re better at is crime prevention because they actually believe that we will invest in schools. We’ll invest in community programs and things that are designed to keep kids out of gangs and keep crime down… But at the same time, demonstrate to people that when people break the law, there’s a consequence or there ought to be.271

This approach of crime prevention and consequences, very much follows the New Labour slogan: “tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime” with each platform from 1999, 2003, and 2007 including both elements in the core commitments.

While the Manitoba NDP did not implement all areas of the third way, or to the degree that New Labour did, the similarities between their platforms demonstrate either a direct influence of the third way philosophy or an indirect influence of the third way through the emulation of New Labour. A senior advisor to the Manitoba NDP states: I know he (Gary

Doer) was influenced by Blair. We did talk about that. I’d say it (the third way) was probably a bit of an influence on Gary… I know he was a big supporter of Tony Blair. We talked about that repeatedly.272 Similarly, Balagus links Doer to the third way:

I think it’s safe to say that Gary Doer was probably pretty much a third way New Democrat. Very much the way British Labour was moving in that direction at the time. So that was pretty consistent. And a more populist and less ideological view of what was going on…I think the Doer years were pretty much marked by trying to find ways to move the province forward in a social democratic agenda at a pace and a way that the general population could buy into. And you can call that third way or you can call it whatever you want but, it was very much the way we governed… A lot of it’s been consensus. It’s been longer and it’s perhaps not as dramatic as some people would like but it’s pretty entrenched. And it’s moved stuff forward and it’s moved stuff along. Whether that’s called third way or just being smart, I don’t know.273

The third way label continues, however, to be controversial within the Manitoba NDP.

271 Michael Balagus, Personal Communication, August 15, 2011. 272 Senior Political Advisor F, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 7, 2010. 273 Balagus, Personal Communication, August 15, 2011.

Some senior advisors and MLA’s within the Manitoba NDP state that the third way did not play a role in the shift that occurred leading up to the 1999 election. Gary Doer, in fact, adamantly denies the adoption of the third way:

We didn’t borrow the “third way.” It became an analysis of the Blair government, and then it became an analysis of our government. We didn’t borrow that, because we were moving towards that long before this kind of analysis. The analysis always followed the policies, sometimes a year, sometimes five years behind what Blair did and what allegedly that meant for us. But being a party believing in economic growth, we weren’t shy about saying it. We believed in economic growth, we practiced economic growth, and we got economic growth… In our first year in office, we had a huge Immigration Forum, with labour and business, to try to move from 2000 immigrants a year to 10 000. That was all based on economic growth and population growth. It was not based on redistributing the status quo. We never believed that that was doable and useful. So before Blair’s election, we were proposing ideas to be symbolic of what we thought would be an economic growth strategy as well as a social inclusion strategy… The media spends more time on how you do things, and what people say, than the real products. And the pundits’ analysis is usually long after what you’ve done. They put it in a sort of analytical box. So, ‘third way’? We were doing some of these things long before we even knew the term existed.274

The hesitation in applying the third way label, despite obvious similarities, is that to many the third way is tantamount to saying they “sold out” their principles.275 A senior advisor to the

Manitoba NDP explains:

We didn’t use the third way internally. A number of people put it to the premier and he said “No, there’s actually two ways here. There’s people who believe in balance and that government has a role and there’s… the ideology which suggests that the government role has to be radically cut back…” He felt that the Conservative party had taken on some of the new right ideology and actually had moved from being a centrist party to one that had taken on more of the anti- government rhetoric… that is seen in the US particularly and in Britain… The premier never accepted that third way language… He probably felt it was closer to saying that we had become liberals… and he still wanted very much to say that the NDP was a party that actually believed that the government worked in partnership and that certain investments were important to the long term

274 Doer, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 19, 2010, in Wesley, Code Politics, 224-225. 275 Adams, Politics in Manitoba, 129.

prosperity of people and societies. He didn’t want to be defined as having moved to a kid of fuzzy intermediate positions.276

Despite the pejorative connotation with some in the Manitoba NDP, the third way does appear to have played an influential role in shaping the moderate platform of the Doer model.

Inoculation

The third and final component of the Doer model is inoculation. Now Communications founder Ron Johnson describes inoculation as: “a term that is used extensively in the United

States where you have a problem with an issue and so you figure out how, before the election, to get rid of it, to shut it down. To do something that inoculates you so when your opponent attacks, you’re not going to be killed by the attack.”277The main issue the Manitoba NDP was vulnerable on was “financial issues”.278

The Manitoba NDP, and left-wing parties generally, have historically had a perceived weakness surrounding economic issues and specifically on taxation.279 In order to inoculate themselves against the “tax and spend” and poor economic steward labels the NDP made two major policy shifts. First, the Manitoba NDP reversed its stated position that if it was to win government it would re-nationalize the recently privatized Manitoba Telephone System (MTS):

“That ship has sailed. It would be too costly. Taxpayers couldn’t afford it. Citizens of Manitoba couldn’t afford it… You would be expected to bring it back but fiscally it was not prudent to

276 Senior Political Advisor B, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010. 277 Johnson, Personal Communication, August 24, 2011. 278 Martin, Personal Communication, Sept. 29, 2011. 279 Ibid.

79 do.”280Another senior political advisor to the Manitoba NDP adds: “it was simply too expensive to do so and we had other priorities.”281 The policy reversal helped inoculate the NDP against the charge of being financially irresponsible and demonstrated the party to be pragmatic.

Second, in a move that mirrored New Labour’s commitment to the Conservative’s spending plans for two years, the Manitoba NDP began supporting the Progressive Conservative’s balanced budget legislation and stated that should the NDP be elected, the party would maintain it:

You always hear about the NDP is going to spend too much, cause deficits. So very early on we took a very hard positions saying we will live by the balanced budget legislation, no deficits. End of story… You’re basically putting up a shield that you can’t get through it because here is our position.282

Leading up to the 1999 election, the NDP also voted in favour of Premier Filmon’s budget, leaving the lone Liberal MLA Kevin Lamoureux to vote against it.283 This was designed to inoculate the part against being labeled “as radicals who, if elected, would lead a tax-and-spend government.”284 Similarly, Gary Doer began reassuring voters that an NDP government would not “change the things that the Filmon government got right” in favour of an ideological extreme agenda.285

This reassurance was further provided within the 1999 platform itself with the inclusion of a property tax cut. While Gary Filmon and the Progressive Conservatives promised $500 million in tax cuts, the NDP promised a $150 property tax credit for all homeowners and

280 Senior Political Advisor D, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, May 4, 2010. 281 Senior Political Advisor B, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010. 282 Kostyra, Personal Communication, September 2, 2011. 283 Adams, Politics in Manitoba, 128. 284 Ibid, 128. 285 Balagus, Personal Communication, August 15, 2011.

80 renters, at a cost of approximately $60 million.286 Rather than trying to out-bid the

Conservatives in regards to tax-cuts, the NDP wanted to simply send a positive signal to voters on the party’s adoption of the tax cutting mantra:

There is no way we were going to be competitive with the Tories on tax cuts. They had a big tax cut package [in] their billion dollar [platform], 500 million [in tax cuts…] And there’s no way we could credibly offer 500 million dollars in tax credits. But…We offered a much smaller tax cut plan that got to the tax cuts that we believed drove people in suburban Winnipeg crazy which was property taxes. So we say “we’re going to help you with your property taxes” and so that’s the first small step. And what that does is you’re taking a small slice of their strength… We’re going to reduce taxes but… it’s going to be smaller, it’s going to be more manageable. It’s not going to be so big that you believe that we can’t do it or that it’s going to drive up the deficit.287

This moderate tax cut inoculated against the fear of the NDP raising taxes, helped reiterate the party’s balanced approach and provided a context to question the credibility of the conservatives being able to balance the budget while cutting $500 million in taxes. The $150 property tax credit was also marketed as part of a larger family friendly package:

Our Families Package is designed to help make life better for Manitoba’s parents and their children. We will provide families with financial relief through our achievable tax breaks, guarantee excellence in our schools, enhanced health services for children, and provide greater recreational opportunities for children and youth. Our commitment is to work together with communities to build hope and optimism for all Manitoba families.288

Within the party, the tax credit was being discussed in a context of social justice: “Who is hurt more by property taxes than low to middle income owners struggling to own their first home?

So the whole notion that there is no tax that is not welcomed by New Democrats is insane.”289

286 Manitoba NDP, Giving More Manitoba Kids Sports and Recreation Opportunities, Press Release, September 15, 1999. 287 Senior Political Advisor A, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010. 288 Ibid. 289 Harrison, Personal Communication, August 31, 2011.

By inoculating on financial issues and having a simplified and moderate agenda, the NDP were able to develop a new more “modern” and “contemporary brand- Today’s NDP.290

The re-branding of the party as Today’s NDP, beginning in 1998, was a critical element in helping the party communicate to Manitobans that the NDP had made changes and was taking a new approach on certain issues. In that sense, Today’s NDP provided another level of inoculation against accusations of a hidden agenda or attacks from other parties such as the “tax and spend” label. The inspiration for the entire re-branding exercise and the changing of the name specifically was the 1997 successful transformation of the British Labour Party into New

Labour, following which the Manitoba NDP decided “we had to present a brand that reflected we had new people and modern policies.”291 A key difference, however, with New Labour and

Today’s NDP is that while New Labour was designed to provide a clear break from its past history, Today’s NDP simply wanted to build on the strong brand the party still had on specific issues, such as health care, education and social issues.292 Michael Balagus elaborates:

“Heading into Today’s NDP… the fundamentals of what the party stood for did not change…

What those [branding] exercises said is we’re still those people with those values but we’re modern now… We can get things done. We’ve got a more modern approach. Society’s changed

[and] we’re part of that.”293 As part of the re-branding exercise, the logo for the party was also changed, following its focus group testing, to include the name Today’s NDP.294 This was consciously decided to ensure that “every time you saw it on a sign or you saw it in the Free

Press or you saw it on a backdrop or you saw it on the evening news you saw the NDP logo that

290 Senior Political Advisor G, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, June 4, 2010. 291 Ibid. 292 Ibid. 293 Balagus, Personal Communication, August 15, 2011. 294 Senior Political Advisor G, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, June 4, 2010.

82 said, Today’s NDP.295 By successfully re-branding itself as a different and more modern entity, the party was able to change the perception of the Manitoba NDP. A senior political advisor describes the “comfort” the brand was able to provide: “Part of our former premier’s popularity was about the comfort level that Today’s NDP created amongst Manitobans. Today’s NDP stood for certain things you could be comfortable with and you could count on.”296This is very similar to the experience of New Labour where following their election in 1997, it was found in focus groups across the Britain and across all social classes that “it was the fact that Labour had become New Labour that gave people the confidence to make the change (and support them).

New Labour was the last line of defence against people’s fears and memories, their images of extremism and failure.”297 Another senior political advisor adds: “That’s what makes Today’s

NDP different. It’s not about changing the world. It’s about moving some very important things on which you have a lot of credibility forward and making commitments not to do things that make people nervous.”298The NDP’s new focus on political marketing necessitated a change in how the party used market research.

Market Research

In order to develop its comprehensive political marketing model, the NDP significantly changed the way the party used market research. Market research had been used prior to Doer winning the leadership of the NDP. However, the level of sophistication and the use of strategic market research increased following the 1995 election: “It is a very research driven party which is also different than the NDP before. It’s not like we did no research before in 1988, 1990. But

295 Ibid. 296 Senior Political Advisor E, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communications with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010. 297 Gould, The Unfinished Revolution, 388. 298 Senior Political Advisor A, Manitoba NDP, Personal Communication with Dr. Jared Wesley, April 23, 2010.

83 it’s all strategic [now].”299 Balagus similarly notes the change to a more strategic use of market research: “I don’t know if we really increased the amount of market research we do. It’s more how we use it that has really changed…the kind of research that we’re doing as opposed to quantitatively doing more.”300 Rather than performing market research across the province with equal distribution across demographics and ridings, the Manitoba NDP began utilizing a market segmentation analysis in order to focus its research on target voters and target ridings. Kostyra summarizes this evolution in market research within the Manitoba NDP:

We’ve always done market research… We’ve done some focus group testing. Both of them have grown and they’ve grown in sophistication. As an example, if you look at the key ridings that you want to win and the key people (target voters) in those ridings you would do more heavy research there. You are [always] going to win certain ridings… and the hardline Tory ridings, they’re always going to be against you no matter what you do, unless you become a Tory. So what is it that’s going to influence those people in the centre or in the swing ridings? So how do you look at your research to find out how they think? What motivates them… What I’ve seen evolve over 40 years of the campaign is a much more of a focus on understanding that. So the polling would reflect that. Focus group testing is talking to those people. No sense talking to your strong supporters…In terms of getting enough ridings to win an election you really have to get into the hearts and minds of the small group of people in the centre. So I’ve seen polling become much more sophisticated. The research more focused.301

This results in what is described as a “much more targeted approach to campaigning” with NDP focused on “where the election is going to be won and lost and who are the voters who are going to win or lose it.”302 More importantly, the limiting of market research to target voters allows an agenda for governing to be dictated or at the very heavily influenced by a very small demographic or group of ridings.

299 Turnbull, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011. 300 Balagus, Personal Communication, August 15, 2011. 301 Kostyra, Personal Communication, September 2, 2011. 302 Balagus, Personal Communication, August 15, 2011.

Despite the potential advantages the Manitoba NDP gain from strategically using market research, the party continues to demonstrate a limited willingness or ability to conduct ongoing extensive market research. Riva Harrison states:

I don’t think he’s (Gary Doer) ever had a huge budget for it (market research)… There’s always a little bit done. Not as much as people ever think but you also can sometimes look at other market research that’s being done. You can borrow things, certain words that people like and respond favourably to. It’s always less than you think. It’s a little more gut instinct than science sometimes. I think we did enough market research to know if we were on the right track. And that is a combination of political polls that are out there generally and the issue polls and are available to all parties. And we did enough of our own party polls to have an idea if we were on the right track and to have some sense of what our opponent’s strengths or weaknesses were. You have some market research to give you some very basics but truthfully a lot of what you do is gut. It’s gut instinct.303

Shauna Martin concurs and suggests that political parties at the provincial level are limited in their ability to conduct extensive ongoing market research because of the high cost to conduct the research and analyze the data: “maybe at the federal level it’s a little different where they maybe have a bit more money to spread around but at the provincial level, you just can’t poll on every issue.”304 Instead, Martin reveals an old Doer adage: “You got to have the nose” for where the political issue is heading.305 Martin also adds:

You have to be able to be skilled enough and take your lessons from previous examples enough that you can carry forward an issue without having to go to a pollster and say we think we’re doing the right thing here can you confirm that. There is just too much lag time in how you’re managing an issue… We poll on big issues but they’re not part of that daily management of issues.306

The audited financial statements, submitted to Elections Manitoba, confirm that the Manitoba

NDP has a wide discrepancy in the amount of market research conducted for the party in a year.

303 Harrison, Personal Communication, August 31, 2011. 304 Martin, Personal Communication, September 29, 2011. 305 Ibid. 306 Ibid.

Table 4.2 lists the amount the NDP spent on market research as reported to Elections Manitoba from 2005 to 2013 (financial statements did not have a specific budget line for market research prior to 2002 and Elections Manitoba were unable to find the annual financial statements from

2002 to 2004).

Table 4.2 Manitoba NDP Market Research

Year Cost of Market Research

2005 $0

2006 $0

2007* $51940

2008 $6342

2009 $0

2010 $62328

2011* $99382.50

2012 $0

2013 $39637.50

* Indicates a provincial election year.

Party pollster and strategist Leslie Turnbull concludes that the NDP “purchase research but not as much as I would think they should.”307

307 Turnbull, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011.

Electoral Results

With the combination of the Doer model being fully implemented, the Conservatives being implicated in a 1995 election vote-splitting scandal by a judicial inquiry, obvious difficulties appearing in social programs from years of fiscal restraint, and the Conservatives running on a platform not seen as moderate, the NDP were swept back into power after an eleven year absence in 1999.The 1999 electoral results were Today’s NDP winning a majority government with thirty-two seats and forty-four percent of the popular vote, the Progressive

Conservatives becoming the Official Opposition with twenty-four seats and forty-one percent of the popular vote, and the Liberals winning only one seat and thirteen percent of the popular vote.308 The NDP were able to win a majority despite only beating the Conservatives by three percent in the popular vote by having higher vote efficiency and adding the much coveted south

Winnipeg ridings of St. Vital, Lord Roberts, Riel and Fort Rouge to the traditional NDP seats in

Northern Manitoba and North Winnipeg.309

In 2003, the NDP were able to win its second straight majority mandate with thirty- five seats and forty-nine percent of the popular vote.310 The Progressive Conservatives and leader Stuart Murray were unable to make any gains, falling to twenty seats and thirty-six percent of the popular vote and the Liberals manage to gain one seat moving to two seats while maintaining their thirteen percent of the popular support.311 The NDP were further able to gain seats in the southern Winnipeg ridings of St. Norbert, Seine River, and Fort Garry.312

308 Adams, Politics in Manitoba, 128. 309 Ibid, 129. 310 Ibid, 177. 311 Ibid. 312 Ibid, 130.

The 2007 election continued the NDP domination, despite the Progressive

Conservatives replacing Stuart Murray with Hugh McFadyen as leader, with the NDP adding the south Winnipeg seat of Southdale for a total of thirty-six seats and forty-eight percent of the popular vote.313 The Conservatives gained two percent in the popular vote with 38 percent but still lost one seat to fall to nineteen and the Liberals maintained its two seats with twelve percent of the popular vote.314

The Doer model dramatically changed the approach the NDP in Manitoba take in both campaigning and governing. The model consists of three main components: simplification, moderation, and inoculation. By combining these strategies, with strategic market research, the

NDP have been able to achieve historic success in Manitoba. Gary Doer adds: “We found that by using this approach in our province – and I think Manitoba is very similar to Canada – we were able win the constituencies that allowed us to win the election.”315 It is this sentiment that led Darrel Dexter and the NDP in Nova Scotia to implement their version of the Doer model and thus create the Doer/Dexter model.

313 Ibid. 314 Ibid, 177. 315 Doer, Policy Challenges for the New Century, 4.

5. FINDINGS- NOVA SCOTIA

The ascension of the Nova Scotia NDP into government in the 2009 election marked a historic victory for the party. The election into government was a first for the NDP in Nova

Scotia and a first for the NDP in any province east of Ontario. Despite narrowly missing being elected into government in 1998, it took the party another eleven years and four elections before finally winning a majority government under Darrell Dexter. To accomplish this, the

NDP in Nova Scotia relied heavily on the success of Gary Doer and the Manitoba NDP, with the party enacting the crucial components of the Doer model – simplification, moderation, and inoculation – in order to similarly transform the party.

The development of what became known as the Dexter model was a radical shift in both how the Nova Scotia NDP presented itself and philosophically approached issues. Dan

O’Connor, former chief of staff to Premier Darrell Dexter and Manitoba Premier Howard

Pawley, describes the Dexter model as: “First addressing things, addressing issues, in the framework of how people experience them in their daily lives, in their households, and in their… families, rather than from the point of view of a policy or from the point of view of governing the province. Discuss the issues as people experience them. [This is] a very key element to the entire approach.”316 This change allowed the party to continually build its support through the 2003 and 2006 elections before winning a majority government in 2009. To fully comprehend the Dexter model and the dramatic changes the Nova Scotia NDP implemented prior to achieving power, the two previous elections will be explored.

316 Dan O’Connor, Personal Communication, September 19, 2011

1998 Election

The 1998 election demonstrated a significant turning point for the Nova Scotia NDP.

Prior to the election, the NDP had never been in contention to achieve power. Rather, the party, first as the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and later as the NDP, played a very minor role in the overall governance structure of the province since first contesting power in the

1937 election.317 Over the next sixty-one years, the Nova Scotia CCF/NDP never exceeded four

MLAs with its popular support ranging from a low of three percent to a high of eighteen percent.318 With the party under the aggressive leadership of Robert Chisholm, the 1998 election saw the NDP benefit from a damaged Liberal brand due to federal and provincial austerity measures, close three-way races, high vote efficiency, and a disgruntled electorate that was looking for an alternative to the traditional two party provincial system.319 Peter Clancy describes: “The two old-line parties were both critically weakened by successive terms in office- the Conservatives by the Buchanan leadership meltdown and the Liberals by fallout from the Savage cuts. Neither party entered the campaign from a position of strength and the electorate proved volatile, particularly in urban areas of mainland Nova Scotia.”320

Furthermore, Clancy states that “the wage freezes and program cuts (including proposed school and hospital closures)…” and “the combined audacity and rigidity of this strategy… forced a

317 Peter Clancy, Bluenose Socialism: The Nova Scotia NDP in Year One (Paper for the APPSA Annual Meeting, Dalhousie University, October 2010), 2. 318 Ibid, 4-5. 319 Ibid, 4-5. 320 Ibid, 5.

90 reorientation of electoral (particularly urban voter) priorities in favour of the last

‘uncontaminated’ party – the NDP.”321

1998 Election Platform

The move into political contention for government was not the result of a shift in the political platform or ideology of the party. The 1998 platform entitled “Priorities for People” was a typical “gainsburger”-styled platform that spanned twenty-nine pages and made eighty- three commitments. Those eighty-three commitments were categorized into six main priorities and numerous sub-categories. Figure 5.1 lists the six main priorities and their corresponding sub-categories.

321 Ibid, 4.

Figure 5.1 1998 Nova Scotia NDP Election Priorities

1. Jobs  Jobs and natural resources  Jobs with a future  Jobs in Cape Breton  Jobs in small business and co-ops  Jobs and the environment  Jobs through training  Jobs in our communities

2. Renew Health Care  Restore faith in health care  Reaffirm health care principles  Reinvest in health care system

3. Improve Education and Create Opportunities for Young Nova Scotians  Commit to quality education  Bring common sense in school construction  Create post-secondary opportunities for all young Nova Scotians  Help young Nova Scotians get a start in the work world

4. Make the Tax System Fairer  Develop fair tax system for ordinary Nova Scotians  Base taxes on the ability to pay

5. Make Government Open, Honest and Accountable  Clean up government patronage  Make government accountable to people  The need for responsible spending  Manage resources wisely for the benefit of all Nova Scotians

6. Keep Our Promises  A realistic time-table  Priorities for reinvestment  Longer-term initiatives

Within the platform, the Nova Scotia NDP focused on two main areas. First, they attacked both the Liberals and the Conservatives, with only a slightly larger focus on the governing Liberals, in order to categorize the two parties as one and the same:

During their 15 years in power, the Tories’ patronage politics made Nova Scotia a national laughing stock. The Liberals under Savage were not better, just different. They removed patronage from low-level highway jobs, but kept the gravy train rolling for high-priced lawyers and consultants.322

The people of Nova Scotia are asking for a different kind of government… They don’t want a return to the bad old Tory days. They reject the Savage-MacLellan Liberals who say one thing during the election but do another after.323

Through economic mismanagement, bad budgeting and corporate giveaways, the Liberals and Tories have mortgaged the future of Nova Scotia.324

The Liberals and Tories have made a practice of using their legislative majorities to ram through measures that, though they are both unpopular and unwise, may be hard to reverse.325

Between them, the Tories and Liberals have almost destroyed the publicly-funded health care system that New Democrats fought so long and hard to bring about.326

New Democrats invented Medicare in this country and only they can save it from years of mismanagement, cost-cutting and privatization by the Liberals and Tories.327

The province’s finances cannot stand any more favours for Liberal and Tory insiders.328

Second, the NDP frequently attacked corporations and big business in the platform in order to both differentiate themselves from the other two parties and to target its message to “ordinary

Nova Scotians”:

Liberals and Tories do the bidding of the banks and big corporations. New Democrats believe in corporate responsibility. We know that we won’t have a healthy economy by giving in to the demands of large corporations and slashing the public sector.329

322 Nova Scotia NDP, Priorities for People, 1998, 23. 323 Ibid, 5. 324 Ibid, 20. 325 Ibid, 24. 326 Ibid, 15. 327 Ibid. 328 Ibid, 23. 329 Ibid, 24.

The Liberals and Tories have failed to stand up to the large corporations as they have discarded thousands of workers in pursuit of better profits. MT &T and Nova Scotia Power, which have shed hundreds of jobs while increasing profits, are examples of this destructive phenomenon.330

The Savage-MacLellan Liberals lacked the leadership and will to stand up to the big oil companies.331

The Liberals and Tories have mismanaged the province’s natural resources. The Westray disaster and $450 million losses at Nova Scotia Resources are part of the Tory legacy. The Liberals have also bungled offshore development and failed to stand up to the big petroleum companies on behalf of Nova Scotians.332

For years, the Liberals and Tories have paid lip service to community economic development, but when the chips were down, they give in to the big corporations like Westray, Dynatek, Michelin, Newbridge, AT&T and the big banks.333

An NDP government would shift support from large corporations, who can stand on their own feet, to local enterprises that need support to stand up or expand.334

The results of the 1998 election was a dramatic rise in the party’s popular support, from eighteen percent in the 1993 election to thirty-four percent, and the NDP tying the governing

Liberals with nineteen seats.335 With the Liberals being propped up by the Conservative party in a minority government, the NDP became the Official Opposition for the first time and looked to be on the verge of achieving power.

1999 Election

With the Nova Scotia NDP being closer to forming government than ever before following the 1998 election, the party looked to force another election as soon as possible.

Former NDP finance minister Graham Steele describes: “Robert (Chisholm) was aggressive –

330 Ibid, 24. 331 Ibid, 9. 332 Ibid, 10. 333 Ibid, 13. 334 Ibid, 14. 335 Ibid, 5.

94 as it turned out, too aggressive – and his attitude rubbed off on caucus and staff… The NDP under Robert was combative and open about its desire to see the government fall.”336 With the

Conservatives withdrawing their support of the growingly unpopular Liberals, the budget was defeated triggering an election fifteen months after the 1998 election. So sure were some within the NDP of its impending victory that Steele divulges seeing their finance critic Howard

Epstein writing out the budget he would draft once in government: “He was at his desk, pen in hand, writing columns of figures on sheets of foolscap. He was writing his first budget as NDP finance minister – during an election campaign.”337 In order to try and finally win government, the NDP maintained the same tactics as what brought them success in 1998 – attacking both the

Liberals and Conservatives equally and demonstrating the NDP as the party for ordinary Nova

Scotians.

1999 Election Platform

The 1999 Nova Scotia NDP election platform was very much a continuation of the 1998 platform. The platform was titled “It’s Time,” a clear reference to the need for change, including the replacing the Liberal government in favour of the NDP: “This election is about making sure that Nova Scotia has a government that can and will do better for average working people and for their families. It’s about choosing a government that will work for you, a government that makes a clean break, a government that is on the side of ordinary Nova

336 Graham Steele, What I Learned About Politics: Inside the Rise – and Collapse – of Nova Scotia’s NDP Government (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 2014), 13. 337 Ibid.

Scotians.”338 The document was sixty-nine pages long and was divided into six platform papers with 118 specific commitments. The six platform paper titles are:

1. It’s Time to tell the truth about the budget

2. It’s Time to stand up for Nova Scotia communities

3. It’s Time to stand up for Cape Breton communities

4. It’s Time to invest in front line health care

5. It’s Time for equal education opportunity

6. It’s Time to respect Nova Scotians

Despite the platform being organized around five main themes as outlined by the six platform papers (the platform papers on Nova Scotia communities and Cape Breton communities were essentially the same), the platform was convoluted in its design and lacked clarity and focus.

This lack of effective communication was exasperated by the extremely high number of specific commitments, a text-heavy format, and the repeating of commitments within the platform.

In order to try and make the 1999 election a referendum about trust, the NDP continued in a similar fashion as the previous 1998 platform in using scathing rhetoric to describe the

Liberal and Conservative record. The tone throughout the 1999 platform was extremely negative with the party insinuating and alleging corruption against both other parties:

Liberals and Tories were too busy helping out their corporate friends and wasting money on their political buddies to protect the interests of hard-working Nova Scotia taxpayers. If a business ran its affairs the way the Liberals and Tories have run the Province, the police would be at the door.339

338 Nova Scotia NDP, It’s Time: NDP Campaign 99, 1999, 2. 339 Ibid, 3.

Our goal is to have the budget truly balanced within four years, but first, we have to see how big a mess the Liberals have left behind… No more lies. Nor more shell games. No more dubious accounting. No more Liberal fudge. No more rabbits out of a hat instead of a budget people can believe in.340

The defeated MacLellan budget is the latest example of Liberal and Tory governments playing shell games with Nova Scotians’ hard earned money.341

The Liberals and Tories haven’t told the truth about the Province’s finances for years. This year’s budget achieved a new level of deception.342

The Liberals and Tories have wasted tens of millions of dollars on handouts to corporations. Sometime the money has been given to fly-by-night operations like Dynatek and MacTimber; other times it has gone to pad the bottom line of hugely- profitable companies like Michelin. In either case, it’s money that shouldn’t have been spent.343

Money is wasted on hand-outs to large corporations and government friends.344

Much-needed paving was done on the road going past the Highway Minister’s home, but most other urgently needed paving was left undone.345

The Liberal and Tory record on healthcare in Nova Scotia has been nothing short of disastrous.346

The Liberals and Tories pay too much attention to their political friends and large corporations, and not enough to the concerns of ordinary Nova Scotians. They bend over backwards to please the likes of Dynatek, PLI or Mentor Networks. But they show little respect for injured workers, nursing home employees or their own crown prosecutors.347

The results of the 1999 Nova Scotia election was a majority Conservative government with thirty seats under leader John Hamm and the NDP and Liberals both falling back to eleven seats each.348 In regards to the popular vote, the Conservatives won 39.20 %, the NDP won 29.97%

340 Ibid, 2. 341 Ibid, 3. 342 Ibid, 6. 343 Ibid, 17. 344 Ibid, 15. 345 Ibid, 18. 346 Ibid, 39. 347 Ibid, 62. 348 Elections Nova Scotia, “July 27, 1999 Nova Scotia Provincial General Election,” accessed January 3, 2015, https://electionsnovascotia.ca/election-data/past-results/july-1999.

97 and the Liberals won 29.81%.349 Similar to the 1995 election defeat of the Manitoba NDP, the

Nova Scotia NDP was shocked at the outcome:

New Democrats had been terrifically disappointed by the results of the 1999 provincial election. Expectations were high after the breakthrough in 1998, when the NDP went from four seats to nineteen. But in 1999 the voters didn’t let the young, aggressive Robert Chisholm take the next step into the premier’s office, preferring instead the reassuring, grandfatherly John Hamm.350

While many assigned the electoral loss on the revelation late in the campaign of NDP leader

Robert Chisholm’s previous drunk-driving conviction, Clancy instead suggests the NDP had not built enough support in much of the province and was in fact only competitive in two-fifths of the ridings.351 In order to further build that support, a new approach was needed.

The Dexter Model

The Dexter model was a dramatic shift in both the political marketing and focus for the

Nova Scotia NDP. The model was heavily influenced by the experiences and success of Gary

Doer and the Manitoba NDP in 1999. Just as Today’s NDP used New Labour as its starting point, the Nova Scotia NDP took the crucial elements of the Doer model while adapting it for the context within Nova Scotia.352 This study found unanimous acknowledgement that the

Nova Scotia NDP actively worked to emulate the transformation the Manitoba NDP made in becoming “Today’s NDP”:

When we were developing this model out here in Nova Scotia, it was largely based upon the work that had gone on in Manitoba.353

349 Ibid. 350 Steele, What I Learned About Politics, 50. 351 Clancy, Bluenose Socialism, 5. 352 Kostyra, Personal Communication, September 2, 2011. 353 MacSween, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011.

The Dexter model was very much fashioned after the Doer model… He saw what Gary (Doer) was accomplishing, how he did it. He (Dexter) was replicating it and of course, customizing it to their province.354

It’s (the Dexter model) remarkably similar (to the Doer model) in terms of the kind of inoculation, the repositioning of what would resonate out there, what would be pushed and language. Those things are all very similar.355

Manitoba was seen as a successful model here (Nova Scotia) that they were prepared to draw lessons from.356

We drew lessons from the experience in Manitoba. Manitoba was the first out of the gates to take on this particular model. We saw it’s a model that worked.357

The technique of the Dexter people saying we can do what the Doer people did. That was a critical thing.358

These excerpts from the interviews highlight the significant effect the Doer model had in creating a new approach.

The transferability of the Doer model to Nova Scotia is largely the result of three factors. First, the political marketing firm of the Manitoba NDP and chief architect of the Doer model, NOW Communications, was also working for the Nova Scotia NDP since 1998. After realizing the positive results of the 1999 Manitoba election, NOW Communication began designing subsequent Nova Scotia NDP campaigns in similar fashion. Second, despite their vast differences in geography, there are remarkable similarities between Manitoba and Nova

Scotia in political culture and overall make-up. Former Manitoba and Nova Scotia Premier

Chief of Staff Dan O’Connor explains: “There’s enough similarities for the two provinces.

Partly [as a result of their population] size. Also, their attitude toward the country and the fact… both Manitoba and Nova Scotia tend to be kind of moderate, small l Liberal kind. Here

354 Kostyra, Personal Communication, September 2, 2011. 355 Kostyra, Personal Communication, September 2, 2011. 356 Martin, Personal Communication, September 29, 2011. 357 MacSween, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011. 358 Johnson, Personal Communication, August 24, 2011.

99 it’s called the Red Tory approach. And so the kind of politics that works in one province often is effective in the other.”359 Former Nova Scotia NDP provincial secretary Michael MacSween concurs and elaborates further:

Manitoba and Nova Scotia have a lot in common in terms of population, to some extent socio-economics. We’re both sort of middle of the pack, not necessarily rich provinces but we have a lot in common. Common traditions. And so we picked up on the Manitoba model as certainly being one which would work here in this province quite well. And fortunately, we were correct about that… The connections between Manitoba [and Nova Scotia] have been and continue to be stronger than, to some extent, other provinces. It’s just more common interests and common experience between the two provinces.360

Finally, the similarities between provinces have led to an established “Manitoba – Nova Scotia back and forth”361 within the NDP with both parties aiding each other during campaigns with organizers and staff: “We participate in the very longstanding approach where the NDP tries to make sure the people within the party, who are able, get the time off, to work fulltime for part or all of an election campaign. Have opportunities to keep participating in campaigns. Learning from doing.”362 This sharing of talent has led to a similar perspective and approach to politics within the respective NDP parties. As a result, the Nova Scotia NDP began implementing the three key components of the Doer model – simplification, moderation, and inoculation –as they gradually built towards becoming the government.

Simplification

With Darrell Dexter taking over as leader from Robert Chisholm’s successor Helen

MacDonald, following her by-election defeat in 2001, the Nova Scotia NDP immediately

359 O’Connor, Personal Communication, September 19, 2011. 360 MacSween, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011. 361 O’Connor, Personal Communication, September 19, 2011. 362 Ibid.

100 initiated significant changes in preparation for the 2003 election. The creation of the Dexter model followed the steps of the Manitoba experience with the Nova Scotia NDP beginning by adopting the first component- the principle of simplification. This meant all communication needed to be easily understood and focused “on practical ways to make life better for ordinary families.”363 MacSween adds:

So rather than talking about grandiose notions and ideas and ideologies, what we talked about was very specific defined things that we, as a party, were seeking to do… In essence, what we did is develop a platform which was a very specific set of commitments… The Dexter model… is having a well-defined plan rather than just simply vote for us because we think differently than the other parties do.364

In addition to ensuring its commitments were simple and clearly articulated, perhaps the most noticeable change in adopting the Dexter model was the overall reduction of commitments. This critical element of the Dexter model “narrows the focus to a number of messages that people can actually hear and digest and relate to.”365 The drastic reduction in commitments resulted in a platform that went from one-hundred-eighteen promises in the 1998 election to seven core commitments in 2003. The 2006 election saw that number fall further to five core commitments before increasing back to seven commitments in 2009. The 2006 platform highlights this reduction in commitments: “Better Deal 2006: The Plan You Can

Count On does not contain hundreds of promises, or pretend to be a plan for everything that will happen in the next five to ten years. It outlines the NDP priorities – the job that we will get

363 Johnson, Personal Communication, August 24, 2011. 364 MacSween, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011. 365 Johnson, Personal Communication, August 24, 2011.

101 done with your support.”366 Ironically, the move to a very simple platform was decided, at least partially, by chance rather than through a strategic move. O’Connor explains:

We took inspiration from 99 in Manitoba that we would no longer feel we had to do a platform book as such and could be more limited in what we were, what our commitments were and going into a short list of key commitments. And part of that we backed into it. We had a pre-campaign event planned in 2003 where we would unveil what we have come up with as our key commitments… It had to be a short enough list so that people could actually remember what they were and the campaign could keep going back to them. We announced that list of key commitments at an event. As it turns out, just days before the campaign began and unexpectedly to us, the news media described the release of the key commitments as the release of our platform. And in a sense it looked like a platform [because] it was costed. They were explained. We had on the books the idea that we were going to follow it up with more traditional platform book. But the team all looked at each other, looked at the coverage, saw what resources we had for the impending campaign and said let’s not waste any time gilding the lily and spoiling the effect we’ve had of saying that there is a clear, simple NDP platform already released ahead of the campaign… And so we scrapped any plans and work that had been down toward a platform book.367

See Figure 5.2 for the length of the Nova Scotia NDP’s platforms from 1998 – 2009 and the number of commitments indicated in each.

366 Nova Scotia NDP, Better Deal 2006: The Plan You Can Count On, 2006, 1. 367 O’Connor, Personal Communication, Sept. 19, 2011

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Figure 5.2 Nova Scotia NDP Election Commitments 1998 – 2009

Nova Scotia NDP Election Platforms 140 118 120

100 83 80 69 Pages 60 Commitments

40 29

20 13 7 7 4 5 2 0 1998 1999 2003 2006 2009

By adopting a simplified communication strategy, both in language and number of commitments, and moderating the positions of the party, the Nova Scotia NDP worked to clearly position itself as a legitimate contender for government.

Moderation

The second component in the Dexter model is moderation. This component critically matches the commitments and policies of the NDP with the mainstream “red tory” political culture of Nova Scotia. The election of Darrell Dexter as leader of the Nova Scotia NDP suggested from the onset that the party would be taking a more moderate approach than it traditionally had done. Former NDP Finance Minister Graham Steele writes about the ideological tension within the party:

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There are, within the Nova Scotia NDP, two broad factions. They overlap, and individuals slide from one to the other, but there are two. One is moderate, pragmatic, centrist. The other is more contrarian, more ideological, less accommodating. Faction 1 sees Faction 2 as inflexible, pushy troublemakers. Faction 2 sees Faction 1 as weak, liberal sellouts. Faction 1 is larger and almost always carries the day at party meetings but Faction 2 is louder. Darrell Dexter is the incarnation of the first faction…368

Describing himself as a “conservative progressive,” Dexter began gradually shifting what the

NDP represented in the attempt to broaden its support from only being a voice of protest:

He (Dexter) said we have to be known by what we stand for. What we want to see done. See improved. Not by what we oppose… The NDP, not even been one of the major parties, had to keep working constantly to add to its base by attracting people to the party, not just driving people away from the current government. Because as a two party province for two hundred and fifty-two years or so, politics here was politics of the ins and outs. [You] didn’t have to have much by way of ideological differences. As long as people were tired of the current government the other party would get elected. And he (Dexter) took a direct and fundamental run at that to say no, we have to build on what the NDP stands for. What we mean to people. Where we’re going to improve peoples’ lives and again making politics about peoples’ lives, not about the competition points between parties.369

With “a keen sense of what matters to working families,” Dexter led the NDP to propose moderate and concrete proposals.370 The main commitments the Nova Scotia NDP made in the 2003, 2006 and 2009 election platforms are listed in Table 5.1.

368 Steele, What I Learned About Politics, 20-21. 369 O’Connor, Personal Communication, September 19, 2011. 370 Steele, What I Learned About Politics, 50.

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Table 5.1 Nova Scotia NDP Election Platforms

2003 2006 2009 “A better deal for “Better deal 2006” “Better deal 2009” today’s families” Ensure the lowest and Give families a needed Create the secure jobs fairest car insurance rates break Nova Scotia’s economy needs Immediately cover health Reduce health wait times, Keep emergency rooms care costs in nursing starting with emergency open and reduce health homes rooms care waits Reduce waiting lists for Deliver affordable, quality Ensure more young people surgery and diagnostic education stay and build a life here in tests Nova Scotia

Remove the HST from Ensure dignity for seniors Take HST off home energy family essentials like home to make life more affordable heating and children’s medicine Increase resources in the Live within our means Fix rural roads and keep classroom so children get communities strong the individual attention they need Freeze tuition fees and Give seniors options to stay introduce a student debt in their homes and relief plan communities longer

Balance the budget Live within our means

This can be compared to the 1998 and 1999 election platforms where commitments were mired in convoluted rhetoric that spoke to more about traditional left-wing ideology than specific policy. For example, the party in the 1998 platform discussed making widespread changes to the health care system:

The Nova Scotia NDP has always recognized that good health is a result of many factors, and that poverty is the biggest single contribution to poor health. The NDP has emphasized the need for health reform that focuses on preventing illness, developing primary health care services and supporting community involvement in health care planning. Our vision for the health system calls for fundamental structural changes with both consumers and health provides participating in

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decisions. But that is a long-term vision. Structural changes of this nature require time and a commitment of resources. 371

Similarly, the NDP repeatedly demonstrated a traditional left-wing suspicion of corporations and instead advocated in the 1998 platform for an increase in the public sector:

We know that we won’t have a healthy economy by giving in to the demands of large corporations and slashing the public sector. We believe government must play a positive role in the economy. Total government employment (federal, provincial and municipal) has been dropping through the 1990s. That’s one reason for Nova Scotia’s high unemployment… An NDP government would renew public sector employment…

Rather than continuing this traditional left-wing approach, MacSween describes the moves that followed the adoption of the Dexter model as one of practicality: “The ability to come up with commitments that are practical, that are doable, affordable. Doable is probably one of those key words that I think Darrell has used in the past. We wanted doable commitments that we can deliver for Nova Scotians.”372 As a result, Dexter moved the party’s focus away from

“ideological battles” and instead began focusing on moderate solutions to the “pocketbook issues” affecting working families.373

There were three major “pocketbook” issues that helped establish Dexter and the NDP as having a moderate political agenda and therefore helped the party become a viable political alternative in forming government. The first major “pocketbook” issue was the need to address rising auto insurance premiums. With premiums sky-rocketing in 2002, the issue quickly became a critical issue of affordability for average Nova Scotians. In certain instances, premiums had tripled from the previous year.374 With MLA’s of all parties being inundated

371 Nova Scotia NDP, Priorities for People, 1998, 15. 372 MacSween, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011. 373 Steele, What I Learned About Politics, 50. 374 Ibid, 51.

106 with calls from irate constituents, the NDP responded to this top of mind issue with a “plausible solution to the crisis” in calling for public ownership of auto insurance.375 The party was able to draw on the experiences of NDP governments in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British

Columbia who brought in public ownership, in years past, in dealing with their own rising auto insurance rates.376 With Dexter being acutely knowledgeable on the subject of auto insurance from his background as a lawyer representing individuals injured in motor vehicle accidents, he was able to clearly articulate a credible plan that would benefit all Nova Scotians. While the

Conservatives, with the support of the Liberals, were able to lower premiums through auto insurance reforms following the 2003 election, the NDP’s deft handling of the issue helped solidify the party’s standing as a government in waiting.

The second major “pocketbook” issue was the push by the NDP to reverse seniors having to pay the full cost of their health care if they lived in a long-term care facility and had savings. This compared to seniors that lived outside of care facilities always having their health care costs paid for. The unusual legislation dated back to a different era, prior to public health care, and was “based on the notion that only those who literally didn’t have any resources left would have the province pick up the cost of their nursing home care.”377 This, however, was seen by Dexter and the NDP as an affront to public health care principles and overall fairness.

As a result, in 2002, the NDP began a carefully planned campaign to ensure the full coverage of all seniors’ health care, regardless of where they lived. Steele describes the positive response for the party:

375 Ibid. 376 Ibid. 377 O’Connor, Personal Communication, September 19, 2011.

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The seniors’ health care campaign emerged as the NDP’s main policy focus. The issue was a winner for Darrell on so many levels. Ending the practice of charging seniors in nursing homes for their health care was so obviously the right thing to do. Darrell emerged as a champion for seniors. He showed himself to be a defender of publicly funded health care… He showed he was a force for positive change.

With the Hamm government first defending the policy before reversing the legislation in 2004, the NDP were able to take full credit for the change.

The final major “pocketbook” issue was the campaign to take the provincial sales tax off home heating. The NDP rationale was simple: “the necessities of life should not be taxed, and in Canada, home heat is a necessity.”378 Following the 2006 election, the Conservative government again relented to NDP pressure on an issue and implemented an eight percent energy rebate. The results, however, was further credit going to Dexter and the NDP for pushing the Conservatives toward the decision. Steele summarizes the impact the three pocketbook issues had on peoples’ perception of Dexter:

Of course much more happened during the years in opposition under Darrell’s leadership but these three campaigns – auto insurance, health care for seniors in nursing homes, and home heating – epitomize the work he did to earn, slowly and steadily, Nova Scotians’ trust. He wasn’t flashy or loud, but he knew what mattered to people and he got things done. He was the uncle, the brother, the friend that everybody wanted to have. By the time of the 2009 provincial election, all I had to do on the doorsteps of Halifax Fairview (Steele’s constituency) was mention that I knew Darrell, and faces would light up. People liked him. They really, really liked him.379

Inoculation

Inoculation is the final component of the Dexter model. Its importance within the model cannot be underestimated. As a party that had never achieved power, the Nova Scotia NDP had

378 Steele, What I Learned About Politics, 52. 379 Steele, What I Learned About Politics, 53.

108 to combat the significant reservations some members of the public had about the party. The majority of the hesitation about the NDP remained about how the party would handle the economy and specifically taxation. Similar to other jurisdictions, including Manitoba, the Nova

Scotia NDP had been successfully labeled a “tax and spend” party: “All politicians have incentives to overspend, but New Democrats in particular, have to fight a stereotype that they’re not good with money.”380 For the first time, however, the Nova Scotia NDP began taking on these issues head on. O’Connor explains:

What we were facing in his (Dexter) first general election was a majority Conservative government whose successful platform had said that they would reduce income taxes just as they went into their first re-election campaign. And so we knew from several years off that the issue of taxation was going to be key and how the NDP responded to that was going to be therefore of considerable interest because it was going to be a major part of what became the 2003 campaign. The decision was that rather that going in opposition to it, we should come up with an approach of our own to the question of tax, fees, what people paid. Essentially, what folks refer to commonly as the pocketbook issues. And that the NDP should not let itself get boxed in as a party that always wants to take money from your pocketbook.381

With the NDP prepared to address its perceived shortcomings, the party began inoculating itself from opposition party attacks by using specific guarantees, branding, and policy.

The specific guarantees that the NDP used during each election campaign was the most definitive inoculation against attacks. Within each platform from 2003, 2006, and 2009, the

NDP included a very specific core commitment intended to blunt the argument that the party was an economic risk. In 2003, the NDP platform included “Balance the budget” as the seventh key commitment along with this explanation:

380 Ibid, 124. 381 O’Connor, Personal Communication, September 19, 2011.

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Waste, gross mismanagement and giveaways have driven up the debt – making it harder to afford vital services. Darrell Dexter and the NDP will balance the budget, and will reduce the economic burden of provincial government debt starting in year one. The NDP plan will cut the debt burden in half by 2020. This measured approach does not rely on arbitrary limits, or cancellation of essential spending like school maintenance and road repair.382

The 2006 NDP platform similarly included “Live Within Our Means: Balance the budget and take steps to build a strong, sustainable economy” as the fifth main goal.383 In 2009, the NDP reiterated the key commitment to “Live within our means” while aggressively attacking the fiscal prudence of the governing Conservatives:

Rodney MacDonald’s Conservatives have mismanaged the province’s finances. They brought in legislation to cover up a deficit of at least $260 million. They’ve wasted money on things like ATVs for children and salary increases for senior political staff. Rodney MacDonald ballooned his Cabinet to 18 members, giving all but two of his MLAs a post. Now he’s planning to add $1.4 billion to the Nova Scotia debt, resulting in $250 million more in debt payments every year. Darrell Dexter and the NDP know that debt and deficits are not the road to prosperity. The NDP is committed to ensuring that Nova Scotia lives within its means, starting with a smaller Cabinet and an independent audit to find out the true state of the province’s finances. An expenditure management review across the public sector will save up to 1% in non-essential spending.384

Any lingering uncertainty over the NDP’s position on economic issues was further inoculated against with Dexter unequivocally stating on May 19, 2009: “We’re not going to raise taxes.” during a televised leaders’ debate.385 Steele describes the promise not to raise taxes as “the reassurance that voters needed” in order to fight “the stereotype of being tax-huggers.”386 Ron

Johnson, founder of NOW Communications and one of the chief architects of the Dexter model further describes the inoculation of the NDP against the tax and spend label:

382 Nova Scotia NDP, A Better Deal For Today’s Families, 2003. 383 Nova Scotia NDP, Better Deal 2006, 2006. 384 Nova Scotia, NDP, Better Deal 2009, 2009. 385 Steele, What I Learned About Politics, 134. 386 Ibid.

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It’s really what are your opportunities and what are your threats and shut down the threats and exploit the opportunities. Really that’s the name of the game. And certainly in Nova Scotia it was the same thing – “Tax and Spend NDP.” So Darrell Dexter said we will balance the budget and reduce the debt. Not something you would expect if you’re a traditional person of the right. You would not expect to hear an NDP candidate for premier say that. He said that. He’s in power now… So that is an example of inoculation.387

By inoculating itself against the “tax and spend” and poor economic manager labels, the NDP was able to re-brand the party and what the party meant to average Nova Scotians.

The re-branding of the Nova Scotia NDP was a vital component in the party being elected into government in 2009. The re-branding exercise began after the 1999 election with the disappointing result serving as the catalyst for change. Steele describes:

When Darrell became interim leader in 2001 and then leader in 2002, he was determined to change the image of the NDP. If John Hamm was everybody’s grandfather, Darrell would be everybody’s uncle. If Alexa McDonough had been shocked and appalled, Darrell would be calm and measured. If Robert Chisholm had done everything he could to bring down the MacLellan government, Darrell would demonstrate his willingness to make the legislature work for the benefit of the people.388

The NDP’s efforts focused on re-branding the party in two ways- around the leadership of

Darrell Dexter and as a party that makes life better for “today’s families.”

Between the 2003 and 2009 elections, the NDP increasingly emphasized Dexter as the face of the party. His image and name were very prominent in the 2009 platform with the font size for his name being significantly larger than that of the NDP. MacSween provides the rationale:

387 Johnson, Personal Communication, August 24, 2011. 388 Steele, What I Learned About Politics, 50.

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People knew when they were voting NDP they were voting for Darrell Dexter… In 2009, a lot of people would say perhaps they were voting for Darrell Dexter even before the party. And that was strategic… We knew from polling and testing [that Dexter was the leader they] had the most faith in, the most trust. They were most familiar with him over and above the other candidates. Our internal polling showed that and it was quite evident throughout Nova Scotia. So one of our advantages was our ability to focus in on the leadership of Darrell Dexter and what he was going to bring as the premier of this province. The 2009 campaign was the first one where we actually did label him as the next premier. Premier Dexter. In the past, we shied away from trying to push him forward as that person… but we were a little bolder in 2009… We knew most people saw Darrell as the most qualified person to be the leader of the province.389

By moving to embed Dexter as the face and brand of the NDP, the party inoculated themselves against the suggestion it had an extreme agenda. Dexter’s personal moderate ideology and his ability to relate to the needs of the average Nova Scotian helped in gaining the support of voters that traditionally voted Liberal and eventually even Conservative:

We know that through the years 2003 and 2006, we did benefit from quite a contention of soft Liberal supporters coming our way. We could see that in the polling. We could see that tracking support and we certainly saw that on those election days with increased support right across the province. So I think in the early days it was largely the soft Liberals that started to gravitate toward the party as we modernized. And those soft Liberals started to see that it reflected their interests in what we were putting forward [more] than what the Liberals were putting forward… The difference in 2009 was Tories certainly seemed to lose interest in their own party and we did see a number of soft Tory vote… Many of the seats that we picked up in 2009, the new seats, were picked up from the Conservatives… In [the] early years, it was generally Liberals coming our way but at the end of the day, we were able to build a party that had former supporters from both the Liberals and the Tories.390

Former Doer and Dexter advisor Shauna Martin concurs and describes the importance of a leader who can draw others to the party:

Finding those qualities in a leader that makes them attractive, not just to New Democrats but to that broader audience who are the ones who really are doing to elect you… It’s branching out to having Liberals vote for you and Tories vote for

389 MacSween, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011. 390 Ibid.

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you and people, who might not normally vote, vote for you. Especially now with the way media covers campaigns and politics in general. You have to have that leader who can appeal to a broader audience. Dexter was really quite loved by a lot of people and he’s done lots of things with his career. He’s been in the Navy. He’s been a lawyer. He’s been a councillor. He’s done a lot of things and so he’s had a lot of contacts in different kind of communities and so he was well known. His personality was well known. His approach to things was well known. And so that just made him more attractive to not just that base, that New Democrat base, but those Tory and Liberal switchers that you have to be able to rely on to elect and re-elect you.391

Steele summarizes the importance of Dexter to the electoral success of the NDP: “The NDP’s biggest asset in the 2009 election was Darrell Dexter. His name carried us all to victory. He knew it, and we knew it.392

In addition to branding the party around Dexter’s leadership, the NDP also began branding the party around the idea of “today’s families.” The overtly similar term to the successful branding idea of “today’s NDP” in Manitoba was first used in 2003 and played to the humble beginnings of Dexter: “Perhaps because of his family background – his father was a sheet metal worker and Darrell grew up between rural Queens County and north-end Halifax –

Darrell has a keen sense of what matters to working families.”393 O’Connor explains the process and reasoning behind using today’s families as a brand:

We took an approach where all the key players, both volunteer and consultants, at least once a year would take a couple of days to talk through every element of strategy and tactics and out of that came the idea we would define for whom we spoke and to whom we spoke as today’s families. Trying to pick up the family is an emotionally sort of rich resonance. It means something to really any and everybody. Something positive. And today’s family reflected this was a [party] looking forward, not backward.394

391 Martin, Personal Communication, September 29, 2011. 392 Steele, What I Learned About Politics, 85. 393 Steele, What I Learned About Politics, 50. 394 O’Connor, Personal Communication, September 19, 2011.

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Clancy further describes the important link the NDP made to the symbol of the family within the context of Nova Scotia’s history:

The symbol of the family runs deep in both the practice and the rhetoric of Maritime Canada. It is potentially a powerful discursive device, uniting across distance and generations and affirming a basic thread in rural life. It is also a part of the home and away dichotomy of small town life, by which newcomers can be designated as “come from aways.” It could be argued that the NDP, whose social democratic background embraces many other solidarities including the workforce, the commonwealth, and a society of friends, is making a bold attempt to link the parochial family to these others. Equally it could be claimed that the NDP has fastened on the family as an identity whose interests transcend an otherwise segmented social formation.395

The use of today’s families is a concept that permeates the 2003, 2006, and 2009 NDP election platforms. The 2003 platform is titled “A better deal for today’s families and begins with a quote from Dexter: “The NDP is working for practical solutions that add up to a better deal for you and your family.”396 Similarly, the 2006 platform begins with a letter from Dexter opens with the statement: “I believe that government must be about making life better for today’s families.”397 By branding itself around the concept of creating a “better deal for today’s family,” the NDP was able to use the positive association most people have with family to inoculate against partisan attacks.

The policies the NDP advocated for and the core commitments contained within the election platform was the final method of inoculation for the NDP. The simple underlying philosophy of the party was: “the government, directly or indirectly, should make sure that you’re not paying as much as it is now requiring you to do.”398 This included a multitude of programs outlined in the 2009 electoral platform including: rebating 50% of the HST on new

395 Clancy, Bluenose Socialism, 6. 396 Nova Scotia NDP, A Better Deal For Today’s Families, 2003. 397 Nova Scotia NDP, Better Deal 2006, 2006. 398 O’Connor, Personal Communication, September 19, 2011.

114 homes for one year, helping cover travel and accommodation costs for out of province medical care, providing tax incentives for graduates of post-secondary education, creating more subsidized child care spaces, taking the HST off home energy, providing support for energy retrofits, and creating home adaption funds for seniors.399 MacSween elaborates on the NDP’s use of policy to inoculate the party:

We recognized that in order to generate the amount of support that was required to cross the finish line we would have to inoculate some of those concerns. And I think that through the prudence of the platforms that were delivered over the three campaigns… you saw a progression that this party in fact is one that has grown up and had developed into a very modern sophisticated political party that is not necessarily trying to be everything to everyone but is trying to deliver a better deal, to mine the phrase. That a set of commitments that people can understand, that [they]can wrap their head around and recognize would be in the best interest of Nova Scotians. But also, would not necessarily result in bankrupting the province. I think that people recognize that in the commitments we were delivering, they were doable and I think that in itself was an inoculation against the suggestion by other parties that we are tax and spend, that we can’t be trusted with the finances of the province.400

In particular, the NDP promise to eliminate the HST on home energy was a critical inoculation piece on the issue of taxation. While both the Conservatives and the Liberals called for tax cuts for small businesses, the NDP focused its attention on the small personal tax break:

Today’s families already pay a lot for the essentials of life, and worry about making ends meet in these uncertain times. That burden is even heavier thanks to Rodney MacDonald’s 8% tax on basic home electricity – a promise he broke soon after he made it. The NDP will get rid of that 8% tax. The NDP will make sure there is no HST added to the price you pay for home energy.401

This small personal tax cut was similar to the Manitoba NDP strategy of providing a $150 tax credit on property taxes in the 1999 election. While the overall budget cost is reasonably small, the moderate tax cut provides a signal to the public that the party understands their needs while

399 Nova Scotia NDP, Better Deal 2009, 2009. 400 MacSween, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011. 401 Nova Scotia NDP, Better Deal 2009, 2009.

115 inoculating against the idea that the NDP is an economic risk. MacSween provides a concrete example of the NDP inoculating against the “Risky NDP” label and the importance of pragmatic commitments to counter the attack:

“Our opponents, the Tories in 2009 introduced a website several months prior to the election being triggered which was called “Risky NDP.” And the purpose of that was, of course, to paint us as a great risk to the future of the province. Some of the content of that website… they dug up previous policy positions of the party from over the years. Some of those policies being decades old and [it being] suggested that if the government were elected and were to enact all of these old policy resolutions that all these horrible things would happen. So we inoculated against that. Following that with our own website which was called, “Thrifty NDP,” which actually pointed out that some of the similar concerns we had with the other parties and some of their positions… [We] did a job to demonstrate that, in fact, the commitments that the Nova Scotia NDP have made are actually amongst the most pragmatic of the lot.”

Market Research

The adoption of the Dexter model necessitated a shift within the Nova Scotia NDP to an increased focus on market research. According to O’Connor, “there had always been some level of opinion research… as a way of understanding peoples’ priorities and concerns, how they felt about things.”402 This, however, had increased recently in both the quantity and the level of sophistication. MacSween describes:

We were certainly developing as a party. Developing the infrastructure to understand the people of the province and the interests and desires of Nova Scotians in the platforms we delivered… From 2003-2009, there was certainly a progression… Certainly we did dip heavily into polling and using that polling for the marketing of the party… Whether that’s direct polling or focus group testing.403

402 O’Connor, Personal Communication, September 19, 2011. 403 MacSween, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011.

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According to O’Connor, that increase in market research has been used by the Nova Scotia

NDP to gain an understanding of the priorities of Nova Scotians, rather than discovering what messaging would be effective:

The effort has been to try to make sure we’re doing opinion research which gives us an understanding of what people are thinking of the parties, the leaders, of their own lives, where the province should go – without directing them into the way we think about things in a sense. So we took… a mapping the terrain approach and still do opinion research more so than testing a load of arguments that our own ideas pre-formed as to what’s going to be the most effective campaign.404

The overall importance of market research to the NDP is summarized by MacSween: “Our disposition ideologically is something that always shapes our direction. But I would be lying if

I were to say that we don’t obviously rely upon good polling data to help shape both our campaign direction as well as, at this point, the direction of the government.”405

Electoral Results

Despite implementing the Dexter model and having a well-respected leader, the NDP were unable to make a breakthrough into government in the 2003 election. The electoral results were the Conservatives under John Hamm winning a minority government with twenty five seats and garnering thirty-six percent of the popular vote, the NDP forming the Official

Opposition with fifteen seats and just under thirty-one percent of the popular vote and the

Liberals falling to third party status with twelve seats despite getting more total votes than the

NDP.406 While the NDP did gain four seats from the previous election in 1999, their totals still

404 O’Connor, Personal Communication, September 19, 2011. 405 MacSween, Personal Communication, September 1, 2011. 406 Elections Nova Scotia, Summary By Political Affiliation of Valid Votes Cast and Candidates Elected, Nova Scotia General Elections 1960-2009, https://electionsnovascotia.ca/sites/default/files/Summary%20of%20Valid%20Votes%20and%20Candidates%20Ele cted%202009.pdf, Accessed February 4, 2015.

117 fell short of their record in 1998 under Robert Chisholm of nineteen seats with thirty-four percent of the popular vote.407

In 2006, the NDP were able to again make further gains on the governing Conservatives but were once again unable to fully capitalize on Darrell Dexter polling as the leader who would make the best premier.408 The election results were the Conservatives, under new leader

Rodney MacDonald, winning another minority government with twenty-three seats on thirty- nine percent of the popular vote, the NDP picking up five more seats in their best result ever with twenty seats and thirty-four percent of the popular vote and the Liberals improving to eleven seats and twenty-seven percent of the vote.409 The 2006 election saw the NDP continue to perform well in the metro areas, winning thirteen of seventeen seats, but the party also won two traditional Conservative rural ridings along the south shore in the ridings of Queens and

Shelburne, foreshadowing the 2009 election.410

With Darrell Dexter continuing to be a popular leader, the NDP remaining committed to the Dexter model, and the public growing increasingly frustrated with the two traditional parties, the NDP achieved power for the first time in Atlantic Canada in 2009. The 2009 election results saw Dexter and the NDP win a majority government with thirty-one seats on forty-five percent of the popular vote, the Liberals re-gaining the Official Opposition with eleven seats and getting twenty-seven percent of the popular vote under new leader Stephen

407 Ibid. 408 Lori Turnbull, “The Nova Scotia Provincial Election of 2009,” Canadian Political Science Review 3, no. 3 (Sept. 2009): 69. 409 Elections Nova Scotia, Summary By Political Affiliation of Valid Votes Cast and Candidates Elected, Nova Scotia General Elections 1960-2009, https://electionsnovascotia.ca/sites/default/files/Summary%20of%20Valid%20Votes%20and%20Candidates%20Ele cted%202009.pdf, Accessed February 4, 2015. 410 Lori Turnbull, “The Nova Scotia Provincial Election of 2006,” Canadian Political Science Review 1, no. 2 (December 2007): 65.

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McNeil, and the Conservatives falling to third party status with ten seats and twenty-four percent of the popular vote.411 The NDP breakthrough came almost exclusively from

Conservatives with the party gaining two former Conservative seats in the Annapolis Valley, six former Conservative seats in the Northeastern region and the NDP sweeping all five seats on the South Shore.412 By maintaining their strong performance in Halifax while expanding their ability to compete in traditionally Conservative rural seats, the NDP were able to finally achieve power.

The Dexter model was a radical departure in political marketing for the Nova Scotia

NDP. Its use played a major role in the historic success of party in the 2009 election. Based heavily on the NDP success in Manitoba beginning in 1999, the model incorporates the same three main components: simplification, moderation and inoculation. Decisions within these components were informed by market research and modified to fit the political environment of the times and province. While it may be unclear on the transferability of the Doer/Dexter model in other jurisdictions in the future, it is clear from the research that the lessons from both case studies will endure.

411 Elections Nova Scotia, Summary By Political Affiliation of Valid Votes Cast and Candidates Elected, Nova Scotia General Elections 1960-2009, https://electionsnovascotia.ca/sites/default/files/Summary%20of%20Valid%20Votes%20and%20Candidates%20Ele cted%202009.pdf, Accessed February 4, 2015. 412 Turnbull, “The Nova Scotia Provincial Election of 2009,” 72.

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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Discussion

The New Democratic Party in Manitoba and Nova Scotia have themselves struggled at different points in the party’s history to establish itself as a party ready to win elections. Most recently, the Manitoba NDP took over a decade and three elections to recover from its devastating 1988 electoral defeat. Similarly, the Nova Scotia NDP took eleven years and four elections to finally reposition itself to win after a close 1998 election and never having been in government before. Part of this difficulty has been the result of the party being characterized as being weak on certain issues such as economics and crime. These supposed weaknesses have led the NDP to be easily labeled as financially incompetent by its partisan opponents and in some cases by the voters themselves. An example is the common label of the NDP being a “tax and spend” party. This pejorative label suggests the party adheres to economic policies that include raising taxes, increasing spending, and poor overall economic management. To counter this, and other possible negative perceptions, the Manitoba and Nova Scotia NDP implemented a series of policy and political marketing changes that is now called the Doer/Dexter model.

This model is based on the lessons the NDP learned from the British Labour Party, as they successfully transformed their party to win the 1997, 2001, and 2005 British elections.

The purpose of this qualitative study was to examine why the NDP in Manitoba and

Nova Scotia were able to be electorally successful after implementing the Doer/Dexter model.

This was accomplished by comparing the changes Gary Doer and the Manitoba NDP and

Darrell Dexter and the Nova Scotia NDP campaigned on in order to win power. This research project examined two specific time periods in analysing the Doer/Dexter model- 1988 – 2007

120 for the Manitoba NDP and 1998 – 2009 for the Nova Scotia NDP. Content analysis on the election platforms of the period and elite interviews with key political strategists of the NDP provide insight into the Doer/Dexter model. Furthermore, previous research into the NDP and political parties at the provincial level is very limited, therefore this study helps to fill the gap and provide further research on the topic.

By utilizing the three components of simplification, moderation and inoculation and the overall Doer/Dexter model, the Manitoba and Nova Scotia NDP was able to change the traditional focus of the party away from ideology and win government. In this sense, the

Doer/Dexter model may signal a continuing evolution of the party, increasingly moving toward the electorate mainstream since its more radical beginnings with the Co-operative

Commonwealth Federation. While the characterization that the Doer/Dexter model could signify a modernizing of the NDP, it is critical to point out that the vast majority of those interviewed for the study also emphasized the importance of NDP values and were hesitant to suggest a change in the party’s principles. O’Connor summarizes: “Actually applying your party’s values… is what’s most important and what really brings life to being a social democratic party.”413 Such a sentiment would suggest that while the Doer/Dexter model advocates a pragmatic and moderate application to social democracy, the core values of the

NDP remain.

It is also important to recognize that the dramatic changes that took place under the

Doer/Dexter model have not become entrenched within the respective NDP parties in Manitoba and Nova Scotia. Under Greg Selinger’s leadership, the Manitoba NDP have displayed a more traditional NDP approach. This includes no longer using inoculation as a strategy and moving

413 O’Connor, Personal Communication, September 19, 2011.

121 away from the simplification principle with the issuing of an eleven page vision document414 and a twelve page platform415 for the 2011 election. Similarly, the newly elected Nova Scotia

NDP leader Gary Burrill appears to have abandoned the Dexter model having campaigned for the party leadership from a “left-wing” perspective that focused on: social justice, economic justice, environmental justice, and democratic renewal.416

With the NDP’s devastating loss of the 2013 Nova Scotia election and with consistent polling showing a potential Manitoba NDP defeat in the upcoming 2016 election it would be easy to discount the Doer/Dexter model as flawed or no longer relevant. These specific difficulties, however, can be explained within the context of the model.

In Nova Scotia, there were two major issues that led to the loss of public support for the

NDP and ultimately their electoral defeat in 2013. First, as discussed, Darrell Dexter and the

Nova Scotia NDP came into government following the 2009 election having promised to balance the budget, improve social programs / services and infrastructure, while at the same time as not raising taxes. These commitments were an integral part of the Nova Scotia NDP’s inoculation strategy to reassure voters that the party was not an economic risk. This difficult combination of commitments was put under further strain with a global economic recession that began in 2008 and proved catastrophic to the Dexter government being able to keep all of its commitments. Former NDP finance minister Graham Steele describes the bleak financial situation facing the new NDP government:

414 Manitoba NDP, Our Vision for the Next Four Years, 2011. Accessed March 29, 2016, http://www.todaysndp.ca/2011/sites/default/files/ManNDP2011VisionDoc6-single.pdf 415 Manitoba NDP, Let’s Keep Building. Don’t Turn Back, 2011. 416 Gary Burrill, “We Can Do Better,” Accessed March 29, 2016, http://garyburrill.ca

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Here’s the problem with the platform and with Darrell’s campaign promises: There was no way it was going to work. The platform promised no reductions in services and a balanced budget. During the campaign, Darrell promised no tax increases. Keeping one of those promises would be hard enough. Keeping two would be really difficult. Keeping all three? That would require a rare combination of good books, a good economy, and good luck. And we were, in June 2009, less than a year into a global financial crisis.417

As a result of the economic difficulties, Dexter and the NDP government elected to raise the provincial portion of the sales tax (HST) from eight percent to ten percent, thereby allowing the

NDP government to have a balanced budget in time for the 2013 election. While partially fulfilling their election promise to balance the budget, the multiple years of running a deficit combined with the need to increase the HST to do so contributed to the NDP losing credibility.

The credibility gap was further exasperated by the NDP previously encouraging people to hold them to account:

Our platform was a very short one. It was essentially a two-page leaflet which on the back side had… the list on the left hand side of the commitments. Also included estimated costs for each one of those commitments in the next column and the final column was timelines around which we expected to be delivering on the commitments during the mandate of the government. And it said right on the bottom: ‘clip and save so you can keep track of our progress as the government.’418

The second major issue that contributed to the loss of trust and support for the Nova Scotia

NDP was the breaking of the MLA expenses scandal in 2010. Steele describes the impact of the scandal: “The February 2010 auditor general’s report on MLA expenses dominated the news for months and was a major factor in the collapse of public support for the Dexter government.”419 While all parties were implicated in the report filed by the auditor general, the

417 Steele, What I Learned About Politics, 80. 418 MacSween, Personal Communication, Sept. 1, 2011. 419 Steele, What I Learned About Politics, 57.

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NDP were further hurt by being the party in government. Steele further contends that that it was these two issues that destined the Nova Scotia NDP for electoral defeat:

We did not know as we stood on the stage behind Darrell, that the seed of our destruction were already sown. For all of our time in office, we struggled against the consequences of two things that were already done and unchangeable when we walked onto that stage: Darrell’s promise not to raise taxes, and MLA expenses. On the night of our victory, our defeat was already written. We just didn’t know it.420

With the Nova Scotia NDP not being able to follow the Doer/Dexter model, especially in inoculating against its weaknesses and further losing trust over the MLA expenses scandal, the party dropped from thirty-one seats and forty-five percent of the popular vote in 2009 to seven seats (was a one seat reduction in total seats available to be won) and twenty-six percent of the popular vote in 2013.

Similar to the Nova Scotia NDP, the inability or unwillingness to follow the

Doer/Dexter model has resulted in a significant drop in support for the Manitoba NDP. This drop coincides with the party’s inability to inoculate against the perception that the party is no longer an effective manager of the economy following continued budget deficits since Greg

Selinger took over the leadership in 2009 and the surprise raising of the provincial sales tax by one percent in the spring budget of 2013. The tax increase came despite clear assurances by

Selinger in the 2011 election campaign that the NDP would not raise taxes. Furthermore, opposition to the tax increase was further galvanized with the needed changes to the balanced budget legislation in order to raise the tax without a referendum – legislation that the NDP previously had agreed to under Gary Doer as an inoculation strategy. The party’s inability to inoculate against its perceived economic weakness was further compounded with the lack of a

420 Ibid, 70-71.

124 simple, coherent communication strategy for the rationale behind the PST increase and specifically what the revenue of the PST increase would be used for. Polling by Probe Research shows that while the NDP’s popularity was decreasing previous to the PST increase, from forty-five percent supporting the party province-wide in September 2012 to thirty-five percent in April 2013, their support plummeted to twenty-eight percent following the budget.421 The

June 2013 poll also indicated a grave political concern for the party, an almost twenty-two percent disparity in support in south Winnipeg between the Progressive Conservatives and the

NDP.422 Such a drop in support during an election would ensure the defeat of the NDP government with the loss of seats in an area of the city the party had come to politically rely on.

Limitations of the Study

While the conclusions surrounding the Doer/Dexter model which were supported with near unanimity amongst the elite interviews conducted, there are limitations with the study.

First, the use of elite interviews as one of the primary research methods meant that conclusions were being drawn from a limited sample size. While a “snowball” method of asking each individual interviewed for a list of others who should be contacted was used, the structure of elite interviews is inherently constricting. Furthermore, there were individuals contacted with valuable and unique perspectives that did not respond to interview requests despite numerous attempts using different mediums. To mitigate some of the effects of the small sample size, the researcher also used the transcripts of elite interviews from Dr. Jared Wesley’s branding study

421 “Progressive Conservatives Take the Lead,” Probe Research, accessed July 28, 2015, http://www.probe- research.com/121213%20Dec%202012%20Party%20Standings.pdf “NDP Continues to Slip in Manitoba,” Probe Research, accessed July 28, 2015, http://probe- research.com/130418a%20Apr%202013%20Party%20Standings.pdf “NDP Reaches New Low in Voter Support,” Probe Research, accessed July 28, 2015, http://www.probe- research.com/130625%20June%202013%20Party%20Standings.pdf 422 Ibid.

125 on the Manitoba NDP. This increased the amount of data analyzed and provided further access to interviews with critical party personnel. Second, amongst the eight interviews conducted, the vast majority were either directly or indirectly involved in the decision making process that led to the Doer/Dexter model. This high level of involvement is also inherent to the elite interview process but can lead to individuals having a strong positive bias and an inability to accurately reflect on their decisions. This may have been the case with the reluctance of party advisors to indicate any shifting in the NDP’s principles, with doing do being tantamount to “selling out.”

Finally, some information that would have been beneficial in drawing conclusions for the study was simply unavailable for analysis. This included market research data beyond qualitative and anecdotal comments and specific party financial records outside of the public record. This is largely the results of individuals not wanting to divulge concrete information that could be used for partisan purposes or for proprietary reasons. However, despite these limitations, this study provides an “insider’s” account of the Doer/Dexter model and highlights how a political marketing model helped propel the NDP into government in Manitoba and Nova Scotia.

Conclusions

The Doer/Dexter model was designed in order for the NDP to achieve government in

Manitoba and Nova Scotia. This study found three critical components within the model that played a significant role in the NDP being elected and re-elected numerous times in Manitoba and for the first time in Nova Scotia. First, the principle of simplification was implemented both within the NDP’s electoral platform and in the communication strategies used by the party. This included reducing the overall number of key commitments within each election platform to between five and seven and ensuring all policies and rhetoric from the party could be easily understood. Second, the NDP used a strategy of ideological moderation in order to

126 position the party to gain the most support. The shift to moderate positions allowed the party to match the traditional political climate of the two provinces and target critical areas of support such as south Winnipeg for the Manitoba NDP and soft- Liberal support for the Nova Scotia

NDP. Finally, the NDP pro-actively used inoculation to address its perceived areas of weakness which continued to largely be centred on economics and taxation. To inoculate against this and the common “tax and spend” label, the party used key commitments to guarantee balanced budgets, promised not to re-engage in controversial large-scale projects such as the re- nationalization of MTS and provided measures of tax reductions. These three elements were increasingly informed by market research and political marketing, although still constrained by the limited pool of funds from which provincial parties currently access.

Three major conclusions can be drawn from the study on the NDP’s Doer/Dexter model. First, despite the success of the NDP in different provinces across the country and over a number of terms, the party continues to be evaluated, almost exclusively, on their perceived or proposed handling of the economy and taxation. Whether this is positive because the NDP are generally trusted in other areas such as social programs, health care and education or negative because there is a significant area of distrust can be a matter for debate. However, the implication for the NDP is that this necessitates the need for simplification, moderation and inoculation as part of their political model.

Second, the limited amount of market research that takes place between elections for the

Manitoba NDP and the Nova Scotia NDP appears to have negative political consequences as a result of not having an understanding of how the public feels on specific topics. The

Doer/Dexter model is predicated on having a good level of market intelligence. By not

127 performing enough market research in non-election years, both the Manitoba and Nova Scotia

NDP made political mistakes that could have been avoided or at least mitigated.

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the ability to deliver on election promises is of critical importance for the continued success of the party. This is especially true within the

Doer/Dexter model with the intentional limiting of key commitments and the use of guarantees as an inoculation method. The old adage warning of the dangers of putting all your eggs in one basket, or in this case a limited number of baskets, can prove to be true and electorally costly if the party is unable to achieve their commitments.

Recommendations for Future Research

Based on the results of the study, there are three recommendations for future research.

First, some of the limitations of the study could be reduced by gaining access and including quantifiable data from the party, market research companies and advertising companies in order to triangulate the conclusions of the qualitative study. Second, a more extensive examination and analysis into the 2013 Nova Scotia election could be performed in order to determine if there were other reasons that led to the NDP election loss and to draw conclusions on the application of the Doer/Dexter model. Lastly, a comparison of the Doer/Dexter model could be compared with other provincial jurisdictions where the NDP have previously won elections.

This study only examined the NDP within the Manitoba and Nova Scotia context since there was a clear connection between the two provincial counterparts. Future studies could expand the scope to include Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Ontario and most recently in Alberta.

The Doer/Dexter model is an effective political marketing model that has been used by the NDP to achieve government numerous times in Manitoba and led to a historic electoral

128 victory in Nova Scotia. This study found that the NDP in Manitoba and Nova Scotia used market research and a comprehensive political marketing strategy that focused on the simplification of communication, the moderation of policy and the inoculation of any perceived weakness in order to win power. NDP political advisor and pollster Leslie Turnbull succinctly summarizes the goals of the model: “If you can make your party the party of family…[Working on] things that are doable, that will make their life better and… the province is better off, then that is a winning formula for social democracy.” 423

423 Turnbull, Personal Communication, Sept. 1, 2011.

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APPENDIX A

Research Ethics Board Approval

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APPENDIX B

Informed Consent Form

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APPENDIX C

Agreement for Maintaining Confidentiality

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APPENDIX D

Interview Questions

1. What was or is your role with the NDP?

2. How much did the experiences of British Labour influence the MB NDP leading up to the 1999 election?

3. Were there lessons learned from the British Labour experience as they moved to governing?

a. Communication Style (Pledge Cards, Slogans) b. Platform- Substance, Middle Class c. Branding- Today’s NDP vs New Labour d. Political Marketing- Adopting a market orientation

4. Was there any lessons that the NDP learned from the mistakes or shortcomings of New Labour?

5. Was there any contact with New Labour in a similar way that Labour did with the Clinton campaign?

6. Tony Blair in his autobiography writes about the need for Labour to modernize itself- both its approach and fundamentally what it believes in. Is this comparable to the MB NDP experience? a. More of a focus towards the middle class and families and less on perhaps more traditional sectors of support like organized labour and the working class? b. Many accuse Tony Blair of being too cautious in his stands and policies- Did Premier Doer adopt a similar approach?

7. What was or is the level of interaction between the NDP in different provinces? With Nova Scotia? a. Was there direct contact or organizational/personnel linkages?

8. What was behind some of the changes from the 1990 and 1995 election platform versus Today’s NDP? Was it a conscious decisions like Tony Blair to reflect the public’s view- political marketing?- Crime, balanced budgets, taxation, less rhetoric against big busisness.

9. What was the level of market research performed leading up to the 1999 election?

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a. Was this very different than the 1990 or 1995 election?

10. Was further market intelligence incorporated in the 2003 and 2007 election? New Labour needed to reconnect with the public.

11. I once read a quote from Donne Flannagan about one of the keys to success of the MB NDP was the shift to ensure you were “inoculated” against your opponent’s strengths i.e. tax cuts, balanced budgets, crime. Could you comment on this?

12. How much of the policies and positions of the party is based on market intelligence? A truly market oriented party tries to present a platform based on what the public wants and then tweaking it to fit the party.

13. Who developed the Political Marketing strategy? What was the political marketing strategy in each successful election? How did this evolve from one election to the next?

14. Do you think the experiences of Premier Doer and the NDP could be transferred to other jurisdictions across the country?

15. How would you describe the Doer/Dexter Model if there is indeed one?

16. I have read some interviews with Premier Doer where he clearly disregards the traditional categories of ideology and what it means to be left-wing or right-wing. This results in a platform and approach that is remarkably similar to what Anthony Giddens called the Third Way. a. Can you comment on this notion of the third way and whether you feel the party came to a similar position? b. Do you feel that the third way with its focus on merging aspects of the right and left-wing could be used to help the NDP be more successful in other regions of the country?

17. Do you see a link between the Doer/Dexter model and Layton’s Orange Crush?

18. Do you have anything that you would like to add in regards to the Manitoba experience or the Doer/Dexter model?

19. Is there anyone that you would recommend that I talk to gain further insight?

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Interview Questions- Shortened Version

1. What role did you play within the NDP leading up to the 1999 election?

2. What was behind some of the changes from the 1990 and 1995 election platforms compared to 1999? (less rhetoric against big business, crime, balanced budgets, taxation)

3. How much did the experiences of British Labour influence the MB NDP leading up to the 1999 election?

4. What were the lessons learned from British Labour?

5. Is there any lesson that was learned from New Labour's mistakes or shortcomings?

6. Was there any contact made with people in New Labour?

7. Can you comment on the idea from Donne Flannagan that he termed "inoculation"?

8. What was the level of market research in the 1999 election? Was this different compared to previous elections or the ones in 2003 and 2007?

9. How much of the policies and positions of the party is based on market research?

10. Tony Blair in his autobiography writes about the need to modernize social democracy. Is this comparable to the MB NDP experience? (more focus on families and the middle class and perhaps less on traditional areas of support)

11. Can you comment on this notion of the third way and whether you feel the party adopted similar policy positions?

12. Do you think the experiences of Today's NDP could be transferred to other jurisdictions across the country?

13. Can you comment on the similarities between Today's NDP and the Dexter government in Nova Scotia?

14. How would you describe the Doer/Dexter Model?

15. What was/is the level of interaction between the NDP in different provinces? With Nova Scotia?

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16. Do you see a link between the Doer/Dexter Model and Layton’s Orange Crush? - Was there direct contact between the federal NDP and the MB and NS NDP?

- Were there organizational/personnel linkages?

17. Do you have anything that you would like to add to the discussion?

18. Is there anyone that you would recommend that I talk to?

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APPENDIX E

Initial Contact Script

Phone- Script

Good morning/afternoon,

My name is Michael Moyes and I am a Master’s student at the University of Manitoba. I am currently writing my thesis on the political marketing of the NDP and I am anxious to speak with ______for a short interview.

Would it be alright if I was to email over the informed consent form which explains my research a little more? What email should I send it to?

Thank you very much for your time.

Email Script

Good morning/afternoon

I am a Masters student at the University of Manitoba in the Political Studies Department and I am currently writing my thesis on the political marketing of the NDP in Manitoba and Nova Scotia. As someone who plays an integral role in the political marketing of Today's NDP, I was hoping I could trouble you for a short (30 min.) interview at your convenience. I have attached my informed consent form for your information.

I can be contacted at this email address or at the following phone numbers- ______(home) or ______(cell).

Thank you very much for your time,

Michael Moyes

University of Manitoba

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APPENDIX F

Agreement for Maintaining Confidentiality

Branding Today’s NDP- Dr. Jared J. Wesley

AGREEMENT FOR MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY BRANDING TODAY’S NDP

I, ______, have read, understand, and agree to abide by the Ethics Protocol for the Branding Today’s NDP study, as approved by the Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board (JFREB) at the University of Manitoba (J2010:015). I affirm that I will not communicate or in any manner disclose publicly any information collected in the Branding Today’s NDP study in such a manner as to compromise the confidentiality of the study’s participants.

______Researcher’s printed name Researcher’s signature

______Date

Should the information collected in this study no longer be of use to the researchers, they shall destroy all materials by means of shredding or incineration. To allow for the study of political branding in the elections of 2011 and 2015, materials will be kept for a period of 6 years. All data collected as part of these interviews will be destroyed on or before December 31, 2015.

Compensation

Beyond copies of any and all publications derived from this study, subjects will not be compensated for their participation.

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